Omaha Public Power District; Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, 14893-14897 [2018-07034]
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 67 / Friday, April 6, 2018 / Notices
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Request for Comments on Identity,
Credential, and Access Management
(ICAM)
AGENCY:
Office of Management and
Notice of public comment
The Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) is seeking public
comment on a draft memorandum titled
‘‘Strengthening the Cybersecurity of
Federal Agencies through Improved
Identity, Credential, and Access
Management.’’
SUMMARY:
The public comment period on
the draft memorandum begins on April
6, 2018 in the Federal Register and will
last for 30 days. The public comment
period will end on May 6, 2018.
DATES:
Interested parties should
provide comments at the following link:
https://policy.cio.gov/identity-draft. The
Office of Management and Budget is
located at 725 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20503.
ADDRESSES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jordan Burris at ofcio@omb.eop.gov.
The Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) is
proposing a new policy for identity,
credential, and access management
(ICAM) across the Federal enterprise.
This memorandum would establish new
government-wide responsibilities for the
Department of Commerce (DOC), the
General Services Administration (GSA),
the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and provide
agencies with implementation guidance
on the requirements defined in National
Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Special Publication 800–63–3. It
would also reduce the policy
compliance burden to agencies by
rescinding and replacing five older
memoranda, which collectively outline
direction to agencies related to EAuthentication and acceptance of
external credentials, among other
matters.
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Margaret H. Graves,
Deputy U.S. Federal Chief Information
Officer.
[FR Doc. 2018–07045 Filed 4–5–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3110–05–P
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Nadene Kennedy,
Polar Coordination Specialist, Office of Polar
Programs.
AGENCY:
[FR Doc. 2018–07099 Filed 4–5–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555–01–P
The National Science
Foundation (NSF) is required to publish
a notice of requests to modify permits
issued to conduct activities regulated
and permits issued under the Antarctic
Conservation Act of 1978. NSF has
published regulations under the
Antarctic Conservation Act in the Code
of Federal Regulations. This is the
required notice of a requested permit
modification and permit issued.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Nature McGinn, ACA Permit Officer,
Office of Polar Programs, National
Science Foundation, 2415 Eisenhower
Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22314; 703–
292–8224; email: ACApermits@nsf.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
National Science Foundation (NSF), as
directed by the Antarctic Conservation
Act of 1978 (Pub. L. 95–541, 45 CFR
671), as amended by the Antarctic
Science, Tourism and Conservation Act
of 1996, has developed regulations for
the establishment of a permit system for
various activities in Antarctica and
designation of certain animals and
certain geographic areas a requiring
special protection.
NSF issued a permit (ACA 2017–013)
to George Watters on October 21, 2016.
The issued permit allows the applicant
to conduct waste management
associated with ship- and shore-based
research and logistic activities
conducted by the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA)
Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(AMLR) Program. The permit covers the
deployment of a variety of
oceanographic instruments.
Now the applicant proposes a permit
modification to provide further details
about two types of oceanographic
instruments that would be deployed
during future research cruises. Up to six
moorings would be deployed, as
described in the original permit, and up
to three Slocum gliders would be
deployed and retrieved. The
Environmental Officer has reviewed the
modification request and has
determined that the amendment is not
a material change to the permit, and it
will have a less than a minor or
transitory impact.
Dates of permitted activities: March
30, 2018—July 30, 2021.
SUMMARY:
period.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
National Science Foundation.
Notice of Permit Modification
Request Received and Permit Issued.
The permit modification was issued
on March 30, 2018.
ACTION:
Budget.
ACTION:
Notice of Permit Modification Received
Under the Antarctic Conservation Act
of 1978
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–285; NRC–2018–0068]
Omaha Public Power District; Fort
Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has issued
exemption from certain requirements to
maintain financial protection from
offsite liability for the Fort Calhoun
Station (FCS) in response to a request
from Omaha Public Power District
(OPPD or the licensee) dated April 28,
2017. Specifically, OPPD requested an
exemption from regulatory requirements
to permit OPPD to reduce the required
level of primary financial protection
from $450 million to $100 million and
to withdraw from participation in the
secondary layer of financial protection.
DATES: The exemption was issued on
March 29, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2018–0068 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2018–0068. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer
Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127;
email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 67 / Friday, April 6, 2018 / Notices
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
it is mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James S. Kim, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001; telephone: 301–415–4125, email:
James.Kim@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of
the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day
of April, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James S. Kim,
Project Manager, Special Projects and Process
Branch, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
Attachment—Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50–285
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
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Exemption
I. Background.
The Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS) site
is located midway between Fort Calhoun and
Blair, Nebraska, on the west bank of the
Missouri River. The FCS facility includes one
Combustion Engineering pressurized water
reactor licensed to operate at power levels
not to exceed 1500 megawatts thermal. The
distance from the reactor containment to the
nearest site boundary is approximately 910
meters (.6 miles). Except for the city of Blair
and the villages of Fort Calhoun and
Kennard, the land use within the 10-mile
radius of FCS is devoted to general farming.
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is the
holder of Renewed Facility Operating
License No. DPR–40. The license provides,
among other things, that the facility is subject
to all rules, regulations, and orders of the
NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated June 24, 2016 (Agencywide
Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML16176A213),
OPPD submitted a certification pursuant to
part 50 of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) paragraph 50.82(a)(1)(i)
to the NRC indicating that it would
permanently shut down FCS by December
31, 2016. On October 24, 2016, OPPD
permanently ceased power operations at FCS.
On November 13, 2016, OPPD submitted a
certification pursuant to 10 CFR
50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently
removed all fuel from the FCS reactor vessel
and placed the fuel into the FCS spent fuel
pool (SFP) (ADAMS Accession No.
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ML16319A254). Accordingly, upon
docketing the certificates pursuant to 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the FCS renewed facility
operating license no longer authorized
operation of the reactor or emplacement or
retention of fuel in the reactor vessel.
However, the licensee remains authorized to
possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel.
Irradiated fuel is currently being stored
onsite in a SFP and in independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI) dry casks.
II. Request/Action.
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific
exemptions,’’ OPPD has requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by a
letter dated April 28, 2017 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML17118A337). The
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) would permit OPPD to reduce its
onsite property damage insurance to $50
million.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
requires each licensee to have and maintain
onsite property damage insurance to stabilize
and decontaminate the reactor and reactor
site in the event of an accident. The onsite
insurance coverage must be either $1.06
billion or whatever amount of insurance is
generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee stated that the risk of an
accident at a permanently shutdown and
defueled reactor is much less than the risk
from an operating power reactor. Since the
license no longer authorizes reactor operation
or emplacement or retention of fuel in the
reactor vessel at FCS, there are no events that
would require the stabilization of reactor
conditions after an accident. Similarly, the
risk of an accident that would result in
significant onsite contamination at FCS is
also much lower than the risk of such an
event at an operating reactor. Therefore,
OPPD requested an exemption from 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) effective April 7, 2018, that
would permit a reduction in its onsite
property damage insurance from $1.06
billion to $50 million, commensurate with
the reduced risk of an accident at the
permanently shutdown and defueled FCS
reactor.
III. Discussion.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR
part 50 when 1) the exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to public health or safety, and are
consistent with the common defense and
security; and 2) any of the special
circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)
are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established after the Three
Mile Island accident out of concern that
licensees may be unable to financially cover
onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major
nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion
coverage requirement was developed based
on an analysis of an accident at a nuclear
reactor operating at power, resulting in a
large fission product release and requiring
significant resource expenditures to stabilize
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the reactor conditions and ultimately
decontaminate and cleanup the site.
The NRC developed these cost estimates
from the spectrum of postulated accidents for
an operating nuclear reactor and the
consequences of any associated release of
radioactive material from the reactor.
Although the risk of an accident at an
operating reactor is very low, the
consequences can be large. In an operating
reactor, the high temperature and pressure of
the reactor coolant system (RCS), as well as
the inventory of relatively short-lived
radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and
consequences of an accident. With the
permanent cessation of reactor operations at
FCS and the permanent removal of the fuel
from the reactor core, such accidents are no
longer possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS,
and supporting systems no longer operate
and, therefore, have no function related to
the storage of the irradiated fuel. Hence,
postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or
supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the
principal radiological risks are associated
with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its
December 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML16356A578), exemption request, OPPD
describes both design-basis and beyonddesign-basis events involving irradiated fuel
stored in the SFP. The staff independently
evaluated the offsite consequences associated
with various decommissioning activities,
design basis accidents, and beyond design
basis accidents at FCS, in consideration of its
permanently shut down and defueled status.
The possible design-basis and beyond design
basis accident scenarios at FCS show that the
radiological consequences of these accidents
are greatly reduced at a permanently shut
down and defueled reactor, in comparison to
a fueled reactor. Further, the staff has used
the offsite radiological release limits
established by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) early-phase
Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the
exclusion area boundary in determining that
any possible radiological releases would be
minimal and would not require
precautionary protective actions (e.g.,
sheltering in place or evacuation).
The staff evaluated the radiological
consequences associated with various
decommissioning activities, and design basis
accidents at FCS, in consideration of
permanently shut down and defueled status
of FCS. The only design-basis accidents that
could potentially result in an offsite
radiological release at FCS, following its
permanent shutdown and defueling, are the
Fuel Handling Accident (FHA) and rupture
of a large liquid radioactive waste tank.
OPPD performed an analysis demonstrating
that 10 days after shutdown, the radiological
consequences of a FHA would not exceed the
limits established by the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. In case of a rupture
of a large liquid radioactive waste tank in the
December 16, 2016 letter, the FCS radioactive
waste disposal system is designed such that
any spillage or leakage of radioactive waste
would be retained within the facility. After
18 months of decay, the only isotope
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remaining in significant amounts, among
those postulated to be released from the
gaseous release associated with a liquid
waste tank failure (LWTF), would be Krypton
85. The resulting skin dose from the release
of Krypton 85 would make an insignificant
contribution to the total effective dose
equivalent, which is the parameter of interest
in the determination of EPA PAGs for
sheltering or evacuation. Accordingly, based
on the time that FCS has been permanently
shutdown (approximately 18 months), the
staff has determined that the possibility of an
offsite radiological release from design-basis
accidents that could exceed the EPA PAGs
has been eliminated.
The only beyond design-basis event that
has the potential to lead to a significant
radiological release at a permanently shut
down and defueled (decommissioning)
reactor is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire
scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely,
accident scenario that involves the loss of
water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a
significant heat-up of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The
probability of a zirconium fire scenario is
related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel
stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks from
a zirconium fire scenario continue to
decrease as a function of the time that FCS
has been permanently shut down.
The NRC previously determined that a
lesser amount of onsite property damage
insurance coverage can be authorized based
on analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In
response to SECY–96–256, ‘‘Changes to
Financial Protection Requirements for
Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR
140.11,’’ dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15062A483), the
Commission issued Staff Requirements
Memorandum dated January 28, 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), and
supported the staff’s recommendation that,
among other things, would allow
permanently shutdown power reactor
licensees to reduce commercial onsite
property damage insurance coverage to $50
million when the licensee was able to
demonstrate the technical criterion that the
spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was
drained of water and to account for the
postulated rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste tank at the FCS site,
should such an event occur. The staff has
used this technical criterion to grant similar
exemptions to other decommissioning
reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station, published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear
Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR
72700), and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Station, published in the Federal Register on
April 25, 2016 (81 FR 24136)).
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated Rulemaking
Plan for Nuclear Power Plant
Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28, 2000, and
SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy Issues Related to
Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June
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4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML003721626 and ML011450420,
respectively), the staff discussed additional
information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and
associated implications for onsite property
damage insurance. Analyzing when the spent
fuel stored in the SFP is capable of adequate
air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates
when the probability of a zirconium fire
would be exceedingly low.
The licensee’s analyses referenced in its
exemption request demonstrate that under
conditions where the SFP water inventory
has drained and only air-cooling of the stored
irradiated fuel is available, there is
reasonable assurance as of April 7, 2018,
which is approximately 18 months after the
permanent shutdown of the facility, that the
FCS spent fuel will remain at temperatures
far below those associated with the onset of
zirconium cladding rapid oxidation. In
addition, the licensee’s adiabatic heat-up
analyses demonstrate that as of April 7, 2018,
there would be at least 10 hours after the loss
of all means of cooling (both air and/or
water), before the spent fuel cladding would
reach a temperature where the potential for
a significant offsite radiological release could
occur. The licensee maintains strategies and
equipment to cool the spent fuel in the
unlikely event coolant is lost, and the 10hour adiabatic heating time would provide
sufficient time for personnel to respond with
on-site equipment to restore a means of spent
fuel cooling. In OPPD’s letter dated December
16, 2016, the licensee furnished information
concerning its SFP inventory makeup
strategies, in the event of a loss of SFP
coolant inventory. The multiple strategies for
providing makeup to the SFP include: using
existing plant systems for inventory makeup;
an internal strategy that relies on the fire
protection system with redundant pumps
(one diesel-driven and electric motor-driven);
and onsite diesel fire truck that can take
suction from the Missouri River. These
strategies are maintained by a license
condition. The licensee also stated that,
considering the very low-probability of
beyond design-basis accidents affecting the
SFP, these diverse strategies provide defensein-depth and time to mitigate and prevent a
zirconium fire, using makeup or spray into
the SFP before the onset of zirconium
cladding rapid oxidation.
By letter dated October 4, 2017 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML17277B679), OPPD
provided a response to an NRC staff request
to address air-cooling of fuel in a drained
pool. In the attachment to this letter, the
licensee compared FCS fuel storage
parameters with those used in NRC generic
evaluations of fuel cooling included in the
following documents:
• NUREG/CR–4982, ‘‘Severe Accidents in
Spent Fuel Pools in Support of Generic
Safety Issue 82,’’ June 1987; and
• NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety and
Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR
[Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,’’ April
1997 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML082260098).
The analysis described in NUREG/CR–
6451 determined that natural air circulation
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14895
would adequately cool fuel that has decayed
for 17 months after operation in a typical
PWR. The licensee found that the FCS fuel
assemblies have a 20 percent lower power
density during operation at power, a 10
percent lower peak burnup, and lower
uranium enrichment, resulting in a much
lower decay heat rate per assembly than
those used in the analysis described in
NUREG/CR–6451. The licensee determined
that the FCS spent fuel storage racks have a
higher storage density than those used in the
NUREG/CR–6451 analysis. However, the
licensee’s analysis demonstrated that the
lower decay heat will be sufficient to offset
the higher storage density compared to the
benchmark. The NRC staff reviewed this
information and determined that the
conclusion that the analysis presented in
NUREG/CR–6451 would bound the fuel
storage conditions at FCS was reasonable.
Therefore, at 18 months after permanent
shutdown, which will be reached by the
requested effective date of April 7, 2018, the
fuel stored at the FCS SFP would be
adequately air-cooled in the unlikely event
the pool completely drained.
In the NRC staff’s safety evaluation of the
licensee’s request for exemptions from
certain emergency planning requirements
dated December 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML17263B198), the NRC staff assessed
the OPPD accident analyses associated with
the radiological risks from a zirconium fire at
the permanently shut down and defueled
FCS site. For the very unlikely beyond
design-basis accident scenario where the SFP
coolant inventory is lost in such a manner
that all methods of heat removal from the
spent fuel are no longer available, the staff
found there will be a minimum of 10 hours
from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite
radiological release might occur. The staff
finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to
support deployment of mitigation equipment,
consistent with plant conditions, to prevent
the zirconium cladding from reaching a point
of rapid oxidation.
Based on the above discussion and the
basis provided in SECY–96–256, the NRC
staff determined $50 million is an adequate
level of onsite property damage insurance for
the FCS decommissioning reactor, once the
spent fuel in the SFP is susceptible to
exceedingly low probability of a zirconium
fire due to adequate air-cooling, is provided
in SECY–96–256. The staff has postulated
that there is still a potential for other
radiological incidents at a decommissioning
reactor that could result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In
SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the
rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage
tank, causing soil contamination and
potential groundwater contamination, as the
most costly postulated event to
decontaminate and remediate (other than a
SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large
liquid radiological waste storage tank rupture
event was determined to have a bounding
onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50
million. Therefore, the staff determined that
the licensee’s proposal to reduce onsite
insurance to a level of $50 million would be
consistent with the bounding cleanup and
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decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY–
96–256, to account for the postulated rupture
of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
FCS site, should such an event occur.
A. Authorized by Law.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
requires each licensee to have and maintain
onsite property damage insurance of either
$1.06 billion or whatever amount of
insurance is generally available from private
sources, whichever is less. In accordance
with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may
grant exemptions from the regulations in 10
CFR part 50, as the Commission determines
are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has
determined that the licensee’s proposed
reduction in onsite property damage
insurance coverage to a level of $50 million
is adequate, consistent with the basis
provided in SECY–96–256. Moreover, the
staff concluded that as of April 7, 2018,
sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at FCS to decrease the probability of
an onsite and offsite radiological release from
a postulated zirconium fire accident to
negligible levels.
The NRC staff has determined that granting
of the licensee’s proposed exemption will not
result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, or other laws, as amended.
Therefore, based on its review of OPPD’s
exemption request, as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY–96–256, the NRC staff
concludes that the exemption is authorized
by law.
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B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and
Safety.
The onsite property damage insurance
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established to provide financial assurance
that following a significant nuclear accident,
onsite reactor conditions could be stabilized
and the site decontaminated. The
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the
existing level of onsite insurance coverage for
FCS are predicated on the assumption that
the reactor is operating. However, FCS is a
permanently shutdown and defueled facility.
The permanently defueled status of the
facility has resulted in a significant reduction
in the number and severity of potential
accidents, and correspondingly, a significant
reduction in the potential for and severity of
onsite property damage. The proposed
reduction in the amount of onsite insurance
coverage does not impact the probability or
consequences of potential accidents. The
proposed level of insurance coverage is
commensurate with the reduced
consequences of credible nuclear accidents at
FCS. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that
granting the requested exemption will not
present an undue risk to the health and safety
of the public.
C. Consistent with the Common Defense and
Security.
The proposed exemption would not
eliminate any requirements associated with
physical protection of the site and would not
adversely affect OPPD’s ability to physically
secure the site or protect special nuclear
material. Physical security measures at FCS
are not affected by the requested exemption.
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Therefore, the proposed exemption is
consistent with the common defense and
security.
D. Special Circumstances.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special
circumstances are present if the application
of the regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose
of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be
available to stabilize reactor conditions and
cover onsite cleanup costs associated with
site decontamination, following an accident
that results in the release of a significant
amount of radiological material. Because FCS
is permanently shut down and defueled, it is
no longer possible for the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents or
other credible events at FCS to exceed the
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. The licensee has evaluated the
consequences of highly unlikely, beyonddesign-basis conditions involving a loss of
coolant from the SFP. The analyses show that
as of April 7, 2018, the likelihood of such an
event leading to a large radiological release
is negligible. The NRC staff’s evaluation of
the licensee’s analyses confirm this
conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee’s
proposed $50 million level of onsite
insurance is consistent with the bounding
cleanup and decontamination cost, as
discussed in the basis provided in SECY–96–
256. Therefore, the staff concludes that the
application of the current requirements in 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in
onsite insurance coverage is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule
for the permanently shutdown and defueled
FCS reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special
circumstances are present whenever
compliance would result in undue hardship
or other costs that are significantly in excess
of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others similarly
situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the
licensee was required to continue to maintain
an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in
excess of those necessary and commensurate
with the radiological contamination risks
posed by the site. In addition, such insurance
levels would be significantly in excess of
other decommissioning reactor facilities that
have been granted similar exemptions by the
NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with
the existing rule would result in an undue
hardship or other costs that are significantly
in excess of those contemplated when the
regulation was adopted and are significantly
in excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances
required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
E. Environmental Considerations.
The requested exemption includes surety,
insurance, or indemnity requirements, and
belongs to a category of actions that the
Commission, by rule or regulation, has
declared to be a categorical exclusion, after
first finding that the category of actions does
not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human environment.
Specifically, the exemption is categorically
excluded under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi)(H).
In addition, the NRC staff has determined
that there would be no significant impacts to
biota, water resources, historic properties,
cultural resources, or socioeconomic
conditions in the region. As such, there are
no extraordinary circumstances present that
would preclude reliance on this categorical
exclusion. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b), no environmental impact statement
need be prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an
exemption from the requirements of any
regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a
categorical exclusion provided that (i) there
is no significant hazards consideration; (ii)
there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any
effluents that may be released offsite; (iii)
there is no significant increase in individual
or cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (iv) there is no significant
construction impact; (v) there is no
significant increase in the potential for or
consequences from radiological accidents;
and (vi) the requirements from which an
exemption is sought involve: surety,
insurance, or indemnity requirements.
The Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, has determined that approval of
the exemption request involves no significant
hazards consideration because reducing the
licensee’s onsite property damage insurance
for FCS does not 1) involve a significant
increase in the probability or consequences
of an accident previously evaluated; or 2)
create the possibility of a new or different
kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or 3) involve a
significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The exempted financial protection regulation
is unrelated to the operation of FCS.
Accordingly, there is no significant change in
the types or significant increase in the
amounts of any effluents that may be released
offsite; and no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The
exempted regulation is not associated with
construction, so there is no significant
construction impact. The exempted
regulation does not concern the source term
(i.e., potential amount of radiation in an
accident), nor mitigation. Therefore, there is
no significant increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological accident. In
addition, there would be no significant
impacts to biota, water resources, historic
properties, cultural resources, or
socioeconomic conditions in the region. The
requirement for onsite property damage
insurance involves surety, insurance, and
indemnity matters. Therefore, pursuant to 10
CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 67 / Friday, April 6, 2018 / Notices
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be prepared
in connection with the approval of this
exemption request.
IV. Conclusions.
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a),
the exemption is authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public health
and safety, and is consistent with the
common defense and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants OPPD an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1), to permit the licensee to reduce
its onsite property damage insurance to a
level of $50 million.
The exemption is effective beginning April
7, 2018.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day
of March, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2018–07034 Filed 4–5–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 72–1051; NRC–2018–0052]
Holtec International HI–STORE
Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
Project
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Environmental impact
statement; public scoping meetings.
AGENCY:
On March 30, 2018, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
published in the Federal Register a
notice of its intent to prepare an
SUMMARY:
environmental impact statement,
conduct scoping, and request comments
for Holtec International’s (Holtec)
application for the HI–STORE
Combined Interim Storage Facility
(CISF). The public scoping comment
period closes on May 29, 2018. The NRC
is announcing public scoping meetings
and an open house schedule. The public
scoping meetings will allow interested
members of the public to develop and
submit their comments.
DATES: April 6, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2018–0052 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking website: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2018–0052. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer
Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127;
email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
it is mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
• Project web page: Information
related to the Holtec HI–STORE CISF
project can be accessed on the NRC’s
Holtec HI–STORE CISF web page at
https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuelstorage/cis/holtec-international.html.
• Public Libraries: A copy of the
application’s Environmental Report can
be accessed at the following public
libraries: Carlsbad Public Library, 101 S.
Halagueno Street, Carlsbad, NM 88220;
Hobbs Public Library, 509 N Shipp St.,
Hobbs, NM 88240; or Roswell Public
Library, 301 N. Pennsylvania, Roswell,
NM 88201.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jill
Caverly, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–
7674; email: Jill.Caverly@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
On March 30, 2018, the NRC
published in the Federal Register (83
FR 13802), a notice of its intent to
prepare an EIS on Holtec’s proposed
CISF for spent nuclear fuel and
requested public comments on the
scope of the EIS. The NRC is
announcing that staff will hold three
public scoping meetings and one open
house. The public scoping meetings will
be held in Rockville, Maryland;
Carlsbad, New Mexico; and Hobbs, New
Mexico. The dates and times for the
public meetings and open house are
provided below:
Date
Time
Location
Public Scoping Meeting and Webinar ...........
April 25, 2018 ......
7:00 p.m.–9:00 p.m. (EDT) ....
Open House ..................................................
April 30, 2018 ......
4:00 p.m.–7:00 p.m. (MDT) ...
Public Scoping Meeting .................................
May 1, 2018 ........
7:00 p.m.–10:00 p.m. (MDT)
Public Scoping Meeting .................................
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with NOTICES
Meeting/Open House
May 3, 2018 ........
7:00 p.m.–10:00 p.m. (MDT)
Rockville, Maryland, NRC Headquarters, Address: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville,
MD 20852
Roswell, New Mexico, Address: Eastern
New Mexico University—Roswell, Campus
Union Building, Multi-Purpose Room 110,
48 University Blvd., Roswell, NM 88130
Hobbs, New Mexico, Address: Lea County
Event Center, 5101 N. Lovington Highway, Hobbs, NM 88240
Carlsbad, New Mexico, Address: Eddy
County Fire Service, 1400 Commerce
Street, Carlsbad, NM 88220.
Persons interested in attending these
meeting should check the NRC’s Public
Meeting Schedule web page at https://
www.nrc.gov/pmns/mtg for additional
information, agendas for the meetings,
and access information for the webinar.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:21 Apr 05, 2018
Jkt 244001
For the meeting in Rockville, Maryland,
the NRC will transmit the public
meeting via webinar and provide a
telephone bridgeline for members of the
public who cannot attend the meeting in
person.
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, on April 2,
2018.
E:\FR\FM\06APN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 67 (Friday, April 6, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 14893-14897]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-07034]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-285; NRC-2018-0068]
Omaha Public Power District; Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued
exemption from certain requirements to maintain financial protection
from offsite liability for the Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) in response
to a request from Omaha Public Power District (OPPD or the licensee)
dated April 28, 2017. Specifically, OPPD requested an exemption from
regulatory requirements to permit OPPD to reduce the required level of
primary financial protection from $450 million to $100 million and to
withdraw from participation in the secondary layer of financial
protection.
DATES: The exemption was issued on March 29, 2018.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0068 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking website: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0068. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-
9127; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by
[[Page 14894]]
email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first
time that it is mentioned in this document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: James S. Kim, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4125, email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of April, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
James S. Kim,
Project Manager, Special Projects and Process Branch, Division of
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Exemption
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket No. 50-285
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1
Exemption
I. Background.
The Fort Calhoun Station, Unit 1 (FCS) site is located midway
between Fort Calhoun and Blair, Nebraska, on the west bank of the
Missouri River. The FCS facility includes one Combustion Engineering
pressurized water reactor licensed to operate at power levels not to
exceed 1500 megawatts thermal. The distance from the reactor
containment to the nearest site boundary is approximately 910 meters
(.6 miles). Except for the city of Blair and the villages of Fort
Calhoun and Kennard, the land use within the 10-mile radius of FCS
is devoted to general farming.
Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) is the holder of Renewed
Facility Operating License No. DPR-40. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated June 24, 2016 (Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML16176A213), OPPD submitted
a certification pursuant to part 50 of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) paragraph 50.82(a)(1)(i) to the NRC
indicating that it would permanently shut down FCS by December 31,
2016. On October 24, 2016, OPPD permanently ceased power operations
at FCS. On November 13, 2016, OPPD submitted a certification
pursuant to 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently removed
all fuel from the FCS reactor vessel and placed the fuel into the
FCS spent fuel pool (SFP) (ADAMS Accession No. ML16319A254).
Accordingly, upon docketing the certificates pursuant to 10 CFR
50.82(a)(2), the FCS renewed facility operating license no longer
authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement or retention of
fuel in the reactor vessel. However, the licensee remains authorized
to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is
currently being stored onsite in a SFP and in independent spent fuel
storage installation (ISFSI) dry casks.
II. Request/Action.
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' OPPD has requested
an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by a letter dated April 28,
2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17118A337). The exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit OPPD to reduce its
onsite property damage insurance to $50 million.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to
have and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an
accident. The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion
or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from private
sources (whichever is less).
The licensee stated that the risk of an accident at a
permanently shutdown and defueled reactor is much less than the risk
from an operating power reactor. Since the license no longer
authorizes reactor operation or emplacement or retention of fuel in
the reactor vessel at FCS, there are no events that would require
the stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident.
Similarly, the risk of an accident that would result in significant
onsite contamination at FCS is also much lower than the risk of such
an event at an operating reactor. Therefore, OPPD requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) effective April 7, 2018, that
would permit a reduction in its onsite property damage insurance
from $1.06 billion to $50 million, commensurate with the reduced
risk of an accident at the permanently shutdown and defueled FCS
reactor.
III. Discussion.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application
by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when 1) the
exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to
public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security; and 2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island accident out of concern that
licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs in
the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified $1.06 billion
coverage requirement was developed based on an analysis of an
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at power, resulting in a
large fission product release and requiring significant resource
expenditures to stabilize the reactor conditions and ultimately
decontaminate and cleanup the site.
The NRC developed these cost estimates from the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor and the
consequences of any associated release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating
reactor is very low, the consequences can be large. In an operating
reactor, the high temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant
system (RCS), as well as the inventory of relatively short-lived
radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an
accident. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at FCS
and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such
accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate and, therefore, have no
function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Hence,
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the
reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its
December 16, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16356A578), exemption
request, OPPD describes both design-basis and beyond-design-basis
events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The staff
independently evaluated the offsite consequences associated with
various decommissioning activities, design basis accidents, and
beyond design basis accidents at FCS, in consideration of its
permanently shut down and defueled status. The possible design-basis
and beyond design basis accident scenarios at FCS show that the
radiological consequences of these accidents are greatly reduced at
a permanently shut down and defueled reactor, in comparison to a
fueled reactor. Further, the staff has used the offsite radiological
release limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) early-phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) of one
roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary in
determining that any possible radiological releases would be minimal
and would not require precautionary protective actions (e.g.,
sheltering in place or evacuation).
The staff evaluated the radiological consequences associated
with various decommissioning activities, and design basis accidents
at FCS, in consideration of permanently shut down and defueled
status of FCS. The only design-basis accidents that could
potentially result in an offsite radiological release at FCS,
following its permanent shutdown and defueling, are the Fuel
Handling Accident (FHA) and rupture of a large liquid radioactive
waste tank. OPPD performed an analysis demonstrating that 10 days
after shutdown, the radiological consequences of a FHA would not
exceed the limits established by the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. In case of a rupture of a large liquid radioactive waste
tank in the December 16, 2016 letter, the FCS radioactive waste
disposal system is designed such that any spillage or leakage of
radioactive waste would be retained within the facility. After 18
months of decay, the only isotope
[[Page 14895]]
remaining in significant amounts, among those postulated to be
released from the gaseous release associated with a liquid waste
tank failure (LWTF), would be Krypton 85. The resulting skin dose
from the release of Krypton 85 would make an insignificant
contribution to the total effective dose equivalent, which is the
parameter of interest in the determination of EPA PAGs for
sheltering or evacuation. Accordingly, based on the time that FCS
has been permanently shutdown (approximately 18 months), the staff
has determined that the possibility of an offsite radiological
release from design-basis accidents that could exceed the EPA PAGs
has been eliminated.
The only beyond design-basis event that has the potential to
lead to a significant radiological release at a permanently shut
down and defueled (decommissioning) reactor is a zirconium fire. The
zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly unlikely,
accident scenario that involves the loss of water inventory from the
SFP, resulting in a significant heat-up of the spent fuel and
culminating in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel
damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario is related to
the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore,
the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that FCS has been permanently shut down.
The NRC previously determined that a lesser amount of onsite
property damage insurance coverage can be authorized based on
analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In response to SECY-96-256,
``Changes to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR
140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483),
the Commission issued Staff Requirements Memorandum dated January
28, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), and supported the
staff's recommendation that, among other things, would allow
permanently shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial
onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the
licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the
spent fuel could be air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water and
to account for the postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological
waste tank at the FCS site, should such an event occur. The staff
has used this technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to
other decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64
FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal
Register on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700), and Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal Register on April
25, 2016 (81 FR 24136)).
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the staff
discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks
at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite
property damage insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in
the SFP is capable of adequate air-cooling is one measure that
demonstrates when the probability of a zirconium fire would be
exceedingly low.
The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request
demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has
drained and only air-cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is
available, there is reasonable assurance as of April 7, 2018, which
is approximately 18 months after the permanent shutdown of the
facility, that the FCS spent fuel will remain at temperatures far
below those associated with the onset of zirconium cladding rapid
oxidation. In addition, the licensee's adiabatic heat-up analyses
demonstrate that as of April 7, 2018, there would be at least 10
hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or
water), before the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature
where the potential for a significant offsite radiological release
could occur. The licensee maintains strategies and equipment to cool
the spent fuel in the unlikely event coolant is lost, and the 10-
hour adiabatic heating time would provide sufficient time for
personnel to respond with on-site equipment to restore a means of
spent fuel cooling. In OPPD's letter dated December 16, 2016, the
licensee furnished information concerning its SFP inventory makeup
strategies, in the event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. The
multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy
that relies on the fire protection system with redundant pumps (one
diesel-driven and electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire
truck that can take suction from the Missouri River. These
strategies are maintained by a license condition. The licensee also
stated that, considering the very low-probability of beyond design-
basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide
defense-in-depth and time to mitigate and prevent a zirconium fire,
using makeup or spray into the SFP before the onset of zirconium
cladding rapid oxidation.
By letter dated October 4, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML17277B679), OPPD provided a response to an NRC staff request to
address air-cooling of fuel in a drained pool. In the attachment to
this letter, the licensee compared FCS fuel storage parameters with
those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in
the following documents:
NUREG/CR-4982, ``Severe Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools in
Support of Generic Safety Issue 82,'' June 1987; and
NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of
Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR [Pressurized-Water
Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' April 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098).
The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural
air circulation would adequately cool fuel that has decayed for 17
months after operation in a typical PWR. The licensee found that the
FCS fuel assemblies have a 20 percent lower power density during
operation at power, a 10 percent lower peak burnup, and lower
uranium enrichment, resulting in a much lower decay heat rate per
assembly than those used in the analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451.
The licensee determined that the FCS spent fuel storage racks have a
higher storage density than those used in the NUREG/CR-6451
analysis. However, the licensee's analysis demonstrated that the
lower decay heat will be sufficient to offset the higher storage
density compared to the benchmark. The NRC staff reviewed this
information and determined that the conclusion that the analysis
presented in NUREG/CR-6451 would bound the fuel storage conditions
at FCS was reasonable. Therefore, at 18 months after permanent
shutdown, which will be reached by the requested effective date of
April 7, 2018, the fuel stored at the FCS SFP would be adequately
air-cooled in the unlikely event the pool completely drained.
In the NRC staff's safety evaluation of the licensee's request
for exemptions from certain emergency planning requirements dated
December 11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17263B198), the NRC staff
assessed the OPPD accident analyses associated with the radiological
risks from a zirconium fire at the permanently shut down and
defueled FCS site. For the very unlikely beyond design-basis
accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, the staff found there will be a minimum of 10
hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The
staff finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment
of mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to
prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid
oxidation.
Based on the above discussion and the basis provided in SECY-96-
256, the NRC staff determined $50 million is an adequate level of
onsite property damage insurance for the FCS decommissioning
reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP is susceptible to
exceedingly low probability of a zirconium fire due to adequate air-
cooling, is provided in SECY-96-256. The staff has postulated that
there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC
staff cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank,
causing soil contamination and potential groundwater contamination,
as the most costly postulated event to decontaminate and remediate
(other than a SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large liquid
radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to have
a bounding onsite cleanup cost of approximately $50 million.
Therefore, the staff determined that the licensee's proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be
consistent with the bounding cleanup and
[[Page 14896]]
decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for
the postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at
the FCS site, should such an event occur.
A. Authorized by Law.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to
have and maintain onsite property damage insurance of either $1.06
billion or whatever amount of insurance is generally available from
private sources, whichever is less. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12,
the Commission may grant exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR
part 50, as the Commission determines are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the
licensee's proposed reduction in onsite property damage insurance
coverage to a level of $50 million is adequate, consistent with the
basis provided in SECY-96-256. Moreover, the staff concluded that as
of April 7, 2018, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have
elapsed at FCS to decrease the probability of an onsite and offsite
radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to
negligible levels.
The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee's
proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, or other laws, as amended. Therefore, based on
its review of OPPD's exemption request, as discussed above, and
consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the
exemption is authorized by law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety.
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) were established to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear accident, onsite reactor conditions
could be stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance
coverage for FCS are predicated on the assumption that the reactor
is operating. However, FCS is a permanently shutdown and defueled
facility. The permanently defueled status of the facility has
resulted in a significant reduction in the number and severity of
potential accidents, and correspondingly, a significant reduction in
the potential for and severity of onsite property damage. The
proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does
not impact the probability or consequences of potential accidents.
The proposed level of insurance coverage is commensurate with the
reduced consequences of credible nuclear accidents at FCS.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that granting the requested
exemption will not present an undue risk to the health and safety of
the public.
C. Consistent with the Common Defense and Security.
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not
adversely affect OPPD's ability to physically secure the site or
protect special nuclear material. Physical security measures at FCS
are not affected by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed
exemption is consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present
if the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances
would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The
underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be available to stabilize reactor
conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs associated with site
decontamination, following an accident that results in the release
of a significant amount of radiological material. Because FCS is
permanently shut down and defueled, it is no longer possible for the
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents or other
credible events at FCS to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. The licensee has evaluated the consequences
of highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss
of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show that as of April 7, 2018,
the likelihood of such an event leading to a large radiological
release is negligible. The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's
analyses confirm this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's proposed $50
million level of onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding
cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in the basis provided
in SECY-96-256. Therefore, the staff concludes that the application
of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06
billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule for the permanently shutdown and
defueled FCS reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs
that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the
regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those
incurred by others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to
continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the
associated insurance premiums would be in excess of those necessary
and commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by
the site. In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly
in excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities that have been
granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in
excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly
situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations.
The requested exemption includes surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements, and belongs to a category of actions that the
Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical
exclusion, after first finding that the category of actions does not
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi)(H). In addition, the NRC staff has
determined that there would be no significant impacts to biota,
water resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or
socioeconomic conditions in the region. As such, there are no
extraordinary circumstances present that would preclude reliance on
this categorical exclusion. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement need be prepared in connection
with the approval of this exemption request.
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a
categorical exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant
hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the
types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that
may be released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure;
(iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no
significant increase in the potential for or consequences from
radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from which an
exemption is sought involve: surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements.
The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration
because reducing the licensee's onsite property damage insurance for
FCS does not 1) involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or 2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident
previously evaluated; or 3) involve a significant reduction in a
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is
unrelated to the operation of FCS. Accordingly, there is no
significant change in the types or significant increase in the
amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not
associated with construction, so there is no significant
construction impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the
source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation in an accident),
nor mitigation. Therefore, there is no significant increase in the
potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In
addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or socioeconomic
conditions in the region. The requirement for onsite property damage
insurance involves surety, insurance, and indemnity matters.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
[[Page 14897]]
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
IV. Conclusions.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10
CFR 50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent
with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances
are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants OPPD an
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), to permit the
licensee to reduce its onsite property damage insurance to a level
of $50 million.
The exemption is effective beginning April 7, 2018.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of March, 2018.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joseph G. Giitter,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2018-07034 Filed 4-5-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P