Yaw Maneuver Conditions-Rudder Reversals, 32807-32815 [2018-15154]
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32807
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 83, No. 136
Monday, July 16, 2018
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No.: FAA–2018–0653–; Notice No.
18–04]
RIN 2120–AK89
Yaw Maneuver Conditions—Rudder
Reversals
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
The FAA proposes to add a
new load condition to the design
standards for transport category
airplanes. The new load condition
would require the airplane be designed
to withstand the loads caused by rapid
reversals of the rudder pedals and
would apply to transport category
airplanes that have a powered rudder
control surface or surfaces. This rule is
necessary because accident and incident
data show that pilots sometimes make
rudder reversals during flight, even
though such reversals are unnecessary
and discouraged by flightcrew training
programs. The current design standards
do not require the airplane structure to
withstand the loads that may result from
such reversals. If the airplane loads
exceed those for which it is designed,
the airplane structure may fail, resulting
in catastrophic loss of control of the
airplane. This proposal aims to prevent
structural failure of the rudder and
vertical stabilizer that may result from
these rudder reversals.
DATES: Send comments on or before
October 15, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by docket number [Insert docket number
from heading] using any of the
following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
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SUMMARY:
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• Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30; U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C.
553(c), DOT solicits comments from the
public to better inform its rulemaking
process. DOT posts these comments,
without edit, including any personal
information the commenter provides, to
www.regulations.gov, as described in
the system of records notice (DOT/ALL–
14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical questions concerning this
action, contact Robert C. Jones,
Propulsion & Mechanical Systems
Section, AIR–672, Transport Standards
Branch, Policy and Innovation Division,
Aircraft Certification Service, Federal
Aviation Administration, 2200 South
216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone and fax (206) 231–3182; email
Robert.C.Jones@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
air commerce by prescribing regulations
and minimum standards for the design
and performance of aircraft that the
Administrator finds necessary for safety
in air commerce. This regulation is
within the scope of that authority. It
prescribes new safety standards for the
design of transport category airplanes.
Authority for This Rulemaking
A. Statement of the Problem
Accident and incident data from the
events described in section II.B.1 show
pilots sometimes make multiple and
unnecessary rudder reversals during
flight. In addition, FAA-sponsored
The FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the
United States Code. Subtitle I, Section
106 describes the authority of the FAA
Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the
scope of the agency’s authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated
under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section
44701, ‘‘General Requirements.’’ Under
that section, the FAA is charged with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
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I. Overview of Proposed Rule
The FAA proposes to add a new load
condition to the design standards in title
14, Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) part 25. The new load condition,
to be located in new proposed § 25.353,
would require that the airplane be
designed to withstand the loads caused
by rapid reversals of the rudder pedals.
Specifically, applicants would have to
show that their proposed airplane
design can withstand an initial full
rudder pedal input, followed by three
rudder reversals at the maximum
sideslip angle, followed by return of the
rudder to neutral. Due to the rarity of
such multiple reversals, the proposed
rule would specify the new load
condition is an ultimate load condition
rather than a limit load condition.
Consequently, the applicant would not
have to apply an additional factor of
safety to the calculated load levels.1
The proposed rule would affect
manufacturers of transport category
airplanes applying for a new type
certificate after the effective date of the
final rule. The proposed rule may also
affect applicants applying for an
amended or supplemental type
certificate as determined under 14 CFR
21.101 after the effective date of the
final rule. Proposed § 25.353 would
apply to transport category airplanes
that have a powered rudder control
surface or surfaces, as explained in the
‘‘Discussion of the Proposal.’’
II. Background
1 The terms ‘‘limit,’’ ‘‘ultimate,’’ and ‘‘factor of
safety’’ are specified in § 25.301, ‘‘Loads,’’ § 25.303,
‘‘Factor of safety,’’ and § 25.305, ‘‘Strength and
deformation.’’ To summarize, design loads are
typically expressed in terms of limit loads, which
are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5,
to determine ultimate loads. In this proposal, the
design loads would be expressed as ultimate loads,
and no additional safety factor would be applied.
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research 2 indicates that pilots use the
rudder more often than previously
thought and often in ways not
recommended by manufacturers.
Section 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requires
manufacturers to provide
documentation that warns pilots against
making large and rapid control reversals
as they may result in structural failures
at any speed, including below the
design maneuvering speed (VA). Despite
the requirement, and though such
rudder reversals are unnecessary and
discouraged by flightcrew training
programs, these events continue to
occur (see section II.B.1, ‘‘History—
Accidents and Incidents’’ below).
Section 25.351, the standard for
protecting the airplane’s vertical
stabilizer from pilot-commanded
maneuver loads, only addresses single,
full rudder inputs at airspeeds up to the
design diving speed (VD).3 This design
standard does not protect the airplane
from the loads imposed by repeated
inputs in opposing directions, or rudder
reversals.4 If the loads on the vertical
stabilizer exceed those for which it is
designed, the vertical stabilizer may fail,
resulting in the catastrophic loss of
airplane control.
Incidents and accidents related to
rudder reversals have occurred in the
past, and the FAA believes that another
such event could occur, resulting in
injuries to occupants or a structural
failure that jeopardizes continued safe
flight and landing of the airplane.
B. History
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1. Accidents and Incidents
Rudder reversals have caused a
number of accidents and incidents. On
November 12, 2001, American Airlines
Flight 587 (AA587), an Airbus Model
A300–600 series airplane, crashed at
Belle Harbor, New York, resulting in
265 deaths and the loss of the airplane.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) found that the probable
cause of this accident was the in-flight
separation of the vertical stabilizer as a
result of the loads beyond ultimate
2 Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14, ‘‘An
International Survey of Transport Airplane Pilots’
Experiences and Perspectives of Lateral/Directional
Control Events and Rudder Issues in Transport
Airplanes (Rudder Survey),’’ dated October 2010, is
available in the Docket and on the internet at https://
www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_
humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/
201014.pdf.
3 V is the design diving speed: The maximum
D
speed at which the airplane is certified to fly. See
14 CFR 1.2. Advisory Circular 25–7C provides
additional information related to VD.
4 A rudder reversal is a continuous, pilotcommanded pedal movement starting from pedal
displacement in one direction followed by pedal
displacement in the opposite direction.
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design that were created by the first
officer’s unnecessary and excessive
rudder pedal inputs. The NTSB also
noted that contributing to these rudder
pedal inputs were characteristics of the
Airbus A300–600 rudder system design
and elements of the American Airlines
Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering
Program.5
In two additional events—commonly
known as the Interflug incident 6 and
Miami Flight 903 accident (AA903) 7—
the vertical stabilizer of each airplane
experienced loads above the ultimate
load level due to pedal reversals
commanded by the pilot after the
airplane stalled.8 While none of the
passengers and crew were injured in the
Interflug incident, a passenger was
seriously injured and a crewmember
sustained minor injuries in the AA903
accident. The AA903 airplane also
sustained sheared fasteners, deformed
nacelles, and engine component
damage, but landed safely. A
catastrophe similar to AA587 was
averted in each of these events because
the vertical stabilizer was stronger than
required by the design standards.9
Other rudder reversal events have
occurred more recently. On January 10,
2008, an Airbus Model 319–114 series
airplane, operated as Air Canada Flight
190 (AC190), encountered a wake vortex
while at cruise altitude over Washington
State.10 The pilot responded with inputs
that included six rudder reversals. The
flightcrew eventually stabilized the
airplane and diverted to an airport
capable of handling the injured
passengers.
The Transportation Safety Board of
Canada (TSB) investigated this event,
5 Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–04/04,
‘‘In-flight Separation of Vertical Stabilizer,
American Airlines Flight 587, Airbus Industrie
A300–605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York,
November 12, 2001,’’ dated October 26, 2004, is
available in the Docket and on the internet at
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Accident
Reports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf.
6 On February 11, 1991, an Airbus Model A310
series airplane experienced in-flight loss of control
over Moscow, Russia.
7 On May 12, 1997, an Airbus Model A300–600
series airplane experienced in-flight loss of control
near West Palm Beach, Florida, after the flightcrew
failed to recognize that the airplane had entered a
stall.
8 The Interflug and Miami Flight 903 events are
discussed in NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/
AAR–04/04, pp. 103–110. See footnote 5 on p. 6.
9 FCHWG Recommendation Report, ‘‘Rudder
Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal,’’ dated
November 7, 2013, is available in the Docket and
on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_
policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/
TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See p. 5 of the report.
10 TSB Aviation Investigation Report A08W0007,
‘‘Encounter with Wake Turbulence,’’ is available in
the Docket and on the internet at https://tsb.gc.ca/
eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08w0007/
a08w0007.pdf.
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along with NTSB accredited
representatives, and classified it as an
accident. Analysis by the TSB showed
that the pilot’s actions resulted in a load
on the vertical stabilizer that exceeded
its limit load by approximately 29
percent. The TSB found that the
flightcrew was startled by wake
turbulence at that altitude, erroneously
believed that the airplane had
malfunctioned, and therefore responded
with erroneous actions. The pilot had
received training to avoid rudder
reversals.
On May 27, 2005, a Bombardier DHC–
8–100 series airplane, operated by
Provincial Airlines Limited for
passenger service, experienced a stall
and uncontrolled descent over
Canada.11 During climb-out, the
indicated airspeed gradually decreased,
due to the flightcrew’s inadvertent
selection of an incorrect autopilot mode.
The airplane stalled at an unexpectedly
high airspeed, likely due to the
formation of ice. The flightcrew’s failure
to recognize the stall resulted in
incorrect control inputs and the loss of
4,200 feet of altitude in approximately
40 seconds before recovery. There were
no injuries and the airplane was not
damaged. During this event, the pilot
commanded a rudder reversal.
2. New Transport Airplane Programs
Since the AA587 accident, the FAA
has responded to the risk posed by
rudder reversals, in part, by requesting
that applicants for new type certificates
show that their designs are capable of
continued safe flight and landing after
experiencing repeated rudder reversals.
Applicants have been able to show this
capability through rudder control laws
in flight control systems. Applicants
have incorporated these control laws
through software and, therefore, added
no weight or maintenance cost to the
airplanes.
In 2016, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) began applying special
conditions to new airplane certification
programs. EASA mandated these special
conditions to address the exact risk of
rudder reversals explained in this
NPRM. The requirements in the EASA
special conditions are identical to the
requirements proposed in this NPRM.
3. FAA Survey of Pilots’ Rudder Use
In 2006, the FAA sponsored a
survey 12 to better comprehend transport
category pilots’ understanding and use
of the rudder. This survey included
11 TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059.
See footnote 10 on p. 7.
12 Report No. DOT/FAA/AM–10/14 (see footnote
2 on p. 5), OMB Control No. 2120–0712.
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transport pilots from all over the world.
The FAA’s analysis of the survey data
found that—
• Pilots use the rudder more than
previously thought and often in ways
not recommended by manufacturers.
• Pilots make erroneous rudder pedal
inputs, and some erroneous rudder
pedal inputs include rudder reversals.
• Even after specific training, many
pilots are not aware that they should not
make rudder reversals, even below VA.
Over the last several years, training and
changes to the airplane flight manual
(AFM) have directed the pilot to avoid
making cyclic control inputs. The
rudder reversals that caused the AC190
incident in 2008, and the Provincial
Airlines Limited incident in 2005,
occurred despite this effort.
• The survey indicated that pilots in
airplane upset situations (e.g., wake
vortex encounters) may revert to prior
training and make sequential rudder
reversals.
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C. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC) Activity
In 2011, the FAA tasked ARAC to
consider the need to add a new flight
maneuver load condition to part 25,
subpart C, that would ensure airplane
structural capability in the presence of
rudder reversals and increasing sideslip
angles (yaw angles) at airspeeds up to
VD. The FAA also tasked ARAC to
consider if other airworthiness
standards would more appropriately
address this concern, such as pedal
characteristics that would discourage
pilots from making rudder reversals.13
ARAC delegated this task to the
Transport Airplane and Engine
subcommittee, which assigned it to the
Flight Controls Harmonization Working
Group (FCHWG).
The FCHWG was tasked to examine
several options to protect the airplane
from pilot-commanded rudder reversals.
These options included developing new
standards for—
• Loads,
• Maneuverability,
• System design,
• Control sensitivity,
• Alerting, and
• Pilot training.
The FCHWG completed its report in
November 2013.14 ARAC and the FAA
accepted the report. The report’s
13 This notice of ARAC tasking was published in
the Federal Register on March 28, 2011 (76 FR
17183).
14 FCHWG Recommendation Report, ‘‘Rudder
Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal,’’ dated
November 7, 2013, is available in the Docket and
on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_
policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/
TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See footnote 9 on p. 7.
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findings and recommendations guided
the formation of this proposal.
While multiple rudder reversals are a
very low probability event, they have
occurred in service and cannot be ruled
out in the future. The FCHWG found
that a load condition was the optimal
way to protect the airplane from the
excessive loads that can result from
multiple rudder reversals. The FCHWG
recommended a load condition over the
other options because it would be a
performance-based requirement. The
FCHWG noted that this would provide
applicants for design approval with the
flexibility to determine the best way to
meet a load condition.
D. NTSB Safety Recommendation
Following the AA587 accident
described in section II.B.1 of this NPRM,
the NTSB provided safety
recommendations to the FAA. The
NTSB stated, ‘‘For airplanes with
variable stop rudder travel limiter
systems, protection from dangerous
structural loads resulting from sustained
alternating large rudder pedal inputs
can be achieved by reducing the
sensitivity of the rudder control system
(for example, by increasing the pedal
forces), which would make it harder for
pilots to quickly perform alternating full
rudder inputs.’’ In Safety
Recommendation A–04–056,15 the
NTSB recommended that the FAA
modify part 25 to include a certification
standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the
flight envelope, including limits for
rudder pedal sensitivity.
This proposed rule would address
this recommendation and, if
incorporated on new airplane designs,
would reduce the risk of an event
similar to AA587. The proposed rule
would also respond to the NTSB’s
concern about rudder pedal sensitivity.
E. Other Regulatory Actions
1. 2010 Revisions to § 25.1583
During its investigation of the AA587
accident, the NTSB found that many
pilots of transport category airplanes
mistakenly believed that, as long as the
airplane’s speed is below VA, they can
make any control input they desire
without risking structural damage to the
airplane. AA587 exposed the fact that
this assumption is incorrect. As a result,
the NTSB recommended that the FAA
amend its regulations to clarify that
operating at or below VA does not
provide structural protection against
15 NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–056 is
available in the Docket and on the internet at https://
www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_
56_62.pdf.
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multiple, full control inputs in one axis,
or full control inputs in more than one
axis at the same time.16 After making its
own assessment, the FAA agreed, and
revised § 25.1583(a)(3) at Amendment
25–130, effective October 15, 2010.
Section 25.1583(a)(3) was revised to
change the information that applicants
must furnish in the AFM explaining the
use of VA to pilots. The amendment
clarified that, depending on the
particular airplane design, flying at or
below VA does not allow a pilot to make
multiple large control inputs in one
airplane axis or full control inputs in
more than one airplane axis at a time
without endangering the airplane’s
structure. However, the AC190 accident
shows that even a properly trained pilot
might make rudder reversals when
startled or responding to a perceived
failure.
2. Airworthiness Directives
In 2012, the FAA adopted an
airworthiness directive (AD) applicable
to all Airbus Model A300–600 and
Model A310 series airplanes.17 The AD
was prompted by the excessive rudder
pedal inputs and consequent high loads
on the vertical stabilizer in the events
described previously, including AA587.
The AD required operators to either
incorporate a design change to the
rudder control system or other systems,
or install a modification that alerts the
pilot to stop making rudder inputs.
In 2015, the FAA adopted an AD
applicable to all Airbus Model A318,
A319, A320, and A321 series
airplanes.18 That AD was prompted by
a determination that, in specific flight
conditions, the allowable load limits on
the vertical stabilizer could be reached
and possibly exceeded. Exceeding
allowable load could result in
detachment of the vertical stabilizer.
The AD also required a modification
that alerts the pilot to stop making
rudder inputs.
F. Advisory Material
The FAA has developed proposed
Advisory Circular (AC) 25.353–X,
‘‘Design Load Conditions for Rudder
Control Reversal,’’ to be published
concurrently with this NPRM. This
proposed AC would provide guidance
16 NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–60 is
available in the Docket and on the internet at https://
www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/A04_56_
62.pdf.
17 AD 2012–21–15 was published in the Federal
Register on November 9, 2012 (77 FR 67526). For
more information, see Docket No. FAA–2011–0518
on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov.
18 AD 2015–23–13 was published in the Federal
Register on December 29, 2015 (77 FR 67526). For
more information, see Docket No. FAA–2011–0518
on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov.
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material on acceptable means, but not
the only means, of showing compliance
with proposed § 25.353. The FAA will
post the proposed AC on the ‘‘Aviation
Safety Draft Documents Open for
Comment’’ web page at https://
www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/.19 The
FAA requests that you submit
comments on the proposed AC through
that web page.
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III. Discussion of the Proposal
The FAA proposes to revise 14 CFR
by adding new § 25.353 to add a design
load condition. It would apply to
transport category airplanes that have a
powered rudder control surface or
surfaces, as explained later in this
section. The load condition would
require that the airplane be able to
withstand three full reversals of the
rudder pedals at the most critical points
in the flight envelope. From a neutral
position, the pedal input would be
sudden and to one side and held; then,
as the maximum sideslip angle is
reached, the pedals would be suddenly
displaced in the opposite direction and
held until the opposite angle is reached;
then again to the first side; then again
to the second side; then suddenly
moved back to the neutral position.
The reason for this proposal is that
pilots make inadvertent and erroneous
rudder pedal inputs, and the accident
and incident data show that the loads
caused by rudder reversals can surpass
the airplane’s structural limit load and
sometimes its ultimate load.
Compliance with the proposed rule
would require a showing that the
airplane’s vertical stabilizer and other
airplane structure are strong enough to
withstand the rudder reversals.
Ten of the eleven members of the
FCHWG recommended proposing some
form of a new load condition to protect
the airplane against rudder reversals.
During discussions, five members of the
FCHWG 20 recommended requiring a
load condition that would protect the
airplane from three, sequential, full
rudder reversals. This notice puts forth
those proposals.
Five members of the FCHWG 21
recommended a similar load condition,
which would only protect against a
single reversal of the rudder pedals. The
FAA is not proposing this alternative
19 The proposed AC is also available in the
Docket. To ensure the FAA receives your comments
on the proposed AC, please submit them via the
instructions found on the ‘‘Aviation Safety Draft
Documents Open for Comment’’ web page.
20 The Air Line Pilots Association, International
(ALPA), EASA, National Civil Aviation Agency—
Brazil (ANAC), and Transport Canada Civil
Aviation (TCCA), and FAA representatives.
21 Airbus, Bombardier, Cessna, Dassault Aviation,
and Embraer.
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because a new rule that only includes a
single rudder reversal, with a safety
factor of 1.0, would not materially
increase the design load level from
current design loads criteria and would
not be effective in preventing accidents
such as the AA587 accident.
One member, The Boeing Company
(Boeing), took the position that no new
rulemaking or design standards are
required, and that the risk from rudder
reversals should be addressed by
flightcrew training. Boeing stated that
rudder reversals are always
inappropriate and that pilots should
never make such commands. Boeing
argued it is inappropriate to issue an
airworthiness standard to mitigate a
situation caused by actions that pilots
should avoid. The FAA rejects this
alternative because, while multiple
rudder reversals are a very low
probability event, they have been seen
in service, despite training, and cannot
be ruled out in the future.
As indicated previously, yaw
maneuver loads are currently specified
in § 25.351, ‘‘Yaw maneuver
conditions.’’ The FAA used this
requirement as a template to develop
the proposed new rudder reversal
design load condition. Therefore, the
proposed load condition would be
similar to the load condition required by
§ 25.351, except as follows:
• Section 25.351 specifies a single,
full-pedal command followed by a
sudden pedal release after the airplane
has reached the steady-state sideslip
angle. Proposed § 25.353 would specify
a single, full-pedal command followed
by three rudder reversals, and return to
neutral.
• In the proposed rule, the rudder
reversals must be performed at the
maximum sideslip angle, which is
referred to as the ‘‘overswing sideslip
angle.’’ This term is also used in
§ 25.351 and would have the same
meaning. The overswing sideslip angle
is the maximum sideslip angle that
occurs following full rudder pedal input
and includes the additional sideslip that
may occur beyond the steady-state
sideslip angle.
• The § 25.353 load requirement
would be an ultimate design load
condition, instead of a limit load
condition as in § 25.351. This means
that applicants would apply a safety
factor of 1.0, rather than 1.5. The
proposed rudder reversal maneuver
would cover the worst-case rudder
maneuver expected to occur in service.
Because service history has shown that
three full rudder reversals are unusual,
the FAA proposes that a safety factor of
1.0 is appropriate.
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• The proposed § 25.353 condition
would require only that the applicant
account for the rudder reversals at
speeds up to the design cruising speed
(VC). In contrast, § 25.351 requires
applicants to account for speeds up to
VD. The reason for this difference is that
VC represents the majority of the flight
envelope, and compliance to VD is not
necessary due to the infrequency of
exposure to such speeds and the low
probability that a rudder reversal will
occur at speeds above VC.
• Section 25.351 requires a pilot force
of up to 300 pounds, depending on the
airplane’s speed. In contrast, the pilot
force specified in § 25.353 would be
limited to 200 pounds because it would
be difficult, and therefore very unlikely,
for a pilot to maintain 300 pounds of
force while performing rapid alternating
inputs.
• The proposed § 25.353 condition
would be evaluated only with the
landing gear retracted and speed brakes
(and spoilers when used as speed
brakes) retracted. This is because flight
loads would be more severe with the
gear and speed brakes retracted.
A. Expected Methods of Compliance
The proposed rule is performancebased. For example, an applicant could
choose to comply with the proposed
standard by using control system
architecture and control laws to limit
the airplane response to rudder
reversals, and thereby reduce structural
loads on the airplane. An applicant
could also choose to comply by
increasing the capability of the airplane
to withstand the maximum expected
structural loads that could result from
the proposed load condition.
B. Proposed Applicability
After examining all the data and
considering stakeholder opinions, the
FAA has determined that the proposed
rule should apply to new type
certification programs of transport
category airplane designs and to
amended or supplemental type
certificate programs as determined
under § 21.101. The proposed rule
would affect manufacturers of transport
category airplanes. In the future,
applicants who want to certify new
airplanes under part 25 would have to
comply with proposed § 25.353.
As noted previously, this proposed
rule would apply only to airplanes that
use powered rudder control surfaces. In
this proposed rule, a powered rudder
control surface is one in which the force
required to deflect the surface against
the airstream is generated or augmented
by hydraulic or electric systems. An
unpowered rudder control surface is
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one for which the force required to
deflect the surface against the airstream
is transmitted from the pilot’s rudder
pedal directly through mechanical
means, without any augmentation from
hydraulic or electrical systems. Powered
rudder control systems include fly-bywire (FBW) and hydro-mechanical
systems. Unpowered rudder control
systems are also referred to as
mechanical systems. Incorporation of a
powered yaw damper into an otherwise
unpowered rudder control system does
not constitute a powered rudder control
surface, for the purpose of this proposed
rule. The reasons that the FAA proposes
to exclude airplanes with unpowered
(mechanical) rudder control surfaces are
as follows, and the FAA seeks comment
on these reasons:
1. The only U.S. transport category
airplane models, currently in
production, that use unpowered rudder
control surfaces are small business jets.
Small airplanes typically have a
minimal delay between pilot yaw
control inputs and airplane response.
The pilots of these airplanes receive
more immediate feedback of airplane
response to their yaw control inputs
and, therefore, are less likely to execute
inappropriate pedal movements
resulting in rudder reversals.
2. The only U.S. transport category
airplane models, currently in
production, that use an unpowered
rudder control surface are also equipped
with a yaw damper. The FAA has
assessed the design of this yaw damper
and determined its normal operation
would be adequate to reduce yaw
overshoot loads resulting from rudder
reversals to acceptable levels. However,
the yaw damper system on these
airplanes is not required to be
operational on any given flight. The yaw
damper is included in these airplanes
primarily to improve ride quality for
passenger comfort (as opposed to
providing adequate stability about the
yaw axis to ensure airplane safety).
Since the yaw damper may not be
available on a given flight, the
manufacturer of these airplanes has
stated it might need to add structure or
an improved yaw damper to any new
type certificated airplanes to comply
with the proposed rule.22 This would
significantly increase design,
production, and operation costs. The
FAA considers that, for these airplanes,
the cost to comply with the proposed,
new load condition through structural
modification is not justified by the
relatively low risk these airplanes face
22 A record of this conversation between the FAA
and airplane manufacturer is available in the
Docket.
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from rudder reversals. Further, the FAA
considers it unlikely that many of these
airplanes would fly for extended
periods without an operable yaw
damper that provides acceptable ride
quality. Therefore, most of these
airplanes have protection against yaw
overshoot loads, even if they are not
required to demonstrate this protection
during certification.
3. The use of unpowered rudder
control surfaces is diminishing in the
transport category airplane fleet. The
FAA expects that most, if not all, new
type certificate applications to which
this proposed rule would apply will
employ powered rudder control
surfaces.
4. The FAA has reviewed the accident
and incident records and has found no
events in which pilots commanded
inappropriate rudder reversals on
airplanes with unpowered rudder
control surfaces. This alone does not
mean such systems cannot be affected
by pilot-commanded inappropriate
rudder reversals. However, the absence
of any previous incidents indicates that
excluding these designs would not
appreciably increase the future risk of
such events above acceptable levels.
C. Summary
The proposed design criteria would
provide a practical, relatively low-cost
solution that would be achievable on
future designs without the requirement
to significantly strengthen the vertical
stabilizer, or make significant changes to
system design. In fact, some current
airplanes would be able to meet the
proposed criteria with no changes
whatsoever. This proposal should
require a minimal increment of
applicant resources to show
compliance. While an applicant might
choose to comply with this
performance-based standard by
strengthening the airplane structure, the
FAA believes that most applicants
would use control laws to comply with
this proposed rule. These control laws
are a part of the flight control computer,
and they adjust control surface
deflections based on pilot input and
other factors like airspeed. Since control
laws are typically implemented through
systems and software, there would be
little to no incremental cost in the form
of weight, equipment, maintenance, or
training.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
direct that each Federal agency shall
propose or adopt a regulation only upon
a reasoned determination that the
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32811
benefits of the intended regulation
justify its costs. Second, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96–354),
as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq.,
requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96–39),
19 U.S.C. Chapter 13, prohibits agencies
from setting standards that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States. In
developing U.S. standards, the Trade
Agreements Act requires agencies to
consider international standards and,
where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L.
104–4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter
25, requires agencies to prepare a
written assessment of the costs, benefits,
and other effects of proposed or final
rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by
State, local, or tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of
$100 million or more annually (adjusted
for inflation with base year of 1995).
This portion of the preamble
summarizes the FAA’s analysis of the
economic impacts of this proposed rule.
In conducting these analyses, FAA
has determined that this proposed rule
has benefits that justify its costs and is
not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ as
defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866. The rule is also not
‘‘significant’’ as defined in DOT’s
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The
proposed rule will not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities, will not create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States, and will
not impose an unfunded mandate on
State, local, or tribal governments, or on
the private sector by exceeding the
threshold identified previously.
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Department of Transportation Order
2100.5 prescribes policies and
procedures for simplification, analysis,
and review of regulations. If the
expected cost impact is so minimal that
a proposed or final rule does not
warrant a full evaluation, this order
permits a statement to that effect and
the basis for it to be included in the
preamble if a full regulatory evaluation
of the costs and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for
this proposed rule. The reasoning for
this determination follows.
1. Background
The genesis of this proposed rule is
the crash of American Airlines Flight
587 (AA587), near Queens, New York,
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on November 12, 2001, resulting in the
death of all 260 passengers and crew
aboard, and the death of five persons on
the ground. The airplane was destroyed
by impact forces and a post-crash fire.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) found that the probable
cause of the accident was ‘‘the in-flight
separation of the vertical stabilizer
[airplane fin] as a result of loads above
ultimate design created by the first
officer’s unnecessary and excessive
rudder pedal inputs.’’ 23 Ultimate loads
on the airplane structure are the limit
loads (1.0) multiplied by a safety factor,
usually 1.5 (as for the vertical
stabilizer). An airplane is expected to
experience a limit load once in its
lifetime and is never expected to
experience an ultimate load.24 For the
AA587 accident, loads exceeding
ultimate loads ranged from 1.83 to 2.14
times the limit load on the vertical
stabilizer,25 as a result of four, full,
alternating rudder inputs known as
‘‘rudder reversals.’’
Significant rudder reversals events are
unusual in the history of commercial
airplane flight, having occurred during
just five notable accidents and
incidents, with AA587 being the only
catastrophic accident resulting from
rudder reversals.26 Ultimate loads were
exceeded in two of the other notable
rudder reversal accidents, the Interflug
incident (Moscow, February 11, 1991)
and American Airlines Flight 903
(AA903) (near West Palm Beach,
Florida, May 12, 1997).27 For the
Interflug incident, with multiple rudder
reversals, loads of 1.55 and 1.35 times
the limit load were recorded; and for
AA903 (eight rudder reversals), a load of
1.53 times the limit load was
recorded.28 A catastrophe similar to
AA587 was averted in these two events
only because the vertical stabilizer was
stronger than required by design
standards.29 In a fourth event—Air
Canada Flight 190 (AC190) (over the
state of Washington, January 10, 2008)—
23 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, p. 160. See footnote 5 on p. 6.
24 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, p. 31, n. 53.
25 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, p. 104.
26 FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee. Flight Controls Harmonization Working
Group. Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder Reversal
Recommendation Report, Nov. 7, 2013. (ARAC
Rudder Reversal Report). This Report identifies four
notable rudder events to which we add the Interflug
incident discussed in the NTSB AA587 Report.
27 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 106–109.
28 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 104.
29 NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR–
04/04, pp. 38–39.
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with four rudder reversals, the limit
load was exceed by 29 percent.
In transport category airplanes, rudder
inputs are generally limited to aligning
the airplane with the runway during
crosswind landings and controlling
engine-out situations, which occur
predominately at low speeds. At high
speeds, the pilot normally directly rolls
the airplane using the ailerons.30 If the
pilot does use the rudder to control the
airplane at high speeds, there will be a
significant phase lag between the rudder
input and the roll response because the
roll response is a secondary effect of the
yawing moment generated by the
rudder.31 The roll does not result from
the rudder input directly. Even if the
rudder is subsequently deflected in the
opposite direction (rudder reversal), the
airplane can continue to roll and yaw in
one direction before reversing because
of the phase lag. The relationship
between rudder inputs and the roll and
yaw response of the airplane can
become confusing to pilots, particularly
with the large yaw and roll rates that
would result from large rudder inputs,
causing the pilots to input multiple
rudder reversals.
Following the AA587 accident, in
November 2004 the NTSB released
Safety Recommendation A–04–56
recommending that the FAA modify
part 25 ‘‘to include a certification
standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the
flight envelope. . . .’’ 32 In 2011, the
FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking
Advisory Committee (ARAC) to
consider the need for rulemaking to
address the rudder reversal issue. ARAC
delegated this task to the Transport
Airplane and Engine subcommittee,
which assigned it to the Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group
(FCHWG). One of the recommendations
of the ARAC Rudder Reversal Report,
issued on November 7, 2013, was to
require transport category airplanes to
be able to safely withstand the loads
imposed by three rudder reversals. This
proposed rule adopts that
recommendation. The ARAC report
indicates that requiring transport
category airplanes to safely operate with
the vertical stabilizer loads imposed by
three full-stroke rudder reversals
accounts for most of the attainable
safety benefits. With more than three
30 An aileron is a hinged control service on the
trailing edge of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft,
one aileron per wing.
31 The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to
the wings and to the normal line of flight. A yaw
movement is a change in the direction of the aircraft
to the left or right around the yaw axis.
32 NTSB Safety Recommendation A–04–56, Nov.
10, 2004.
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rudder reversals, the FCHWG found
little increase in vertical stabilizer loads.
2. Costs and Benefits of This Proposed
Rule
Since the catastrophic AA587
accident, the FAA has responded to the
risk posed by rudder reversals by
requesting, through the issue paper
process, that applicants for new type
certificates show that their designs are
capable of continued safe flight and
landing after experiencing repeated
rudder reversals. For airplanes with
FBW systems, manufacturers have been
able to show capability by means of
control laws, incorporated through
software changes and, therefore, adding
no weight and imposing no additional
maintenance cost to the airplanes. Many
if not all of these designs have
demonstrated tolerance to three or more
rudder reversals. Aside from converting
to an FBW system, alternatives available
to manufacturers specializing in
airplane designs with mechanical or
hydro-mechanical rudders include
increasing the reliability of the yaw
damper and strengthening the airplane
vertical stabilizer.
To estimate the cost of the proposed
rule, the FAA solicited unit cost
estimates from U.S. industry and
incorporated these estimates into an
airplane life cycle model. The FAA
received one estimate for large part 25
airplanes and two estimates for small
part 25 airplanes (business jets).
One of the business jet estimates was
provided by a manufacturer specializing
in mechanical rather than FBW rudder
systems; therefore, that estimate reflects
significantly higher compliance costs.
This manufacturer’s most cost-efficient
approach to addressing the proposed
requirement—although high in
comparison to manufacturers who use
FBW systems exclusively—is to comply
with a strengthened vertical stabilizer.
The cost of complying with a more
reliable yaw damper was higher than
strengthening the vertical stabilizer, and
higher yet if complying by converting to
a FBW rudder system for new models.
As a result of these high costs and
other reasons set forth in the preamble,
the FAA has decided that the proposed
rule would not apply to airplanes with
‘‘unpowered’’ (mechanical) rudder
control surfaces. An ‘‘unpowered’’
rudder control surface is one whose
movement is affected through
mechanical means, without any
augmentation from hydraulic or
electrical systems. Accordingly, the
proposed rule would not apply to
models with mechanical rudder control
systems, but would apply only to
models with FBW or hydro-mechanical
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rudder systems. The FAA solicits
comments on the exclusion of airplanes
with unpowered rudder control surfaces
from the proposed rule and the
corresponding inclusion of FBW and
hydro-mechanical models.
The FAA estimates the costs of the
proposed rule using unit cost per model
estimates from industry for FBW models
and our estimates of the number of new
large airplane and business jet
certifications with FBW rudder systems
in the ten years after the effective date
of the proposed rule. These estimates
are shown in table 1. The FAA solicits
comments, with detailed cost estimates,
on our estimates.
TABLE 1—COST ESTIMATED FOR PROPOSED RULE
[$ 2016]
Cost per
model
Number of
new FBW
models
(10 yrs)
Costs
Large Airplanes ............................................................................................................................
Business Jets ...............................................................................................................................
$300,000
235,000
2
2
$600,000
470,000
Total Costs ...........................................................................................................................
........................
........................
1,070,000
With these cost estimates, the FAA
finds the proposed rule to be minimal
cost, with expected net safety benefits
from the reduced risk of rudder reversal
accidents.
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B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980
(Pub. L. 96–354) (RFA) establishes ‘‘as a
principle of regulatory issuance that
agencies shall endeavor, consistent with
the objectives of the rule and of
applicable statutes, to fit regulatory and
informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and
governmental jurisdictions subject to
regulation. To achieve this principle,
agencies are required to solicit and
consider flexible regulatory proposals
and to explain the rationale for their
actions to assure that such proposals are
given serious consideration.’’ The RFA
covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-forprofit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to
determine whether a rule will have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. If
the agency determines that it will, the
agency must prepare a regulatory
flexibility analysis as described in the
RFA. However, if an agency determines
that a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that
the head of the agency may so certify
and a regulatory flexibility analysis is
not required. The certification must
include a statement providing the
factual basis for this determination, and
the reasoning should be clear. As noted
above, because manufacturers with FBW
rudder systems have been able to show
compliance by means of low-cost
changes to control laws incorporated
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through software changes, the FAA
estimates the costs of this proposed rule
to be minimal. Therefore, as provided in
section 605(b), the head of the FAA
certifies that this proposed rule will not
have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
C. International Trade Impact
Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979
(Pub. L. 96–39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or
engaging in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
Pursuant to this Act, the establishment
of standards is not considered an
unnecessary obstacle to the foreign
commerce of the United States, so long
as the standard has a legitimate
domestic objective, such as the
protection of safety, and does not
operate in a manner that excludes
imports that meet this objective. The
statute also requires consideration of
international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for
U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the effect of
this proposed rule and determined that
its purpose is to protect the safety of
U.S. civil aviation. Therefore, the
proposed rule is in compliance with the
Trade Agreements Act.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–4)
requires each Federal agency to prepare
a written statement assessing the effects
of any Federal mandate in a proposed or
final agency rule that may result in an
expenditure of $100 million or more (in
1995 dollars) in any one year by State,
local, and tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector; such
a mandate is deemed to be a ‘‘significant
regulatory action.’’ The FAA currently
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uses an inflation-adjusted value of
$155.0 million in lieu of $100 million.
This proposed rule does not contain
such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not
apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires that the
FAA consider the impact of paperwork
and other information collection
burdens imposed on the public. The
FAA has determined that there would
be no new requirement for information
collection associated with this proposed
rule.
F. International Compatibility and
Cooperation
(1) In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to
conform to International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable. The FAA
has determined that there are no ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed
regulations.
(2) Executive Order 13609,
‘‘Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation,’’ promotes international
regulatory cooperation to meet shared
challenges involving health, safety,
labor, security, environmental, and
other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or
prevent unnecessary differences in
regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies
and agency responsibilities of Executive
Order 13609, and has determined that
this action would have no effect on
international regulatory cooperation.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA
actions that are categorically excluded
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from preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.
The FAA has determined this
rulemaking action qualifies for the
categorical exclusion identified in
paragraph 312f of Order 1050.1E and
involves no extraordinary
circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed
rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, ‘‘Federalism.’’
The agency has determined that this
action would not have a substantial
direct effect on the States, or the
relationship between the Federal
Government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and, therefore,
would not have Federalism
implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations
That Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule
under Executive Order 13211, ‘‘Actions
Concerning Regulations that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use’’ (May 18, 2001).
The agency has determined that it
would not be a ‘‘significant energy
action’’ under the executive order and
would not be likely to have a significant
adverse effect on the supply,
distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13771, Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory
Costs
This proposed rule is not expected to
be an E.O. 13771 regulatory action
because this proposed rule is not
significant under E.O. 12866.
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VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. The agency also invites
comments relating to the economic,
environmental, energy, or federalism
impacts that might result from adopting
the proposals in this document. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the proposal, explain
the reason for any recommended
change, and include supporting data. To
ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters
should send only one copy of written
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comments, or if comments are filed
electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all
comments it receives, as well as a report
summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning
this proposed rulemaking. Before acting
on this proposal, the FAA will consider
all comments it receives on or before the
closing date for comments. The FAA
will consider comments filed after the
comment period has closed if it is
possible to do so without incurring
expense or delay. The agency may
change this proposal in light of the
comments it receives.
Proprietary or Confidential Business
Information: Commenters should not
file proprietary or confidential business
information in the docket. Such
information must be sent or delivered
directly to the person identified in the
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section of this document, and marked as
proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD–ROM, mark
the outside of the disk or CD–ROM, and
identify electronically within the disk or
CD–ROM the specific information that
is proprietary or confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is
aware of proprietary information filed
with a comment, the agency does not
place it in the docket. It is held in a
separate file to which the public does
not have access, and the FAA places a
note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to
examine or copy this information, it
treats it as any other request under the
Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
552). The FAA processes such a request
under Department of Transportation
procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
B. Availability of Rulemaking
Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking
documents may be obtained from the
internet by—
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking
Portal (https://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visiting the FAA’s Regulations and
Policies web page at https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
3. Accessing the Government Printing
Office’s web page at https://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by
sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of
Rulemaking, ARM–1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or
by calling (202) 267–9680. Commenters
must identify the docket or notice
number of this rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in
developing this proposed rule,
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including economic analyses and
technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend chapter I of title 14,
Code of Federal Regulations as follows:
PART 25—AIRWORTHINESS
STANDARDS: TRANSPORT
CATEGORY AIRPLANES
1. The authority citation for part 25
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113,
44701, 44702 and 44704.
■
2. Add § 25.353 to read as follows:
§ 25.353 Rudder control reversal
conditions.
For airplanes with a powered rudder
control surface or surfaces, the airplane
must be designed to withstand the
ultimate loads that result from the yaw
maneuver conditions specified in
paragraphs (a) through (e) of this section
at speeds from VMC or the highest
airspeed for which it is possible to
achieve maximum rudder deflection at
zero sideslip, whichever is greater, up to
VC/MC. The applicant must evaluate
these conditions with the landing gear
retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers
when used as speed brakes) retracted. In
computing the loads on the airplane, the
applicant may assume yawing velocity
to be zero. The applicant must assume
a pilot force of 200 pounds when
evaluating each of these conditions:
(a) With the airplane in unaccelerated
flight at zero yaw, the flight deck rudder
control is displaced as specified in
§ 25.351(a) and (b).
(b) With the airplane yawed to the
overswing sideslip angle, the flight deck
rudder control is suddenly displaced in
the opposite direction.
(c) With the airplane yawed to the
opposite overswing sideslip angle, the
flight deck rudder control is suddenly
displaced in the opposite direction.
(d) With the airplane yawed to the
subsequent overswing sideslip angle,
the flight deck rudder control is
suddenly displaced in the opposite
direction.
(e) With the airplane yawed to the
opposite overswing sideslip angle, the
flight deck rudder control is suddenly
returned to neutral.
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 136 / Monday, July 16, 2018 / Proposed Rules
Issued under authority provided by 49
U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a) in Washington,
DC, on July 2, 2018.
Dorenda D. Baker,
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2018–15154 Filed 7–13–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION
29 CFR Parts 4041A, 4245, and 4281
RIN 1212–AB38
Terminated and Insolvent
Multiemployer Plans and Duties of
Plan Sponsors
Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
AGENCY:
The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation proposes to amend its
multiemployer reporting, disclosure,
and valuation regulations to reduce the
number of actuarial valuations required
for smaller plans terminated by mass
withdrawal, add a valuation filing
requirement and a withdrawal liability
reporting requirement for certain
terminated plans and insolvent plans,
remove certain insolvency notice and
update requirements, and reflect the
repeal of the multiemployer plan
reorganization rules.
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before September 14, 2018 to be
assured of consideration.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be
submitted by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. (Follow the online
instructions for submitting comments.)
• Email: reg.comments@pbgc.gov.
Refer to RIN 1212–AB38 in the subject
line.
• Mail or Hand Delivery: Regulatory
Affairs Division, Office of the General
Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, 1200 K Street NW,
Washington, DC 20005–4026.
All submissions must include the
agency’s name (Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, or PBGC) and the
RIN for this rulemaking (RIN 1212–
AB38). All comments received will be
posted without change to PBGC’s
website, www.pbgc.gov, including any
personal information provided. Copies
of comments may also be obtained by
writing to Disclosure Division, Office of
the General Counsel, Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation, 1200 K Street
NW, Washington, DC 20005–4026, or
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:54 Jul 13, 2018
Jkt 244001
calling 202–326–4040 during normal
business hours. (TTY users may call the
Federal relay service toll-free at 800–
877–8339 and ask to be connected to
202–326–4040.)
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Hilary Duke (duke.hilary@pbgc.gov),
Assistant General Counsel for
Regulatory Affairs, Office of the General
Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, 1200 K Street NW,
Washington, DC 20005–4026; 202–326–
4400, extension 3839. (TTY users may
call the Federal relay service toll-free at
800–877–8339 and ask to be connected
to 202–326–4400, extension 3839.)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Executive Summary—Purpose of the
Regulatory Action
This proposed rule would make
certain reporting and disclosure of
multiemployer information to PBGC and
interested parties more efficient and
reflect the repeal of the multiemployer
plan reorganization rules. The proposal
would reduce costs by allowing smaller
plans terminated by mass withdrawal to
perform actuarial valuations less
frequently and by removing certain
notice requirements for insolvent plans.
This would reduce plan administrative
costs and, in turn, may reduce financial
assistance provided by PBGC.
PBGC’s legal authority for this action
is based on section 4002(b)(3) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), which authorizes
PBGC to issue regulations to carry out
the purposes of title IV of ERISA;
section 4041A(f)(2) of ERISA, which
gives PBGC authority to prescribe
reporting requirements for terminated
plans; section 4245(e) of ERISA, which
directs PBGC to prescribe requirements
for notices regarding multiemployer
plan insolvency; section 4261 of ERISA,
which authorizes PBGC to provide
financial assistance to insolvent plans,
and section 4281(d)(3) of ERISA, which
directs PBGC to prescribe requirements
for notices to plan participants and
beneficiaries in the event of a benefit
suspension by an insolvent plan.
Executive Summary—Major Provisions
of the Regulatory Action
Plan Sponsor Duties—Annual Valuation
and Withdrawal Liability
The plan sponsor of a multiemployer
plan terminated by mass withdrawal is
responsible for specific duties,
including an annual actuarial valuation
of the plan’s assets and benefits. This
proposed rule would reduce
administrative burden by allowing the
plan sponsor to perform an actuarial
valuation only every 5 years if the
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
32815
present value of the plan’s
nonforfeitable benefits is $50 million or
less. The proposed rule would add a
new requirement for plan sponsors of
certain terminated or insolvent plans to
file actuarial valuations with PBGC.
Where the present value of the plan’s
nonforfeitable benefits is $50 million or
less, a plan receiving financial
assistance from PBGC would be able to
file alternative valuation information.
The plan sponsor of a multiemployer
plan also is responsible for determining,
giving notice of, and collecting
withdrawal liability. The proposal
would require plan sponsors of certain
terminated or insolvent plans to file
with PBGC information about
withdrawal liability payments and
whether any employers have withdrawn
but have not yet been assessed
withdrawal liability.
Insolvency Notices and Updates
A multiemployer plan terminated by
mass withdrawal that is insolvent or is
expected to be insolvent for a plan year
must provide certain notices to PBGC
and participants and beneficiaries.
Similarly, a multiemployer plan that is
certified by the plan’s actuary to be in
critical status and that is expected to
become insolvent under section 4245 of
ERISA must provide certain notices to
PBGC and interested parties. Notices
include a notice of insolvency and a
notice of insolvency benefit level. The
proposed rule would eliminate outdated
information included in the notices. The
proposal would require a plan to
provide notices of insolvency if the plan
sponsor determines the plan is insolvent
in the current plan year or is expected
to be insolvent in the next plan year.
The proposal also would eliminate the
requirement to provide most annual
updates to the notices of insolvency
benefit level.
Background
The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) administers two
insurance programs for private-sector
defined benefit pension plans under
title IV of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA): A
single-employer plan termination
insurance program and a multiemployer
plan insolvency insurance program. In
general, a multiemployer pension plan
is a collectively bargained plan
involving two or more unrelated
employers. This proposed rule deals
with multiemployer plans.
Under section 4041A of ERISA, a
mass withdrawal termination of a plan
occurs when all employers withdraw or
cease to be obligated to contribute to the
plan. A plan terminated by mass
E:\FR\FM\16JYP1.SGM
16JYP1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 136 (Monday, July 16, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 32807-32815]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-15154]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 136 / Monday, July 16, 2018 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 32807]]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No.: FAA-2018-0653-; Notice No. 18-04]
RIN 2120-AK89
Yaw Maneuver Conditions--Rudder Reversals
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to add a new load condition to the design
standards for transport category airplanes. The new load condition
would require the airplane be designed to withstand the loads caused by
rapid reversals of the rudder pedals and would apply to transport
category airplanes that have a powered rudder control surface or
surfaces. This rule is necessary because accident and incident data
show that pilots sometimes make rudder reversals during flight, even
though such reversals are unnecessary and discouraged by flightcrew
training programs. The current design standards do not require the
airplane structure to withstand the loads that may result from such
reversals. If the airplane loads exceed those for which it is designed,
the airplane structure may fail, resulting in catastrophic loss of
control of the airplane. This proposal aims to prevent structural
failure of the rudder and vertical stabilizer that may result from
these rudder reversals.
DATES: Send comments on or before October 15, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [Insert docket
number from heading] using any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30; U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket
Operations in Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments
from the public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts
these comments, without edit, including any personal information the
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at
www.dot.gov/privacy.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room W12-140
of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this action, contact Robert C. Jones, Propulsion & Mechanical Systems
Section, AIR-672, Transport Standards Branch, Policy and Innovation
Division, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation
Administration, 2200 South 216th Street, Des Moines, WA 98198;
telephone and fax (206) 231-3182; email [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Authority for This Rulemaking
The FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in
Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes
the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation
Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority.
This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
Requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations and minimum standards for the design and performance of
aircraft that the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air
commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority. It
prescribes new safety standards for the design of transport category
airplanes.
I. Overview of Proposed Rule
The FAA proposes to add a new load condition to the design
standards in title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 25.
The new load condition, to be located in new proposed Sec. 25.353,
would require that the airplane be designed to withstand the loads
caused by rapid reversals of the rudder pedals. Specifically,
applicants would have to show that their proposed airplane design can
withstand an initial full rudder pedal input, followed by three rudder
reversals at the maximum sideslip angle, followed by return of the
rudder to neutral. Due to the rarity of such multiple reversals, the
proposed rule would specify the new load condition is an ultimate load
condition rather than a limit load condition. Consequently, the
applicant would not have to apply an additional factor of safety to the
calculated load levels.\1\
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\1\ The terms ``limit,'' ``ultimate,'' and ``factor of safety''
are specified in Sec. 25.301, ``Loads,'' Sec. 25.303, ``Factor of
safety,'' and Sec. 25.305, ``Strength and deformation.'' To
summarize, design loads are typically expressed in terms of limit
loads, which are then multiplied by a factor of safety, usually 1.5,
to determine ultimate loads. In this proposal, the design loads
would be expressed as ultimate loads, and no additional safety
factor would be applied.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rule would affect manufacturers of transport category
airplanes applying for a new type certificate after the effective date
of the final rule. The proposed rule may also affect applicants
applying for an amended or supplemental type certificate as determined
under 14 CFR 21.101 after the effective date of the final rule.
Proposed Sec. 25.353 would apply to transport category airplanes that
have a powered rudder control surface or surfaces, as explained in the
``Discussion of the Proposal.''
II. Background
A. Statement of the Problem
Accident and incident data from the events described in section
II.B.1 show pilots sometimes make multiple and unnecessary rudder
reversals during flight. In addition, FAA-sponsored
[[Page 32808]]
research \2\ indicates that pilots use the rudder more often than
previously thought and often in ways not recommended by manufacturers.
Section 25.1583(a)(3)(ii) requires manufacturers to provide
documentation that warns pilots against making large and rapid control
reversals as they may result in structural failures at any speed,
including below the design maneuvering speed (VA). Despite
the requirement, and though such rudder reversals are unnecessary and
discouraged by flightcrew training programs, these events continue to
occur (see section II.B.1, ``History--Accidents and Incidents'' below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14, ``An International Survey of
Transport Airplane Pilots' Experiences and Perspectives of Lateral/
Directional Control Events and Rudder Issues in Transport Airplanes
(Rudder Survey),'' dated October 2010, is available in the Docket
and on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/data_research/research/med_humanfacs/oamtechreports/2010s/media/201014.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 25.351, the standard for protecting the airplane's vertical
stabilizer from pilot-commanded maneuver loads, only addresses single,
full rudder inputs at airspeeds up to the design diving speed
(VD).\3\ This design standard does not protect the airplane
from the loads imposed by repeated inputs in opposing directions, or
rudder reversals.\4\ If the loads on the vertical stabilizer exceed
those for which it is designed, the vertical stabilizer may fail,
resulting in the catastrophic loss of airplane control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ VD is the design diving speed: The maximum speed
at which the airplane is certified to fly. See 14 CFR 1.2. Advisory
Circular 25-7C provides additional information related to
VD.
\4\ A rudder reversal is a continuous, pilot-commanded pedal
movement starting from pedal displacement in one direction followed
by pedal displacement in the opposite direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incidents and accidents related to rudder reversals have occurred
in the past, and the FAA believes that another such event could occur,
resulting in injuries to occupants or a structural failure that
jeopardizes continued safe flight and landing of the airplane.
B. History
1. Accidents and Incidents
Rudder reversals have caused a number of accidents and incidents.
On November 12, 2001, American Airlines Flight 587 (AA587), an Airbus
Model A300-600 series airplane, crashed at Belle Harbor, New York,
resulting in 265 deaths and the loss of the airplane. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the probable cause of
this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer
as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by
the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. The
NTSB also noted that contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were
characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and
elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering
Program.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, ``In-flight
Separation of Vertical Stabilizer, American Airlines Flight 587,
Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, Belle Harbor, New York, November
12, 2001,'' dated October 26, 2004, is available in the Docket and
on the internet at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR0404.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In two additional events--commonly known as the Interflug incident
\6\ and Miami Flight 903 accident (AA903) \7\--the vertical stabilizer
of each airplane experienced loads above the ultimate load level due to
pedal reversals commanded by the pilot after the airplane stalled.\8\
While none of the passengers and crew were injured in the Interflug
incident, a passenger was seriously injured and a crewmember sustained
minor injuries in the AA903 accident. The AA903 airplane also sustained
sheared fasteners, deformed nacelles, and engine component damage, but
landed safely. A catastrophe similar to AA587 was averted in each of
these events because the vertical stabilizer was stronger than required
by the design standards.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ On February 11, 1991, an Airbus Model A310 series airplane
experienced in-flight loss of control over Moscow, Russia.
\7\ On May 12, 1997, an Airbus Model A300-600 series airplane
experienced in-flight loss of control near West Palm Beach, Florida,
after the flightcrew failed to recognize that the airplane had
entered a stall.
\8\ The Interflug and Miami Flight 903 events are discussed in
NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 103-110. See
footnote 5 on p. 6.
\9\ FCHWG Recommendation Report, ``Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/
Rudder Reversal,'' dated November 7, 2013, is available in the
Docket and on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See p. 5 of the report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Other rudder reversal events have occurred more recently. On
January 10, 2008, an Airbus Model 319-114 series airplane, operated as
Air Canada Flight 190 (AC190), encountered a wake vortex while at
cruise altitude over Washington State.\10\ The pilot responded with
inputs that included six rudder reversals. The flightcrew eventually
stabilized the airplane and diverted to an airport capable of handling
the injured passengers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ TSB Aviation Investigation Report A08W0007, ``Encounter
with Wake Turbulence,'' is available in the Docket and on the
internet at https://tsb.gc.ca/eng/rapports-reports/aviation/2008/a08w0007/a08w0007.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this
event, along with NTSB accredited representatives, and classified it as
an accident. Analysis by the TSB showed that the pilot's actions
resulted in a load on the vertical stabilizer that exceeded its limit
load by approximately 29 percent. The TSB found that the flightcrew was
startled by wake turbulence at that altitude, erroneously believed that
the airplane had malfunctioned, and therefore responded with erroneous
actions. The pilot had received training to avoid rudder reversals.
On May 27, 2005, a Bombardier DHC-8-100 series airplane, operated
by Provincial Airlines Limited for passenger service, experienced a
stall and uncontrolled descent over Canada.\11\ During climb-out, the
indicated airspeed gradually decreased, due to the flightcrew's
inadvertent selection of an incorrect autopilot mode. The airplane
stalled at an unexpectedly high airspeed, likely due to the formation
of ice. The flightcrew's failure to recognize the stall resulted in
incorrect control inputs and the loss of 4,200 feet of altitude in
approximately 40 seconds before recovery. There were no injuries and
the airplane was not damaged. During this event, the pilot commanded a
rudder reversal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ TSB Aviation Investigation Report A05A0059. See footnote 10
on p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. New Transport Airplane Programs
Since the AA587 accident, the FAA has responded to the risk posed
by rudder reversals, in part, by requesting that applicants for new
type certificates show that their designs are capable of continued safe
flight and landing after experiencing repeated rudder reversals.
Applicants have been able to show this capability through rudder
control laws in flight control systems. Applicants have incorporated
these control laws through software and, therefore, added no weight or
maintenance cost to the airplanes.
In 2016, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) began applying
special conditions to new airplane certification programs. EASA
mandated these special conditions to address the exact risk of rudder
reversals explained in this NPRM. The requirements in the EASA special
conditions are identical to the requirements proposed in this NPRM.
3. FAA Survey of Pilots' Rudder Use
In 2006, the FAA sponsored a survey \12\ to better comprehend
transport category pilots' understanding and use of the rudder. This
survey included
[[Page 32809]]
transport pilots from all over the world. The FAA's analysis of the
survey data found that--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-10/14 (see footnote 2 on p. 5), OMB
Control No. 2120-0712.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Pilots use the rudder more than previously thought and
often in ways not recommended by manufacturers.
Pilots make erroneous rudder pedal inputs, and some
erroneous rudder pedal inputs include rudder reversals.
Even after specific training, many pilots are not aware
that they should not make rudder reversals, even below VA.
Over the last several years, training and changes to the airplane
flight manual (AFM) have directed the pilot to avoid making cyclic
control inputs. The rudder reversals that caused the AC190 incident in
2008, and the Provincial Airlines Limited incident in 2005, occurred
despite this effort.
The survey indicated that pilots in airplane upset
situations (e.g., wake vortex encounters) may revert to prior training
and make sequential rudder reversals.
C. Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (ARAC) Activity
In 2011, the FAA tasked ARAC to consider the need to add a new
flight maneuver load condition to part 25, subpart C, that would ensure
airplane structural capability in the presence of rudder reversals and
increasing sideslip angles (yaw angles) at airspeeds up to
VD. The FAA also tasked ARAC to consider if other
airworthiness standards would more appropriately address this concern,
such as pedal characteristics that would discourage pilots from making
rudder reversals.\13\ ARAC delegated this task to the Transport
Airplane and Engine subcommittee, which assigned it to the Flight
Controls Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ This notice of ARAC tasking was published in the Federal
Register on March 28, 2011 (76 FR 17183).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FCHWG was tasked to examine several options to protect the
airplane from pilot-commanded rudder reversals. These options included
developing new standards for--
Loads,
Maneuverability,
System design,
Control sensitivity,
Alerting, and
Pilot training.
The FCHWG completed its report in November 2013.\14\ ARAC and the
FAA accepted the report. The report's findings and recommendations
guided the formation of this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ FCHWG Recommendation Report, ``Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/
Rudder Reversal,'' dated November 7, 2013, is available in the
Docket and on the internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/TAEfch-rpsrr-3282011.pdf. See footnote 9 on p. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While multiple rudder reversals are a very low probability event,
they have occurred in service and cannot be ruled out in the future.
The FCHWG found that a load condition was the optimal way to protect
the airplane from the excessive loads that can result from multiple
rudder reversals. The FCHWG recommended a load condition over the other
options because it would be a performance-based requirement. The FCHWG
noted that this would provide applicants for design approval with the
flexibility to determine the best way to meet a load condition.
D. NTSB Safety Recommendation
Following the AA587 accident described in section II.B.1 of this
NPRM, the NTSB provided safety recommendations to the FAA. The NTSB
stated, ``For airplanes with variable stop rudder travel limiter
systems, protection from dangerous structural loads resulting from
sustained alternating large rudder pedal inputs can be achieved by
reducing the sensitivity of the rudder control system (for example, by
increasing the pedal forces), which would make it harder for pilots to
quickly perform alternating full rudder inputs.'' In Safety
Recommendation A-04-056,\15\ the NTSB recommended that the FAA modify
part 25 to include a certification standard that will ensure safe
handling qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope,
including limits for rudder pedal sensitivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-056 is available in the
Docket and on the internet at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/RecLetters/A04_56_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed rule would address this recommendation and, if
incorporated on new airplane designs, would reduce the risk of an event
similar to AA587. The proposed rule would also respond to the NTSB's
concern about rudder pedal sensitivity.
E. Other Regulatory Actions
1. 2010 Revisions to Sec. 25.1583
During its investigation of the AA587 accident, the NTSB found that
many pilots of transport category airplanes mistakenly believed that,
as long as the airplane's speed is below VA, they can make
any control input they desire without risking structural damage to the
airplane. AA587 exposed the fact that this assumption is incorrect. As
a result, the NTSB recommended that the FAA amend its regulations to
clarify that operating at or below VA does not provide
structural protection against multiple, full control inputs in one
axis, or full control inputs in more than one axis at the same
time.\16\ After making its own assessment, the FAA agreed, and revised
Sec. 25.1583(a)(3) at Amendment 25-130, effective October 15, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-60 is available in the
Docket and on the internet at https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-
recs/recletters/A04_56_62.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 25.1583(a)(3) was revised to change the information that
applicants must furnish in the AFM explaining the use of VA
to pilots. The amendment clarified that, depending on the particular
airplane design, flying at or below VA does not allow a
pilot to make multiple large control inputs in one airplane axis or
full control inputs in more than one airplane axis at a time without
endangering the airplane's structure. However, the AC190 accident shows
that even a properly trained pilot might make rudder reversals when
startled or responding to a perceived failure.
2. Airworthiness Directives
In 2012, the FAA adopted an airworthiness directive (AD) applicable
to all Airbus Model A300-600 and Model A310 series airplanes.\17\ The
AD was prompted by the excessive rudder pedal inputs and consequent
high loads on the vertical stabilizer in the events described
previously, including AA587. The AD required operators to either
incorporate a design change to the rudder control system or other
systems, or install a modification that alerts the pilot to stop making
rudder inputs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ AD 2012-21-15 was published in the Federal Register on
November 9, 2012 (77 FR 67526). For more information, see Docket No.
FAA-2011-0518 on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2015, the FAA adopted an AD applicable to all Airbus Model A318,
A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes.\18\ That AD was prompted by a
determination that, in specific flight conditions, the allowable load
limits on the vertical stabilizer could be reached and possibly
exceeded. Exceeding allowable load could result in detachment of the
vertical stabilizer. The AD also required a modification that alerts
the pilot to stop making rudder inputs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ AD 2015-23-13 was published in the Federal Register on
December 29, 2015 (77 FR 67526). For more information, see Docket
No. FAA-2011-0518 on the internet at https://www.regulations.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
F. Advisory Material
The FAA has developed proposed Advisory Circular (AC) 25.353-X,
``Design Load Conditions for Rudder Control Reversal,'' to be published
concurrently with this NPRM. This proposed AC would provide guidance
[[Page 32810]]
material on acceptable means, but not the only means, of showing
compliance with proposed Sec. 25.353. The FAA will post the proposed
AC on the ``Aviation Safety Draft Documents Open for Comment'' web page
at https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/draft_docs/.\19\ The FAA requests that
you submit comments on the proposed AC through that web page.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ The proposed AC is also available in the Docket. To ensure
the FAA receives your comments on the proposed AC, please submit
them via the instructions found on the ``Aviation Safety Draft
Documents Open for Comment'' web page.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Discussion of the Proposal
The FAA proposes to revise 14 CFR by adding new Sec. 25.353 to add
a design load condition. It would apply to transport category airplanes
that have a powered rudder control surface or surfaces, as explained
later in this section. The load condition would require that the
airplane be able to withstand three full reversals of the rudder pedals
at the most critical points in the flight envelope. From a neutral
position, the pedal input would be sudden and to one side and held;
then, as the maximum sideslip angle is reached, the pedals would be
suddenly displaced in the opposite direction and held until the
opposite angle is reached; then again to the first side; then again to
the second side; then suddenly moved back to the neutral position.
The reason for this proposal is that pilots make inadvertent and
erroneous rudder pedal inputs, and the accident and incident data show
that the loads caused by rudder reversals can surpass the airplane's
structural limit load and sometimes its ultimate load. Compliance with
the proposed rule would require a showing that the airplane's vertical
stabilizer and other airplane structure are strong enough to withstand
the rudder reversals.
Ten of the eleven members of the FCHWG recommended proposing some
form of a new load condition to protect the airplane against rudder
reversals. During discussions, five members of the FCHWG \20\
recommended requiring a load condition that would protect the airplane
from three, sequential, full rudder reversals. This notice puts forth
those proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA),
EASA, National Civil Aviation Agency--Brazil (ANAC), and Transport
Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA), and FAA representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Five members of the FCHWG \21\ recommended a similar load
condition, which would only protect against a single reversal of the
rudder pedals. The FAA is not proposing this alternative because a new
rule that only includes a single rudder reversal, with a safety factor
of 1.0, would not materially increase the design load level from
current design loads criteria and would not be effective in preventing
accidents such as the AA587 accident.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Airbus, Bombardier, Cessna, Dassault Aviation, and Embraer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One member, The Boeing Company (Boeing), took the position that no
new rulemaking or design standards are required, and that the risk from
rudder reversals should be addressed by flightcrew training. Boeing
stated that rudder reversals are always inappropriate and that pilots
should never make such commands. Boeing argued it is inappropriate to
issue an airworthiness standard to mitigate a situation caused by
actions that pilots should avoid. The FAA rejects this alternative
because, while multiple rudder reversals are a very low probability
event, they have been seen in service, despite training, and cannot be
ruled out in the future.
As indicated previously, yaw maneuver loads are currently specified
in Sec. 25.351, ``Yaw maneuver conditions.'' The FAA used this
requirement as a template to develop the proposed new rudder reversal
design load condition. Therefore, the proposed load condition would be
similar to the load condition required by Sec. 25.351, except as
follows:
Section 25.351 specifies a single, full-pedal command
followed by a sudden pedal release after the airplane has reached the
steady-state sideslip angle. Proposed Sec. 25.353 would specify a
single, full-pedal command followed by three rudder reversals, and
return to neutral.
In the proposed rule, the rudder reversals must be
performed at the maximum sideslip angle, which is referred to as the
``overswing sideslip angle.'' This term is also used in Sec. 25.351
and would have the same meaning. The overswing sideslip angle is the
maximum sideslip angle that occurs following full rudder pedal input
and includes the additional sideslip that may occur beyond the steady-
state sideslip angle.
The Sec. 25.353 load requirement would be an ultimate
design load condition, instead of a limit load condition as in Sec.
25.351. This means that applicants would apply a safety factor of 1.0,
rather than 1.5. The proposed rudder reversal maneuver would cover the
worst-case rudder maneuver expected to occur in service. Because
service history has shown that three full rudder reversals are unusual,
the FAA proposes that a safety factor of 1.0 is appropriate.
The proposed Sec. 25.353 condition would require only
that the applicant account for the rudder reversals at speeds up to the
design cruising speed (VC). In contrast, Sec. 25.351
requires applicants to account for speeds up to VD. The
reason for this difference is that VC represents the
majority of the flight envelope, and compliance to VD is not
necessary due to the infrequency of exposure to such speeds and the low
probability that a rudder reversal will occur at speeds above
VC.
Section 25.351 requires a pilot force of up to 300 pounds,
depending on the airplane's speed. In contrast, the pilot force
specified in Sec. 25.353 would be limited to 200 pounds because it
would be difficult, and therefore very unlikely, for a pilot to
maintain 300 pounds of force while performing rapid alternating inputs.
The proposed Sec. 25.353 condition would be evaluated
only with the landing gear retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers
when used as speed brakes) retracted. This is because flight loads
would be more severe with the gear and speed brakes retracted.
A. Expected Methods of Compliance
The proposed rule is performance-based. For example, an applicant
could choose to comply with the proposed standard by using control
system architecture and control laws to limit the airplane response to
rudder reversals, and thereby reduce structural loads on the airplane.
An applicant could also choose to comply by increasing the capability
of the airplane to withstand the maximum expected structural loads that
could result from the proposed load condition.
B. Proposed Applicability
After examining all the data and considering stakeholder opinions,
the FAA has determined that the proposed rule should apply to new type
certification programs of transport category airplane designs and to
amended or supplemental type certificate programs as determined under
Sec. 21.101. The proposed rule would affect manufacturers of transport
category airplanes. In the future, applicants who want to certify new
airplanes under part 25 would have to comply with proposed Sec.
25.353.
As noted previously, this proposed rule would apply only to
airplanes that use powered rudder control surfaces. In this proposed
rule, a powered rudder control surface is one in which the force
required to deflect the surface against the airstream is generated or
augmented by hydraulic or electric systems. An unpowered rudder control
surface is
[[Page 32811]]
one for which the force required to deflect the surface against the
airstream is transmitted from the pilot's rudder pedal directly through
mechanical means, without any augmentation from hydraulic or electrical
systems. Powered rudder control systems include fly-by-wire (FBW) and
hydro-mechanical systems. Unpowered rudder control systems are also
referred to as mechanical systems. Incorporation of a powered yaw
damper into an otherwise unpowered rudder control system does not
constitute a powered rudder control surface, for the purpose of this
proposed rule. The reasons that the FAA proposes to exclude airplanes
with unpowered (mechanical) rudder control surfaces are as follows, and
the FAA seeks comment on these reasons:
1. The only U.S. transport category airplane models, currently in
production, that use unpowered rudder control surfaces are small
business jets. Small airplanes typically have a minimal delay between
pilot yaw control inputs and airplane response. The pilots of these
airplanes receive more immediate feedback of airplane response to their
yaw control inputs and, therefore, are less likely to execute
inappropriate pedal movements resulting in rudder reversals.
2. The only U.S. transport category airplane models, currently in
production, that use an unpowered rudder control surface are also
equipped with a yaw damper. The FAA has assessed the design of this yaw
damper and determined its normal operation would be adequate to reduce
yaw overshoot loads resulting from rudder reversals to acceptable
levels. However, the yaw damper system on these airplanes is not
required to be operational on any given flight. The yaw damper is
included in these airplanes primarily to improve ride quality for
passenger comfort (as opposed to providing adequate stability about the
yaw axis to ensure airplane safety). Since the yaw damper may not be
available on a given flight, the manufacturer of these airplanes has
stated it might need to add structure or an improved yaw damper to any
new type certificated airplanes to comply with the proposed rule.\22\
This would significantly increase design, production, and operation
costs. The FAA considers that, for these airplanes, the cost to comply
with the proposed, new load condition through structural modification
is not justified by the relatively low risk these airplanes face from
rudder reversals. Further, the FAA considers it unlikely that many of
these airplanes would fly for extended periods without an operable yaw
damper that provides acceptable ride quality. Therefore, most of these
airplanes have protection against yaw overshoot loads, even if they are
not required to demonstrate this protection during certification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ A record of this conversation between the FAA and airplane
manufacturer is available in the Docket.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. The use of unpowered rudder control surfaces is diminishing in
the transport category airplane fleet. The FAA expects that most, if
not all, new type certificate applications to which this proposed rule
would apply will employ powered rudder control surfaces.
4. The FAA has reviewed the accident and incident records and has
found no events in which pilots commanded inappropriate rudder
reversals on airplanes with unpowered rudder control surfaces. This
alone does not mean such systems cannot be affected by pilot-commanded
inappropriate rudder reversals. However, the absence of any previous
incidents indicates that excluding these designs would not appreciably
increase the future risk of such events above acceptable levels.
C. Summary
The proposed design criteria would provide a practical, relatively
low-cost solution that would be achievable on future designs without
the requirement to significantly strengthen the vertical stabilizer, or
make significant changes to system design. In fact, some current
airplanes would be able to meet the proposed criteria with no changes
whatsoever. This proposal should require a minimal increment of
applicant resources to show compliance. While an applicant might choose
to comply with this performance-based standard by strengthening the
airplane structure, the FAA believes that most applicants would use
control laws to comply with this proposed rule. These control laws are
a part of the flight control computer, and they adjust control surface
deflections based on pilot input and other factors like airspeed. Since
control laws are typically implemented through systems and software,
there would be little to no incremental cost in the form of weight,
equipment, maintenance, or training.
IV. Regulatory Notices and Analyses
Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic
analyses. First, Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct that each
Federal agency shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its
costs. Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354),
as codified in 5 U.S.C. 603 et seq., requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39), 19 U.S.C. Chapter 13,
prohibits agencies from setting standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. In developing
U.S. standards, the Trade Agreements Act requires agencies to consider
international standards and, where appropriate, that they be the basis
of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Pub. L. 104-4), as codified in 2 U.S.C. Chapter 25, requires agencies
to prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other
effects of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate
likely to result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more annually (adjusted for inflation with base year of
1995). This portion of the preamble summarizes the FAA's analysis of
the economic impacts of this proposed rule.
In conducting these analyses, FAA has determined that this proposed
rule has benefits that justify its costs and is not a ``significant
regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of Executive Order
12866. The rule is also not ``significant'' as defined in DOT's
Regulatory Policies and Procedures. The proposed rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
will not create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States, and will not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local,
or tribal governments, or on the private sector by exceeding the
threshold identified previously.
A. Regulatory Evaluation
Department of Transportation Order 2100.5 prescribes policies and
procedures for simplification, analysis, and review of regulations. If
the expected cost impact is so minimal that a proposed or final rule
does not warrant a full evaluation, this order permits a statement to
that effect and the basis for it to be included in the preamble if a
full regulatory evaluation of the costs and benefits is not prepared.
Such a determination has been made for this proposed rule. The
reasoning for this determination follows.
1. Background
The genesis of this proposed rule is the crash of American Airlines
Flight 587 (AA587), near Queens, New York,
[[Page 32812]]
on November 12, 2001, resulting in the death of all 260 passengers and
crew aboard, and the death of five persons on the ground. The airplane
was destroyed by impact forces and a post-crash fire.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) found that the
probable cause of the accident was ``the in-flight separation of the
vertical stabilizer [airplane fin] as a result of loads above ultimate
design created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder
pedal inputs.'' \23\ Ultimate loads on the airplane structure are the
limit loads (1.0) multiplied by a safety factor, usually 1.5 (as for
the vertical stabilizer). An airplane is expected to experience a limit
load once in its lifetime and is never expected to experience an
ultimate load.\24\ For the AA587 accident, loads exceeding ultimate
loads ranged from 1.83 to 2.14 times the limit load on the vertical
stabilizer,\25\ as a result of four, full, alternating rudder inputs
known as ``rudder reversals.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 160. See
footnote 5 on p. 6.
\24\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 31, n. 53.
\25\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, p. 104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Significant rudder reversals events are unusual in the history of
commercial airplane flight, having occurred during just five notable
accidents and incidents, with AA587 being the only catastrophic
accident resulting from rudder reversals.\26\ Ultimate loads were
exceeded in two of the other notable rudder reversal accidents, the
Interflug incident (Moscow, February 11, 1991) and American Airlines
Flight 903 (AA903) (near West Palm Beach, Florida, May 12, 1997).\27\
For the Interflug incident, with multiple rudder reversals, loads of
1.55 and 1.35 times the limit load were recorded; and for AA903 (eight
rudder reversals), a load of 1.53 times the limit load was
recorded.\28\ A catastrophe similar to AA587 was averted in these two
events only because the vertical stabilizer was stronger than required
by design standards.\29\ In a fourth event--Air Canada Flight 190
(AC190) (over the state of Washington, January 10, 2008)--with four
rudder reversals, the limit load was exceed by 29 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ FAA Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group. Rudder Pedal Sensitivity/Rudder
Reversal Recommendation Report, Nov. 7, 2013. (ARAC Rudder Reversal
Report). This Report identifies four notable rudder events to which
we add the Interflug incident discussed in the NTSB AA587 Report.
\27\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 106-109.
\28\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 104.
\29\ NTSB Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04, pp. 38-39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In transport category airplanes, rudder inputs are generally
limited to aligning the airplane with the runway during crosswind
landings and controlling engine-out situations, which occur
predominately at low speeds. At high speeds, the pilot normally
directly rolls the airplane using the ailerons.\30\ If the pilot does
use the rudder to control the airplane at high speeds, there will be a
significant phase lag between the rudder input and the roll response
because the roll response is a secondary effect of the yawing moment
generated by the rudder.\31\ The roll does not result from the rudder
input directly. Even if the rudder is subsequently deflected in the
opposite direction (rudder reversal), the airplane can continue to roll
and yaw in one direction before reversing because of the phase lag. The
relationship between rudder inputs and the roll and yaw response of the
airplane can become confusing to pilots, particularly with the large
yaw and roll rates that would result from large rudder inputs, causing
the pilots to input multiple rudder reversals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ An aileron is a hinged control service on the trailing edge
of the wing of a fixed-wing aircraft, one aileron per wing.
\31\ The yaw axis is defined to be perpendicular to the wings
and to the normal line of flight. A yaw movement is a change in the
direction of the aircraft to the left or right around the yaw axis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the AA587 accident, in November 2004 the NTSB released
Safety Recommendation A-04-56 recommending that the FAA modify part 25
``to include a certification standard that will ensure safe handling
qualities in the yaw axis throughout the flight envelope. . . .'' \32\
In 2011, the FAA tasked the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee
(ARAC) to consider the need for rulemaking to address the rudder
reversal issue. ARAC delegated this task to the Transport Airplane and
Engine subcommittee, which assigned it to the Flight Controls
Harmonization Working Group (FCHWG). One of the recommendations of the
ARAC Rudder Reversal Report, issued on November 7, 2013, was to require
transport category airplanes to be able to safely withstand the loads
imposed by three rudder reversals. This proposed rule adopts that
recommendation. The ARAC report indicates that requiring transport
category airplanes to safely operate with the vertical stabilizer loads
imposed by three full-stroke rudder reversals accounts for most of the
attainable safety benefits. With more than three rudder reversals, the
FCHWG found little increase in vertical stabilizer loads.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ NTSB Safety Recommendation A-04-56, Nov. 10, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Costs and Benefits of This Proposed Rule
Since the catastrophic AA587 accident, the FAA has responded to the
risk posed by rudder reversals by requesting, through the issue paper
process, that applicants for new type certificates show that their
designs are capable of continued safe flight and landing after
experiencing repeated rudder reversals. For airplanes with FBW systems,
manufacturers have been able to show capability by means of control
laws, incorporated through software changes and, therefore, adding no
weight and imposing no additional maintenance cost to the airplanes.
Many if not all of these designs have demonstrated tolerance to three
or more rudder reversals. Aside from converting to an FBW system,
alternatives available to manufacturers specializing in airplane
designs with mechanical or hydro-mechanical rudders include increasing
the reliability of the yaw damper and strengthening the airplane
vertical stabilizer.
To estimate the cost of the proposed rule, the FAA solicited unit
cost estimates from U.S. industry and incorporated these estimates into
an airplane life cycle model. The FAA received one estimate for large
part 25 airplanes and two estimates for small part 25 airplanes
(business jets).
One of the business jet estimates was provided by a manufacturer
specializing in mechanical rather than FBW rudder systems; therefore,
that estimate reflects significantly higher compliance costs. This
manufacturer's most cost-efficient approach to addressing the proposed
requirement--although high in comparison to manufacturers who use FBW
systems exclusively--is to comply with a strengthened vertical
stabilizer. The cost of complying with a more reliable yaw damper was
higher than strengthening the vertical stabilizer, and higher yet if
complying by converting to a FBW rudder system for new models.
As a result of these high costs and other reasons set forth in the
preamble, the FAA has decided that the proposed rule would not apply to
airplanes with ``unpowered'' (mechanical) rudder control surfaces. An
``unpowered'' rudder control surface is one whose movement is affected
through mechanical means, without any augmentation from hydraulic or
electrical systems. Accordingly, the proposed rule would not apply to
models with mechanical rudder control systems, but would apply only to
models with FBW or hydro-mechanical
[[Page 32813]]
rudder systems. The FAA solicits comments on the exclusion of airplanes
with unpowered rudder control surfaces from the proposed rule and the
corresponding inclusion of FBW and hydro-mechanical models.
The FAA estimates the costs of the proposed rule using unit cost
per model estimates from industry for FBW models and our estimates of
the number of new large airplane and business jet certifications with
FBW rudder systems in the ten years after the effective date of the
proposed rule. These estimates are shown in table 1. The FAA solicits
comments, with detailed cost estimates, on our estimates.
Table 1--Cost Estimated for Proposed Rule
[$ 2016]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of new
Cost per model FBW models (10 Costs
yrs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Large Airplanes................................................. $300,000 2 $600,000
Business Jets................................................... 235,000 2 470,000
-----------------------------------------------
Total Costs................................................. .............. .............. 1,070,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
With these cost estimates, the FAA finds the proposed rule to be
minimal cost, with expected net safety benefits from the reduced risk
of rudder reversal accidents.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Determination
The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (Pub. L. 96-354) (RFA)
establishes ``as a principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall
endeavor, consistent with the objectives of the rule and of applicable
statutes, to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale
of the businesses, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions
subject to regulation. To achieve this principle, agencies are required
to solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain
the rationale for their actions to assure that such proposals are given
serious consideration.'' The RFA covers a wide range of small entities,
including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and small
governmental jurisdictions.
Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a rule will
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities. If the agency determines that it will, the agency must
prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in the RFA.
However, if an agency determines that a rule is not expected to have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities,
section 605(b) of the RFA provides that the head of the agency may so
certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required. The
certification must include a statement providing the factual basis for
this determination, and the reasoning should be clear. As noted above,
because manufacturers with FBW rudder systems have been able to show
compliance by means of low-cost changes to control laws incorporated
through software changes, the FAA estimates the costs of this proposed
rule to be minimal. Therefore, as provided in section 605(b), the head
of the FAA certifies that this proposed rule will not have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
C. International Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 96-39) prohibits Federal
agencies from establishing standards or engaging in related activities
that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United
States. Pursuant to this Act, the establishment of standards is not
considered an unnecessary obstacle to the foreign commerce of the
United States, so long as the standard has a legitimate domestic
objective, such as the protection of safety, and does not operate in a
manner that excludes imports that meet this objective. The statute also
requires consideration of international standards and, where
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
The FAA has assessed the effect of this proposed rule and
determined that its purpose is to protect the safety of U.S. civil
aviation. Therefore, the proposed rule is in compliance with the Trade
Agreements Act.
D. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-
4) requires each Federal agency to prepare a written statement
assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 million or more
(in 1995 dollars) in any one year by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector; such a mandate
is deemed to be a ``significant regulatory action.'' The FAA currently
uses an inflation-adjusted value of $155.0 million in lieu of $100
million.
This proposed rule does not contain such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II of the Act do not apply.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information
collection burdens imposed on the public. The FAA has determined that
there would be no new requirement for information collection associated
with this proposed rule.
F. International Compatibility and Cooperation
(1) In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to conform to
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA has
determined that there are no ICAO Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed regulations.
(2) Executive Order 13609, ``Promoting International Regulatory
Cooperation,'' promotes international regulatory cooperation to meet
shared challenges involving health, safety, labor, security,
environmental, and other issues and to reduce, eliminate, or prevent
unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements. The FAA has
analyzed this action under the policies and agency responsibilities of
Executive Order 13609, and has determined that this action would have
no effect on international regulatory cooperation.
G. Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions that are categorically
excluded
[[Page 32814]]
from preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National Environmental Policy Act in the absence of
extraordinary circumstances. The FAA has determined this rulemaking
action qualifies for the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph
312f of Order 1050.1E and involves no extraordinary circumstances.
V. Executive Order Determinations
A. Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and
criteria of Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism.'' The agency has
determined that this action would not have a substantial direct effect
on the States, or the relationship between the Federal Government and
the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among
the various levels of government, and, therefore, would not have
Federalism implications.
B. Executive Order 13211, Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA analyzed this proposed rule under Executive Order 13211,
``Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy
Supply, Distribution, or Use'' (May 18, 2001). The agency has
determined that it would not be a ``significant energy action'' under
the executive order and would not be likely to have a significant
adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy.
C. Executive Order 13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs
This proposed rule is not expected to be an E.O. 13771 regulatory
action because this proposed rule is not significant under E.O. 12866.
VI. Additional Information
A. Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. The agency
also invites comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy,
or federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should
submit only one time.
The FAA will file in the docket all comments it receives, as well
as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed rulemaking. Before acting on this
proposal, the FAA will consider all comments it receives on or before
the closing date for comments. The FAA will consider comments filed
after the comment period has closed if it is possible to do so without
incurring expense or delay. The agency may change this proposal in
light of the comments it receives.
Proprietary or Confidential Business Information: Commenters should
not file proprietary or confidential business information in the
docket. Such information must be sent or delivered directly to the
person identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document, and marked as proprietary or confidential. If submitting
information on a disk or CD-ROM, mark the outside of the disk or CD-
ROM, and identify electronically within the disk or CD-ROM the specific
information that is proprietary or confidential.
Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), if the FAA is aware of proprietary
information filed with a comment, the agency does not place it in the
docket. It is held in a separate file to which the public does not have
access, and the FAA places a note in the docket that it has received
it. If the FAA receives a request to examine or copy this information,
it treats it as any other request under the Freedom of Information Act
(5 U.S.C. 552). The FAA processes such a request under Department of
Transportation procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.
B. Availability of Rulemaking Documents
An electronic copy of rulemaking documents may be obtained from the
internet by--
1. Searching the Federal eRulemaking Portal (https://www.regulations.gov);
2. Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies web page at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies or
3. Accessing the Government Printing Office's web page at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/.
Copies may also be obtained by sending a request to the Federal
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence
Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680.
Commenters must identify the docket or notice number of this
rulemaking.
All documents the FAA considered in developing this proposed rule,
including economic analyses and technical reports, may be accessed from
the internet through the Federal eRulemaking Portal referenced in item
(1) above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation
Administration proposes to amend chapter I of title 14, Code of Federal
Regulations as follows:
PART 25--AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS: TRANSPORT CATEGORY AIRPLANES
0
1. The authority citation for part 25 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(f), 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702 and
44704.
0
2. Add Sec. 25.353 to read as follows:
Sec. 25.353 Rudder control reversal conditions.
For airplanes with a powered rudder control surface or surfaces,
the airplane must be designed to withstand the ultimate loads that
result from the yaw maneuver conditions specified in paragraphs (a)
through (e) of this section at speeds from VMC or the
highest airspeed for which it is possible to achieve maximum rudder
deflection at zero sideslip, whichever is greater, up to VC/
MC. The applicant must evaluate these conditions with the
landing gear retracted and speed brakes (and spoilers when used as
speed brakes) retracted. In computing the loads on the airplane, the
applicant may assume yawing velocity to be zero. The applicant must
assume a pilot force of 200 pounds when evaluating each of these
conditions:
(a) With the airplane in unaccelerated flight at zero yaw, the
flight deck rudder control is displaced as specified in Sec. 25.351(a)
and (b).
(b) With the airplane yawed to the overswing sideslip angle, the
flight deck rudder control is suddenly displaced in the opposite
direction.
(c) With the airplane yawed to the opposite overswing sideslip
angle, the flight deck rudder control is suddenly displaced in the
opposite direction.
(d) With the airplane yawed to the subsequent overswing sideslip
angle, the flight deck rudder control is suddenly displaced in the
opposite direction.
(e) With the airplane yawed to the opposite overswing sideslip
angle, the flight deck rudder control is suddenly returned to neutral.
[[Page 32815]]
Issued under authority provided by 49 U.S.C. 106(f) and 44701(a)
in Washington, DC, on July 2, 2018.
Dorenda D. Baker,
Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2018-15154 Filed 7-13-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
