Addressing Electrode-Induced Rail Pitting From Pressure Electric Welding, 35699-35702 [2018-16022]
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2018 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Docket No. FRA–2017–0074, Notice No. 2;
Safety Advisory 2018–01]
Addressing Electrode-Induced Rail
Pitting From Pressure Electric Welding
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:
FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2018–01 to remind railroads,
contractors, and the rail welding
industry of the potential for electrodeinduced rail pitting and fatigue cracking
during the pressure electric rail welding
process.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
Matthew Brewer, Staff Director, Rail
Integrity Division, Office of Railroad
Safety, FRA, 500 Broadway, Suite 240,
Vancouver, WA 98660, telephone (202)
385–2209; or Mr. Aaron Moore, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone
(202) 493–7009.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August
16, 2017, FRA published a notice of a
draft safety advisory in the Federal
Register to address electrode-induced
rail pitting from pressure electric
welding and seeking comment on the
issue. 82 FR 38989. FRA noted its
investigation and research into the issue
demonstrated that improper electrode
contact to the rail during the welding
process could result in electrodeinduced pitting that may lead to fatigue
fracture and ultimately rail failure. As a
result, FRA’s draft safety advisory
contained specific recommendations to
help the industry prevent electrodeinduced pitting.
FRA presented the information
contained in the draft safety advisory to
its Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee’s (RSAC) Rail Integrity
Working Group. Subsequent RSAC
discussions and comments submitted by
the Association of American Railroads
(AAR) indicated that the rail industry
agrees with FRA’s concern that stray
arcing can result in the formation of
electrode pits and that fatigue cracking
can then develop from these electrode
pits. AAR noted, however, that FRA’s
draft safety advisory did not present any
information to support a finding that
rail failures from electrode-induced rail
pitting are a wide-spread problem.
Further, AAR noted that its member
railroads report they have seen no
indications of a systemic problem
involving electrode pitting, and that
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SUMMARY:
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17:38 Jul 26, 2018
Jkt 244001
railroads and welding companies have
procedures in place to prevent electrode
pitting and remediate it when it does
occur. Accordingly, AAR asserted that
FRA should not issue any
recommendations burdening the
industry such as those included in the
draft safety advisory.
After consideration of AAR’s
comments and input from RSAC
discussions, FRA agrees with AAR’s
position that, although stray arcing
during the pressure electric welding
process can result in the formation of
electrode burns or pits on the web,
head, or base of rail, and that fatigue
cracking can develop from those burns
or pits, railroads and welding
companies have procedures in place
addressing the issue of electrode pitting.
Accordingly, in issuing Safety Advisory
2018–01, FRA has not adopted the
specific recommended actions listed in
its draft safety advisory and instead
intends Safety Advisory 2018–01 to
merely remind railroads, contractors,
and the rail welding industry to be
diligent in complying with existing
practices and procedures designed to
prevent electrode-induced pitting in rail
and to mitigate the pitting when it does
occur.
Safety Advisory 2018–01
Pressure electric welding is the
process of using a hydraulicallyoperated welding head that clamps
around two opposing rail ends, pressing
an electrode on each rail, then
hydraulically pulling the rail ends
together while arcing current through
the electrodes into the rails, causing
them to essentially melt together to form
a continuous rail. Stray arcing during
this process results in the formation of
electrode burns or pits on the web,
head, or base of the rail. Fractures in the
rail may originate from the electrode
pits because they behave as stress
raisers (also referred to as stress
concentrations). Fatigue cracks may
develop at locations of stress
concentration. Once a fatigue crack
initiates, the localized stress encourages
the growth of the crack, which may
potentially lead to rail failure. FRA
believes electrode pitting may be a
contributing factor, if not the root cause,
in some accidents involving rail web
cracking.
Figure 1 below shows a photograph of
a rail with electrode pits in the web. The
location of these electrode pits, when
they occur, is typically four to eight
inches on either side of the weld.
Electrode-induced pitting from pressure
electric welding may also occur in the
head and base of the rail. It is unclear
whether traditional ultrasonic rail
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
35699
testing can consistently detect electrodeinduced pitting.
In 2016, FRA’s Office of Railroad
Safety requested technical support from
The National Transportation Systems
Center (Volpe) to study the fatigue and
fracture behavior of rails with pitting
from electrodes used in welding. Volpe
enlisted technical support from the U.S.
´
´
Army’s Benet Laboratories (Benet) to
conduct forensic examination of three
rail sections with electrode-induced
pitting in the web from the pressure
electric welding process. FRA obtained
these rails from members of the railroad
´
industry. Benet’s examination included
fractography (the science of studying
fracture surfaces to identify the origin
and causes of fracture), metallography
(the science of studying the
microstructure of metals to provide
information concerning the properties
and processing history of metallic
alloys), and testing to determine the
chemical composition and tensile
mechanical properties of the rail steel.
´
Benet confirmed the electrode-induced
web fatigue cracking is a result of pitting
caused by inadequate electrode-to-rail
contact.
´
Specifically, Benet’s metallurgical
analyses concluded the cracking in the
rail web originated from the pitting
created by inadequate electrode-to-rail
contact during the pressure electric
welding process. The fractographic and
metallographic examinations revealed
evidence of fatigue cracking originating
from the pitting and fast fracture once
the fatigue crack reached a critical
length. Figure 2 below shows three
photographs of the fracture surface of a
´
crack found in one of the rails Benet
examined. These photographs support
the metallurgical evidence indicative of
three stages of fatigue fracture: (1) Crack
initiation or formation originating from
the pitting; (2) crack propagation or
growth by metal fatigue; and (3) final
rupture or fast fracture. Figure 3 below
shows photographs of the
microstructure near the electrode pits in
each examined rail, providing further
evidence the cracking originated from
the pitting created by improper
electrode contact during welding.
The results from the metallurgical
analysis also suggested premature and
sudden rail failure may result from high
wheel-impact load (e.g., flat wheel),
especially in cold-weather
environments when the longitudinal rail
force is tensile. Results from the
chemical analysis and mechanical
testing indicated the chemistry and
mechanical properties of the rails
selected for evaluation were within
specifications the American Railway
Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way
E:\FR\FM\27JYN1.SGM
27JYN1
35700
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2018 / Notices
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES1
Association (AREMA) published, except
for the hardness measurements in one
rail, which were slightly lower than the
AREMA minimum. Hardness is a
measure of the resistance of a material
to surface indentation produced by a
carbide indenter applied at a given load
for a given length of time. The lower
hardness in that rail, manufactured in
the 1950s, may be attributed to lower
concentrations (compared to the other
two rails) of alloying elements,
specifically carbon, silicon, and
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:38 Jul 26, 2018
Jkt 244001
chromium, which were still within
AREMA tolerances. Testing of the
chemistry and the mechanical
properties revealed all three rails were
made from standard quality steel
containing no other defects except the
electrode-induced pitting.
FRA recognizes that the industry
already has practices and procedures in
place to avoid electrode pitting during
the pressure electric welding process.
Therefore, FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2018–01 to remind railroads,
PO 00000
Frm 00097
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
railroad employees, railroad contractors,
and welding companies and their
employees of the importance of
complying with those procedures to
prevent electrode pitting and,
ultimately, to prevent rail failures. (FRA
has posted a copy of this notice on its
public website, www.fra.dot.gov, where
you may view the figures below in their
full resolution.)
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
E:\FR\FM\27JYN1.SGM
27JYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2018 / Notices
35701
Figure 1: Electrode-Induced Pits in a Rail
Figure 3: Photographs of Rail Cross Sections
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17:38 Jul 26, 2018
Jkt 244001
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Sfmt 4725
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EN27JY18.329
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Figure 2: Photographs of Crack Fracture Surface in Examined Rail
35702
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 145 / Friday, July 27, 2018 / Notices
Ronald Louis Batory,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018–16022 Filed 7–26–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–C
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Secretary of
Transportation
[Docket No. DOT–OST–2018–0108]
Vendor and Grantee Invoice
Submission Process Change
U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of enforced change with
request for comments.
AGENCY:
The DOT invites the public
and other Federal agencies to comment
on a proposed vendor invoice
submission change. DOT will submit
the proposed information collection
request to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) for review, as required by
the Paperwork Reduction Act. This
notice sets forth new processes and
procedures for vendors and grantees
that submit invoices and receive
payments for DOT Operating
Administrations (OAs). Existing users of
DOT’s eInvoicing system, including
grantees and vendors, will also be
required to use Login.gov. DOT’s
objective is to improve efficiency and
reduce unnecessary burden on vendors
and grantees by eliminating existing
manual processes for invoice entry,
invoice approvals and user registration
to reduce costs, increase timeliness of
payments, and improve data quality.
Introducing e-authentication to facilitate
user validation and account
management will greatly reduce the
burden on vendors and grantees by
eliminating the current paper based
registration process. This electronic
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SUMMARY:
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17:38 Jul 26, 2018
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invoicing process is currently used by
DOT’s grantee community and was
successfully piloted to select vendors.
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before September 24, 2018.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for additional information
should be directed to the U.S.
Department of Transportation, Office of
Financial Management, B–30, Room
W98–431, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington DC 20590–0001, Anthony
Chestnut, (202) 366–9661,
DOTElectronicInvoicing@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
OMB Control Number: 2105–0564.
Type of Request: Revision to
previously approved information
collection.
Background: This notice sets forth
new processes and procedures for
existing and future vendors and grantees
that submit invoices and receive
payments from DOT Operating
Administrations (OAs). The vendors
and grantees involved must meet the
following requirements to participate:
• Vendors and grantees will need to
have electronic internet access to
register in GSA Login.gov and login into
Delphi eInvoicing system.
• The identities of system users will
be verified prior to receiving access to
the Delphi eInvoicing system.
Information required for Login.gov
includes his/her email address, full
name, phone number, and password.
• System users will Register with and
Create an account with GSA Login.gov.
System users will provide his/her email
address and receive an email back to
confirm. They will then create a
password and input a telephone number
and opt to receive either a personal call
from Login.gov or text message with an
authentication code.
• Once the system user is
authenticated, he/she will complete a
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 9990
System Access Request for Delphi
eInvoicing system. The users will
provide the following information: Full
name, office phone number, work email
address, vendor name, purchase order
(contract or grant award) numbers, and
agency doing business with. System
users will provide the form to DOT to
finalize the access.
• Once access is complete, vendors
will submit invoices electronically and
DOT OAs will process invoices
electronically.
Affected Public: All Current and
Future DOT Vendors and grantees.
Total Estimated Number of
Respondents: Greater than 5,000.
Total Estimated Number of
Responses: Greater than 5,000.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 500 (Initial Registration Only
Calculated at 5 Minutes per).
Frequency of Collection: One Time.
Annual Estimated Total Annual
Burden Costs: $5,000.
Public Comments Invited: You are
asked to comment on any aspect of this
information collection, including (a)
whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the
Department’s performance; (b) the
accuracy of the estimated burden; (c)
ways for the Department to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collection; and (d) ways
that the burden could be minimized
without reducing the quality of the
collected information.
Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520, as amended.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 24,
2018.
Jennifer Funk,
Acting, Deputy Chief Financial Officer,
Department of Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2018–16089 Filed 7–26–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–9X–P
E:\FR\FM\27JYN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 145 (Friday, July 27, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35699-35702]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-16022]
[[Page 35699]]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Docket No. FRA-2017-0074, Notice No. 2; Safety Advisory 2018-01]
Addressing Electrode-Induced Rail Pitting From Pressure Electric
Welding
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2018-01 to remind railroads,
contractors, and the rail welding industry of the potential for
electrode-induced rail pitting and fatigue cracking during the pressure
electric rail welding process.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Matthew Brewer, Staff Director,
Rail Integrity Division, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 500 Broadway,
Suite 240, Vancouver, WA 98660, telephone (202) 385-2209; or Mr. Aaron
Moore, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-7009.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 16, 2017, FRA published a notice
of a draft safety advisory in the Federal Register to address
electrode-induced rail pitting from pressure electric welding and
seeking comment on the issue. 82 FR 38989. FRA noted its investigation
and research into the issue demonstrated that improper electrode
contact to the rail during the welding process could result in
electrode-induced pitting that may lead to fatigue fracture and
ultimately rail failure. As a result, FRA's draft safety advisory
contained specific recommendations to help the industry prevent
electrode-induced pitting.
FRA presented the information contained in the draft safety
advisory to its Railroad Safety Advisory Committee's (RSAC) Rail
Integrity Working Group. Subsequent RSAC discussions and comments
submitted by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) indicated that
the rail industry agrees with FRA's concern that stray arcing can
result in the formation of electrode pits and that fatigue cracking can
then develop from these electrode pits. AAR noted, however, that FRA's
draft safety advisory did not present any information to support a
finding that rail failures from electrode-induced rail pitting are a
wide-spread problem. Further, AAR noted that its member railroads
report they have seen no indications of a systemic problem involving
electrode pitting, and that railroads and welding companies have
procedures in place to prevent electrode pitting and remediate it when
it does occur. Accordingly, AAR asserted that FRA should not issue any
recommendations burdening the industry such as those included in the
draft safety advisory.
After consideration of AAR's comments and input from RSAC
discussions, FRA agrees with AAR's position that, although stray arcing
during the pressure electric welding process can result in the
formation of electrode burns or pits on the web, head, or base of rail,
and that fatigue cracking can develop from those burns or pits,
railroads and welding companies have procedures in place addressing the
issue of electrode pitting. Accordingly, in issuing Safety Advisory
2018-01, FRA has not adopted the specific recommended actions listed in
its draft safety advisory and instead intends Safety Advisory 2018-01
to merely remind railroads, contractors, and the rail welding industry
to be diligent in complying with existing practices and procedures
designed to prevent electrode-induced pitting in rail and to mitigate
the pitting when it does occur.
Safety Advisory 2018-01
Pressure electric welding is the process of using a hydraulically-
operated welding head that clamps around two opposing rail ends,
pressing an electrode on each rail, then hydraulically pulling the rail
ends together while arcing current through the electrodes into the
rails, causing them to essentially melt together to form a continuous
rail. Stray arcing during this process results in the formation of
electrode burns or pits on the web, head, or base of the rail.
Fractures in the rail may originate from the electrode pits because
they behave as stress raisers (also referred to as stress
concentrations). Fatigue cracks may develop at locations of stress
concentration. Once a fatigue crack initiates, the localized stress
encourages the growth of the crack, which may potentially lead to rail
failure. FRA believes electrode pitting may be a contributing factor,
if not the root cause, in some accidents involving rail web cracking.
Figure 1 below shows a photograph of a rail with electrode pits in
the web. The location of these electrode pits, when they occur, is
typically four to eight inches on either side of the weld. Electrode-
induced pitting from pressure electric welding may also occur in the
head and base of the rail. It is unclear whether traditional ultrasonic
rail testing can consistently detect electrode-induced pitting.
In 2016, FRA's Office of Railroad Safety requested technical
support from The National Transportation Systems Center (Volpe) to
study the fatigue and fracture behavior of rails with pitting from
electrodes used in welding. Volpe enlisted technical support from the
U.S. Army's Ben[eacute]t Laboratories (Ben[eacute]t) to conduct
forensic examination of three rail sections with electrode-induced
pitting in the web from the pressure electric welding process. FRA
obtained these rails from members of the railroad industry.
Ben[eacute]t's examination included fractography (the science of
studying fracture surfaces to identify the origin and causes of
fracture), metallography (the science of studying the microstructure of
metals to provide information concerning the properties and processing
history of metallic alloys), and testing to determine the chemical
composition and tensile mechanical properties of the rail steel.
Ben[eacute]t confirmed the electrode-induced web fatigue cracking is a
result of pitting caused by inadequate electrode-to-rail contact.
Specifically, Ben[eacute]t's metallurgical analyses concluded the
cracking in the rail web originated from the pitting created by
inadequate electrode-to-rail contact during the pressure electric
welding process. The fractographic and metallographic examinations
revealed evidence of fatigue cracking originating from the pitting and
fast fracture once the fatigue crack reached a critical length. Figure
2 below shows three photographs of the fracture surface of a crack
found in one of the rails Ben[eacute]t examined. These photographs
support the metallurgical evidence indicative of three stages of
fatigue fracture: (1) Crack initiation or formation originating from
the pitting; (2) crack propagation or growth by metal fatigue; and (3)
final rupture or fast fracture. Figure 3 below shows photographs of the
microstructure near the electrode pits in each examined rail, providing
further evidence the cracking originated from the pitting created by
improper electrode contact during welding.
The results from the metallurgical analysis also suggested
premature and sudden rail failure may result from high wheel-impact
load (e.g., flat wheel), especially in cold-weather environments when
the longitudinal rail force is tensile. Results from the chemical
analysis and mechanical testing indicated the chemistry and mechanical
properties of the rails selected for evaluation were within
specifications the American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way
[[Page 35700]]
Association (AREMA) published, except for the hardness measurements in
one rail, which were slightly lower than the AREMA minimum. Hardness is
a measure of the resistance of a material to surface indentation
produced by a carbide indenter applied at a given load for a given
length of time. The lower hardness in that rail, manufactured in the
1950s, may be attributed to lower concentrations (compared to the other
two rails) of alloying elements, specifically carbon, silicon, and
chromium, which were still within AREMA tolerances. Testing of the
chemistry and the mechanical properties revealed all three rails were
made from standard quality steel containing no other defects except the
electrode-induced pitting.
FRA recognizes that the industry already has practices and
procedures in place to avoid electrode pitting during the pressure
electric welding process. Therefore, FRA is issuing Safety Advisory
2018-01 to remind railroads, railroad employees, railroad contractors,
and welding companies and their employees of the importance of
complying with those procedures to prevent electrode pitting and,
ultimately, to prevent rail failures. (FRA has posted a copy of this
notice on its public website, www.fra.dot.gov, where you may view the
figures below in their full resolution.)
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P
[[Page 35701]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN27JY18.329
[[Page 35702]]
Ronald Louis Batory,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-16022 Filed 7-26-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C