Single-Counterparty Credit Limits for Bank Holding Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 38460-38511 [2018-16133]

Agencies

• FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 151 (Monday, August 6, 2018)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 38460-38511]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-16133]



[[Page 38459]]

Vol. 83

Monday,

No. 151

August 6, 2018

Part II





 Federal Reserve System





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12 CFR Part 252





 Single-Counterparty Credit Limits for Bank Holding Companies and 
Foreign Banking Organizations; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 151 / Monday, August 6, 2018 / Rules 
and Regulations

[[Page 38460]]


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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 252

[Regulation YY; Docket No. R-1534]
RIN 7100-AE 48


Single-Counterparty Credit Limits for Bank Holding Companies and 
Foreign Banking Organizations

AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Board is adopting a final rule (final rule) to establish 
single-counterparty credit limits for bank holding companies and 
foreign banking organizations with $250 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets, including any U.S. intermediate holding company of 
such a foreign banking organization with $50 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets, and any bank holding company identified as a 
global systemically important bank holding company under the Board's 
capital rules. The final rule implements section 165(e) of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which requires 
the Board to impose limits on the amount of credit exposure that such a 
bank holding company or foreign banking organization can have to an 
unaffiliated company in order to reduce the risks arising from the 
company's failure.

DATES: The final rule is effective October 5, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Laurie S. Schaffer, Associate General 
Counsel, (202) 452-2272, Benjamin W. McDonough, Assistant General 
Counsel, (202) 452-2036, Pamela G. Nardolilli, Special Counsel, (202) 
452-3289, Christopher G. Callanan, Senior Attorney, (202) 452-3594, or 
Lucy O. Chang, Senior Attorney, (202) 475-6331, Legal Division; or 
Arthur Lindo, Deputy Director, (202) 452-2695, or Jeffery Zhang, 
Economist, (202) 736-1968, Division of Supervision and Regulation; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets 
NW, Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only, 
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD) users may contact (202) 
263-4869.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
    A. Background
    B. Notice of Proposed Rulemakings, General Summary of Comments, 
and Enactment of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act
    C. Overview of the Final Rule
II. SCCL for Covered Companies
    A. Key Terminology and Concepts
    B. Credit Exposure Limits
    C. Gross Credit Exposure
    D. Net Credit Exposure
    E. Exposures to Securitization Funds, Investment Funds, or Other 
Special Purpose Vehicles
    F. Aggregation of Exposures to Connected Counterparties
    G. Exemptions
    H. Compliance and Timing of Applicability
III. Final Rule for Foreign Banking Organizations
    A. Background
    B. Summary of Comments on Proposal for Foreign Banking 
Organizations
    C. Overview of the Final Rule for Foreign Banking Organizations
    D. Key Terminology and Concepts
    E. Credit Exposure Limits
    F. Gross Credit Exposure
    G. Net Credit Exposure
    H. Exposures to SPVs and Aggregation of Exposures to Connected 
Counterparties
    I. Exemptions
    J. Compliance
    K. Timing of Applicability
IV. Impact Analysis
V. Regulatory Analysis
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
    C. Solicitation of Comments on the Use of Plain Language

I. Introduction

A. Background

    In March 2016, the Board invited public comment on a notice of 
proposed rulemaking (``proposal'' or ``proposed rule'') to establish 
single-counterparty credit limits for domestic and foreign bank holding 
companies with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets.\1\ The 
proposed rule would have implemented section 165(e) of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), which 
requires the Board to establish limits on the amount of credit exposure 
that such a U.S. or foreign holding company can have to an unaffiliated 
company in order to reduce the risks arising from the company's 
failure. The March 2016 notice of proposed rulemaking followed earlier 
proposals to implement section 165(e) for U.S. and foreign banking 
organizations (FBOs).\2\
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    \1\ See 81 FR 14328 (Mar. 16, 2016).
    \2\ 77 FR 594 (Jan. 5, 2012); 77 FR 76628 (Dec. 28, 2012).
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    During the 2007-2009 financial crisis, some of the largest 
financial firms in the world collapsed or experienced material 
financial distress. Counterparties of failing firms were placed under 
severe strain when the failing firm could not meet its financial 
obligations, in some cases resulting in the counterparties' inability 
to meet their own financial obligations. Similarly, weakened financial 
firms came under increased stress when counterparties with large 
exposures to the firms suddenly attempted to reduce those exposures.
    As demonstrated in the crisis, interconnectivity among major 
financial companies poses risks to the financial stability of the 
global financial system. The effect of a large financial institution's 
failure or near collapse is transmitted and amplified by the 
interconnectedness of large, systemically important firms--that is, the 
degree to which they extend each other credit and serve as 
counterparties to one another. Financial distress at a banking 
organization may materially raise the likelihood of distress at other 
firms, given the network of bilateral credit exposures between large, 
systemically important firms throughout the financial system. 
Accordingly, a large financial firm's systemic risk is likely to be 
related directly to its interconnectedness vis-[agrave]-vis other 
financial institutions and the financial sector as a whole. This 
interconnectedness of financial firms also creates the potential for an 
increase in the likelihood of distress at non-financial firms that are 
dependent upon financial firms for funding.
    The financial crisis also revealed shortcomings in the U.S. 
regulatory approach to credit exposure limits, which limited only a 
portion of the interconnectedness among large financial companies. For 
example, certain commercial banks and U.S. branches and agencies of 
foreign banking organizations were subject to single-borrower lending 
and investment limits. However, these limits often excluded credit 
exposures generated by derivatives and some securities financing 
transactions, and the limits did not apply at the consolidated holding 
company level.\3\
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    \3\ Section 610 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the term ``loans 
and extensions of credit'' for purposes of the lending limits 
applicable to national banks to include any credit exposure arising 
from a derivative transaction, repurchase agreement, reverse 
repurchase agreement, securities lending transaction, or securities 
borrowing transaction. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, section 
610, 124 Stat. 1376, 1611 (2010), codified at 12 U.S.C. 84(b). As 
discussed in more detail below, these types of transactions also are 
subject to the single-counterparty credit limits of section 165(e). 
12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(3).
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    As noted, section 165(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act (section 165(e)) 
requires the Board to establish single-counterparty credit limits 
(SCCL) for large U.S. and foreign bank holding companies and nonbank 
financial companies, in order to limit the risks that the failure of 
any

[[Page 38461]]

individual firm could pose to these firms.\4\ In particular, section 
165(e) prohibits such firms from having credit exposure to any 
unaffiliated company that exceeds 25 percent of the capital stock and 
surplus of the firm.\5\ The Board is authorized to establish a lower 
amount to mitigate the risks to the financial stability of the United 
States.\6\
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    \4\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(1).
    \5\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(2).
    \6\ See id.
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    Credit exposure to a company is defined in section 165(e) to mean 
all extensions of credit to the company, including loans, deposits, and 
lines of credit; all repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase 
agreements, and securities borrowing and lending transactions with the 
company (to the extent that such transactions create credit exposure 
for the company); all guarantees, acceptances, and letters of credit 
(including endorsement or standby letters of credit) issued on behalf 
of the company; all purchases of, or investments in, securities issued 
by the company; counterparty credit exposure to the company in 
connection with derivative transactions between the covered company and 
the company; and any other similar transaction that the Board, by 
regulation, determines to be a credit exposure for purposes of section 
165(e).\7\
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    \7\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(3).
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    Section 165(e) authorizes the Board to issue such regulations and 
orders, including definitions consistent with section 165(e), as may be 
necessary to administer and carry out the section.\8\ In addition, it 
authorizes the Board to exempt transactions, in whole or in part, from 
the definition of the term ``credit exposure,'' if the Board finds that 
the exemption is in the public interest and consistent with the 
purposes of section 165(e).\9\
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    \8\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(5).
    \9\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(6). Section 165(e) also authorizes the 
Board to establish single-counterparty credit limits for nonbank 
financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (FSOC) for supervision by the Board. The final rule does not 
at this time apply to any such nonbank financial company. The Board 
intends to consider whether to apply similar requirements to these 
companies separately by rule or order at a later time.
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    The framework of SCCL established by the final rule is similar to 
and builds upon existing credit exposure limits for depository 
institutions, including the investment securities limits and the 
lending limits imposed on certain depository institutions by the 
National Bank Act and Federal Reserve Act.\10\ A national bank 
generally is limited, subject to certain exceptions, in the total 
amount of investment securities of any one obligor that it may purchase 
for its own account to no more than 10 percent of its capital stock and 
surplus.\11\ In addition, a national bank's total outstanding loans and 
extensions of credit to any one borrower may not exceed 15 percent of 
the bank's capital stock and surplus, plus an additional 10 percent of 
the bank's capital stock and surplus, if the amount that exceeds the 
bank's 15 percent general limit is fully secured by readily-marketable 
collateral.\12\ U.S. branches of foreign banks are subject to similar 
limits, albeit measured against the capital stock and surplus of the 
top-tier parent foreign banking organization.\13\
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    \10\ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh); 12 U.S.C. 84; 12 CFR 1 
and 32; see also 12 U.S.C. 335 (applying the provisions of 12 U.S.C. 
24(Seventh) to state member banks).
    \11\ See 12 U.S.C. 24(Seventh); 12 CFR 1.3.
    \12\ See 12 U.S.C. 84; 12 CFR 32.3. State-chartered banks, as 
well as state- and federally-chartered savings associations, also 
are subject to lending limits imposed by relevant state and federal 
law.
    \13\ See 12 CFR 211.28.
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    The SCCL in section 165(e) operate separately and independently 
from the investment securities limits and lending limits in the 
National Bank Act and other statutes, and a covered company or covered 
foreign entity must comply with all of the limits that are applicable 
to it and its subsidiaries. Under the final rule, a covered company 
would be required to ensure that it meets the SCCL on a consolidated 
basis. Because of this, the final rule could affect the amount of a 
subsidiary depository institution's loans and extensions of credit, 
regardless of the subsidiary depository institution's applicable 
lending limits.

B. Notices of Proposed Rulemakings, General Summary of Comments, and 
Enactment of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer 
Protection Act

    The Board received 48 comments, representing approximately 60 
parties, on the 2011 proposal on section 165(e) relating to U.S. bank 
holding companies and 35 comments, representing over 45 organizations, 
on the 2012 proposed rule relating to FBOs.\14\
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    \14\ All of the comments are available on the Board's public 
website. A summary of comments received on the 2011 and 2012 
proposal appears in the March 2016 re-proposal. See 81 FR at 14329-
30.
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    In March 2016, the Board re-proposed a rule to implement section 
165(e) \15\ in order to take account of (1) the large volume of 
comments received on the earlier proposed rules; (2) the revised 
lending limits rules applicable to national banks; \16\ (3) the 
introduction by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) of a 
large exposures standard (large exposure standard), which establishes 
an international standard for the maximum amount of credit exposure 
that an internationally active bank is permitted to have to a single 
counterparty; \17\ and (4) the results of quantitative impact studies 
and related analysis conducted by Board staff to assess the impact of 
section 165(e).
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    \15\ See 81 FR at 14328.
    \16\ See 78 FR 37930 (June 25, 2013).
    \17\ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Supervisory 
framework for measuring and controlling large exposures (April 
2014), https://www.bis.org/press/p140415.htm.
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    The Board received approximately 30 comments in response to the 
2016 proposed rule. Comments were received from a wide range of 
individuals, banking organizations, industry and trade groups 
representing banking, insurance, and the broader financial services 
industry, and public interest groups. Board staff also met with a 
number of commenters to discuss issues relating to the proposed rule, 
and summaries of these meetings may be found on the Board's public 
website.
    Certain commenters expressed support for the broader goals of the 
proposed rule to limit single-counterparty concentrations at large 
financial companies. A number of commenters expressed concerns with 
particular aspects of the proposed rules.
    The Board received a large number of comments on the scope of 
application of the proposal: How to define a ``covered company'' and a 
``counterparty,'' terms that form the basis for the application of the 
credit exposure limits under the proposed rules. The proposal would 
have defined a covered company to include all of its subsidiaries. 
``Subsidiary'' would have been defined to mean a company that is 
directly or indirectly controlled by that company for purposes of the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act).\18\ The proposal defined a 
counterparty to include a company and all entities with respect to 
which the company (1) owns or controls 25 percent or more of a class of 
voting securities; (2) owns or controls 25 percent or more of the total 
equity; or (3) consolidates for financial reporting purposes. 
Commenters urged the Board to adopt a financial consolidation standard 
to define a ``covered company'' and

[[Page 38462]]

``counterparty.'' Commenters contended that moving to a financial 
consolidation standard would capture true exposure risks and reduce the 
complexity and compliance costs of the final rule.
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    \18\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(cc). ``Control'' is defined 
in the Board's Regulation YY by reference to the BHC Act. See 12 CFR 
252.2(g); see also 12 U.S.C. 1841 et seq. The BHC Act generally 
defines control to mean ownership or control of 25 percent or more 
of any class of voting securities; control in any manner over the 
election of a majority of the directors; or exercise of a 
controlling influence over management or policies. 12 U.S.C. 
1841(a)(2).
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    In addition, the proposal would have required a covered company to 
aggregate one or more counterparties that were economically 
interdependent with or tied to the counterparty through certain control 
relationships. A few commenters expressed support for this aspect of 
the proposal. The large majority of commenters, however, contended that 
these tests were highly subjective and could be costly and burdensome 
to implement in practice because the tests relied on information that 
might be difficult for a covered company to acquire from its 
counterparty. To mitigate these concerns, commenters requested that the 
Board adopt a threshold for counterparty exposures (for example, the 
control relationship test should only apply if a counterparty exposure 
exceeds 5 percent of the covered company's tier 1 capital). Certain 
commenters urged the Board to use a financial consolidation standard to 
define a counterparty and not to include any additional tests to 
aggregate one or more counterparties under the final rule.
    Commenters also objected to the inclusion of a natural person 
together with members of the person's immediate family as a 
counterparty under the proposed rule. Commenters argued that the Board 
should exclude natural persons from the final rule's definition of 
counterparty, suggesting that it is unlikely that a natural person 
aggregated with members of its immediate family would ever approach the 
applicable SCCL and that collecting information for this test would be 
burdensome and unjustified on a cost-benefit basis. Commenters 
recommended that, at a minimum, the Board include a materiality 
threshold for exposures to a natural person to be subject to the 
requirements of the final rule and that the final rule provide a longer 
transition period for compliance with the requirements if natural 
persons are included in the final rule.
    Certain commenters questioned whether the limit of 25 percent of 
tier 1 capital that would have applied to a large covered company (with 
$250 billion or more in total consolidated assets or $10 billion or 
more in on-balance-sheet foreign exposures) was authorized under the 
statute. Commenters also questioned the basis for the 15 percent of 
tier 1 capital limit for major covered companies' exposures to major 
counterparties. In particular, commenters expressed the view that this 
lower limit may not be necessary in light of other post-crisis 
financial regulatory reforms adopted by the Board. By contrast, some 
commenters argued that the proposal would continue to permit an 
excessively high level of exposure. These commenters argued the 
proposed limit of 15 percent of a major covered company's tier 1 
capital for exposures of the largest financial institutions was too low 
and did not take into account the greater social costs of the failure 
of a systemically important institution as compared to a smaller 
institution.
    A number of commenters expressed concern with the Board's approach 
to measuring exposures resulting from securities financing 
transactions, including securities lending transactions, securities 
borrowing transactions, repurchase agreements, and reverse repurchase 
agreements. Under the proposal, a covered company would have been 
required to measure credit exposure to a counterparty in a securities 
financing transaction as the value of any cash and securities 
transferred to that counterparty (adjusted upwards by a risk-based add-
on) minus the value of any cash and securities received from that 
counterparty as collateral (adjusted downwards by a risk-based 
haircut). Commenters contended that the proposed rule's application of 
collateral volatility haircuts on both sides of the transaction did not 
recognize the risk-mitigating value of positive correlations between 
securities on loan and securities received as collateral. Commenters 
urged the Board to adopt a more risk-sensitive standardized approach to 
measuring securities financing transactions that has recently been 
finalized by the BCBS or afford securities financing transactions 
treatment similar to that provided for derivative transactions in the 
proposal (that is, use of any methodology permitted under the Board's 
capital rules), consistent with the large exposure standard.\19\ 
Commenters noted that the significantly more risk-sensitive treatment 
of derivative transactions in the proposed rule would create an 
incentive for covered companies and their counterparties to engage in 
derivative transactions that replicate the economics of a securities 
financing transaction.
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    \19\ See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: 
Finalising post-crisis reforms (Dec. 2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.
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    The proposal contained a section addressing how investments in and 
exposures to securitization vehicles, investment funds, and other 
special purpose vehicles would be treated. This section of the proposal 
specified the circumstances under which a covered company would be 
required to look through the vehicle to the underlying exposures. A 
number of commenters raised concerns about the breadth and scope of the 
look-through approach and requested additional clarity around these 
provisions. The commenters recommended that the Board limit the 
application of these provisions to only certain types of exposures (for 
example, investments in the securitization vehicle). Certain commenters 
also requested that the Board not require aggregation of any exposure 
to a third party connected to a securitization vehicle, investment 
fund, or other special purpose vehicle.
    Commenters generally expressed support for certain of the 
exemptions and exclusions contained in the proposal, such as the 
exemption for trade exposures to qualifying central counterparties, the 
exclusion of certain sovereign issuers from the ``counterparty'' 
definition, and the exemption for intraday exposures. Some commenters 
requested additional exemptions in the final rule, including exemptions 
for short-dated exposures arising from traditional custody services. A 
few commenters requested that the Board maintain flexibility in the 
final rule to provide additional exemptions. The Federal Home Loan 
Banks urged the Board to exempt credit exposures to the Federal Home 
Loan Banks. Commenters also requested a longer initial compliance 
period.
    A number of commenters asked the Board to consider the costs and 
benefits of the proposed rule. Commenters argued that certain aspects 
of the proposed rule would make it difficult to implement and that the 
Board should evaluate these aspects of the proposal on a cost-benefit 
basis.
    As required under the Dodd-Frank Act at the time, the proposed rule 
would have applied the SCCL to any U.S. BHC or FBO with $50 billion or 
more in total consolidated assets. The narrower scope of application of 
the final rule reflects the passage of the Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (EGRRCPA).\20\ Subject to an 
eighteen-month transition period, EGRRCPA recently amended section 165 
of the Dodd-Frank Act to restrict the scope of application of most 
enhanced prudential standards (including SCCL) to U.S. global 
systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs) and to

[[Page 38463]]

U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and FBOs with $250 billion or more 
in total consolidated assets.\21\ Under EGRRCPA, however, the Board may 
apply an SCCL or any other enhanced prudential standard to U.S. BHCs or 
FBOs with between $100 billion and $250 billion in total consolidated 
assets, if the Board makes certain safety and soundness or financial 
stability findings.
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    \20\ Public Law 115-174, section 401, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
    \21\ EGRRCPA raised the asset thresholds for application of 
enhanced prudential standards under section 165 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act in two stages. Immediately on the date of enactment of EGRRCPA, 
bank holding companies with total consolidated assets less than $100 
billion (other than any bank holding company that is a U.S. GSIB 
under the Board's capital rules) were no longer subject to section 
165. Eighteen months after the date of enactment of EGRRCPA, bank 
holding companies with total consolidated assets less than $250 
billion (other than any U.S. GSIB) will no longer be subject to 
section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, unless the Board determines, by 
order or regulation, to apply any enhanced prudential standard to 
such firms after making certain statutory findings. See section 401 
of EGRRCPA.
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    As described below in detail, the Board has modified the proposed 
rule in response to comments and in light of the enactment of EGRRCPA, 
while taking into account the need to limit the credit exposure of 
large financial firms.

C. Overview of the SCCL

    Under the final rule, the aggregate net credit exposure of a U.S. 
GSIB (major covered company) and any bank holding company with total 
consolidated assets of $250 billion or more (collectively, covered 
companies) to a single counterparty is subject to one of two credit 
exposure limits that are tailored to the size and systemic footprint of 
the firm. As discussed below in more detail, the final rule does not 
apply to U.S. bank holding companies or FBOs with less than $250 
billion in total consolidated assets.\22\
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    \22\ The final rule applies to a U.S. intermediate holding 
company (IHC) subsidiary of such an FBO that has $50 billion or more 
in total consolidated assets. In some cases, these U.S. intermediate 
holding companies also may be bank holding companies.
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    The first limit under the final rule prohibits any covered company 
that is not a major covered company from having aggregate net credit 
exposure to an unaffiliated counterparty in excess of 25 percent of its 
tier 1 capital.
    The second limit prohibits any major covered company from having 
aggregate net credit exposure in excess of 15 percent of its tier 1 
capital to a major counterparty and in excess of 25 percent of its tier 
1 capital to any other counterparty. A ``major counterparty'' is 
defined as a global systemically important banking organization or a 
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board. This framework is 
consistent with the requirement in section 165(a)(1)(B) of the Dodd-
Frank Act that the enhanced standards established by the Board under 
section 165 increase in stringency based on factors such as the nature, 
scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, and mix of the 
activities of the company.\23\ The framework also is consistent with 
the authorization provided to the Board under section 165(e) to apply a 
lower limit to the extent necessary to mitigate risks to financial 
stability.\24\ The SCCL applicable to covered companies in the final 
rule are summarized in Table 1.
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    \23\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(1)(B); see also 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(2)(A).
    \24\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(e); see Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, Calibrating the Single-Counterparty Credit Limit 
between Systemically Important Financial Institutions (Mar. 4, 
2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/sccl-paper-20160304.pdf.

    Table 1--Single-Counterparty Credit Limits Applicable to Covered
                                Companies
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 Category of covered company        Applicable credit exposure limit
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Covered companies that are     Aggregate net credit exposure to a
 not major covered companies.   counterparty cannot exceed 25 percent of
                                a covered company's tier 1 capital.
Major covered companies (U.S.  Aggregate net credit exposure to a major
 GSIBs).                        counterparty cannot exceed 15 percent of
                                a major covered company's tier 1
                                capital.
                               Aggregate net credit exposure to any
                                other counterparty cannot exceed 25
                                percent of a major covered company's
                                tier 1 capital.
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    As discussed below, tier 1 capital provides a superior capital base 
relative to capital stock and surplus as it has greater loss-absorbing 
capacity. In addition, the 15 percent of tier 1 capital limit is based 
on the heightened systemic risk presented by exposures between GSIBs.
    In contrast to the proposal, the final rule applies only to FBOs 
with $250 billion or more in total global consolidated assets, and 
their subsidiary U.S. intermediate holding companies (IHCs) with total 
assets of $50 billion or more (together, ``covered foreign entities''). 
The proposal would have applied the SCCL to the combined U.S. 
operations of any FBO with $50 billion or more in total global 
consolidated assets and separately to any FBO's U.S. IHC with $50 
billion or more in total consolidated assets. Unlike in the proposal, 
an FBO subject to the final rule can comply with the combined U.S. 
operations SCCL by certifying to the Board that it meets, on a 
consolidated basis, an SCCL established by its home country supervisor 
that is consistent with the large exposure standard. The SCCL for U.S. 
IHCs that are covered foreign entities are largely unchanged from the 
proposal and fall into three tailored tiers. These limits are 
summarized in Table 2 below.

   Table 2--Single-Counterparty Credit Limits Applicable to U.S. IHCs
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     Category of U.S. IHC           Applicable credit exposure limit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. IHCs that have total      Aggregate net credit exposure of the U.S.
 consolidated assets of at      IHC to a counterparty cannot exceed 25
 least $50 billion but less     percent of the IHC's total regulatory
 than $250 billion.             capital plus the balance of its
                                allowance for loan and lease losses
                                (ALLL) not included in tier 2 capital
                                under the capital adequacy guidelines in
                                12 CFR part 252.
U.S. IHCs that have $250       Aggregate net credit exposure of the U.S.
 billion or more in total       IHC to a counterparty cannot exceed 25
 consolidated assets but are    percent of the IHC's tier 1 capital.
 not major U.S. IHCs.

[[Page 38464]]

 
U.S. IHCs that have $500       Aggregate net credit exposure of a major
 billion or more in total       U.S. IHC to a major counterparty cannot
 consolidated assets (major     exceed 15 percent of the IHC's tier 1
 U.S. IHCs).                    capital.
                               Aggregate net credit exposure of a major
                                U.S. IHC to any other counterparty
                                cannot exceed 25 percent of the IHC's
                                tier 1 capital.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The SCCL in the final rule apply to the credit exposures of a 
covered company on a consolidated basis, including any subsidiaries, to 
any unaffiliated counterparty. As discussed below, subsidiary of a 
covered company under the final rule is defined to mean a company that 
is consolidated on the financial statements of the covered company.\25\ 
A counterparty includes a company (including any consolidated 
affiliates of the company, as discussed below); a natural person 
(including the person's immediate family) where the exposure to the 
natural person exceeds 5 percent of the covered company's tier 1 
capital; a U.S. state (including all of its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions); certain foreign 
sovereign entities (including their agencies and instrumentalities); 
and political subdivisions of foreign sovereign entities (including 
their agencies and instrumentalities).
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    \25\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(gg).
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    As noted, the SCCL in the final rule apply to a covered company's 
aggregate net credit exposure, rather than aggregate gross credit 
exposure, to a counterparty. The key difference between gross credit 
exposure and net credit exposure is that a company's net credit 
exposure takes into account any available credit risk mitigants--for 
example, collateral, guarantees, credit or equity derivatives, and 
other hedges--provided the credit risk mitigants meet certain 
requirements in the rule, as discussed more fully below. To illustrate, 
if a covered company had $100 in gross credit exposure to a 
counterparty with respect to a particular credit transaction, and the 
counterparty pledged collateral with an adjusted market value of $50, 
the full amount of which qualified as ``eligible collateral'' under the 
final rule, the covered company's net credit exposure to the 
counterparty on the transaction would be $50, provided that the other 
$50 would be ``risk-shifted'' to the eligible collateral issuer, as 
described below.
    In order to calculate its aggregate net credit exposure to a 
counterparty, a covered company first must calculate its gross credit 
exposure to the counterparty on each credit transaction in accordance 
with certain valuation and other requirements under the final rule. 
Second, the covered company must reduce its gross credit exposure 
amount based on eligible credit risk mitigants to determine its net 
credit exposure for each credit transaction with the counterparty. 
Third and finally, the covered company must sum all of its net credit 
exposures to the counterparty to calculate the covered company's 
aggregate net credit exposure to the counterparty. It is this final 
amount, the aggregate net credit exposure, that is subject to the SCCL 
under the final rule.
    The final rule applies a ``risk-shifting'' approach with respect to 
a credit exposure involving eligible collateral or an eligible 
guarantor. In general, any reduction in the exposure amount to the 
original counterparty relating to the eligible collateral or eligible 
guarantor would result in a dollar-for-dollar increase in exposure to 
the eligible collateral issuer or eligible guarantor (as applicable). 
For example, in the case discussed above where a covered company had 
$100 in gross credit exposure to a counterparty and the counterparty 
pledged collateral with an adjusted market value of $50, the covered 
company would have net credit exposure to the counterparty on the 
transaction of $50 and net credit exposure to the issuer of the 
collateral of $50. In no case, however, would risk-shifting result in 
credit exposure to a counterparty that is any larger than the credit 
exposure being mitigated. As a specific example, in the foregoing 
example, if the exposure was overcollateralized with $150 in 
collateral, the exposure to the issuer of the collateral would be 
capped at $100 while the exposure to the counterparty would be reduced 
to $0.
    In cases where a covered company hedges its exposure to an entity 
that is not a ``financial entity'' (a non-financial entity) using an 
eligible credit or equity derivative, and the underlying exposure is 
subject to the Board's market risk capital rule (12 CFR part 217, 
subpart F), the covered company must calculate its exposure to the 
eligible guarantor using a methodology that it is permitted to use 
under the Board's risk-based capital rules. For these purposes, a 
``financial entity'' includes regulated U.S. financial institutions, 
such as holding companies, insurance companies, broker-dealers, banks, 
thrifts, and futures commission merchants, as well as foreign banking 
organizations and non-U.S.-based securities firms and non-U.S.-based 
insurance companies subject to consolidated supervision and regulation 
comparable to that imposed on U.S. depository institutions, securities 
broker-dealers, or insurance companies.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(r).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II. SCCL for Covered Companies

A. Key Terminology and Concepts

    The terms ``covered company'' and ``counterparty'' form the basis 
for application of the SCCL in the final rule. The final rule contains 
modifications from the proposal to these and other definitions in 
response to concerns raised by commenters.
1. Covered Company and Counterparty
    Under the proposal, ``covered company'' would have been defined to 
mean any bank holding company (other than a foreign banking 
organization that is subject to subpart Q of the Board's Regulation YY) 
that has $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets and all of 
its subsidiaries.\27\ The term ``subsidiary'' of a specified company 
would have been defined under the proposal to mean a company that is 
directly or indirectly controlled by the specified company.\28\ The 
applicable definition of ``control'' was defined by reference to 
section 2(a) of the BHC Act.\29\
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    \27\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(f).
    \28\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(cc).
    \29\ See section 252.2(g) of the Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR 
252.2(g)). Control under the BHC Act is defined to mean a company 
(1) owns, controls, or has the power to vote 25 percent or more of 
any class of voting securities of another company; (2) controls in 
any manner the election of a majority of trustees of the other 
company; or (3) the Board determines, after notice and opportunity 
for hearing, that the company indirectly exercises a controlling 
influence over the management or policies of the other company. 12 
U.S.C. 1841(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the proposal would have defined ``counterparty'' to 
mean a natural person and members of the

[[Page 38465]]

person's immediate family; a state \30\ including all of its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions (including 
municipalities); certain foreign sovereign entities and all of their 
agencies and instrumentalities; and political subdivisions of a foreign 
sovereign entity such as states, provinces, and municipalities.\31\ 
Under the proposal, a counterparty also would have included any company 
and all persons that the counterparty (1) owns, controls, or holds with 
the power to vote 25 percent or more of a class of voting securities; 
(2) owns, controls, or holds 25 percent or more of the total equity; or 
(3) consolidates for financial reporting purposes.\32\
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    \30\ ``State'' would have been defined by reference to the 
enhanced prudential standards to mean any state, commonwealth, 
territory, or possession of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Guam, or the United States 
Virgin Islands. See 12 CFR 252.2(r).
    \31\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(e).
    \32\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(e)(2). The preamble to the 
proposal explained that, to the extent that one or more of these 
conditions are met with respect to a company's relationship to an 
investment fund or vehicle, exposures to such fund or vehicle would 
need to be aggregated with that counterparty. See 81 FR at 14,332.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The definitions of ``covered company'' and ``counterparty'' were 
two of the most commented upon aspects of the proposal. A large number 
of commenters urged the Board to use financial consolidation for 
aggregating a covered company and its subsidiaries instead of BHC Act 
control. These commenters argued that a standard based on financial 
consolidation would bring within the scope of the final rule those 
exposures that actually put a covered company's capital at risk. 
Commenters contended that the financial reporting consolidation 
approach would more accurately capture true economic exposures of 
covered companies to their counterparties.
    Commenters contended that basing the definition of ``covered 
company'' on control, as defined under the BHC Act, would introduce 
significant complexity into a covered company's management of its 
credit limits. This approach also would capture exposures that are not 
likely to be material to a covered company, including exposures of 
subsidiaries for which a covered company does not have operational 
control to actually monitor, measure, and conform credit exposures to 
the limits of the final rule. Commenters indicated that opportunities 
to use such a subsidiary to evade the final rule would be limited 
because a covered company would not exercise operational control of the 
subsidiary. Some commenters suggested that, to the extent evasion 
remains a concern, the final rule could include an explicit reservation 
of authority for the Board to address such concerns, and one commenter 
suggested the Board could use its supervisory authority to address any 
potential evasion of the final rule. Commenters also contended that 
using BHC Act control would impose significant compliance costs to 
capture risks that are not likely to be material to a covered company 
(i.e., that compliance costs would exceed the limited incremental risk 
mitigation benefits).
    Commenters also argued that using the BHC Act to define a ``covered 
company'' could result in some entities being included as part of both 
the covered company and the counterparty at the same time (i.e., in the 
case of certain joint venture subsidiaries). Commenters argued that if 
financial consolidation is not used to define ``covered company,'' the 
final rule must clarify the treatment of joint ventures that could fall 
within the scope of being both a covered company and counterparty using 
BHC Act control. In the alternative to financial consolidation, these 
commenters suggested certain targeted modifications to the definition 
of covered company and counterparty to ensure that a joint venture that 
is controlled due to BHC Act control (for example, where the covered 
company owns 51 percent and the counterparty owns 49 percent) would not 
be considered both part of a covered company and of a counterparty 
under the final rule.
    Commenters urged that, if the final rule does not adopt a financial 
consolidation standard to define subsidiaries of a covered company, the 
final rule should define subsidiaries of covered companies based on a 
simple percentage ownership test like the 2011 proposal and the 
counterparty definition (i.e., ownership of 25 percent or more of the 
voting securities and ownership of 25 percent or more of the total 
equity). Under either this alternative or reference to BHC Act control, 
commenters requested categorical exemptions for funds or investments 
that are not consolidated for financial reporting purposes. In 
particular, commenters urged the Board to provide exemptions for 
registered investment companies and foreign public funds including 
during the seeding period; certain covered funds as defined in section 
13 of the BHC Act, also known as the Volcker Rule, and implementing 
regulations, including during the seeding period; certain merchant 
banking portfolio companies; companies acquired in the ordinary course 
of collecting a debt previously contracted; small business investment 
companies and community development investments; and bank collective 
investment trusts.
    Similar to the comments on the definition of covered company, a 
number of commenters urged the Board to define ``counterparty'' with 
respect to a company based on financial reporting consolidation and to 
eliminate the additional tests based on percentage ownership.\33\ These 
commenters asserted that the 25 percent ownership tests added 
additional and unnecessary complexity to aggregating counterparty 
exposure and would be inconsistent with the large exposure standard. As 
with the definition of ``covered company,'' commenters argued that 
aggregation of connected counterparties based on financial 
consolidation would capture true connected exposure risks consistent 
with the purposes of section 165(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act. A few 
commenters also indicated that financial consolidation would address 
joint venture issues. Other commenters requested that particular 
entities not be treated as part of a counterparty for purposes of the 
final rule even if they would be consolidated with the counterparty, 
including a sponsored or advised registered fund (e.g., during the 
seeding period) and special purpose vehicles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ These commenters also contended that the economic 
interdependence and control tests to aggregate counterparty 
exposures should be eliminated as described further below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To address the concerns raised by commenters and to reduce the 
burden of complying with the final rule, the Board has modified the 
definitions of ``covered company,'' ``counterparty,'' and 
``subsidiary,'' and has added a new term ``affiliate.'' The purpose of 
these modifications is to apply a financial consolidation standard to 
define both the bank holding companies that are subject to the final 
rule and to define the counterparty exposures that are subject to the 
SCCL in the final rule. Under the final rule, a ``subsidiary'' is 
defined to include a company that is consolidated with the covered 
company under applicable accounting standards, and an ``affiliate'' is 
defined to include any subsidiary of the company and any other company 
that is consolidated with the company under applicable accounting 
standards.\34\ For example, a subsidiary of a covered company under the 
final rule includes an insured depository institution that the covered

[[Page 38466]]

company consolidates for financial reporting purposes. Similarly, an 
affiliate of a counterparty under the final rule includes a parent 
company of the counterparty, as well as any other firm that is 
consolidated with the counterparty under applicable accounting 
standards. Applicable accounting standards can include U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, or other similar standards. ``Subsidiary'' and ``affiliate'' 
would also include a company that is not subject to such principles or 
standards, if consolidation would have occurred if such principles or 
standards had applied.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(b) & (gg).
    \35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Using financial accounting standards for purposes of the final 
rule, rather than the control test in the BHC Act, should address many 
of the concerns raised by commenters and serve to reduce burden and 
complexity and mitigate costs of complying with the requirements of the 
final rule, without allowing evasion of the SCCL. Although 
consolidation tests under relevant accounting standards must also be 
applied on a case-by-case basis, like the proposed rule's control 
tests, the analysis already has been performed for companies that 
prepare their financial statements in accordance with relevant 
accounting standards. For companies that do not prepare these 
statements, industry participants should be more familiar with the 
relevant accounting standards and tests, and they will be less 
burdensome to apply. Additionally, the accounting consolidation 
standard typically results in consolidation at a higher level of 
ownership than the 25 percent voting interest standard that applies 
under the BHC Act control test, which is responsive to commenters' 
concerns that the proposed definitions were overly inclusive.
    This change in the final rule should also address the concerns 
raised by commenters with respect to investment funds. Investment funds 
generally are not consolidated with the asset manager other than during 
the seeding period or other periods in which the manager holds an 
outsize portion of the fund's interest, although this may depend on the 
facts and circumstances. During these periods, when a covered company 
may own up to 100 percent of the ownership interest of an investment 
fund, the investment fund should be treated as a subsidiary. Similarly, 
merchant banking portfolio companies and companies held pursuant to 
debt previously contracted authorities would be treated as part of the 
covered company if consolidated with the covered company.
    Joint ventures that are consolidated with the covered company are 
treated as part of a covered company even if a counterparty also has an 
investment in such joint venture. If a covered company invests in a 
minority-owned joint venture that is not consolidated, the final rule 
requires the covered company to treat that joint venture as a 
counterparty and recognize exposures to the joint venture.
    The final rule also has adjusted the asset threshold for covered 
companies. As noted, EGRRCPA raised the threshold, from $50 billion to 
$250 billion in total consolidated assets, for the application of the 
SCCL and other enhanced prudential standards to a bank holding company 
in two stages.\36\ EGRRCPA also provides the Board with 18 months to 
determine whether to apply the SCCL or other enhanced prudential 
standards to BHCs with between $100 billion and $250 billion in total 
consolidated assets. Accordingly, the final rule defines a ``covered 
company'' to mean any U.S. GSIB and any BHC (other than an FBO that is 
subject to the SCCL under subpart Q of Regulation YY) that has $250 
billion or more in total consolidated assets. The Board is developing a 
comprehensive proposal on application of enhanced prudential standards 
to U.S. BHCs and FBOs with total consolidated assets of $100 billion 
but less than $250 billion. In connection with this proposal and other 
tailoring and implementation efforts related to EGRRCPA, the Board may 
make amendments to the SCCL framework in this final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ This change took effect on the date of enactment of EGRRCPA 
for U.S. BHCs with total consolidated assets of less than $100 
billion, and will take effect 18 months after enactment for all 
other firms. See section 401(d)(1) of EGRRCPA. Notwithstanding this 
change, the enhanced prudential standards required under section 
165, including the SCCL, continue to apply to U.S. GSIBs, regardless 
of asset size. See section 401(f) of EGRRCPA. In addition and as 
noted, the Board may determine to apply the SCCL, or any other 
enhanced prudential standard, to U.S. BHCs or FBOs with between $100 
billion and $250 billion in total consolidated assets, if the Board 
makes certain safety and soundness or financial stability findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the final rule maintains the economic interdependence 
and aggregation due to control relationships for covered companies as 
described below.\37\ These additional tests require a covered company 
to aggregate counterparties in certain cases and further allow the 
Board to aggregate counterparties. Specifically, these tests provide 
for the aggregation of counterparties where the failure, default, 
insolvency, or material financial distress of one counterparty would 
cause the failure, default, insolvency, or material financial distress 
of the other counterparty or due to the presence of significant control 
relationships.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ See final rule Sec.  252.76.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule retains individuals and certain governmental 
entities within the definition of a ``counterparty,'' because credit 
exposures to such entities can create risks to the covered company that 
are similar to those created by large exposures to companies.\38\ The 
severe distress or failure of an individual, U.S. state or 
municipality, sovereign entity, or political subdivision of a sovereign 
entity, could have effects on a covered company that are comparable to 
those caused by the failure of a financial firm or nonfinancial 
corporation to which the covered company has a large credit exposure. 
With respect to sovereign entities, these risks are most acute in the 
case of sovereigns that present greater credit risk. Therefore, the 
Board believes that it is appropriate to extend the SCCL to foreign 
sovereign entities that do not receive a zero percent risk weight under 
the standardized approach of the Board's risk-based capital rule in the 
same manner as credit exposures to companies.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(e); 12 U.S.C. 
5365(b)(1)(B)(iv).
    \39\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(e); 12 CFR part 217, subpart D. 
The final rule would not apply to exposures of a U.S. IHC or of the 
combined U.S. operations of an FBO to the FBO's home country 
sovereign entity, regardless of the risk weight assigned to that 
sovereign entity under the Board's capital rules (12 CFR part 217). 
See section III.D.4 infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board is extending the SCCL to individuals, U.S. states and 
municipalities, and certain foreign sovereigns using two legal 
authorities. First, under section 165(b)(1)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
the Board may impose such additional enhanced prudential standards as 
the Board of Governors determines are appropriate.\40\ Second, under 
section 5(b) of the BHC Act, the Board may issue such regulations as 
may be necessary to enable it to administer and carry out the purposes 
of this chapter and prevent evasions thereof.\41\ Such purposes include 
examining the financial, operational, and other risks within the bank 
holding company system that may pose a threat to (1) the safety and 
soundness of the bank holding company or of any depository institution 
subsidiary of the bank holding company; or (2) the stability of the 
financial system of the United States.\42\ The final rule would

[[Page 38467]]

help to promote the safety and soundness of a covered company and 
mitigate risks to financial stability by limiting a covered company's 
maximum credit exposure to an individual, U.S. state, foreign sovereign 
entity, or political subdivision of a foreign sovereign entity, and 
thereby reduce the risk that the failure of such individual or entity 
could cause the failure or material financial distress of a covered 
company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(1)(B).
    \41\ 12 U.S.C. 1844.
    \42\ 12 U.S.C. 1844(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Companies as Counterparties
    To address the concerns raised by commenters and reduce burden on 
covered companies, the Board has modified the definition of 
``counterparty'' with respect to a company. Under the final rule, a 
counterparty that is a company includes the company and all its 
affiliates.\43\ As noted, the final rule applies a financial 
consolidation test with respect to the definition of counterparty to 
address concerns raised by commenters and to reduce the cost of 
complying with the final rule for the same reasons as described above 
with respect to covered company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Natural Persons as Counterparties
    As noted, the proposal would have included in the definition of 
``counterparty'' a natural person and members of the person's immediate 
family as a counterparty. Commenters urged the Board to exclude natural 
persons from the credit exposure limits of the final rule. These 
commenters argued that a natural person, even when aggregated with the 
person's immediate family, would be unlikely to approach 25 percent of 
a covered company's eligible capital base. Commenters argued that it 
would be impossible for such exposures to pose the types of systemic 
interconnectivity risks that the Dodd-Frank Act was meant to address 
and that section 165(e) prohibits a covered company from having credit 
exposure to an ``unaffiliated company,'' which indicates that Congress 
did not intend to cover exposures to natural persons. Further, 
commenters contended that collecting information that would be required 
to monitor exposures to natural persons aggregated with their immediate 
family and developing systems to monitor and track these relationships 
across millions of individual customers may not be possible and could 
not be justified on a cost-benefit basis. Commenters suggested that if 
exposure to a natural person is included in the final rule and required 
to be aggregated with immediate family members for purposes of the 
exposure limits under the final rule, a threshold of 5 percent of a 
covered company's eligible capital base should apply. Commenters 
pointed out that such a threshold would mitigate the need to engage in 
an analysis of every individual that might require aggregation and 
thereby reduce the burden of complying with the final rule.
    The final rule continues to cover exposures to natural persons, 
together with members of the person's immediate family, as 
counterparties, subject to a threshold discussed below.\44\ ``Immediate 
family'' is defined under the final rule in the same manner as under 
the proposal to mean the spouse of an individual, the individual's 
minor children, and any of the individual's children (including adults) 
residing in the individual's home.\45\ To address concerns raised by 
commenters, the final rule only requires a covered company to aggregate 
a natural person with members of the person's immediate family if the 
exposure of the covered company to the natural person exceeds 5 percent 
of the company's tier 1 capital. This modification should reduce burden 
and address concerns raised by commenters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(e).
    \45\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(u).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Governmental Entities as Counterparties
a. States
    As noted, the proposal would have included a State, collectively 
with all of its agencies, instrumentalities and political subdivisions 
(including municipalities) as a counterparty.\46\ Commenters argued 
that the proposal provided no basis for the aggregation of states and 
political subdivisions, ignored the different credit profiles that 
exist among a State and its subdivisions, and is at odds with 
historical default experience. As a result, certain commenters urged 
the Board to use the economic interdependence and control aggregation 
tests to determine if a covered company must aggregate its exposures to 
a State with exposures to its political subdivisions subject to a 
threshold of 5 percent or 10 percent of eligible capital.\47\ These 
commenters argued that at a minimum, municipal revenue bonds, which are 
generally issued to finance public projects, should not be aggregated 
together with a State and its agencies, instrumentalities, and 
political subdivisions as these bonds are contractually supported by a 
specific stream of revenue derived from the relevant project, which is 
expressly recognized in Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See 12 CFR 252.2(r).
    \47\ The economic interdependence and control aggregation tests 
are described further in Section II.F infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The events that would render a State incapable of repaying a loan 
or bond would likely be highly correlated to the economic performance 
of the State and would have similar effects on the revenue streams 
underlying municipal revenue bonds. Accordingly, the final rule, like 
the proposal, treats a State and all of its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions (including any 
municipalities), collectively, as a counterparty.\48\ In addition, the 
final rule requires that a covered company aggregate municipal revenue 
bonds with other types of municipal bonds, as well as exposures of the 
State and its agencies, instrumentalities, and other political 
subdivisions. Similarly, the Board has declined to adopt a 5 percent 
threshold for aggregating States with their agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions. The Board believes that 
a covered company should limits its exposure to such entities to no 
more than 25 percent of its tier 1 capital given the high likelihood of 
correlation in the economic performance of these entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Foreign Sovereigns
    The proposal would have included as a counterparty, a foreign 
sovereign entity and all of its agencies and instrumentalities (not 
including any political subdivision) that is not assigned a zero 
percent risk weight under the standardized approach in the Board's 
capital rules (12 CFR part 217, subpart D).\49\ In addition, under the 
proposal, a covered company would have been required to treat a 
political subdivision of a foreign sovereign entity, together with its 
agencies and instrumentalities, as a single counterparty.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(e)(4). ``Sovereign entity'' 
would have been defined under the proposal to mean a central 
national government or an agency, department, ministry, or central 
bank, but not including any political governmental subdivision such 
as a state, province or municipality. See proposed rule Sec.  
252.71(bb).
    \50\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(e)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A few commenters opposed the exemption for zero risk-weight 
sovereign exposures on the basis that such exposures can be risky. 
Other commenters urged that the carve-out for exposures to zero risk-
weight foreign sovereign entities should be extended to their zero 
risk-weight public sector entities (PSEs), because they similarly pose 
little risk of default, and this

[[Page 38468]]

treatment would align the treatment of such PSEs with the determination 
of risk weights under the risk-based capital rules.
    Some commenters urged the Board not to aggregate foreign sovereign 
entities with their agencies and instrumentalities. These commenters 
recommended an approach that foreign sovereign entities only be 
aggregated with their agencies and instrumentalities if the entities 
meet the economic interdependence test, including the 5 percent of a 
covered company's eligible capital base threshold.
    One commenter argued that the final rule should exempt exposures of 
foreign subsidiaries of covered companies to the respective sovereign 
entity of the jurisdiction in which such subsidiary is incorporated, 
regardless of the risk weight assigned to the sovereign entity. This 
commenter argued that foreign subsidiaries of covered companies need to 
retain these exposures as part of the transactions in a host country in 
order to manage their liquidity risk, to have access to intra-day 
liquidity facilities provided by central banks, and to have collateral 
to pledge at local central counterparties. Finally, this commenter 
urged the Board to treat each political subdivision of a foreign 
sovereign entity as a separate counterparty from any other political 
subdivision, as is the case for U.S. states, and urged that entities 
owned by a foreign government with their own revenue sources and 
without government guarantees should be treated as different 
counterparties since each poses its own credit risk characteristics.
    The final rule retains the proposed approach to sovereign entities 
without modification. The final rule continues to include certain 
governmental entities within the definition of a ``counterparty'' 
because credit exposures to such entities create risks to the covered 
company that are similar to those created by large exposures to 
companies. The severe distress or failure of a sovereign entity could 
have effects on a covered company that are comparable to those caused 
by the failure of a financial firm or nonfinancial corporation to which 
the covered company has a large credit exposure. These risks are most 
acute in the case of sovereign entities that present greater credit 
risk, as evidenced by the risk weight that applies to the sovereign 
entity under the Board's capital rules.
    In response to commenters who requested that the Board treat each 
political subdivision of a foreign sovereign entity as a separate 
counterparty from any other political subdivision, as is the case for 
the states of the U.S., the Board is confirming that each political 
subdivision of a foreign sovereign entity (together with any agencies 
and instrumentalities of the political subdivision, collectively) would 
be treated as a separate counterparty.\51\ This treatment is 
appropriate because the events that would render a political 
subdivision incapable of repaying a loan or bond would likely be highly 
correlated to the economic performance of the agencies and 
instrumentalities within the political subdivision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(e)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Major Company and Major Counterparty
    The requirements of the proposal would have provided that no 
``major covered company,'' defined as a covered company that is a U.S. 
global systemically important banking organization and all of its 
subsidiaries, could have aggregate net credit exposure to a major 
counterparty in excess of 15 percent of the major covered company's 
tier 1 capital.\52\ A ``major counterparty'' was defined as (1) any 
major covered company and all of its subsidiaries, collectively; (2) 
any foreign banking organization and all of its subsidiaries, 
collectively, that would be considered a global systemically important 
foreign banking organization; and (3) any nonbank financial company 
supervised by the Board.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.72(c).
    \53\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(v).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, a foreign banking organization would have been 
considered to be a global systemically important foreign banking 
organization if (1) the foreign banking organization has the 
characteristics of a global systemically important banking organization 
under the global methodology; or (2) the Board, using any relevant 
information determines that the foreign banking organization would be a 
GSIB under the global methodology; that the top-tier foreign banking 
organization, if it were subject to the Board's capital rules would be 
identified as a GSIB; or that the U.S. IHC, if it were subject to the 
Board's capital rules, would be identified as a GSIB.
    No comments were received on the definition of ``major covered 
company'' under the proposal. In terms of the identification of a 
``major counterparty,'' commenters urged the Board to make this 
determination by reference to the annual FSB Report listing GSIBs 
identified by the BCBS.\54\ Commenters indicated this approach to 
identifying major counterparties would harmonize with the BCBS approach 
and allow reliance upon and integration with pre-existing data sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ The Financial Stability Board maintains and periodically 
publishes a list of entities that have the characteristics of a 
global systemically important banking organization on its website, 
https://www.fsb.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The methodology in the Board's GSIB surcharge rule identifies the 
most systemically important U.S. banking organizations.\55\ This 
methodology evaluates a banking organization's systemic importance on 
the basis of its size, interconnectedness, cross-jurisdictional 
activity, substitutability, and complexity. The firms that score 
highest on these attributes are classified as GSIBs. While the GSIB 
surcharge rule itself applies only to U.S bank holding companies, its 
methodology is equally well suited to evaluating the systemic 
importance of foreign banking organizations. Moreover, the method 1 
methodology in the GSIB surcharge rule for identifying GSIBs is 
consistent with the methodology developed by the BCBS to identify 
GSIBs; foreign jurisdictions collect information from banking 
organizations in connection with that framework that parallels the 
information collected by the Board for purposes of the Board's GSIB 
surcharge rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ See 12 CFR part 217, subpart H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Given that the global methodology and the method 1 methodology in 
the GSIB surcharge rule to identify GSIBs are virtually identical, the 
two methodologies should lead to the same outcomes, and the 
requirements in the final rule to identify whether a foreign banking 
organization is a GSIB should entail minimal additional burden for 
foreign banking organizations. Accordingly, the final rule generally 
adopts the same methodology as the proposal for determining whether a 
foreign banking organization and all of its subsidiaries, collectively, 
would be considered a global systemically important foreign banking 
organization, with minor changes to clarify that this determination 
applies at the top-tier foreign banking organization.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ ``Top-tier foreign banking organization,'' with respect to 
a foreign banking organization, means the top-tier foreign banking 
organization or, alternatively, a subsidiary of the top-tier foreign 
banking organization designated by the Board. 12 CFR 252.2(aa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule applies certain notice requirements to foreign 
banking organizations subject to the final rule. First, each top-tier 
foreign banking organization that controls a U.S. IHC is required to 
submit to the Board by

[[Page 38469]]

January 1 of each calendar year notice of whether the home country 
supervisor (or other appropriate home country regulatory authority) of 
the top-tier foreign banking organization of the U.S. IHC has adopted 
standards consistent with the global methodology. In addition, these 
firms are required to provide notice of whether the top-tier foreign 
banking organization prepares the indicators used by the global 
methodology to identify a banking organization as a global systemically 
important banking organization and, if it does, whether the top-tier 
foreign banking organization has determined that it has the 
characteristics of a global systemically important banking organization 
under the global methodology. This section also provides that a top-
tier foreign banking organization, which controls a U.S. IHC and 
prepares or reports for any purpose the indicator amounts necessary to 
determine whether the top-tier foreign banking organization is a global 
systemically important banking organization under the global 
methodology, must use the data to determine whether the top-tier 
foreign banking organization has the characteristics of a global 
systemically important banking organization under the global 
methodology. These requirements mirror requirements in other Board 
regulations to identify foreign GSIBs, and an FBO is not expected to 
provide separate notice to the Board for purposes of the final rule if 
the FBO has already provided notice related to other regulatory 
requirements.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ See, e.g., 12 CFR 252.153(b)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Aggregate Net Credit Exposure
    As noted, aggregate net credit exposure is the credit exposure 
amount to which the SCCL apply. The proposal would have defined 
aggregate net credit exposure to mean the sum of all net credit 
exposures of a covered company to a single counterparty. Under the 
proposal, ``covered company'' would have been defined to include all of 
the company's subsidiaries (that is, companies that were under common 
control of the covered company for purposes of section 2 of the BHC 
Act).\58\ As noted, the definitions of ``covered company'' and 
``subsidiary'' in the final rule have been revised to incorporate 
financial consolidation principles, and ``subsidiary'' is no longer 
part of the definition of ``covered company.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(f) & (cc); see also Sec.  
252.2(g) of the Board's Regulation YY, 12 CFR 252.2(g).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the final rule, ``aggregate net credit exposure'' is defined 
to mean the sum of all net credit exposures of a covered company and 
its subsidiaries to a single counterparty as calculated under the final 
rule.\59\ The purpose of this modification is to make clear that, 
notwithstanding the changes to the definition of ``covered company'' 
and ``subsidiary'' from the proposal to the final rule, a covered 
company must still aggregate exposures of its subsidiaries for purposes 
of the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(c). ``Net credit exposure'' 
also is a defined term under the final rule. ``Net credit exposure'' 
is defined to mean, with respect to any credit transaction, the 
gross credit exposure of a covered company and all its subsidiaries 
calculated under Sec.  252.73, as adjusted in accordance with Sec.  
252.74. See final rule Sec.  252.71(aa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Financial Entity
    Under the proposal, a covered company would not have been required 
to include the notional amount of an eligible credit or equity 
derivative for a hedged transaction where the counterparty is not a 
financial entity. A ``financial entity'' would have included regulated 
U.S. financial institutions, such as insurance companies, broker-
dealers, bank holding companies, banks, thrifts, and futures commission 
merchants, as well as foreign banking organizations and certain non-
U.S.-based securities firms or non-U.S.-based insurance companies.\60\ 
A ``financial entity'' also would have included a company whose primary 
business includes the management of financial assets, lending, 
factoring, leasing, provision of credit enhancements, securitization, 
investments, financial custody, central counterparty services, 
proprietary trading, insurance, and other financial services.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(q).
    \61\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to achieve additional clarity, the definition of 
``financial entity'' in the final rule has been modified from the 
proposal to provide a list of discrete entities that would constitute 
financial entities for purposes of the final rule.\62\ In developing 
this definition of ``financial entity,'' the Board sought to provide 
certainty and clarity to covered companies regarding the types of 
financial firms that would require notional amount treatment of 
eligible credit and equity derivatives and those that would not (that 
is, where the counterparty on the underlying hedged transaction is not 
a financial entity). The approach in the final rule is intended to 
strike a balance between the desire to capture all financial entities, 
without being overly broad and capturing commercial firms and sovereign 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ 12 CFR 252.71(r).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

5. Eligible Collateral
    Under the proposal, ``eligible collateral'' would have been defined 
to include cash on deposit with a covered company (including cash held 
for the covered company by a third-party custodian or trustee); debt 
securities (other than mortgage- or asset-backed securities) that are 
bank-eligible investments and that have an investment grade rating; 
equity securities that are publicly traded; or convertible bonds that 
are publicly traded.\63\ Section 252.74 of the proposal explained how 
eligible collateral would have been taken into account in the 
calculation of net credit exposure.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(k); see also 12 CFR 252.2(p) 
(defining ``publicly traded'').
    \64\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters argued that the list of ``eligible 
collateral'' should be consistent with the definition of ``financial 
collateral'' under the Board's regulatory capital rules and with the 
large exposure standard. In particular, these commenters requested that 
the final rule should include as ``eligible collateral'' gold, any 
long- or short-term debt securities that are not resecuritization 
exposures and that are investment grade (including mortgage- or asset-
backed securities), and money market fund shares and other mutual fund 
shares if a price of such shares is publicly quoted daily.
    As requested by certain commenters, the final rule makes clear that 
cash in a foreign currency or U.S. dollars is an acceptable form of 
eligible collateral and that cash held by a third-party custodian or 
trustee may be held inside or outside the United States. For any asset 
to count as eligible collateral under the final rule, as under the 
proposal, the covered company generally is required to have a 
perfected, first priority security interest in the collateral or the 
legal equivalent thereof, if outside of the United States.
    In response to comments, the Board has added gold bullion to the 
list of eligible collateral. The Board has declined to add certain 
other types of collateral such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
shares in money market mutual funds (MMMF) as requested by commenters 
even though these collateral types are recognized as eligible 
collateral in the Board's capital rules. The Board has decided to limit 
the scope of eligible collateral to restrict those collateral types 
that would be likely to suffer from a bout of illiquidity and general 
market dislocation in a period of financial stress when a

[[Page 38470]]

covered company may need to monetize collateral quickly in the face of 
a large counterparty default. This stands in contrast to the purpose of 
collateral for capital purposes, which serves to offset losses that may 
arise in a variety of circumstances, not all of which coincide with the 
default of a significant counterparty or a period of financial 
distress. Unlike gold bullion, both MMMF and MBS have previously been 
subject to bouts of illiquidity and dislocation during periods of 
financial stress due to their complexity and lack of transparency. In 
light of these structural features of both MBS and MMMF, the final rule 
does not to recognize these collateral types as eligible collateral.
    Accordingly, under the final rule, ``eligible collateral'' 
generally is defined in a similar manner as in the proposal to include 
cash in foreign currency or U.S. dollars on deposit with a covered 
company (including cash held for the covered company by a custodian or 
trustee that is not an affiliate of the covered company whether inside 
or outside the United States); debt securities (other than mortgage- or 
asset-backed securities) that are bank-eligible investments and that 
have an investment grade rating; equity securities that are publicly 
traded; convertible bonds that are publicly traded; or gold.\65\ Like 
the proposal, the final rule generally excludes mortgage-backed 
securities and other asset-backed securities from the definition of 
``eligible collateral'' because of concerns that those securities may 
be more likely than other securities to become illiquid and lose value 
during periods of financial instability. However, asset-backed 
securities guaranteed by a U.S. government-sponsored entity, such as 
Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac, qualify as eligible collateral 
under the final rule so long as the entity remains under U.S. 
government conservatorship. The final rule clarifies that eligible 
collateral does not include debt securities or equity securities issued 
by the covered company or its affiliate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(k) and final rule Sec.  
252.71(k); see also 12 CFR 252.2(p) (defining ``publicly traded'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Credit Transaction
    Consistent with the statutory definition of credit exposure, the 
proposed rule would have defined ``credit transaction'' to mean, with 
respect to a counterparty, any (i) extension of credit to the 
counterparty, including loans, deposits, and lines of credit, but 
excluding advised or other uncommitted lines of credit; (ii) repurchase 
or reverse repurchase agreement with the counterparty; (iii) securities 
lending or securities borrowing transaction with the counterparty; (iv) 
guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit (including any confirmed 
letter of credit or standby letter of credit) issued on behalf of the 
counterparty; (v) purchase of, or investment in, securities issued by 
the counterparty; (vi) credit exposure to the counterparty in 
connection with a derivative transaction between the covered company 
and the counterparty; (vii) credit exposure to the counterparty in 
connection with a credit derivative or equity derivative transaction 
between the covered company and a third party, the reference asset of 
which is an obligation or equity security issued by the counterparty; 
\66\ and (viii) any transaction that is the functional equivalent of 
the above, and any similar transaction that the Board determines to be 
a credit transaction for purposes of this subpart.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ ``Credit derivative'' and ``equity derivative'' are defined 
in Sec.  252.71(g) and (p) of the proposed rule, respectively.
    \67\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(h). The definition of 
``credit transaction'' in the proposed rule is similar to the 
definition of ``credit exposure'' in section 165(e) of the Dodd-
Frank Act. See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter urged the Board to exclude foreign demand deposits 
associated with custody services from the credit exposure calculation 
under the final rule. This commenter argued that cash deposits 
denominated in a foreign currency are often received from custody 
clients as a result of securities ownership and held in a demand 
deposit account with sub-custodian banks in jurisdictions where it does 
not self-custody.
    The final rule retains the proposed definition of ``credit 
transaction'' without modification. The final rule does not exclude 
foreign demand deposits associated with custody services as requested 
by certain commenters. Section 165(e) explicitly provides that ``credit 
exposure'' means all extensions of credit including loans, deposits, 
and lines of credit. The Board may only grant exemptions that are in 
the public interest and consistent with the purposes of section 165(e) 
of the Dodd-Frank Act. In light of the plain language of the statute, 
the Board believes that if a covered company holds deposits at a 
counterparty, those deposits should be subject to the limits of the 
final rule and that an exclusion would not be appropriate in these 
circumstances. The final rule exempts intra-day exposures to minimize 
the impact of the proposal on payment and settlement transactions.
7. Other Terms
    The final rule also defines a number of other terms, which are 
defined largely in the same manner as under the proposal. Additionally, 
there are certain newly defined terms that were not defined in the 
proposal but which should provide additional clarity regarding the 
application of the SCCL. These terms are discussed throughout the 
remainder of this preamble.

B. Credit Exposure Limits

    Section 252.72 of the proposed rule would have contained the key 
SCCL.\68\ As noted, a number of commenters argued that the use of tier 
1 capital as the eligible capital base for covered companies was 
inconsistent with the statute, because section 165(e) defines the 
general SCCL limit by reference to a firm's ``capital stock and 
surplus.'' In addition, some commenters urged the Board to eliminate 
the 15 percent limit for major covered companies to major 
counterparties. These commenters expressed the view that before 
proceeding with the application of the lower 15 percent limit, the 
Federal Reserve should properly account for the probability of the 
default of a major covered company or major counterparty taking into 
account the impact of key components of regulatory reforms aimed 
specifically at addressing both the probability and impact of such a 
default. One commenter argued the more stringent limit could negatively 
impact job creation and the economy and was unnecessary in light of 
increased capital levels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By contrast, other commenters expressed the view that the Board 
should use the flexibility granted by Congress under the statute to 
lower the credit exposure limits relative to the proposal. For 
instance, one commenter noted that a 25 percent limit would mean that a 
bank could expose 100 percent of its entire capital to four borrowers. 
These commenters expressed the view that the 15 percent limit between 
major covered companies and major counterparties was too high and did 
not take into account the greater costs of a failure of a global 
systemically importantant banking organization. These commenters argued 
that the economic damage created by multiple defaults of the largest 
firms would be catastrophic and that the credit exposure limit between 
such firms should be much lower than the 15 percent level proposed. One 
commenter,

[[Page 38471]]

for example, recommended a credit exposure limit of 5 percent of tier 1 
capital. A few commenters expressed the view that the final rule should 
use gross credit exposure rather than net credit exposure to establish 
the SCCL.
    The Board has considered the comments received as well as changes 
to the final rule made in response to EGRRCPA. Section 252.72 of the 
final rule now contains two credit exposure limits that are tailored to 
the size and systemic footprint of the firm. No covered company may 
have an aggregate net credit exposure to any counterparty that exceeds 
25 percent of the tier 1 capital of the covered company. In addition, 
no major covered company may have aggregate net credit exposure to any 
major counterparty that exceeds 15 percent of the tier 1 capital of the 
major covered company.
1. 25 Percent of Tier 1 Capital Limit
    The Board continues to believe that the use of tier 1 capital is 
the appropriate measurement for the SCCL applicable to covered 
companies. Notwithstanding the arguments that the standard in SCCL 
established under section 165(e) is based on a company's ``capital 
stock and surplus,'' section 165(e) expressly authorizes the Board to 
establish a lower amount as necessary to mitigate the risks to the 
financial stability of the United States. Further, section 165 requires 
the Board to tailor enhanced prudential standards to increase in 
stringency based on certain factors (capital structure, riskiness, 
complexity, financial activities (including the financial activities of 
their subsidiaries), size, and other risk-related factors that the 
Board deems appropriate).\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(1)(B); 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As indicated, the SCCL in the final rule for covered companies are 
calculated by reference to tier 1 capital as defined under the Board's 
capital rules, rather than total regulatory capital plus ALLL.\70\ A 
key financial stability benefit of the SCCL is that such limits help 
reduce the likelihood that the failure of one financial institution 
will lead to the failure of other financial institutions. By reducing 
the likelihood of multiple simultaneous failures arising from 
interconnectedness, the SCCL reduce the probability of future financial 
crises and the social costs that would be associated with such crises. 
For this benefit to be realized, SCCL for firms whose failure is more 
likely to have an adverse impact on financial stability should be based 
on a measure of capital that is available to absorb losses on a going-
concern basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See 12 CFR 217.2; 12 CFR 217.20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Total regulatory capital plus ALLL includes capital elements that 
do not absorb losses on a going-concern basis. For example, total 
regulatory capital includes a covered company's subordinated debt, 
which is senior in the creditor hierarchy to equity and therefore only 
takes losses once a company's equity has been wiped out. In contrast, a 
company's tier 1 capital consists only of equity claims on the company, 
such as common equity and certain preferred shares. By definition, 
these equity claims are available to absorb losses on a going-concern 
basis. Therefore, in order to limit the aggregate net credit exposure 
that a covered company can have to a single counterparty, the SCCL 
applicable to such companies should be based on their tier 1 capital. 
Basing single-counterparty credit limits for such companies on tier 1 
capital also is consistent with the mandate in section 165(a)(1)(B) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act to tailor enhanced prudential standards such that 
they increase in stringency based on the systemic footprint of the 
firms to which they apply.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(1)(B); 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(2)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moreover, this approach would be consistent with lessons learned 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. During the crisis, 
counterparties and other creditors of distressed financial institutions 
discounted lower-quality regulatory capital instruments issued by such 
institutions, such as trust preferred shares, hybrid capital 
instruments, and other term instruments. Instead, market participants 
focused on a financial institution's common equity capital and other 
simple, perpetual-maturity instruments that now qualify as tier 1 
regulatory capital. For this reason, the Board's revised capital 
framework introduced a new definition of common equity tier 1 capital, 
restricted the set of instruments that qualify as additional tier 1 
capital, and raised the tier 1 capital regulatory minimum from four to 
six percent.\72\ In contrast, the Board's revised capital framework 
left the total regulatory capital minimum requirement unchanged from 
its pre-crisis calibration of 8 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See 12 CFR part 217.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thus, basing single-counterparty credit limits for such covered 
companies on tier 1 capital would be consistent with the post-crisis 
focus on higher-quality forms of capital and would provide a more 
reliable capital base for the credit limits. In addition, the analysis 
that follows suggests that using a narrower definition of capital for 
covered companies should mitigate risks to U.S. financial stability.
    The marginal impact of basing single-counterparty credit limits on 
tier 1 capital for firms with $250 billion or more in total assets 
appears to be limited. As of December 31, 2016, tier 1 capital 
represented approximately 84 percent of the total regulatory capital 
plus ALLL for these firms. Further, the quantitative impact study Board 
staff conducted to help gauge the likely effects of the proposed 
requirements suggests that using tier 1 capital as the eligible capital 
base for bank holding companies with $250 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets or $10 billion or more in total on-balance-sheet 
foreign exposures likely would increase the total amount of excess 
exposure among U.S. bank holding companies by approximately $30 
billion. This incremental amount of excess credit exposure could be 
largely eliminated by firms through compression of derivatives, 
collection of additional collateral from counterparties, greater use of 
central clearing, and modest rebalancing of portfolios among 
counterparties. The revised treatment for calculating net credit 
exposure from securities financing transactions should also reduce this 
exposure. For all these reasons, the Board has determined that it is 
appropriate to apply a more stringent SCCL of 25 percent of tier 1 
capital to covered companies to mitigate risks to the financial 
stability of the United States.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(2). In contrast, the SCCL for a U.S. 
IHC with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets but less 
than $250 billion in total consolidated assets are based on the U.S. 
IHC's total regulatory capital plus ALLL. See final rule Sec.  
252.172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. 15 Percent of Tier 1 Capital Limit
    The 15 percent of tier 1 capital limit that applies to credit 
exposures of a major covered company to a major counterparty reflects 
the financial stability consequences associated with such credit 
extensions. A credit extension between a major covered company and a 
major counterparty is expected to result in a heightened degree of 
credit risk to the major covered company relative to the case in which 
a major covered company extends credit to a counterparty that is not a 
major counterparty. The heightened credit risk arises because major 
covered companies and major counterparties are often engaged in common 
business lines and often have common counterparties and common funding 
sources. This creates a significant degree of commonality in their 
economic performance. In

[[Page 38472]]

particular, factors that would likely cause the distress of a major 
counterparty would also likely be expected simultaneously to adversely 
affect a major covered company that has extended credit to the major 
counterparty. As a result, such credit extensions would be expected to 
present more credit risk and greater potential for financial 
instability than a credit extension made by a major covered company to 
a counterparty that is not a major counterparty.
    In the white paper that was released in conjunction with the 
proposal, Board staff analyzed data on the default correlation between 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) as well as data 
on the default correlation between SIFIs and a sample of non-SIFI 
companies.\74\ The analysis supports the view that the correlation 
between SIFIs, and hence the correlation between major covered 
companies and major counterparties, is measurably higher than the 
correlation between SIFIs and other companies. This finding further 
supports the view that credit extensions between SIFIs, and hence by a 
major covered company to a major counterparty, present a higher degree 
of risk and the potential for greater financial instability than credit 
extensions of a major covered company to a non-major counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \74\ See, ``Calibrating the Single-Counterparty Credit Limit 
between Systemically Important Financial Institutions,'' May 4, 
2016, https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/sccl-paper-20160304.pdf. For purposes of the white paper, SIFIs include 
global systemically important banking organizations and nonbank 
financial companies designated by FSOC for supervision by the Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters contended that the credit limit on exposures to 
major counterparties should reflect a reduced probability of default of 
such major counterparties resulting from a range of post-crisis 
reforms. The Board disagrees with this approach. SCCL are, by their 
nature, simple and transparent limits that do not depend on the 
probability of default of any individual counterparty. As a specific 
example, the general 25 percent limit does not recognize any difference 
in the probability of default between counterparties. Moreover, the 
SCCL are designed to protect against counterparty default and hence 
explicitly assume the default of the counterparty in question 
regardless of the likelihood of such an event. Accordingly, it would be 
inconsistent with the general motivation for counterparty credit limits 
to differentiate based on perceived differences in credit quality.
    Because credit extensions of a major covered company to a major 
counterparty present a heightened degree of credit risk and a greater 
potential for heightened financial instability and to mitigate risks to 
the financial stability of the United States, the Board has determined 
that it is appropriate to apply a more stringent SCCL for credit 
extensions between a major covered company and a major counterparty of 
15 percent of tier 1 capital.\75\ The more stringent credit limit of 15 
percent of tier 1 capital is informed by the results of a credit risk 
model that is described in detail in the white paper. More 
specifically, data on correlations, as described above, is used to 
calibrate a credit risk model. The credit risk model is then used to 
set the single-counterparty credit limit between SIFIs such that the 
amount of credit risk that a SIFI is permitted to incur through 
extensions of credit to another SIFI is no greater than the amount of 
credit risk that the SIFI would be permitted to incur through 
extensions of credit to a non-SIFI under the 25 percent limit 
applicable to such exposures. The resulting calibrated model produces 
inter-SIFI single-counterparty credit limits that are in line with the 
proposed limit of 15 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An additional factor that is not considered explicitly in the 
context of the white paper's credit risk model, but which should 
influence the calibration of the credit limit between major covered 
companies and major counterparties, is the relative difference in 
adverse consequences arising from multiple SIFI defaults relative to 
the default of a SIFI and non-SIFI counterparty. The financial 
stability consequences of multiple SIFI defaults caused by the default 
of a SIFI borrower and the resulting default of a SIFI lender are 
likely substantially greater than the adverse consequences that would 
result from the default of a single SIFI lender and a single non-SIFI 
borrower. As a result, there is a compelling rationale to require that 
credit risk posed by inter-SIFI credit extensions be materially smaller 
than that posed by credit extensions between a SIFI lender and non-SIFI 
borrower. This consideration suggests that an appropriate inter-SIFI 
single-counterparty credit limit would be even lower than the 15 
percent limit suggested by the calibrated credit risk model that is 
presented in the white paper. The Board has considered the case for an 
even more stringent credit limit on such inter-SIFI exposures and has 
decided not to lower the limit so as not to unduly constrain the 
ability of large banking organizations to engage in transactions that 
are a necessary part of their business and banking models. Accordingly, 
the 15 percent of tier 1 capital single-counterparty credit limit on 
credit exposures of a major covered company to a major counterparty 
should help to mitigate risks to U.S. financial stability while also 
allowing large banking organizations to continue to transact with each 
other as needed on a commercial basis.

C. Gross Credit Exposure

    Under the proposal, gross credit exposure would have been defined 
to mean, with respect to any credit transaction, the credit exposure of 
the covered company to the counterparty before adjusting for the effect 
of any qualifying master netting agreements, eligible collateral, 
eligible guarantees, eligible credit derivatives and eligible equity 
derivatives, other eligible hedges (i.e., a short position in the 
counterparty's debt or equity securities), and any unused portion of 
certain extensions of credit.\76\ No comments were received on the 
definition of ``gross credit exposure'' or ``credit transaction,'' and 
the final rule continues to define these terms in the same manner as 
the proposal.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \76\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(r). Section 252.74 of the 
proposed rule explains how these adjustments are made.
    \77\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(t) & (h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 252.73 of the proposal described how the gross credit 
exposure of a covered company to a counterparty would have been 
calculated for each type of credit transaction described above.\78\ In 
general, the methodologies contained in the proposed rule are similar 
to those used to calculate credit exposure under the standardized risk-
based capital rules for bank holding companies.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.73(a)(1)-(12).
    \79\ 12 CFR part 217, subpart D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 252.73 of the final rule describes how the gross credit 
exposure of a covered company to a counterparty should be calculated 
for each type of credit transaction. In general, the methodologies 
contained in the final rule are the same as those under the proposal, 
other than the calculation methodologies for certain derivative 
transactions and securities financing transactions, which have been 
modified to address comments received and are similar to those used to 
calculate credit exposure under the standardized risk-based capital 
rules for bank holding companies.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \80\ Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 38473]]

1. Loans, Deposits, and Lines of Credit
    Section 165(e) provides that credit exposure includes all extension 
of credit to a company, including loans, deposits, and lines of 
credit.\81\ Consistent with the statutory definition of credit 
exposure, the proposed rule would have defined ``credit transaction'' 
to mean, with respect to a counterparty, any extension of credit to the 
counterparty, including loans, deposits, and lines of credit, but 
excluding advised or other uncommitted lines of credit. As noted, the 
proposal provided that the gross credit exposure for loans by a covered 
company to the counterparty and leases in which the covered company is 
the lessor and the counterparty is the lessee, would have been equal to 
the amount owed by the counterparty to the covered company under the 
transaction. The final rule retains this treatment.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(3)(A).
    \82\ See final rule Sec.  252.73(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Debt and Equity Securities
    Similar to the proposal, under the final rule, trading and 
available-for-sale debt securities held by the covered company, as well 
as equity securities, are valued for purposes of single-counterparty 
credit limits based on their market value. This approach requires a 
covered company to revalue upwards the amount of an investment in such 
securities when the market value of the securities increases. In these 
circumstances, the revaluation would reflect the covered company's 
greater financial exposure to the counterparty and would reduce the 
covered company's ability to engage in additional transactions with the 
counterparty. In circumstances where the market value of the securities 
falls, however, a covered company would revalue downwards its exposure 
to the issuer of the securities. This reflects the fact that, just as 
an increase in the value of a security results in greater exposure to 
the issuer of that security, a decrease in the value of the security 
leaves a firm with less exposure to that issuer.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See final rule Sec.  252.73(a)(2) and (3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Securities Financing Transactions
    The proposal addressed the valuation of a securities financing 
transaction that is subject to a bilateral netting agreement and meets 
the definition of a ``repo-style'' transaction in the section dealing 
with calculation of net credit exposure. To enhance clarity, the Board 
now addresses the valuation of securities financing transactions, 
including those subject to a bilateral netting agreement that meet the 
definition of ``repo-style'' transaction, in the gross credit exposure 
section of the final rule.
    Under the proposal, exposure from such a transaction generally 
would have been equal to an exposure at default amount as modified 
based on certain standardized collateral haircuts.\84\ A covered 
company would not have been permitted to apply its own internal 
estimates for haircuts. Further, in calculating its net credit exposure 
to a counterparty due to such transactions, a covered company would 
have been required to disregard any collateral received from that 
counterparty that is not eligible collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.73(a)(4)-(7) & 252.74(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposal also would have required a covered company to 
recognize a credit exposure to any issuer of eligible collateral 
provided in connection with the securities financing transaction. The 
amount of credit exposure to the issuer would have been equal to the 
market value of the collateral minus standardized supervisory haircuts. 
However, the amount of the credit exposure to the issuer of the 
collateral would have been capped at the gross credit exposure to the 
counterparty on the original credit transaction.
    As noted, commenters objected to the proposed methodology for 
netting securities financing transactions as overly conservative and 
highly risk-insensitive. The commenters generally argued that the 
proposed approach implied unrealistic assumptions about correlations 
among securities that a covered company transfers to its counterparty 
and receives from that counterparty. For example, if a covered company 
loans equity securities to a counterparty and receives equity 
securities from the counterparty as collateral, the proposed 
methodology implied that, upon the counterparty's default, the value of 
the equities transferred to the counterparty would increase in value 
while the value of the equities received would decrease in value. These 
commenters urged the Board to permit a covered company to use any 
methodology permitted under the risk-based capital rules, consistent 
with the proposal's approach for measuring derivative exposures, 
including any revisions to the risk-based capital rules. Commenters 
argued that securities lending plays a critical role in the broader 
U.S. securities markets and flaws in the securities financing 
transaction measurement methodology that have the potential to cause 
covered companies to pull back from this activity as a result of a 
significant overstatement of risk could have real market consequences.
    In response to comments, the final rule includes a modified 
approach to securities financing transactions. The methodology that 
would have applied to securities financing transactions under the 
proposal could have overstated exposure from some transactions. In 
addition, the more risk-sensitive treatment of derivatives relative to 
securities financing transactions under the proposal could have 
artificially incentivized firms to engage in derivatives that are 
economically equivalent to securities financing transactions. 
Accordingly, the final rule allows covered companies to use any method 
that the company is authorized to use under the Board's capital rules, 
including, in certain circumstances, internal models to measure 
exposure to securities financing transactions.\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ See Sec.  252.73(a)(4) of the final rule. The Board may 
revisit the approach to securities financing transactions permitted 
under the capital rules in the future. See, e.g., Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms (Dec. 
2017), https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Derivatives
    The proposed SCCL rule drew a distinction between derivative 
transactions that were subject to a qualifying master netting agreement 
(QMNA) and derivatives that were not subject to such an agreement.\86\ 
Derivative transactions between the covered company and the 
counterparty that were not subject to a QMNA would have been valued 
based on the current exposure of the derivatives contract and its 
potential future exposure.\87\ Derivative transactions between the 
covered company and the counterparty subject to a QMNA would have been 
valued based on the exposure at default amount calculated using 
methodologies the covered company is permitted to use under subparts D 
and E of the Board's capital rules (12 CFR part 217).\88\ This approach 
would have allowed certain covered companies to calculate counterparty 
exposures for certain derivatives transactions subject to a QMNA using 
internal models.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ ``Qualifying master netting agreement'' is defined in Sec.  
252.71(cc) of the final rule by reference to the Board's capital 
rules.
    \87\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.73(a)(10).
    \88\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.73(a)(11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to credit derivative transactions between a covered 
company and a third party, where the covered company is the protection 
provider and the reference asset is a debt investment in the 
counterparty, the credit exposure of the covered company to the 
counterparty is equal to the

[[Page 38474]]

maximum potential loss to the covered company on the transaction.\89\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ Under the proposal, this treatment would have applied to 
both equity derivatives and credit derivatives. See proposed rule 
Sec.  252.73(a)(12). Under the final rule, a covered company that is 
the protection provider on an equity derivative will apply the same 
treatment as under the Board's capital rules. See final rule Sec.  
252.73(7)-(8). ``Credit derivative'' is defined in Sec.  252.71(g) 
of the final rule, and ``equity derivative'' is defined in Sec.  
252.71(p) of the final rule. ``Derivative transaction'' is defined 
in Sec.  252.71(j) of the final rule in the same manner as it is 
defined in the National Bank Act, as amended by section 610 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act. See 12 U.S.C. 84(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While commenters generally supported the valuation of derivative 
transactions under the proposal, certain commenters recommended that 
the final rule measure the credit exposure amount for derivatives that 
are not subject to a QMNA in a manner consistent with the proposed 
rule's measurement of the credit exposure amount for derivatives that 
are subject to a QMNA--that is, by permitting measurement using 
internal model methodologies for measuring credit exposure amounts 
(IMM). These commenters argued that requiring a different approach 
would introduce unnecessary operational complexity by subjecting the 
same set of derivative transactions to two different credit exposure 
calculations depending on whether the derivatives are subject to a QMNA 
without any apparent prudential benefit. These commenters also 
expressed the view that allowing IMM with respect to derivatives that 
are not subject to a QMNA would maintain internal consistency within 
the final rule and be consistent with the risk-based capital rules more 
generally.
    In response to comments, the Board has modified the proposed rule 
to allow a covered company to use any methodology that the covered 
company is authorized to use under the capital rules to value a 
derivatives transaction. Thus, to the extent that a covered company is 
authorized to use a particular approach, including an internal model, 
to value a derivatives transaction under the capital rules, the covered 
company is authorized to use the same approach to value the transaction 
under the final rule.
5. Collateral in Custody
    The proposal explained that, with respect to cleared and uncleared 
derivatives, the amount of initial margin and excess variation margin 
(that is, variation margin in excess of that needed to secure the mark-
to-market value of a derivative) posted to a bilateral or central 
counterparty would have been treated as credit exposure to the 
counterparty unless the margin is held in a segregated account at a 
third-party custodian. Certain commenters urged the Board to make clear 
that all collateral posted to counterparties and held in segregated 
accounts at third-party custodians would not be treated as credit 
exposure to the counterparty (i.e., the custodian) and that this 
treatment be codified in the final rule. The Board notes that initial 
margin and excess variation margin that is posted to a bilateral or 
central counterparty and held in a segregated account by a third-party 
custodian are not subject to counterparty risk with respect to the 
third-party custodian. Therefore, a covered company is not required 
under the final rule to calculate gross credit exposure to a third 
party acting solely as a custodian with respect to collateral held in a 
segregated account with that custodian.
6. Investments in and Exposures to Securitization Vehicles, Investment 
Funds, and Other Special Purpose Vehicles That Are Not Subsidiaries
    Under the proposal, a covered company with $250 billion in total 
consolidated assets or $10 billion in total on-balance-sheet foreign 
exposures would have calculated its gross credit exposure arising from 
investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, investment 
funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not subsidiaries of 
the covered company pursuant to Sec.  252.75 of the proposed rule. The 
final rule, like the proposal, directs a covered company to calculate 
its gross credit exposure to such entities pursuant to Sec.  252.75 of 
the final rule. A discussion of this valuation methodology, including 
comments received on the proposal's valuation methodology, follows in 
section II.E. infra.
7. Attribution Rule
    Just as in the proposal, Sec.  252.73(c) of the final rule includes 
the statutory attribution rule, which provides that a covered company 
must treat a transaction with any person as a credit exposure to a 
counterparty to the extent the proceeds of the transaction are used for 
the benefit of, or transferred to, that party.\90\ This attribution 
rule seeks to prevent firms from evading the single-counterparty credit 
limits by using intermediaries and thereby avoiding a direct credit 
transaction with a particular counterparty. The attribution rule in the 
final rule is similar to that of the proposed rule, except that the 
final rule refers to a ``party'' rather than a ``counterparty'' to 
follow more closely the terms of section 165(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \90\ See final rule Sec.  252.73(c); see also 12 U.S.C. 
5365(e)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is the Board's intention to avoid interpreting the attribution 
rule in a manner that would impose undue burden on covered companies by 
requiring firms to monitor and trace the proceeds of transactions made 
in the ordinary course of business. In general, credit exposures 
resulting from transactions made in the ordinary course of business 
will not be subject to the attribution rule.

D. Net Credit Exposure

    Section 252.74 of the proposed rule explained how a covered company 
would have converted gross credit exposure amounts to net credit 
exposure amounts by taking into account eligible collateral, eligible 
guarantees, eligible credit and equity derivatives, other eligible 
hedges (for example, a short position in the counterparty's debt or 
equity securities), and for securities financing transactions, the 
effect also of bilateral netting agreements.\91\ The key difference 
between these two amounts is that a company's net credit exposure would 
take into account any available credit risk mitigants, such as 
collateral, guarantees, credit or equity derivatives, and other hedges, 
provided the credit risk mitigants meet certain requirements in the 
rule, as discussed more fully below. For example, if a covered company 
had $100 in gross credit exposure to a counterparty with respect to a 
particular credit transaction, and the counterparty pledged collateral 
with an adjusted market value of $50, the full amount of which 
qualified as ``eligible collateral'' under the rule, the covered 
company's net credit exposure to the counterparty on the transaction 
would be $50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \91\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In order to calculate its aggregate net credit exposure to a 
counterparty under the proposed rule, a covered company first would 
have calculated its gross credit exposure to a counterparty on each 
credit transaction in accordance with certain valuation and other 
requirements under the rule. Second, the covered company would have 
reduced its gross credit exposure amount, based on eligible credit risk 
mitigants, to determine its net credit exposure for each credit 
transaction with the counterparty. Third and finally, the covered 
company would have summed all of its net credit exposures to the 
counterparty to calculate the covered company's aggregate net credit 
exposure to the counterparty. It is this final amount, the

[[Page 38475]]

aggregate net credit exposure, that would have been subject to the 
SCCL.
    With respect to a credit exposure involving eligible collateral or 
an eligible guarantor,\92\ the proposed rule would have applied a 
``risk-shifting'' approach. In general, any reduction in the exposure 
amount to the original counterparty relating to the eligible collateral 
or eligible guarantor would result in a dollar-for-dollar increase in 
exposure to the eligible collateral issuer or eligible guarantor (as 
applicable). For example, in the case discussed above where a covered 
company had $100 in gross credit exposure to a counterparty and the 
counterparty pledged collateral with an adjusted market value of $50, 
the covered company would have net credit exposure to the counterparty 
on the transaction of $50 and net credit exposure to the issuer of the 
collateral of $50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ The proposal referred to an ``eligible protection 
provider'' instead of an ``eligible guarantor.'' For simplicity, the 
final rule refers to ``eligible guarantor,'' which is the term used 
in the Board's capital rules. The definition of ``eligible 
guarantor'' in the final rule is unchanged from the proposal. See 
final rule Sec.  252.71(o).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, in cases where a covered company hedged its exposure to an 
entity that is not a ``financial entity'' (a non-financial entity) 
using an eligible credit or equity derivative, and the underlying 
exposure is subject to the Board's market risk capital rule (12 CFR 
part 217, subpart F), the covered company would have calculated its 
exposure to the eligible guarantor using methodologies that it is 
permitted to use under the Board's risk-based capital rules.\93\ The 
final rule follows the same general approach to the calculation of net 
credit exposure as the proposal, with modifications as discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(e)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Collateral
    Section 252.74(c) of the proposed rule describes how eligible 
collateral would have been taken into account in the calculation of net 
credit exposure.\94\ Under the proposal, the net credit exposure of a 
covered company to a counterparty on a credit transaction would have 
been the gross credit exposure of the covered company on the 
transaction minus the adjusted market value of any eligible collateral 
related to the transaction. In addition, under the proposal, a covered 
company generally would have been required to recognize a credit 
exposure to the collateral issuer in an amount equal to the adjusted 
market value of the collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See proposed rule Sec. Sec.  252.71(k) & 252.74(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certain commenters argued that eligible margin loans should not be 
subject to the risk-shifting requirement under the final rule. These 
commenters contended that ``risk-shifting'' to the eligible collateral 
issuer in the case of margin lending accounts would introduce a 
significant and unnecessary operational burden as it would require a 
covered company to identify each collateral issuer and shift 
individually relatively small dollar amounts of such exposures to each 
collateral issuer for each of these small exposures.
    The final rule does not exclude margin loans from the risk-shifting 
requirements. The final rule contains no de minimis risk-shifting 
exception for any specific loan type, and margin loans do not have any 
special characteristics that would justify special treatment for margin 
loans relative to other credit transactions.
    In computing its net credit exposure to a counterparty with respect 
to a credit transaction under the proposed rule, a covered company 
would have been required to reduce its gross credit exposure on the 
transaction by the adjusted market value of any eligible 
collateral.\95\ Other than in the context of repo-style transactions, 
the ``adjusted market value'' of eligible collateral would have been 
defined to mean the fair market value of the eligible collateral after 
the application of certain haircuts.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \95\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(c).
    \96\ Table 1 to section 217.132 of the Board's capital rules (12 
CFR 217.132, tbl. 1) provides haircuts for multiple collateral 
types, including some types that do not meet the proposed definition 
of ``eligible collateral.'' Notwithstanding the inclusion of those 
collateral types in the reference table, a company cannot reduce its 
gross credit exposure for a transaction with a counterparty based on 
the adjusted market value of collateral that does not meet the 
definition of ``eligible collateral.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule follows the same general approach. The net credit 
exposure of a covered company to a counterparty on a credit transaction 
under the final rule is the gross credit exposure of the covered 
company on the transaction minus the adjusted market value of any 
eligible collateral related to the transaction.\97\ In addition, under 
the final rule, a covered company generally must recognize a credit 
exposure to the collateral issuer in an amount equal to the adjusted 
market value of the collateral.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ As discussed below, the final rule treats eligible 
collateral as a gross credit exposure to the collateral issuer under 
the Board's authority under 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(3)(F).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule treats eligible collateral as a gross credit 
exposure to the collateral issuer under the Board's authority under 
section 165(e) to determine that any other similar transaction is a 
credit exposure.\98\ This approach will help to promote a covered 
company's careful monitoring of its direct and indirect credit 
exposures. In order not to discourage overcollateralization, however, a 
covered company's maximum credit exposure to the collateral issuer is 
limited to the credit exposure to the original counterparty (unless the 
counterparty is exempt or excluded from the rule).\99\ A covered 
company would continue to have credit exposure to the original 
counterparty to the extent that the adjusted market value of the 
eligible collateral does not equal the full amount of the credit 
exposure to the original counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \98\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(3)(F).
    \99\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(b)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amount of credit exposure to the original counterparty and the 
issuer of the eligible collateral would fluctuate over time based on 
the adjusted market value of the eligible collateral. Collateral that 
previously met the definition of eligible collateral under the rule but 
over time ceases to do so would no longer be eligible to reduce gross 
credit exposure to the original counterparty. Covered companies will 
need to monitor the adjusted market value and eligibility of all 
collateral under the final rule. To the extent the adjusted market 
value of collateral has increased or declined, the covered company 
would need to adjust its exposures to the original counterparty and 
issuer of collateral as appropriate. To the extent that collateral no 
longer meets the definition of eligible collateral, the covered company 
would need to recognize an exposure to the original counterparty.
    Example: A covered company (Company A) makes a $1,000 loan to a 
counterparty (Company B), creating $1,000 of gross credit exposure to 
that counterparty, and the counterparty provides eligible collateral 
issued by a third party (Company C) that has an adjusted market value 
of $700 on day 1. Company A is required to reduce its credit exposure 
to Company B by the adjusted market value of the eligible collateral. 
As a result, on day 1, Company A has gross credit exposure of $700 to 
Company C and $300 net credit exposure to Company B.
    As noted, the amount of credit exposure to the original 
counterparty and the issuer of the eligible collateral will fluctuate 
over time based on movements in the adjusted market value of the 
eligible collateral. If the adjusted market value of the eligible 
collateral decreased to $400 on day 2 in the previous example, on day 2 
Company A's net credit exposure to Company B would increase to $600, 
and its gross

[[Page 38476]]

credit exposure to Company C would decrease to $400. By contrast, if on 
day 3 the adjusted market value of the eligible collateral increased to 
$800, on day 3 Company A's net credit exposure to Company B would 
decrease to $200, and its gross credit exposure to Company C would 
increase to $800. In each case, the covered company's total credit 
exposure would be capped at the original amount of the exposure created 
by the loan or $1,000--even if the adjusted market value of the 
eligible collateral exceeded $1,000.
    Finally, in cases where eligible collateral is issued by an issuer 
covered by one of the exemptions in Sec.  252.77 of the final rule or 
that is excluded from the definition of ``counterparty,'' the 
requirement to recognize an exposure to the collateral issuer does not 
apply.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \100\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(g)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example: A covered company makes a $1,000 loan to a counterparty 
and that counterparty has pledged as collateral U.S. government bonds 
with an adjusted market value of $1,000. In this case, the covered 
company does not have any net credit exposure to the original 
counterparty because the value of the loan and the adjusted market 
value of the U.S. government bonds are equal. Although the covered 
company has $1,000 of exposure to the U.S. government, single-
counterparty credit limits do not apply to that exposure because U.S. 
government bonds are excluded from the single-counterparty credit 
limits of the final rule.
2. Eligible Guarantees
    Section 252.74(d) of the proposed rule described how to reflect 
eligible guarantees in calculations of net credit exposure to a 
counterparty.\101\ Eligible guarantees would have been defined as 
guarantees that meet certain conditions, including having been written 
by an eligible protection provider.\102\ The proposal would have 
defined ``eligible protection provider'' in the same way as ``eligible 
guarantor'' in Sec.  217.2 of the Board's capital rules. As such, an 
eligible protection provider would have included a sovereign entity, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, a Federal 
Home Loan Bank, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer 
Mac), a multilateral development bank (MDB), a depository institution, 
a bank holding company, a savings and loan holding company, a credit 
union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying central counterparty. An 
eligible protection provider also would have included any entity, other 
than a special purpose entity, (i) that at the time the guarantee is 
issued or anytime thereafter, has issued and maintains outstanding an 
unsecured debt security without credit enhancement that is investment 
grade, (ii) whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with 
the credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees, 
and (iii) that is not an insurance company engaged predominantly in the 
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond 
insurer or re-insurer). No comments were received on this aspect of the 
proposal, and the final rule is substantively the same as the proposal 
with respect to the treatment of eligible guarantees. However, for 
simplicity, the final rule refers to ``eligible guarantor'' instead of 
``eligible protection provider,'' as that is the term used in the 
Board's capital rules. The definition of ``eligible guarantor'' in the 
final rule is unchanged from the proposal.\103\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(d).
    \102\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(n) for the definition of 
``eligible guarantee,'' including a description of the requirements 
of an eligible guarantee.
    \103\ See final rule Sec.  252.71(o).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In calculating its net credit exposure to the counterparty under 
the final rule, as in the proposal, a covered company is required to 
reduce its gross credit exposure to the counterparty by the amount of 
any eligible guarantee from an eligible guarantor.\104\ As with other 
types of eligible collateral, the covered company would then include 
the amount of the eligible guarantee when calculating its gross credit 
exposure to the eligible guarantor.\105\ In addition, as with eligible 
collateral, a covered company's gross credit exposure to an eligible 
guarantor (with respect to an eligible guarantee) could not exceed its 
gross credit exposure to the original counterparty on the credit 
transaction prior to recognition of the eligible guarantee.\106\ 
Accordingly, the exposure to the eligible guarantor would be capped at 
the amount of the credit exposure to the original counterparty, even if 
the amount of the eligible guarantee is larger than the original 
exposure. A covered company would continue to have credit exposure to 
the original counterparty to the extent that the eligible guarantee is 
for an amount less than the full amount of the credit exposure to the 
original counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(c).
    \105\ See id.
    \106\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example: A covered company makes a $1,000 loan to an unaffiliated 
counterparty and obtains a $700 eligible guarantee on the loan from an 
eligible guarantor. The covered company has gross credit exposure of 
$700 to the protection provider as a result of the eligible guarantee 
and $300 net credit exposure to the original counterparty.
    Example: A covered company makes a $1,000 loan to an unaffiliated 
counterparty and obtains a $1,500 eligible guarantee from an eligible 
guarantor. The covered company has $1,000 gross credit exposure to the 
protection provider (capped at the amount of the exposure to the 
unaffiliated counterparty), but the covered company has no net credit 
exposure to the original counterparty as a result of the eligible 
guarantee.
    As with eligible collateral, a covered company is required to 
reduce its gross exposure to a counterparty by the amount of an 
eligible guarantee in order to ensure that concentrations in exposures 
to guarantors are captured by the risk-shifting approach. This 
requirement was meant to limit the ability of a covered company to 
extend loans or other forms of credit to a large number of high-risk 
borrowers that are guaranteed by a single guarantor.
3. Eligible Credit and Equity Derivative Hedges
    Under the proposal, a covered company would have been required to 
reduce its gross credit exposure to a counterparty by the notional 
amount of any eligible credit or equity derivative that references the 
counterparty if the covered company obtains the derivative from an 
eligible protection provider.\107\ In these circumstances, the covered 
company generally would have been required to include the notional 
amount of the eligible credit or equity derivative hedge in calculating 
its gross credit exposure to the eligible protection provider.\108\ 
However, in cases where the eligible credit or equity derivative was 
used to hedge covered positions subject to the Board's market risk rule 
(12 CFR part 217, subpart F) \109\ and the counterparty on the hedged 
transaction was not a financial entity, the covered company would only 
have been required to recognize a credit exposure to the eligible 
protection provider using methodologies that the covered company is 
authorized to use under the Board's capital rules (12 CFR part 217, 
subparts D and E), rather than the notional amount. Under the proposal, 
an eligible protection provider would have been defined to have the 
same

[[Page 38477]]

meaning as the definition of ``eligible guarantor'' in the Board's 
capital rules.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(e).
    \108\ Id.
    \109\ ``Covered position'' is defined in 12 CFR 217.202.
    \110\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.71(o).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One commenter expressed support for the notional amount transfer of 
exposure to the protection provider. This commenter, however, objected 
to the transfer of exposure to the protection provider using the 
Board's risk-based capital rules in the case where the hedged 
transaction is a non-financial entity. This commenter argued that this 
approach was effectively a loophole in the exposure calculation that 
would create incentives for a bank to transfer risks to third parties 
rather than developing a solid underwriting analysis of their 
counterparties.
    Certain commenters objected to the treatment of equity derivatives 
under the proposal. These commenters argued that equity derivatives 
that are covered positions under the market risk rule should be 
calculated as part of a covered company's net long or net short 
position with respect to a given issuer in a manner more generally 
aligned with how exposure amounts are calculated for such positions 
under the market risk rule. Commenters contended that this approach, 
rather than the approach under the proposal to treat equity derivatives 
in a manner equivalent to instruments designed to offer credit 
protection, would be consistent with the applicable risk-based capital 
rules and the large exposure standard.
    Some commenters argued that purchased credit and equity derivatives 
when calculating net exposure for covered positions in the trading book 
should not be subject to the requirement to be purchased from an 
eligible protection provider. These commenters argued that permitting 
only credit and equity derivatives purchased from eligible protection 
providers to reduce a gross exposure conflicts with the nature of 
trading book positions and impacts the utility of derivatives purchased 
from protection providers that do not meet the eligibility criteria. As 
such, these commenters requested that the rule allow risk-shifting to a 
protection provider that is not an ``eligible protection provider.''
    More broadly, a few commenters expressed the view that credit 
default swaps should not be used to reduce the calculation of exposure, 
noting that the experience of American International Group during the 
crisis demonstrates how the credit default swap itself can be worthless 
and argued this could be a potential loophole in the final rule. For 
example, one commenter requested that any obligations of a counterparty 
to a covered company be recognized directly, regardless of whether the 
covered company has taken an offsetting position. This commenter 
generally opposed the netting of derivative positions. Another 
commenter urged that dollar-for-dollar risk shifting is appropriate but 
calculation of exposure based upon any method permitted in the risk-
based capital rules where the reference asset obligor is not a 
financial entity would result in much less than dollar-for-dollar risk 
shifting since the risk-based capital rules do not require derivatives 
to be measured at their full notional value.
    After considering the comments on the proposal, the Board has 
determined not to modify the treatment of eligible credit and equity 
derivatives in the manner suggested by commenters. The Board believes 
that the treatment in the final rule is reflective of the nature of 
credit and equity derivatives. Equity derivatives shift risk from 
underlying equities in the same manner as credit derivatives shift risk 
from underlying credit instruments. Moreover, there is no basis for a 
distinction between trading book and banking book products under a 
credit exposure regime.
    Section 252.74(d) of the final rule sets forth the treatment of 
eligible credit and equity derivatives, in the case where the covered 
company is the protection purchaser.\111\ In the case where a covered 
company is a protection purchaser, such derivatives can be used to 
mitigate gross credit exposure. A covered company may only recognize 
eligible credit and equity derivative hedges for purposes of 
calculating net credit exposure under the final rule. These derivatives 
are required to meet certain criteria, including having been written by 
an eligible guarantor.\112\ An eligible credit derivative hedge is 
required to be simple in form, meaning a single-name or standard, non-
tranched index credit derivative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(d).
    \112\ See final rule Sec. Sec.  252.71(l) and (m) defining 
``eligible credit derivative'' and ``eligible equity derivative,'' 
respectively. ``Eligible guarantor'' is defined in Sec.  252.71(o) 
of the final rule. The same types of organizations that are eligible 
guarantors for the purposes of eligible guarantees are eligible 
guarantors for purposes of eligible credit and equity derivatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where protection is obtained, a covered company must recognize 
exposure to an eligible guarantor.\113\ Accordingly, under the final 
rule, a covered company is required to reduce its gross credit exposure 
to a counterparty by the notional amount of any eligible credit 
derivative hedge that references the counterparty if the covered 
company obtains the derivative from an eligible guarantor.\114\ In 
these circumstances, the covered company generally will be required to 
include the notional amount of the eligible credit derivative hedge in 
calculating its gross credit exposure to the eligible guarantor.\115\ 
Similarly, a covered company is required to shift its gross credit 
exposure from a counterparty to an eligible guarantor in any case where 
the covered company obtains an eligible equity derivative hedge that 
references the counterparty from such eligible guarantor. As is the 
case for eligible collateral and eligible guarantees, the gross 
exposure to the eligible guarantor would in no event be greater than it 
was to the original counterparty prior to recognition of the eligible 
credit or equity derivative.\116\ In cases where a covered company is 
required to shift its credit exposure from the counterparty to an 
eligible guarantor under the final rule, the covered company is 
permitted to exclude the relevant equity or credit derivative when 
calculating its gross exposure to the eligible guarantor. This is to 
avoid requiring covered companies to double count the same exposures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ As noted, the final rule replaces the term ``eligible 
protection provider'' with ``eligible guarantor,'' as that is the 
term used in the Board's capital rules. The definition of the term 
in the final rule is unchanged from the proposal.
    \114\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(d).
    \115\ See final rule Sec. Sec.  252.74(d)(1)-(2).
    \116\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board also has determined not to make the changes requested by 
commenters to allow requiring risk-shifting to protection providers 
that do not meet the definition of ``eligible guarantor.'' Limiting 
exposures to a large protection provider is an important feature of the 
final rule. As with eligible collateral and eligible guarantees, a 
covered company is required to reduce its gross exposure to a 
counterparty by the amount of an eligible equity or credit derivative, 
and to recognize an exposure to an eligible guarantor, in order to 
ensure that concentrations in exposures to eligible guarantors are 
captured in the regime.
    The Board believes that the quality and creditworthiness of the 
protection provider is an important consideration when assessing the 
likelihood that the purchased protection would be provided in the event 
of a large counterparty default. Moreover, the Board notes that many 
positions subject to the Board's market risk rule represent mark-to-
market positions that are intended to hedge market movement on a day-
to-day basis and are not always intended to hedge against extreme 
default events. Accordingly, there is no inconsistency in the final 
rule's

[[Page 38478]]

requirement that protection be purchased from an eligible guarantor.
    For eligible credit and equity derivatives that are used to hedge 
covered positions subject to the Board's market risk rule (12 CFR part 
217, subpart F),\117\ the approach is the same as that explained above, 
except in the case of credit derivatives where the counterparty on the 
hedged transaction is not a financial entity.\118\ In this case, a 
covered company is required to reduce its gross credit exposure to the 
counterparty on the hedged transaction by the notional amount of the 
eligible credit derivative that references the counterparty if the 
covered company obtains the derivative from an eligible guarantor. In 
addition, the covered company is required to recognize a credit 
exposure to the eligible guarantor that is measured using methodologies 
that the covered company is authorized to use under the Board's risk-
based capital rules (12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E), rather than 
the notional amount.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ ``Covered position'' is defined in 12 CFR 217.202.
    \118\ The revised definition of ``financial entity'' is 
explained above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule includes this treatment for credit and equity 
derivatives that are used to hedge covered positions subject to the 
market risk rule, where the credit or equity derivative is used to 
hedge an exposure to an entity that is not a financial entity. The 
final rule requires full notional risk-shifting for credit derivatives 
used to hedge exposures to financial entities because most protection 
providers are financial entities, and when both the protection provider 
and the reference entity are financial entities, the probability of 
correlated defaults generally is substantially greater than when 
protection is sold on non-financial reference entities.
    Example: A covered company holds a $1,000 bond issued by a non-
financial entity (for example, a commercial firm or non-excluded 
sovereign) that is a covered position subject to the Board's market 
risk rule, and the covered company purchases an eligible credit 
derivative in a notional amount of $800 from Protection Provider X, 
which is an eligible guarantor, to hedge its exposure to the non-
financial entity. The covered company continues to have $200 in net 
credit exposure to the non-financial entity. In addition, the covered 
company would treat Protection Provider X as a counterparty, and would 
measure its exposure to Protection Provider X using any methodology 
that the covered company is permitted to use under the Board's capital 
rules to calculate its risk-based capital requirements.
    Example: A covered company holds as a covered position subject to 
the Board's market risk rule a $1,000 bond issued by a financial entity 
(for example, a banking organization), and the covered company 
purchases an eligible credit derivative in a notional amount of $800 
from Protection Provider X, which is an eligible guarantor, to hedge 
its exposure to the financial entity. The covered company continues to 
have credit exposure of $200 to the underlying financial entity. In 
addition, the covered company now treats Protection Provider X as a 
counterparty, and has an $800 credit exposure to Protection Provider X.
4. Treatment of Maturity Mismatches
    Under the proposal, if the residual maturity of a credit risk 
mitigant was less than that of the underlying exposure, the credit risk 
mitigant would only have been recognized if the credit risk mitigant's 
original maturity were equal to or greater than one year and its 
residual maturity were not less than three months from the current 
date.\119\ In that case, the reduction in the underlying exposure would 
have been adjusted based on the same approach that is used in the 
Board's capital rules (12 CFR part 217) to address a maturity mismatch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \119\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(b)-(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters argued that credit and equity derivatives that are 
covered positions under the Board's market risk rule should not be 
subject to the maturity mismatch adjustments. These commenters argued 
that, in the trading book, maturity of purchased protection is less 
important as positions change frequently, are often not held to 
maturity, and additional extending protection can and would be 
purchased if necessary. Other commenters argued that no maturity 
mismatch should exist for securities financing transactions, consistent 
with the Board's capital rules.
    The Board has determined not to make the changes to the proposal 
recommended by commenters. The SCCL are point-in-time measures of 
exposure and generally are not designed to respond to anticipated 
future actions but to reflect actual credit exposure at the time the 
exposure amount is measured. If the residual maturity of a credit risk 
mitigant is less than that of the underlying exposure, the credit risk 
mitigant is only recognized under the final rule if the credit risk 
mitigant's original maturity is equal to or greater than one year and 
its residual maturity is not less than three months from the current 
date.\120\ In that case, the reduction in the underlying exposure would 
be adjusted based on the same approach that is used in the Board's 
capital rules (12 CFR part 217) to address a maturity mismatch.\121\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \120\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(i).
    \121\ A credit risk mitigant would be adjusted using the formula 
Pa = P x (t - 0.25)/(T - 0.25), where Pa is the value of the credit 
protection adjusted for maturity mismatch; P is the credit 
protection adjusted for any haircuts; t is the lesser of (1) T or 
(2) the residual maturity of the credit protection, expressed in 
years; and T is the lesser of (1) 5 or (2) the residual maturity of 
the exposure, expressed in years. See 12 CFR 217.36(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to the amount of exposure that a covered company is 
required to recognize to the issuer of eligible collateral or to an 
eligible guarantor in cases of maturity mismatch, such amount generally 
is equal to the amount by which the relevant form of credit risk 
mitigation has reduced the exposure to the original counterparty. 
However, in the case of credit and equity derivatives used to hedge 
exposures subject to the Board's market risk rule (12 CFR 217, subpart 
F) that are to counterparties that are non-financial entities, the 
covered company is permitted to recognize a credit exposure with regard 
to the eligible guarantor measured using methodologies that the covered 
company is authorized to use under the Board's capital rules (12 CFR 
217, subparts D and E).
    Example: A covered company makes a loan to a counterparty and 
hedges the resulting exposure by obtaining an eligible guarantee from 
an eligible guarantor. If the residual maturity of the guarantee were 
less than that of the loan, the covered company would adjust the value 
assigned to the guarantee using the formula in the Board's capital 
rules (12 CFR part 217). The covered company would then reduce its 
gross credit exposure to the underlying counterparty by the adjusted 
value of the guarantee and would set its exposure to the eligible 
guarantor equal to the adjusted value of the guarantee.
    Example: A covered company holds bonds issued by a non-financial 
entity that are subject to the Board's market risk rule, and hedges the 
exposure using an eligible credit derivative obtained from an eligible 
guarantor. If the residual maturity of the eligible credit derivative 
were less than that of the bonds, the covered company would reduce its 
exposure to the issuer of the bonds by the adjusted value of the credit 
derivative using the formula in the Board's capital rules. The covered

[[Page 38479]]

company would measure its exposure to the eligible guarantor using 
methodologies that the covered company is permitted to use under the 
Board's capital rules (12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E), without any 
specific adjustment to reflect the maturity mismatch between the bonds 
and the credit derivative.
5. Treatment of Currency Mismatch
    To provide additional clarity, the final rule includes a section 
regarding application of currency mismatch adjustments to certain 
credit risk mitigants--namely, eligible collateral, eligible 
guarantees, eligible equity derivatives, and eligible credit 
derivatives--in cases where the collateral or hedge is denominated in a 
different currency than the hedged exposure. As with several other 
aspects of the final rule, this treatment is consistent with the 
Board's capital rules. This section clarifies that a covered company 
that reduces its credit exposure to a counterparty under the final rule 
as a result of eligible collateral, an eligible guarantee, an eligible 
equity derivative, or an eligible credit derivative must apply the 
currency mismatch adjustment approach in the Board's capital rules, if 
applicable, when calculating the covered company's gross credit 
exposure to the issuer of eligible collateral or an eligible 
guarantor.\122\ As noted, a covered company that reduces its credit 
exposure to a counterparty as a result of such credit risk mitigants 
must calculate its gross credit exposure to an issuer of eligible 
collateral or an eligible guarantor even in cases where the underlying 
credit transaction would not be subject the credit limits of the final 
rule.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \122\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(h); see also 12 CFR 
217.37(c)(3)(ii) (providing the currency mismatch adjustments 
relevant to eligible collateral); 12 CFR 217.36(f) (providing the 
currency mismatch adjustments relevant to eligible guarantees, 
eligible credit deriatives, and eligible equity derivatives).
    \123\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(b)-(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To provide additional clarity, the final rule includes a section 
regarding application of cross-currency haircuts to certain credit risk 
mitigants, including eligible credit and equity derivatives. This 
section clarifies that a covered company that reduces its credit 
exposure to a counterparty under the final rule must apply the currency 
mismatch adjustment approach in the Board's capital rules (12 CFR 
217.36(f)), if applicable, when calculating the covered company's gross 
credit exposure to the eligible guarantor, including in instances where 
the underlying credit transaction would not be subject the credit 
limits of the final rule.\124\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(d) & (h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

6. Other Eligible Hedges
    Under the proposal, a covered company would have been allowed to 
reduce its credit exposure to a counterparty by the face amount of a 
short sale of the counterparty's debt or equity securities, provided 
that the instrument in which the covered company has a short position 
was junior to, or pari passu with, the instrument in which the covered 
company has the long position.\125\ This restriction on the set of 
short positions permitted to offset long positions would have helped to 
reduce the risk that any loss arising from the covered company's long 
exposure were not offset by a gain in the covered company's short 
exposure. No comments were received on this aspect of the proposal, and 
the final rule retains the approach from the proposal.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \125\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(f).
    \126\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example: A covered company holds $100 of bonds issued by Company X. 
If the covered company sells short $100 of equity shares issued by 
Company X, the covered company would not have any net credit exposure 
to Company X. Similarly, the covered company would not have any net 
credit exposure to Company X if it sells short $100 of Company X's debt 
obligations, provided that those obligations are junior to, or pari 
passu with, the Company X bonds that the covered company holds.
7. Unused Credit Lines
    Section 252.74(g) of the proposed rule addressed the calculation of 
the net credit exposure for any unused portion of certain extensions of 
credit. In computing its net credit exposure to a counterparty for a 
credit line or revolving credit facility, a covered company would have 
been permitted to reduce its gross credit exposure by the amount of the 
unused portion of the credit extension to the extent that the covered 
company did not have any legal obligation to advance additional funds 
under the facility until the counterparty provided the amount of 
adjusted market value of collateral that qualifies under the credit 
line or revolving credit facility with respect to the entire used 
portion of the facility.\127\ To qualify for this reduction, the credit 
contract governing the extension of credit would have been required to 
specify that any used portion of the credit extension must be fully 
secured at all times by collateral that is either (i) cash; (ii) 
obligations of the United States or its agencies; (iii) obligations 
directly and fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the 
Federal National Mortgage Association or the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation, but only while operating under the conservatorship or 
receivership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, or any additional 
obligations issued by a U.S. government-sponsored entity, as determined 
by the Board.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(g).
    \128\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters urged the Board to permit the full list of eligible 
collateral to qualify for this provision. Commenters also requested 
that the Board allow covered companies to apply the same credit 
conversion factors (CCF) to unfunded, off-balance sheet commitments as 
under the Board's capital rules rather than the proposed uniform 100 
percent CCF to all such commitments regardless of contractual 
provisions, to better reflect actual economic exposure.
    Under the final rule, in calculating net credit exposure to a 
counterparty for a credit line or revolving credit facility, a covered 
company is permitted to reduce its gross credit exposure by the amount 
of the unused portion of the credit extension, to the extent that the 
covered company does not have any legal obligation to advance 
additional funds under the facility until the counterparty provides the 
amount of adjusted market value of eligible collateral that qualifies 
under the credit line or revolving credit facility with respect to the 
entire used portion of the facility.\129\ In response to comments, this 
provision has been modified to make clear that any form of eligible 
collateral as defined in the final rule (and described above) can be 
used as collateral for this purpose. To ensure that the methodology is 
simple and transparent and reflects the true value of the exposure, the 
final rule does not, however, include credit conversion factors similar 
to the Board's capital rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \129\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

8. Credit Transactions Involving Exempt and Excluded Persons
    Under the proposed rule, if a covered company obtained eligible 
collateral from an entity that would have been exempt or excluded from 
the SCCL (e.g., the U.S. government or a foreign sovereign entity that 
receives a zero percent risk weight under the Board's capital rules), 
or obtained an eligible guarantee or an eligible credit or equity 
derivative from an eligible protection provider on an exposure to an 
exempt

[[Page 38480]]

or excluded entity, the covered company would have been required to 
recognize an exposure to the collateral issuer or eligible protection 
provider to the same extent as if the underlying exposure were to an 
entity that is not exempt.\130\ The Board did not receive comments on 
this aspect of the proposal, and the final rule follows the same 
approach to exempt and excluded entities as the proposal.\131\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.74(g).
    \131\ See final rule Sec.  252.74(g). As noted, the final rule 
replaces the term ``eligible protection provider'' with ``eligible 
guarantor,'' as that is the term used in the Board's capital rules. 
The definition of the term in the final rule is unchanged from the 
proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example: A covered company has purchased a credit derivative from 
an eligible guarantor to hedge the credit risk on a portfolio of U.S. 
government bonds. The covered company needs to recognize an exposure to 
the credit protection provider equal to the full notional of the credit 
derivative (if the bonds are subject to the Board's risk-based capital 
rules in 12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E) or to the counterparty 
credit risk measurements obtained by using methodologies that the 
covered company is permitted to use under the market risk capital rules 
(if the bonds are subject to the Board's market risk rule in 12 CFR 
part 217, subpart F).

E. Exposures to Securitization Funds, Investment Funds, or Other 
Special Purpose Vehicles

1. Look-Through Approach
    Special considerations arise in connection with measuring credit 
exposures of a covered company to a securitization fund, investment 
fund, or other special purpose vehicle (collectively, ``SPVs''). Under 
the proposed rule, large covered companies would have been required to 
analyze their credit exposure to the issuers of the underlying assets 
in an SPV in which the large covered company invests or to which the 
large covered company otherwise has credit exposure.\132\ If such 
company was able to demonstrate that its exposure to each underlying 
asset in an SPV were less than 0.25 percent of its tier 1 capital 
(considering only exposures that arise from the SPV), then the covered 
company would have been allowed to recognize an exposure solely to the 
SPV and not to the underlying assets.\133\ Conversely, if a large 
covered company was not able to demonstrate that its exposure to the 
issuer of each underlying asset held by an SPV were less than 0.25 
percent of the covered company's tier 1 capital, then the company would 
have been required to apply a ``look-through approach'' and recognize 
an exposure to each issuer of the assets held by the SPV that exceeded 
0.25 percent of its tier 1 capital.\134\ In the latter case, if a large 
covered company were required to apply the look-through approach, but 
was unable to identify an issuer of assets underlying an SPV, the 
covered company would have been required to attribute the exposure to a 
single ``unknown counterparty'' and aggregate all exposures to such 
unknown counterparties to a single counterparty.\135\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(a).
    \133\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(a)(3). The Board notes that 
a covered company's exposure to each underlying asset in an SPV 
necessarily would be less than 0.25 percent of the covered company's 
tier 1 capital if the covered company's entire investment in the SPV 
is less than 0.25 percent of the covered company's tier 1 capital.
    \134\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(a)(2).
    \135\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The application of the look-through approach would have depended on 
the nature of the investment of the covered company in the SPV. Where 
all investors in an SPV are pari passu, the covered company would have 
calculated its exposure to an issuer of assets held by the SPV as an 
amount equal to the covered company's pro rata share in the SPV 
multiplied by the value of the SPV's underlying assets issued by that 
issuer.\136\ Otherwise, where the investors do not rank pari passu, 
then the exposure to an issuer would have been calculated as the lower 
of either the value of the tranche in which the covered company has 
invested or the value of each asset attributed to the issuer--then 
multiplied by the covered company's pro rata share.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(b)(3)(i).
    \137\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(b)(3)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While one commenter expressed support for the look-through 
requirement, a number of commenters expressed the view that the look-
through approach was overbroad, complex, and unworkable as proposed. 
Commenters requested a number of modifications related to the 
proposal's look-through approach. Commenters urged the Board to clarify 
the scope of the look-through requirement. In particular, commenters 
argued that the look-through approach should only apply to exposures 
arising from cash investments in a securitization vehicle, investment 
fund, or other SPV and synthetic positions, such as derivative 
contracts or other instruments, that mirror the economics of a cash 
investment that are held in the banking book and exposures arising from 
extensions of credit and liquidity facilities that mimic the risks of 
such cash investments and that exceed 0.25 percent of the large covered 
company's tier 1 capital. A few commenters urged clarification that the 
look-through approach would not extend to exposures resulting from the 
provision of traditional custody services to an investment fund client, 
including payment, settlement, and asset administration. Certain 
commenters expressed concerns that covered companies would have to 
attribute excessive exposures to a single unknown counterparty, which 
could chill investment in funds and vehicles. Commenters requested 
clarification as to whether the attribution to a single unknown 
counterparty was required for a covered company's entire exposure to a 
securitization vehicle or merely the portion that it is unable to link 
back to an individual issuer.
    Certain commenters argued that the Board should adopt a more risk-
based approach to the look-through requirement by only requiring the 
look-through to underlying assets for which the exposure value is at 
least 0.25 percent of the company's tier 1 capital (the partial look-
through approach available under the large exposure standard). These 
commenters also requested that the look-through be undertaken at less 
frequent intervals (e.g., monthly or when asset-level disclosures are 
publicly filed) and using the most recently available information. Some 
commenters urged the Board to eliminate the requirement that exposures 
be attributed to a single, unknown counterparty across all SPVs when a 
large covered company is unable to identify each issuer of assets.
    Commenters requested that the final rule exempt from the look-
through requirement exposures such as retail asset-backed securities 
(including those funds or vehicles backed by credit card receivables, 
auto-loans, and residential mortgages), pools of finance receivables in 
which the underlying assets are comprised of small business borrower 
receivables (such as equipment loans and leases, trade receivables, and 
loans to auto dealers), and commercial mortgage-backed securities. 
Commenters also argued that investment funds registered under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (or governed by similar legislation in 
other jurisdictions) should be exempt based on the stringent 
diversification requirements to which such funds are subject.\138\ 
Commenters argued that it is unlikely that any of the underlying assets 
would materially contribute to a

[[Page 38481]]

covered company's exposure to a given counterparty given the granular 
nature of such assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \138\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80a-5(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters recommended that the Board exclude exposures from 
the look-through requirement that are required under other legal 
standards, such as the risk retention rule, since these exposures 
cannot be sold down. Commenters contended that the significant 
practical challenges of complying with the proposal could result in 
covered companies not investing in SPVs which could have a negative 
effect on credit markets. For example, certain commenters argued that 
covered companies may not have access to information at the frequency 
and level of granularity required.
    In order to address the concerns raised by commenters, the Board 
has narrowed the scope of the look-through approach and reduced the 
burden of its implementation. The final rule requires application of 
the look-through approach only to individual underlying assets for 
which the exposure value is at least 0.25 percent of the company's tier 
1 capital, even in cases where the covered company cannot demonstrate 
that each underlying asset in an SPV is less than 0.25 percent of the 
covered company's tier 1 capital. This approach is referred to as the 
partial look-through in this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.\139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \139\ See final rule Sec.  252.75(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board has not modified the look-through approach to exclude 
explicitly certain types of SPVs. However, certain information provided 
by commenters (e.g., that some retail exposures are unlikely to have 
large underlying exposures) bears on the potential compliance burden of 
the look-through and partial look-through approaches. In particular, 
covered companies may be able to ascertain that an SPV does not contain 
any exposures greater than or equal to 0.25 percent of tier 1 capital 
based on characteristics of the SPV without having to measure each 
specific exposure within the SPV.
    Finally, to address the concerns that covered companies may not 
have access to information at the frequency and level of granularity 
required, the final rule allows covered companies to rely in good faith 
on the most recent available information. In other words, covered 
companies are allowed to fill in any missing values to the best of 
their ability (i.e., in a reasonable manner and based on the most 
recently available information).
    Example: An SPV holds $10 of bonds issued by Company A, $10 of 
bonds issued by Company B, and $20 of bonds issued by Company C. Assume 
that all investors in the SPV are pari passu and that a covered 
company's pro rata share in the SPV is 50 percent. Assume further that 
the ratio of the covered company's pro rata investment in each bond (A, 
B, C) to its tier 1 capital is 0.26 percent, 0.26 percent, and 0.52 
percent. The covered company needs to recognize a $5 exposure to 
Company A and Company B (i.e., 50 percent of $10) and a $10 exposure to 
Company C (i.e., 50 percent of $20).
    The foregoing example considers a case in which all of the 
underlying investments are at least 0.25 percent of the covered 
company's tier 1 capital. The following example illustrates application 
of the partial look-through approach.
    Example: An SPV holds $10 of bonds issued by Company A, $10 of 
bonds issued by Company B, and $20 of bonds issued by Company C. Assume 
that all investors in the SPV are pari passu and that a covered 
company's pro rata share in the SPV is 50 percent. Assume further that 
the ratio of the covered company's pro rata investment in each bond (A, 
B, C) to its tier 1 capital is 0.24 percent, 0.24 percent, and 0.48 
percent. The covered company needs to recognize a $10 exposure to the 
SPV (i.e., 50 percent of the $10 exposure to Company A plus 50 percent 
of the $10 exposure to Company B). Note that the covered company only 
recognizes the exposure to the SPV--and not individually to Companies A 
and B--because those two exposures are under 0.25 percent of tier 1 
capital. Finally, the covered company must recognize a $10 exposure to 
Company C (i.e., 50 percent of the $20 exposure to Company C), as the 
exposure to Company C is above 0.25 percent of tier 1 capital.
    The previous two examples consider situations in which the covered 
company can identify the counterparty associated with each underlying 
investment in the SPV. In certain cases, a covered company may not be 
able to identify the counterparty in each underlying investment of the 
SPV. In such cases, the underlying investments must be allocated to an 
unknown counterparty if the pro rata size of the investment exceeds 
0.25 percent of tier 1 capital, as demonstrated in the following 
example.\140\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \140\ See final rule Sec.  252.75(a)(3)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example: An SPV holds $10 of bonds issued by one unidentified 
company, $14 of bonds issued by another unidentified company, and $20 
of bonds issued by a third unidentified company. Assume that all 
investors in the SPV are pari passu and that a covered company's pro 
rata share in the SPV is 50 percent. Assume further that the ratio of 
the covered company's pro rata investment in each bond (A, B, C) to its 
tier 1 capital is 0.24 percent, 0.34 percent, and 0.48 percent. A 
covered company would need to recognize a $5 exposure to the SPV (i.e., 
50 percent of the $10 exposure to the first unidentified company) and a 
$17 exposure to an unknown counterparty (i.e., 50 percent of the $14 
exposure to the second unidentified company and 50 percent of the $20 
exposure to the third unidentified company).
    Note that the example above applies both the partial look-through 
approach, as the exposure to the first unidentified company is 
allocated to the SPV since it represents less than 0.25 percent of tier 
1 capital, and the unknown counterparty treatment since the exposures 
to the second and third unknown companies are allocated to a single 
unknown counterparty, as each pro rata investment in the second and 
third investment exceeds 0.25 percent of the covered company's tier 1 
capital. Finally, note that the foregoing example only considers a 
single SPV and accordingly the effect of applying the unknown 
counterparty treatment is to allocate some portion of the underlying 
investments of the SPV to a single unknown counterparty. To the extent 
that a covered company cannot identify the counterparty associated with 
several underlying investments across several SPVs, all of these 
unidentified investments must be allocated to a single unknown 
counterparty to the extent that the pro rata size of each investment 
exceeded 0.25 percent of the covered company's tier 1 capital.
    If all investors in an SPV are not pari passu, a covered company 
that is required to use the look-through approach would measure its 
exposure to an issuer of assets held by the SPV for each tranche in the 
SPV in which the covered company invests. The covered company would do 
this using a two-step process. First, the covered company would assume 
that the total exposure to an issuer of assets held by the SPV among 
all investors in a given SPV tranche is equal to the lesser of the 
value of the tranche and the value of the assets issued by the issuer 
that are held by the SPV. Second, the covered company would multiply 
this exposure amount by the percentage of the SPV tranche that the 
covered company holds.
    Example: An SPV holds $10 of bonds issued by Company A. The SPV has 
issued $4 of junior notes and $6 of senior notes to the SPV's 
investors. A covered company holds 50 percent of the junior notes and 
50 percent of the

[[Page 38482]]

senior notes. With respect to the junior tranche of the SPV, the lesser 
of the value of the tranche (i.e., $4) and the value of the underlying 
assets issued by Company A (i.e., $10) is $4. With respect to the 
senior tranche of the SPV, the lesser of the value of the tranche 
(i.e., $6) and the value of the underlying assets issued by Company A 
(i.e., $10) is $6. Because the covered company's pro rata share of each 
tranche is 50 percent, it would need to recognize $2 of exposure to 
Company A because of its investment in the junior tranche (i.e., 50 
percent of $4), and $3 of exposure to Company A because of its 
investment in the senior tranche (i.e., 50 percent of $6), assuming the 
look-through approach is required.
2. Aggregation of Exposures to Certain Third Parties
    Under the proposal, a large covered company would have been 
required to recognize a gross credit exposure to each third party with 
a contractual or other business relationship with an SPV whose failure 
or material financial distress would cause a loss in the value of the 
covered company's investment in or exposure to the SPV.\141\ A covered 
company would have been required to recognize gross credit exposure to 
such a third party in addition to the covered company's gross credit 
exposure to an SPV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters urged the Board to eliminate the third-party 
exposure requirement. Commenters argued that this requirement would 
have required a covered company to recognize additional exposures 
without a consideration of the actual amount of risk to which the 
covered company is exposed as a result of such exposures. Commenters 
contended that the requirement under the proposal referenced a ``loss'' 
to a covered company's investment in a securitization vehicle or 
investment fund without reference to the materiality of such an 
investment relative to the covered company. Moreover, commenters argued 
that the proposal did not limit in any manner the universe of third 
parties, which could make it impossible for a covered company to 
identify all relevant third parties. As an alternative to eliminating 
this requirement, commenters urged the Board to limit this requirement 
to third parties that provide credit support or liquidity facilities to 
an SPV and only apply the requirement where the large covered company's 
investment in the vehicle exceeds 0.25 percent of its tier 1 capital, 
consistent with the look-through requirement. Commenters further argued 
that this requirement should only be on a reasonable ``best efforts'' 
basis, because covered companies may lack access to information to 
comply with this requirement (e.g., a covered company may not know the 
identity of currency or interest rate providers). Commenters noted that 
in any case this requirement would overstate exposures by requiring a 
covered company to recognize an exposure to two different parties: The 
SPV and the third-party credit provider to the SPV.
    The Board has modified the final rule to address the concerns 
raised by commenters, thereby reducing burden on covered companies. 
First, the Board has narrowed the scope of the requirement. The 
proposed rule would have applied to third parties that have a 
contractual or other business relationship with an SPV.\142\ Based on 
suggestions from commenters, the final rule applies solely to third 
parties that have a contractual obligation to provide credit or 
liquidity support to an SPV.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \142\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(c)(1).
    \143\ See final rule Sec.  252.75(c)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the final rule explicitly limits the exposure that a 
covered company has to attribute to a third party under this 
requirement. The proposed rule would have required a large covered 
company to recognize an exposure to the third party in an amount equal 
to the large covered company's exposure to the SPV.\144\ The final rule 
caps the recognized exposure to the maximum contractual obligation of 
that third party to the SPV.\145\ This should mitigate the concern that 
the requirement would have required a covered company to recognize 
additional exposures without consideration of the actual amount of risk 
to which the covered company is exposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.75(c)(2).
    \145\ See final rule Sec.  252.75(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, under the final rule, covered companies may rely in good 
faith on the most recent available information. In other words, covered 
companies are allowed to rely on a reasonable best effort in the event 
that they lack access to information to comply with this requirement.

F. Aggregation of Exposures to Connected Counterparties

    The proposed rule would have required a covered company to 
aggregate counterparties based on tests of economic interdependence or 
due to certain control relationships.\146\ In cases where the total 
exposures to a single counterparty exceeded five percent of the covered 
company's eligible capital base, the covered company would have had to 
aggregate exposures to that counterparty with its exposures to all 
other counterparties that are ``economically interdependent'' with the 
first counterparty.\147\ The purpose of this proposed requirement was 
to limit a covered company's overall credit exposure to two or more 
counterparties where the underlying risk of one counterparty's 
financial distress or failure would cause the financial distress or 
failure of another counterparty. For similar reasons, under the 
proposed rule, a covered company would have been required to aggregate 
exposures of an unaffiliated counterparty with its exposures to all 
other counterparties connected by control relationships.\148\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.76.
    \147\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.76(a).
    \148\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.76(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters argued that it would be very difficult and burdensome 
for covered companies to obtain the information required under the 
proposed rule to aggregate their counterparties on the basis of the 
economic interdependence and control tests. Certain commenters argued 
that if the control relationship tests were retained in the final rule, 
it should apply only to exposures exceeding five percent of the 
eligible capital base, similar to the threshold under the proposal for 
the economic interdependence test. Commenters urged the Board to make 
clear that any determinations regarding economic interdependence and 
control relationships, if retained in the final rule, would be subject 
to a reasonable inquiry standard (that is, there should be good faith 
due diligence into the relationship between the counterparty and other 
potentially related entities). Commenters also requested that the Board 
make clear these tests applied only within, and not across, different 
categories of counterparties (that is, the tests would not be used to 
aggregate a natural person with a company or a company with a State).
1. Economic Interdependence
    The Board has incorporated two key provisions into the economic 
interdependency assessment in the final rule to address the concerns 
raised by commenters and to reduce burden on covered companies.\149\ 
First, the Board has revised the relevant factors to clarify when firms 
must aggregate exposures to counterparties. For instance, the proposed 
rule would have required a

[[Page 38483]]

covered company to consider whether a counterparty (counterparty A) has 
fully or partly guaranteed the credit exposure of another counterparty 
(counterparty B), or is liable by other means, and the credit exposure 
is significant enough that counterparty B is likely to default if 
presented with a claim relating to the guarantee or liability.\150\ The 
final rule reframes this standard to make it more concrete and more 
formulaic: Whether one counterparty has fully or partly guaranteed the 
credit exposure of the other counterparty, or is liable by other means, 
in an amount that is 50 percent or more of the covered company's net 
credit exposure to the counterparty.\151\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \149\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(b).
    \150\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.76(a)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
    \151\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, the final rule allows firms to request in writing a 
determination from the Board that two counterparties are not 
economically interdependent, even if one or more factors in the final 
rule are met.\152\ Upon such a request, the Board may grant temporary 
relief to the covered company and not require the covered company to 
aggregate one counterparty with another counterparty provided that the 
counterparty could modify its business relationships, such as by 
reducing its reliance on the other counterparty, and provided that such 
relief is in the public interest and is consistent with the purpose of 
the final rule and section 165(e).\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \152\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(b)(3).
    \153\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(b)(3)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, as under the proposal, this economic interdependency 
assessment in the final rule is required only when exposure to a 
counterparty exceeds five percent of a covered company's tier 1 
capital. The Board investigated the potential burden of the above 
requirement using supervisory data covering U.S. GSIBs and their 
largest credit counterparties from 2008 to 2017. Although the specific 
definition of credit exposure in the supervisory data did not match 
precisely the exposure calculation that will be required under the 
final rule, the analysis does provide general insight into the 
frequency of large credit exposures. Based on this data, credit 
exposures exceeding the five-percent threshold occurred only 20 times 
per year since 2012, for all firms combined.
    Example: A covered company has a credit exposure to a bank that is 
equal to 4.5 percent of tier 1 capital. This covered company does not 
have to apply the economic interdependency test to the bank because the 
credit exposure does not exceed five percent of its tier 1 capital.
    Example: A covered company has credit exposures to both a car 
manufacturer and a tire manufacturer. The exposure to the car 
manufacturer is equal to 5.5 percent of its tier 1 capital. The 
exposure to the tire manufacturer is 1.5 percent of its tier 1 capital. 
The tire manufacturer sells all of its output to the car manufacturer. 
This satisfies Sec.  252.76(b)(2)(i) of the final rule, so the covered 
company has to aggregate the credit exposures to both counterparties, 
which yields a total credit exposure of 7.0 percent of its tier 1 
capital. Notably, this example also satisfies Sec.  252.76(b)(2)(iii) 
of the final rule.
    Example: A covered company has credit exposures to a bank and an 
insurance company. The exposure to the bank is equal to 6.0 percent of 
its tier 1 capital, or $3 billion. The exposure to the insurance 
company is 1.0 percent of its tier 1 capital, or $1 billion. As part of 
its business, the insurance company guaranteed half of the bank's 
exposures to the covered company, i.e., $1.5 billion. This partial 
guarantee of $1.5 billion is greater than 50 percent of the covered 
company's exposure to the insurance company, as $1.5 billion is greater 
than $0.5 billion. This threshold exceeds the standard in the final 
rule, which means the covered company must aggregate the exposures to 
the bank and the insurance company.
2. Control Relationships
    Similar to the approach to economically interdependent 
counterparties, the Board has modified the control relationship tests 
in the final rule to address the concerns raised by commenters and to 
reduce burden. First, the control test in the final rule applies only 
when exposures exceed a threshold of five percent of tier 1 capital, 
similar to the economic interdependence standard. In practice, the 
likelihood of a counterparty exceeding this five percent threshold is 
unlikely.
    Second, covered companies will be required to apply only two clear 
control tests, based on 25 percent voting control and majority control 
of the board of directors.\154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(c)(1). For purposes of the 
final rule, one counterparty (counterparty A) is deemed to control 
the other counterparty (counterparty B) if (i) counterparty A owns, 
controls, or holds with the power to vote 25 percent or more of any 
class of voting securities of counterparty B; or (ii) counterparty A 
controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors, 
trustees, general partners (or individuals exercising similar 
functions) of counterparty B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third and finally, the final rule allows covered companies to 
request a determination in writing from the Board that two 
counterparties are not under common control, even if one or more of the 
control factors are met.\155\ Upon such a request, the Board may grant 
temporary relief to the covered company and not require the covered 
company to aggregate one counterparty with another counterparty 
provided that, taking into account the specific facts and 
circumstances, such indicia of control does not result in entities 
being connected by control relationships for purposes of the final 
rule, and provided that such relief is in the public interest and is 
consistent with the purpose of the final rule and section 165(e).\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(c)(2)(i).
    \156\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(c)(2)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, it should be noted that the final rule authorizes the Board 
to determine, after notice to the covered company and opportunity for 
hearing, that one or more counterparties of the covered company are 
economically interdependent or connected by control relationships for 
the purposes of this section, based on consideration of the factors in 
the final rule as well as related indicia.\157\ Moreover, the Board can 
determine, after notice to the covered company and opportunity for 
hearing, that the exposures to two counterparties must be aggregated to 
prevent evasion of the final rule and section 165(e).\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(d).
    \158\ See final rule Sec.  252.76(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Example: A covered company has a credit exposure to a bank that is 
equal to 4.5 percent of its tier 1 capital. This covered company does 
not have to apply the control test because the exposure level does not 
exceed five percent of its tier 1 capital.
    Example: A covered company has credit exposures to both a bank and 
a fund that is sponsored by the bank. The exposure to the bank is equal 
to 6.5 percent of its tier 1 capital. The exposure to the fund is 2.0 
percent of its tier 1 capital. The bank does not own, control, or hold 
the power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of voting securities 
of the fund; however, the bank does have the ability to appoint a 
majority of the directors of the fund. Under the final rule, this 
covered company is required to aggregate its credit exposures to the 
fund with its credit exposures to the bank, which yields 8.5 percent of 
its tier 1 capital.

G. Exemptions

    Section 165(e)(6) of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the Board may, 
by regulation or order, exempt transactions, in whole or in part, from 
the definition of the term ``credit exposure'' for purposes of that 
subsection, if the Board

[[Page 38484]]

finds that the exemption is in the public interest and is consistent 
with the purposes of that subsection.\159\ The proposed rule would have 
included several exemptions for credit transactions from the SCCL, 
including (1) direct claims on, and portions of claims that are 
directly and fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by the 
Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, while these entities are operating under the 
conservatorship or receivership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency; 
(2) intraday credit exposure to a counterparty; and (3) trade exposures 
to a central counterparty that meets the definition of a qualifying 
central counterparty.\160\ The proposal also would have exempted any 
Federal Home Loan Bank from the definition of covered company.\161\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \159\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(6).
    \160\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.77(a).
    \161\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.77(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Many commenters expressed support for the proposed exemptions to 
qualifying central counterparties and for intraday credit exposures to 
a counterparty. Certain commenters requested an additional exemption 
for short-dated exposures arising from the provision of traditional 
custody services or, in the alternative, the implementation of a five-
day cure period for such exposures. A few commenters requested an 
express exemption for credit exposures to the Federal Home Loan Banks. 
One commenter urged the Board to include regulatory exemptive authority 
in the final rule that would provide explicit flexibility for tailoring 
the rule for a particular covered company based on the company's risk 
profile.
    Certain commenters also requested exemptions for multilateral banks 
and certain supranational entities, including the Bank of International 
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the 
International Monetary Fund, and multilateral development banks that 
are assigned a zero percent risk weight under the Board's capital 
rules. One commenter argued it is inappropriate to exclude sovereign 
exposures to zero percent risk weight foreign sovereign entities, which 
can be risky. Other commenters urged that the exclusion for exposures 
to zero percent risk weight foreign sovereign entities be extended to 
their zero percent risk weight public sector entities. These commenters 
argued that these entities similarly pose little risk of default and 
such treatment would align with the determination of risk weights under 
the Board's risk-based capital rules. Certain commenters requested that 
the Board allow covered companies to exclude any credit exposures to a 
counterparty that are deducted from their tier 1 capital as credit 
exposure since the covered company has already reduced its regulatory 
capital by these amounts. The Board's capital rules require certain 
unconsolidated investments in financial institutions to be deducted 
once certain thresholds are reached.
    In response to comments, the Board has decided not to allow covered 
companies to exclude exposures that have been deducted from capital for 
two reasons. First, the deduction only occurs after a certain threshold 
is reached and so the full amount of the exposure cannot be excluded as 
only part of the exposure is deducted from capital. Second, the 
deduction from capital serves better to reflect the actual loss 
absorbing capacity of a company's capital base. These deductions are 
intended to result in a more accurate measure of equity capital; 
accordingly, no corresponding adjustment to the value of the related 
credit exposure is required.
    Section 252.77 of the final rule sets forth additional exemptions 
from the single-counterparty credit limits.\162\ The Board has retained 
the exemptions from the proposal and added two additional exemptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \162\ See final rule Sec.  252.77.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The first exemption from the final rule is for direct claims on, 
and the portions of claims that are directly and fully guaranteed as to 
principal and interest by, the Federal National Mortgage Association 
and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, while these entities 
are operating under the conservatorship or receivership of the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency. This exemption reflects a policy decision that 
credit exposures to these government-sponsored entities should not be 
subject to a regulatory limit for so long as the entities are in the 
conservatorship or receivership of the U.S. government.\163\ This 
approach is consistent with the approach that the Board used in its 
risk retention rules.\164\ As determined by the Board, obligations 
issued by other U.S. government-sponsored entities also would be 
exempt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ See final rule Sec.  252.77(a)(1).
    \164\ See 12 CFR 244.8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second exemption from the final rule is for intraday credit 
exposure to a counterparty.\165\ This exemption will help minimize the 
impact of the rule on the payment and settlement of financial 
transactions. The Board has declined to broaden this exemption as 
requested by commenters to ensure that the credit exposure measures 
accurately reflect actual credit exposures assumed by covered 
companies. Moreover, the operational and logistical difficulties that 
extend to measuring intraday credit extensions do not extend in the 
same manner to longer-term credit extensions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \165\ See final rule Sec.  252.77(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The third exemption from the final rule is for trade exposures to a 
central counterparty that meets the definition of a qualifying central 
counterparty under the Board's capital rules (QCCP).\166\ These 
exposures include potential future exposure arising from transactions 
cleared by a QCCP and pre-funded default fund contributions. The final 
rule exempts these exposures to QCCPs from single-counterparty credit 
limits because of the concern that application of single-counterparty 
credit limits to these exposures would require firms to spread activity 
across a greater number of CCPs, which could lead to a reduction in 
multilateral netting benefits.\167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ See final rule Sec.  252.77(a)(3). Qualifying central 
counterparty is defined to have the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 
of the Board's risk-based capital rules. See final rule Sec.  
252.71(bb); See also 12 CFR 217.2.
    \167\ As initial margin and excess variation margin posted to 
the QCCP and held in a segregated account by a third-party custodian 
are not subject to counterparty risk, these amounts would not be 
considered credit exposures under the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In response to comments, the final rule includes two new 
exemptions. The fourth exemption from the final rule is for any credit 
transaction with the Bank for International Settlements, the 
International Monetary Fund, or institutions that are members of the 
World Bank Group (namely, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International 
Development Association, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 
and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes). 
Although the Bank for International Settlements is not itself a central 
bank of any sovereign entity, the membership of the Bank for 
International Settlements is comprised entirely of central banks of 
sovereign entities, which are generally not defined as counterparties 
in the final rule.\168\ With respect to the other entities, the Board 
notes that the United States is a shareholder or contributing member of 
each of those entities, along with other sovereign entities. In light 
of

[[Page 38485]]

the generally high-credit quality of these institutions and considering 
that each has a membership structure comprised of a significant 
proportion of sovereign entities or agencies with strong 
creditworthiness, the Board is of the view that this treatment is 
appropriate. The fifth exemption from the final rule is for any credit 
transaction with the European Commission or European Central Bank. 
These international organizations share many features of sovereign 
entities that have been excluded from the final SCCL rule, including 
the assignment of a zero percent risk weight under the Board's capital 
rules. The Board believes that these exemptions are in the public 
interest, given the public purpose of each of these entities, and given 
the low credit risk of these entities, are consistent with the purposes 
of section 165(e) and this final rule. Accordingly, for the reasons 
discussed above and in the proposal, the Board has determined that each 
of these exemptions is in the public interest and is consistent with 
the purpose of section 165(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ Central banks of sovereign entities would only be 
considered counterparties under the final rule if the central bank's 
foreign sovereign entity was not assigned a zero percent risk weight 
under the Board's capital rules. See final rule Sec.  252.71(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The sixth exemption category implements section 165(e)(6) of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and provides a catch-all category to exempt any 
transaction which the Board determines to be in the public interest and 
consistent with the purposes of section 165(e).\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e)(6); final rule Sec.  252.77(a)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 252.77(b) of the final rule implements section 165(e)(6) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, which provides a statutory exemption for the 
Federal Home Loan Banks. The Board views section 165(e)(6) as providing 
an exemption for Federal Home Loan Banks from the definition of covered 
company but as not providing an exemption for a covered company's 
credit exposure to the Federal Home Loan Banks. As such, a covered 
company's exposure to a Federal Home Loan Bank is subject to the SCCL 
in the final rule.

H. Compliance and Timing of Applicability

1. Scope of Compliance
    Under the proposed rule, a covered company with $250 billion or 
more in total consolidated assets would have been required to comply 
with the requirements of the proposed rule on a daily basis. These 
covered companies also would have been required to submit a monthly 
compliance report to the Board.
    Certain commenters requested clarification that the daily 
compliance requirement for a covered company should be based on the 
most recent information available with respect to counterparties, 
consistent with the company's internal risk management processes, and 
not on information that is updated on a daily basis. Other commenters 
believed that daily compliance constitutes a significant operational 
challenge, especially with respect to the look-through approach for 
SPVs. These commenters noted that the composition of SPVs is typically 
reported only on a monthly or less frequent basis. To address these 
concerns, the final rule allows covered companies to rely in good faith 
on the most recent available information about an SPV. For example, 
consistent with the final rule, a covered company may fill in values, 
in a reasonable manner, based on available information.
    Similar to the proposal, under Sec.  252.78(a) of the final rule, a 
covered company is required to comply with the requirements on a daily 
basis, as of the end of each business day.\170\ To address commenters' 
concerns regarding the ability to access certain information (including 
information regarding SPVs), the final rule allows covered companies to 
rely in good faith on the most recent available information. In other 
words, covered companies are allowed to fill in missing values, in a 
reasonable manner, based on available information. In addition, under 
the final rule, a covered company must report its compliance to the 
Federal Reserve on a quarterly basis, as of the end of the quarter, 
rather than a monthly basis, unless the Board determines and notifies 
that company in writing that more frequent reporting is required.\171\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \170\ See final rule Sec.  252.78(a)(1).
    \171\ See final rule Sec.  252.78(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board has approved proposed forms, published elsewhere in this 
issue of the Federal Register, for covered companies to report credit 
exposures to their counterparties as those credit exposures would be 
measured under the final rule and section 165(e). The comment period on 
the proposed reporting expires on October 5, 2018.
2. Noncompliance
    Section 252.78(c) of the proposed rule addressed the consequences 
if a covered company were to fail to comply with the credit exposure 
limits.\172\ The proposed rule stated that, if a covered company were 
not in compliance with respect to a counterparty due to any of four 
factors--(1) a decrease in the covered company's capital stock and 
surplus; (2) the merger of the covered company with another covered 
company; (3) a merger of two unaffiliated counterparties; or (4) any 
other circumstance the Board determines is appropriate--then the 
covered company would not have been subject to enforcement actions with 
respect to such noncompliance for a period of 90 days,\173\ so long as 
the company were to use reasonable efforts to return to compliance with 
the proposed rule during this period. The covered company would have 
been prohibited from engaging in any additional credit transactions 
with such a counterparty in contravention of this requirement during 
the noncompliance period, except in cases where the Board determined 
that such additional credit transactions were necessary or appropriate 
to preserve the safety and soundness of the covered company or 
financial stability.\174\ In granting approval for any such special 
temporary exceptions, the Board could have imposed supervisory 
oversight and reporting measures that it determined would have been 
appropriate to monitor compliance with the foregoing standards.\175\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \172\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.78(c).
    \173\ This period could have been adjusted by the Board as 
appropriate to preserve the safety and soundness of the covered 
company or U.S. financial stability. Id.
    \174\ Id.
    \175\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.78(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters suggested broadening the cure period to 
mitigate potential disruptions to proper market activities. In 
particular, these commenters requested that the cure period be 
broadened to apply to any breach that is beyond the covered company's 
control and could be reasonably remediated within the 90-day period. 
Commenters also requested appropriate transition periods if an exposure 
or counterparty changes status or loses an exemption under the final 
rule (e.g., if a sovereign's risk-weight increases or if a qualifying 
central counterparty loses its status). A few commenters suggested that 
any breaches of the proposal's credit exposure limits should be 
promptly reported to the Board.
    To address the concerns of commenters, the final rule includes an 
additional factor for relief during a period of noncompliance: An 
unforeseen and abrupt change in the status of a counterparty as a 
result of which the covered company's credit exposure to the 
counterparty becomes limited by the requirements of this section.\176\ 
Along with the proposed

[[Page 38486]]

discretionary factor (``[a]ny other factor(s) the Board determines, in 
its discretion, is appropriate''),\177\ this factor should sufficiently 
broaden the scope of the cure period to mitigate the risk of an 
enforcement action due to circumstances outside the control of the 
covered company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ See final rule Sec.  252.78(c)(2). The factors are (i) a 
decrease in the covered company's capital stock and surplus; (ii) 
the merger of the covered company with another covered company; 
(iii) a merger of two unaffiliated counterparties; (iv) an 
unforeseen and abrupt change in the status of a counterparty as a 
result of which the covered company's credit exposure to the 
counterparty becomes limited by the requirements of this section; or 
(v) any other factor(s) the Board determines, in its discretion, is 
appropriate.
    \177\ This prong is Sec.  252.78(c)(4) in the proposed rule and 
Sec.  252.78(c)(2) in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Initial Applicability and Ongoing Applicability
    Under the proposed rule, covered companies with $250 billion or 
more in total consolidated assets would have been required to comply 
one year from the effective date of the rule, unless that time were 
extended by the Board in writing.\178\ In addition, under the proposed 
rule, any company that becomes a covered company after the effective 
date of the rule would have been required to comply with the 
requirements of the rule beginning on the first day of the fifth 
calendar quarter after it becomes a covered company, unless that time 
were accelerated or extended by the Board in writing.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.70(g)(2).
    \179\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.70(h).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters urged the Board to provide covered companies 
additional time to comply with the requirements of the final rule. Most 
of these commenters argued that two years from the date the applicable 
reporting form is finalized is the minimum amount of time covered 
companies would need to develop the infrastructure to comply with the 
requirements.\180\ These commenters pointed out that compliance with 
the final rule would entail the deployment of significant resources and 
development of entirely new systems and procedures, which would depend 
on the final rule and the associated reporting requirements. Moreover, 
certain commenters argued that if retail exposures were not exempted 
from the scope of the final rule, then a minimum of three years from 
finalization of the applicable reporting form would be necessary for 
covered companies to develop and implement systems capable of tracking 
and calculating exposures to millions of individual customers, their 
intermediate family members, and any other entities a covered company 
may be required to aggregate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ Section 252.78(a) of the proposal would have required 
covered companies to comply with the requirements on a daily basis 
at the end of each business day and submit on a monthly basis a 
report demonstrating its daily compliance. The preamble to the 
proposal explained that the Board plans to develop reporting forms 
for covered companies to use to report credit exposures to their 
counterparties as those exposures would be measured under rules 
implementing section 165(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act. 81 FR at 14344 
(Mar. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board has simplified the final rule to address the concerns 
raised by commenters regarding the compliance period of the final rule. 
The final rule gives major covered companies (i.e., GSIBs) until 
January 1, 2020, to comply,\181\ and gives all other covered companies 
until July 1, 2020, to comply.\182\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \181\ See final rule Sec.  252.70(c)(1)(ii).
    \182\ See final rule Sec.  252.70(c)(1)(i). A covered company 
that becomes subject to the final rule after its effective date is 
also given two years from the date on which it becomes a covered 
company to comply, unless that time is accelerated or extended by 
the Board in writing. See final rule Sec.  252.70(c)(2). The Board 
may, for instance, exercise its discretion to apply the SCCL to a 
covered company in a period of less than two years if the Board 
determined that there was a rapid expansion of risk in that company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Final Rule for Foreign Banking Organizations

A. Background

    In February 2014, the Board adopted a final rule establishing 
enhanced prudential standards for FBOs with U.S. banking operations and 
total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more.\183\ Under that rule, 
an FBO with U.S. non-branch assets of $50 billion or more is required 
to form a U.S. IHC to hold its interests in U.S. bank and nonbank 
subsidiaries.\184\ An FBO's U.S. IHC is subject to enhanced prudential 
standards on a consolidated basis, including risk-based and leverage 
capital requirements, liquidity requirements, and risk management 
standards. Certain enhanced prudential standards also apply to an FBO's 
``combined U.S. operations,'' which would include an FBO's U.S. 
branches and agencies, as well as its U.S. IHC and its subsidiaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \183\ See Enhanced Prudential Standards for Bank Holding 
Companies and Foreign Banking Organizations, 79 FR 17240 (Mar. 27, 
2014). The definition of ``foreign banking organization'' is the 
same as in section 211.21(o) of the Board's Regulation K (12 CFR 
211.21(o)), provided that, if the top-tier foreign banking 
organization is incorporated in or organized under the laws of any 
State, the foreign banking organization shall not be treated as a 
foreign banking organization for purposes of this part. See 12 CFR 
252.2(j).
    \184\ An FBO's U.S. IHC is not required to hold the FBO's 
interest in any company held under section 2(h)(2) of the BHC Act, 
12 U.S.C. 1841(h)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As with covered companies, and consistent with the amendments to 
section 165(e) made by EGRRCPA, the single-counterparty credit limits 
in this final rule would apply to the U.S. operations of an FBO with 
$250 billion or more in total global consolidated assets. The single-
counterparty credit limits also would apply to any U.S. IHC of such an 
FBO with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets. However, the 
final rule makes clear that the SCCL applicable to the U.S. operations 
of an FBO would not apply if an FBO certifies to the Board that it 
meets large exposure or SCCL standards on a consolidated basis 
established by its home country supervisor that are consistent with the 
large exposure standard, unless the Board determines, in writing, after 
notice to the FBO, that compliance with the final rule is required.

B. Summary of Comments on Proposal for Foreign Banking Organizations

    As noted, under the proposal, an FBO was subject to two SCCL: One 
for its IHC measured against the IHC's capital base and one for its 
combined U.S. operations (including U.S. branches) measured against the 
capital base of the entire FBO. With respect to an FBO's combined U.S. 
operations (rather than its U.S. IHC), the proposal would have applied 
SCCL with respect to exposures of any U.S. branch or agency of the 
foreign banking organization; exposures of the U.S. subsidiaries of the 
foreign banking organization, including any U.S. IHC; and all 
subsidiaries of such subsidiaries (other than any companies held under 
section 2(h)(2) of the BHC Act).\185\ The U.S. IHC and the FBO itself, 
with respect to its combined U.S. operations, each would have been a 
``covered entity'' under the proposal. A number of commenters argued 
that application of SCCL to those FBOs that are subject to comparable 
large exposure or single-counterparty credit limit regimes in their 
home country is inconsistent with the statutory mandate to give due 
regard to principles of national treatment and competitive 
equality.\186\ These commenters also noted that certain provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act expressly provide for the recognition of comparable 
home country regulation.\187\ These commenters argued that the 
development of the large exposure standard made it more likely that 
other jurisdictions would have comparable single-counterparty credit 
limit regimes to that of section 165(e) and its implementing 
regulation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ 12 U.S.C. 1841(h)(2).
    \186\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(2).
    \187\ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters also argued that the proposal would have had a 
materially disproportionate and adverse effect on

[[Page 38487]]

FBOs relative to covered companies due to the scope of FBOs subject to 
the proposal and the existence of limits for both the combined U.S. 
operations of FBOs and the U.S. IHCs of FBOs. In particular, commenters 
expressed concern that the proposed rule would apply to all FBOs with 
$50 billion or more in total global consolidated assets, regardless of 
the size of their U.S. operations. As a result, these commenters 
contended that the proposal would subject FBOs to materially greater 
costs and burdens than their covered company counterparts (e.g., by 
requiring FBOs to prepare, monitor, and keep records for limits at 
multiple levels of an FBO's U.S. operations).
    Further, commenters expressed the view that the proposal 
potentially could interfere with the safety and soundness and 
enterprise-wide risk management of FBOs by applying multiple, 
redundant, and inconsistent regimes for calculating credit exposures. 
Commenters also expressed concerns with the noncompliance cross-trigger 
to FBOs (that is, the prohibition against either the U.S. IHC or the 
combined U.S. operations of an FBO engaging in additional credit 
transactions with a counterparty if either entity exceeds its SCCL) as 
discriminatory and unwarranted. Certain commenters urged that, before 
applying SCCL to only a portion of the FBO's operations, the Board be 
required to find that existing federal and state lending limits 
applicable to an FBO's U.S. branches and agencies and comparable home 
country SCCL currently applicable to FBOs are not sufficient and that a 
lower SCCL is necessary to mitigate risks to the financial stability of 
the United States.
    In light of these concerns, some commenters recommended that the 
final rule apply to a U.S. IHC as if it were a covered company and that 
an FBO, with respect to their combined U.S. operations, be required to 
comply with a comparable home country SCCL regime consistent with the 
large exposure standard. These commenters noted that such an approach 
would comport with the Board's approach to implementing regulatory 
capital and stress testing components and meet the requirements of 
section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act.
    Commenters representing FBOs also expressed substantive concerns 
with many of the same issues as commenters representing covered 
companies, such as the definitions of ``covered company'' and 
``counterparty,'' the look-through approach for SPVs, and the 
aggregation of counterparties based on the economic interdependence and 
control relationship tests. To address these concerns, the final rule 
for FBOs generally contains the same modifications as those described 
above for covered companies.

C. Overview of the Final Rule for Foreign Banking Organizations

    As noted, the final rule retains both sets of proposed limits that 
would have applied to FBOs; however, also as noted, an FBO that is 
subject on a consolidated basis to a home country SCCL framework will 
be able to comply with the SCCL for its combined U.S. operations by 
certifying to the Board that the FBO complies with its home country 
SCCL framework. This modification should address, in large part, the 
concerns raised by commenters regarding the multiple limits applicable 
to FBOs under the proposal and mitigate the compliance costs of the 
final rule for FBOs subject to the requirements in the final rule.\188\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \188\ The U.S. IHC and the FBO itself, with respect to its 
combined U.S. operations, are each a ``covered foreign entity'' 
under the final rule. For improved clarity, the final rule uses the 
term ``covered foreign entity'' rather than the term ``covered 
entity'' that was used in the proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An FBO that cannot make such a certification would be subject to 
one of two credit exposure limits with respect to its U.S. operations 
that are tailored to the size and systemic footprint of the firm. 
Similar to the final rule's provisions for covered companies, the first 
category of limits applies to any entity that is part of the combined 
U.S. operations of an FBO with total consolidated assets that equal or 
exceed $250 billion.\189\ These covered foreign entities would be 
prohibited from having aggregate net credit exposure to an unaffiliated 
counterparty in excess of 25 percent of the FBO's tier 1 capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \189\ See final rule Sec.  252.170(a)(2)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The second category of limits prohibits any top-tier FBO that has 
the characteristics of a GSIB under the global methodology \190\ (major 
FBO) from having aggregate net credit exposure in excess of 15 percent 
of the FBO's tier 1 capital to a major counterparty (a GSIB or a 
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board) and in excess of 25 
percent of the FBO's tier 1 capital to any other counterparty. This 
standard is similar to the standard in the final rule for covered 
companies and consistent with the requirements in section 165(a)(1)(B) 
and section 165(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act, as discussed above.\191\ The 
SCCL applicable to the combined U.S. operations of an FBO that cannot 
certify to the Board that it complies with a home country SCCL regime 
consistent with the large exposure standard are summarized in Table 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ ``Global methodology'' is defined in the Board's 
Regulation YY as ``the assessment methodology and the higher loss 
absorbency requirement for global systemically important banks 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as updated 
from time to time.'' 12 CFR 252.2(o).
    \191\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(a)(1)(B), (e); See, ``Calibrating the 
Single-Counterparty Credit Limit between Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions,'' May 4, 2016, https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/sccl-paper-20160304.pdf.

  Table 3--Single-Counterparty Credit Limits Applicable to the Combined
            U.S. Operations of Foreign Banking Organizations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Applicable credit exposure
   Category of covered foreign entity                 limit
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Combined U.S. operations of FBOs with    Aggregate net credit exposure
 total consolidated assets that equal     to a counterparty cannot
 or exceed $250 billion but are not       exceed 25 percent of the FBO's
 major FBOs.                              tier 1 capital.
Major FBOs.............................  Aggregate net credit exposure
                                          to a major counterparty cannot
                                          exceed 15 percent of the FBO's
                                          tier 1 capital.
                                         Aggregate net credit exposure
                                          to any other counterparty
                                          cannot exceed 25 percent of
                                          the FBO's tier 1 capital.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the final rule, as in the proposal, the SCCL for a U.S. IHC 
of such an FBO with total consolidated assets that equal or exceed $50 
billion to a single counterparty falls into one of three tailored 
tiers. First, a U.S. IHC with total consolidated assets of at least $50 
billion but less than $250 billion is prohibited from having aggregate 
net

[[Page 38488]]

credit exposure to a single counterparty in excess of 25 percent of the 
company's total regulatory capital plus ALLL.\192\ Second, a U.S. IHC 
with total consolidated assets of $250 billion or more but less than 
$500 billion is prohibited from having aggregate net credit exposure to 
a single counterparty in excess of 25 percent of the U.S. IHC's tier 1 
capital. (This limit is based on tier 1 capital for the same reasons as 
described above with respect to the limit applied to covered 
companies.) Third, a U.S. IHC with $500 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets is prohibited from having aggregate net credit 
exposure to a major counterparty in excess of 15 percent of the U.S. 
IHC's tier 1 capital and faces a 25 percent of tier 1 capital limit for 
any other counterparty. (This 15 percent limit of tier 1 capital limit 
is premised on the same rationale as described above with respect to 
the 15 percent of tier 1 capital limit that applies to major covered 
companies.) Similar to the final rule applicable to covered companies, 
a ``major counterparty'' is defined as a U.S. or foreign GSIB or a 
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board. These limits are 
summarized in Table 2 above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \192\ The final rule's definition of ``capital stock and 
surplus'' with respect to a foreign banking organization reflects 
differences in international accounting standards. See final rule 
Sec.  252.171(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In determining whether a U.S. IHC complies with these limits, 
exposures of the U.S. IHC itself and its subsidiaries needs to be taken 
into account. Similar to the final rule's requirements for covered 
companies, ``subsidiary'' is defined as any company that is 
consolidated by the other company under applicable accounting 
standards.\193\ Definitions of ``counterparty,'' ``affiliate,'' and 
other related terms in the final rule also are similar to the final 
rule applicable to covered companies. The attribution requirements and 
application of the economic interdependence and control relationship 
tests also are generally the same as under the portions of the final 
rule applicable to covered companies.\194\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \193\ See final rule Sec.  252.171(gg). For a company that is 
not subject to applicable accounting standards, ``subsidiary'' 
includes a company that would have been consolidated if such 
principles or standards had applied.
    \194\ A U.S. IHC with total consolidated assets of $50 billion 
or more but less than $250 billion generally would not be required 
to apply the economic interdependence or control relationship tests. 
See final rule Sec.  252.176(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The final rule includes modifications in response to concerns 
raised by commenters, including comments made to the proposal for 
covered companies. The Board's final rule applicable to covered 
companies and the final rule applicable to FBOs have been aligned to 
the extent such alignment is appropriate. For example, the definition 
of ``covered foreign entity'' has been revised in the final rule to 
refer to financial consolidation standards rather than concepts of BHC 
Act control as under the proposal, which also is consistent with the 
approach in the final rule for covered companies. Similarly, FBOs that 
are not GSIBs will have until July 1, 2020, to comply with its 
requirements, as is the case with similarly situated covered companies.
    Although the major components of the SCCL for foreign banking 
organizations are the same as the requirements applicable to covered 
companies, there are some differences between these requirements. For 
example, as discussed in more detail below, the SCCL would not apply to 
exposures of a U.S. IHC or of the combined U.S. operations of an FBO to 
the FBO's home country sovereign entity, regardless of the risk weight 
assigned to that sovereign entity under the Board's capital rules (12 
CFR part 217).

D. Key Terminology and Concepts

1. Major Counterparty, Major Foreign Banking Organization, and Major 
Intermediate Holding Company
    Under the proposal, a ``major foreign banking organization'' would 
have been defined to mean any FBO with total consolidated assets of 
$500 billion or more. Similarly, a ``major U.S. intermediate holding 
company'' would have been defined to mean a U.S. IHC with total 
consolidated assets of $500 billion or more. Under the proposal, major 
foreign banking organizations and major U.S. IHCs would have been 
subject to the more stringent 15 percent of tier 1 capital limit with a 
major counterparty (defined to mean a U.S. GSIB, foreign GSIB, or 
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board).
    Some commenters argued that major FBOs should be defined as GSIBs, 
in the same manner as ``major covered company'' would have been defined 
in the proposal for covered companies. These commenters noted that a 
GSIB determination is based on indicators that correlate to an 
institution's systemic importance rather than simply consideration of 
its size, and that basing the classification of FBOs and U.S. IHCs as 
``major'' based on size alone would grossly overstate the systemic 
impact of these entities on the U.S. financial system. Some commenters 
suggested the Board define a major FBO as an FBO that meets the 
following criteria: (i) The FBO is a GSIB as determined by the 
Financial Stability Board; and (ii) the FBO is required to have an IHC 
for its U.S. operations. These commenters urged that major 
counterparties also be identified in this manner.
    Similar to the definition of ``major covered company'' with respect 
to covered companies, the final rule generally defines ``major foreign 
banking organization'' as a covered FBO that has the characteristics of 
a GSIB under the global methodology.\195\ This should address in large 
part commenters' concerns with respect to FBOs. As discussed above, a 
U.S. IHC with total consolidated assets of $500 billion or more would 
present significant risk because of both its size and the likelihood 
that such a U.S. IHC would have significant cross-border exposure.\196\ 
Therefore, the Board believes that a total consolidated assets 
threshold of $500 billion or more provides a reasonable indication of a 
U.S. IHC's ability to impact U.S. financial stability while providing a 
bright-line threshold that aids administrability of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \195\ ``Global methodology'' is defined in the Board's 
Regulation YY as ``the assessment methodology and the higher loss 
absorbency requirement for global systemically important banks 
issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, as updated 
from time to time.'' 12 CFR 252.2(o).
    \196\ As of March 31, 2018, all U.S. IHCs had less than $500 
billion in total consolidated assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Eligible Guarantor
    Under the proposal, ``eligible protection provider'' for FBOs would 
not have included the FBO or any entity that is an affiliate either of 
the U.S. IHC or of any part of the FBO's combined U.S. operations. 
Commenters argued that the exclusion of an FBO and its affiliates would 
hinder effective enterprise-wide risk management.
    As noted, the final rule replaces the term ``eligible protection 
provider'' with ``eligible guarantor,'' as that is the term used in the 
Board's capital rules. The Board has decided not to extend the 
definition of eligible guarantor to the FBO or any entity that is an 
affiliate either of the U.S. IHC or of any part of the FBO's combined 
U.S. operations.\197\ Extraterritorial application of the final rule is 
limited by excluding exposures of the FBO outside the U.S. IHC, or its 
combined U.S. operations, from the SCCL. Similarly, hedges that are 
initiated and booked by the FBO outside of the U.S. IHC or its combined 
U.S. operations are not subject to the SCCL.

[[Page 38489]]

Further, this approach preserves consistent treatment with the SCCL 
applicable to covered companies--since those covered companies are 
subject to SCCL on a consolidated basis, a hedge provided by one 
subsidiary to another subsidiary would not result in any reduction of 
credit exposure of the covered company. If the Board were to change the 
definition as requested, an FBO or U.S. IHC would be able to reduce its 
credit exposures in a way unavailable to covered companies. For these 
reasons, the Board has decided not to expand the definition of eligible 
guarantor as requested.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \197\ See final rule Sec.  252.171(p).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Eligible Collateral
    The proposal would have excluded from ``eligible collateral'' debt 
and equity securities, including convertible bonds, issued by an 
affiliate of the U.S. IHC or by any part of the combined U.S. 
operations of the FBO. FBO commenters argued that this was 
discriminatory and noted that a similar restriction did not appear in 
the definition of eligible collateral for covered companies. In 
response to comments, the final rule applicable to covered companies 
clarifies that, with respect to application of the SCCL to covered 
companies, ``eligible collateral'' does not include debt securities or 
equity securities issued by the covered company or its affiliate.\198\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \198\ See final rule Sec.  252.171(l).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Some commenters also expressed concern with the limitation on 
eligible collateral that would have required a U.S. IHC or the combined 
U.S. operations of an FBO to have a perfected, first priority security 
interest in the collateral. Those commenters argued that this 
requirement could interfere with effective enterprise-wide risk 
management and urged recognition of collateral where a non-U.S. branch 
has a security interest if the collateral is held for the benefit of 
the combined U.S. operations of the FBO. The Board believes that 
covered foreign entities that operate in the United States should be 
subject to creditor protections that are consistent with U.S. law and, 
therefore, has not modified this requirement. Moreover, with respect to 
exposures within the United States and outside an FBO's U.S. IHC, an 
FBO that certifies that it complies on a consolidated basis to a home 
country SCCL regime consistent with the large exposure standard would 
be subject to its home country requirements, not the final rule, in 
which case a perfected, first priority security interest in collateral 
may not be required.
4. Counterparty
    The final rule generally defines ``counterparty'' in the same 
manner as the final rule that applies to covered companies.\199\ The 
Board received similar comments concerning the definition of 
``counterparty'' in the proposed rule for FBOs as with the proposed 
rule for covered companies, and the definition has been modified in the 
final rule in the same manner and for the same reasons as the revised 
definition of ``counterparty'' in the final rule for covered companies, 
as discussed earlier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \199\ See final rule Sec. Sec.  252.71(e), 252.171(f).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    One key difference between this definition in the final rule for 
FBOs and the final rule for covered companies is that, with respect to 
an FBO, the FBO's home country sovereign entity is not included as a 
counterparty, notwithstanding the risk weight assigned to that 
sovereign entity under the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217).\200\ 
This difference recognizes that an FBO's U.S. IHC and combined U.S. 
operations may have exposures to the FBO's home country sovereign 
entity that are required by home country laws or are necessary to 
facilitate the normal course of business for the consolidated FBO. The 
proposal included an exemption to exclude these exposures; however, in 
light of the fact that these foreign sovereign entities would not be 
considered companies formally subject to the requirements of section 
165(e) of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board believes it is more appropriate 
simply to not include these entities as defined counterparties. 
``Sovereign entity'' is defined in the final rule, as under the 
proposal, to mean a central national government (including the U.S. 
government) or an agency, department, ministry, or central bank, but 
not including any political subdivision such as a state, province or 
municipality.\201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See final rule Sec.  252.171(f).
    \201\ See final rule Sec.  252.171(hh).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Certain commenters requested clarification or confirmation that the 
home country sovereign entity exemption includes a sovereign's agencies 
and instrumentalities. Since the definition of ``sovereign entity'' 
includes an agency, department, ministry or central bank, these 
entities would fall within the scope of the home country sovereign 
entity exemption. Some commenters requested that the final rule extend 
the scope of this exemption to include the sovereign's political 
subdivisions. These commenters urged that there is no reason to treat 
political subdivisions differently from sovereign agencies and 
instrumentalities. As noted, the Board's final rule applicable to 
covered companies includes a U.S. State (including all of its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions) as a separate 
counterparty because the severe distress or failure of a U.S. state or 
municipality could have effects on a covered company that are 
comparable to those caused by the failure of a financial firm or 
nonfinancial corporation to which the covered company has a large 
credit exposure. For the same reason, the Board includes as a separate 
counterparty political subdivisions of a foreign sovereign entity 
(including all of such political subdivision's agencies and 
instrumentalities), and the final rule does not extend the exclusion 
for exposures to an FBO's home country sovereign entity.

E. Credit Exposure Limits

    Section 252.172 of the proposed rule contained the key quantitative 
limitations on credit exposure of a covered entity to a single 
counterparty.\202\ As noted, consistent with the final rule applied to 
covered companies and the amendments to section 165(e) made by EGRRCPA, 
the final rule would apply SCCL to an FBO with U.S. banking operations 
and $250 billion or more in total global consolidated assets. The final 
rule seeks to limit further the burden on FBOs by generally permitting 
an FBO to comply with the SCCL for the combined U.S. operations of an 
FBO by certifying to the Board that the FBO meets large exposure or 
SCCL standards on a consolidated basis established by its home country 
supervisor that are consistent with the large exposure standard.\203\ 
The final rule applies the SCCL to any U.S. IHC with $50 billion or 
more in total consolidated assets that is a subsidiary of an FBO with 
$250 billion or more in total global consolidated assets, consistent 
with the proposal and the Board's other enhanced prudential standards 
applicable to U.S. IHCs.\204\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.172.
    \203\ An FBO that makes such a certification is required to 
provide to the Board reports relating to its compliance with the 
large exposure or SCCL standards of its home country supervisor 
concurrently with filing the FR Y-7Q or any successor report.
    \204\ See also section 401(g) of EGRRCPA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A number of commenters argued that application of SCCL to foreign 
banking organizations subject to comparable large exposure or single-
counterparty credit limit regimes in their home country is inconsistent 
with the statutory mandate to give due regard to

[[Page 38490]]

the principle of national treatment and competitive equality.\205\ 
These commenters noted that certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
expressly provide for the recognition of comparable home country 
regulation,\206\ and contended that more jurisdictions are likely to 
have comparable single-counterparty credit limit regimes following 
development of the large exposure standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \205\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(2).
    \206\ See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(2)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The principle of national treatment and equality of competitive 
opportunity generally means that FBOs operating in the United States 
should be treated no less favorably than similarly situated U.S. 
banking organizations and should generally be subject to the same 
restrictions and obligations in the United States as those that apply 
to the domestic operations of U.S. banking organizations. The final 
rule generally applies SCCL to FBOs in the same manner as to covered 
companies, consistent with the principle of national treatment and 
equality of competitive opportunity. In particular, the final rule uses 
the same total consolidated assets threshold of $250 billion or more 
for both covered companies and FBOs, and both covered companies and 
FBOs are designated as ``major covered companies'' and ``major foreign 
banking organizations'' based on whether those firms have certain 
characteristics of GSIBs.\207\ The final rule's application of SCCL to 
U.S. IHCs is tailored such that U.S. IHCs of similar size to covered 
companies are subject to the same SCCL. Although the final rule for 
FBOs differs from the final rule for covered companies by applying SCCL 
to U.S. IHCs with total consolidated assets of at least $50 billion but 
less than $250 billion, the SCCL applicable to this category of 
companies is tailored relative to covered companies (a limit of 25 
percent of capital stock and surplus rather than a limit of 25 percent 
of tier 1 capital). Furthermore, application of the SCCL to these U.S. 
IHCs promotes equality of competitive opportunity, since they represent 
one portion of a significantly larger banking organization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \207\ As noted, a U.S. IHC with total consolidated assets of 
$500 billion or more would be considered a ``major U.S. intermediate 
holding company.'' Although this threshold is not identical to the 
standard applied to covered companies, the Board believes that an 
entity with that level of total consolidated assets would present 
significant risk because of both its size and the likelihood that 
such a U.S. IHC would have significant cross-border exposure. As a 
result, it is consistent with the principle of national treatment to 
subject such U.S. IHCs to the same SCCL as a major covered company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the final rule also does not include as a counterparty 
the home country sovereign entity of an FBO, without regard to the risk 
weight that applies to the sovereign. This treatment is consistent with 
the exclusion of exposures to the U.S. government from the final rule. 
Finally, as noted, the final rule permits FBOs to comply with the SCCL 
for their combined U.S. operations by certifying to the Board that the 
FBO meets large exposure or SCCL standards on a consolidated basis 
established by its home country supervisor that are consistent with the 
large exposure standard. This option should avoid subjecting an FBO to 
duplicative SCCL standards. For all these reasons, the Board believes 
it is providing due regard to the principles of national treatment and 
equality of competitive opportunity in applying SCCL to FBOs through 
this final rule.\208\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted, the Board is developing a comprehensive proposal on 
application of enhanced prudential standards to FBOs with total 
consolidated assets of at least $100 billion but less than $250 
billion, including any subsidiary U.S. IHC. In connection with this 
proposal and other tailoring and implementation efforts related to 
EGRRCPA, the Board may make amendments to the SCCL framework in this 
final rule.

F. Gross Credit Exposure

    Under the proposed rule, a covered entity would have been permitted 
to calculate gross exposure to certain derivative transactions using 
any methodology that it is permitted to use under the Board's capital 
rules, including IMM. This treatment would have been the same as the 
proposed treatment of covered companies. FBO commenters expressed 
support for the proposal's flexibility in permitting use of IMM that 
have been approved for risk based-capital purposes to value exposures 
due to derivative transactions. However, commenters explained that an 
FBO would be unable to benefit from this treatment with respect to its 
U.S. IHC or its combined U.S. operations because there is currently no 
approval process in place for FBOs to seek approval to use IMM in the 
United States. As a result, these commenters indicated that an FBO 
would need to use the standardized methodology, which does not fully 
consider correlation between derivatives and any netting benefits, and 
thus may overstate the entity's exposures, in valuing exposures due to 
derivatives transactions of its U.S. IHC and its combined U.S. 
operations. Some commenters urged the Board to provide an avenue in the 
final rule for an FBO to obtain approval for its U.S. IHC and its 
combined U.S. operations to use IMM in calculating exposures due to 
derivatives transactions. In particular, these commenters argued that, 
to the extent FBOs are subject to rigorous approval processes to use 
IMM in their home countries, the Board should establish a process to 
recognize and defer to home country regulators' approval of IMM and 
thereby permit an FBO to use such methodologies in calculating 
exposures due to derivative transactions of its U.S. IHC or its 
combined U.S. operations, if desired. These commenters noted that this 
approach would be consistent with the statutory mandate to give due 
regard to comparable home country treatment.
    Under the final rule, an FBO is authorized to measure its gross 
credit exposure to a counterparty on a derivatives transaction using 
the same valuation approaches as those set forth in the final rule 
applicable to covered companies. As noted, an FBO that is subject on a 
consolidated basis to a home country SCCL framework will be able to 
comply with the SCCL for its combined U.S. operations by certifying to 
the Board that the FBO complies with its home country SCCL framework. 
To the extent the FBO's home country SCCL framework permits the use of 
internal models to value derivative transactions, the FBO's 
certification to the Board that the FBO complies with the SCCL 
framework could be based, in part, on its measurement of derivatives 
transactions using such models. In the case of a U.S. IHC, the U.S. IHC 
is authorized under the final rule to value a derivative transaction 
using any approach, including internal models, that the U.S. IHC is 
authorized to use under the capital rules to value the derivatives 
transaction.

G. Net Credit Exposure

    The final rule describes how a covered foreign entity would convert 
gross credit exposure amounts to net credit exposure amounts by taking 
into account eligible collateral, eligible guarantees, eligible credit 
and equity derivatives, and other eligible hedges (that is, a short 
position in the counterparty's debt or equity securities). An FBO 
generally would calculate its net credit exposure to a counterparty by 
adjusting its gross credit exposure to that counterparty in the same 
way as covered companies would adjust their gross credit exposures. 
However, the definition of ``eligible collateral'' for

[[Page 38491]]

covered foreign entities would exclude debt or equity securities 
(including convertible bonds) issued by an affiliate (rather than a 
subsidiary) of the U.S. IHC or the combined U.S. operations of a 
foreign banking organization. Referring to ``affiliate'' in the context 
of FBOs preserves consistent treatment with covered companies, who are 
subject to SCCL on a consolidated basis. As discussed above, the 
definition of ``eligible guarantor'' would exclude the foreign banking 
organization or any affiliate thereof, in order to preserve consistent 
treatment with covered companies.\209\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See final rule Sec.  252.171(p).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

H. Exposures to SPVs and Aggregation of Exposures to Connected 
Counterparties

    The final rule generally treats foreign covered entities in the 
same manner as covered companies with respect to exposures to SPVs and 
the application of the economic interdependence and control 
relationship tests.\210\ This treatment includes modifications made in 
the final rule for covered companies in response to public comments for 
the same reasons discussed earlier in this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION. 
Just as in the proposal, under the final rule for FBOs, U.S. IHCs with 
total consolidated assets of at least $50 billion but less than $250 
billion generally are not required to apply the specialized SPV 
treatment of section 252.175 of the final rule. However, the final rule 
has been revised such that only a covered foreign entity or U.S. IHC 
with $250 billion or more in total consolidated assets is required to 
apply the economic interdependence and control relationship tests to 
aggregate connected counterparties, unless the Board determines it is 
necessary to apply these tests with respect to such a company to 
prevent evasion of the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \210\ See final rule Sec. Sec.  252.175-.176.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

I. Exemptions

    As with the proposal for covered companies, certain commenters also 
requested exemptions for multilateral banks and certain supranational 
entities, including the Bank of International Settlements, the European 
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, 
and multilateral development banks that are assigned a zero percent 
risk weight under the Board's capital rules.
    As noted, section 165(e)(6) of the Dodd-Frank Act permits the Board 
to exempt transactions from the definition of the term ``credit 
exposure'' for purposes of this subsection, if the Board finds that the 
exemption is in the public interest and is consistent with the purposes 
of this subsection. The final rule provides the same exemptions for the 
credit exposures of covered foreign entities as those provided in the 
final rule for covered companies.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ See final rule Sec.  252.177(a). As noted, the final rule 
retains the treatment for an FBO's exposures to a home country 
sovereign entity, but does so by modifying the definition of 
``counterparty'' to exclude these entities. See section III.D.4 
supra for additional discussion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

J. Compliance

    Under the proposed rule, a U.S. IHC and the combined U.S. 
operations of an FBO with less than $250 billion in total consolidated 
assets, and less than $10 billion in total on-balance-sheet foreign 
exposures, would have been required to comply with the requirements of 
the proposed rule as of the end of each quarter.\212\ Other U.S. IHCs 
and FBOs would have been required to comply with the proposed rule on a 
daily basis as of the end of each business day and submit a monthly 
compliance report demonstrating its daily compliance.\213\ The final 
rule, like the proposal, requires a U.S. IHC with total consolidated 
assets of at least $50 billion but less than $250 billion to comply 
with the requirements of the rule as of the end of each quarter, unless 
the Board determines and notifies the U.S. IHC in writing that more 
frequent compliance is required. Also like the proposal, the final rule 
requires an FBO (with respect to its combined U.S. operations) or U.S. 
IHC with total consolidated assets of $250 billion or more to comply 
with the requirements of the rule on a daily basis, as of the end of 
each business day. The final rule requires all covered foreign entities 
to report compliance on a quarterly basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.178(a).
    \213\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, an FBO would have been required to ensure the 
compliance of its U.S. IHC and its combined U.S. operations. If either 
the U.S. IHC or the combined U.S. operations were not in compliance 
with respect to a counterparty, both the U.S. IHC and the combined U.S. 
operations would have been prohibited from engaging in any additional 
credit transactions with such a counterparty, except in cases when the 
Board determines that such additional credit transactions were 
necessary or appropriate to preserve the safety and soundness of the 
foreign banking organization or financial stability.\214\ In 
considering special temporary exceptions, the Board could have imposed 
supervisory oversight and reporting measures that the Board determined 
were appropriate to monitor compliance with the foregoing 
standards.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.178(c).
    \215\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.178(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters expressed concern with the fact that if either the U.S. 
IHC or the combined U.S. operations of an FBO were not in compliance, 
both the U.S. IHC and the combined U.S. operations would be prohibited 
from engaging in any additional credit transactions with such a 
counterparty (the ``cross-trigger''). Commenters contended there was no 
similar restriction on U.S. covered companies (for example, the breach 
of lending limits that apply to a national bank subsidiary would not 
restrict lending or additional exposures by other parts of the 
consolidated BHC). Commenters also noted that this provision would 
create incentives for FBOs to shift banking, lending, and derivatives 
activities to non-U.S. branches to avoid the potential curtailment of 
activities that could result from operation of the cross-trigger.
    As noted, the final rule modifies the manner in which the SCCL 
apply to an FBO. In particular, an FBO that is subject on a 
consolidated basis to a home country SCCL framework will be able to 
comply with the SCCL for its combined U.S. operations by certifying to 
the Board that the FBO complies with its home country SCCL framework. 
If an FBO is able to make such a certification, the FBO would be viewed 
as compliant with the final rule with respect to its combined U.S. 
operations. As a result, any noncompliance by the FBO would be with 
respect to its IHC. This modification should help mitigate concerns 
raised by commenters regarding the cross-trigger.

K. Timing of Applicability

    Under the proposal, FBOs and U.S. IHCs with less than $250 billion 
in total consolidated assets and less than $10 billion in total on-
balance-sheet foreign assets would have been required to comply with 
the proposed rule two years from the effective date of the proposed 
rule, unless that time were extended by the Board in writing.\216\ FBOs 
and U.S. IHCs with $250 billion or more in total consolidated assets or 
$10 billion or more in total on-balance-sheet foreign assets would have 
been required to comply with the proposed rule one year from the 
effective date of any final rule, unless that time were

[[Page 38492]]

extended by the Board in writing.\217\ The proposal would have required 
any company that became a covered company after the effective date of 
the final rule to comply with the requirements of the rule beginning on 
the first day of the fifth calendar quarter after it becomes a covered 
entity, unless that time were accelerated or extended by the Board in 
writing.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.170(c)(1)(i), 
252.170(c)(2)(i).
    \217\ See proposed rule Sec. Sec.  252.170(c)(1)(ii), 
252.170(c)(2)(ii).
    \218\ See proposed rule Sec.  252.170(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commenters argued that FBOs should have more time to comply with 
the final rule, for reasons similar to those provided by commenters 
concerning the proposal for covered companies. In particular, these 
commenters argued that the one-year compliance period might be 
insufficient for smaller organizations in light of the multiple and 
complex requirements on the combined U.S. operations of an FBO.
    The Board has determined to permit all covered foreign entities 
that are not major FBOs or major U.S. IHCs until July 1, 2020, to 
comply with the final rule, while major FBOs and major U.S. IHCs have 
until January 1, 2020, to comply. This timing is similar to the final 
compliance period for covered companies. Also similar to the final rule 
for covered companies, the final rule requires a covered foreign entity 
that becomes a covered foreign entity after the effective date of the 
final rule to comply with the SCCL beginning on the first day of the 
ninth calendar quarter after it becomes a covered foreign entity, 
unless that time is accelerated or extended by the Board in writing.

IV. Impact Analysis

    A quantitative impact study conducted by Board staff on the 
proposal concluded that banking firms would generally have been able to 
meet the proposed SCCL with modest adjustments. The study estimated 
that the total amount of covered companies' credit exposure in excess 
of the limits in the proposed rule would have been less than $100 
billion, and that the overwhelming majority of this excess credit 
exposure would have been credit exposure of major covered companies to 
major counterparties. The final rule contains a number of recommended 
modifications that would reduce this estimated impact. In particular, 
the final rule would allow covered companies and U.S. IHCs to use 
internal models to measure exposures from securities financing 
transactions, which was one of the major sources of excess exposure. 
Moreover, the narrower scope of application of the final rule, 
including the narrower definitions of ``covered company'' and 
``counterparty,'' would further reduce its impact. Finally, recent 
staff analysis shows that covered companies and U.S. IHCs have very few 
single-counterparty exposures above 5 percent of their tier 1 capital. 
Thus, they are unlikely to exceed the credit limits of the final rule. 
As a result, staff believes the final rule is unlikely to have a 
material impact on covered companies and U.S. IHCs.
    Importantly, the final rule provides covered companies and U.S. 
IHCs with a compliance period of 18 to 24 months, which should allow 
firms sufficient time to construct an infrastructure for monitoring and 
reporting their credit exposures to the Federal Reserve and for 
conforming any excess credit exposures. Covered firms will have a 
number of relatively low-cost mechanisms for reducing any residual 
excess credit exposures, including shifting exposures to other less-
concentrated counterparties, increasing margin requirements for some 
derivatives or securities financing transactions, or increasing use of 
derivative transactions that are cleared by qualifying central 
counterparties.

V. Regulatory Analysis

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Certain provisions of the final rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 through 3521). The Board has 
reviewed the reporting requirements in Sec. Sec.  252.78(a) and 
252.178(a) of the final rule under the authority delegated to the Board 
by Office of Management and Budget. As noted, the Board is addressing 
these requirements in a separate notice published elsewhere in this 
issue of the Federal Register.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA), 
generally requires that an agency prepare and make available an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis in connection with a notice of proposed 
rulemaking.
    The Board solicited public comment on this rule in a notice of 
proposed rulemaking \219\ and has since considered the potential impact 
of this rule on small entities in accordance with section 604 of the 
RFA. Based on the Board's analysis, and for the reasons stated below, 
the Board believes the final rule will not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ 81 FR 14328 (Mar. 16, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under regulations issued by the Small Business Administration 
(SBA), a ``small entity'' includes a depository institution, bank 
holding company, or savings and loan holding company with assets of 
$550 million or less (small banking organizations).\220\ As discussed 
in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the final rule generally would apply 
to bank holding companies and foreign banking organizations with total 
consolidated assets of $250 billion or more. Companies that are subject 
to the final rule have consolidated assets that substantially exceed 
the $550 million asset threshold at which a banking entity is 
considered a ``small entity'' under SBA regulations. Because the final 
rule does not apply to any company with assets of $550 million or less, 
the final rule would not apply to any ``small entity'' for purposes of 
the RFA. The Board does not believe that the final rule duplicates, 
overlaps, or conflicts with any other Federal rules. In light of the 
foregoing, the Board does not believe that the final rule would have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
supervised.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ See 13 CFR 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    1. Statement of the need for, and objectives of the final rule.
    In accordance with section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Board is 
proposing to amend Regulation YY to establish SCCL for covered 
companies and covered foreign entities in order to limit the risks that 
the failure of any individual firm could pose to those 
organizations.\221\ Section 165(e) requires the Board to implement the 
SCCL by regulation. The reasons and justification for the final rule 
are described above in more detail in this SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    2. Summary of the significant issues raised by public comment on 
the Board's initial analysis, the Board's assessment of any such 
issues, and a result of such comments.
    The Board performed a regulatory flexibility analysis in connection 
with the final rule. Moreover, the final rule does not impact small 
entities as described below.
    3. Small entities affected by the final rule and compliance 
requirements.
    The provisions of the final rule apply to covered companies and 
covered foreign entities. Bank holding companies and foreign banking 
organizations that are subject to the proposed rule therefore 
substantially exceed the $550 million asset threshold at which a 
banking entity would qualify as a small banking organization.

[[Page 38493]]

    4. Significant alternatives to the final rule.
    In light of the foregoing, the Board does not believe that this 
final rule would have a significant negative economic impact on any 
small entities.

C. Solicitation of Comments on the Use of Plain Language

    Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act of 1999 requires the 
Federal banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and 
final rules published after January 1, 2000. The Board received no 
comments on these matters and believes that the final rule is written 
plainly and clearly.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 252

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Federal 
Reserve System, Holding companies, Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements, Securities.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System amends 12 CFR part 252 as follows:

PART 252--ENHANCED PRUDENTIAL STANDARDS (REGULATION YY).

0
1. The authority citation for part 252 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 321-338a, 481-486, 1467a(g), 1818, 1828, 
1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1844(c), 3904, 3906-
3909, 4808, 5361, 5365, 5366, 5367, 5368, 5371.

0
2. Add subpart H to read as follows:
Subpart H--Single-Counterparty Credit Limits
Sec.
252.70 Applicability and general provisions.
252.71 Definitions.
252.72 Credit exposure limits.
252.73 Gross credit exposure.
252.74 Net credit exposure.
252.75 Investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, 
investment funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not 
affiliates of the covered company.
252.76 Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty due to 
economic interdependence or control relationships.
252.77 Exemptions.
252.78 Compliance.

Subpart H--Single-Counterparty Credit Limits


Sec.  252.70   Applicability and general provisions.

    (a) In general. (1) This subpart establishes single counterparty 
credit limits for a covered company.
    (2) For purposes of this subpart:
    (i) Covered company means
    (A) Any bank holding company (other than a foreign banking 
organization that is subject to subpart Q of this part, including any 
U.S. intermediate holding company of such foreign banking organization) 
with total consolidated assets that equal or exceed $250 billion; and
    (B) Any U.S. bank holding company identified as a global 
systemically important BHC pursuant to Sec.  217.402 of the Board's 
Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.402).
    (ii) Major covered company means any covered company that is a U.S. 
bank holding company identified as a global systemically important BHC 
pursuant to Sec.  217.402 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.402).
    (b) Credit exposure limits. (1) Section 252.72 establishes credit 
exposure limits for a covered company and a major covered company.
    (2) A covered company is required to calculate its aggregate net 
credit exposure, gross credit exposure, and net credit exposure to a 
counterparty using the methods in this subpart.
    (c) Applicability of this subpart. (1)(i) A company that is a 
covered company as of October 5, 2018, must comply with the 
requirements of this subpart, including but not limited to Sec.  
252.72, beginning on July 1, 2020, unless that time is extended by the 
Board in writing.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, a company 
that is a major covered company as of October 5, 2018, must comply with 
the requirements of this subpart, including but not limited to Sec.  
252.72, beginning on January 1, 2020, unless that time is extended by 
the Board in writing.
    (2) A covered company that becomes subject to this subpart after 
October 5, 2018 must comply with the requirements of this subpart 
beginning on the first day of the ninth calendar quarter after it 
becomes a covered company, unless that time is accelerated or extended 
by the Board in writing.
    (d) Cessation of requirements. (1) Any company that becomes a 
covered company will remain subject to the requirements of this subpart 
unless and until its total consolidated assets fall below $250 billion 
for each of four consecutive quarters, as reported on the covered 
company's FR Y-9C, effective on the as-of date of the fourth 
consecutive FR Y-9C.
    (2) A covered company that has ceased to be a major covered company 
for purposes of Sec.  252.72(b) is no longer subject to the 
requirements of Sec.  252.72(b) beginning on the first day of the 
calendar quarter following the reporting date on which it ceased to be 
a major covered company; provided that the covered company remains 
subject to the requirements of this subpart, unless it ceases to be a 
covered company pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section.


Sec.  252.71   Definitions.

    Unless defined in this section, terms that are set forth in Sec.  
252.2 of this part and used in this subpart have the definitions 
assigned in Sec.  252.2. For purposes of this subpart:
    (a) Adjusted market value means:
    (1) With respect to the value of cash, securities, or other 
eligible collateral transferred by the covered company to a 
counterparty, the sum of:
    (i) The market value of the cash, securities, or other eligible 
collateral; and
    (ii) The product of the market value of the securities or other 
eligible collateral multiplied by the applicable collateral haircut in 
Table 1 to Sec.  217.132 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.132); 
and
    (2) With respect to cash, securities, or other eligible collateral 
received by the covered company from a counterparty:
    (i) The market value of the cash, securities, or other eligible 
collateral; minus
    (ii) The market value of the securities or other eligible 
collateral multiplied by the applicable collateral haircut in Table 1 
to Sec.  217.132 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.132).
    (3) Prior to calculating the adjusted market value pursuant to 
paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section, with regard to a transaction 
that meets the definition of ``repo-style transaction'' in Sec.  217.2 
of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2), the covered company would 
first multiply the applicable collateral haircuts in Table 1 to Sec.  
217.132 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.132) by the square root 
of \1/2\.
    (b) Affiliate means, with respect to a company:
    (1) Any subsidiary of the company and any other company that is 
consolidated with the company under applicable accounting standards; or
    (2) For a company that is not subject to principles or standards 
referenced in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, any subsidiary of the 
company and any other company that would be consolidated with the 
company, if consolidation would have occurred if such principles or 
standards had applied.
    (c) Aggregate net credit exposure means the sum of all net credit 
exposures of a covered company and all

[[Page 38494]]

of its subsidiaries to a single counterparty as calculated under this 
subpart.
    (d) Bank-eligible investments means investment securities that a 
national bank is permitted to purchase, sell, deal in, underwrite, and 
hold under 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh) and 12 CFR part 1.
    (e) Counterparty means, with respect to a credit transaction:
    (1) With respect to a natural person, the natural person, and, if 
the credit exposure of the covered company to such natural person 
exceeds 5 percent of the covered company's tier 1 capital, the natural 
person and members of the person's immediate family collectively;
    (2) With respect to any company that is not a subsidiary of the 
covered company, the company and its affiliates collectively;
    (3) With respect to a State, the State and all of its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions (including any 
municipalities) collectively;
    (4) With respect to a foreign sovereign entity that is not assigned 
a zero percent risk weight under the standardized approach in the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subpart D), the foreign 
sovereign entity and all of its agencies and instrumentalities (but not 
including any political subdivision) collectively; and
    (5) With respect to a political subdivision of a foreign sovereign 
entity such as a state, province, or municipality, any political 
subdivision of the foreign sovereign entity and all of such political 
subdivision's agencies and instrumentalities, collectively.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ In addition, under Sec.  252.76, under certain 
circumstances, a covered company is required to aggregate its net 
credit exposure to one or more counterparties for all purposes under 
this subpart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (f) Covered company is defined in Sec.  252.70(a)(2)(i) of this 
subpart.
    (g) Credit derivative has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (h) Credit transaction means, with respect to a counterparty:
    (1) Any extension of credit to the counterparty, including loans, 
deposits, and lines of credit, but excluding uncommitted lines of 
credit;
    (2) Any repurchase agreement or reverse repurchase agreement with 
the counterparty;
    (3) Any securities lending or securities borrowing transaction with 
the counterparty;
    (4) Any guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit (including any 
endorsement, confirmed letter of credit, or standby letter of credit) 
issued on behalf of the counterparty;
    (5) Any purchase of securities issued by or other investment in the 
counterparty;
    (6) Any credit exposure to the counterparty in connection with a 
derivative transaction between the covered company and the 
counterparty;
    (7) Any credit exposure to the counterparty in connection with a 
credit derivative or equity derivative between the covered company and 
a third party, the reference asset of which is an obligation or equity 
security of, or equity investment in, the counterparty; and
    (8) Any transaction that is the functional equivalent of the above, 
and any other similar transaction that the Board, by regulation or 
order, determines to be a credit transaction for purposes of this 
subpart.
    (i) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3 of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (j) Derivative transaction means any transaction that is a 
contract, agreement, swap, warrant, note, or option that is based, in 
whole or in part, on the value of, any interest in, or any quantitative 
measure or the occurrence of any event relating to, one or more 
commodities, securities, currencies, interest or other rates, indices, 
or other assets.
    (k) Eligible collateral means collateral in which, notwithstanding 
the prior security interest of any custodial agent, the covered company 
has a perfected, first priority security interest (or the legal 
equivalent thereof, if outside of the United States), with the 
exception of cash on deposit, and is in the form of:
    (1) Cash on deposit with the covered company or a subsidiary of the 
covered company (including cash in foreign currency or U.S. dollars 
held for the covered company by a custodian or trustee, whether inside 
or outside of the United States);
    (2) Debt securities (other than mortgage- or asset-backed 
securities and resecuritization securities, unless those securities are 
issued by a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise) that are bank-
eligible investments and that are investment grade, except for any debt 
securities issued by the covered company or any subsidiary of the 
covered company;
    (3) Equity securities that are publicly traded, except for any 
equity securities issued by the covered company or any subsidiary of 
the covered company;
    (4) Convertible bonds that are publicly traded, except for any 
convertible bonds issued by the covered company or any subsidiary of 
the covered company; or
    (5) Gold bullion.
    (l) Eligible credit derivative means a single-name credit 
derivative or a standard, non-tranched index credit derivative, 
provided that:
    (1) The contract meets the requirements of an eligible guarantee 
and has been confirmed by the protection purchaser and the protection 
provider;
    (2) Any assignment of the contract has been confirmed by all 
relevant parties;
    (3) If the credit derivative is a credit default swap, the contract 
includes the following credit events:
    (i) Failure to pay any amount due under the terms of the reference 
exposure, subject to any applicable minimal payment threshold that is 
consistent with standard market practice and with a grace period that 
is closely in line with the grace period of the reference exposure; and
    (ii) Receivership, insolvency, liquidation, conservatorship, or 
inability of the reference exposure issuer to pay its debts, or its 
failure or admission in writing of its inability generally to pay its 
debts as they become due, and similar events;
    (4) The terms and conditions dictating the manner in which the 
contract is to be settled are incorporated into the contract;
    (5) If the contract allows for cash settlement, the contract 
incorporates a robust valuation process to estimate loss reliably and 
specifies a reasonable period for obtaining post-credit event 
valuations of the reference exposure;
    (6) If the contract requires the protection purchaser to transfer 
an exposure to the protection provider at settlement, the terms of at 
least one of the exposures that is permitted to be transferred under 
the contract provide that any required consent to transfer may not be 
unreasonably withheld; and
    (7) If the credit derivative is a credit default swap, the contract 
clearly identifies the parties responsible for determining whether a 
credit event has occurred, specifies that this determination is not the 
sole responsibility of the protection provider, and gives the 
protection purchaser the right to notify the protection provider of the 
occurrence of a credit event.
    (m) Eligible equity derivative means an equity derivative, provided 
that:
    (1) The derivative contract has been confirmed by all relevant 
parties;
    (2) Any assignment of the derivative contract has been confirmed by 
all relevant parties; and
    (3) The terms and conditions dictating the manner in which the 
derivative contract is to be settled are incorporated into the 
contract.

[[Page 38495]]

    (n) Eligible guarantee has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of 
the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (o) Eligible guarantor has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of 
the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (p) Equity derivative has the same meaning as ``equity derivative 
contract'' in Sec.  217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (q) Exempt counterparty means an entity that is identified as 
exempt from the requirements of this subpart under Sec.  252.77, or 
that is otherwise excluded from this subpart, including any sovereign 
entity assigned a zero percent risk weight under the standardized 
approach in the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subpart D).
    (r) Financial entity means:
    (1)(i) A bank holding company or an affiliate thereof; a savings 
and loan holding company as defined in section 10(n) of the Home 
Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1467a(n)); a U.S. intermediate holding 
company established or designated for purposes of compliance with this 
part; or a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board;
    (ii) A depository institution as defined in section 3(c) of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)); an organization that 
is organized under the laws of a foreign country and that engages 
directly in the business of banking outside the United States; a 
federal credit union or state credit union as defined in section 2 of 
the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752(1) and (6)); a national 
association, state member bank, or state nonmember bank that is not a 
depository institution; an institution that functions solely in a trust 
or fiduciary capacity as described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)(D)); an industrial loan 
company, an industrial bank, or other similar institution described in 
section 2(c)(2)(H) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(H));
    (iii) An entity that is state-licensed or registered as:
    (A) A credit or lending entity, including a finance company; money 
lender; installment lender; consumer lender or lending company; 
mortgage lender, broker, or bank; motor vehicle title pledge lender; 
payday or deferred deposit lender; premium finance company; commercial 
finance or lending company; or commercial mortgage company; except 
entities registered or licensed solely on account of financing the 
entity's direct sales of goods or services to customers;
    (B) A money services business, including a check casher; money 
transmitter; currency dealer or exchange; or money order or traveler's 
check issuer;
    (iv) Any person registered with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission as a swap dealer or major swap participant pursuant to the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), or an entity that 
is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as a 
security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap participant 
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et 
seq.);
    (v) A securities holding company as defined in section 618 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
1850a); a broker or dealer as defined in sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(4)-(5)); an 
investment adviser as defined in section 202(a) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)); an investment company 
registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.); or a company 
that has elected to be regulated as a business development company 
pursuant to section 54(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 
U.S.C. 80a-53(a));
    (vi) A private fund as defined in section 202(a) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)); an entity that would be an 
investment company under section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3) but for section 3(c)(5)(C); or an entity that is 
deemed not to be an investment company under section 3 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 pursuant to Investment Company Act Rule 
3a-7 (17 CFR 270.3a-7) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission;
    (vii) A commodity pool, a commodity pool operator, or a commodity 
trading advisor as defined, respectively, in sections 1a(10), 1a(11), 
and 1a(12) of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(10), 
1a(11), and 1a(12)); a floor broker, a floor trader, or introducing 
broker as defined, respectively, in sections 1a(22), 1a(23) and 1a(31) 
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(22), 1a(23), and 
1a(31)); or a futures commission merchant as defined in section 1a(28) 
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(28));
    (viii) An employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and 
(32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 
1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002);
    (ix) An entity that is organized as an insurance company, primarily 
engaged in writing insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by 
insurance companies, or is subject to supervision as such by a State 
insurance regulator or foreign insurance regulator;
    (x) Any designated financial market utility, as defined in section 
803 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(12 U.S.C. 5462); and
    (xi) An entity that would be a financial entity described in 
paragraphs (r)(1)(i) through (x) of this section, if it were organized 
under the laws of the United States or any State thereof; and
    (2) Provided that, for purposes of this subpart, ``financial 
entity'' does not include any counterparty that is a foreign sovereign 
entity or multilateral development bank.
    (s) Foreign sovereign entity means a sovereign entity other than 
the United States government and the entity's agencies, departments, 
ministries, and central bank collectively.
    (t) Gross credit exposure means, with respect to any credit 
transaction, the credit exposure of the covered company before 
adjusting, pursuant to Sec.  252.74, for the effect of any eligible 
collateral, eligible guarantee, eligible credit derivative, eligible 
equity derivative, other eligible hedge, and any unused portion of 
certain extensions of credit.
    (u) Immediate family means the spouse of an individual, the 
individual's minor children, and any of the individual's children 
(including adults) residing in the individual's home.
    (v) Intraday credit exposure means credit exposure of a covered 
company to a counterparty that by its terms is to be repaid, sold, or 
terminated by the end of its business day in the United States.
    (w) Investment grade has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (x) Major counterparty means any counterparty that is or includes:
    (1) A major covered company;
    (2) A top-tier foreign banking organization that meets the 
requirements of Sec.  252.172(c)(3) through (5); or
    (3) Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board.
    (y) Major covered company is defined in Sec.  252.70(a)(2)(ii) of 
this subpart.
    (z) Multilateral development bank has the same meaning as in Sec.  
217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (aa) Net credit exposure means, with respect to any credit 
transaction, the gross credit exposure of a covered company and all of 
its subsidiaries calculated under Sec.  252.73, as adjusted in 
accordance with Sec.  252.74.
    (bb) Qualifying central counterparty has the same meaning as in 
Sec.  217.2 of

[[Page 38496]]

the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (cc) Qualifying master netting agreement has the same meaning as in 
Sec.  217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (dd) Securities financing transaction means any repurchase 
agreement, reverse repurchase agreement, securities borrowing 
transaction, or securities lending transaction.
    (ee) Short sale means any sale of a security which the seller does 
not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security 
borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.
    (ff) Sovereign entity means a central national government 
(including the U.S. government) or an agency, department, ministry, or 
central bank, but not including any political subdivision such as a 
state, province, or municipality.
    (gg) Subsidiary. A company is a subsidiary of another company if:
    (1) The company is consolidated by the other company under 
applicable accounting standards; or
    (2) For a company that is not subject to principles or standards 
referenced in paragraph (gg)(1) of this definition, consolidation would 
have occurred if such principles or standards had applied.
    (hh) Tier 1 capital means common equity tier 1 capital and 
additional tier 1 capital, as defined in the Board's Regulation Q (12 
CFR part 217) and as reported by the bank holding company on the most 
recent FR Y-9C report on a consolidated basis.
    (ii) Total consolidated assets. A company's total consolidated 
assets are determined based on:
    (1) The average of the bank holding company's total consolidated 
assets in the four most recent consecutive quarters as reported 
quarterly on the FR Y-9C; or
    (2) If the bank holding company has not filed an FR Y-9C for each 
of the four most recent consecutive quarters, the average of the bank 
holding company's total consolidated assets, as reported on the 
company's FR Y-9C, for the most recent quarter or consecutive quarters, 
as applicable.


Sec.  252.72   Credit exposure limits.

    (a) General limit on aggregate net credit exposure. No covered 
company may have an aggregate net credit exposure to any counterparty 
that exceeds 25 percent of the tier 1 capital of the covered company.
    (b) Limit on aggregate net credit exposure of major covered 
companies to major counterparties. No major covered company may have 
aggregate net credit exposure to any major counterparty that exceeds 15 
percent of the tier 1 capital of the major covered company.


Sec.  252.73   Gross credit exposure.

    (a) Calculation of gross credit exposure. The amount of gross 
credit exposure of a covered company to a counterparty with respect to 
a credit transaction is, in the case of:
    (1) A deposit of the covered company held by the counterparty, loan 
by a covered company to the counterparty, and lease in which the 
covered company is the lessor and the counterparty is the lessee, equal 
to the amount owed by the counterparty to the covered company under the 
transaction.
    (2) A debt security or debt investment held by the covered company 
that is issued by the counterparty, equal to:
    (i) The market value of the securities, for trading and available-
for-sale securities; and
    (ii) The amortized purchase price of the securities or investments, 
for securities or investments held to maturity.
    (3) An equity security held by the covered company that is issued 
by the counterparty, equity investment in a counterparty, and other 
direct investments in a counterparty, equal to the market value.
    (4) A securities financing transaction must be valued using any of 
the methods that the covered company is authorized to use under the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E) to value such 
transactions:
    (i)(A) As calculated for each transaction, in the case of a 
securities financing transaction between the covered company and the 
counterparty that is not subject to a bilateral netting agreement or 
does not meet the definition of ``repo-style transaction'' in Sec.  
217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2); or
    (B) As calculated for a netting set, in the case of a securities 
financing transaction between the covered company and the counterparty 
that is subject to a bilateral netting agreement with that counterparty 
and meets the definition of ``repo-style transaction'' in Sec.  217.2 
of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2);
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, the 
covered company must:
    (A) Assign a value of zero to any security received from the 
counterparty that does not meet the definition of ``eligible 
collateral'' in Sec.  252.71(k); and
    (B) Include the value of securities that are eligible collateral 
received by the covered company from the counterparty (including any 
exempt counterparty), calculated in accordance with paragraphs 
(a)(4)(i) through (iv) of this section, when calculating its gross 
credit exposure to the issuer of those securities;
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section 
and with respect to each credit transaction, a covered company's gross 
credit exposure to a collateral issuer under this paragraph (a)(4) is 
limited to the covered company's gross credit exposure to the 
counterparty on the credit transaction; and
    (iv) In cases where the covered company receives eligible 
collateral from a counterparty in addition to the cash or securities 
received from that counterparty, the counterparty may reduce its gross 
credit exposure to that counterparty in accordance with Sec.  
252.74(b).
    (5) A committed credit line extended by a covered company to a 
counterparty, equal to the face amount of the committed credit line.
    (6) A guarantee or letter of credit issued by a covered company on 
behalf of a counterparty, equal to the maximum potential loss to the 
covered company on the transaction.
    (7) A derivative transaction must be valued using any of the 
methods that the covered company is authorized to use under the Board's 
Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E) to value such 
transactions:
    (i)(A) As calculated for each transaction, in the case of a 
derivative transaction between the covered company and the 
counterparty, including an equity derivative but excluding a credit 
derivative described in paragraph (a)(8) of this section, that is not 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement; or
    (B) As calculated for a netting set, in the case of a derivative 
transaction between the covered company and the counterparty, including 
an equity derivative but excluding a credit derivative described in 
paragraph (a)(8) of this section, that is subject to a qualifying 
master netting agreement.
    (ii) In cases where a covered company is required to recognize an 
exposure to an eligible guarantor pursuant to Sec.  252.74(d), the 
covered company must exclude the relevant derivative transaction when 
calculating its gross exposure to the original counterparty under this 
section.
    (8) A credit derivative between the covered company and a third 
party where the covered company is the protection provider and the 
reference asset is an obligation or debt security of the counterparty, 
equal to the maximum potential loss to the covered company on the 
transaction.

[[Page 38497]]

    (b) Investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, 
investment funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not 
subsidiaries. Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section, a covered 
company must calculate pursuant to Sec.  252.75 its gross credit 
exposure due to any investment in the debt or equity of, and any credit 
derivative or equity derivative between the covered company and a third 
party where the covered company is the protection provider and the 
reference asset is an obligation or equity security of, or equity 
investment in, a securitization vehicle, investment fund, and other 
special purpose vehicle that is not a subsidiary of the covered 
company.
    (c) Attribution rule. Notwithstanding any other requirement in this 
subpart, a covered company must treat any transaction with any natural 
person or entity as a credit transaction with another party, to the 
extent that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit 
of, or transferred to, the other party.


Sec.  252.74   Net credit exposure.

    (a) In general. For purposes of this subpart, a covered company 
must calculate its net credit exposure to a counterparty by adjusting 
its gross credit exposure to that counterparty in accordance with the 
rules set forth in this section.
    (b) Eligible collateral. (1) In computing its net credit exposure 
to a counterparty for any credit transaction other than a securities 
financing transaction, a covered company must reduce its gross credit 
exposure on the transaction by the adjusted market value of any 
eligible collateral.
    (2) A covered company that reduces its gross credit exposure to a 
counterparty as required under paragraph (b)(1) of this section must 
include the adjusted market value of the eligible collateral, when 
calculating its gross credit exposure to the collateral issuer.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a covered 
company's gross credit exposure to a collateral issuer under this 
paragraph (b) is limited to:
    (i) Its gross credit exposure to the counterparty on the credit 
transaction, or
    (ii) In the case of an exempt counterparty, the gross credit 
exposure that would have been attributable to that exempt counterparty 
on the credit transaction if valued in accordance with Sec.  252.73(a).
    (c) Eligible guarantees. (1) In calculating net credit exposure to 
a counterparty for any credit transaction, a covered company must 
reduce its gross credit exposure to the counterparty by the amount of 
any eligible guarantee from an eligible guarantor that covers the 
transaction.
    (2) A covered company that reduces its gross credit exposure to a 
counterparty as required under paragraph (c)(1) of this section must 
include the amount of eligible guarantees when calculating its gross 
credit exposure to the eligible guarantor.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(2) of this section, a covered 
company's gross credit exposure to an eligible guarantor with respect 
to an eligible guarantee under this paragraph (c) is limited to:
    (i) Its gross credit exposure to the counterparty on the credit 
transaction prior to recognition of the eligible guarantee, or
    (ii) In the case of an exempt counterparty, the gross credit 
exposure that would have been attributable to that exempt counterparty 
on the credit transaction prior to recognition of the eligible 
guarantee if valued in accordance with Sec.  252.73(a).
    (d) Eligible credit and equity derivatives. (1) In calculating net 
credit exposure to a counterparty for a credit transaction under this 
section, a covered company must reduce its gross credit exposure to the 
counterparty by:
    (i) In the case of any eligible credit derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the notional amount of the eligible credit derivative; or
    (ii) In the case of any eligible equity derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the gross credit exposure amount to the counterparty 
(calculated in accordance with Sec.  252.73(a)(7)).
    (2)(i) A covered company that reduces its gross credit exposure to 
a counterparty as provided under paragraph (d)(1) of this section must 
include, when calculating its net credit exposure to the eligible 
guarantor, including in instances where the underlying credit 
transaction would not be subject to the credit limits of Sec.  252.72 
(for example, due to an exempt counterparty), either
    (A) In the case of any eligible credit derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the notional amount of the eligible credit derivative; or
    (B) In the case of any eligible equity derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the gross credit exposure amount to the counterparty 
(calculated in accordance with Sec.  252.73(a)(7)).
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section, in cases 
where the eligible credit derivative or eligible equity derivative is 
used to hedge covered positions that are subject to the Board's market 
risk rule (12 CFR part 217, subpart F) and the counterparty on the 
hedged transaction is not a financial entity, the amount of credit 
exposure that a company must recognize to the eligible guarantor is the 
amount that would be calculated pursuant to Sec.  252.73(a).
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(2) of this section, a covered 
company's gross credit exposure to an eligible guarantor with respect 
to an eligible credit derivative or an eligible equity derivative under 
this paragraph (d) is limited to:
    (i) Its gross credit exposure to the counterparty on the credit 
transaction prior to recognition of the eligible credit derivative or 
the eligible equity derivative, or
    (ii) In the case of an exempt counterparty, the gross credit 
exposure that would have been attributable to that exempt counterparty 
on the credit transaction prior to recognition of the eligible credit 
derivative or the eligible equity derivative if valued in accordance 
with Sec.  252.73(a).
    (e) Other eligible hedges. In calculating net credit exposure to a 
counterparty for a credit transaction under this section, a covered 
company may reduce its gross credit exposure to the counterparty by the 
face amount of a short sale of the counterparty's debt security or 
equity security, provided that:
    (1) The instrument in which the covered company has a short 
position is junior to, or pari passu with, the instrument in which the 
covered company has the long position; and
    (2) The instrument in which the covered company has a short 
position and the instrument in which the covered company has the long 
position are either both treated as trading or available-for-sale 
exposures or both treated as held-to-maturity exposures.
    (f) Unused portion of certain extensions of credit. (1) In 
computing its net credit exposure to a counterparty for a committed 
credit line or revolving credit facility under this section, a covered 
company may reduce its gross credit exposure by the amount of the 
unused portion of the credit extension to the extent that the covered 
company does not have any legal obligation to advance additional funds 
under the extension of credit and the used portion of the credit 
extension has been fully secured by eligible collateral.
    (2) To the extent that the used portion of a credit extension has 
been secured by eligible collateral, the covered company may reduce its 
gross credit exposure by the adjusted market value

[[Page 38498]]

of any eligible collateral received from the counterparty, even if the 
used portion has not been fully secured by eligible collateral.
    (3) To qualify for the reduction in net credit exposure under this 
paragraph, the credit contract must specify that any used portion of 
the credit extension must be fully secured by the adjusted market value 
of any eligible collateral.
    (g) Credit transactions involving exempt counterparties. (1) A 
covered company's credit transactions with an exempt counterparty are 
not subject to the requirements of this subpart, including but not 
limited to Sec.  252.72.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (g)(1) of this section, in cases 
where a covered company has a credit transaction with an exempt 
counterparty and the covered company has obtained eligible collateral 
from that exempt counterparty or an eligible guarantee or eligible 
credit or equity derivative from an eligible guarantor, the covered 
company must include (for purposes of this subpart) such exposure to 
the issuer of such eligible collateral or the eligible guarantor, as 
calculated in accordance with the rules set forth in this section, when 
calculating its gross credit exposure to that issuer of eligible 
collateral or eligible guarantor.
    (h) Currency mismatch adjustments. For purposes of calculating its 
net credit exposure to a counterparty under this section, a covered 
company must apply, as applicable:
    (1) When reducing its gross credit exposure to a counterparty 
resulting from any credit transaction due to any eligible collateral 
and calculating its gross credit exposure to an issuer of eligible 
collateral, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, the currency 
mismatch adjustment approach of Sec.  217.37(c)(3)(ii) of the Board's 
Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.37(c)(3)(ii)); and
    (2) When reducing its gross credit exposure to a counterparty 
resulting from any credit transaction due to any eligible guarantee, 
eligible equity derivative, or eligible credit derivative from an 
eligible guarantor and calculating its gross credit exposure to an 
eligible guarantor, pursuant to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, 
the currency mismatch adjustment approach of Sec.  217.36(f) of the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.36(f)).
    (i) Maturity mismatch adjustments. For purposes of calculating its 
net credit exposure to a counterparty under this section, a covered 
company must apply, as applicable, the maturity mismatch adjustment 
approach of Sec.  217.36(d) of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 
217.36(d)):
    (1) When reducing its gross credit exposure to a counterparty 
resulting from any credit transaction due to any eligible collateral or 
any eligible guarantees, eligible equity derivatives, or eligible 
credit derivatives from an eligible guarantor, pursuant to paragraphs 
(b) through (d) of this section, and
    (2) In calculating its gross credit exposure to an issuer of 
eligible collateral, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, or to 
an eligible guarantor, pursuant to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this 
section; provided that
    (3) The eligible collateral, eligible guarantee, eligible equity 
derivative, or eligible credit derivative subject to paragraph (i)(1) 
of this section:
    (i) Has a shorter maturity than the credit transaction;
    (ii) Has an original maturity equal to or greater than one year;
    (iii) Has a residual maturity of not less than three months; and
    (iv) The adjustment approach is otherwise applicable.


Sec.  252.75   Investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, 
investment funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not 
subsidiaries of the covered company.

    (a) In general. (1) For purposes of this section, the following 
definitions apply:
    (i) SPV means a securitization vehicle, investment fund, or other 
special purpose vehicle that is not a subsidiary of the covered 
company.
    (ii) SPV exposure means an investment in the debt or equity of an 
SPV, or a credit derivative or equity derivative between the covered 
company and a third party where the covered company is the protection 
provider and the reference asset is an obligation or equity security 
of, or equity investment in, an SPV.
    (2)(i) A covered company must determine whether the amount of its 
gross credit exposure to an issuer of assets in an SPV, due to an SPV 
exposure, is equal to or greater than 0.25 percent of the covered 
company's tier 1 capital using one of the following two methods:
    (A) The sum of all of the issuer's assets (with each asset valued 
in accordance with Sec.  252.73(a)) in the SPV; or
    (B) The application of the look-through approach described in 
paragraph (b) of this section.
    (ii) With respect to the determination required under paragraph 
(a)(2)(i) of this section, a covered company must use the same method 
to calculate gross credit exposure to each issuer of assets in a 
particular SPV.
    (iii) In making a determination under paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this 
section, the covered company must consider only the credit exposure to 
the issuer arising from the covered company's SPV exposure.
    (iv) For purposes of this paragraph (a)(2), a covered company that 
is unable to identify each issuer of assets in an SPV must attribute to 
a single unknown counterparty the amount of its gross credit exposure 
to all unidentified issuers and calculate such gross credit exposure 
using one method in either paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) or (a)(2)(i)(B) of 
this section.
    (3)(i) If a covered company determines pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section that the amount of its gross credit exposure to an 
issuer of assets in an SPV is less than 0.25 percent of the covered 
company's tier 1 capital, the amount of the covered company's gross 
credit exposure to that issuer may be attributed to either that issuer 
of assets or the SPV:
    (A) If attributed to the issuer of assets, the issuer of assets 
must be identified as a counterparty, and the gross credit exposure 
calculated under paragraph (a)(2)(i)(A) of this section to that issuer 
of assets must be aggregated with any other gross credit exposures 
(valued in accordance with Sec.  252.73) to that same counterparty; and
    (B) If attributed to the SPV, the covered company's gross credit 
exposure is equal to the covered company's SPV exposure, valued in 
accordance with Sec.  252.73(a).
    (ii) If a covered company determines pursuant to paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section that the amount of its gross credit exposure to an 
issuer of assets in an SPV is equal to or greater than 0.25 percent of 
the covered company's tier 1 capital or the covered company is unable 
to determine that the amount of the gross credit exposure is less than 
0.25 percent of the covered company's tier 1 capital:
    (A) The covered company must calculate the amount of its gross 
credit exposure to the issuer of assets in the SPV using the look-
through approach in paragraph (b) of this section;
    (B) The issuer of assets in the SPV must be identified as a 
counterparty, and the gross credit exposure calculated in accordance 
with paragraph (b) must be aggregated with any other gross credit 
exposures (valued in accordance with Sec.  252.73) to that same 
counterparty; and
    (C) When applying the look-through approach in paragraph (b) of 
this section, a covered company that is unable to identify each issuer 
of assets in an SPV must attribute to a single unknown counterparty the 
amount of its gross credit exposure, calculated in

[[Page 38499]]

accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, to all unidentified 
issuers.
    (iii) For purposes of this section, a covered company must 
aggregate all gross credit exposures to unknown counterparties for all 
SPVs as if the exposures related to a single unknown counterparty; this 
single unknown counterparty is subject to the limits of Sec.  252.72 as 
if it were a single counterparty.
    (b) Look-through approach. A covered company that is required to 
calculate the amount of its gross credit exposure with respect to an 
issuer of assets in accordance with this paragraph (b) must calculate 
the amount as follows:
    (1) Where all investors in the SPV rank pari passu, the amount of 
the gross credit exposure to the issuer of assets is equal to the 
covered company's pro rata share of the SPV multiplied by the value of 
the underlying asset in the SPV, valued in accordance with Sec.  
252.73(a); and
    (2) Where all investors in the SPV do not rank pari passu, the 
amount of the gross credit exposure to the issuer of assets is equal 
to:
    (i) The pro rata share of the covered company's investment in the 
tranche of the SPV; multiplied by
    (ii) The lesser of:
    (A) The market value of the tranche in which the covered company 
has invested, except in the case of a debt security that is held to 
maturity, in which case the tranche must be valued at the amortized 
purchase price of the securities; and
    (B) The value of each underlying asset attributed to the issuer in 
the SPV, each as calculated pursuant to Sec.  252.73(a).
    (c) Exposures to third parties. (1) Notwithstanding any other 
requirement in this section, a covered company must recognize, for 
purposes of this subpart, a gross credit exposure to each third party 
that has a contractual obligation to provide credit or liquidity 
support to an SPV whose failure or material financial distress would 
cause a loss in the value of the covered company's SPV exposure.
    (2) The amount of any gross credit exposure that is required to be 
recognized to a third party under paragraph (c)(1) of this section is 
equal to the covered company's SPV exposure, up to the maximum 
contractual obligation of that third party to the SPV, valued in 
accordance with Sec.  252.73(a). (This gross credit exposure is in 
addition to the covered company's gross credit exposure to the SPV or 
the issuers of assets of the SPV, calculated in accordance with 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.)
    (3) A covered company must aggregate the gross credit exposure to a 
third party recognized in accordance with paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of 
this section with its other gross credit exposures to that third party 
(that are unrelated to the SPV) for purposes of compliance with the 
limits of Sec.  252.72.


Sec.  252.76   Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty 
due to economic interdependence or control relationships.

    (a) In general. (1) If a covered company has an aggregate net 
credit exposure to any counterparty that exceeds 5 percent of its tier 
1 capital, the covered company must assess its relationship with the 
counterparty under paragraph (b)(2) of this section to determine 
whether the counterparty is economically interdependent with one or 
more other counterparties of the covered company and under paragraph 
(c)(1) of this section to determine whether the counterparty is 
connected by a control relationship with one or more other 
counterparties.
    (2) If, pursuant to an assessment required under paragraph (a)(1) 
of this section, the covered company determines that one or more of the 
factors of paragraph (b)(2) or (c)(1) of this section are met with 
respect to one or more counterparties, or the Board determines pursuant 
to paragraph (d) of this section that one or more other counterparties 
of a covered company are economically interdependent or that one or 
more other counterparties of a covered company are connected by a 
control relationship, the covered company must aggregate its net credit 
exposure to the counterparties for all purposes under this subpart, 
including, but not limited to, Sec.  252.72.
    (3) In connection with any request pursuant to paragraph (b)(3) or 
(c)(2) of this section, the Board may require the covered company to 
provide additional information.
    (b) Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty due to 
economic interdependence. (1) For purposes of this paragraph, two 
counterparties are economically interdependent if the failure, default, 
insolvency, or material financial distress of one counterparty would 
cause the failure, default, insolvency, or material financial distress 
of the other counterparty, taking into account the factors in paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section.
    (2) A covered company must assess whether the financial distress of 
one counterparty (counterparty A) would prevent the ability of the 
other counterparty (counterparty B) to fully and timely repay 
counterparty B's liabilities and whether the insolvency or default of 
counterparty A is likely to be associated with the insolvency or 
default of counterparty B and, therefore, these counterparties are 
economically interdependent, by evaluating the following:
    (i) Whether 50 percent or more of one counterparty's gross revenue 
is derived from, or gross expenditures are directed to, transactions 
with the other counterparty;
    (ii) Whether counterparty A has fully or partly guaranteed the 
credit exposure of counterparty B, or is liable by other means, in an 
amount that is 50 percent or more of the covered company's net credit 
exposure to counterparty A;
    (iii) Whether 25 percent or more of one counterparty's production 
or output is sold to the other counterparty, which cannot easily be 
replaced by other customers;
    (iv) Whether the expected source of funds to repay the loans of 
both counterparties is the same and neither counterparty has another 
independent source of income from which the loans may be serviced and 
fully repaid; \1\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ An employer will not be treated as a source of repayment 
under this paragraph because of wages and salaries paid to an 
employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (v) Whether two or more counterparties rely on the same source for 
the majority of their funding and, in the event of the common 
provider's default, an alternative provider cannot be found.
    (3)(i) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2) of this section, if a 
covered company determines that one or more of the factors in paragraph 
(b)(2) is met, the covered company may request in writing a 
determination from the Board that those counterparties are not 
economically interdependent and that the covered company is not 
required to aggregate those counterparties.
    (ii) Upon a request by a covered company pursuant to paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section, the Board may grant temporary relief to the 
covered company and not require the covered company to aggregate one 
counterparty with another counterparty provided that the counterparty 
could promptly modify its business relationships, such as by reducing 
its reliance on the other counterparty, to address any economic 
interdependence concerns, and provided that such relief is in the 
public interest and is consistent with the purpose of this subpart and 
12 U.S.C. 5365(e).
    (c) Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty due to 
certain control relationships. (1) For purposes of this subpart, one 
counterparty (counterparty A) is deemed to control the other 
counterparty (counterparty B) if:

[[Page 38500]]

    (i) Counterparty A owns, controls, or holds with the power to vote 
25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of counterparty B; 
or
    (ii) Counterparty A controls in any manner the election of a 
majority of the directors, trustees, or general partners (or 
individuals exercising similar functions) of counterparty B.
    (2)(i) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this section, if a 
covered company determines that one or more of the factors in paragraph 
(c)(1) is met, the covered company may request in writing a 
determination from the Board that counterparty A does not control 
counterparty B and that the covered company is not required to 
aggregate those counterparties.
    (ii) Upon a request by a covered company pursuant to paragraph 
(c)(2) of this section, the Board may grant temporary relief to the 
covered company and not require the covered company to aggregate 
counterparty A with counterparty B provided that, taking into account 
the specific facts and circumstances, such indicia of control does not 
result in the entities being connected by control relationships for 
purposes of this subpart, and provided that such relief is in the 
public interest and is consistent with the purpose of this subpart and 
12 U.S.C. 5365(e).
    (d) Board determinations for aggregation of counterparties due to 
economic interdependence or control relationships. The Board may 
determine, after notice to the covered company and opportunity for 
hearing, that one or more counterparties of a covered company are:
    (i) Economically interdependent for purposes of this subpart, 
considering the factors in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, as well as 
any other indicia of economic interdependence that the Board determines 
in its discretion to be relevant; or
    (ii) Connected by control relationships for purposes of this 
subpart, considering the factors in paragraph (c)(1) of this section 
and whether counterparty A:
    (A) Controls the power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of Counterparty B pursuant to a voting agreement;
    (B) Has significant influence on the appointment or dismissal of 
counterparty B's administrative, management, or governing body, or the 
fact that a majority of members of such body have been appointed solely 
as a result of the exercise of counterparty A's voting rights; or
    (C) Has the power to exercise a controlling influence over the 
management or policies of counterparty B.
    (e) Board determinations for aggregation of counterparties to 
prevent evasion. Notwithstanding paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section, a covered company must aggregate its exposures to a 
counterparty with the covered company's exposures to another 
counterparty if the Board determines in writing after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that the exposures to the two counterparties 
must be aggregated to prevent evasions of the purposes of this subpart, 
including, but not limited to Sec.  252.76 and 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).


Sec.  252.77   Exemptions.

    (a) Exempted exposure categories. The following categories of 
credit transactions are exempt from the limits on credit exposure under 
this subpart:
    (1) Any direct claim on, and the portion of a claim that is 
directly and fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the 
Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, only while operating under the conservatorship or 
receivership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and any additional 
obligation issued by a U.S. government-sponsored entity as determined 
by the Board;
    (2) Intraday credit exposure to a counterparty;
    (3) Any trade exposure to a qualifying central counterparty related 
to the covered company's clearing activity, including potential future 
exposure arising from transactions cleared by the qualifying central 
counterparty and pre-funded default fund contributions;
    (4) Any credit transaction with the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance 
Corporation, the International Development Association, the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, or the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes;
    (5) Any credit transaction with the European Commission or the 
European Central Bank; and
    (6) Any transaction that the Board exempts if the Board finds that 
such exemption is in the public interest and is consistent with the 
purpose of this subpart.
    (b) Exemption for Federal Home Loan Banks. For purposes of this 
subpart, a covered company does not include any Federal Home Loan Bank.
    (c) Additional exemptions by the Board. The Board may, by 
regulation or order, exempt transactions, in whole or in part, from the 
definition of the term ``credit exposure,'' if the Board finds that the 
exemption is in the public interest and is consistent with the purpose 
of 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).


Sec.  252.78   Compliance.

    (a) Scope of compliance. (1) Using all available data, including 
any data required to be maintained or reported to the Federal Reserve 
under this subpart, a covered company must comply with the requirements 
of this subpart on a daily basis at the end of each business day.
    (2) A covered company must report its compliance to the Federal 
Reserve as of the end of the quarter, unless the Board determines and 
notifies that company in writing that more frequent reporting is 
required.
    (3) In reporting its compliance, a covered company must calculate 
and include in its gross credit exposure to an issuer of eligible 
collateral or eligible guarantor the amounts of eligible collateral, 
eligible guarantees, eligible equity derivatives, and eligible credit 
derivatives that were provided to the covered company in connection 
with credit transactions with exempt counterparties, valued in 
accordance with and as required by Sec.  252.74(b) through (d) and (g).
    (b) Qualifying Master Netting Agreement. With respect to any 
qualifying master netting agreement, a covered company must establish 
and maintain procedures that meet or exceed the requirements of Sec.  
217.3(d) of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.3(d)) to monitor 
possible changes in relevant law and to ensure that the agreement 
continues to satisfy these requirements.
    (c) Noncompliance. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, if a covered company is not in compliance with this subpart 
with respect to a counterparty solely due to the circumstances listed 
in paragraphs (c)(2)(i) through (v) of this section, the covered 
company will not be subject to enforcement actions for a period of 90 
days (or, with prior notice to the company, such shorter or longer 
period determined by the Board, in its sole discretion, to be 
appropriate to preserve the safety and soundness of the covered company 
or U.S. financial stability), if the covered company uses reasonable 
efforts to return to compliance with this subpart during this period. 
The covered company may not engage in any additional credit 
transactions with such a counterparty in contravention of this rule 
during the period of noncompliance, except as provided in paragraph 
(c)(2).

[[Page 38501]]

    (2) A covered company may request a special temporary credit 
exposure limit exemption from the Board. The Board may grant approval 
for such exemption in cases where the Board determines that such credit 
transactions are necessary or appropriate to preserve the safety and 
soundness of the covered company or U.S. financial stability. In acting 
on a request for an exemption, the Board will consider the following:
    (i) A decrease in the covered company's capital stock and surplus;
    (ii) The merger of the covered company with another covered 
company;
    (iii) A merger of two counterparties; or
    (iv) An unforeseen and abrupt change in the status of a 
counterparty as a result of which the covered company's credit exposure 
to the counterparty becomes limited by the requirements of this 
section; or
    (v) Any other factor(s) the Board determines, in its discretion, is 
appropriate.
    (d) Other measures. The Board may impose supervisory oversight and 
additional reporting measures that it determines are appropriate to 
monitor compliance with this subpart. Covered companies must furnish, 
in the manner and form prescribed by the Board, such information to 
monitor compliance with this subpart and the limits therein as the 
Board may require.

0
3. Add subpart Q to read as follows:

Subpart Q--Single-Counterparty Credit Limits

Sec.
252.170 Applicability and general provisions.
252.171 Definitions.
252.172 Credit exposure limits.
252.173 Gross credit exposure.
252.174 Net credit exposure.
252.175 Investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, 
investment funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not 
affiliates of the covered foreign entity.
252.176 Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty due 
to economic interdependence or control relationships.
252.177 Exemptions.
252.178 Compliance.


Sec.  252.170   Applicability and general provisions.

    (a) In general. (1) This subpart establishes single counterparty 
credit limits for a covered foreign entity.
    (2) For purposes of this subpart:
    (i) Covered foreign entity means:
    (A) A foreign banking organization with total consolidated assets 
that equal or exceed $250 billion with respect to its combined U.S. 
operations; and
    (B) Any U.S. intermediate holding company of such a foreign banking 
organization with total consolidated assets that equal or exceed $50 
billion, including a U.S. intermediate holding company that is a bank 
holding company.
    (ii) Major foreign banking organization means a foreign banking 
organization that is a covered foreign entity and meets the 
requirements of Sec.  252.172(c)(3) through (5).
    (iii) Major U.S. intermediate holding company means any covered 
foreign entity that is a U.S. intermediate holding company and has 
total consolidated assets that equal or exceed $500 billion.
    (b) Credit exposure limits. (1) Section 252.172 establishes credit 
exposure limits for covered foreign entities, major foreign banking 
organizations, and major U.S. intermediate holding companies.
    (2) A covered foreign entity is required to calculate its aggregate 
net credit exposure, gross credit exposure, and net credit exposure to 
a counterparty using the methods in this subpart.
    (c) Applicability of this subpart--(1) Foreign banking 
organizations. (i) A foreign banking organization that is a covered 
foreign entity as of October 5, 2018, must comply with the requirements 
of this subpart, including but not limited to Sec.  252.172, beginning 
on July 1, 2020, unless that time is extended by the Board in writing.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section, a foreign 
banking organization that is a major foreign banking organization as of 
October 5, 2018, must comply with the requirements of this subpart, 
including but not limited to Sec.  252.172, beginning on January 1, 
2020, unless that time is extended by the Board in writing.
    (iii) A foreign banking organization that becomes a covered foreign 
entity subject to this subpart after October 5, 2018 must comply with 
the requirements of this subpart beginning on the first day of the 
ninth calendar quarter after it becomes a covered foreign entity, 
unless that time is accelerated or extended by the Board in writing.
    (2) U.S. intermediate holding companies. (i) A U.S. intermediate 
holding company that is a covered foreign entity but not a major U.S. 
intermediate holding company as of October 5, 2018, must comply with 
the requirements of this subpart, including but not limited to Sec.  
252.172, beginning on July 1, 2020, unless that time is extended by the 
Board in writing.
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section, a U.S. 
intermediate holding company that is a major U.S. intermediate holding 
company as of October 5, 2018, must comply with the requirements of 
this subpart, including but not limited to Sec.  252.172, beginning on 
January 1, 2020, unless that time is extended by the Board in writing.
    (iii) A U.S. intermediate holding company that becomes a covered 
foreign entity subject to this subpart after October 5, 2018 must 
comply with the requirements of this subpart beginning on the first day 
of the ninth calendar quarter after it becomes a covered foreign 
entity, unless that time is accelerated or extended by the Board in 
writing.
    (d) Cessation of requirements--(1) Foreign banking organizations. 
(i) Any foreign banking organization that becomes a covered foreign 
entity will remain subject to the requirements of this subpart unless 
and until its total consolidated assets fall below $250 billion for 
each of four consecutive quarters, as reported on the covered foreign 
entity's FR Y-7Q, effective on the as-of date of the fourth consecutive 
FR Y-7Q.
    (ii) A foreign banking organization that is a covered foreign 
entity and that has ceased to be a major foreign banking organization 
for purposes of Sec.  252.172(c) is no longer subject to the 
requirements of Sec.  252.172(c) beginning on the first day of the 
calendar quarter following the reporting date on which it ceased to be 
a major foreign banking organization; provided that the foreign banking 
organization remains subject to the requirements of this subpart, 
unless it ceases to be a foreign banking organization that is a covered 
foreign entity pursuant to paragraph (d)(1)(i) of this section.
    (2) U.S. intermediate holding companies. (i) Any U.S. intermediate 
holding company that becomes a covered foreign entity will remain 
subject to the requirements of this subpart unless and until its total 
consolidated assets fall below $50 billion for each of four consecutive 
quarters, as reported on the covered foreign entity's FR Y-9C, 
effective on the as-of date of the fourth consecutive FR Y-9C.
    (ii) A U.S. intermediate holding company that is a covered foreign 
entity and that has ceased to be a major U.S. intermediate holding 
company for purposes of Sec.  252.172(c) is no longer subject to the 
requirements of Sec.  252.172(c) beginning on the first day of the 
calendar quarter following the reporting date on which it ceased to be

[[Page 38502]]

a major U.S. intermediate holding company; provided that the U.S. 
intermediate holding company remains subject to the requirements of 
this subpart, unless it ceases to be a U.S. intermediate holding 
company that is a covered foreign entity pursuant to paragraph 
(d)(2)(i) of this section.


Sec.  252.171   Definitions.

    Unless defined in this section, terms that are set forth in Sec.  
252.2 of this part and used in this subpart have the definitions 
assigned in Sec.  252.2. For purposes of this subpart:
    (a) Adjusted market value means:
    (1) With respect to the value of cash, securities, or other 
eligible collateral transferred by the covered foreign entity to a 
counterparty, the sum of:
    (i) The market value of the cash, securities, or other eligible 
collateral; and
    (ii) The product of the market value of the securities or other 
eligible collateral multiplied by the applicable collateral haircut in 
Table 1 to Sec.  217.132 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.132); 
and
    (2) With respect to cash, securities, or other eligible collateral 
received by the covered foreign entity from a counterparty:
    (i) The market value of the cash, securities, or other eligible 
collateral; minus
    (ii) The market value of the securities or other eligible 
collateral multiplied by the applicable collateral haircut in Table 1 
to Sec.  217.132 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.132).
    (3) Prior to calculating the adjusted market value pursuant to 
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this section, with regard to a transaction 
that meets the definition of ``repo-style transaction'' in Sec.  217.2 
of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2), the covered foreign entity 
would first multiply the applicable collateral haircuts in Table 1 to 
Sec.  217.132 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.132) by the 
square root of \1/2\.
    (b) Affiliate means, with respect to a company:
    (1) Any subsidiary of the company and any other company that is 
consolidated with the company under applicable accounting standards; or
    (2) For a company that is not subject to principles or standards 
referenced in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, any subsidiary of the 
company and any other company that would be consolidated with the 
company, if consolidation would have occurred if such principles or 
standards had applied.
    (c) Aggregate net credit exposure means the sum of all net credit 
exposures of a covered foreign entity and all of its subsidiaries to a 
single counterparty as calculated under this subpart.
    (d) Bank-eligible investments means investment securities that a 
national bank is permitted to purchase, sell, deal in, underwrite, and 
hold under 12 U.S.C. 24 (Seventh) and 12 CFR part 1.
    (e) Capital stock and surplus means, with respect to a U.S. 
intermediate holding company, the sum of the following amounts in each 
case as reported by the U.S. intermediate holding company on the most 
recent FR Y-9C on a consolidated basis:
    (1) The tier 1 capital and tier 2 capital of the U.S. intermediate 
holding company, as calculated under the capital adequacy guidelines 
applicable to that U.S. intermediate holding company under subpart O of 
the Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR part 252, subpart O); and
    (2) The excess allowance for loan and lease losses of the U.S. 
intermediate holding company not included in its tier 2 capital, as 
calculated under the capital adequacy guidelines applicable to that 
U.S. intermediate holding company under subpart O of the Board's 
Regulation YY (12 CFR part 252, subpart O).
    (f) Counterparty means with respect to a credit transaction:
    (1) With respect to a natural person, the natural person, and, if 
the credit exposure of the covered foreign entity to such natural 
person exceeds 5 percent of its capital stock and surplus in the case 
of a U.S. intermediate holding company that is a covered foreign entity 
with total consolidated assets of less than $250 billion, or 5 percent 
of its tier 1 capital in the case of a foreign banking organization 
that is a covered foreign entity or a U.S. intermediate holding company 
with total consolidated assets that equal or exceed $250 billion, the 
natural person and members of the person's immediate family 
collectively;
    (2) With respect to any company that is not an affiliate of the 
covered foreign entity, the company and its affiliates collectively;
    (3) With respect to a State, the State and all of its agencies, 
instrumentalities, and political subdivisions (including any 
municipalities) collectively;
    (4) With respect to a foreign sovereign entity that is not assigned 
a zero percent risk weight under the standardized approach in the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subpart D), other than the home 
country foreign sovereign entity of a foreign banking organization, the 
foreign sovereign entity and all of its agencies and instrumentalities 
(but not including any political subdivision), collectively; and
    (5) With respect to a political subdivision of a foreign sovereign 
entity such as a state, province, or municipality, any political 
subdivision of the foreign sovereign entity and all of such political 
subdivision's agencies and instrumentalities, collectively.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ In addition, under Sec.  252.176, under certain 
circumstances, a covered foreign entity is required to aggregate its 
net credit exposure to one or more counterparties for all purposes 
under this subpart.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (g) Covered foreign entity is defined in Sec.  252.170(a)(2)(i) of 
this subpart.
    (h) Credit derivative has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (i) Credit transaction means, with respect to a counterparty:
    (1) Any extension of credit to the counterparty, including loans, 
deposits, and lines of credit, but excluding uncommitted lines of 
credit;
    (2) Any repurchase agreement or reverse repurchase agreement with 
the counterparty;
    (3) Any securities lending or securities borrowing transaction with 
the counterparty;
    (4) Any guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit (including any 
endorsement, confirmed letter of credit, or standby letter of credit) 
issued on behalf of the counterparty;
    (5) Any purchase of securities issued by or other investment in the 
counterparty;
    (6) Any credit exposure to the counterparty in connection with a 
derivative transaction between the covered foreign entity and the 
counterparty;
    (7) Any credit exposure to the counterparty in connection with a 
credit derivative or equity derivative between the covered foreign 
entity and a third party, the reference asset of which is an obligation 
or equity security of, or equity investment in, the counterparty; and
    (8) Any transaction that is the functional equivalent of the above, 
and any other similar transaction that the Board, by regulation, 
determines to be a credit transaction for purposes of this subpart.
    (j) Depository institution has the same meaning as in section 3 of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)).
    (k) Derivative transaction means any transaction that is a 
contract, agreement, swap, warrant, note, or option that is based, in 
whole or in part, on the value of, any interest in, or any quantitative 
measure or the occurrence of any event relating to, one or more 
commodities,

[[Page 38503]]

securities, currencies, interest or other rates, indices, or other 
assets.
    (l) Eligible collateral means collateral in which, notwithstanding 
the prior security interest of any custodial agent, the covered foreign 
entity has a perfected, first priority security interest (or the legal 
equivalent thereof, if outside of the United States), with the 
exception of cash on deposit, and is in the form of:
    (1) Cash on deposit with the covered foreign entity or an affiliate 
of the covered foreign entity (including cash in foreign currency or 
U.S. dollars held for the covered foreign entity by a custodian or 
trustee, whether inside or outside of the United States);
    (2) Debt securities (other than mortgage- or asset-backed 
securities and resecuritization securities, unless those securities are 
issued by a U.S. government-sponsored enterprise) that are bank-
eligible investments and that are investment grade, except for any debt 
securities issued by the covered foreign entity or any affiliate of the 
covered foreign entity;
    (3) Equity securities that are publicly traded, except for any 
equity securities issued by the covered foreign entity or any affiliate 
of the covered foreign entity;
    (4) Convertible bonds that are publicly traded, except for any 
convertible bonds issued by the covered foreign entity or any affiliate 
of the covered foreign entity; or
    (5) Gold bullion.
    (m) Eligible credit derivative means a single-name credit 
derivative or a standard, non-tranched index credit derivative, 
provided that:
    (1) The contract meets the requirements of an eligible guarantee 
and has been confirmed by the protection purchaser and the protection 
provider;
    (2) Any assignment of the contract has been confirmed by all 
relevant parties;
    (3) If the credit derivative is a credit default swap, the contract 
includes the following credit events:
    (i) Failure to pay any amount due under the terms of the reference 
exposure, subject to any applicable minimal payment threshold that is 
consistent with standard market practice and with a grace period that 
is closely in line with the grace period of the reference exposure; and
    (ii) Receivership, insolvency, liquidation, conservatorship, or 
inability of the reference exposure issuer to pay its debts, or its 
failure or admission in writing of its inability generally to pay its 
debts as they become due, and similar events;
    (4) The terms and conditions dictating the manner in which the 
contract is to be settled are incorporated into the contract;
    (5) If the contract allows for cash settlement, the contract 
incorporates a robust valuation process to estimate loss reliably and 
specifies a reasonable period for obtaining post-credit event 
valuations of the reference exposure;
    (6) If the contract requires the protection purchaser to transfer 
an exposure to the protection provider at settlement, the terms of at 
least one of the exposures that is permitted to be transferred under 
the contract provide that any required consent to transfer may not be 
unreasonably withheld; and
    (7) If the credit derivative is a credit default swap, the contract 
clearly identifies the parties responsible for determining whether a 
credit event has occurred, specifies that this determination is not the 
sole responsibility of the protection provider, and gives the 
protection purchaser the right to notify the protection provider of the 
occurrence of a credit event.
    (n) Eligible equity derivative means an equity derivative, provided 
that:
    (1) The derivative contract has been confirmed by all relevant 
parties;
    (2) Any assignment of the derivative contract has been confirmed by 
all relevant parties; and
    (3) The terms and conditions dictating the manner in which the 
derivative contract is to be settled are incorporated into the 
contract.
    (o) Eligible guarantee has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of 
the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (p) Eligible guarantor has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of 
the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2), but does not include the 
foreign banking organization or any entity that is an affiliate of 
either the U.S. intermediate holding company or of any part of the 
foreign banking organization's combined U.S. operations.
    (q) Equity derivative has the same meaning as ``equity derivative 
contract'' in Sec.  217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (r) Exempt counterparty means an entity that is identified as 
exempt from the requirements of this subpart under Sec.  252.177, or 
that is otherwise excluded from this subpart, including any sovereign 
entity assigned a zero percent risk weight under the standardized 
approach in the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subpart D).
    (s) Financial entity means:
    (1)(i) A bank holding company or an affiliate thereof; a savings 
and loan holding company as defined in section 10(n) of the Home 
Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.C. 1467a(n)); a U.S. intermediate holding 
company established or designated for purposes of compliance with this 
part; or a nonbank financial company supervised by the Board;
    (ii) A depository institution as defined in section 3(c) of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813(c)); an organization that 
is organized under the laws of a foreign country and that engages 
directly in the business of banking outside the United States; a 
federal credit union or state credit union as defined in section 2 of 
the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. 1752(1) and (6)); a national 
association, state member bank, or state nonmember bank that is not a 
depository institution; an institution that functions solely in a trust 
or fiduciary capacity as described in section 2(c)(2)(D) of the Bank 
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1841(c)(2)(D)); an industrial loan 
company, an industrial bank, or other similar institution described in 
section 2(c)(2)(H) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 
1841(c)(2)(H));
    (iii) An entity that is state-licensed or registered as:
    (A) A credit or lending entity, including a finance company; money 
lender; installment lender; consumer lender or lending company; 
mortgage lender, broker, or bank; motor vehicle title pledge lender; 
payday or deferred deposit lender; premium finance company; commercial 
finance or lending company; or commercial mortgage company; except 
entities registered or licensed solely on account of financing the 
entity's direct sales of goods or services to customers;
    (B) A money services business, including a check casher; money 
transmitter; currency dealer or exchange; or money order or traveler's 
check issuer;
    (iv) Any person registered with the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission as a swap dealer or major swap participant pursuant to the 
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), or an entity that 
is registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission as a 
security-based swap dealer or a major security-based swap participant 
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et 
seq.);
    (v) A securities holding company as defined in section 618 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (12 U.S.C. 
1850a); a broker or dealer as defined in sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78c(a)(4)-(5)); an 
investment adviser as defined in section 202(a) of the

[[Page 38504]]

Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)); an investment 
company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.); or 
a company that has elected to be regulated as a business development 
company pursuant to section 54(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(15 U.S.C. 80a-53(a));
    (vi) A private fund as defined in section 202(a) of the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)); an entity that would be an 
investment company under section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3) but for section 3(c)(5)(C); or an entity that is 
deemed not to be an investment company under section 3 of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 pursuant to Investment Company Act Rule 
3a-7 (17 CFR 270.3a-7) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission;
    (vii) A commodity pool, a commodity pool operator, or a commodity 
trading advisor as defined, respectively, in sections 1a(10), 1a(11), 
and 1a(12) of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(10), 
1a(11), and 1a(12)); a floor broker, a floor trader, or introducing 
broker as defined, respectively, in sections 1a(22), 1a(23) and 1a(31) 
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(22), 1a(23), and 
1a(31)); or a futures commission merchant as defined in section 1a(28) 
of the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 1a(28));
    (viii) An employee benefit plan as defined in paragraphs (3) and 
(32) of section 3 of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 
1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002);
    (ix) An entity that is organized as an insurance company, primarily 
engaged in writing insurance or reinsuring risks underwritten by 
insurance companies, or is subject to supervision as such by a State 
insurance regulator or foreign insurance regulator;
    (x) Any designated financial market utility, as defined in section 
803 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(12 U.S.C. 5462); and
    (xi) An entity that would be a financial entity described in 
paragraphs (s)(1)(i) through (x) of this section, if it were organized 
under the laws of the United States or any State thereof; and
    (2) Provided that, for purposes of this subpart, ``financial 
entity'' does not include any counterparty that is a foreign sovereign 
entity or multilateral development bank.
    (t) Foreign sovereign entity means a sovereign entity other than 
the United States government and the entity's agencies, departments, 
ministries, and central bank.
    (u) Gross credit exposure means, with respect to any credit 
transaction, the credit exposure of the covered foreign entity before 
adjusting, pursuant to Sec.  252.174, for the effect of any qualifying 
master netting agreement, eligible collateral, eligible guarantee, 
eligible credit derivative, eligible equity derivative, other eligible 
hedge, and any unused portion of certain extensions of credit.
    (v) Immediate family means the spouse of an individual, the 
individual's minor children, and any of the individual's children 
(including adults) residing in the individual's home.
    (w) Intraday credit exposure means credit exposure of a covered 
foreign entity to a counterparty that by its terms is to be repaid, 
sold, or terminated by the end of its business day in the United 
States.
    (x) Investment grade has the same meaning as in Sec.  217.2 of the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (y) Major counterparty means any counterparty that is or includes:
    (1) A U.S. bank holding company identified as a global systemically 
important BHC pursuant to Sec.  217.402 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 
CFR 217.402);
    (2) A top-tier foreign banking organization that meets the 
requirements of Sec.  252.172(c)(3) through (5); or
    (3) Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board.
    (z) Major foreign banking organization is defined in Sec.  
252.170(a)(2)(ii) of this subpart.
    (aa) Major U.S. intermediate holding company is defined in Sec.  
252.170(a)(2)(iii) of this subpart.
    (bb) Multilateral development bank has the same meaning as in Sec.  
217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (cc) Net credit exposure means, with respect to any credit 
transaction, the gross credit exposure of a covered foreign entity and 
all of its subsidiaries calculated under Sec.  252.173, as adjusted in 
accordance with Sec.  252.174.
    (dd) Qualifying central counterparty has the same meaning as in 
Sec.  217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (ee) Qualifying master netting agreement has the same meaning as in 
Sec.  217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2).
    (ff) Securities financing transaction means any repurchase 
agreement, reverse repurchase agreement, securities borrowing 
transaction, or securities lending transaction.
    (gg) Short sale means any sale of a security which the seller does 
not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security 
borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.
    (hh) Sovereign entity means a central national government 
(including the U.S. government) or an agency, department, ministry, or 
central bank, but not including any political subdivision such as a 
state, province, or municipality.
    (ii) Subsidiary. A company is a subsidiary of another company if
    (1) The company is consolidated by the other company under 
applicable accounting standards; or
    (2) For a company that is not subject to principles or standards 
referenced in paragraph (ii)(1) of this definition, consolidation would 
have occurred if such principles or standards had applied.
    (jj) Tier 1 capital means common equity tier 1 capital and 
additional tier 1 capital, as defined in subpart O of the Board's 
Regulation YY(12 CFR part 252, subpart O).
    (kk) Tier 2 capital means tier 2 capital as defined in subpart O of 
the Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR part 252, subpart O).
    (ll) Total consolidated assets. (1) A foreign banking 
organization's total consolidated assets are determined based on:
    (i) The average of the foreign banking organization's total 
consolidated assets in the four most recent consecutive quarters as 
reported quarterly on the FR Y-7Q; or
    (ii) If the foreign banking organization has not filed an FR Y-7Q 
for each of the four most recent consecutive quarters, the average of 
the foreign banking organization's total consolidated assets, as 
reported on the foreign banking organization's FR Y-7Q, for the most 
recent quarter or consecutive quarters, as applicable; or
    (iii) If the foreign banking organization has not yet filed an FR 
Y-7Q, as determined under applicable accounting standards.
    (2) A U.S. intermediate holding company's total consolidated assets 
are determined based on:
    (i) The average of the U.S. intermediate holding company's total 
consolidated assets in the four most recent consecutive quarters as 
reported quarterly on the FR Y-9C; or
    (ii) If the U.S. intermediate holding company has not filed an FR 
Y-9C for each of the four most recent consecutive quarters, the average 
of the U.S. intermediate holding company's total consolidated assets, 
as reported on the company's FR Y-9C, for the most recent

[[Page 38505]]

quarter or consecutive quarters, as applicable; or
    (iii) If the U.S. intermediate holding company has not yet filed an 
FR Y-9C, as determined under applicable accounting standards.


Sec.  252.172   Credit exposure limits.

    (a) General limit on aggregate net credit exposure. No U.S. 
intermediate holding company that is a covered foreign entity may have 
an aggregate net credit exposure to any counterparty that exceeds 25 
percent of the consolidated capital stock and surplus of the U.S. 
intermediate holding company.
    (b) Limit on aggregate net credit exposure for U.S. intermediate 
holding companies with total consolidated assets that equal or exceed 
$250 billion and foreign banking organizations that are covered foreign 
entities. (1) No U.S. intermediate holding company with total 
consolidated assets that equal or exceed $250 billion that is a covered 
foreign entity may have an aggregate net credit exposure to any 
counterparty that exceeds 25 percent of the tier 1 capital of the U.S. 
intermediate holding company.
    (2) No foreign banking organization that is a covered foreign 
entity may permit its combined U.S. operations to have aggregate net 
credit exposure to any counterparty that exceeds 25 percent of the tier 
1 capital of the foreign banking organization.
    (c) Limit on aggregate net credit exposure of major U.S. 
intermediate holding companies and major foreign banking organizations 
to major counterparties. (1) No major U.S. intermediate holding company 
may have aggregate net credit exposure to any major counterparty that 
exceeds 15 percent of the tier 1 capital of the major U.S. intermediate 
holding company.
    (2) No major foreign banking organization may permit its combined 
U.S. operations to have aggregate net credit exposure to any major 
counterparty that exceeds 15 percent of the tier 1 capital of the major 
foreign banking organization.
    (3) For purposes of this subpart, a top-tier foreign banking 
organization will be a major counterparty if it meets one of the 
following conditions:
    (i) The top-tier foreign banking organization determines, pursuant 
to 12 CFR 252.153(b)(6), that the top-tier foreign banking organization 
has the characteristics of a global systemically important banking 
organization under the global methodology; or
    (ii) The Board, using information available to the Board, 
determines:
    (A) That the top-tier foreign banking organization would be a 
global systemically important banking organization under the global 
methodology;
    (B) That the top-tier foreign banking organization, if it were 
subject to the Board's Regulation Q, would be identified as a global 
systemically important BHC under 12 CFR 217.402 of the Board's 
Regulation Q; or
    (C) That the U.S. intermediate holding company, if it were subject 
to 12 CFR 217.402 of the Board's Regulation Q, would be identified as a 
global systemically important BHC.
    (4) Each top-tier foreign banking organization that controls a U.S. 
intermediate holding company must submit to the Board by January 1 of 
each calendar year through the U.S. intermediate holding company:
    (A) Notice of whether the home country supervisor (or other 
appropriate home country regulatory authority) of the top-tier foreign 
banking organization of the U.S. intermediate holding company has 
adopted standards consistent with the global methodology; and
    (B) Notice of whether the top-tier foreign banking organization 
prepares or reports the indicators used by the global methodology to 
identify a banking organization as a global systemically important 
banking organization and, if it does, whether the top-tier foreign 
banking organization has determined that it has the characteristics of 
a global systemically important banking organization under the global 
methodology pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153(b)(6).
    (5) A top-tier foreign banking organization that controls a U.S. 
intermediate holding company and prepares or reports for any purpose 
the indicator amounts necessary to determine whether the top-tier 
foreign banking organization is a global systemically important banking 
organization under the global methodology must use the data to 
determine whether the top-tier foreign banking organization has the 
characteristics of a global systemically important banking organization 
under the global methodology.
    (d) Foreign banking organizations subject on a consolidated basis 
to a large exposures or single-counterparty credit limit regime by its 
home-country supervisor. (1) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) through (c) 
of this section, a foreign banking organization that is a covered 
foreign entity is not required to comply with the requirements of this 
subpart with respect to limits on the aggregate net credit exposure of 
its combined U.S. operations if the foreign banking organization 
certifies to the Board that it meets large exposure standards on a 
consolidated basis established by its home-country supervisor that are 
consistent with the large exposures framework published by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel Large Exposures Framework), 
unless the Board determines in writing, after notice to the foreign 
banking organization, that compliance with this subpart is required.
    (i) For purposes of this paragraph, home-country large exposure 
standards that are consistent with the Basel Large Exposures Framework 
include single-counterparty credit limits and any restrictions set 
forth in ``Supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large 
exposures'' (2014) (Basel LE Standard), as implemented in accordance 
with the Basel LE Standard.
    (ii) [Reserved]
    (2) A foreign banking organization that is a covered foreign entity 
must provide to the Board reports relating to its compliance with the 
large exposure standards described in paragraph (d)(1) of this section 
concurrently with filing the FR Y-7Q or any successor report.


Sec.  252.173   Gross credit exposure.

    (a) Calculation of gross credit exposure. The amount of gross 
credit exposure of a covered foreign entity to a counterparty with 
respect to a credit transaction is, in the case of:
    (1) A deposit of the covered foreign entity held by the 
counterparty, loan by a covered foreign entity to the counterparty, and 
lease in which the covered foreign entity is the lessor and the 
counterparty is the lessee, equal to the amount owed by the 
counterparty to the covered foreign entity under the transaction.
    (2) A debt security or debt investment held by the covered foreign 
entity that is issued by the counterparty, equal to:
    (i) The market value of the securities, for trading and available-
for-sale securities; and
    (ii) The amortized purchase price of the securities or investments, 
for securities or investments held to maturity.
    (3) An equity security held by the covered foreign entity that is 
issued by the counterparty, equity investment in a counterparty, and 
other direct investments in a counterparty, equal to the market value.
    (4) A securities financing transaction must be valued using any of 
the methods that the covered foreign entity is authorized to use under 
the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E) to value 
such transactions:

[[Page 38506]]

    (i)(A) As calculated for each transaction, in the case of a 
securities financing transaction between the covered foreign entity and 
the counterparty that is not subject to a bilateral netting agreement 
or does not meet the definition of ``repo-style transaction'' in Sec.  
217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2); or
    (B) As calculated for a netting set, in the case of a securities 
financing transaction between the covered foreign entity and the 
counterparty that is subject to a bilateral netting agreement with that 
counterparty and meets the definition of ``repo-style transaction'' in 
Sec.  217.2 of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.2);
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (a)(4)(i) of this section, the 
covered foreign entity must:
    (A) Assign a value of zero to any security received from the 
counterparty that does not meet the definition of ``eligible 
collateral'' in Sec.  252.171(l); and
    (B) Include the value of securities that are eligible collateral 
received by the covered foreign entity from the counterparty (including 
any exempt counterparty), calculated in accordance with paragraphs 
(a)(4)(i) through (iv) of this section, when calculating its gross 
credit exposure to the issuer of those securities;
    (iii) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(4)(i) and (ii) of this section 
and with respect to each credit transaction, a covered foreign entity's 
gross credit exposure to a collateral issuer under this paragraph 
(a)(4) is limited to the covered foreign entity's gross credit exposure 
to the counterparty on the credit transaction;
    (iv) In cases where the covered foreign entity receives eligible 
collateral from a counterparty in addition to the cash or securities 
received from that counterparty, the counterparty may reduce its gross 
credit exposure to that counterparty in accordance with Sec.  
252.174(b).
    (5) A committed credit line extended by a covered foreign entity to 
a counterparty, equal to the face amount of the committed credit line.
    (6) A guarantee or letter of credit issued by a covered foreign 
entity on behalf of a counterparty, equal to the maximum potential loss 
to the covered foreign entity on the transaction.
    (7) A derivative transaction must be valued using any of the 
methods that the covered foreign entity is authorized to use under the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR part 217, subparts D and E) to value such 
transactions:
    (i)(A) As calculated for each transaction, in the case of a 
derivative transaction between the covered foreign entity and the 
counterparty, including an equity derivative but excluding a credit 
derivative described in paragraph (a)(8) of this section, that is not 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement; or
    (B) As calculated for a netting set, in the case of a derivative 
transaction between the covered foreign entity and the counterparty, 
including an equity derivative but excluding a credit derivative 
described in paragraph (a)(8) of this section, that is subject to a 
qualifying master netting agreement.
    (ii) In cases where a covered foreign entity is required to 
recognize an exposure to an eligible guarantor pursuant to Sec.  
252.174(d), the covered foreign entity must exclude the relevant 
derivative transaction when calculating its gross exposure to the 
original counterparty under this section.
    (8) A credit derivative between the covered foreign entity and a 
third party where the covered foreign entity is the protection provider 
and the reference asset is an obligation or debt security of the 
counterparty, equal to the maximum potential loss to the covered 
foreign entity on the transaction.
    (b) Investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, 
investment funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not 
affiliates. Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this section.
    (1) Unless the Board applies the requirements of Sec.  252.175 to 
the transaction pursuant to Sec.  252.175(d), a U.S. intermediate 
holding company that is a covered foreign entity but has less than $250 
billion in total consolidated assets must:
    (A) Calculate pursuant to Sec.  252.173(a) its gross credit 
exposure due to any investment in the debt or equity of, and any credit 
derivative or equity derivative between the covered foreign entity and 
a third party where the covered foreign entity is the protection 
provider and the reference asset is an obligation or equity security 
of, or equity investment in, a securitization vehicle, investment fund, 
and other special purpose vehicle that is not an affiliate of the 
covered foreign entity; and
    (B) Attribute that gross credit exposure to the securitization 
vehicle, investment fund, or other special purpose vehicle for purposes 
of this subpart.
    (2) A foreign banking organization that is a covered foreign entity 
or a U.S. intermediate holding company with total consolidated assets 
that equal or exceed $250 billion must calculate pursuant to Sec.  
252.175 its gross credit exposure due to any investment in the debt or 
equity of, and any credit derivative or equity derivative between the 
covered foreign entity and a third party where the covered foreign 
entity is the protection provider and the reference asset is an 
obligation or equity security of, or equity investment in, a 
securitization vehicle, investment fund, and other special purpose 
vehicle that is not an affiliate of the covered foreign entity.
    (c) Attribution rule. Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this 
section, a covered foreign entity must treat any transaction with any 
natural person or entity as a credit transaction with another party, to 
the extent that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the 
benefit of, or transferred to, the other party.


Sec.  252.174  Net credit exposure.

    (a) In general. For purposes of this subpart, a covered foreign 
entity must calculate its net credit exposure to a counterparty by 
adjusting its gross credit exposure to that counterparty in accordance 
with the rules set forth in this section.
    (b) Eligible collateral. (1) In computing its net credit exposure 
to a counterparty for any credit transaction other than a securities 
financing transaction, a covered foreign entity must reduce its gross 
credit exposure on the transaction by the adjusted market value of any 
eligible collateral.
    (2) A covered foreign entity that reduces its gross credit exposure 
to a counterparty as required under paragraph (b)(1) of this section 
must include the adjusted market value of the eligible collateral when 
calculating its gross credit exposure to the collateral issuer.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2) of this section, a covered 
foreign entity's gross credit exposure to a collateral issuer under 
this paragraph (b) is limited to:
    (i) Its gross credit exposure to the counterparty on the credit 
transaction, or
    (ii) In the case of an exempt counterparty, the gross credit 
exposure that would have been attributable to that exempt counterparty 
on the credit transaction if valued in accordance with Sec.  
252.173(a).
    (c) Eligible guarantees. (1) In calculating net credit exposure to 
a counterparty for any credit transaction, a covered foreign entity 
must reduce its gross credit exposure to the counterparty by the amount 
of any eligible guarantee from an eligible guarantor that covers the 
transaction.
    (2) A covered foreign entity that reduces its gross credit exposure 
to a counterparty as required under

[[Page 38507]]

paragraph (c)(1) of this section must include the amount of eligible 
guarantees when calculating its gross credit exposure to the eligible 
guarantor.
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(2) of this section, a covered 
foreign entity's gross credit exposure to an eligible guarantor with 
respect to an eligible guarantee under this paragraph (c) is limited 
to:
    (i) Its gross credit exposure to the counterparty on the credit 
transaction prior to recognition of the eligible guarantee, or
    (ii) In the case of an exempt counterparty, the gross credit 
exposure that would have been attributable to that exempt counterparty 
on the credit transaction prior to recognition of the eligible 
guarantee if valued in accordance with Sec.  252.173(a).
    (d) Eligible credit and equity derivatives. (1) In calculating net 
credit exposure to a counterparty for a credit transaction under this 
section, a covered foreign entity must reduce its gross credit exposure 
to the counterparty by:
    (i) In the case of any eligible credit derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the notional amount of the eligible credit derivative; or
    (ii) In the case of any eligible equity derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the gross credit exposure amount to the counterparty 
(calculated in accordance with Sec.  252.173(a)(7)).
    (2)(i) A covered foreign entity that reduces its gross credit 
exposure to a counterparty as provided under paragraph (d)(1) of this 
section must include, when calculating its net credit exposure to the 
eligible guarantor, including in instances where the underlying credit 
transaction would not be subject to the credit limits of Sec.  252.172 
(for example, due to an exempt counterparty), either
    (A) In the case of any eligible credit derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the notional amount of the eligible credit derivative; or
    (B) In the case of any eligible equity derivative from an eligible 
guarantor, the gross credit exposure amount to the counterparty 
(calculated in accordance with Sec.  252.173(a)(7)).
    (ii) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section, in cases 
where the eligible credit derivative or eligible equity derivative is 
used to hedge covered positions that are subject to the Board's market 
risk rule (12 CFR part 217, subpart F) and the counterparty on the 
hedged transaction is not a financial entity, the amount of credit 
exposure that a entity must recognize to the eligible guarantor is the 
amount that would be calculated pursuant to Sec.  252.173(a).
    (3) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(2) of this section, a covered 
foreign entity's gross credit exposure to an eligible guarantor with 
respect to an eligible credit derivative or an eligible equity 
derivative under this paragraph (d) is limited to:
    (i) Its gross credit exposure to the counterparty on the credit 
transaction prior to recognition of the eligible credit derivative or 
the eligible equity derivative, or
    (ii) In the case of an exempt counterparty, the gross credit 
exposure that would have been attributable to that exempt counterparty 
on the credit transaction prior to recognition of the eligible credit 
derivative or the eligible equity derivative if valued in accordance 
with Sec.  252.173(a).
    (e) Other eligible hedges. In calculating net credit exposure to a 
counterparty for a credit transaction under this section, a covered 
foreign entity may reduce its gross credit exposure to the counterparty 
by the face amount of a short sale of the counterparty's debt security 
or equity security, provided that:
    (1) The instrument in which the covered foreign entity has a short 
position is junior to, or pari passu with, the instrument in which the 
covered foreign entity has the long position; and
    (2) The instrument in which the covered foreign entity has a short 
position and the instrument in which the covered foreign entity has the 
long position are either both treated as trading or available-for-sale 
exposures or both treated as held-to-maturity exposures.
    (f) Unused portion of certain extensions of credit. (1) In 
computing its net credit exposure to a counterparty for a committed 
credit line or revolving credit facility under this section, a covered 
foreign entity may reduce its gross credit exposure by the amount of 
the unused portion of the credit extension to the extent that the 
covered foreign entity does not have any legal obligation to advance 
additional funds under the extension of credit and the used portion of 
the credit extension has been fully secured by eligible collateral.
    (2) To the extent that the used portion of a credit extension has 
been secured by eligible collateral, the covered foreign entity may 
reduce its gross credit exposure by the adjusted market value of any 
eligible collateral received from the counterparty, even if the used 
portion has not been fully secured by eligible collateral.
    (3) To qualify for the reduction in net credit exposure under this 
paragraph, the credit contract must specify that any used portion of 
the credit extension must be fully secured by the adjusted market value 
of any eligible collateral.
    (g) Credit transactions involving exempt counterparties. (1) A 
covered foreign entity's credit transactions with an exempt 
counterparty are not subject to the requirements of this subpart, 
including but not limited to Sec.  252.172.
    (2) Notwithstanding paragraph (g)(1) of this section, in cases 
where a covered foreign entity has a credit transaction with an exempt 
counterparty and the covered foreign entity has obtained eligible 
collateral from that exempt counterparty or an eligible guarantee or 
eligible credit or equity derivative from an eligible guarantor, the 
covered foreign entity must include (for purposes of this subpart) such 
exposure to the issuer of such eligible collateral or the eligible 
guarantor, as calculated in accordance with the rules set forth in this 
section, when calculating its gross credit exposure to that issuer of 
eligible collateral or eligible guarantor.
    (h) Currency mismatch adjustments. For purposes of calculating its 
net credit exposure to a counterparty under this section, a covered 
foreign entity must apply, as applicable:
    (1) When reducing its gross credit exposure to a counterparty 
resulting from any credit transaction due to any eligible collateral 
and calculating its gross credit exposure to an issuer of eligible 
collateral, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, the currency 
mismatch adjustment approach of Sec.  217.37(c)(3)(ii) of the Board's 
Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.37(c)(3)(ii)); and
    (2) When reducing its gross credit exposure to a counterparty 
resulting from any credit transaction due to any eligible guarantee, 
eligible equity derivative, or eligible credit derivative from an 
eligible guarantor and calculating its gross credit exposure to an 
eligible guarantor, pursuant to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section, 
the currency mismatch adjustment approach of Sec.  217.36(f) of the 
Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.36(f)).
    (i) Maturity mismatch adjustments. For purposes of calculating its 
net credit exposure to a counterparty under this section, a covered 
foreign entity must apply, as applicable, the maturity mismatch 
adjustment approach of Sec.  217.36(d) of the Board's Regulation Q (12 
CFR 217.36(d)):
    (1) When reducing its gross credit exposure to a counterparty 
resulting from any credit transaction due to any eligible collateral or 
any eligible guarantees, eligible equity derivatives, or eligible 
credit derivatives from an eligible guarantor, pursuant to

[[Page 38508]]

paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section, and
    (2) In calculating its gross credit exposure to an issuer of 
eligible collateral, pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, or to 
an eligible guarantor, pursuant to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this 
section; provided that
    (3) The eligible collateral, eligible guarantee, eligible equity 
derivative, or eligible credit derivative subject to paragraph (i)(1) 
of this section:
    (1) Has a shorter maturity than the credit transaction;
    (2) Has an original maturity equal to or greater than one year;
    (3) Has a residual maturity of not less than three months; and
    (4) The adjustment approach is otherwise applicable.


Sec.  252.175  Investments in and exposures to securitization vehicles, 
investment funds, and other special purpose vehicles that are not 
affiliates of the covered foreign entity.

    (a) In general. (1) This section applies only to a foreign banking 
organization that is a covered foreign entity or a U.S. intermediate 
holding company with total consolidated assets that equal or exceed 
$250 billion, provided that:
    (i) In order to avoid evasion of this subpart, the Board may 
determine, after notice to the covered foreign entity and opportunity 
for hearing, that a U.S. intermediate holding company with less than 
$250 billion in total consolidated assets must apply either the 
approach in paragraph (a) of this section or the look-through approach 
in paragraph (b) of this section, or must recognize exposures to a 
third party that has a contractual obligation to provide credit or 
liquidity support to a securitization vehicle, investment fund, or 
other special purpose vehicle that is not an affiliate of the covered 
foreign entity, as provided in paragraph (c) of this section; and
    (ii) For purposes of paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the 
Board, in its discretion and as applicable, may allow a covered foreign 
entity to measure its capital base using the covered foreign entity's 
capital stock and surplus rather than its tier 1 capital.
    (2) For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:
    (i) SPV means a securitization vehicle, investment fund, or other 
special purpose vehicle that is not an affiliate of the covered foreign 
entity.
    (ii) SPV exposure means an investment in the debt or equity of an 
SPV or a credit derivative or equity derivative between the covered 
foreign entity and a third party where the covered foreign entity is 
the protection provider and the reference asset is an obligation or 
equity security of, or equity investment in, an SPV.
    (3)(i) A covered foreign entity must determine whether the amount 
of its gross credit exposure to an issuer of assets in an SPV, due to 
an SPV exposure, is equal to or greater than 0.25 percent of the 
covered foreign entity's tier 1 capital using one of the following two 
methods:
    (A) The sum of all of the issuer's assets (with each asset valued 
in accordance with Sec.  252.173(a)) in the SPV; or
    (B) The application of the look-through approach described in 
paragraph (b) of this section.
    (ii) With respect to the determination required under paragraph 
(a)(3)(i) of this section, a covered foreign entity must use the same 
method to calculate gross credit exposure to each issuer of assets in a 
particular SPV.
    (iii) In making a determination under paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this 
section, the covered foreign entity must consider only the credit 
exposure to the issuer arising from the covered foreign entity's SPV 
exposure.
    (iv) For purposes of this paragraph (a)(3), a covered foreign 
entity that is unable to identify each issuer of assets in an SPV must 
attribute to a single unknown counterparty the amount of its gross 
credit exposure to all unidentified issuers and calculate such gross 
credit exposure using one method in either paragraph (a)(3)(i)(A) or 
(B) of this section.
    (4)(i) If a covered foreign entity determines pursuant to paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section that the amount of its gross credit exposure to 
an issuer of assets in an SPV is less than 0.25 percent of the covered 
foreign entity's tier 1 capital, the amount of the covered foreign 
entity's gross credit exposure to that issuer may be attributed to 
either that issuer of assets or the SPV:
    (A) If attributed to the issuer of assets, the issuer of assets 
must be identified as a counterparty, and the gross credit exposure 
calculated under paragraph (a)(3)(i)(A) of this section to that issuer 
of assets must be aggregated with any other gross credit exposures 
(valued in accordance with Sec.  252.173) to that same counterparty; 
and
    (B) If attributed to the SPV, the covered foreign entity's gross 
credit exposure is equal to the covered foreign entity's SPV exposure, 
valued in accordance with Sec.  252.173(a).
    (ii) If a covered foreign entity determines pursuant to paragraph 
(a)(3) of this section that the amount of its gross credit exposure to 
an issuer of assets in an SPV is equal to or greater than 0.25 percent 
of the covered foreign entity's tier 1 capital or the covered foreign 
entity is unable to determine that the amount of the gross credit 
exposure is less than 0.25 percent of the covered foreign entity's tier 
1 capital:
    (A) The covered foreign entity must calculate the amount of its 
gross credit exposure to the issuer of assets in the SPV using the 
look-through approach in paragraph (b) of this section;
    (B) The issuer of assets in the SPV must be identified as a 
counterparty, and the gross credit exposure calculated in accordance 
with paragraph (b) must be aggregated with any other gross credit 
exposures (valued in accordance with Sec.  252.173) to that same 
counterparty; and
    (C) When applying the look-through approach in paragraph (b) of 
this section, a covered foreign entity that is unable to identify each 
issuer of assets in an SPV must attribute to a single unknown 
counterparty the amount of its gross credit exposure, calculated in 
accordance with paragraph (b) of this section, to all unidentified 
issuers.
    (iii) For purposes of this section, a covered foreign entity must 
aggregate all gross credit exposures to unknown counterparties for all 
SPVs as if the exposures related to a single unknown counterparty; this 
single unknown counterparty is subject to the limits of Sec.  252.172 
as if it were a single counterparty.
    (b) Look-through approach. A covered foreign entity that is 
required to calculate the amount of its gross credit exposure with 
respect to an issuer of assets in accordance with this paragraph (b) 
must calculate the amount as follows:
    (1) Where all investors in the SPV rank pari passu, the amount of 
the gross credit exposure to the issuer of assets is equal to the 
covered foreign entity's pro rata share of the SPV multiplied by the 
value of the underlying asset in the SPV, valued in accordance with 
Sec.  252.173(a); and
    (2) Where all investors in the SPV do not rank pari passu, the 
amount of the gross credit exposure to the issuer of assets is equal 
to:
    (i) The pro rata share of the covered foreign entity's investment 
in the tranche of the SPV; multiplied by
    (ii) The lesser of:
    (A) The market value of the tranche in which the covered foreign 
entity has invested, except in the case of a debt security that is held 
to maturity, in which case the tranche must be valued at the amortized 
purchase price of the securities; and
    (B) The value of each underlying asset attributed to the issuer in 
the SPV, each as calculated pursuant to Sec.  252.173(a).

[[Page 38509]]

    (c) Exposures to third parties. (1) Notwithstanding any other 
requirement in this section, a covered foreign entity must recognize, 
for purposes of this subpart, a gross credit exposure to each third 
party that has a contractual obligation to provide credit or liquidity 
support to an SPV whose failure or material financial distress would 
cause a loss in the value of the covered foreign entity's SPV exposure.
    (2) The amount of any gross credit exposure that is required to be 
recognized to a third party under paragraph (c)(1) of this section is 
equal to the covered foreign entity's SPV exposure, up to the maximum 
contractual obligation of that third party to the SPV, valued in 
accordance with Sec.  252.173(a). (This gross credit exposure is in 
addition to the covered foreign entity's gross credit exposure to the 
SPV or the issuers of assets of the SPV, calculated in accordance with 
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section.)
    (3) A covered foreign entity must aggregate the gross credit 
exposure to a third party recognized in accordance with paragraphs 
(c)(1) and (2) of this section with its other gross credit exposures to 
that third party (that are unrelated to the SPV) for purposes of 
compliance with the limits of Sec.  252.172.


Sec.  252.176  Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty 
due to economic interdependence or control relationships.

    (a) In general. (1)(i) Paragraphs (a)(2) through (d) of this 
section apply only to a foreign banking organization that is a covered 
foreign entity or a U.S. intermediate holding company with total 
consolidated assets that equal or exceed $250 billion.
    (ii) Paragraph (e) of this section applies to all covered foreign 
entities.
    (2)(i) If a covered foreign entity has an aggregate net credit 
exposure to any counterparty that exceeds 5 percent of its tier 1 
capital, the covered foreign entity must assess its relationship with 
the counterparty under paragraph (b)(2) of this section to determine 
whether the counterparty is economically interdependent with one or 
more other counterparties of the covered foreign entity and under 
paragraph (c)(1) of this section to determine whether the counterparty 
is connected by a control relationship with one or more other 
counterparties.
    (ii) If, pursuant to an assessment required under paragraph 
(a)(2)(i) of this section, the covered foreign entity determines that 
one or more of the factors of paragraph (b)(2) or (c)(1) of this 
section are met with respect to one or more counterparties, or the 
Board determines pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section that one or 
more other counterparties of a covered foreign entity are economically 
interdependent or that one or more other counterparties of a covered 
foreign entity are connected by a control relationship, the covered 
foreign entity must aggregate its net credit exposure to the 
counterparties for all purposes under this subpart, including, but not 
limited to, Sec.  252.172.
    (iii) In connection with any request pursuant to paragraph (b)(3) 
or (c)(2) of this section, the Board may require the covered foreign 
entity to provide additional information.
    (b) Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty due to 
economic interdependence. (1) For purposes of this paragraph, two 
counterparties are economically interdependent if the failure, default, 
insolvency, or material financial distress of one counterparty would 
cause the failure, default, insolvency, or material financial distress 
of the other counterparty, taking into account the factors in paragraph 
(b)(2) of this section.
    (2) A covered foreign entity must assess whether the financial 
distress of one counterparty (counterparty A) would prevent the ability 
of the other counterparty (counterparty B) to fully and timely repay 
counterparty B's liabilities and whether the insolvency or default of 
counterparty A is likely to be associated with the insolvency or 
default of counterparty B and, therefore, these counterparties are 
economically interdependent, by evaluating the following:
    (i) Whether 50 percent or more of one counterparty's gross revenue 
is derived from, or gross expenditures are directed to, transactions 
with the other counterparty;
    (ii) Whether counterparty A has fully or partly guaranteed the 
credit exposure of counterparty B, or is liable by other means, in an 
amount that is 50 percent or more of the covered foreign entity's net 
credit exposure to counterparty A;
    (iii) Whether 25 percent or more of one counterparty's production 
or output is sold to the other counterparty, which cannot easily be 
replaced by other customers;
    (iv) Whether the expected source of funds to repay the loans of 
both counterparties is the same and neither counterparty has another 
independent source of income from which the loans may be serviced and 
fully repaid; \1\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ An employer will not be treated as a source of repayment 
under this paragraph because of wages and salaries paid to an 
employee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (v) Whether two or more counterparties rely on the same source for 
the majority of their funding and, in the event of the common 
provider's default, an alternative provider cannot be found.
    (3)(i) Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(2) of this section, if a 
covered foreign entity determines that one or more of the factors in 
paragraph (b)(2) is met, the covered foreign entity may request in 
writing a determination from the Board that those counterparties are 
not economically interdependent and that the covered foreign entity is 
not required to aggregate those counterparties.
    (ii) Upon a request by a covered foreign entity pursuant to 
paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the Board may grant temporary relief 
to the covered foreign entity and not require the covered foreign 
entity to aggregate one counterparty with another counterparty provided 
that the counterparty could promptly modify its business relationships, 
such as by reducing its reliance on the other counterparty, to address 
any economic interdependence concerns, and provided that such relief is 
in the public interest and is consistent with the purpose of this 
subpart and 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).
    (c) Aggregation of exposures to more than one counterparty due to 
certain control relationships. (1) For purposes of this subpart, one 
counterparty (counterparty A) is deemed to control the other 
counterparty (counterparty B) if:
    (i) Counterparty A owns, controls, or holds with the power to vote 
25 percent or more of any class of voting securities of counterparty B; 
or
    (ii) Counterparty A controls in any manner the election of a 
majority of the directors, trustees, or general partners (or 
individuals exercising similar functions) of counterparty B.
    (2)(i) Notwithstanding paragraph (c)(1) of this section, if a 
covered foreign entity determines that one or more of the factors in 
paragraph (c)(1) is met, the covered foreign entity may request in 
writing a determination from the Board that counterparty A does not 
control counterparty B and that the covered foreign entity is not 
required to aggregate those counterparties.
    (ii) Upon a request by a covered foreign entity pursuant to 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section, the Board may grant temporary relief 
to the covered foreign entity and not require the covered foreign 
entity to aggregate counterparty A with counterparty B provided that, 
taking into account the specific facts and circumstances, such indicia 
of control does not result in the entities being connected by control 
relationships for purposes of this

[[Page 38510]]

subpart, and provided that such relief is in the public interest and is 
consistent with the purpose of this subpart and 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).
    (d) Board determinations for aggregation of counterparties due to 
economic interdependence or control relationships. The Board may 
determine, after notice to the covered foreign entity and opportunity 
for hearing, that one or more counterparties of a covered foreign 
entity are:
    (1) Economically interdependent for purposes of this subpart, 
considering the factors in paragraph (b)(2) of this section, as well as 
any other indicia of economic interdependence that the Board determines 
in its discretion to be relevant; or
    (2) Connected by control relationships for purpose of this subpart, 
considering the factors in paragraph (c)(1) of this section and whether 
counterparty A:
    (i) Controls the power to vote 25 percent or more of any class of 
voting securities of Counterparty B pursuant to a voting agreement;
    (ii) Has significant influence on the appointment or dismissal of 
counterparty B's administrative, management, or governing body, or the 
fact that a majority of members of such body have been appointed solely 
as a result of the exercise of counterparty A's voting rights; or
    (iii) Has the power to exercise a controlling influence over the 
management or policies of counterparty B.
    (e) Board determinations for aggregation of counterparties to 
prevent evasion. Notwithstanding paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section, a covered foreign entity must aggregate its exposures to a 
counterparty with the covered foreign entity's exposures to another 
counterparty if the Board determines in writing after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that the exposures to the two counterparties 
must be aggregated to prevent evasions of the purposes of this subpart, 
including, but not limited to Sec.  252.176 and 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).


Sec.  252.177   Exemptions.

    (a) Exempted exposure categories. The following categories of 
credit transactions are exempt from the limits on credit exposure under 
this subpart:
    (1) Any direct claim on, and the portion of a claim that is 
directly and fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the 
Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation, only while operating under the conservatorship or 
receivership of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, and any additional 
obligation issued by a U.S. government-sponsored entity as determined 
by the Board;
    (2) Intraday credit exposure to a counterparty;
    (3) Any trade exposure to a qualifying central counterparty related 
to the covered foreign entity's clearing activity, including potential 
future exposure arising from transactions cleared by the qualifying 
central counterparty and pre-funded default fund contributions;
    (4) Any credit transaction with the Bank for International 
Settlements, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance 
Corporation, the International Development Association, the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, or the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes;
    (5) Any credit transaction with the European Commission or the 
European Central Bank; and
    (6) Any transaction that the Board exempts if the Board finds that 
such exemption is in the public interest and is consistent with the 
purpose of this subpart.
    (b) Additional exemptions by the Board. The Board may, by 
regulation or order, exempt transactions, in whole or in part, from the 
definition of the term ``credit exposure,'' if the Board finds that the 
exemption is in the public interest and is consistent with the purpose 
of 12 U.S.C. 5365(e).


Sec.  252.178   Compliance.

    (a) Scope of compliance. (1) Using all available data, including 
any data required to be maintained or reported to the Federal Reserve 
under this subpart, a foreign banking organization that is a covered 
foreign entity or a U.S. intermediate holding company with total 
consolidated assets that equal or exceed $250 billion must comply with 
the requirements of this subpart on a daily basis at the end of each 
business day.
    (2) Using all available data, including any data required to be 
maintained or reported to the Federal Reserve under this subpart, a 
U.S. intermediate holding company with less than $250 billion in total 
consolidated assets must comply with the requirements of this subpart 
on a quarterly basis, unless the Board determines and notifies the 
entity in writing that more frequent compliance is required.
    (3) A covered foreign entity must report its compliance to the 
Federal Reserve as of the end of the quarter, unless the Board 
determines and notifies that entity in writing that more frequent 
reporting is required.
    (4) In reporting its compliance, a covered foreign entity must 
calculate and include in its gross credit exposure to an issuer of 
eligible collateral or eligible guarantor the amounts of eligible 
collateral, eligible guarantees, eligible equity derivatives, and 
eligible credit derivatives that were provided to the covered foreign 
entity in connection with credit transactions with exempt 
counterparties, valued in accordance with and as required by Sec.  
252.174(b) through (d) and (g).
    (b) Qualifying Master Netting Agreement. With respect to any 
qualifying master netting agreement, a covered foreign entity must 
establish and maintain procedures that meet or exceed the requirements 
of Sec.  217.3(d) of the Board's Regulation Q (12 CFR 217.3(d)) to 
monitor possible changes in relevant law and to ensure that the 
agreement continues to satisfy these requirements.
    (c) Noncompliance. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this 
section, if a covered foreign entity is not in compliance with this 
subpart with respect to a counterparty solely due to the circumstances 
listed in paragraphs (c)(2)(i) through (v) of this section, the covered 
foreign entity will not be subject to enforcement actions for a period 
of 90 days (or, with prior notice to the foreign entity, such shorter 
or longer period determined by the Board, in its sole discretion, to be 
appropriate to preserve the safety and soundness of the covered foreign 
entity or U.S. financial stability), if the covered foreign entity uses 
reasonable efforts to return to compliance with this subpart during 
this period. The covered foreign entity may not engage in any 
additional credit transactions with such a counterparty in 
contravention of this rule during the period of noncompliance, except 
as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
    (2) A covered foreign entity may request a special temporary credit 
exposure limit exemption from the Board. The Board may grant approval 
for such exemption in cases where the Board determines that such credit 
transactions are necessary or appropriate to preserve the safety and 
soundness of the covered foreign entity or U.S. financial stability. In 
acting on a request for an exemption, the Board will consider the 
following:
    (i) A decrease in the covered foreign entity's capital stock and 
surplus;
    (ii) The merger of the covered foreign entity with another covered 
foreign entity;
    (iii) A merger of two counterparties; or

[[Page 38511]]

    (iv) An unforeseen and abrupt change in the status of a 
counterparty as a result of which the covered foreign entity's credit 
exposure to the counterparty becomes limited by the requirements of 
this section; or
    (v) Any other factor(s) the Board determines, in its discretion, is 
appropriate.
    (d) Other measures. The Board may impose supervisory oversight and 
additional reporting measures that it determines are appropriate to 
monitor compliance with this subpart. Covered foreign entities must 
furnish, in the manner and form prescribed by the Board, such 
information to monitor compliance with this subpart and the limits 
therein as the Board may require.

    By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, July 24, 2018.
Yao-Chin Chao,
Assistant Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 2018-16133 Filed 8-3-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6210-01-P