Milk in California; Proposal To Establish a Federal Milk Marketing Order, 14110-14172 [2018-06167]
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 63 / Monday, April 2, 2018 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Part 1051
[Doc. No. AO–15–0071; AMS–DA–14–0095]
Milk in California; Proposal To
Establish a Federal Milk Marketing
Order
Agricultural Marketing Service,
USDA.
ACTION: Proposed rule; order for
referendum; notice of public meeting.
AGENCY:
The Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) proposes the issuance of
a Federal Milk Marketing Order
(FMMO) regulating the handling of milk
in California. This proposed rule
proposes adoption of a California
FMMO incorporating the entire state of
California and would adopt the same
dairy product classification and pricing
provisions used throughout the current
FMMO system. The proposed California
FMMO provides for the recognition of
producer quota as administered by the
California Department of Food and
Agriculture. This proposed FMMO is
subject to producer approval by
referendum.
DATES: The Agricultural Marketing
Service (AMS) will conduct a public
meeting at 9:00 a.m. on April 10, 2018,
to explain and answer questions relating
to how the proposed California FMMO
contained in this proposed rule, if
adopted, would operate and review the
producer referendum process that will
be followed to obtain producer approval
of the proposed rule.
ADDRESSES: The public meeting will be
held at the Clovis Veterans Memorial
District Building, 808 Fourth Street,
Clovis, California 93612. Meeting
information can be found at
www.ams.usda.gov/caorder.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Erin
Taylor, Acting Director, Order
Formulation and Enforcement Division,
USDA/AMS/Dairy Program, STOP 0231,
Room 2969–S, 1400 Independence Ave.
SW, Washington, DC 20250–0231, (202)
720–7311, email address: erin.taylor@
ams.usda.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
proposed rule, in accordance to 7 CFR
part 900.13a, is the Secretary’s final
decision in this proceeding and
proposes the issuance of a marketing
order as defined in 7 CFR part 900.2(j).
AMS finds that a FMMO for California
would provide more orderly marketing
conditions in the marketing area,
warranting promulgation of a California
FMMO. The record is replete with
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SUMMARY:
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discussion from most parties on
whether disorderly marketing
conditions exist, or are even needed, to
warrant promulgation of a California
FMMO. FMMOs are authorized by the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. 601–674
and 7253) (AMAA). The declared policy
of the AMAA makes no mention of
‘‘disorder,’’ and AMS finds that
disorderly marketing conditions are not
a requirement for an order to be
promulgated. The standard for FMMO
promulgation is to ‘‘. . . establish and
maintain such orderly marketing
conditions . . . ,’’ (7 U.S.C. 602(4)) and
AMS finds that the proposed California
FMMO meets that standard.
AMS has considered all record
evidence presented at the hearing.
Pursuant to a February 14, 2018
Memorandum from Secretary of
Agriculture Sonny Perdue, Judicial
Officer William Jensen conducted an
independent de novo review of the
hearing record. The Judicial Officer
issued an Order on March 9, 2018
whereby he ratified all decisions and
rulings made by Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) Jill Clifton during the
hearing. The Judicial Officer ratified ALJ
Clifton’s Certification of the Transcript,
except that he revised the list of exhibits
that ALJ Clifton identified as not having
been admitted into evidence by adding
‘‘Exhibit 108-Exhibit D’’ to that list.
AMS has also considered the arguments
and proposed findings submitted in
post-hearing briefs, officially noticed
documents, and comments and
exceptions filed in response to the
recommended decision to formulate this
proposed FMMO. The regulatory
provisions proposed herein reflect
California marketing conditions, while
adhering to fundamental FMMO
principles that have historically helped
to maintain orderly marketing
conditions, ensured a sufficient supply
of pure and wholesome milk, and been
in the public interest.
A FMMO is a regulation issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture that places
certain requirements on the handling of
milk in the area it covers. Each FMMO
is established under the authority of the
AMAA. A FMMO requires handlers of
milk for a marketing area to pay
minimum class prices according to how
the milk is used. These prices are
established under each FMMO after a
public hearing where evidence is
received on the supply and demand
conditions for milk in the market. A
FMMO requires that payments for milk
be pooled and paid to individual
farmers or cooperative associations of
farmers on the basis of a uniform or
average price. Thus, all eligible dairy
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farmers (producers) share in the
marketwide use-values of milk by
regulated handlers.
AMS proposes the establishment of a
FMMO in 7 CFR part 1051 to regulate
the handling of milk in California.
Where appropriate, AMS proposes the
adoption of uniform provisions found in
7 CFR part 1000 that are have been
adopted into the 10 current FMMOS
established in chapter X. These uniform
provisions include, but are not limited
to, product classification, end-product
price formulas, Class I differential
structure, and the producer-handler
definition.1 This decision recognizes the
unique market structure of the
California dairy industry through
tailored performance-based standards to
determine eligibility for pool
participation.
As in all current FMMOs, California
handlers regulated by a California
FMMO would be responsible for
accurate reporting of all milk
movements and uses, and would be
required to make timely payments to
producers. The California FMMO would
be administered by the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
through a Market Administrator, who
would provide essential marketing
services, such as laboratory testing,
reporting verification, information
collection and publication, and
producer payment enforcement.
A unique feature of the proposed
order is a provision for the recognition
of the quota value specified in the
California quota program currently
administered by the California
Department of Food and Agriculture
(CDFA). AMS finds that the California
quota program should remain a function
of CDFA in whatever manner CDFA
deems appropriate. Should CDFA
continue to use producer monies to
fund the quota program, AMS finds that
the proper recognition of quota values
within a California FMMO, as provided
for in the Agriculture Act of 2014 (2014
Farm Bill) (Pub. L. 113–79, sec.
1410(d)), is to permit an authorized
deduction from payment to producers,
in an amount determined and
announced by CDFA.
In conjunction with this proposed
FMMO, AMS conducted a Regulatory
Economic Impact Analysis to determine
the potential impact of regulating
California milk handlers under a FMMO
on the milk supply, product demand
and prices, milk allocation in California
and throughout the United States, and
impacts to consumers. As part of the
1 References to Class I, Class II, Class III and Class
IV refer to products classified in those classes based
on uniform FMMO provisions.
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analysis, a regional econometric model
was used to project deviations from the
USDA Agricultural Baseline Projections
to 2026 2 under the provisions of the
proposed California FMMO. The full
text of the Regulatory Economic Impact
Analysis Report and accompanying
documentation may be accessed at
www.regulations.gov or
www.ams.usda.gov/caorder.
Prior documents in this proceeding:
Notice of Hearing: Issued July 27,
2015; published August 6, 2015 (80 FR
47210);
Notice To Reconvene Hearing: Issued
September 25, 2015; published
September 30, 2015 (80 FR 58636);
Recommended Decision and
Opportunity To File Written Exceptions:
Issued February 6, 2017; published
February 14, 2017 (82 FR 10634);
Documents for Official Notice: Issued
August 8, 2017; published August 14,
2017 (82 FR 37827); and
Submission for OMB Review:
Information Collection—Producer
Ballots: Issued September 27, 2017;
published October 2, 2017 (82 FR
45795);
Delay of Rulemaking: Issued February
1, 2018; published February 6, 2018 (83
FR 5215);
Ratification of Record: Issued March
14, 2018; published March 19, 2018 (83
FR 11903).
This proposed rule is governed by the
provisions of Sections 556 and 557 of
Title 5 of the United States Code and is
therefore excluded from the
requirements of Executive Order 12866.
This proposed rule is not expected to
be an Executive Order 13771 regulatory
action because this proposed rule is not
a significant regulatory action under
Executive Order 12866.
The provisions of this proposed rule
have been reviewed under Executive
Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. They
are not intended to have a retroactive
effect. If adopted, the proposed FMMO
would not preempt any state or local
laws, regulations, or policies, unless
they present an irreconcilable conflict
with this rule.
AMS is committed to complying with
the E-Government Act, to promote the
use of the internet and other
information technologies to provide
increased opportunities for citizen
access to Government information and
services, and for other purposes.
The AMAA provides that
administrative proceedings must be
exhausted before parties may file suit in
2 Official Notice is taken of: U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Office of the Chief Economist, World
Agricultural Outlook Board, Interagency
Agricultural Projections Committee, 2016, Longterm Projections Report OCE–2016–1.
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court. Under 7 U.S.C. 608c(15)(A) of the
AMAA, any handler subject to an order
may request modification or exemption
from such order by filing with USDA a
petition stating that the order, any
provision of the order, or any obligation
imposed in connection with the order is
not in accordance with the law. A
handler is afforded the opportunity for
a hearing on the petition. After a
hearing, USDA would rule on the
petition. The AMAA provides that the
district court of the United States in any
district in which the handler is an
inhabitant, or has its principal place of
business, has jurisdiction in equity to
review USDA’s ruling on the petition,
provided a bill in equity is filed not
later than 20 days after the date of the
entry of the ruling.
Civil Rights Impact Analysis
AMS has reviewed this proposed rule
in accordance with Departmental
Regulation 4300–4—Civil Rights Impact
Analysis (CRIA), to identify and address
potential impacts the proposal might
have on any protected groups of people.
After a careful review of the proposed
rule’s intent and provisions, AMS has
determined that this proposed rule, if
adopted, would not limit or reduce the
ability of individuals in any protected
classes to participate in the proposed
FMMO, or to enjoy the anticipated
benefits of the proposed program. Any
impacts on dairy farmers and processors
arising from implementation of this
proposed rule are not expected to be
disproportionate for members of any
protected group on a prohibited basis.
An anonymous commenter took
exception to AMS’s determination with
respect to civil rights impact of the
proposed rule. The commenter took
exception with AMS’s conclusion that
because the proposed California FMMO
would provide for orderly marketing
conditions, its implementation would
not result in disparate impacts on
protected classes, especially consumers.
The civil rights analysis did not
consider consumers because consumers
are not a protected class. Other
observations suggested by the
commenter regarding consumerism and
homelessness are outside the scope of
the CRIA.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Pursuant to the requirements set forth
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
(5 U.S.C. 601–612), AMS has considered
the economic impact of this action on
small entities. Accordingly, AMS has
prepared this regulatory flexibility
analysis.
The purpose of the RFA is to fit
regulatory actions to the scale of
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businesses subject to such actions so
that small businesses will not be unduly
or disproportionately burdened. Small
dairy farm businesses have been defined
by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) (13 CFR 121.601) as those
businesses having annual gross receipts
of less than $750,000. SBA’s definition
of small agricultural service firms,
which includes handlers that would be
regulated under this proposed FMO,
varies depending on the product
manufactured. Small fluid milk and ice
cream manufacturers are defined as
having 1,000 or fewer employees. Small
butter and dry or condensed dairy
product manufacturers are defined as
having 750 or fewer employees. Small
cheese manufacturers are defined as
having 1,250 or fewer employees.
For the purpose of determining which
California dairy farms are ‘‘small
businesses,’’ the $750,000 per year
criterion was used to establish a
production guideline that equates to
approximately 315,000 pounds of milk
per month. Although this guideline does
not factor in additional monies that may
be received by dairy farmers, it is a
standard encompassing most small
dairy farms. For the purpose of
determining a handler’s size, if the plant
is part of a larger company operating
multiple plants that collectively exceed
the employee limit for that type of
manufacturing, the plant is considered a
large business even if the local plant has
fewer than the defined number of
employees.
Interested persons were invited to
present evidence at the hearing on the
probable regulatory and informational
impact of the proposed California
FMMO on small businesses. Specific
evidence on the number of large and
small dairy farms in California (above
and below the threshold of $750,000 in
annual sales) was not presented at the
hearing. However, data compiled by
CDFA 3 suggests that between 5 and 15
percent of California dairy farms would
be considered small business entities.
No comparable data for dairy product
manufacturers was available.
Record evidence indicates that
implementing the proposed California
FMMO would not impose a
disproportionate burden on small
businesses. Currently, the California
dairy industry is regulated by a
California State Order (CSO) that is
administered and enforced by CDFA.
While the CSO and FMMOs have
differences that are discussed elsewhere
3 Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, California
Dairy Review, Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2015.
https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/CDR/2015/CDR_
SEPT_15.pdf.
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in this document, they both maintain
similar classified pricing and
marketwide pooling functions.
Therefore, it is not expected that the
proposed regulatory change will have a
significant impact on California small
businesses.
The record evidence indicates that
while the program is likely to impose
some costs on the regulated parties,
those costs would be outweighed by the
benefits expected to accrue to the
California dairy industry. In conjunction
with the publication of the
recommended decision (82 FR 10634),
AMS released a Regulatory Economic
Impact Analysis (REIA) to study the
possible impacts of the proposed
California FMMO. AMS received five
comments related to the REIA. The
substance of those comments and
AMS’s response are provided in the
documentation that accompanies an
updated REIA, which was prepared to
reflect the provisions proposed in this
FMMO. The updated analysis may be
viewed in conjunction with this
proposed FMMO (Docket No. AMS–
DA–14–0095) at www.regulations.gov.
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California Dairy Market Background
The record shows that the California
dairy industry accounts for
approximately 20 percent of the nation’s
milk supply. While its 39 million
residents are concentrated in the state’s
coastal areas, the majority of California’s
dairy farms are located in the interior
valleys, frequently at some distance
from milk processing plants and
consumer population centers.
CDFA has defined and established
distinct regulations for Northern and
Southern California dairy regions.4
According to data published by CDFA,5
over 94 percent of the state’s
approximately 40.4 billion pounds of
milk for 2016 was produced in the
Northern California region. The five
leading milk production counties in
2016 were Tulare, Merced, Kings,
Stanislaus, and Kern, together
accounting for approximately 72.4
percent of the state’s milk.
According to CDFA, there were 1,392
dairy farms in California in 2016. Of
those, 1,297 were located in Northern
California, and 95 were in Southern
California. The statewide average
number of cows per dairy was 1,249; in
4 Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, Stabilization
and Marketing Plan for Market Milk, as Amended,
for the Northern California Marketing Area, August
2015. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/hearings/
2015/NOCAL_STAB_PLAN61.pdf.
5 Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, California
Dairy Statistics Annual, 2016. https://
www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/Annual/2016/2016_
Statistics_Annual.pdf.
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Northern California, the average herd
size was 1,265 cows, and in Southern
California, 1,026 cows. Average milk
production for the state’s 1.74 million
cows was 23,265 pounds in 2016.
According to record evidence, 132
handlers reported milk receipts to CDFA
for at least one month during 2015. A
CDFA February 2015 list of California
dairy product processing plants by type
of product produced 6 shows that 35
California plants processed Class 1
products; 75 plants processed Class 2
and 3 products; 18 plants processed
Class 4a products; and 64 plants
processed Class 4b products.7 Some
plants processed products in more than
one class.
CDFA reported 8 that approximately
98 percent of California’s 2016 milk
production was market grade (Grade A),
and the rest was manufacturing grade
(Grade B). Thirteen percent of the milk
pooled under the CSO was utilized by
California processors as Class 1 (fluid
milk). Eight and three-tenths percent
was utilized for Classes 2 and 3 (soft
and frozen dairy products), 32.3 percent
was utilized for Class 4a (butter and
dried milk powders), and 46.4 percent
was utilized for Class 4b (cheese).
According to CDFA, total Class 1 sales
in California were approximately 642
million gallons in 2016. Record
evidence shows that annual California
Class 1 sales outside the state averaged
22 million gallons for the five years
preceding 2015.
The record shows that for the fiveyear period from 2010 through 2014, an
average of 230 million pounds of
California bulk milk products were
transferred to out-of-state plants for
processing each year. During the same
period, an average of 633 million
pounds of milk from outside the state
was received and reported by California
pool plants each year.
Impact on Small Businesses
AMS proposes to establish a FMMO
in California similar to the 10 existing
FMMOs in the national system. The
California dairy industry is currently
regulated under the CSO, which is
similar to the proposed FMMO in most
respects. California handlers currently
report milk receipts and utilization to
CDFA, which calculates handler prices
based on component values derived
from finished product sales surveys.
6 Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, Milk and
Dairy Food Safety Branch, Milk Plant Listings.
https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ahfss/Milk_and_Dairy_
Food_Safety/#Plants.
7 References to Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, Class 4a
and Class 4b refer to products classified in those
categories based on the CSO.
8 CDFA, California Dairy Statistics Annual, 2016.
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Likewise, FMMO handlers report milk
receipts and utilization to the Market
Administrators, who calculate handlers’
pool obligations according to price
formulas that incorporate component
prices based on end product sales
values. Under both programs, the value
of handlers’ milk is pooled, and pool
revenues are shared by all the pooled
producers. Thus, transitioning to the
FMMO is expected to have only a
minimal impact on the reporting and
regulatory responsibilities for large or
small handlers, who are already
complying with similar CSO
regulations.
Pricing
Under the proposed California
FMMO, uniform FMMO end-product
price formulas would replace the CDFA
price formulas currently used to
calculate handler milk prices. FMMO
end-product price formulas incorporate
component prices derived from national
end-product sales surveys conducted by
AMS. Use of price formulas based on
national product sales would permit
California producers to receive prices
for pooled milk reflective of the national
market for commodity products for
which their milk is utilized. Consistent
with the current FMMOs, California
FMMO Class I prices would be
computed using the higher of the Class
III or IV advance prices announced the
previous month, and would be adjusted
by the Class I differential for the county
where the plant is located.9
Regulated minimum prices, especially
for milk used in cheese manufacturing,
are likely to be higher than what
handlers would pay under the CSO.
However, pooling regulations under the
proposed FMMO would allow handlers
to elect not to pool milk used in
manufacturing. This option would be
available to both large and small
manufacturing handlers.
Dairy farmers whose milk is pooled
on the proposed California FMMO
would receive a pro rata share of the
pool revenues through the California
FMMO uniform blend price. The
California FMMO would not provide for
the quota and non-quota milk pricing
tiers found under the CSO. Under the
proposed California FMMO, regulated
handlers would be allowed to deduct
monies, in an amount determined and
announced by CDFA, from blend prices
paid to California dairy farmers for
9 FMMOs have four classifications of milk: Class
I—fluid milk products; Class II—fluid cream
products, soft ‘‘spoonable’’ cheeses, ice cream, and
yogurt; Class III—hard cheeses and spreadable
cheese such as cream cheese; Class IV—butter and
dried milk products.
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pooled milk and send those monies to
CDFA to administer the quota program.
These changes are expected to affect
producers and handlers of all sizes, but
are not expected to be disproportionate
for small entities.
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Producer-Handlers
The record shows that there are four
producer-handlers 10 in California
whose Class 1 milk production is all or
partially exempt from CSO pricing and
pooling by virtue of their ‘‘exempt
quota’’ holdings, representing
approximately 21 million pounds of
milk each month. It is likely that these
four entities would become fully
regulated by the proposed California
FMMO and accountable to the
marketwide pool for all of their Class I
sales in the marketing area. By
accounting to the pool for all their Class
I sales in the marketing area, the value
of the marketwide pool is expected to
increase, benefiting most other large and
small producers. The proposed
California FMMO makes no provision
for exempting large producer-handlers
from pricing and pooling regulations
under the order.
The evidentiary record shows that
several smaller California producerhandlers, whose production volume
exceeds the threshold to receive an
exemption from the CSO’s pricing and
pooling regulations, would likely
qualify as producer-handlers under the
proposed California FMMO.11
Interstate Commerce
The evidentiary record indicates that
milk in interstate commerce, which the
CSO does not have authority to regulate,
would be regulated under the proposed
California FMMO. Currently, California
handlers who purchase milk produced
outside the state do not account to the
CSO marketwide pool for that milk.
Record evidence shows approximately
425 million pounds of milk from
outside the state was processed into
Class 1 products at California processing
plants during 2014.
Under the proposed FMMO, all Class
I milk processed and distributed in the
marketing area would be subject to
FMMO pricing and pooling regulations,
regardless of its origin. Thus, revenues
from Class 1 sales that are not currently
regulated would accrue to the California
FMMO pool and would be shared with
all producers who are pooled on the
10 Producer-handlers are dairy farmers who
process and distribute their own farm milk into
dairy products.
11 The CSO exempts producer-handlers with sales
averaging less than 500 gallons of milk per day on
an annual basis and who distribute 95 percent of
their production to retail or wholesale outlets.
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California FMMO, including out-of-state
producers. If California handlers elect to
continue processing out-of-state milk
into Class I products, under the
provisions of the proposed California
FMMO they would be required to pay
the order’s classified minimum price for
that milk. Those additional revenues
would be pooled and would benefit
large and small producers who
participate in the pool. Both large and
small out-of-state producers who ship
milk to pool plants in California would
receive the California FMMO uniform
blend price for their milk.
Classification and Fortification
Dairy product classification under the
CSO and the proposed FMMO is
similar, but not identical. The table
below compares CSO and FMMO
product classes.
Equivalent
FMMO
Class
CSO Class
Class
Class
Class
Class
1 .....................................
2 and 3 ...........................
4b ...................................
4a ...................................
Class
Class
Class
Class
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Under the proposed California
FMMO, the classification of certain
California products would change to
align with standard FMMO
classifications:
• Reassigning buttermilk from CSO
Class 2 to FMMO Class I
• Reassigning half and half from CSO
Class 1 to FMMO Class II
• Reassigning eggnog from CSO Class
2 to FMMO Class I
• There are numerous instances
where the CSO classifies a product
based on product type and where the
product is sold.12 The proposed
California FMMO would classify all
products based solely on product type.
Under the proposed FMMO,
California handlers would no longer
receive credits for fluid milk
fortification. Instead, accounting for
fortification would be uniform with
other FMMOs, as the fluid milk
equivalent of the milk solids used to
fortify fluid milk products would be
classified as Class IV, and the increased
volume of Class I product due to
fortification would be classified as Class
I. The FMMO system accounts for
fortification differently than does the
CSO. The record does not indicate the
net impact of this change. However, the
impact is not expected to
disproportionately affect small entities.
12 Official
Notice is taken of: CDFA, Classification
of Dairy Products. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/
pdf/PRDCLASS.pdf.
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Transportation Credits
The proposed California FMMO does
not contain a transportation credit
program to encourage milk shipments to
Class 1, 2, and 3 plants, as is currently
provided for in the CSO. AMS proposes
that producer payments be adjusted to
reflect the applicable producer location
adjustment for the handler location
where the milk is received, thus
providing the incentive to producers to
supply Class I plants. Producers are
responsible for finding a market for their
milk and consequently bear the cost of
transporting their milk to a plant. The
record of this proceeding does not
support reducing the producers’ value
of the marketwide pool by authorizing
transportation credits to handlers. This
change is not expected to
disproportionately impact small
business entities.
Summary
AMS continues to find that adoption
of the proposed California FMMO
would promote more orderly marketing
of milk in interstate commerce.
Classified milk prices under the order
would reflect national prices for
manufactured products and local prices
for fluid milk products, fostering greater
equality for California producers and
handlers in the markets where they
compete. Under the proposed FMMO,
handlers would be assured a uniform
cost for raw milk, and producers would
receive uniform payments for raw milk,
regardless of its use. Small dairy farmers
and handlers are not expected to be
disproportionately impacted by the
transition from CSO to FMMO
regulations.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35), the ballot materials that
will be used in conducting the
referendum have been submitted to and
approved by OMB (0581–0300). The
forms to be used to administer the
proposed California FMMO have also
been reviewed by OMB (0581–0032) and
would be approved should the
California FMMO producer referendum
pass.
Any additional information collection
and recordkeeping requirements that
may be imposed under the proposed
order would be submitted to OMB for
public comment and approval.
Secretary’s Decision
Notice is hereby given of the filing
with the Hearing Clerk of this final
decision with respect to the proposed
marketing agreement and order
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regulating the handling of milk in
California.
This final decision is issued pursuant
to the provisions of the AMAA and the
applicable rules of practice and
procedure governing the formulation of
marketing agreements and orders (7 CFR
part 900). The proposed marketing
agreement and order are authorized
under 7 U.S.C. 608c.
The proposed marketing agreement
and order are based on the record of a
public hearing held September 22
through November 18, 2015, in Clovis,
California. The hearing was held to
receive evidence on four proposals
submitted by dairy farmers, handlers,
and other interested parties. Notice of
this hearing was published in the
Federal Register on August 6, 2015 (80
FR 47210).
Ninety-eight witnesses testified over
the course of the 40-day hearing.
Witnesses provided a broad overview of
the history and complexity of the
California dairy industry, and submitted
194 exhibits containing supporting data,
analyses, and historical information.
Upon the basis of evidence
introduced at the hearing and the record
thereof, the Administrator of AMS on
February 6, 2017, filed with the Hearing
Clerk, USDA, a recommended decision
and Opportunity to File Written
Exceptions thereto by May 15, 2017.
Twenty-nine comments or exceptions
were filed. That document also
announced AMS’s intent to request
approval of new information collection
requirements to implement the program.
Written comments on the proposed
information collection requirements
were due April 17, 2017. Two
comments were filed. AMS issued a
notice regarding Documents for Official
Notice, inviting comments on whether
the Department should take official
notice of numerous listed documents
submitted for consideration by
proponents. The notice was issued on
August 8, 2017, and published on
August 14, 2017. Comments on the
official notice request were due August
29, 2017. Three supportive comments
were received and are discussed later in
this decision. Lastly, AMS announced
its intent to request approval of a new
information collection for ballot
material to be used in a producer
referendum in a document issued on
April 17, 2017, and published on April
21, 2017. Comments on the ballot
material information collection were
due June 20, 2017. One supportive
comment was received. A Submission
for OMB Review seeking OMB approval
of the ballot material was issued on
September 27, 2017, and published on
October 2, 2017 (82 FR 45795).
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The material issues presented on the
record of hearing are as follows:
1. Whether the handling of milk in the
proposed marketing area is in the
current of interstate commerce, or
directly burdens, obstructs, or affects
interstate commerce in milk or its
products;
2. Whether economic and marketing
conditions in California show a need for
a Federal marketing order that would
tend to effectuate the declared policy of
the Act;
3. If an order is issued, what its
provisions should be with respect to:
a. Handlers to be regulated and milk
to be priced and pooled under the order;
b. Classification of milk, and
assignment of receipts to classes of
utilization;
c. Pricing of milk;
d. Distribution of proceeds to
producers; and
e. Administrative provisions.
Findings and Conclusions
The findings and conclusions on the
material issues are based on the record
of the hearing and the comments and
exceptions filed with regard to the
recommended decision. Discussions are
organized by topic, recognizing
inevitable overlap in some areas. Topics
are addressed in the following order:
1. Regulatory Comparison
2. Overview of Proposals
3. Justification for a California FMMO
4. California Quota Program Recognition
5. Definitions and Uniform Provisions
6. Classification
7. Pricing
8. Pooling
9. Transportation Credits
10. Miscellaneous and Administrative
Provisions
11. Ruling on Office Notice Documents
12. Rulings on Proposed Findings,
Conclusions, and Exceptions
1. Regulatory Comparison
The purpose of the following section
is to provide a general description and
comparison of the major features of the
California state dairy regulatory
framework and the FMMO system as
provided in the evidentiary record. A
more detailed discussion of each issue
is provided in the appropriate section of
this decision.
California State Order:
Currently, milk marketing in
California is regulated by the CDFA. The
CSO is codified in the Pooling Plan for
Market Milk, as amended, and in two
Stabilization and Marketing Plan(s) for
Market Milk, as amended, for the
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Northern and Southern California
marketing areas.13
Quota
The California quota program is a
state-administered producer program
that entitles the quota holder to $0.195
per pound of solids-not-fat above the
CSO base and overbase price of milk.14
The quota premium is funded by a
deduction from the CSO marketwide
pool before the CSO overbase price is
calculated. The quota program requires
quota holders to deliver milk to a pool
plant at least once every 60 days. Quota
can be bought and sold, and according
to record evidence, approximately 58
percent of California dairy farms owned
some volume of quota in 2015.
Classification
The CSO provides for the pricing of
five classified use values of milk. In
general, Class 1 is milk used in fluid
milk products; Class 2 is milk used in
heavy cream, cottage cheese, yogurt, and
sterilized products; Class 3 is milk used
in ice cream and frozen products; Class
4a is milk used in butter and dry milk
products, such as nonfat dry milk; and
Class 4b is milk used in cheese—other
than cottage cheese—and whey
products.
Pricing
The CSO utilizes an end-product
pricing system to determine classified
prices for raw milk produced and
manufactured in the State of California.
Class 1, 4a, and 4b prices are announced
monthly. Class 2 and 3 prices are
announced bi-monthly. Prices for all
five milk classes are component-based.
Three components of milk are used to
determine prices: butterfat (fat); solidsnot-fat (SNF), which includes protein
and lactose; and a fluid carrier (used in
only the Class 1 price).
The CSO determines milk component
prices based on commodity market
prices obtained from the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME), the AMS
Dairy Market News Western Dry
Whey—Mostly (WDW-Mostly) price
series, and the announced nonfat dry
milk (NFDM) California Weighted
Average Price (CWAP), which is
determined by CDFA through weekly
surveys of California manufacturing
plants.
The price for milk used in cheese
manufacturing (CSO Class 4b) is a
13 Official Notice is taken of: Chapter 2, Part 3,
Division 21 and Chapter 3, Part 3, Division 21 of
the California Food and Agriculture Code.
14 The hearing record reveals that the $0.195 per
pound solids-non-fat equates to a $1.70 per cwt of
milk quota premium. Additionally, under current
CSO provisions, base and overbase prices are equal.
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central issue in this proceeding. The
Class 4b price is announced monthly
and utilizes average commodity market
prices for block Cheddar cheese, butter,
and dry skim whey to determine the
Class 4b component values. The average
CME prices for butter and 40-pound
Cheddar blocks are adjusted by f.o.b.
price adjusters, which are designed to
represent the difference between the
CME price and the price California
manufacturers actually receive. The
CME butter price is also reduced by
$0.10 per pound to derive the value of
whey butter as it relates to cheese
processing. The value of dry skim whey
is determined through a sliding scale
that provides a per hundredweight (cwt)
value based on a series of announced
WDW-Mostly per pound value ranges.
The sliding scale determines dry whey’s
contribution to the Class 4b price, with
a floor of $0.25 per cwt and a ceiling of
$0.75 per cwt when the WDW-Mostly
price equals or exceeds $0.60 per
pound.
The CSO pricing system has a number
of features worth highlighting. First,
under the CSO, handlers must pay at
least minimum classified prices for all
Grade A milk purchased from California
dairy farmers, regardless of whether the
milk is pooled on the CSO.
Additionally, Class 1 processors may
claim credits against their pool
obligations to offset the cost of fortifying
fluid milk to meet the State-mandated
nonfat solids content standards.
The classified use values of all the
milk pooled on the CSO are aggregated,
and producers are paid on the fat and
SNF component levels in their raw
milk. Producers are paid on the basis of
their allocated quota (if applicable),
base, and overbase production for the
month. While the CSO pricing formulas
have changed over time, in their current
form the base and overbase prices are
the same. Generally, the quota price is
the overbase price plus the $1.70 per
cwt quota premium.
Pooling
Almost all California-produced milk
received by California pool plants is
pooled on the CSO, with some
exceptions. Grade B milk is neither
pooled nor subject to minimum prices.
Manufacturing plants that do not make
any Class 1 or 2 products can opt out
of the pool; however, they are still
required to pay announced CSO
classified minimum prices for Grade A
milk received. The requirement that
quota holders must deliver milk to a
pool plant at least once every 60 days
tends to limit the amount of Grade A
milk not pooled on the CSO. The
decision not to pool milk in California
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carries with it a stipulation that the
plant may not repool for 12 months after
opting not to pool, and after repooling,
a plant cannot opt out of pooling for 12
months.
Entities recognized as producerhandlers under the CSO may be exempt
from pooling some or all of their milk.
Producer-handlers are dairy farmers
who also process and distribute their
dairy products. Fully exempt (‘‘Option
66’’) producer-handlers have minimal
production volumes and are exempt
from the pricing and pooling provisions
of the CSO. Producer-handlers who own
exempt quota (‘‘Option 70’’) do not
account to the CSO marketwide pool for
the volume of Class 1 milk covered by
their exempt quota.
The State of California cannot regulate
interstate commerce; therefore, milk
from out-of-state producers cannot be
regulated by the CSO. While the record
reflects that California handlers
typically pay for out-of-state milk at a
price reflective of the receiving plant’s
utilization, those prices are not
regulated or enforced by the CSO.
Transportation Credits
The CSO provides transportation
credits to producers for farm-to-plant
Class 1, 2, and 3 milk movements
between designated supply zones and
plants with more than 50 percent Class
1, 2, and/or 3 utilization in designated
demand zones. The CSO also provides
for transportation allowances to
handlers for plant-to-plant milk
movements.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders
A FMMO is a regulation issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) that
places certain requirements on the
handling of milk in a defined
geographic marketing area. FMMOs are
authorized by the AMAA. The declared
policy of the AMAA is to ‘‘. . . establish
and maintain such orderly marketing
conditions for agricultural commodities
in interstate commerce . . .’’ (7 U.S.C.
602(1)). The principal means of meeting
the objectives of the FMMO program are
through the use of classified milk
pricing and the marketwide pooling of
returns.
Classification
Whereas the CSO designates five
classes of milk utilization, FMMOs
provide for four classes of milk
utilization. FMMO Class I is milk used
in fluid milk products. Class II is milk
used to produce fluid cream products,
soft ‘‘spoonable’’ products like cottage
cheese, ice cream, sour cream, and
yogurt, and other products such as kefir,
baking mixes, infant formula and meal
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replacements, certain prepared foods,
and ingredients in other prepared food
products. Class III is milk used to
produce spreadable cheeses like cream
cheese, and hard cheeses, like Cheddar,
that can be crumbled, grated, or
shredded. Class IV is milk used to
produce butter, evaporated, or
sweetened condensed milk in
consumer-style packages, and dry milk
products.
Pricing
Like the CSO, the FMMO program
currently uses end-product price
formulas based on the wholesale prices
of finished products to determine the
minimum classified prices handlers pay
for raw milk in the four classes of
utilization. However, the FMMO pricing
system has some notable differences.
While the CSO announces some
classified prices on a bi-monthly basis,
FMMOs announce prices for all four
milk classes monthly. FMMOs use four
components of milk to determine prices:
Butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and
other solids.
Like the CSO, the FMMO determines
component prices based on commodity
prices. However, AMS administers the
Dairy Product Mandatory Reporting
Program (DPMRP) to survey weekly
wholesale prices of four manufactured
dairy products (cheese, butter, NFDM
and dry whey), and releases weekly
average survey prices in the National
Dairy Product Sales Report (NDPSR).15
The FMMO product-price formulas use
these surveyed prices to determine the
component values in raw milk.
As referenced previously, a central
issue of this proceeding is the pricing of
milk used for cheese manufacturing
(FMMO Class III). The FMMO pricing
system determines the Class III value
from DPMRP surveyed butter, cheese,
and dry whey prices. The FMMO does
not utilize a sliding scale to determine
the value of whey that contributes to the
Class III price.
Unlike the CSO, FMMOs do not
provide for a tiered system of producer
payments. A uniform blend price is
computed for each FMMO reflecting the
use of all milk in each marketwide pool.
A blend price is paid for all milk that
is pooled on the FMMO, adjusted for
location. In six of the FMMOs,
producers are paid for the pounds of
butterfat, pounds of protein, pounds of
other solids, and cwt of milk pooled.
The cwt price is known as the producer
price differential (PPD) and reflects the
15 Official Notice is taken of: The Notice of
Equivalent Price Series: 77 FR 22282. The National
Dairy Product Sales Report was deemed as
equivalent to the price series previously released by
the National Agricultural Statistics Service.
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producer’s pro rata share of the value of
Class I, Class II, and Class IV uses in the
pool relative to Class III value. In the
other four FMMOs, producers are paid
on a butterfat and skim basis.
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Pooling
Inclusion in the FMMO marketwide
pool carries with it an obligation to be
available to serve the fluid market with
necessary milk supplies throughout the
year. In the FMMO system, participation
in the pool is mandatory for distributing
plants that process Grade A milk into
Class I products sold in a FMMO
marketing area. Handlers of
manufacturing milk (Class II, III, or IV)
have the option of pooling, and pool
eligibility is based on performance
standards specific to each FMMO.
FMMOs recognize the unique
business structures of producerhandlers and exempt them from the
pricing and pooling regulations of the
orders based on size. Producer-handler
exemptions under FMMOs are limited
to those vertically-integrated entities
that produce and distribute no more
than three million pounds of packaged
fluid milk products each month.
Unlike the CSO, FMMOs are
authorized to regulate the interstate
commerce connected with milk
marketing. Thus, there is no
differentiated regulatory treatment for
milk produced outside of a FMMO
marketing area boundary. All eligible
milk is pooled and priced in the same
manner, regardless of its source.
Transportation Credits
The Appalachian and Southeast
FMMOs provide for transportation
credits to offset a handler’s cost of
hauling supplemental milk to Class I
markets. During deficit months,
handlers can apply for transportation
credits to offset the cost of supplemental
milk deliveries from outside the
marketing area to meet the Class I
demand of FMMO handlers. The most
significant difference from the CSO here
is that the FMMO transportation credits
described are not paid from the
marketwide pool. Instead, they are paid
from separate funds obtained through
monthly assessments on handlers’ Class
I producer milk. The exception is the
Upper Midwest FMMO, which provides
transportation credits on plant-to-plant
milk movements paid from the
marketwide pool.
2. Overview of Proposals
Four proposals were published in the
Hearing Notice of this proceeding. Dairy
Farmers of America, Inc., Land O’Lakes,
Inc., and California Dairies, Inc. jointly
submitted Proposal 1. Dairy Farmers of
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America, Inc. (DFA), is a national dairyfarmer owned cooperative with
approximately 14,000 members and
several processing facilities located
throughout the United States, with
products marketed both nationally and
internationally. Within California, DFA
represents 260 members and operates
three processing facilities. Land O’Lakes
(LOL) is a national farmer-owned
cooperative with over 2,200 dairyfarmer members. LOL has processing
facilities in the Upper Midwest, the
eastern United States, and the State of
California, with products marketed
nationally and internationally. Within
California, LOL represents 200 dairyfarmer members and operates three
processing facilities. California Dairies,
Inc. (CDI), is a California based dairyfarmer owned cooperative with 390
dairy-farmer members, six processing
facilities in California, and national and
international product sales. Combined,
DFA, LOL, and CDI (Cooperatives)
market approximately 75 percent of the
milk produced in California.
Proposal 1 seeks to establish a
California FMMO that incorporates the
same dairy product classification and
pricing provisions as those used
throughout the FMMO system. Proposal
1 also includes unique pooling
provisions, described as ‘‘inclusive’’
throughout the proceeding, that would
pool the majority of the milk produced
in California each month while also
allowing for the pooling of milk
produced outside of the marketing area
if it meets specific pooling provisions.
The proposal includes fortification and
transportation credits similar to those
currently provided by the CSO. Lastly,
Proposal 1 provides for payment of the
California quota program quota values
from the marketwide pool before the
FMMO blend price is computed each
month.
Proposal 2 was submitted on behalf of
the Dairy Institute of California
(Institute). The Institute is a California
trade association representing
proprietary fluid milk processors,
cheese manufacturers, and cultured and
frozen dairy products manufacturers in
38 plants throughout California.
Institute plants process 70 percent of the
fluid milk products, 85 percent of the
cultured and frozen dairy products, and
90 percent of the cheese manufactured
in the state. The Institute’s first position
is that a California FMMO should not be
promulgated. However, should USDA
find justification for promulgation, the
Institute supports Proposal 2. Proposal 2
incorporates the same dairy product
classification provisions used
throughout the FMMO system, as well
as pooling provisions that are consistent
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with those found in other FMMOs. The
Proposal 2 pooling provisions require
the pooling of Class I milk, but the
pooling of milk used in manufactured
products is optional. Proposal 2
includes fortification and transportation
credits similar to those currently
provided by the CSO. It also includes an
additional shrinkage allowance for
extended shelf life (ESL) products above
that provided in the FMMO system.
Lastly, Proposal 2 recognizes quota
value by allowing producers to opt out
of the quota program, thus receiving a
FMMO blend price reflective of the
market’s utilization. Under Proposal 2,
producers who remain in the quota
program would have their blend price
monies transferred to CDFA and
redistributed according to their quota
and non-quota holdings.
Proposal 3 was submitted on behalf of
the California Producer Handlers
Association (CPHA). CPHA is an
association of four producer-handlers:
Foster Farms Dairy, Inc. (Foster);
Hollandia Dairy, Inc.; Producers Dairy
Foods, Inc. (Producers);and Rockview
Dairies, Inc. (Rockview). CPHA
members own their respective dairy
farms and process that farm milk, as
well as the milk of other dairy farms, for
delivery to consumers. CPHA members
own exempt quota, which entitles them
to exemption from CSO pricing and
pooling provisions for the volume of
Class 1 milk covered by their exempt
quota. Proposal 3 seeks recognition and
continuation of CPHA members’ exempt
quota status under a California FMMO.
Proposal 4 was submitted on behalf of
Ponderosa Dairy (Ponderosa). Ponderosa
is a Nevada dairy farm that supplies raw
milk to California fluid milk processing
plants. Ponderosa contends that
disorderly marketing conditions do not
exist in California that would warrant
promulgation of a FMMO. However, if
USDA finds justification for a California
FMMO, Proposal 4 seeks to allow
California handlers to elect partiallyregulated plant status with regard to
milk they receive from out-of-state
producers. Such allowance would
enable handlers to not pool out-of-state
milk, as long as they could demonstrate
that they paid out-of-state producers an
amount equal to or higher than the
market blend price.
3. Justification for a California FMMO
This section reviews and summarizes
the testimony, hearing evidence, and
comments and exceptions filed
regarding the recommended decision
addressing whether or not promulgation
of a California FMMO is justified. After
careful consideration and review, this
final decision affirms the finding that
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the proposed California FMMO would
provide for more orderly marketing
conditions for the handling of milk in
the State of California, as provided for
and authorized by the AMAA. The
Secretary has found upon the record
that the proposed order and all of its
terms and provisions will tend to
effectuate the declared policy of the
AMAA 608 c(4).
Summary of Testimony
A Cooperative witness testified
regarding current California marketing
conditions and the need for establishing
a California FMMO. According to the
witness, California is the largest milkproducing state, producing more than
20 percent of the nation’s milk. The
witness stated that the pooled volume of
a California FMMO would be the largest
of all FMMOs, averaging slightly below
3.4 billion pounds per month; the Class
I volume would represent the third
largest, following the Northeast and
Mideast FMMOs.
The Cooperative witness testified that
the primary reason California farmers
are seeking the establishment of a
FMMO is to receive prices reflective of
the national commodity values for all
milk uses. The witness opined that
orderly marketing is no longer attainable
through the CSO because the prices
California dairy farmers receive do not
reflect the full value of their raw milk.
The witness estimated that this pricing
difference has reduced California dairy
farm income by $1.5 billion since 2010.
The witness maintained that Proposal 1
allows California dairy farms to receive
an equitable price for their milk, while
also tailoring FMMO provisions to the
California dairy industry. The
Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief
reflected this position.
The Cooperative witness testified that
there are significant price differences,
depending on whether a producer’s
milk is regulated by the CSO or a
FMMO. To illustrate this difference, the
witness compared California farm milk
prices to those received by producers in
the states that comprise the Upper
Midwest and Pacific Northwest
marketing areas.16 The witness selected
these areas for comparison due to the
similar milk utilization in the Upper
Midwest FMMO and the geographic
proximity of the Pacific Northwest
FMMO. The witness estimated that
between August 2012 and May 2015,
California dairy farmers received on
average $1.85 per cwt less (ranging from
$0.43–$4.27 per cwt lower) than
producers pooled on the Upper Midwest
16 Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois; Oregon,
Washington and Northern Idaho, respectively.
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and Pacific Northwest FMMOs. The
witness used the data to emphasize a
wide difference in prices for farmers in
similarly situated areas. The witness
opined that a California FMMO, as
advanced in Proposal 1, would ensure
California dairy farmers receive
equitable prices, more in line with those
received by their FMMO counterparts.
The Cooperative witness emphasized
that while both the CSO and the
FMMOs use end-product pricing
formulas to determine class prices, the
two regulatory systems use different
commodity series, effective dates, yield
factors, and make allowances, which
result in substantially different prices,
as highlighted above. The witness
explained that while the two regulatory
systems have always had price
differences, historically CSO and
FMMO prices were relatively close.
According to the witness, prices began
to diverge significantly in 2007 when
the CSO established a fixed whey factor
in its formula for milk used to produce
cheese. From that point forward, the
witness said, price differences have
become significant and have led to
market disruptions both in the fluid and
manufacturing markets.
The Cooperative witness summarized
USDA’s justification from the FMMO
Order Reform decision for adopting a
national Class I price surface that
assigns a Class I differential for every
county in the country, including
counties in California. The witness said
that the separate CSO Class 1 price
surface undermines the integrity of the
nationally coordinated Class I price
surface and has become a source of
disorder in California. To demonstrate
the disorder, the witness compared
FMMO Class I and CSO Class 1 prices
for both in-state and out-of-state
purchases. The witness said that
because of the CSO and FMMO
differences in both classified price
formulas and Class I/1 price surfaces,
the Class 1 price paid by California
handlers is almost always lower than
what it otherwise would be if FMMO
Class I prices were applicable for those
same purchases.
The Cooperative witness presented a
similar comparison between CSO Class
1 prices and Class I prices in FMMO
areas that were likely competitors. The
witness said that under FMMO
regulations, the difference in Class I
prices between two FMMO areas is
attributed to the difference in the Class
I differential at the two locations. For
example, the witness explained, the
Class I price difference between two
plants, one located in a $2.10 zone and
another in the $2.00 zone, would be
$0.10 per cwt. However, when the
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witness compared Class 1 prices in
California and a competing FMMO area,
the price difference was always greater
than the difference in differentials. For
example, the FMMO differential in the
Los Angeles/San Diego market is $2.10,
while the differential in neighboring
Phoenix is $2.35, a difference of $0.25.
However, said the witness, when
comparing the actual CSO Class 1 price
in Los Angeles/San Diego with the
FMMO Class I price in Phoenix from
August 2012 to July 2015, the difference
averaged $0.62. The witness concluded
that these observed price differences
undermine a nationally-coordinated
pricing structure and contribute to
disorderly marketing, where fluid milk
handlers pay different minimum prices
depending on where they are regulated.
The Cooperative witness also
provided testimony on the CSO and
FMMO price disparities for
manufacturing milk. The witness
testified that FMMO Class II, III, and IV
prices reflect national prices for
products manufactured in these classes.
If Proposal 1 is adopted, the witness
said, California handlers would pay the
same uniform prices as their FMMO
competitors in the national marketplace.
The witness noted past FMMO
decisions that discussed the national
supply and demand for manufactured
dairy products and the need for national
uniform manufacturing prices. The
witness stressed that California
producers should also receive these
national prices like their FMMO
counterparts.
The Cooperative witness elaborated
on the differences between CSO and
FMMO manufacturing class prices.
When comparing FMMO Class II to CSO
Class 2 and Class 3 prices, the witness
cited differences in the commodity
series used as price references, the time
periods of data used, and the length of
time prices are applicable to explain the
sometimes large differences in prices
under the two regulatory systems. As a
result, the witness said, Class 2 products
are sometimes sold on a spot basis to
exploit short-term price differences.
The Cooperative witness presented a
comparison of CSO Class 4a and FMMO
Class IV prices from January 2000 to
July 2015, revealing that over the entire
time period the Class 4a price averaged
$0.29 per cwt less than the Class IV
price. The witness added that over this
15-year period, the CSO Class 4a price
on an annual average basis was never
above the FMMO Class IV price.
The Cooperative witness also
provided testimony on the price
disparity between CSO Class 4b and
FMMO Class III price formulas. Data
from January 2000 to July 2015 revealed
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that the CSO Class 4b price was lower
than the Class III price in 161 of the 187
months examined. The witness
computed the average difference over
that 15-year time period to be $0.91 per
cwt, with the largest difference of $3.24
per cwt occurring in November 2014.
The witness attributed the observed
price differences to differences in the
valuation of dry whey between the CSO
4b and the FMMO Class III formulas.
The witness said that in 2007, the whey
factor in the CSO Class 4b formula
became a tiered, bracketed system with
a floor of $0.25 and a ceiling of $0.75,
which is reached when the WDWMostly price is greater than or equal to
$0.60 per pound. The witness added
that the whey value contained in the
FMMO Class III price comes from the
AMS NDPSR, and reflects the
mandatory reporting of dry whey sales
throughout the country. The witness
estimated that from August 2012
through July 2015, the Dairy Market
News (DMN) whey value contributed
$0.68 per cwt to the CSO 4b price, while
the NDPSR whey value contributed
$2.39 per cwt to the FMMO Class III
price. The witness concluded that the
whey cap contained in the CSO 4b price
results in lower contributions to the
marketwide pool than what is observed
in the national marketplace and
reflected in FMMO prices.
The Cooperative witness reiterated
the consequences of having two
different regulatory pricing schemes
which has led to severe differences
between the regulated markets. The
witness opined that the regulatory
differences allow California handlers
who purchase raw milk and
manufacture products for sale in the
national marketplace to pay
substantially different regulated
minimum prices than handlers
regulated by the FMMO system. The
witness estimated that because of the
regulatory price differences, from
August 2012 to July 2015, California
farms received, on average, $1.89 per
cwt less than similarly-situated FMMO
farms. The witness concluded that this
results in California farms being in a
worse competitive position than
similarly situated FMMO farms. The
witness labeled this as disorderly and
said that this condition should be
remedied through the adoption of
Proposal 1.
The Cooperative witness also entered
data estimating the value of regulating
interstate commerce through the
establishment of a California FMMO.
The witness cited January 2009 through
July 2015 CDFA data that indicated a
monthly average of 54.5 million pounds
of milk originating outside the state was
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processed by California processing
plants, and another monthly average 36
million pounds of milk was produced
inside California and sold to plants
located outside of the state. The witness
explained that this milk is able to evade
CSO minimum-price regulations
because of the state’s inability to
regulate interstate commerce.
Consequently, the witness said, out-ofstate farms delivering milk to California
plants can receive plant blend prices,
which can be higher than the market’s
overbase price received by in-state
producers delivering to the same plant.
The witness elaborated that the problem
is compounded because processors
receiving these unregulated supplies are
not required to pay minimum classified
prices and can instead pay a lower price
than their competitors pay for regulated
milk. By regulating these interstate
transactions through the establishment
of a California FMMO, the witness
stressed, the California market would be
more orderly.
The Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief
also highlighted the CSO’s inability to
regulate out-of-area milk as a market
dysfunction. The Cooperatives wrote
that out-of-area sales financially harm
California dairy farms because the Class
1 revenues from those sales do not
contribute to the CSO marketwide pool
that is shared with all the farms in the
market.
A consultant witness, appearing on
behalf of the Cooperatives, testified in
support of Proposal 1. The witness was
of the opinion that the primary purpose
of FMMOs is to enhance producer
prices, which is provided in the AMAA
through its flexibility to regulate milk
and/or milk products, not just fluid
milk. As evidence of this flexibility, the
witness discussed the Evaporated Milk
Marketing Agreement, in existence until
1947, under which manufacturing milk
was regulated. The witness said it was
reasonable to conclude from this
example that the regulation of all
California plants that purchase milk
from California farms, as contained in
Proposal 1, would fall within the scope
of the AMAA.
The consultant witness elaborated
that extending minimum price
regulation to all classes of milk in
California is necessary to avoid the
market-disrupting practice of handlers
opting to not pool eligible milk because
of price, often referred to as depooling.
The witness said that many FMMOs
have adopted provisions to reduce
instances of depooling. Currently under
the CSO, the witness said, while plants
can choose to not participate in the
marketwide pool, they gain no price
advantage because they are still required
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to pay minimum classified prices. The
witness was of the opinion that the
impact of depooling would be greater in
a California FMMO because of how
California quota premiums are paid. The
witness testified that uniform prices
calculated after deducting quota
premiums would be less than they
otherwise would be if large volumes of
milk were not pooled. Additionally, the
witness addressed the requirement of
uniform producer payments. The
witness was of the opinion that under
Proposal 1, once quota premiums were
paid, as required by California law,
remaining pool revenues would be
distributed uniformly to producers for
non-quota milk, as required by the
AMAA.
The consultant witness addressed the
issue of whether Proposal 1 would
implement classified prices that were
too high. The witness opined that the
classified price formulas contained in
Proposal 1 would not establish
manufacturing milk prices that are too
high because FMMO regulated handlers
in other areas are already paying those
prices. The witness entered data
showing that cheese production has
increased in the western states (not
including California and Idaho) by 92
percent from 2000 to 2014, while
California cheese production has
increased only 64 percent. The witness
concluded that minimum FMMO prices
have not been detrimental to FMMOregulated plants, and offered the fact
that over-order premiums are currently
paid to FMMO producers to support
that claim. The witness stated that
regulations providing for orderly
marketing conditions should also
provide stability (regulations should not
alter market transactions) and efficiency
(regulations should stimulate a
competitive economic environment),
and concluded that both are embodied
in Proposal 1.
Twenty-seven California dairy farmers
testified in support of Proposal 1.
Sixteen belong to one of the three
proponent Cooperatives: Nine LOL
members, three DFA members, and four
CDI members. An additional 11 dairy
farmers not associated with the
Cooperatives provided testimony
supporting the adoption of Proposal 1.
Although each dairy farmer provided
unique testimony, several difficulties
challenging the California dairy
industry were addressed repeatedly.
Producer testimony described financial
hardships due to the CSO producer
prices they receive consistently being
below the amount needed to cover the
cost of production. One farmer witness
cited CDFA cost of production data from
the first quarter of 2015 for the North
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Valley of California, and estimated that
90 percent of surveyed farms had
negative net incomes. Farmer witnesses
stated that a FMMO would provide an
opportunity for dairy farms to cover
their cost of production and work
toward reducing debts incurred from
historically low mailbox prices.
A number of producers testified that
historically they had many competitive
advantages (low cost of land, grain, hay
and water) enabling them to produce
milk at a significantly lower cost than
farms located in the rest of the county.
All of the witnesses testified that the
hardships of high land, feed, and/or
water costs, as compared to those in
other dairy states, have eroded their
competitive advantage. Citing no
competitive advantage, coupled with
the difference between the FMMO and
CSO pricing formulas, dairy farmers
testified they are receiving a lower
mailbox price than their FMMO
counterparts. Testimony stressed that
these realities are forcing many
California dairy farms out of business.
Many producers expressed that their
inability to cover the cost of production
is tied to how whey is valued in the
CSO Class 4b formula. Thirteen of the
27 producers testified regarding the
impact of the whey valuation on
mailbox prices. The witnesses stressed
that the CSO historically responded to
producers’ needs by encouraging
manufacturing plant investment that
would provide an outlet for milk to be
processed at a regulated price
considered fair. According to the
witnesses, this regulatory balance
shifted in 2007 because of a CDFA
rulemaking that adopted a sliding scale
capping the value of the dry whey factor
in the Class 4b formula. Witnesses
stated that the 2007 hearing marked the
start of the widening discrepancy
between mailbox prices for California
dairy farmers and those received by
other dairy farmers across the nation.
Witnesses also said that the reduced
mailbox prices continue to undervalue
milk throughout the State. The
producers were of the opinion that a
California FMMO would bring
California’s valuation of dry whey in
line with the rest of the country. With
comparable whey values, producers
testified their mailbox price would
become more representative of the true
market value of their milk.
Three testifying producers owned
farms in both California and in FMMO
regulated areas. These producers
testified to the difference in production
costs and mailbox prices received by
their farms over the last decade or more.
Their testimonies specifically
highlighted the industry differences
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between California and Wisconsin. The
producers said the production
advantages California dairy farmers
once enjoyed (inexpensive land, feed,
and a different regulatory environment)
no longer exist, and as a result,
California dairy farms are closing or
moving out of state at an increasing rate.
Seven producers testified that the use
of futures contracting and hedging as
risk management tools are hindered by
the differences in the CSO and FMMO
price formulas. They explained that
current risk management tools are based
on FMMO prices, and the fact that CSO
prices are different make those tools less
effective for California producers.
Eight producers provided evidence
about reductions in the California dairy
industry since 2007. According to the
witnesses, many farms have elected to
reduce their herd size or cease dairy
farming. A witness provided September
2014 to September 2015 data showing
that the Cooperatives have experienced
a 6.6 percent reduction in milk
production volume. The witness stated
that the reduction seen by the
Cooperatives is supported by CDFA data
showing a 3.5 percent reduction in
California milk production. The witness
noted that while milk production in
California is decreasing, it is increasing
in the rest of the country. The witnesses
believed the discrepancy between
California and national milk production
trends is due to the inability of
California farms to compete on a level
playing field with farms in the FMMO
system. Many also expressed concern
with the impact on related businesses
due to the closing of many California
dairy farms.
According to six producer witnesses,
many farms have opted to weather the
milk price volatility by diversifying
their operations and investing in treecrop production. Several witnesses
testified that lenders encourage treecrop production over dairy farming, due
to the reduction of risk and the large
margins attainable in tree-crop farming.
Producers expressed a belief that the
adoption of a California FMMO would
lead to a more stable dairy industry
supported by lenders.
Overall, California producer witnesses
stated they are currently subject to a
regulatory system that does not provide
producer milk prices representative of
the full value of their raw milk in the
market. The producers believe adoption
of a California FMMO represents an
opportunity to remedy this regulatory
disadvantage and to compete on a level
playing field with the rest of the
country.
A Western United Dairymen (WUD)
representative testified in support of
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Proposal 1. WUD is a trade organization
representing approximately 50 percent
of California dairy farmers, whose farm
sizes range from 17 to 10,000 cows.
According to the WUD witness, the
difference between CSO Class 4b and
FMMO Class III prices demonstrates
that the CSO is not providing California
dairy farms with a milk price reflective
of the national marketplace for
manufactured dairy products. The
witness attributed the pricing
differences to how dry whey is
accounted for in the two price formulas.
The witness said the value difference
has become increasingly larger since the
CSO adopted a fixed whey factor in
2007, and then subsequently replaced it
with a sliding scale whey factor in 2011.
The witness said that from August 2014
to July 2015 the CSO Class 4b whey
value averaged $1.50 per cwt less than
the FMMO Class III whey value. As a
result, the witness said, there are
different regulated minimum milk
prices for the milk products that
compete in a national market. This
regulated milk price difference, the
witness stressed, results in market
decisions based on government
regulations instead of market
fundamentals. Furthermore, the witness
said, the resulting lower CSO class
prices put California dairy farmers at a
competitive disadvantage compared to
their FMMO counterparts. The witness
concluded that this situation is
disorderly and reiterated WUD’s
support for Proposal 1 as a more
appropriate method to determine the
value of whey.
A witness representing the California
Dairy Campaign (CDC) testified in
support of Proposal 1. CDC is a dairy
producer organization with members
located throughout California. The CDC
witness said that over the last 10 years,
more than 600 California dairy farms
have permanently closed or moved to
other states. The witness attributed this
to milk prices that have been
consistently lower than the cost of
producing milk in California, and noted
that water and feed availability due to
the ongoing drought is the primary
reason for increased production costs.
The witness highlighted the
consolidation and concentration of the
California dairy manufacturing sector
that causes dairy producers to be price
takers in the market, thus making
equitable regulated minimum prices
vital to the long-term viability of
California dairy farms.
The CDC witness testified that the
failure of the CSO to align with FMMO
prices, particularly between CSO Class
4b and FMMO Class III, has resulted in
a more than $1.5 billion loss to
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California producers since 2010. The
witness also said that risk-management
tools, particularly the USDA Margin
Production Program (MPP), are not as
effective for California dairy farms
because the national all-milk price used
to determine MPP payments is
significantly higher than California
producer mailbox prices under CSO
regulation.
The witness highlighted CDC’s
support of specific provisions contained
in Proposal 1, including the adoption of
FMMO end-product pricing formulas,
unique pooling provisions that address
the needs of the California market,
regulation of out-of-state milk, uniform
producer-handler provisions, fluid milk
fortification allowances, and the
continuation of the California quota
program. The witness opined that
Proposal 1 addresses California’s unique
market conditions and is the only path
to restoring California producer price
equity and the health of the California
dairy industry.
CDC’s post-hearing brief stated that
CDC has supported adoption of a
California FMMO for over 20 years. The
brief highlighted 2015 CDFA data
showing California cost of production at
$19.30 per cwt, while the average farm
income was $15.94 per cwt. The brief
stated the belief that minimum prices
are put in place to ensure dairy farmers
are able to share in some minimal level
of profitability. CDC estimated that in
2015, a 1,000-cow California dairy farm
was paid approximately $1.4 million
less than equal-sized farms whose milk
was pooled on a FMMO. A witness
representing Milk Producers Council
(MPC) testified in support of Proposal 1.
MPC is a nonprofit trade association
with 120 California dairy-farmer
members, accounting for approximately
10 percent of the California milking
herd. The witness agreed with
testimony given by the Cooperatives
outlining California’s disorderly
marketing conditions. The witness said
that California dairy farmers have
repeatedly, though unsuccessfully,
sought relief through CDFA to bring
CSO classified prices more in line with
FMMO classified prices. This is why
California dairy farmers are now seeking
to join the FMMO system, the witness
added.
The MPC witness testified that
Proposal 1 would establish orderly
marketing conditions in California,
resulting in a level playing field for
producers and processors. The witness
stressed that not only would Proposal 1
provide price alignment between
California and FMMOs, but a California
FMMO would regulate interstate
commerce—something the CSO cannot
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do. Proposal 1 would also maintain the
current California quota program, a vital
financial tool for many California dairy
farmers, the witness stated. The witness
said that while the quota program has
no impact on the minimum prices
handlers pay, it does aid in providing a
local milk supply for some plants that
would otherwise have to source milk
from farther distances. The witness
explained that in some instances, quota
is an investment farms located in higher
cost areas of the state make to remain
financially viable and be able to provide
a local milk supply to plants that would
otherwise have to seek a supply from
farther distances.
A witness representing the National
Farmers Union (NFU) testified in
support of Proposal 1. NFU is a national
grassroots farmer organization with over
200,000 members across the nation,
including dairy farmers located in
California. The witness testified that
NFU supports the inclusion of
California in the FMMO system so
California dairy farms can receive prices
similar to those received by dairy farms
located throughout the country. The
witness testified that California’s lowmilk prices and high-feed costs have
resulted in strained margins and
ultimately the closure of over 400 dairy
farms in the last five years.
The NFU witness testified that the
pay price differences between dairy
farms whose milk is pooled under the
CSO and FMMOs are primarily due to
the difference in the Class 4b and Class
III prices and have resulted in
disorderly marketing conditions and a
revenue loss to California dairy farms of
more than $1.5 billion since 2010. The
witness added that pay-price differences
have reduced the ability of California
dairy farms to utilize risk management
tools, and put them at a disadvantage
when competing for resources such as
feed, land, cattle and labor.
A witness appearing on behalf of the
Institute testified that while the Institute
offered Proposal 2 as an alternative to
the Cooperatives’ proposal, their first
position is that disorderly marketing
conditions do not exist in California to
warrant the promulgation of a FMMO.
The witness stated that the California
dairy industry is currently regulated by
the CSO, whose purpose, much like a
FMMO, is to provide for orderly
marketing conditions. The witness
emphasized their opinion that orderly
marketing conditions are currently
achieved through CSO classified pricing
and marketwide pooling.
The Institute witness reviewed CSO
history and regulatory evolution, and
highlighted regulatory changes
demonstrating how the CSO has
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consistently adapted to changing market
conditions. Some, but not all, of these
regulatory changes are highlighted
below.
The Institute witness explained that
California sought state solutions to
disorderly marketing conditions through
the Young Act of 1935. When FMMOs
were authorized in 1937, California
opted to remain under the purview of
the CSO.
The Institute witness explained that
the CSO adopted marketwide pooling
through the Gonsalves Milk Pooling Act.
Before that time, handlers operated
individual handler pools, giving Class 1
handlers strong bargaining power as
producers sought Class 1 contracts.
According to the witness, this led to
handler practices that eroded producer
revenues. The witness testified that the
California quota program, also
authorized by the Gonsalves Milk
Pooling Act, was a way for Southern
California dairy farmers, who at the time
had a higher percentage of Class 1
contracts, to preserve some of the Class
1 earnings they would otherwise be
required to share with all producers
through marketwide pooling. At the
time, the witness said, producers were
assigned a production base, and
producer quota was allocated based on
historical Class 1 sales. Milk marketed
in excess of a producer’s base and quota
allocations was termed overbase milk.
The witness explained that during this
time the state’s population was growing,
and quota was deemed necessary to
ensure the market’s Class 1 needs would
always be met.
The Institute witness said that when
the quota program was established,
there was a growing number of dairy
farmers who also owned fluid milk
bottling operations. They typically
processed all the milk they produced,
and were referred to as producerhandlers. These operations feared that
the income benefits they gained from
processing their own milk would
disappear with the establishment of
mandatory pooling. To relieve this
concern, the witness said smaller
producer-handlers were exempted from
pooling in return for not receiving a
quota allocation. The witness explained
larger producer-handlers had the option
of not receiving a quota premium, and
deducting those quota pounds from
their Class 1 obligations to the pool, an
amount referred to as exempt quota.
The Institute witness testified that the
CSO was modified numerous times in
the late 1970’s and early 1980’s to
ensure that Class 1 needs of the market
would always be met. First, call
provisions were established requiring
manufacturing plants participating in
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the pool to maintain a percentage of
quota milk available to Class 1 plants.
Second, a system of transportation
credits and allowances was established
to cover part of the cost of moving milk
from surplus areas to deficit areas for
Class 1 use. According to the witness,
CDFA regularly updates these milk
movement incentives to reflect current
costs.
In the early 1990’s, CDFA amended
how the quota premium was derived. At
the time, quota funds were derived from
Class 1, 2, and 3 prices, while overbase
prices were derived from Class 4a and
4b prices. Consequently, the witness
noted, the difference between quota and
overbase prices varied greatly by month.
The witness said the historic value of
quota, in comparison to the overbase
value, was evaluated to derive a fixed
quota price of $0.195 per pound of
quota solids nonfat.
The Institute witness also reviewed
several instances since 2000 where CSO
provisions were amended to reflect
changing market conditions and
changing FMMO regulations. These
instances included adopting the ‘‘higher
of’’ concept for pricing Class 1 milk,
incorporating a dry whey factor in the
price formulas, and changing the make
allowances contained in the product
price formulas—all changes the witness
said were necessary to maintain orderly
marketing conditions in California.
The Institute witness maintained that
current California marketing conditions
are orderly, and therefore the
establishment of a FMMO is not
justified. The witness stated the CSO
program focuses on orderly marketing
conditions to ensure Class 1 needs are
met, while providing reasonable returns
to those dairy farms who supply the
Class 1 market. The witness stressed the
regulated price differences between CSO
Class 4a/4b prices and FMMO Class III/
IV prices do not amount to disorder, and
in fact, those differences are needed to
maintain orderly marketing in the state.
The Institute witness testified that in
the CSO-regulated environment, where
all milk is subject to minimum price
regulation, it is important that
manufacturing prices are not set above
market-clearing levels. The witness
elaborated that the largest market, and
therefore the highest value, for finished
dairy products is in the eastern United
States where most of the population
resides. Therefore, the witness said, in
order for California dairy products to be
transported and compete in the eastern
markets, they must have a lower value
in the West. The witness was of the
opinion that FMMO Class III and Class
IV prices are not appropriate local,
market-clearing prices for California.
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The Institute witness also opined that
current differences between CSO Class 2
and 3 prices and FMMO Class II prices
are not disorderly. The witness
explained that Class 2 and 3 prices are
set relative to the Class 4a price, and it
is important that these prices are not set
so high as to encourage dairy ingredient
substitution with Class 4a products. The
witness argued the Cooperatives
provided no evidence that the class
price differences between the CSO and
FMMO systems are disorderly.
The Institute witness also testified
regarding the difference between CSO
Class 1 and FMMO Class I prices. While
CSO Class 1 prices are somewhat lower
than those in neighboring FMMO areas,
the witness said, they are not causing
disorderly marketing conditions. The
witness explained that if lower priced
California milk is sold into FMMO
areas, there are provisions for FMMO
partial regulation to ensure the
California Class 1 plants do not have a
regulatory price advantage over the
FMMO plants.
The Institute witness testified that
recent declines in California milk
production and increases in dairy farm
consolidation are not evidence of
disorderly marketing conditions. The
witness elaborated that dairy-farm
consolidation is a natural market
evolution resulting from differences in
producers’ cost structure, risk tolerance,
and access to capital. This is no
different than consolidation trends seen
in other regions of the country, added
the witness. The witness also testified
that, while dairy farmer margins have
been volatile in recent years, California
milk production costs have remained
below the United States average.
According to USDA Economic Research
Service data, the witness said 2010–
2014 California milk production costs
were well below the national average,
by a yearly average of $4.19 per cwt.
Regardless of milk production and
consolidation trends, the witness stated
that California has adequate milk
supplies to meet fluid demand, and
milk movements to meet processing and
manufacturing demands are largely
efficient.
The Institute witness explained that
its members represent approximately 65
percent of the fluid milk processing in
California, and none have expressed
difficulty obtaining milk supplies or any
type of disorderly marketing condition.
The witness expressed concern that any
changes in the regulatory environment
would likely increase the cost of fluid
milk. This cost would be passed onto
consumers, thereby creating a barrier for
fluid milk sales, said the witness.
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The Institute witness opined the CSO
has an effective pricing and pooling
system that has evolved over time to
address changing market conditions,
and disorderly marketing conditions do
not exist to warrant a California FMMO.
However, should the Department
recommend a California FMMO, the
witness said the provisions outlined in
Proposal 2 should be adopted.
The post-hearing brief submitted on
behalf of the Institute reiterated its
opinion that the Department must find
disorderly marketing conditions to
justify intervention. Disorderly
marketing conditions under the AMAA,
the Institute wrote, refers to the fluid
milk supply and not the market for
manufactured milk. The brief stated that
California has, on average, an 11 to 12
percent Class 1 utilization and more
than enough reserve milk to meet fluid
demand.
The Institute’s brief outlined a sixpoint test that it argued needs to be met
in order to justify a California FMMO.
The Institute stated the current CSO
already meets all six of the requirements
and thus Federal intervention is not
justified.
The Institute’s brief also addressed
the 1996 and 2014 Farm Bills as they
pertain to the consideration of a
California FMMO. The Institute stressed
that in neither case did Congress amend
the AMAA, and therefore the
Department is authorized, but not
required, to incorporate the California
quota program. According to the
Institute, whatever decision the
Department makes, it must uphold the
AMAA’s uniform payments and trade
barrier provisions. The Institute stated
that Proposal 1’s incorporation of the
California quota program does not
uphold either of these provisions.
The Institute’s post-hearing brief
argued that the differences in Class III
and Class 4b prices, highlighted by the
Cooperatives, do not provide
justification for a California FMMO.
According to the brief, the AMAA
requires marketing orders to have
regional application that recognizes
differences in production and market
conditions.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Hilmar Cheese Company (Hilmar)
testified that the Department has
consistently found that evidence of
disorderly marketing conditions must
exist in order to justify Federal
intervention through the promulgation
or amendment of a FMMO. Hilmar is a
dairy manufacturer with facilities in
California and Texas selling dairy
products both domestically and
internationally. According to the
witness, Hilmar’s California cheese and
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whey manufacturing facility is the
largest cheese manufacturing facility in
the State, processing 12 percent of the
total California milk supply, which is
purchased from 200 dairy farms, most of
whom are not affiliated with any
cooperative.
The Hilmar witness cited previous
Department decisions, including the
1981 Southwestern Idaho/Eastern
Oregon and the 1990 Carolina
promulgations, as examples of what
market conditions should be present in
order for the Department to act. The
witness was of the opinion that the
Cooperatives did not provide evidence
of actual disorderly marketing
conditions in California warranting
Federal intervention.
In its post-hearing brief, Hilmar stated
that FMMOs are designed to be a
marketing tool to address problems
associated with the inherent instability
in milk marketing. Hilmar reiterated its
opposition to a California FMMO,
stating that the Department has
consistently denied proposals seeking
price enhancement, as they believe is
the case in this proceeding. Hilmar
stated that the record does not support
the notion that there is an inadequate
supply of milk for fluid use in
California, and therefore a California
FMMO is not justified.
A witness appearing on behalf of HP
Hood, LLC, a milk processor with
facilities in California and other states,
testified that disorderly marketing
conditions are not present in California
and therefore a FMMO is not warranted.
The witness said the CSO is an efficient
program that has been routinely
updated to reflect changing market
conditions. The witness stated that HP
Hood has not had any difficulty
securing an adequate supply of raw milk
for its California processing plants, nor
is HP Hood aware of instances where
raw milk had to be transported long
distances in order to meet California
demand.
The HP Hood witness suggested the
Department consider the potential
adverse impacts of recommending a
California FMMO on other FMMOs, as
well as potential increases in milk costs
to consumers that may stem from
adoption of the higher uniform
minimum milk prices included in
Proposal 1. The witness specifically
opposed the inclusive pooling portion
of Proposal 1 and explained how the
ability for milk handlers to pool or not
pool is how orderly marketing has been
maintained in the existing FMMOs. The
witness urged the adoption of Proposal
2, should the Department find that a
California FMMO is warranted.
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A witness appeared on behalf of
Saputo Cheese USA, Inc. (Saputo), a
proprietary international dairy and
grocery products manufacturer and
marketer with seven dairy productmanufacturing facilities in California.
Saputo opposes the promulgation of a
California FMMO, but should the
Department find a FMMO warranted, it
supports adoption of Proposal 2. The
witness testified that disorderly
marketing conditions are not present in
California to warrant FMMO
promulgation. The witness explained
how CDFA has been responsive to dairy
industry concerns, has held many
hearings in the past, and administers the
CSO in a manner that facilitates orderly
marketing as well as, or better than, the
FMMO system.
The Saputo witness summarized
many of the similarities and differences
between the CSO and FMMO systems.
The witness was of the opinion that the
CSO mandatory pooling rules increased
milk production to surplus levels and
encouraged the construction of bulk,
storable dairy product manufacturing
facilities. In conjunction with these
rules, the witness explained, CSO
regulated minimum prices are set at
levels that are not too high to encourage
significant additional increases in
supply.
The Saputo witness described the
California cheese production landscape.
The witness, relying on CDFA data, said
that from January through March of
2015, 57 cheese plants processed 45
percent of California’s milk. The witness
noted that out of the 57 cheese plants,
3 of the plants processed more than 25
percent of the state’s entire milk supply.
The witness stated that if the increase in
the hypothetical California FMMO Class
III price included in the USDA
Preliminary Economic Analysis of $1.84
per cwt occurred, under a system of
mandatory pooling, the aforementioned
3 cheese plants would face combined
increased annual raw milk costs of
nearly $196.5 million. The witness
testified that such raw milk cost
increases would be disorderly and
threaten the viability of California
manufacturing facilities.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Farmdale Creamery (Farmdale) testified
in support of Proposal 2. Farmdale is a
proprietary dairy processing company
located in San Bernardino, CA, that
manufactures cheese, sour cream, dried
whey protein concentrate, and
buttermilk. The witness was of the
opinion that disorderly marketing
conditions are not present in California,
since there is no shortage of milk to
meet fluid milk needs. The Farmdale
witness opined that the CSO maintains
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an orderly market by responding to
changing market conditions when
warranted.
Should the Department find a
California FMMO justified, the witness
supported adoption of Proposal 2 and
opposed the mandatory pooling
provisions contained in Proposal 1.
The witness also testified about
financial losses incurred by Farmdale
since 2005, when the CSO whey value
was sometimes higher than what they
could obtain from the market. The
witness added that their on-again, offagain financial losses demonstrate the
inability of current regulatory pricing
systems to track and value the whey
markets.
A witness appeared on behalf of
Pacific Gold Creamery (Pacific Gold) in
opposition to the adoption of a
California FMMO, although the witness
supported the provisions contained in
Proposal 2 should a FMMO be
recommended. Pacific Gold operates a
dairy farmer-owned specialty cheese
plant in California. The witness testified
that across existing FMMOs and
unregulated areas, dairy product
manufacturers regularly pay below
FMMO minimum prices. The witness
presented and explained USDAprepared FMMO data regarding volumes
of milk pooled and not pooled across
existing FMMOs.
The Pacific Gold witness explained
how their business produces ricotta
from the whey stream of their cheese
manufacturing, and how ricotta sales
supplement the income of the cheese
operation. The witness was of the
opinion that the FMMO Class III price,
and the accompanying higher whey
value contained in Proposal 1, would be
devastating to small and mid-size
facilities. The witness also testified how
an increase in California minimumregulated prices would jeopardize
exports, saying that U.S. domestic
cheese prices are already relatively
higher than global prices.
A post-hearing brief was submitted on
behalf of Trihope Dairy Farms
(Trihope). Trihope is a dairy farm
located in, and pooled on, the Southeast
FMMO. Trihope stated that disorderly
marketing conditions do not exist in
California to warrant promulgation of a
FMMO. Trihope was of the opinion that
California dairy farmers are seeking
higher prices through a new regulatory
body, which is not a justification for
USDA to proceed. According to
Trihope, the AMAA was designed to
solve marketing problems in
unregulated areas, not to address price
disparities between Federal and State
regulation.
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Trihope expressed concern about the
potential impact a California FMMO
would have on the entire system.
Trihope specifically noted the impacts
to the southeastern marketing areas
contained in the USDA Preliminary
Economic Impact Analysis. According
to their brief, Trihope estimates losses
from 2017 to 2024 of approximately
$313,091. Trihope wrote that
California’s marketing issues of high
California milk production and limited
plant capacity would not be solved by
a FMMO.
A post-hearing brief submitted by
Select Milk Producers, Inc. (Select)
expressed support for the adoption of a
California FMMO. Select is a national
dairy-farmer cooperative that markets
over 6.5 billion pounds of milk
annually, and whose members’ milk is
regularly pooled on the Appalachian,
Mideast, Southeast and Southwest
FMMOs. Select also supplies plants
located in many other FMMOs, but it
does not supply any California plants.
Select opined that having California’s
milk supply priced similarly to the rest
of the FMMOs would remedy the
competitive disadvantages faced by
companies competing in the national
marketplace, and would allow for more
efficient milk movements. Select
expressed support for maintaining a
uniform national pricing system and
opposed the Institute’s alternative
whey-pricing proposal. Select expressed
support for the Cooperatives’ inclusive
pooling provisions on the basis that the
provisions would apply only to
California, due to its unique marketing
conditions. Select stated the California
quota program should be addressed
outside of this rulemaking proceeding.
Select was of the opinion that adoption
of a California FMMO would lead to
more orderly milk marketing throughout
the entire FMMO system, and thus
uphold the intent of the AMAA.
A post-hearing brief submitted on
behalf of the Northwest Dairy
Association (NDA) expressed support
for Proposal 1. NDA is a dairy farmerowned cooperative that markets the
milk of its 460 members and operates
numerous fluid milk and manufacturing
plants located in Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, and Montana. NDA was of the
opinion that adoption of Proposal 1
would create more orderly marketing
conditions and strengthen the entire
FMMO system. As California represents
the largest milk supply in the United
States, NDA wrote, it is important for
the integrity of the FMMO program to
include the additional 20 percent of
United States milk represented by
California. NDA stated that California
producers should not be disadvantaged
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with lower Class III and IV prices than
what their western FMMO producer
counterparts receive.
Findings
The record contains a voluminous
amount of testimony, evidence, and
opinions as to whether or not a
California FMMO is justified. The
Cooperatives and their supporters argue
that a California FMMO was authorized
by Congress in the 2014 Farm Bill. They
contend that this proceeding is not
about whether or not a FMMO should
be established, but rather to determine
what the California FMMO provisions
should be. The Cooperatives are of the
opinion that the existence of disorderly
marketing conditions is not required by
the AMAA to justify order
promulgation. They stressed in their
post-hearing briefs that a FMMO needs
to establish and maintain orderly
marketing conditions, and that would be
accomplished through the adoption of
their proposal. However, should the
Department find that disorderly
marketing conditions must be present,
the Cooperatives provided evidence of
what they believe are ongoing
disorderly marketing conditions in
California.
In general, the record reflects that the
California producer community
supports joining the FMMO system.
Producers are of the opinion that the
prices they currently receive under the
CSO do not reflect the appropriate value
for their milk and its components.
Particularly, producers believe that the
price they receive for milk used for
cheese manufacturing does not value
the dry whey component at a level
commensurate with what manufacturers
receive for whey in the marketplace.
In contrast, the Institute and its
members consistently argued
throughout the hearing, in their posthearing briefs, and in comments to the
recommended decision that the
existence of disorderly marketing
conditions is required by the AMAA,
and that such conditions do not exist in
California. They provided testimony
explaining how the CSO is a flexible
system that is routinely evaluated
through the CDFA hearing process and
changes are made as market conditions
warrant. The Institute and its members
were united in the opinion that the
Cooperatives are solely seeking to
receive higher prices for their milk, and
that such higher prices are not justified
for California.
As discussed earlier, the declared
policy of the AMAA is to ‘‘. . . establish
and maintain such orderly marketing
conditions for agricultural commodities
in interstate commerce . . .’’ FMMOs
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accomplish this through the classified
pricing of milk products and
marketwide pooling of those classified
use values. Through these mechanisms,
orderly marketing conditions are
provided so that handlers are assured
uniform minimum raw milk costs and
producers receive minimum uniform
payments for their raw milk, regardless
of its use.
While in recent history FMMOs have
been consolidated, amended and
expanded, it has been decades since a
new order has been promulgated. The
records of those promulgation
proceedings include descriptions of the
market conditions at the time, and how
a FMMO would provide order in the
market. However, those decisions did
not, nor does this final decision find,
that disorderly marketing conditions
must exist or are a condition of order
promulgation. Order promulgation and
amendatory proceedings have reiterated
that a FMMO must adhere to the
declared policy of the AMAA, where
there is no express or implicit
declaration of a requirement for a
finding of disorderly marketing
conditions.
This final decision continues to find,
based on the evidentiary record, a
FMMO for California would provide
more orderly marketing conditions in
the marketing area, and therefore
promulgation of a California FMMO is
warranted. The record is replete with
discussion from most parties on
whether disorderly marketing
conditions exist, or are even needed, to
warrant promulgation of a California
FMMO. The declared policy of the
AMAA makes no mention of ‘‘disorder,’’
and this final decision continues to find
that disorderly marketing conditions are
not a requirement for an order to be
promulgated. The standard for FMMO
promulgation is to ‘‘. . . establish and
maintain such orderly marketing
conditions . . . ,’’ and this decision
continues to find that the proposed
California FMMO meets that standard
by providing uniform minimum raw
milk costs to handlers and minimum
uniform payments to producers for their
raw milk, regardless of its use.
Comments filed on behalf of the
Cooperatives supported the
Department’s finding that a California
FMMO would effectuate the declared
policy of the AMAA and was therefore
warranted. The Cooperatives supported
the determination that disorderly
market conditions were not a
requirement for FMMO promulgation.
Furthermore, the Cooperatives wrote,
the recommended decision properly
found that the intent of the AMAA was
not to preclude a group of state-
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regulated producers from petitioning for
a FMMO. The Cooperatives expressed
that the recommended California
FMMO, with some modifications they
offered, would provide for more orderly
marketing conditions by assuring
producers that the prices they receive
more appropriately represent the full
value of all the classified use values of
raw milk in the market. Additionally,
wrote the Cooperatives, the proposed
California FMMO would provide more
orderly marketing conditions by
ensuring that prices paid by handlers
would be reflective of the national
market for manufactured dairy products
in which California products compete.
Comments filed on behalf of Select
supported the finding that disorderly
marketing conditions are not a
requirement for order promulgation and
that a California FMMO would provide
more orderly marketing conditions.
Additionally WUD, CDC, MPC, and
National All-Jersey (NAJ), whose
comments focused primarily on the
specific provisions recommended,
offered general support for establishing
a California FMMO.
The Institute took exception to the
Department’s finding that disorderly
marketing conditions are not a
requirement for order promulgation.
They argued that a FMMO can only be
promulgated if the regulations
‘‘establish’’ order, and they contend that
the Department’s finding that an order
can be established if it creates ‘‘more’’
order unjustly broadens the authority of
the AMAA. The Institute wrote that to
establish orderly marketing conditions,
market disorder must first exist.
Therefore, because the Department did
not find disorder in the California
marketplace, the promulgation of a
California FMMO is not justified.
The Institute further argued that the
California FMMO promulgation
standard articulated in the
recommended decision was in contrast
to prior agency decisions that cited
disorder as a reason for promulgation or
amendment. Lastly, the Institute argued
that FMMO Supplemental Rules of
Practice refer to disorder as a condition
for submitting an amendatory proposal,
so such standard should not be ignored
in the California FMMO proceeding.
The Institute concluded that the
Department does not have the legal
authority to change its interpretation of
the declared policy of the AMAA, and
therefore California lacks the market
disorder needed to justify promulgation
of a FMMO.
Separate comments filed by Leprino
Foods (Leprino) and Dean Foods
supported the arguments by the Institute
regarding order promulgation.
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Comments filed by the International
Dairy Foods Association (IDFA) did not
offer an opinion on whether a California
FMMO should be promulgated, but did
take exception with the Department’s
finding that disorderly marketing is not
a requirement for FMMO promulgation.
IDFA opined that if orderly marketing
conditions already exist, the Department
has no basis to promulgate an order.
Like the Institute, IDFA argued that
there should be no differentiation in the
threshold for Federal government
intervention between amendatory and
promulgation proceedings. IDFA
contended that the FMMO
Supplemental Rules of Practice were
adopted through notice and comment
rulemaking by which the Department
adopted the disorderly marketing
conditions requirement, and the
different threshold for promulgation
described in the recommended decision
is not appropriate. Additionally, IDFA
reviewed multiple amendatory FMMO
decisions that cited disorderly
marketing conditions as a justification
for regulatory change. IDFA concluded
that imposing Federal regulations in a
market that exhibits no signs of market
disorder carries the risk of disrupting
the currently existing orderly marketing
conditions. Comments filed by Hilmar
also took exception with the
Department’s finding that disorderly
marketing conditions are not a
requirement for FMMO promulgation.
Hilmar wrote that the objective of the
AMAA is to establish and maintain
orderly marketing conditions and that
the Department ignored past FMMO
proceedings that cited disorderly
marketing conditions as a justification
for regulatory change. Hilmar contended
that the Department did not explain
why the California FMMO proceeding
was held to a different standard.
Another commenter also argued that
disorderly marketing conditions should
be a requirement for FMMO
promulgation. The commenter
elaborated that in order for a FMMO to
align with the public interest, the public
should have access to milk at a
reasonable cost, and further study is
needed to determine the impact to all
stakeholders. The commenter wrote that
it was not in the public interest to
establish a FMMO in a market where
disorderly market conditions have not
been found.
Additional opposition to the
Department’s finding that disorderly
marketing conditions are not a
requirement for FMMO promulgation
was also expressed in comments filed
by Pacific Gold and HP Hood.
Comments filed by CPHA were
specific to exempt quota; however
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CPHA stressed that it would be unable
to offer support or opposition to a
California FMMO until CDFA has
released its plan for operating the
California quota program.
The Department recognizes that many
commenters took exception to the
finding that disorderly marketing is not
a requirement for FMMO promulgation.
Similar to arguments made at the
hearing and in post-hearing briefs, the
commenters provided numerous
rulemaking examples where market
disorder was found. However, none
demonstrated that market disorder was
a requirement for FMMO promulgation.
This final decision continues to find
that the declared policy of the AMAA to
‘‘establish and maintain orderly
marketing conditions’’ does not require
market disorder to be the justification
for promulgation of an order.
Numerous commenters noted that the
Supplemental Rules of Practice in 7 CFR
900.20–900.33 stipulate that petitioners
provide examples of market disorder to
justify requesting an amendatory
proceeding. Commenters took exception
to the fact that the Department was not
now requiring evidence of market
disorder to justify this promulgation
proceeding. The 2008 Farm Bill
required the Department to establish
these Supplemental Rules specifically to
address only amendatory proceedings.
The rules outline submission
requirements for FMMO amendatory
proposals and specify timeframes the
Department must adhere to during the
amendatory rulemaking process.
Congress could have extended the reach
of the Supplemental Rules to include
both amendatory and promulgation
FMMO proceedings, but did not.
The record indicates that there are
both handler and producer price
differences between the CSO and the
FMMO systems. The record contains
data regarding the difference in
classified use values paid by handlers
regulated by the CSO and FMMOs. As
will be discussed later, this decision
proposes the adoption of the classified
price formulas that currently exist in the
FMMO system. A California FMMO,
under the provisions contained in this
final decision, would ensure that the
prices handlers pay to purchase pooled
California milk would be similar to
prices paid for milk pooled on other
FMMOs. As commodity dairy products
compete in the national market, current
FMMOs uniformly price the raw milk
used in those products. This pricing
system ensures that competing handlers
have uniform minimum raw milk costs,
and consequently none has a regulatory
price advantage. The record
demonstrates that California
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manufactured dairy products compete
in the national market. However, the
CSO-regulated prices for raw milk paid
by California manufacturers are
different than those paid by
manufacturers under FMMOs. This final
decision continues to find the proposed
California FMMO would provide
classified milk prices that would be
more uniform with those paid by
competing handlers, and more reflective
of the national market for manufactured
milk products and the local market for
fluid milk products, as is the policy for
the 10 current FMMOs. This final
decision finds these prices would
provide more orderly market conditions
for California.
This final decision continues to find
that the classified prices proposed for a
California FMMO will provide
producers with a minimum producer
blend price more reflective of the
national market for manufactured
products and the utilization of the local
California market. Taken together,
handler and producer prices reflective
of the national market in which
manufactured dairy products are sold
will ensure orderly marketing
conditions in California.
While the current CSO provides
classified pricing and marketwide
pooling similar to a FMMO, the hearing
record reflects that California dairy
producers have been unsuccessful in
obtaining a minimum regulated price
they believe is reflective of the full
value of their raw milk. Some parties
argued on the record, and in their
comments on the recommended
decision, that because the CSO already
provides for classified pricing and
marketwide pooling, disorderly
marketing conditions do not exist in
California, and therefore there is no
justification for promulgating a
California FMMO. As discussed earlier,
disorderly marketing conditions are not
a precedent or requirement for order
promulgation. Furthermore, this final
decision continues to find that it is not
the intent of the AMAA to preclude a
group of producers from petitioning for
a FMMO simply because they are
otherwise regulated by a state order that
provides for classified pricing and
marketwide pooling. Such a restriction
would place an undue barrier on those
producers as they would not have the
opportunity to petition for FMMO
regulation simply because they are
currently regulated by a state.
Additionally, unlike the CSO, a
California FMMO would have the
authority to regulate interstate
commerce. The record reveals that there
is milk, both raw and packaged, being
sold into and out of California over
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which the CSO has no regulatory
jurisdiction. The revenues from those
unregulated Class I sales are not shared
with all the producers supplying the
California market. A FMMO would
ensure that those classified use values
would be shared with all producers who
supply the California market. The
ability of a California FMMO to capture
interstate sales, through either full or
partial regulation, would protect the
integrity of the entire regulatory
framework. Furthermore, out-of-state
producers supplying that milk would be
paid the order’s blend price, which is
reflective of the market’s total classified
use value.
In their post-hearing brief, the
Institute made reference to a ‘‘six-point
test’’ that must be met in order for a
FMMO to be promulgated. While the
Institute correctly lists various factors
that have been used in some order
promulgations, the articulated AMAA
standard that must be met for order
promulgation is that the order will ‘‘. . .
establish and maintain such orderly
marketing conditions. . . .’’
Other parties in post-hearing briefs
contended that the 2014 Farm Bill
mandated that a California FMMO be
promulgated. The Farm Bill merely
authorized a California FMMO that
recognizes quota value as determined
appropriate through a rulemaking
proceeding. It is important to note that
California producers could have
petitioned for a FMMO at any time.
However, Congress did not provide for
the recognition of quota before the 1996
Farm Bill, and later, the 2014 Farm Bill.
This decision finds that a California
FMMO is justified, as it would meet the
objective of the AMAA to ‘‘. . .
maintain such orderly marketing
conditions. . . .’’ The provisions
proposed herein are tailored to the
California market, adhere to the uniform
handler and producer pricing provisions
of the AMAA, and recognize quota as
authorized by the 2014 Farm Bill and as
deemed appropriate by an objective
analysis of this hearing record.
Some hearing participants indicated
that a goal of FMMOs, and therefore of
a California FMMO, is to enhance
producer prices. Other participants from
outside of California, in testimony and
post-hearing briefs, expressed the
opinion that a California FMMO could
not be promulgated if it would have
adverse impacts on other FMMOs, and
that the Department must act to mitigate
those adverse impacts before such
promulgation.
FMMOs are a marketing tool that,
among other things, establish a
marketing framework and enforce
market-based minimum prices to
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handlers and uniform payments to
producers reflective of all classified use
values in the market. The record reflects
that at the time of the hearing, California
represented over 20 percent of the
United States milk supply. If a
California FMMO is established, over 80
percent of the United States milk supply
would fall under the same regulatory
framework. This decision finds that a
California FMMO would provide more
orderly marketing conditions in
California. Through inclusion of
California in the FMMO regulatory
framework, the prices received by all
producers participating in the FMMO
system would be more reflective of the
national marketplace for dairy products.
This would send uniform market signals
to producers that would allow them to
make their individual business
decisions.
Comments filed by the Maine Dairy
Industry Association (MDIA) supported
the establishment of the proposed
California FMMO, but reiterated their
opinion that the Department must
mitigate potential adverse producer
impacts in other FMMOs. Specifically,
MDIA commented that the Department
should address four specific adverse
impacts: Impact on producer welfare
and orderly marketing; impact on Class
I utilization; impact from projected
regional changes in milk production;
and impact from projected depooling in
various FMMOs.
It is to be expected that incorporating
an additional 20 percent of the U.S.
milk supply into a FMMO—milk that is
currently state regulated—would have
an impact in other regions of the
country. The REIA released in
conjunction with this final decision
estimates the potential impact of
regulating California milk handlers
under a FMMO and its results show
impacts in all regions throughout the
United States. This final decision
continues to find that promulgation of a
California FMMO would enable 80
percent of the United States milk supply
to fall under the same regulatory
framework. Consolidation under this
Federal milk marketing framework
would ensure that prices received by all
producers participating in the FMMO
system would be more reflective of the
national marketplace for dairy products.
This final decision finds that changes to
other FMMOs to counter projected
impacts are not warranted and would
only serve to send incorrect market
signals to those producers who need to
make individual business decisions
based on accurate information.
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4. California Quota Program
Recognition
This section reviews and highlights
the hearing evidence, post hearing
briefs, and comments or exceptions
submitted in response to the
recommended decision regarding the
appropriate recognition of the California
quota program, including exempt quota,
in a California FMMO. The California
quota program is a state-administered
program that entitles the quota holder to
an additional $0.195 per pound of SNF
over the CSO overbase price. Currently,
the money to pay the quota premium is
deducted from the CSO marketwide
pool before the CSO overbase price is
calculated. This decision continues to
find that the quota program should
remain entirely within the jurisdiction
of CDFA, and that its proper recognition
under the proposed California FMMO
would be through an authorized
deduction from payments due to
producers.
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Summary of Testimony
A Cooperative witness testified
regarding the development of the
California quota program and its
continued significance to California
dairy farmers. The witness explained
the California quota system is a tiered
pricing system, developed in the late
1960s, that pays producers on three
price calculations referred to as quota,
base, and overbase. In its current form,
ownership of quota entitles producerowners to a higher price for milk
covered by quota, and a lower base/
overbase price on their nonquota milk
production. Approximately 58 percent
of all California farmers own quota at
varying levels, which in aggregate
represents approximately 2.2 million
pounds of SNF on a daily basis. The
witness testified that, currently, quota
premium payments are approximately
$12.5 to $13 million per month, and this
money is taken out of the CSO
marketwide pool before the base/
overbase price is calculated. The
witness stressed that the quota program
is an important revenue source for
California dairy farms and that the value
of quota should not be diminished with
the adoption of a California FMMO.
The Cooperative witness reviewed the
authorization of the California milk
pooling and quota programs by the 1967
Gonsalves Milk Pooling Act (Gonsalves
Act). Originally, the witness explained,
producers were assigned quota holdings
as they related to the producers’
historical milk production and
individual deliveries to the Class 1
market. The witness said that in the
beginning, quota premiums were not a
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set value, but instead were determined
by allocating quota holdings to the
highest value milk (Class 1). Then base
and overbase production were allocated
to the remaining classes in descending
order of classified value. In essence, the
witness explained, quota holders were
paid the Class 1 price for their quota
holdings, and then a separate lower
value for their non-quota holdings.
According to the witness, when CDFA
sought to enhance producer prices,
additional revenue was typically
assigned to Class 1 and subsequently
quota holders, and overbase prices were
not impacted. The witness said that as
milk production grew without
corresponding increases in quota
holdings, producers were faced with
lower milk prices on their non-quota
production. Therefore, the Gonsalves
Act was amended, effective January 1,
1994, setting the quota premium at
$0.195 per pound of SNF (equivalent to
$1.70 per cwt). The result, said the
witness, was that overbase production
did not subsidize quota milk, and quota
holders could receive a reasonable
return on their quota holdings.
The witness also discussed
adjustments made to the total CSO
marketwide pool value in conjunction
with the quota program. According to
the witness, when pooling was
originally established, the provisions
contained producer location
differentials designed to encourage
quota milk to be delivered to Class 1
plants. However, as overbase milk
production began to grow, location
differentials applicable only to quota
milk did not ensure that the market’s
Class 1 needs would always be met, the
witness stated. Consequently, in 1983
transportation allowances (on milk
movements from ranches to plants) were
established in lieu of location
differentials. At the same time, the
witness said, regional quota adjusters
(RQAs), while providing no direct
incentive to move Class 1 milk, were
established to address producer equity
issues that arose with the elimination of
location differentials. The witness
described RQAs as reductions (ranging
from $0.00 to $0.27 per cwt) to the
producer’s quota premium, depending
on their farm location and plant of
receipt. In essence, the witness said,
quota premiums have a location value:
The further the dairy farm is located
from the receiving plant, the lower the
quota premium.
The Cooperative witness stated that
quota can only be held on Grade A milk
produced in California, and a quota
holder must deliver milk to a pool
handler at least every 60 days. The
witness also noted the fact that quota is
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bought and sold on a monthly basis,
which underscores its continued
importance to California dairy farms.
The witness estimated that at a price of
$525 per pound of SNF, the California
quota program has a value of $1.2
billion to California dairy farms.
The witness was of the opinion,
which was reiterated in the
Cooperatives’ post-hearing briefs, that
under current California and Federal
statutory authorities, a California
FMMO can be established and the
California quota program maintained.
The witness said that the main objective
of Proposal 1 is to preserve the quota
program to the maximum extent
possible, and that proponents believe
this is consistent with the Congressional
intent of the Agricultural Act of 2014
(2014 Farm Bill), which authorized a
California FMMO that recognizes the
quota program.
The witness concluded by outlining
what the proponents believe is the
necessary framework of a proposed
working relationship between CDFA
and the Department, and said that the
provisions contained in Proposal 1 are
needed to effectively maintain the quota
program. The witness explained that
Proposal 1 allows the quota premium to
be removed from the marketwide pool
before a FMMO blend price is
computed. Producers would then
receive the blend price for their
nonquota holdings and the FMMO
blend price plus the quota premium
(adjusted for RQAs) for their quota
holdings. According to the witness,
USDA would enforce all producer
payments, including quota payments,
and jurisdiction over quota
administration, calculations, record
keeping, and regulatory changes would
remain with CDFA.
In their post-hearing brief, the
Cooperatives asserted that their
proposal is the only one that properly
recognizes the quota program as
intended by Congress. The Cooperatives
rebutted the Institute’s claim that
adoption of Proposal 1 would create a
trade barrier to milk produced outside
the state because that milk would be
ineligible for the quota program. The
Cooperatives offered a modification that
would create an out-of-state adjustor to
ensure out-of-state producers do not
receive a lower price than their in-state
counterparts who can earn California
quota premium payments.
The Cooperatives further argued that
Proposal 1 upholds the AMAA’s
uniform pricing provisions, as all quota
milk would be paid uniformly, all nonquota milk would be paid uniformly,
and all milk located outside of the
proposed marketing area would be
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unaffected by the quota program. The
Cooperatives’ brief stated that the ability
of a FMMO to regulate interstate
commerce would provide a more level
playing field among all handlers with
sales in California.
A consultant witness, appearing on
behalf of the proponents of Proposal 1,
testified regarding the economic
importance of the California quota
program, and provided a brief history of
its evolution. At current market prices,
the witness estimated the value of the
California quota program at $1.164
billion—a significant economic asset for
dairy farms and the communities they
support, especially in counties where a
high percentage of milk production is
covered by quota. The witness noted
that not only is quota a solid financial
investment for dairy farms, but it is a
tangible asset used by dairy farms to
obtain additional financing from banks
and lenders.
The witness utilized an economic
impact analysis model to estimate the
total economic impact of the California
quota program. The witness estimated
that total annual economic value of
quota is associated with a $27.9 million
increase in California GDP, creation of
1,269 jobs, an $11 million increase in
local tax revenue, and a $16.7 million
increase in Federal tax revenue. The
witness clarified that the analysis did
not consider the economic impact of the
quota program on non-quota holders,
but stressed that any change to the quota
program would create regulatory
uncertainty and diminish the economic
value of quota. The witness opined that
Proposal 2 does not recognize the
economic value of quota and would
result in the devaluation of the asset,
which would financially harm
California quota holders. The witness
concluded that Proposal 1 was the only
proposal that would preserve and
maintain the California quota program.
Twelve dairy farmers testified that a
California FMMO must provide for the
continuation of the California quota
program. The farmers stressed the
importance of the program as an asset
for dairy farms throughout the state. The
witnesses explained that farms utilize
quota not only for the monthly quota
premium they receive, but also as an
asset on farm balance sheets for lending
purposes. The witnesses expressed
concern that any devaluation of their
quota asset would be financially
harmful to their businesses. Of the 27
dairy farmers who testified, eight said
they owned quota, and both quota and
non-quota holders expressed support for
the quota program.
A witness testifying on behalf of WUD
also elaborated on the importance of
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maintaining the quota program and the
need for strict pooling provisions to
ensure the quota premium could
continue to be paid. The witness said
quota is considered an asset and if its
value is diminished, it could create cash
flow and lending difficulties for dairy
farms. The witness was of the opinion
that if a California order was adopted
with pooling provisions similar to those
found in other FMMOs, the quota value
would likely be diminished, which
would violate the California statute. A
witness appearing on behalf of the
Institute testified regarding Proposal 2’s
recognition of the California quota
program. Like the Cooperative witness,
the Institute witness provided a
historical overview of the quota
program’s authorization and evolution.
The witness stated that the quota
program served as a way to compensate
producers who shipped most of their
milk to Class 1 plants through the
contract system in place prior to
marketwide pooling. At the time, the
witness said, the industry believed
prices to producers would become more
uniform and quota allocation would be
equalized among producers as Class 1
utilization grew.
The Institute witness outlined the
problems the Institute believes arise
from Proposal 1’s method for quota
recognition. The witness was of the
opinion, which also was stressed in the
Institute’s post-hearing brief, that the
Cooperatives have rendered an overly
broad interpretation of the 2014 Farm
Bill, and in doing so, proposed
provisions that violate the AMAA. The
witness said that before quota can be
recognized, a California FMMO must
first determine and pay a traditional
FMMO blend price to out-of-state dairy
farms who cannot own quota. The
witness said that subtracting the quota
value from the marketwide pool first,
before computing a non-quota blend
price, as suggested in Proposal 1, would
result in non-uniform payments to
producers and violate the AMAA.
The Institute witness explained the
mechanics of quota recognition in
Proposal 2, which were modeled after
the former Oregon-Washington FMMO.
The witness said that out-of-state
producers would receive a traditional
FMMO blend price for their milk pooled
on the California FMMO. In-state
producers would have the option to
receive the CDFA calculated quota and
non-quota prices, or they could
irrevocably opt out of the quota program
and receive the traditional FMMO blend
price. The witness explained that
producers opting to be paid on a quota/
non quota basis would have their
aggregate FMMO blend price monies
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transferred to CDFA for reblending and
distribution to that producer subset. The
witness opined that by giving in-state
producers the payment choice, the
uniform payment provision of the
AMAA would be satisfied. The Institute
witness said that Proposal 2 sought to
recognize quota value as authorized by
the 2014 Farm Bill while
simultaneously upholding the purpose
and provisions of the AMAA. These
opinions were reiterated in the
Institute’s post-hearing brief.
The Institute witness highlighted
California producer support for the
quota program, and was of the opinion
that USDA’s Preliminary Economic
Impact Analysis prediction that the
program would quickly erode under
Proposal 2 was overstated.
Proposal 3, submitted by the CPHA,
seeks to have exempt quota—as part of
the California quota program—be
recognized and preserved, should a
California FMMO be recommended.
CPHA also proposed that the terms of
consanguinity, as currently applied to
producer-handlers under CDFA
regulations, be removed to allow
indefinite perpetuation of exempt quota.
CPHA withdrew the second part of their
proposal at the hearing.
A consultant witness for CPHA
provided testimony regarding the
history of the Gonsalves Act and
detailed how exempt quota was
included as part of the State’s milk
marketing program from its inception.
According to the witness, the CSO
marketwide pooling system and quota
program were developed as an
alternative to a FMMO. The witness said
the quota program was originally
designed so that farmers who
historically served fluid milk processors
would continue to receive a higher price
for the portion of their milk that had
previously been under Class 1 contract;
under the CSO marketwide pooling
system, all of the Class 1 revenue would
be shared with the market’s producers.
Over time, the witness said, it was
thought that quota holdings would be
equalized among dairy farmers. Those
who had not previously held contracts
with fluid milk processors were
expected to be assigned rights to new
quota created as the fluid milk market
expanded.
The consultant witness explained that
dairy farmers who processed their own
milk into fluid milk products were
issued exempt quota, rather than regular
quota, under the new CSO system. The
exempt quota was allotted to these
vertically integrated entities, known as
producer-handlers, in recognition of
how their milk was marketed. The
witness said that there were originally
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49 exempt quota holders, but only 4
remain. The witness said that the
amount of exempt quota was
legislatively capped in 1995.
The consultant witness clarified that
exempt quota was issued as certificates
of ownership to the producer entity. The
witness explained that the handler side
of the business is still required to report
all of its milk receipts to the CSO, and
in turn, the handler entity receives a
credit against its financial obligation to
the pool for the volume of exempt quota
owned by the producer entity. The
handler entity then accounts to the CSO
marketwide pool for Class 1 sales in
excess of the exempt quota volume, said
the witness. The producer entity side
receives the Class 1 price from the
handler side for the exempt quota
volume of milk they produce, and then
they receive a combination of the quota
and overbase prices from the
marketwide pool, depending on their
regular quota holdings.
A witness from Producers, testifying
on behalf of CPHA, said that all four
members of CPHA own exempt quota,
are referred to as ‘‘Option 70’’ producerhandlers, are fully regulated, and report
to the CSO marketwide pool for all their
Class 1 sales. The witness contrasted
this to ‘‘Option 66’’ producer-handlers,
who are fully exempt from the CSO and
do not participate in the quota program.
Of the original 49 ‘‘Option 70’’
producer-handlers, the witness said
only the four CPHA members remain,
and all have maintained essentially the
same business structures since the quota
program was established.
According to the Producers witness,
CPHA members hold both exempt quota
and regular quota, but most of the milk
produced by CPHA members is
accounted for as overbase production.
Using 2015 CDFA data, the Producers
witness calculated that ‘‘Option 70’’
producer-handler milk represents
approximately 0.6 percent of all
California production. The witness
estimated that exempt quota represents
17.4 percent of ‘‘Option 70’’ producerhandler production and 4.6 percent of
all California Class 1 sales. The witness
said that all of the milk produced and
sold by CPHA members, including
volumes covered by exempt quota, is
reported to the CSO marketwide pool.
The Producers witness said that the
Gonsalves Act primarily addressed
industry problems that did not impact
producer-handlers because all the milk
from their dairy operations flowed to
their own Class 1 plants and the markets
they had developed. The witness was of
the opinion that the exempt quota
feature was included as part of the quota
program to recognize the vertically
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integrated producer-handler’s unique
business structure.
Additional CPHA witnesses
representing Foster and Rockview
joined the Producers witness in
describing their acquisition and
maintenance of exempt quota over the
years. Each mentioned they had to make
strategic business decisions or sacrifices
in order to preserve their exempt quota
status.
The CPHA witnesses attempted to
quantify the value of exempt quota,
explaining that exempt quota is carried
as an asset on their farms’ books and can
be sold as or converted to regular quota.
The CPHA witnesses measured the
value of exempt quota as the difference
between the CSO Class 1 and the quota
prices. Using historical CDFA data, the
Producers and Rockview witnesses
calculated the average exempt quota
value over the previous 20 years to be
approximately $1.14 and $1.20 per cwt,
respectively.
Using CDFA data for the preceding
five years, a second Foster witness
calculated the value of exempt quota in
terms of regular quota for both northern
and southern California. The witness
estimated that every pound of exempt
quota in northern California and
southern California is worth 1.96
pounds and 2.12 pounds of regular
quota, respectively. Valuing regular
quota at $525 per pound of SNF, but not
adjusting for RQAs, the witness
estimated the value of exempt quota as
$1,029 per pound of SNF in northern
California, and $1,113 per pound of SNF
in southern California. Citing CDFA
production data, the witness calculated
the value of the collective 40,244.51
pounds of SNF exempt quota in
northern California as $41,411,600 and
the 17,669.59 pounds of SNF exempt
quota in southern California as
$19,666,253.
The Rockview witness added that
converting exempt quota to regular
quota would make those volumes
eligible for CSO transportation credits
that are not currently available for
exempt quota milk.
A Cooperative witness also testified
with regard to the evolution of exempt
quota for ‘‘Option 70’’ producerhandlers. The witness estimated that the
four CPHA members market
approximately five percent of all
California Class 1 sales. The witness
explained that exempt quota entitles the
producer-handler to waive any pool
obligation on those holdings. The
witness described the value of exempt
quota as the difference between the
Class 1 and quota prices. The witness
estimated that from 1970 through 2014,
the additional value of exempt quota
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was approximately $0.58 per cwt in
southern California. The witness
estimated the monthly impact to the
marketwide pool of recognizing exempt
quota in this manner at less than onehalf of one cent per cwt. The witness
testified that the Cooperatives did not
oppose adoption of Proposal 3.
A witness representing the Institute
was of the opinion that exempt quota
was offered to large producer-handlers
for political expediency. According to
the witness, as the Gonsalves Act and
the particulars of marketwide pooling
were being developed in the 1960s,
larger producer-handlers worried they
would lose advantages enjoyed under
the then-prevailing system. The witness
explained that to head off producerhandler opposition to marketwide
pooling, concessions were made to
smaller producer-handlers who were
exempted entirely from pooling and
received no quota allocation. Larger
entities were given the option to forgo
the quota premium and instead exempt
those pounds from their Class 1 pool
obligations.
The Institute witness testified that
exempt quota holds no real market
value, as it cannot be bought and sold.
The witness acknowledged that
determining an equivalency between
exempt quota and regular quota might
be one method to assign a value to
exempt quota. The Institute witness
opined that exempt quota holders have
already recovered the cost of their
exempt quota, which they were last able
to purchase 20 years previous.
A witness from Dean Foods testified
that the competitive advantage
producer-handlers gain from their
exempt quota can be spread out over
their total volume of Class 1 sales. Dean
Foods is a national fluid milk
manufacturer that operates three Class I
plants and one Class II plant in
California. The witness argued that
CPHA witnesses diluted the impact of
exempt quota on Class 1 sales by
comparing exempt quota volumes to
total California milk production. The
witness contended that it was more
accurate to compare total ‘‘Option 70’’
producer-handler Class 1 production to
total California Class 1 sales. The
witness calculated that the total volume
of the four producer-handlers, including
their exempt quota volumes, accounted
for 24 percent of total California Class
1 volume, including milk from out of
state. The witness testified that 31
handlers process the other 76 percent of
California Class 1 milk.
Additional fluid milk processor
witnesses representing Clover Stornetta
Farms and Farmdale Creamery, along
with another Dean Foods witness, all
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testified that their companies face
significant disadvantages compared to
producer-handlers with exempt quota
because, unlike exempt quota holders,
their companies must account to the
CSO pool at classified prices every
month for all the milk they utilize.
Some witnesses claimed they have lost
sales to ‘‘Option 70’’ producer-handlers
due to these regulatory disadvantages.
The Producers witness countered
opposition testimony that exempt quota
provides a competitive advantage
enabling producer-handlers to bid
customers away from fully-regulated
handlers. The witness said that
Producers pays the Class 1 price to the
farm side of the business for the exempt
quota milk they use, and pays the quota
or overbase price for the rest of the
farm’s milk it processes.
In its post-hearing brief, the Institute
argued against recognition of exempt
quota under a California FMMO.
According to the Institute’s brief, the
recognition of exempt quota in a
California FMMO would violate the
AMAA’s uniform pricing provisions.
The Institute explained that by
recognizing exempt quota, exemptquota-holding producer entities would
not share the value of all their Class 1
sales with their fellow dairy farmers,
and handler entities would not be
required to pay uniform minimum
prices for their raw milk supplies.
The Institute brief further argued that
the 2014 Farm Bill language authorizing
a California FMMO that recognizes
quota value does not mean California’s
entire quota system should be preserved
and maintained, nor that certain Class 1
handlers should be permitted to have a
regulatory competitive advantage over
other Class 1 handlers. The Institute
brief also argued that permitting a
differentiated status for only those few
entities who currently own exempt
quota would be inequitable to new
market entrants.
In response, CPHA’s reply brief
asserted that CPHA handler entities
currently pay Class 1 prices for all their
raw milk, exempt quota provides no
financial advantage over other fullyregulated handlers, and there are no
market disruptions attributable to
exempt quota. The reply brief stressed
that CPHA producer entities, not their
handler counterparts, hold exempt
quota. The reply brief also asserted that
the record contains no evidence that
exempt quota holders enjoy raw milk
price advantages. CPHA contended that
all handlers pay the same classified
price for raw milk in California, despite
misperceptions to the contrary. CPHA
pointed out that competitors have won
and lost accounts for milk sales for a
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variety of reasons not necessarily
attributed to exempt quota ownership.
According to CPHA’s reply brief,
Congress’s use of the term ‘‘quota
system,’’ and its omission of specific
reference to exempt quota in the 2014
Farm Bill language, is consistent with
its directive that the Secretary should
hold a hearing to consider, and is
authorized to recognize, all aspects of
California’s quota program under a
California FMMO.
CPHA’s reply brief clarified the intent
of Proposal 3 to allow for the
preservation of exempt quota status for
those few producer-handlers who own
it. CPHA argued its members are not
seeking exemption from all pricing and
pooling obligations under a California
FMMO, but merely recognition of their
ownership of exempt quota and the
related volumes of production it
represents.
A post hearing brief submitted by
Trihope expressed concerns regarding
the recognition of the California quota
program within the FMMO framework.
Trihope was of the opinion that any
recognition of quota would violate the
AMAA’s uniform payments provision.
Trihope also wrote that authorizing
quota payments would give a revenue
advantage to California dairy farms and
create a trade barrier for out-of-state
farms seeking to be pooled on the
California FMMO.
Findings
The record contains detailed
information about the establishment and
evolution of the quota program
administered by the State of California.
The record reflects that the Gonsalves
Act legislatively authorized both the
California quota program and
marketwide pooling within the structure
of the CSO. Until that point, dairy farms
were paid through individual handler
pools that reflected a plant’s use values
for their milk—there was no marketwide
pooling function that allowed all
producers to share in the benefits from
Class 1 sales and the burden of
balancing the market to ensure an
adequate supply of milk to meet Class
1 demand. Many witnesses alluded to
the political compromise reached to
compensate dairy farmers who held
Class 1 supply contracts from the
financial loss they would incur by
pooling and sharing their Class 1
revenue with all dairy farmers in
California. While the original quota
allotment was based on existing Class 1
contracts, it was thought at the time that
quota would equalize among producers
as Class 1 utilization increased and
future quota allotments were issued;
however, this did not occur.
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Many witnesses spoke of the
importance they believe the California
quota program has for the state’s dairy
industry. Producers spoke of the
investments they made in purchasing
quota allotments, and of the continued
financial benefit quota provides through
the monthly quota premium they
receive. Even producers who own little
or no quota spoke of the importance of
continuing the program for their fellow
dairy farmers.
The 2014 Farm Bill authorized the
promulgation of a California FMMO,
and specified that the order ‘‘shall have
the right to reblend and distribute order
receipts to recognize quota value.’’ The
hearing record is replete with testimony
on the proper interpretation of those
final three words, ‘‘recognize quota
value.’’ The Cooperatives conveyed, and
stressed in their post-hearing brief
submissions, that the 2014 Farm Bill
mandates the quota program must be
recognized, and only the method of
recognition is to be decided through this
rulemaking proceeding. The
Cooperatives were of the opinion that
the proper recognition of quota value is
through the deduction of quota monies
from the marketwide pool before a
California blend price is calculated, as
is current practice for the CSO.17 The
Cooperatives stressed repeatedly that
should any conflict be found between
the provisions of the 2014 Farm Bill and
the AMAA, the 2014 Farm Bill language
should be given more credence, as it is
the most recent Congressional action.
Institute witnesses and post-hearing
briefs stressed that quota recognition
must be harmonized with the AMAA, in
particular its uniform payments and
trade-barrier provisions. Should any
conflict arise, the Institute contends that
because the Farm Bill did not amend the
AMAA, the AMAA as the authorizing
legislation should take precedent. The
Institute’s approach to recognizing
quota value is to first allow producers
the one-time decision to opt out of the
quota program. Those producers who
opt out of the quota program would be
paid a FMMO blend price calculated
without a deduction for quota. Those
producers who remain in the quota
program would have their FMMO blend
price monies sent, in aggregate, to CDFA
for reblending and redistribution
according to their quota and nonquota
milk marketings. The Institute is of the
opinion that because dairy producers
opting out of the quota program would
not have their payments affected by
17 This position was slightly modified in their
post-hearing brief to also adjust prices for out-ofstate producers so that their price was not impacted
by quota payments.
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quota, recognizing quota under a
California FMMO would not violate the
uniform pricing and trade-barrier
provisions of the AMAA.
As discussed earlier, when
promulgating or amending any FMMO,
the Department must always evaluate
whether the proposed action is
authorized by the AMAA. The AMAA
not only clearly defines its policy goal,
which this decision has already
discussed, but it also defines specific
provisions that must be contained in the
FMMO framework. The two most
relevant to the discussion on quota
recognition are the provision for
uniform payments handlers make to
producers, and the provision to prevent
trade barriers. The uniform payment
provisions require all handlers regulated
by a FMMO to pay the same classified
use value for their raw milk, and all
producers whose milk is pooled on a
FMMO to receive the same price for
their milk regardless of how it is
utilized. In this respect, similarly
situated handlers are assured that they
are paying the same raw milk costs as
their competitors, and producers are
indifferent as to where or how their
milk is utilized, as they receive the same
price regardless.
The trade barrier provision specifies
that no FMMO may in any manner limit
the marketing of milk or milk products
within the marketing area. In this
regard, FMMOs cannot adopt provisions
that would create any economic barrier
limiting the marketing of milk within
marketing area boundaries.
To determine how to properly
recognize quota value, Congress
provided additional guidance to the
2014 Farm Bill language through the
2014 Conference Report.18 In the report,
Congress specified that the Department
has discretion to determine how best to
recognize quota value in whatever
manner is appropriate on the basis of a
rulemaking proceeding. Consistent with
the Conference Report, this decision
evaluated record evidence pertaining to
how the current California quota
program operates, how it can best be
recognized within FMMO provisions
tailored to the California market, and
how all the FMMO provisions work in
conjunction with each other to adhere to
all AMAA provisions.
The California quota program, like the
CSO, is administered by CDFA. The
record reflects that 58 percent of
California dairy farmers own quota. In
its current form, the quota program
entitles a quota holder to an additional
$0.195 per pound SNF (equivalent to
$1.70 per cwt) over the market’s
overbase price on the quota milk they
market each month. Similar to their
FMMO counterparts, California
handlers pay classified use values for
their milk, and those values make up
the CSO marketwide pool. Each month,
CDFA deducts quota monies from the
CSO marketwide pool before a
marketwide blend price, otherwise
known as the overbase price, is
calculated. CDFA then announces the
quota and overbase prices 19 to be paid
to California dairy farmers. As a result,
in general, nonquota milk receives the
market’s overbase price, and quota milk
receives the overbase price plus an
additional $1.70 per cwt. CDFA enforces
payments of both quota and overbase
prices. Record data shows that the
deduction from the CSO marketwide
pool to pay quota premiums is
approximately $12.5 to $13 million per
month. Numerous witnesses estimated,
at quota market prices at the time of the
hearing, the asset value of quota at $1.2
billion.
The record reflects that the California
quota program is funded by California
producers. All handlers regulated
through the CSO pay minimum
classified use values, and it is only once
those values have been pooled that the
quota value is deducted from the pool.
Data on the record indicates that all
California dairy farmers, including
quota holders, receive $0.37 per cwt
less, on average, for all of their milk
marketings in order to fund the $0.195
per pound of quota SNF payment to
quota holders.
This decision continues to find the
California quota program could be
maintained, administered, and enforced
by CDFA and that a California FMMO
should operate as a stand-alone
program. As is currently done in all
FMMOs, handlers would pay classified
use values into the pool, and all
producers, both in-state and out-of-state,
would receive a FMMO blend price
reflective of the market’s use values. It
is through this structure that a
California FMMO could ensure the
uniform payment and trade barrier
provisions of the AMAA are upheld.
Should CDFA determine it can
continue to operate the California quota
program through the use of producer
monies, as is the current practice, the
proposed California FMMO could
recognize quota values through an
18 Official Notice is taken of: the Agricultural
Agreement of 2014 Conference Report. https://
www.congress.gov/congressional-report/113thcongress/house-report/333/1.
19 The record reflects that CDFA also announces
a base price that is equal to the overbase price. For
simplicity, this decision will refer only to the
overbase price.
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authorized deduction by handlers from
the payments due to producers for those
dairy farmers determined by CDFA to be
participants in the state-administered
California quota program. The amount
of the deduction would be determined
and announced by CDFA.
Currently, FMMOs allow for
authorized deductions, such as the
Dairy Promotion and Research Program
assessment, from a producer’s milk
check. The proposed California FMMO
would similarly authorize a deduction
for the state-administered California
quota program. The California FMMO
would allow regulated handlers to
deduct monies, in an amount
determined and announced by CDFA,
from blend prices paid to California
dairy farmers for pooled milk, and send
those monies to CDFA to administer the
quota program. CDFA would in turn
enforce quota payments to quota
holders.
In essence, this decision proposes that
the California quota program could
continue to operate in essentially the
same manner as it currently does. The
record reflects that the California quota
program already assesses California
producers to pay quota values to quota
holders. While producers may not see
this as an itemized deduction on their
milk checks, their overbase price is
lower than it otherwise would be if
there was no quota program. This is a
result of deducting the quota value from
the pool prior to calculating the
overbase price.
The California FMMO would
authorize deductions from those
California producers whose milk is
pooled on the order. As this decision
will later explain, the proposed
California FMMO would have
performance-based pooling standards
that allow for manufacturing milk to not
be pooled. CDFA would be responsible
for the collection of California producer
monies for milk not pooled because a
California FMMO would only apply to
producer milk as defined by the order.
USDA and CDFA could cooperate by
sharing data through a memorandum of
understanding to facilitate CDFA
administration of the quota program.
The Department received 13
comments supporting the
recommendation to continue the
California quota program under the
authority and direction of CDFA, with
FMMO cooperation for relevant
information sharing. Comments
expressing support for the proposed
recognition of California quota program
in the recommended California FMMO
were received from the Cooperatives,
the Institute, CPHA, HP Hood, Select,
Producers, WUD, MPC, Pacific Gold,
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NAJ, The Kroger Company (Kroger),
CDC, and other individuals. Several
commenters stated that the proposed
recognition resolved concerns raised
during the hearing regarding inclusive
pooling, uniform pricing and interstate
trade barriers.
Comments filed on behalf of the
Institute stated that the Department’s
solution acknowledges the ‘‘recognize
quota’’ language of the 2014 Farm Bill
without violating the AMAA’s
requirements for uniform pricing. The
Institute was also of the opinion that
permitting CDFA to operate a
standalone quota program through
authorized deductions from producer
payments allows the Department to
avoid any potential interstate commerce
issues relating to quota.
Comments filed on behalf of the
Cooperatives also supported the
Department’s proposed recognition of
the California quota program, as well as
CDFA’s continued administration of
quota as a standalone program. The
Cooperatives stated that the
Department’s decision properly
recognized quota values and protected
the financial investment of the
California quota holders. The
Cooperatives stated their support is
contingent upon CDFA continuing the
quota program as proposed by the
Department, and added that if CDFA
were unable or unwilling to maintain
the program without diminishing quota
value, the Cooperatives would withdraw
their support of the Department’s
decision. The Cooperatives proposed
that specific references to the applicable
California statute and regulations that
pertain to the California quota program
be added to the proposed California
FMMO.
Comments submitted on behalf of
WUD supported the Department’s
treatment of the quota program, but
requested that the producer referendum
be postponed until CDFA determines
how it will operate the program.
CDFA submitted a comment
confirming its ability to establish a
standalone, producer-funded quota
program as proposed by the Department,
and stated its aim to reach a conclusion
prior to a California FMMO producer
referendum. In its filed comments,
CDFA indicated that it would work
toward a solution with the intent of
concluding its process before a
California FMMO producer referendum
was held so California producers would
have the pertinent information needed
to make an informed decision.
The Department continues to find the
proper recognition of quota under the
proposed California FMMO is to allow
for authorized deductions from
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producer payments in accordance with
the California quota program, as
determined and administered by CDFA.
As the Department finds this
rulemaking proceeding is separate from
CDFA’s handling of the quota program,
language referencing the CDFA
regulations for administering quota is
not included in the proposed California
FMMO. Standalone language in the
proposed California FMMO references
the California quota program.
Regarding the treatment of exempt
quota as addressed in Proposal 3, this
decision continues to find that exempt
quota is part of the California quota
program and therefore its proper
recognition should be determined by
CDFA. The record demonstrates that
exempt quota was initially granted
when the California quota program was
established, and like regular quota, the
provisions have been adjusted
numerous times through both California
legislative and rulemaking actions. This
decision continues to find the
continuation of exempt quota, in
whatever manner appropriate, should be
determined by CDFA.
The record reflects that under the
proposed FMMO, the four California
producer-handlers who own exempt
quota would likely become fullyregulated handlers because their sales
exceed three million pounds per month.
These fully-regulated handlers would be
required to account to the marketwide
pool for all of their Class I utilization
and pay uniform FMMO minimum
classified prices for all milk they pool.
The CPHA witnesses testified that
exempt quota is held on the producer
side of their businesses. CDFA could
best determine how those producers
holding exempt quota should be
compensated for their exempt quota
holdings. Such compensation cannot be
made by reducing the minimum Class I
obligation of FMMO fully-regulated
handlers without undermining the
uniform handler payment provision of
the AMAA.
Comments submitted on behalf of the
CPHA expressed provisional support for
the proposed treatment of quota,
assuming all aspects of the current
program, including exempt quota,
would be maintained by CDFA. CPHA
asked the Department to reopen the
comment period pertaining to the quota
program until CDFA releases a final
statement detailing their plan to
administer the quota program in its
entirety. CPHA stated that until such
time their comments on the
recommended decision would be
incomplete.
This decision does not find
justification for reopening the public
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comment period. CDFA has publically
outlined the steps it intends to take to
preserve, plan for, and operate the
California quota program. CDFA has
publically stated it intends to complete
a producer referendum and release the
results before a FMMO producer
referendum is held. California
producers will be able to consider that
information when voting on the
proposed California FMMO.
Throughout the hearing, and in posthearing briefs and comments filed in
response to the recommended decision,
dairy farmers and their Cooperative
representatives stressed that while a
California FMMO would provide them a
more equitable price for their milk,
entry into the FMMO system must not
diminish or disturb, in any form,
California quota values. This final
decision continues to find that the
package of FMMO provisions in this
decision would create more orderly
marketing of milk in California, adhere
to all the provisions of the AMAA, and
allow the California quota program to
operate independently of the FMMO. In
doing so, the California quota program
will not be diminished or disturbed in
any form by California’s entry into the
FMMO system.
5. Definitions and Uniform Provisions
This section outlines definitions and
provisions of a California FMMO that
describe the persons and dairy plants
affected by the FMMO and specify the
regulation of those entities.
Summary of Testimony
The Cooperatives and the Institute
both proposed regulatory language for
an entire FMMO, including definitions
and regulations specific to a California
FMMO, as well as adoption of several of
the uniform provisions common to other
FMMOs. In many cases, hearing
witnesses simply provided the list of
uniform provisions for which they
supported adoption, and in most cases,
proponents for Proposals 1 and 2 agreed
on the inclusion of these provisions.
Findings
The FMMO system currently provides
for uniform definitions and provisions,
which are found in Part 1000 under the
General Provisions of Federal Milk
Marketing Orders. Where applicable,
those provisions are incorporated by
reference into each FMMO. The uniform
provisions were developed as part of
FMMO Order Reform to prescribe
certain provisions that needed to be
contained in each FMMO to describe
and define those entities affected by
FMMO regulatory plans.
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As outlined in the Order Reform
Proposed Rule 20 and as implemented in
the Final Rule,21 the establishment of a
set of uniform provisions provides for
regulatory simplification and defines
common terms used in the
administration of all FMMOs, resulting
in the uniform application of basic
program principles throughout the
system. Application of standardized
terminology and administrative
procedures enhances communication
among regulated entities and supports
effective administration of the
individual FMMOs.
This final decision continues to find
that a set of uniform provisions should
continue to be maintained throughout
the FMMO system to ensure consistency
between the uses of terms. Therefore,
this final decision finds that a California
FMMO should contain provisions
consistent with those in the 10 current
FMMOs.
Marketing conditions in each
regulated marketing area do not lend
themselves to completely identical
provisions. Consequently, some
provisions are tailored to the marketing
conditions of the individual order, and
provisions for a California FMMO in
this final decision are similarly tailored
to the California market where
appropriate. This section provides a
brief description of the uniform
definitions and provisions for a
California FMMO. Where a definition or
provision does not lend itself to uniform
application, it is discussed in greater
detail here or in other sections of this
document.
Two commenters expressed support
for adopting the uniform provisions as
proposed in the recommended decision
to ensure consistency between uses of
terms and application of principles and
practices in FMMO areas.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
supported adoption of all but four of the
recommended uniform provisions, for
which they offered modifications: Pool
plant, exempt plant, producer, and
producer milk. Their specific exceptions
are discussed later in this decision. The
Cooperatives’ comments also confirmed
their support for adoption of the
‘‘miscellaneous and administrative’’
provisions generally used throughout
the FMMO system, which specify the
reporting, accounting, and payment
procedures under the orders.
This decision continues to propose a
set of uniform definitions consistent
with the ten current FMMOs. The
20 Official Notice is taken of: Federal Order
Reform Proposed Rule: 63 FR 4802.
21 Official Notice is taken of: Federal Order
Reform Final Rule: 64 FR 47898.
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definitions for a California FMMO are
explained below:
Marketing Area. The Marketing Area
refers to the geographic area where
handlers who have fluid milk sales
would be regulated. In this case, the
marketing area should include the entire
state of California. The marketing area
encompasses any wharves, piers, and
docks connected to California and any
craft moored there. It also includes all
territory within California occupied by
government reservations, installations,
institutions, or other similar
establishments.
Route Disposition. A Route
Disposition should be a measure of fluid
milk (Class I) sales in commercial
channels. It should be defined as the
amount of fluid milk products in
consumer-type packages or dispenser
units delivered by a distributing plant to
a retail or wholesale outlet, either
directly or through any distribution
facility.
Plant. A Plant should be defined as
what constitutes an operating entity for
pricing and regulatory purposes. Plant
should include the land, buildings,
facilities, and equipment constituting a
single operating unit or establishment
where milk or milk products are
received, processed, or packaged. The
definition should include all
departments, including where milk
products are stored, such as coolers, but
not separate buildings used as reload
points for milk transfers or used only as
distribution points for storing fluid milk
products in transit. On-farm facilities
operated as part of a single dairy farm
entity for cream separation or
concentration should not be considered
plants.
Distributing Plant. A Distributing
Plant should be defined as a plant
approved by a duly constituted
regulatory agency to handle Grade A
milk that processes or packages fluid
milk products from which there is route
disposition.
Supply Plant. A Supply Plant should
mean a regular or reserve supplier of
bulk milk for the fluid market that helps
coordinate the market’s milk supply and
demand. A supply plant should be a
plant, other than a distributing plant,
that is approved to handle Grade A milk
as defined by a duly constituted
regulatory agency, and at which fluid
milk products are received or from
which fluid milk products are
transferred or diverted.
Pool Plant. A Pool Plant should mean
a plant serving the market to a degree
that warrants its producers sharing in
the added value that derived from the
classified pricing of milk. The pool
plant definition provides for pooling
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standards that are unique to each
FMMO. The specifics of the pooling
standards for a California FMMO are
discussed in detail in the Pooling
section of this final decision.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
took exception to the Department’s
recommended definition of Pool Plant,
preferring instead the definition
detailed in their post-hearing brief,
which defined a pool plant as any
California plant receiving milk from a
California producer, unless otherwise
exempt. The Cooperatives’ definition
was aligned with their inclusive pooling
proposal, which is not proposed for
adoption in this final decision.
Therefore, this decision continues to
find the Department’s proposed pool
plant definition appropriate. Specific
details regarding pooling standards for a
California FMMO are discussed in the
Pooling section of this final decision.
Nonpool Plant. A Nonpool Plant
should be defined as a plant that
receives, processes, or packages milk,
but does not satisfy the standards for
being a pool plant. Nonpool plant
should be further defined to include: A
Plant Fully Regulated under Another
Federal Order, which means a plant that
is fully subject to the pricing and
pooling provisions of another order; a
Producer-Handler Plant, which means a
plant operated by a producer-handler as
defined under any Federal order; a
Partially Regulated Distributing Plant,
which means a plant from which there
is route disposition in the marketing
area during the month, but does not
meet the provisions for full regulation;
and an Unregulated Supply Plant,
which is a supply plant that does not
qualify as a pool supply plant.
Exempt Plant. An Exempt Plant also
is a nonpool plant, and should be
defined as a plant exempt from the
pricing and pooling provisions of any
order, although the exempt plant
operator would still need to comply
with certain reporting requirements
regarding its route disposition and
exempt status. Exempt plants should
include plants operated by a
governmental agency with no route
disposition in commercial market
channels, plants operated by duly
accredited colleges or universities
disposing of fluid milk products only
through their own facilities and having
no commercial route disposition, plants
from which the total route disposition is
for individuals or institutions for
charitable purposes and without
remuneration, and plants that have
route disposition and sales of packaged
fluid milk products to other plants of no
more than 150,000 pounds during the
month.
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The exempt plant definition was
standardized as part of Order Reform to
provide a uniform definition of
distributing plants that, because of their
size, did not significantly impact
competitive relationships among
handlers in the market. The 150,000
pound limit on route disposition and
sales of packaged fluid milk products
was deemed appropriate because at the
time it was the maximum amount of
fluid milk products allowed by an
exempt plant in any FMMO. Therefore,
the uniform provisions ensured that
exempt plants remained exempt from
pricing and pooling provisions as part of
Order Reform. This decision continues
to find that to provide for regulatory
consistency, the exempt plant definition
in a California FMMO should be
uniform with the 10 current FMMOs.
This provision would allow for smaller
California distributing plants that do not
significantly impact the competitive
relationship among handlers to be
exempt from the pricing and pooling
provisions of a California FMMO.
Both the Cooperatives and the
Institute proposed adoption of the
standard FMMO definition of exempt
plants, and hearing witnesses were
supportive of the proposals. However,
in their post-hearing brief, the
Cooperatives proposed two additional
exempt plant categories to provide
regulatory relief to small handlers under
Proposal 1. The two additional exempt
plant categories proposed include: (1)
Plants that process 300,000 pounds or
less of milk during the month into Class
II, III, and IV products, and have no
Class I production or distribution; and
(2) plants that process, in total, 300,000
pounds or less of milk during the
month, from which no more than
150,000 pounds is disposed of as route
disposition or sales of packaged fluid
milk products to other plants. Proposal
1, as originally drafted, would have
fully regulated all handlers that received
California milk, except for plants with
150,000 pounds or less of route
disposition. Through the proposed
modification, the Cooperatives sought to
extend exempt plant status to smaller
plants regardless of their use of milk. In
essence, it would allow smaller plants
with primarily manufacturing uses to be
exempt from the pricing and pooling
provisions.
The recommended decision found
that the performance-based pooling
provisions would make such additional
exemptions unnecessary, as plants with
manufacturing uses would have the
option to elect not to pool their milk
supply. In their filed comments, the
Cooperatives took exception to the
recommended definition of exempt
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plant as it did not contain the necessary
language for inclusive pooling. This
final decision continues to find the
recommended exempt plant definition
appropriate, as this decision does not
propose adopting inclusive pooling for
a California FMMO, negating the need
for language tailored to inclusive
pooling provisions. Specific details
regarding pooling standards for a
California FMMO are discussed in the
Pooling section of this final decision.
Handler. A Handler should be defined
as a person who buys milk from dairy
farmers. Handlers have a financial
responsibility for payments to dairy
farmers for milk in accordance with its
classified use. Handlers must file
reports with the Market Administrator
detailing their receipts and utilization of
milk.
The handler definition for a California
FMMO should include the operator of a
pool plant, a cooperative association
that diverts milk to nonpool plants or
delivers milk to pool plants for its
account, and the operator of a nonpool
plant.
The handler definition should also
include intermediaries, such as brokers
and wholesalers, who provide a service
to the dairy industry, but are not
required by the FMMO to make
minimum payments to producers.
The Cooperatives proposed adoption
of the uniform FMMO handler
definition for a California FMMO. The
Institute proposed adopting the uniform
handler definition, modified to include
proprietary bulk tank handlers (PBTH).
A witness representing the Institute and
Hilmar testified regarding the PBTH
provision. The witness said a PBTH
provision had been included in some
former FMMOs to allow proprietary
handlers to pool milk in a fashion
similar to cooperative handlers, without
needing to first deliver milk to a pool
supply plant to meet the performance
standards of the order. The witness
explained that under Proposal 2, a
PBTH would have to operate a plant—
located in the marketing area—that does
not process Class I milk and further, the
PBTH would have to be recognized as
the responsible handler for all milk
pooled under that provision. The
witness was of the opinion that the
PBTH provision would promote
efficient milk movements, reduce
transportation costs, and eliminate
unnecessary milk loading and
unloading simply to meet the order’s
performance standards.
The witness said the flexibilities of a
PBTH provision would offer operational
efficiencies to Hilmar and allow them to
meet criteria similar to the pool supply
plant qualifications advanced in
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Proposal 2. The witness explained that
Hilmar would be able to ship milk
directly from a farm to a distributing
plant, rather than shipping milk first to
a pool supply plant and then on to a
distributing plant.
In their post-hearing briefs, the
Cooperatives opposed the PBTH
provision, citing disorderly marketing
conditions with its use in earlier
marketing orders, and stating that the
provision is unnecessary, prone to
create disorder, and, as proposed,
administratively unworkable. No
comments were filed in regard to this
provision as proposed in the
recommended decision. The record
supports adoption of the standard
FMMO handler definition without the
additional PBTH provision prescribed
in Proposal 2. The Department has
found in the past that PBTH provisions
led to the pooling of milk that was not
part of the legitimate reserve supply for
distributing plants in the marketing
area.22 In California, with a relatively
low Class I utilization, such a provision
is unnecessary to ensure an adequate
supply of milk for Class I use. Therefore,
this decision continues to find that the
uniform handler definition, without the
inclusion of a PBTH provision, is
appropriate for a California FMMO.
Producer-Handler. Under the 10
existing FMMOs, Producer-Handlers are
defined as persons who operate, as their
own enterprise and at their sole risk,
both a dairy farm and a distributing
plant from which there is route
disposition within the marketing area,
and have total Class I fluid milk sales of
no more than three million pounds per
month. Seven of the existing orders also
allow producer-handlers to receive up
to 150,000 pounds of fluid milk
products per month from fully-regulated
handlers in any order. Producerhandlers are exempt from the pricing
and pooling provisions under each of
the existing orders.
As a result of their exemption from
the pricing and pooling provisions,
producer-handlers, in their capacity as
handlers, are not required to pay the
minimum class prices established under
the orders, nor are they, in their
capacity as producers, granted
minimum price protection for disposal
of their surplus milk. Producerhandlers, in their capacity as handlers,
are not obligated to equalize their usevalue of milk through payment of the
difference between their use-value of
milk and the respective order’s blend
price into the producer-settlement fund.
22 Official Notice is taken of: Pacific Northwest
and Western Marketing Areas Tentative Final
Decision: 68 FR 49375.
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Thus, producer-handlers retain the full
value of milk processed and disposed of
as fluid milk products by their
operation.
Entities defined as FMMO producerhandlers must adhere to strict criteria
that limit certain business practices,
including the purchase of supplemental
milk. Given these limitations, producerhandlers bear the full burden of
balancing their milk production
between fluid and other uses. Milk
production in excess of their Class I
route disposition does not enjoy
minimum price protection under the
orders and may be sold at whatever
price is obtainable in the market.
Producer-handlers are required to
submit reports and provide access to
their books, records and any other
documentation as deemed necessary by
the Market Administrator to ensure
compliance with the requirements for
their regulatory status as producerhandlers. Therefore, producer-handlers
are regulated under the orders, but are
not ‘‘fully regulated’’ like other handlers
who are subject to an order’s pricing
and pooling provisions.
Under the CSO, two categories of
producer-handlers are recognized.
‘‘Option 66’’ producer-handlers may
request exemption from the CSO’s
pooling regulations if both their farm
production and their sales average less
than 500 gallons of milk per day on an
annual basis, and if they ship 95 percent
of their production to retail or wholesale
outlets. ‘‘Option 66’’ producer-handlers
are fully exempt from the pool for their
entire production and may not own
quota or production base. The record
reflects that there were two ‘‘Option 66’’
producer-handlers in California at the
time of the hearing. No production data
was submitted at the hearing to quantify
the volume of ‘‘Option 66’’ producerhandler milk exempt from the CSO
pool.
The CSO’s second producer-handler
category pertains to ‘‘Option 70’’
producer-handlers—large scale entities
that own exempt quota, which exempts
them from pooling a portion of their
Class 1 milk. The exempt quota held by
‘‘Option 70’’ producer-handlers was
discussed earlier in this decision.
Proposals 1 and 2 both include
definitions and provisions for producerhandlers consistent with the 10 FMMOs
that currently exempt persons who
operate both dairy farms and
distributing plants, and process and
distribute no more than three million
pounds of fluid milk per month. The
producer-handler regulations under
Proposal 2 more closely resemble those
in the Pacific Northwest and Arizona
FMMOs in that they contain additional
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specificity about producer-handler
qualifications.
A Cooperative witness supported
adoption of the standard FMMO
producer-handler definition for a
California FMMO as contained in
Proposal 1. Under the standard
definition, producer-handlers who sell
or deliver up to three million pounds of
Class I milk or packaged fluid milk
products monthly would be exempt
from the pricing and pooling provisions.
The witness added that under Proposal
1, producer-handlers could own regular
quota and qualify for transportation
credits.
Two producer witnesses who also
operate processing facilities in
California described their individual
experiences related to running small
dairy farms and fluid milk processing
operations. Both witnesses testified that
they supported Proposal 1 because,
among other things, they thought the
proposed FMMO producer-handler
definition could provide them
exemptions from the pooling
requirements for their Class I
production and sales, something that
they do not currently enjoy from the
CSO.
A witness from Organic Pastures
Dairy Company, LLC (Organic Pastures)
testified on behalf of Organic Pastures
and three other small San Joaquin
Valley ‘‘producer-distributor’’ entities.
According to the witness, these entities
produce and bottle their own Class 1
milk, but do not qualify as ‘‘Option 66’’
producer-handlers, and must therefore
account to the CSO pool. The witness
explained that these businesses have
taken risks to develop their own brands
and customer bases, but struggle to
survive financially. The witness said
that Organic Pastures’ monthly pool
obligation for December 2014 was
$50,000 for the milk they bottled and
sold in California. The witness
contended that because they produce,
process, and distribute their own
products, they should be exempt from
regulation.
The entities represented by the
witness supported a California FMMO
because they believe they would meet
the FMMO producer-handler definition
and thus be exempt from the pricing
and pooling provisions. The witness
testified that the standard three-million
pound limit would allow them to grow
their businesses, but remain exempt
from pricing and pooling provisions.
A witness from Dean Foods testified
in support of the producer-handler
provision contained in Proposal 2. The
witness described similarities and
differences between the producerhandler definitions in Proposals 1 and
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2. The witness added that proponents of
Proposal 2 recommended adoption of
the additional ownership requirements,
which mirror the standards in the
Pacific Northwest and Arizona FMMOs.
The witness explained that the
additional requirements would ensure
that larger-size operations typical of the
western Federal orders that meet the
producer-handler definition would not
be able to undermine the intent of the
provision.
The witness testified that Dean Foods
fully supported the Institute’s proposal
to cap producer-handler exemptions at
three million pounds of monthly Class
I route disposition. The witness cited
USDA decisions that found producerhandlers with greater than three million
pounds of route disposition per month
impacted the market, and thus their
exemption from pricing and pooling
provisions was disorderly.
Support for the producer-handler
provisions contained in Proposal 2 was
also expressed by two small California
processors and by the Cooperatives in
their post-hearing brief.
The FMMO system has historically
exempted producer-handlers from the
pricing and pooling provisions of
FMMOs on the premise that the burden
of disposal of their surplus milk was
borne by them alone. Until 2005, there
was no limit on the amount of Class I
route disposition producer-handlers
were allowed before they would be fully
regulated. A Pacific Northwest and
Arizona FMMO rulemaking established
a three-million pound per month limit
on Class I route disposition.23 The
record of that proceeding revealed large
producer-handlers were able to market
fluid milk at prices below those that
could be offered by fully regulated
handlers in such volumes that the
practice was undermining the order’s
ability to establish uniform prices to
handlers and producers. That
proceeding found that producerhandlers with more than three million
pounds of Class I route disposition
significantly affected the blend prices
received by producers and should
therefore be fully regulated. The
producer-handler provisions in all
FMMOs were later amended in 2010.24
In that proceeding, USDA found a threemillion pound monthly limit on
producer-handler total Class I route
dispositions appropriate to maintain
orderly marketing conditions
throughout the FMMO system.
23 Official Notice is taken of: Pacific Northwest
and Arizona Proposed Rule: 70 FR 19636.
24 Official Notice is taken of: FMMO ProducerHandler Final Rule: 75 FR 21157.
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The recommended decision found the
regulatory treatment of producerhandlers should continue to be uniform
throughout the FMMO system. The
monthly three million pound limit on
Class I route disposition would ensure
that California FMMO producerhandlers could not use their pricing and
pooling exemption to undermine
orderly marketing conditions.
The adoption of the standard FMMO
producer-handler definition was
supported by proponents of Proposals 1
and 2, as well as by entities that could
meet the proposed producer-handler
definition. The record does not contain
data to indicate how many California
entities would meet the proposed
FMMO producer-handler definition, but
it does indicate that only a small
number would be impacted.
The additional qualification standards
contained in the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona FMMOs were explained in the
Order Reform Proposed Rule.25 The
decision explained that the larger than
average herd size of dairy farms in the
western United States lent to the
existence of producer-handlers that
were a significant factor in the market.
Therefore, the Pacific Northwest and
Arizona FMMOs adopted producerhandler provisions with additional
qualification standards tailored to the
larger dairy farm size typical of the
western region of the United States.
The record reveals that herd sizes in
California tend to be typical of the larger
herd sizes found in the western
FMMOs. According to CDFA data, in
2015 California’s average herd size was
1,215. Therefore, the recommended
decision found it appropriate that the
producer-handler provision in a
California FMMO should include the
additional qualification standards
similar to those in the nearby Pacific
Northwest and Arizona FMMOs.
In their post-hearing brief, the
Cooperatives proposed modifying
Proposal 1 to broaden the producerhandler definition to include utilization
other than Class I. The modification
would allow producer-handlers with
Class II, Class III, or Class IV
manufacturing, in conjunction with
their Class I processing, to be granted
producer-handler status, as long as their
total production remained under the
three million pound processing limit.
The Cooperatives contend this would
provide regulatory relief to smaller
producer-handlers, who would
otherwise become regulated under the
inclusive pooling provisions of Proposal
1. The recommended decision found
25 Federal Order Reform Proposed Rule: 63 FR
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that extending the producer-handler
definition to include manufacturing
uses would not be necessary because the
recommended package of pooling
provisions would allow for optional
pooling of milk used in manufacturing.
Individual comments filed by HP
Hood, Kroger, and the CDC expressed
support for the producer-handler
provision contained in the
recommended decision. Commenters
agreed that producer-handlers should be
treated in California the same way they
are treated in the rest of the FMMO
system, and that allowing exemptions
for production above 3 million pounds
per month would create disorder.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
also confirmed their support for the
recommended producer-handler
definition, which mirrors the definition
used in the other western orders.
This final decision continues to find
that the producer-handler definition,
including additional language related to
producer-handler qualification, as
proposed in the recommended decision
would be appropriate for a California
FMMO. As well, the proposed
California FMMO should contain the
uniform FMMO producer-handler
provision that limits monthly Class I
route disposition to three million
pounds. Because this final decision does
not propose adoption of inclusive
pooling, dairy product manufacturers of
all sizes are allowed to opt out of the
marketwide pool, making it unnecessary
to provide additional allowances for
small producer-handlers under the
proposed California FMMO.
California Quota Program. The
California Quota Program should be
defined as the program outlined by the
applicable provisions of the California
Food and Agriculture Code and related
provisions of the pooling plan
administered by CDFA. Details about
the proposals, record evidence, and this
decision’s findings regarding
appropriate recognition of the California
quota program were discussed earlier in
this decision.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
recommended modifying language for
the California Quota Program definition
to ensure all applicable statutory and
regulatory language is referenced and
incorporated. This comment was
addressed in the Quota section of this
decision.
Producer. A Producer should be
defined as a dairy farmer that supplies
the market with Grade A milk for fluid
use or who is at least capable of doing
so if necessary. Producers would be
eligible to share in the revenue that
accrues from marketwide milk pooling.
The producer definition in each FMMO
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order typically differs with respect to
the degree of association that dairy
farmers must demonstrate within a
marketing area, as provided in the
producer milk definition.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
took exception to the definition of
Producer, as the definition does not
contain language necessary for inclusive
pooling. This decision continues to find
the recommended producer definition
appropriate, as this final decision does
not recommend adopting inclusive
pooling for a California FMMO, negating
the need for language tailored to
inclusive pooling provisions. The
details of the proposals, record
evidence, and this decision’s findings
regarding the producer milk definition
are described later in the Pooling
section of this decision.
Producer Milk. Producer Milk should
be defined to identify the milk of
producers that is eligible for inclusion
in the marketwide pool. This definition
is specific to the proposed California
FMMO marketing order, reflecting
California marketing conditions, and it
provides the parameters for the efficient
movement of milk between dairy farms
and processing plants.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
took exception to the definition of
Producer Milk as the definition does not
contain language necessary for inclusive
pooling. This decision continues to find
the definition of producer milk
appropriate, as this final decision does
not recommend adopting inclusive
pooling for a California FMMO, negating
the need for language tailored to
inclusive pooling provisions. The
details of the proposals, record
evidence, and this decision’s findings
regarding the producer milk definition
are described later in the Pooling
section of this decision.
Other Source Milk. The order should
include the uniform FMMO definition
of Other Source Milk to include all the
skim milk and butterfat in receipts of
fluid milk products and bulk fluid
cream products from sources other than
producers, cooperative handlers, or pool
plants. Other source milk should also
include certain products from any
source that are used to make other
products and products for which a
handler fails to make a disposition.
Fluid Milk Product. A California
FMMO should include the standard
FMMO definition of a Fluid Milk
Product, which sets out the criteria for
determining whether the use of
producer milk and milk-derived
ingredients in those products should be
priced at the Class I price. Under the
definition, Fluid Milk Product includes
any milk products in fluid or frozen
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form that are intended to be used as
beverages containing less than 9 percent
butterfat, and containing 6.5 percent or
more nonfat solids or 2.25 percent or
more true milk protein. Fluid milk
products would include, but not be
limited to: Milk, eggnog, and cultured
buttermilk; and those products could be
flavored, cultured, modified with added
or reduced nonfat solids, sterilized,
concentrated, or reconstituted. Nonfat
solid and protein sources include, but
are not limited to, casein, whey protein
concentrate, dry whey, and lactose,
among others.
Products such as whey, evaporated
milk, sweetened condensed milk, yogurt
beverages containing 20 or more percent
yogurt by weight, kefir, and certain
packaged infant formula and meal
replacements, would not be considered
fluid milk products for pricing
purposes.
Fluid Cream Product. The order
should include the standard FMMO
definition of Fluid Cream Product. Fluid
cream product includes cream or milk
and cream mixtures containing at least
9 percent butterfat. Plastic cream and
frozen cream would not be considered
fluid cream products.
Cooperative Association. The order
should include the uniform FMMO
definition of Cooperative Association to
facilitate administration of the order as
it applies to dairy farmer cooperative
associations. Under the uniform
definition, a Cooperative Association
means any cooperative marketing
association of producers that the
Secretary determines is qualified to be
so recognized under the CapperVolstead Act. Cooperative associations
have full authority to engage in the sales
and marketing of their members’ milk
and milk products. The definition also
provides the recognition of cooperative
association federations that function as
cooperative associations for the
purposes of determining milk payments
and pooling.
Commercial Food Processing
Establishment. The uniform FMMO
definition for Commercial Food
Processing Establishment should be
included in a California FMMO to
describe those facilities that use fluid
milk and cream as ingredients in other
food products. The definition helps
identify, for classification purposes,
whether disposition to such a facility
should be considered anything but Class
I, and clarifies that packaged fluid milk
products could not be further disposed
of by the facility other than those
received in consumer-type containers of
one gallon or smaller. Producer milk
may be diverted to commercial food
processing establishments, subject to the
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diversion and pricing provisions of a
California FMMO.
Market Administrator. The record
supports a provision for the
administration of the order by a Market
Administrator, who is selected by the
Secretary and responsible for the
oversight of FMMO activities. The
market administrator receives and
reviews handler reports, allocates
handlers’ milk receipts to their proper
utilization and classification, publicizes
monthly milk prices, provides monthly
written account statements to handlers,
and manages the producer settlement
fund which serves as a clearing house
for marketwide pool revenues. The
market administrator is authorized to
make adjustments to the order’s
shipping and diversion provisions,
where justified, and to investigate
noncompliance with the order. The
market administrator manages the
marketwide pool, conducts handler
audits, provides laboratory testing of
milk samples, and performs many other
functions that support the regulation of
milk marketing in the area. Market
administrator activities are funded
through an administrative assessment
on handlers.
Continuity and Separability of
Provisions. Each FMMO prescribes
uniform rules governing the
implementation and maintenance of the
marketing order itself, and a California
FMMO should likewise include these
provisions. These rules state that the
Secretary determines when the FMMO
becomes effective and whether and
when it should be terminated. The rules
also provide for the fulfillment of any
outstanding obligations arising under
the order and liquidating any assets
held by the Market Administrator if the
order is terminated or suspended.
Finally, the rules provide that if, for
some reason, one provision of the
order—or its applicability to a person or
circumstance—were to be held invalid,
the applicability of that provision to
other persons or circumstances and the
remaining order provisions would
otherwise continue in force.
Handler Responsibility for Records
and Facilities. Provision should be
made for the maintenance and retention
by handlers of the records pertaining to
their operations under a California
FMMO. Records of the handler’s milk
purchases, sales, processing, packaging,
and disposition should be included,
along with records of the handler’s milk
utilization, producer payments, and
other records required by the market
administrator to verify the handler’s
compliance with order provisions. The
market administrator should be able to
review and audit each handler’s records,
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and should have access to the handler’s
facilities, equipment and operations, as
needed to verify the handler’s obligation
under the order. Handlers should be
required to retain all pertinent records
for three years, or longer, if part of a
compliance enforcement action, or as
directed by the market administrator.
Termination of Obligations. Provision
should be made under a California
FMMO for notification to any handler
who fails to meet financial obligations
under the order, including payments to
producers, other handlers, and to the
market administrator. Such provision is
contained in the uniform provisions of
all FMMOs, and specifies that the
market administrator has two years after
the receipt of the handler’s report of
receipts and utilization to notify the
handler of any unmet financial
obligation. Provisions are included for
the enforcement of the handler’s
payment requirement and for the
handler’s opportunity to file a petition
for relief as provided under the AMAA.
6. Classification
The AMAA authorizes FMMOs to
regulate milk in interstate commerce,
and its provisions require that milk be
classified according to the form in
which or purpose for which it is used.
The classification of milk is uniform in
all FMMOs to maintain orderly
marketing conditions within and
between FMMOs and to ensure that
handlers competing in the national
market for manufactured products have
similar raw milk costs.
This decision continues to find that
because California would be joining the
FMMO system, it should contain the
uniform classification provisions
included in the 10 existing FMMOs.
Adoption of standard FMMO product
classification provisions in the proposed
California FMMO is appropriate to
maintain uniform pricing for similar
products both within the California
FMMO and throughout the FMMO
system. This section provides a
summary of the hearing evidence, posthearing arguments, and comments or
exceptions submitted regarding the
proposed milk classification provisions
under a California FMMO.
Summary of Testimony
Proposals 1 and 2 both offer standard
FMMO product classifications for their
respective California FMMO provisions.
Proposal 2 also provides an additional
shrinkage allowance for ESL production
at qualified ESL pool distributing
plants.
A Cooperative witness testified
regarding the proposed classification
provisions contained in Proposal 1. The
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witness reviewed the evolution of the
FMMO classification provisions and
noted that the CSO uses a similar
classification system, with limited
differences. The witness was of the
opinion that the FMMO classification
provisions should be adopted in a
California FMMO to ensure uniform
classification of milk and milk products
throughout the entire FMMO system.
A Cooperative witness contended that
ESL products are value-added products
and should not be granted additional
shrinkage allowances under a California
FMMO. The Cooperatives further argued
that ESL shrinkage allowances should
be evaluated at a national hearing
because ESL products are manufactured
in other FMMO marketing areas, in
addition to California.
A consultant witness, appearing on
behalf of the Institute, testified in
support of the portion of Proposal 2 that
establishes an additional shrinkage
allowance for the manufacture of ESL
and ultra-high temperature (UHT) milk
products. The witness explained that
the shrinkage allowance recognizes the
inherent loss of milk from farm to plant
and within the plant. The FMMO
system currently allows for up to a 2
percent shrinkage allowance for pool
distributing plants, depending on how
the milk was received at the plant. The
witness contended that the standard 2
percent allowance was developed before
extensive use of ESL technology became
common-place, and was based on
typical shrinkage experienced in
traditional high temperature, short time
pasteurization (HTST) processing. The
witness explained that under current
FMMO classification provisions, a
portion of the milk accounted for as
shrinkage is classified at the lowest
priced class for the month and
shrinkage losses beyond 2 percent are
considered excess shrinkage and
classified as Class I.
The consultant witness testified that
Proposal 2 provides a shrinkage
allowance of an additional 3 percent on
ESL production at plants qualified as
ESL pool distributing plants. Under the
proposed provisions, the plants eligible
for the additional shrinkage allowance
would be distributing plants located in
the marketing area that process 15
percent of the respective plant’s total
receipts of fluid milk products
physically received at the plant into
ultra-pasteurized or asepticallyprocessed fluid milk products.
The intent of Proposal 2, explained
the witness, is for an eligible plant to
have a maximum shrinkage allowance
of up to 5 percent on milk used in its
ESL production, not on all milk used in
the plant. Data from the witness’ ESL
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processing clients, all located outside of
California, showed their total product
pound shrinkage averaged above 5
percent. The witness also estimated
based on 2013 to 2014 USDA record
data, that excess shrinkage in ESL and
UHT plants throughout the country
averaged 2.09 percent.
Another Institute consultant witness
testified regarding a 19-plant shrinkage
study of ESL plants; three of the plants
in the study were located in California.
The study showed a weighted average
product pound shrinkage of 2.73
percent.
Two additional Institute consultant
witnesses and a witness from HP Hood
testified in support of the ESL shrinkage
allowance provided in Proposal 2. The
witnesses presented historical shrinkage
data for ESL and UHT manufacturing
facilities and offered extensive technical
explanations for why shrinkage levels
are higher in those systems than in
HTST systems. The witnesses explained
that shrinkage refers to milk lost in the
manufacturing process due primarily to
the fact that it sticks to the equipment
pipes and is lost in the cleaning process.
The witnesses stressed that ESL
equipment has longer piping, and noted
numerous operational differences which
inherently lead to higher losses of milk
when compared to HTST processing.
The HP Hood witness provided a
similar explanation of ESL processing
and why it lends itself to higher product
losses. The witness said that even
though fluid milk sales across the
United States are declining, HP Hood
ESL product sales have grown. The
witness was of the opinion that because
increases in ESL fluid milk sales benefit
the entire dairy industry, dairy
producers should share the burden of
producing these products through
greater shrinkage allowances, as
reflected in the classification provisions
provided in Proposal 2.
HP Hood, in its post-hearing brief,
reiterated its position that the heavy
investment in the development of ESL
technology and market expansion for
those products should be shared by
dairy farmers. The Institute, in its posthearing brief, concurred with HP Hood’s
points and argued the shrinkage
allowances provided in Proposal 2
would assure ESL processors, like
conventional fluid milk processors,
would only be charged Class I prices for
milk contained in fluid milk products
and not for milk lost during processing.
The Institute also stated that a
promulgation proceeding for a new
FMMO was an appropriate place to
consider ESL shrinkage allowances.
The Cooperatives’ reply brief
reiterated that ESL products are value-
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added products and handlers already
receive a premium in the market.
Additionally, the Cooperatives claimed
that the manufacturing costs cited by HP
Hood in its brief were not significant
enough to warrant the proposed change
to the uniform classification rules.
Findings
As discussed previously in this
decision, the primary objective of
FMMOs is to establish and maintain
orderly marketing conditions. FMMOs
achieve this goal through the classified
pricing and the marketwide pooling of
the proceeds of milk associated with a
marketing area. To that end, the AMAA
specifies that a FMMO should classify
milk ‘‘in accordance with the form in
which or the purpose for which it is
used.’’ The classification of milk
ensures competing handlers have the
same minimum regulated price for milk
used in a particular product category.
Thus, FMMOs have found it is
reasonable and appropriate that milk
used in identical or nearly identical
products should be placed in the same
class of use. This reduces the incidence
of disorderly marketing that could arise
from regulated price differences
between competing handlers.
Currently, the provisions providing
the classification of milk pooled on the
existing FMMOs are identical.26
Uniform classification provisions are
particularly important in assuring
orderly marketing because markets are
no longer isolated, and handlers often
sell products outside of their local
marketing area. The current FMMO
classification provisions provide four
classes of milk use, and specify
provisions for the classification of milk
transfers and diversions, plant
shrinkages and overages, allocation of
handler receipts to handler utilization,
and Market Administrator reporting and
announcements concerning
classification.
Under the current FMMO uniform
provisions, Class I consists of milk used
to produce fluid milk products (whole
milk, lowfat milk, skim milk, flavored
milk such as chocolate milk). Class II
milk includes milk used to make a
variety of soft products, including
cottage cheese, ice cream, yogurt and
yogurt beverages, sour cream, baking
mixes, puddings, meal replacements,
and prepared foods. Class III includes
milk used to make hard cheeses that
may be sliced, grated, shredded, or
crumbled, cream cheese, and other
spreadable cheeses. Class IV milk
includes milk used to produce butter,
evaporated or condensed milk in
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consumer-type packages, and dried milk
products. Other milk dispositions,
including milk that is dumped, fed to
animals, or accidentally lost or
destroyed, is generally assigned to the
lowest priced class for the month.
The record reflects that current
product classification provisions under
the CSO are comparable to those under
FMMOs. While the CSO has five classes
of milk (1, 2, 3, 4a and 4b), the record
reflects that under the uniform FMMO
classification provisions, products
currently classified by the CSO as Class
2 and 3 would be classified by the
California FMMO as Class II; CSO Class
4b products would be classified as
California FMMO Class III; and CSO
Class 4a products would be classified as
California FMMO Class IV products.
Both the Cooperatives and the
Institute support the product
classification provisions already
provided in the current FMMOs.
Neither group was of the opinion that
the proposed FMMO classification
provisions would disadvantage any
handler currently regulated by the CSO.
This decision continues to find that a
California FMMO should contain, to the
maximum extent possible, provisions
that are uniform with the FMMO system
California producers are seeking to
enter. To that end, the proposed
California FMMO should include the
same classification provisions as
currently provided in existing FMMOs
to allow for consistency of regulation
between FMMOs. Adoption of these
provisions would ensure that milk
pooled on the California FMMO is
classified uniformly with the rest of the
FMMO system, and consequently,
competing handlers will incur the same
regulated minimum prices.
Therefore, this decision continues to
find that a California FMMO should
provide the following product
classifications used in existing FMMOs:
Class I milk should be defined as milk
used to produce fluid milk products;
Class II milk should be defined as milk
used to make a variety of soft products,
including cream products, highmoisture cheeses like cottage cheese, ice
cream, yogurt and yogurt beverages,
sour cream, baking mixes, puddings,
meal replacements, and prepared foods;
Class III milk should be defined as milk
used to make spreadable cheeses like
cream cheese, and hard cheeses that
may be sliced, grated, shredded, or
crumbled; Class IV milk should be
defined as milk used to make butter,
evaporated or condensed milk in
consumer-type packages, and dried milk
products. Other uses for milk, including
milk that is dumped, fed to animals, or
accidentally lost or destroyed, should be
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assigned to the lowest-priced class for
the month.
This decision also finds that the
California FMMO should adopt the
same provisions as the existing FMMOs
regarding the classification of milk
transfers and diversions, plant shrinkage
and overages, and allocation of handler
receipts to handler utilization.
A comment submitted on behalf of the
Cooperatives expressed support for the
Department’s recommendations to adopt
a uniform classification system under a
California FMMO. They wrote that, with
the exception of the issue regarding ESL
shrinkage, which is discussed below, all
major proponents at the hearing
endorsed the Department’s findings that
uniform classification helps equalize
competing handlers throughout the
system.
The existing FMMOs also contain
uniform provisions recognizing that
some milk loss is inevitable in milk
processing. This is referred to as
shrinkage and is calculated as the
difference between the plant’s total
receipts and total utilization. Pool
handlers must account for all receipts
and all utilization. Shrinkage provisions
assign a value to milk losses at a plant.
There is, however, a limit on the
quantity of shrinkage that may be
allocated to the lowest priced class. The
limit depends on how the milk is
received. For instance, shrinkage on
milk physically received at the plant
directly from producers based on farm
weights and tests is limited to 2 percent,
whereas, shrinkage on milk received
directly from producers on a basis other
than farm weights and tests is limited to
1.5 percent. Similar limits are placed on
other types of bulk receipts. Quantities
of milk in excess of the shrinkage limit
are considered ‘‘excess shrinkage.’’
Excess shrinkage is assigned to the
highest class of utilization at the plant
to arrive at gross utilization, from which
the allocation process begins.
The CSO provides a shrinkage
allowance of up to 3 percent of the
plant’s total receipts, which is allocated
on the basis of the plant’s utilization.
Similar to the FMMOs, excess shrinkage
in the CSO is assigned as Class 1.
The recommended decision did not
propose an additional shrinkage
allowance for ESL products. Comments
filed by HP Hood opposed the
Department’s recommendation, noting
that ESL products have gained
popularity while overall fluid milk
consumption has declined, and
processors should be compensated for
the investments they have made to buoy
the fluid milk sector.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
supported the Department’s
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recommendation that no additional
shrinkage allowance be provided for
ESL production. The Cooperatives wrote
that adopting a different shrinkage
allowance for ESL products would
deviate from national uniformity in the
FMMO system.
This final decision does not find
justification for an additional shrinkage
allowance for ESL production at ESL
pool distributing plants. While the
record contains some ESL plant
shrinkage data, data pertaining to ESL
production at California plants is
limited. The record does indicate that
ESL production occurs throughout the
country. This decision continues to find
that amending provisions that are
uniform throughout the FMMO system
to allow an additional shrinkage
allowance on ESL production should be
evaluated on the basis of a separate
national rulemaking proceeding.
7. Pricing
The two main proposals in this
proceeding offered end-product price
formulas as the appropriate method for
pricing producer milk pooled on a
California FMMO, although the factors
in the formulas differed. This section
reviews arguments presented in
testimony and post-hearing briefs
regarding the appropriate method to
value producer milk. This section
further explains the finding that the
recommended California FMMO
include adoption of the same endproduct price formulas used in the 10
existing FMMOs and addresses
comments and exceptions received in
response to the recommended decision.
Summary of Testimony
A LOL witness, appearing on behalf of
the Cooperatives, testified in support of
the classified price provisions contained
in Proposal 1. The witness testified that
under Proposal 1, California would
adopt the classified prices (including
the commodity price series, product
yields, and make allowances), the
component prices, and the advanced
pricing factors presently used in the
FMMO system. The witness stated that
65 percent of the milk produced in the
United States is currently priced under
these common provisions, and the same
should apply to the 20 percent of the
national milk supply produced in
California.
The witness provided testimony
regarding the evolution of a national
manufacturing price, starting with the
Minnesota-Wisconsin price series in the
1960’s, and ending with the national
classified end-product price formulas
adopted in 2000. The witness discussed
the national pricing system that resulted
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from FMMO Order Reform (Order
Reform), including the multiple
component pricing (MCP) system used
in 6 of the 10 current FMMOs. The
witness explained that the MCP system
met the criteria set forth by Congress to
make pricing simple, transparent, and
based on sound economic theory. Under
the MCP system, the witness said, prices
are derived from actual, observed
market transactions for wholesale
commodity milk products, and utilize
yield factors and make allowances to
determine the value of raw milk in each
class. The witness explained that
through the Dairy Product Mandatory
Reporting Program (DPMRP),
manufacturers of the four commodity
dairy products (cheese, butter, NFDM,
and dry whey) are required to submit
sales information on current market
transactions. The witness said that
information is aggregated, released in
the National Dairy Product Sales Report
(NDPSR), and utilized in the FMMO
price formulas. The witness stated that
because many large-scale California
dairy plants are part of the DPMRP,
California commodity prices are
reflected in the prices paid by FMMO
handlers and received by producers in
the rest of the country, and the same
prices should be applicable to milk
pooled under a California FMMO.
The witness also testified regarding
the influence of California dairy
manufacturing costs on the current
FMMO make allowances. The witness
noted that a USDA Rural Cooperative
Business Service (RCBS) study, a
Cornell University study of processing
costs, and a CDFA cost-of-processing
survey were relied upon by the
Department to determine appropriate
make allowance levels for cheese,
butter, NFDM, and dry whey. In the
witness’s opinion, the inclusion of
CDFA manufacturing cost data in the
formulation of FMMO manufacturing
allowances justifies the use of the same
manufacturing allowances (butter:
$0.1715 per pound; NFDM: $0.1678 per
pound; cheese: $0.2003 per pound; and
dry whey: $0.1991 per pound) in a
California FMMO. The witness also
reviewed the rulemaking history on the
derivation of the product yields
contained in the current FMMO price
formulas, and was of the opinion that
they are similar to product yields
attainable by California manufacturing
plants. The witness stated that the
FMMO make allowances and product
yields remained relevant, as they had
been reaffirmed by the Department in a
2013 Final Rule.27
27 Official Notice is taken of: FMMO Class III and
IV Price Formula Final Rule: 78 FR 24334.
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The witness also testified regarding
the FMMO national Class I price
surface. The witness said that Order
Reform resulted in the adoption of a
national pricing surface, which assigned
a value to milk for every county in the
United States based on milk supply and
demand at those locations. The witness
was of the opinion that since California
was factored into the Department’s
Order Reform analysis to derive the
price surface, it would be appropriate
for the price surface to be adopted in a
California FMMO. The witness noted
the price surface identifies five pricing
zones covering California, ranging from
$1.60 to $2.10 per cwt. The witness
explained that in the FMMO system, the
Class I differential is added to the higher
of the Class III or Class IV price to
determine the Class I price for a
distributing plant at its location. The
witness elaborated that since Class I
processors compete with Class III and IV
manufacturers for a milk supply, Class
I prices are linked to manufacturing
prices in the FMMO system, and this
concept should likewise apply to a
California FMMO.
The witness also explained how the
base Class I differential, $1.60 per cwt,
was derived during Order Reform. The
witness said that the $1.60 base
differential assumes a cost per cwt of
$0.40 to maintain a Grade A facility,
$0.60 for marketing, and $0.60 for
securing a milk supply in competition
with manufacturers. The witness noted
these values were established in 2000,
and although still relevant, the actual
costs are higher in the current
marketplace. The Cooperatives provided
additional information in their posthearing brief, contending that current
costs support a base Class I differential
of $2.40, a 50 percent increase over the
base listed above.
The witness concluded by saying that
California dairy farmers should receive
prices reflecting the current national
market and that are comparable to what
producers receive from FMMO
regulated plants in the rest of the
country. This position was reiterated in
the Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief.
Another Cooperative witness
provided testimony on the handler’s
value of milk and related provisions.
The witness proposed that handlers
regulated by a California FMMO pay
classified prices based on the
components in the raw milk they
receive (otherwise known as ‘‘multiple
component pricing’’): butterfat, protein,
and other solids. Under Proposal 1, the
witness said, regulated handlers would
pay for milk on the following
components:
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• Class I: butterfat and skim
• Class II: butterfat and solids nonfat
• Class III: butterfat, protein and other
solids
• Class IV: butterfat and solids nonfat
The Cooperative witness reiterated
the Federal Order Reform recommended
decision justification for implementing
a national pricing structure and
contended the same reasons apply to
extending national pricing to a
California FMMO. The witness added
that while California handlers would be
paying the same national prices for milk
components, there would be no need to
adjust price formulas for regional
product yields because handlers only
pay for the components they receive.
The witness also explained that
Proposal 1 did not prescribe location
adjustments in the price formulas
because California plants are included
in the price surveys that determine the
national commodity prices used in the
FMMO formulas.
The Cooperative witness testified that
Proposal 1 includes a fortification
allowance on milk solids used to fortify
Class I products to meet California’s
fluid milk standards, as is currently
provided in the CSO. The witness noted
that Proposal 1 does not propose a
somatic cell adjustment or producer
location differentials since both features
are not currently contained in the CSO.
The Cooperative witness said
Proposal 1 seeks to have producers paid
on the basis of butterfat, protein and
other solids, and does not include a
producer price differential (PPD)
adjustment per se. The witness said that
the PPD is typically viewed as the
benefit to FMMO producers for
participating in the marketwide pool
since the PPD reflects the additional
revenue shared from the higher value
class utilizations. Instead, the witness
explained that under Proposal 1, the
California FMMO would calculate a
monthly PPD, but the PPD value would
be paid to producers according to each
component’s annual contribution to the
Class III price. For example, said the
witness, if on an annual basis butterfat
accounted for 32 percent of the total
value of the Class III price, then 32
percent of the monthly PPD value
would be paid out through an
adjustment to the butterfat price. This
same adjustment, the witness said,
would apply to the producer protein
and other solids prices. The witness
explained that FMMO producers
typically find the monthly PPD concept
confusing and complicated, especially
in months when it is a negative value.
The witness said that California
producers, who do not receive a PPD
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adjustment under the CSO, might find
Proposal 1’s method of distributing the
PPD value simpler to understand.
The witness also clarified that the
Cooperatives were amending the
proposal regarding announcement of
producer prices contained in Proposal 1
from ‘‘on or before the 11th’’ to ‘‘on or
before the 14th’’ day after the end of the
month.
Support for a national uniform pricing
system was reiterated in the
Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief. The
Cooperatives argued that the hearing
record demonstrates California cheese
competes in the national market. Having
California milk priced uniformly in the
FMMO system would not disadvantage
California processors, reiterated the
Cooperatives, but it would diminish the
current pricing advantage they have
under the CSO. The brief noted record
evidence that many FMMO cheese
processors paid higher than FMMO
minimum prices for milk as proof that
FMMO minimum prices are not too
high.
The Cooperatives’ brief also discussed
California whey processing. The brief
stated that 85.8 percent of cheese
manufactured nationally is produced in
plants that also process whey. In
California, the Cooperatives wrote, the
percentage is closer to 90 percent. Based
on these comparable percentages, the
Cooperatives stated whey pricing in
California should be no different from
the rest of the country.
The Cooperatives also stressed
opposition to any adjustment to the
price formulas to reflect a lower location
value in California. The Cooperatives
stated milk prices should not be
California centric because manufactured
products are sold nationally. If
California classified prices were to be
based solely on California product sales,
the Cooperatives were of the opinion
that California handlers would receive a
raw milk cost advantage over other
FMMO regulated handlers. The brief
noted that the Cooperatives manufacture
a majority of the butter and NFDM
produced in California, and they did not
believe the proposed California FMMO
prices associated with those Class IV
products would be too high. The
Cooperatives stressed that any changes
to the FMMO pricing system should be
considered at a national hearing and not
in this single-market proceeding.
An Institute witness testified
regarding the pricing provisions
included in Proposal 2. The witness
explained that Class I products have the
highest use value in order to encourage
adequate milk production to meet Class
I needs, and to attract milk to Class I
rather than to manufacturing uses. As
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manufacturing class uses balance the
supply and demand needs of the
marketing area, the witness said it
would be important that those classified
use values not be set above marketclearing levels.
The Institute witness testified that
historically, as milk began to travel
greater distances for processing, FMMO
pricing policy became more coordinated
to promote orderly marketing conditions
both within and between FMMOs. The
witness said that the MinnesotaWisconsin price series served as the
basis for FMMO pricing because the
area surveyed represented the largest
reserve supply of milk in the country,
and therefore generated an appropriate
market-clearing price for manufacturing
milk. The witness stated that California
is now the region with the largest
reserve supply and because California
products must compete for sales in the
east, the value of raw milk in California
is lower than in eastern parts of the
country. Therefore, emphasized the
witness, minimum prices for a
California FMMO should not be set
above market-clearing levels in
California. This position was reiterated
in the Institute’s post-hearing brief.
The Institute witness cautioned
against setting minimum prices too high
because it could lead to the inability of
dairy farmers to find a willing buyer for
their milk. Alternatively, the witness
said, if minimum prices are set too low,
dairy farmers could be compensated by
the market through over-order
premiums. The witness said Class III
and IV prices for a California FMMO
need to be reflective of commodity
prices received by California plants, and
reflective of current California
manufacturing costs. The witness was of
the opinion that the national values
used in the current FMMO Class III and
IV formulas are not appropriate for
California.
The Institute witness explained their
preference would be to use western
commodity prices in the Class III and IV
formulas. However, the witness said
that, due to data confidentiality issues,
the Department is unable to report these
prices. As an alternative, the witness
said, Proposal 2 contains default
commodity values that would adjust the
NDPSR prices based on the historical
difference between the NDPSR prices
and California or western based prices
as reported by either CDFA or Dairy
Market News. This western adjustment,
the witness said, would result in
commodity prices in the price formulas
being more representative of the prices
received by California handlers. The
witness noted the only exception to how
the adjustors are calculated is the
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default adjustor proposed for the Class
III protein price. The Class III protein
price adjustor utilized CME 40-pound
block Cheddar cheese prices, because
CDFA stopped reporting California 40pound block Cheddar prices after
August 2011.
The Institute witness also reviewed
the manufacturing allowances contained
in Proposal 2. Except for the dry whey
manufacturing allowance, explained the
witness, all are based on the most recent
CDFA manufacturing cost survey for
2013.28 The witness explained that
CDFA no longer reports dry whey cost
data. Therefore, Proposal 2 provides for
a dry whey manufacturing allowance
that adds the difference between the
FMMO manufacturing allowances for
nonfat dry milk and dry whey to the
most recent CDFA weighted average
manufacturing cost for nonfat dry milk.
The witness was of the opinion that the
yields contained in the FMMO price
formulas would be appropriate for
California, and are therefore also
prescribed in Proposal 2.
The Institute witness testified that
many California cheese plants
manufacture products other than dry
whey that often do not generate
revenues to match the dry whey value
in the regulated formulas. Other plants,
according to the witness, do not have
the capability to process the whey byproduct from their cheese making
operations. Therefore, the witness
offered an alternative Class III other
solids price formula that would be
based on whey protein concentrate
(WPC), and would cap the whey value
to recognize that not all plants are able
to capture value from their whey stream.
The witness testified that a more
appropriate reference commodity for
whey products, one that would be more
applicable to most California
cheesemakers’ operations, would be
WPC. The witness explained that over
the previous eight years, the production
of dry whey declined 3.3 percent, while
the production of various WPC and
Whey Protein Isolate (WPI) products has
seen increases ranging from 1.1 percent
to 9.5 percent.
The Institute witness testified that
cheese and whey markets are vastly
different, and not all cheese plants find
it profitable to invest in whey
processing. According to the witness,
when cheese plants do invest, it is
usually in the limited processing of
whey into concentrate solids for
transportation savings. The witness said
that only one plant in California
28 Proposed manufacturing allowances were later
amended by the Institute to incorporate a marketing
cost.
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consistently dries whey, and of the 57
California cheese plants, only 13
process whey in any fashion. The
witness explained that the alternative
other solids price formula offered by the
Institute incorporates the value of liquid
WPC–34 sold to a plant that would then
process the product further into a dry
product. While there are a variety of
liquid whey products marketed, the
witness said using WPC–34 prices as a
reference price for other solids would be
most appropriate because WPC–34 is
the predominant form of liquid whey
sold. The witness explained how
Proposal 2 would convert the WPC–34
reference price to a dry whey equivalent
basis so that the other parts of the other
solids price formula could be retained.
The witness added that the dry whey
make allowance would need to be
increased to include the cost of cooling
and delivering the liquid whey to a
processing facility. To provide some
protection to small cheesemakers when
the price is very high, and to dairy
producers when the price is very low,
the witness proposed another solids
price floor of $0.25 per pound and a
ceiling of $1.50 per pound.
The Institute’s post-hearing brief
discussed several of the unique aspects
of the California dairy industry. The
brief stated that from 1995 to 2014,
while the state’s population grew 23
percent, California milk production
increased 82 percent, which in turn
fueled the expansion of cheese
processing in the state. The brief stated
that three processing facilities account
for 25 percent of California’s cheese
manufacturing, and much of that
production is marketed east of the
Mississippi River. The brief cautioned
that increasing minimum prices would
create an economic trade barrier where
California processors would no longer
have the ability to compete in eastern
markets due to higher minimum
regulated prices.
The Institute’s post-hearing brief also
addressed the need for a national
FMMO pricing hearing. The Institute
reiterated hearing testimony that current
pricing formulas are based on data from
the 1990s, making the prices out of
alignment with current market realities.
The brief stated that pricing formulas
need to be updated in order to be
representative of current marketing
conditions. The FMMO pricing system,
the Institute stressed, needs all pricing
formulas to be set at market clearing
levels that enable over-order premiums
to be paid when appropriate.
A witness appearing on behalf of
Leprino Foods, a mozzarella cheese and
whey products manufacturer based in
Denver, Colorado, testified regarding the
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Class III price formula contained in
Proposal 2. Leprino operates nine plants
in the U.S., three of which are in
California. Leprino is a member of the
Institute and supports adoption of
Proposal 2 if the Department
recommends a California FMMO.
The Leprino witness stressed the
importance of minimizing the impacts
of minimum regulated pricing on the
dairy marketplace. The witness testified
that the United States dairy industry is
increasingly integrated with global dairy
markets since more than 15 percent of
United States milk solids are exported,
and that many manufacturers, including
Leprino, have made significant
investments in developing export
markets to increase demand for United
States dairy products. The witness said
it is important that any future California
FMMO facilitate rather than inhibit the
dairy industry’s ability to leverage this
export opportunity.
The Leprino witness testified about
the importance of setting minimum
regulated milk prices at market clearing
levels that would allow for reasonable
returns achievable under good
management practices by California
manufacturers. The witness testified
that 80 percent of California milk
production is utilized in Class III and IV
products, a large percentage of which
are marketed outside of California.
Therefore, the witness said, California
FMMO minimum prices should reflect
values of California-manufactured
products, f.o.b. the manufacturing plant.
The witness added that because price
formulas could only be changed through
a hearing process, it would be important
to set the regulated price formulas at
minimum levels that allow market
forces to function outside of the
regulated system. The witness said
regulated prices that are too high would
lead to over-production of milk and
disorderly marketing conditions. This
concept was reiterated in the posthearing briefs submitted by the Institute
and Leprino.
The Leprino witness summarized
findings from the Order Reform Final
Decision that explained how
manufacturing plant operators who find
make-allowances inadequate to cover
their actual costs are free to not
participate in the order. The witness
noted this option would not be available
under Proposal 1, which underscores
the importance of setting appropriate
market clearing prices.
The Leprino witness testified that a
California FMMO would require a Class
III formula that is set in relation to
achievable returns in California using
the most recent data. The witness
explained Leprino’s preference that the
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14141
Department suspend the California
FMMO proceeding to defer
implementation until after a national
hearing could be held to review and
revise the existing Class III formula. The
witness added that the Department
should hold a national Class III and IV
price formula hearing after this
rulemaking to utilize more current data
and account for the impacts of a
California FMMO, if necessary.
The Leprino witness testified in
support of establishing a DPMRP
western price survey to determine
minimum milk prices under a California
FMMO. The witness explained how the
Department might rely on surveyed
commodity prices from other western
states, if necessary, to overcome any
data confidentiality issues. In its brief,
Leprino encouraged the Department to
establish a definition for the Western
Area, and recommended it include
California, Oregon and Washington. In
addition to these three states, the
witness said that other areas should be
considered in order to eliminate
confidentiality constraints. However,
the witness said that in the event
confidentiality concerns continue to
arise, Proposal 2 contained alternative
default equations.
The Leprino witness discussed the
justification for pricing western
produced products differently than
those in the rest of the country. The
witness stressed that the location value
of California manufactured products is
lower because of the additional
transportation costs required to deliver
products to the population centers in
the east. This opinion was reiterated in
Leprino’s post-hearing brief. The
witness noted that nearly half of
Leprino’s cheese production sold
domestically is shipped to markets east
of the Mississippi, and they incur
transportation costs ranging from $0.10
to $0.15 per pound.
The Leprino witness was of the
opinion that bulk Cheddar cheese
remains the most appropriate product
from which to derive the FMMO Class
III price, but California Class III price
formulas should rely on 40-pound block
Cheddar prices because all California
Cheddar production is in blocks. The
adoption of 40-pound block Cheddar
prices was reiterated in Leprino’s posthearing brief.
The witness testified in support of
modifying the make allowances in
Proposal 2 to incorporate a sales and
administrative cost of $0.0015 per
pound. Therefore, the new proposed
make allowances per pound of product
would be as follows: $0.2306 for cheese,
$0.1739 for butter, $0.2310 for whey,
and $0.2012 for NFDM.
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The Leprino witness provided
extensive testimony on the appropriate
valuation of whey in FMMO Class III
minimum pricing. The witness
explained how the explicit whey factor
had been a problem for cheesemakers
and led the Institute to propose an
alternative valuation. Proposal 2 would
value the whey portion of the Class III
price formula relative to its
concentrated liquid whey value, which
the witness said was the most generic
whey product produced. The witness
stated that the WPC–34 price index is
the most common reference used for the
sale of liquid whey by cheese plants
selling concentrated whey in California.
The witness added that the prices
received for liquid whey are discounted
to reflect additional processing required
to produce a full-value whey product.
Accordingly, said the witness,
California FMMO minimum prices
should rely on WPC–34 survey prices to
approximate a whey value in the Class
III price.
The Leprino witness testified in
opposition to the Class III and IV
formulas contained in Proposal 1. The
formulas, the witness said, do not reflect
California market conditions. The
witness warned that higher regulated
prices in California would lead to
disorderly marketing conditions. In its
post-hearing brief, Leprino stated the
pricing formulas in Proposal 1 use old
manufacturing cost data and the
national weighted average prices for the
four products exceeded the prices
received in California. Leprino noted
that there was no evidence provided by
the Cooperatives related to the relevance
of the Proposal 1 formulas to California.
A witness testifying on behalf of
Hilmar spoke on how the current
FMMO Class III and IV pricing
formulas, if applied to a California
FMMO incorporating inclusive pooling,
would lead to disorderly marketing
conditions. In its brief, Hilmar stated
that disorderly marketing conditions
would negate the competitive
equilibrium present between eastern
and western markets and lead to a trade
barrier that would hinder the California
dairy industry.
The witness testified that Hilmar had
not experienced difficulties in sourcing
raw milk supplies, and that there was
currently no disorder in California to
warrant promulgation of a California
FMMO. The witness described several
scenarios in the past where CSO whey
pricing methodology over valued whey
and led to disorderly marketing
conditions for Hilmar, its independent
producer suppliers, and other California
dairy farmers, which CDFA was able to
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remedy through an adjustment to the
whey factor.
The Hilmar witness testified that if
milk used in California cheese
production was subject to the whey
factor used in the current FMMO Class
III price, the whey product stream in
California would be overvalued. Use of
that whey factor, along with the
inclusive pooling provisions in Proposal
1, would give rise to disorderly
marketing conditions.
The Hilmar witness was of the
opinion that 2015 California milk
production decreased for reasons not
relevant to the differences in CSO 4b
versus FMMO Class III pricing. Instead,
the witness said, production was
influenced by low milk powder prices
related to global oversupply of milk
powder, as well as drought,
environmental regulations, and
competition for land from other crops.
The Hilmar witness testified that CSO
milk prices are minimums, and
cooperatives have the ability to
negotiate for higher milk prices from
their proprietary plant customers. The
witness said that Hilmar paid premiums
of approximately $120 million for milk
above the CSO 4b price over the last
several years. The witness explained
that these premiums were paid for milk
characteristics such as component
content and other market-based factors.
The witness added that when CSO 4b
prices were temporarily increased
through CDFA’s adjustment to the
sliding scale whey factor, the premiums
Hilmar paid for milk decreased.
The Hilmar witness testified that the
make-allowances in the FMMO Class III
and IV formulas are outdated, and new
manufacturing cost studies are
necessary. The witness stated that
Hilmar’s manufacturing costs for cheese
and milk powders are higher than those
provided for in the FMMO Class III and
IV formulas. The witness said that if a
California FMMO was adopted with
inclusive pooling, it would be
impossible for Hilmar to clear the
market, unlike in existing FMMOs
where manufacturing milk is not
required to be pooled.
The Hilmar witness explained that
California FMMO minimum milk prices
need to reflect local supply and demand
conditions. The witness entered Hilmar
data showing that prices received for the
sale of Hilmar cheese averaged $0.04 per
pound lower than the announced
NDPSR weighted average cheese price
from 2010 to 2013. This price
difference, the witness explained, is a
function of the additional transportation
cost incurred by Hilmar to transport
product to eastern markets. The witness
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made similar price comparisons for
NFDM and butter.
The Hilmar witness stressed that if
California FMMO prices are not
reflective of the California market, the
California dairy industry will be less
competitive in the global marketplace.
The witness noted that in 2014, Hilmar
exported 10 percent of its cheese, 50
percent of its WPC, and 95 percent of its
lactose; and it planned to export all of
the skim milk powder to be produced at
a manufacturing facility nearing
completion in Turlock, California.
Inclusive pooling and U.S.-centric milk
pricing in California, said the witness,
would lead to competitive
disadvantages for California
manufacturers in international and
domestic markets.
The Hilmar witness testified that they
produce several types of whey products,
but not dry whey. The witness was of
the opinion that dry whey is a poor
indicator of the value of Hilmar’s WPC
products. The witness said the potential
minimum regulated cost under
inclusive pooling provisions in a
California FMMO would make
production of Hilmar’s whey products
unprofitable.
In the post-hearing brief submitted by
Hilmar, concerns regarding an adequate
return on investment were raised.
Hilmar was of the opinion that Proposal
1 does not provide an adequate level of
return on investment to allow for
processors to remain viable. The brief
stated that adoption of provisions
allowing for handlers to opt not to pool
manufacturing milk could alleviate
those concerns.
In its post-hearing brief, Hilmar
sought to counter the Cooperatives’
claim that California manufacturers
have a competitive advantage over their
FMMO counterparts and thus should be
able to pay FMMO minimum prices.
Hilmar countered that California
handlers have a long-term competitive
disadvantage when compared to their
FMMO counterparts because of the
CSO’s mandatory pricing and pooling
provisions. Hilmar maintained that the
value of milk in California is lower than
in the eastern part of the country, and
California FMMO price formulas should
reflect this reality.
A witness testified in support of
Proposal 2 on behalf of Marquez
Brothers International (Marquez), a
Hispanic cheese manufacturer located
in Hanford, California. The witness
explained how their company invested
in a processing facility in 2004 to
address challenges with whey disposal.
The witness explained that of the total
milk solids they receive, approximately
48 percent is used in cheese, and 52
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percent ends up in the whey stream.
The formulation of Marquez’s whey
stream, the witness noted, is
approximately 5.11 percent whey
cream, 9.45 percent WPC–80, and 85.44
percent lactose permeate.
The Marquez witness testified that out
of 57 California cheese plants, 49 plants
(19.1 percent of California cheese
production) have limited or no ability to
process whey. The witness testified that
whey disposal had been a burden for
their business in the past, costing $1.5
million per year with no revenue offset
and no recognition in the CSO 4b price
of whey disposal costs. The witness
added that the same problems existed in
the FMMO Class III formula price
contained in Proposal 1. The witness
testified that the reliance on dry whey
to price the other solids component of
the FMMO Class III price would be
inappropriate since cheesemakers must
pay producers for the value of whey that
can be generated from their milk,
regardless of whether that price is
actually obtained from the market.
The Marquez witness testified that
adoption of Proposal 1 would
discourage investment in cheese
processing technologies. The witness
said that a system of inclusive pooling
coupled with other increases in
operating costs would lead to
competitive difficulties for California
cheese plants.
A witness appeared on behalf of
BESTWHEY, LLC (BESTWHEY), in
opposition to adoption of Proposal 1.
BESTWHEY provides consulting
services to cheese manufacturing
facilities, with a focus on specialty
cheeses and whey handling and
disposal. According to the witness,
Proposal 1 would restrict the growth of
California’s cheese industry and
eliminate most of the small cheese
businesses in the state, and Proposal 1’s
inclusive pricing and pooling would
lead to an over-supply of California
milk. The witness highlighted the
limited number of California plants with
whey processing capabilities. The
witness supported adoption of Proposal
2 because, according to the witness, it
would provide a more realistic value for
whey in the other solids price
calculation, based on the actual value of
liquid whey sold by cheese plants.
A witness appeared on behalf of
Klondike Cheese (Klondike), a
Wisconsin-based cheese manufacturer.
The witness said that Klondike cools its
liquid whey by-product and sells it to a
larger whey processing facility. The
witness provided detailed descriptions
of whey processing methodology and
the associated costs. The witness
testified that basing the other solids
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price on dry whey markets is
inappropriate and does not accurately
reflect the revenues from whey at their
operation. The witness entered
Klondike 2014 data showing an average
loss on its whey production of $0.6516
per cwt of milk.
A witness testified on behalf of
Decatur Dairy (Decatur), a cooperativeowned, Wisconsin-based cheese
manufacturer, in regard to using dry
whey as the basis for the other solids
price. The witness provided detailed
descriptions of whey processing
methodology and the associated costs.
The witness said that Decatur sells
warm wet whey to a nearby plant for
further processing. The witness said that
dry whey prices contained in the
FMMO product-price formulas did not
reflect the revenue they receive from
their liquid whey sales, and it is not
feasible for them to invest in drying
equipment. The witness entered Decatur
data for 2012 to 2015 showing average
annual losses on its whey production
ranging from $0.0627 to $0.7114 per cwt
of milk.
A consultant witness appeared on
behalf Joseph Gallo Farms (Gallo
Farms). The witness explained that
Gallo Farms owns two dairy farms, as
well as cheese and whey processing
facilities in California, and supports
adoption of Proposal 2. Gallo Farms
processes WPC from their own cheese
operation and from other cheese
facilities.
The Gallo Farms witness testified that
if they had been required to pay the
FMMO Class III price for milk, they
would not have been able to make
updates or improvements to their
facilities. The witness estimated their
cheese costs would have increased by
$0.2237 per pound if Proposal 1 had
been in effect from January 2014
through September 2015. The witness
was of the opinion that California dairy
farmers should not compare the prices
received in California to prices received
in the Midwest or East Coast, where
significant population centers are
serviced. The witness characterized the
California market as significantly
different from eastern markets, as it
includes not only the West Coast
population centers, but also Mexico and
other export markets. The witness was
of the opinion that a California FMMO,
as provided for in Proposal 1, could lead
to the closure of small and medium
sized manufacturing plants.
The Gallo Farms witness supported
the portion of Proposal 2 that relies on
WPC to determine the other solids price,
as most whey pricing is related to the
WPC market rather than dry whey. An
Institute witness testified regarding
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Class I pricing. The witness was of the
opinion that the policy of assigning
Class I milk the highest classified value
should be reevaluated, given current
market realities. The witness said that
Proposal 1 relied on the current Class I
price surface and fluid milk pricing
system incorporated in the existing
FMMOs, while other potential fluid
milk pricing options have not been
thoroughly investigated. The witness
argued that although the ‘‘higher of’’
pricing mechanisms dampens Class I
sales and limits the ability of fluid milk
processors to hedge their Class I milk
volumes, the Institute still supported
the Class I milk pricing mechanism
advanced in Proposal 2.
The Institute witness also testified
regarding a technical modification to
Proposal 2 that would affect how
handlers pay for the milk components
used in Class I products and how
handler credits for fortifying fluid milk
products would be determined. The
witness explained that milk standards
set by the State of California require a
higher nonfat solids content than the
Food and Drug Administration standard
used elsewhere in the country.
California fluid milk processors fortify
raw milk with either condensed or
nonfat dry milk to meet these higher
standards.
The Institute witness described the
differences between CSO and FMMO
accounting for fluid milk fortification.
Under FMMOs, the witness said,
handlers account to the pool at the Class
IV price for the solids used to fortify
milk, but then are charged the twofactor (butterfat and skim) Class I price
for the volumetric increase in fluid milk
realized through fortification. Under the
CSO, handlers account to the pool using
a three-factor (butterfat, nonfat solids,
and fluid carrier) Class 1 price for all
solids used in Class 1 products, but then
receive a credit for the solids used to
fortify milk to meet the state standards.
The Institute witness was of the opinion
that the CSO three-factor system,
coupled with its fortification credits, is
superior to the FMMO system because
it encourages orderly milk movements
by making fluid milk handlers
indifferent to the solids content of milk
they receive, and it ensures that Class 1
handlers do not have a regulated milk
price advantage over one another. The
witness explained that plants receiving
milk with a higher solids content might
pay a higher Class 1 price for the raw
milk, but less for fortification, while
plants receiving milk with a lower
solids content might pay a lower Class
1 price for the milk, but more for
fortification, making both plants
competitive with each other. The
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witness emphasized that in the absence
of a fortification credit for meeting the
California milk solids requirement,
handlers under a California FMMO
might make milk sourcing decisions
solely to take advantage of a two-factor
Class I price formula.
A witness appeared on behalf of
Hilmar to outline the history of FMMO
surplus milk pricing policies. The
witness, referring to decisions from
previous FMMO rulemakings and
reports, stated that FMMO minimum
pricing should be set at levels aligning
with net revenues received by
manufacturers in the local marketing
area in order for milk to ‘‘clear’’ the
market. Therefore, the witness
concluded, the Department must
examine the local California market
situation when determining appropriate
minimum prices in a California FMMO.
A Cooperative witness addressed the
alternative Other Solids price formula
that was offered by the Institute. The
witness stressed that no verifiable price
series for WPC–34 exists, nor did the
Institute present any third-party WPC–
34 manufacturing cost studies. The
witness estimated that 86 percent of the
Class 4b milk was processed at plants
that had whey drying capabilities. In
addition, the witness said that the
Cooperatives’ modified exempt plant
provision would exempt as many as 25
of the 57 cheese plants from FMMO
minimum price regulation.
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Findings
Handler’s Value of Milk
The FMMO program currently uses
product price formulas relying on the
wholesale price of finished products to
determine the minimum classified
prices handlers pay for raw milk in the
four classes of products. Class III and
Class IV prices are announced on or
before the 5th day of the month
following the month to which they
apply. The Class III and Class IV price
formulas form the base from which
Class I and Class II prices are
determined. The Class I price is
announced in advance of the applicable
month. It is determined by adding a
Class I differential assigned to the
plant’s location to the higher of an
advanced Class III or Class IV price
computed by using the most recent two
weeks’ DPMRP data released on or
before the 23rd of the preceding month.
The Class II skim milk price is
announced at the same time as the Class
I price, and is determined by adding
$0.70 per cwt to the advanced Class IV
skim milk price. The Class II butterfat
price is announced at the end of the
month, at the same time as the Class III
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and Class IV prices, by adding $0.007
per pound to the Class IV butterfat
price.
AMS administers the DPMRP to
survey weekly wholesale prices of four
manufactured dairy products (cheese,
butter, NFDM and dry whey), and
releases weekly average survey prices in
the NDPSR. The FMMO product price
formulas use these surveyed products to
determine the component values in raw
milk. The pricing system determines
butterfat prices for milk used in
products in each of the four classes from
surveyed butter prices; protein and
other solids prices for milk used in
Class III products from surveyed cheese
and dry whey prices, respectively; and
a nonfat solids price for milk used in
Class II and Class IV products from
surveyed NFDM product prices. The
skim milk portion of the Class I price is
the higher of either the protein and
other solids prices of the advanced Class
III skim milk price or the NFDM price
of the advanced Class IV skim milk
price.
The butterfat, protein, other solids,
and nonfat solids prices are derived
through the average monthly NDPSR
survey price, minus a manufacturing
(make) allowance, multiplied by a yield
factor. The make allowance factor
represents the cost manufacturers incur
in making raw milk into one pound of
product. The yield factor is an
approximation of the product quantity
that can be made from a hundredweight
of milk received at the plant. The milk
received at the plant is adjusted to
reflect farm-to-plant shrinkage when
using farm weights and tests. This endproduct pricing system was
implemented as a part of Order Reform
on January 1, 2000,29 and last amended
on July 1, 2013.30
The pricing methodology described
above was proposed by the Cooperatives
to apply in a California FMMO and is
contained in Proposal 1. The
Cooperatives maintain that the
Department has for many years held that
the market for manufactured dairy
products is national in scope and that
the price of milk used to manufacture
those products should therefore be the
same across the nation. Proponents of
Proposal 1 explained that the
commodity prices used in the formulas
are based on a survey of prices for
manufactured dairy products from
plants across the country, including
California. Proponents went on to point
out that the surveyed manufacturing
costs were from plants in California, as
29 Federal
Order Reform Final Rule: 64 FR 70868.
Class III and IV Price Formula Final
Rule: 78 FR 24334.
30 FMMO
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well as in other states. These surveyed
costs have been used to determine
FMMO make allowances in the productprice formulas since their inception.
The Cooperatives, through witness
testimony and post-hearing briefs,
stressed that prices used to determine
California handlers’ value of milk
should be based on the same national
average factors as those used in the
FMMOs. The Cooperatives repeatedly
stressed that manufactured products
compete in a national market, and
therefore California dairy farmers
should receive a milk price reflective of
those commodity values. The
Cooperatives’ primary justification for a
California FMMO is that the CSO does
not provide California dairy farmers a
milk price reflective of these national
values, and they are now seeking to be
included in the FMMO system so
California dairy farmers can receive
prices similar to their counterparts in
the rest of the country.
The Institute, through witness
testimony and post-hearing briefs,
argued that classified prices in a
California FMMO must be reflective of
the current market conditions in
California. They were of the opinion
that not only has data used in the
formulas become outdated, but that the
value of California milk is inherently
lower because of California’s geographic
location in the West and the additional
cost of transporting finished product to
population centers in the East. The
Institute argued that these conditions
make it hard for its dairy manufacturing
member companies to remain
competitive in the market.
In Proposal 2, the Institute proposed
several changes to the current FMMO
pricing formulas that would be
applicable in California. First, the
Institute proposed a western states price
series for each commodity surveyed by
the DPMRP. If a western price could not
be used because of data confidentiality
issues, the Institute proposed that a
fixed value for each commodity be
subtracted from the current NDPSR
prices to represent the lower value of
products in the West. Second, the
Institute suggested that a Western states
manufacturing cost survey be conducted
to determine relevant California make
allowances for each commodity, and if
this was not feasible, they proposed
specific make allowance levels they
asserted are representative of
manufacturing costs in California.
Third, they proposed the NDPSR
Cheddar cheese price used in the
FMMO protein price formula for
California only consider 40-pound block
prices. They proposed that 500-pound
barrel Cheddar cheese prices should not
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be included as they are in current
FMMOs.
Class III and Class IV Pricing. The
record evidence supports the finding
that the classified and component price
formulas used in the 10 current
FMMOs 31 be utilized without change in
the proposed California FMMO. These
national formulas were adopted as part
of Federal Order Reform and are
described earlier in this decision. The
Order Reform Final Decision 32 found
that because commodity dairy products
compete in the national market, it was
appropriate that the raw milk used in
those products be priced uniformly
across the FMMO system. This hearing
record contains testimony explaining
the FMMO evolution toward national
uniform pricing for manufactured
products. Such explanation was also
outlined in the Order Reform Final
Decision.
In the early 1960s, FMMOs used a
Minnesota-Wisconsin (M–W)
manufacturing grade milk price series to
determine a price for milk used in
manufactured products based on the
supply and demand for Grade B milk.
As Grade B milk production and the
number of plants purchasing Grade B
milk declined, FMMOs moved to a
Basic Formula Price (BFP). The BFP
price incorporated an updating formula
with the base M–W price to account for
the month-to-month changes in the
prices paid for butter, NFDM, and
cheese. The Order Reform decision
recognized that Grade B milk would
only continue to decline and that the
FMMO system needed a more accurate
method for determining the value of
producer milk.
As outlined in the Order Reform Final
Decision, the goals for replacing the BFP
price were: (1) To meet the supply and
demand criteria set forth in the AMAA;
(2) not to deviate greatly from the
general level of the current BFP; and (3)
to demonstrate the ability to change in
reaction to changes in supply and
demand. The product-price and
component formulas currently used in
the FMMO system were found to be the
appropriate market-oriented alternative
to the BFP. Additionally, that final
decision specifically addressed the
national market for commodity dairy
products:
‘‘. . . the current BFP may have a
greater tendency to reflect supply and
demand conditions in Minnesota and
Wisconsin rather than national supply/
demand conditions. The formulas in
this decision use national commodity
price series, thereby reflecting the
national supply and demand for dairy
products and the national demand for
milk.’’ 33
The Department subsequently
reiterated the necessity for FMMO
classified prices to reflect national
markets in a later final decision on Class
III and IV pricing when it specifically
addressed public comments pertaining
to the relationship between the CSO and
FMMOs:
‘‘Class III and Class IV dairy products
compete in a national market. Because
of this, Class III and Class IV milk prices
established for all Federal milk
marketing order areas are the same.’’ 34
The evidentiary record of this
proceeding supports and validates the
same conclusion that prices used in a
California FMMO should reflect the
national marketplace for cheese, butter,
NFDM and dry whey. The record
reflects that commodity products
produced in California compete in the
same national market as products
produced throughout the country.
Uniform FMMO price formulas ensure
similarly situated handlers have equal
minimum raw milk costs regardless of
where the handler is regulated, and as
California is seeking to join the FMMO
system, it is appropriate that the milk
pooled on the California FMMO be
priced under the same uniform price
provisions found in all current FMMOs.
Additionally, the record evidence
supports the finding that by pricing
California milk under these uniform
pricing provisions, prices received by
farmers whose milk is pooled on the
California FMMO would be more
reflective of the national market for
commodity products for which their
milk is utilized. Therefore, adopting a
western adjusted price series, a 40pound only Cheddar cheese price, and
California-specific make allowances is
not appropriate.
FMMO price formulas already
account for California market
conditions; therefore, it is reasonable
and appropriate to use these price
formulas in a California FMMO. This
decision finds that the national FMMO
pricing policy continues to reflect the
marketing conditions of the entire
FMMO system and is appropriate for
adoption in California.
FMMO product-price formulas
generally consist of three factors:
commodity price, manufacturing
allowance, and yield factor. Product
yields contained in the formulas reflect
33 Federal
31 7
CFR 1000.50 and 1000.52.
Notice is taken of Federal Order Reform
Final Decision: 64 FR 16026.
32 Official
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Order Reform Final Decision: 64 FR
16026.
34 Official Notice is taken of: FMMO Class III and
IV Final Decision: 67 FR 67906.
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standard industry norms. Yield factors
were last updated in 2013,35 and the
record shows that these values continue
to reflect current market conditions, as
there was no dispute as to their
continued relevancy.
Commodity prices used in the FMMO
formulas are announced by AMS in the
NDPSR every month and reflect current
commodity prices received for products
over the previous four or five weeks.
While surveyed plant names and
locations are not released by USDA,
several witnesses testified that
California dairy product sales meeting
the reporting specifications 36 are
included in the NDPSR. These
California sales are part of the NDPSR
prices used by the FMMOs in the same
way that sales from plants located in
other areas of the United States are
currently included. FMMO pricing
formulas currently contain the following
per-pound make allowances: Cheese—
$0.2003, butter—$0.1715, NFDM—
$0.1678, and dry whey—$0.1991. These
make allowances were last updated in
2013.37 They were determined on the
basis of a 2006 CDFA survey (plants
located inside of California) and a 2006
Cornell Program on Dairy Markets and
Policy (CPDMP) survey (plants located
outside of California) of manufacturing
costs. The butter and NFDM make
allowances were computed by taking a
weighted average of the CDFA and
CPDMP surveys, weighted by national
commodity production volumes, and
adjusting for marketing costs. The
cheese make allowance was computed
by relying solely on the CDFA survey
and adjusting for marketing costs. The
dry whey make allowance was
computed by relying solely on the
CPDMP survey and adjusting for
marketing costs. California dry whey
data was not considered because at the
time it was restricted and therefore not
available.
As the record demonstrates, most of
the manufacturing allowances already
account for California manufacturing
costs. In regard to the Institute’s
position that data used to determine
make allowance levels is not current,
this decision recognizes 2006 data was
used to determine current make
allowance levels. Since that time, the
Department has not received a hearing
request to amend the levels. It may be
appropriate to amend these levels in the
future, and the Department would
evaluate any changes to those levels on
35 FMMO Class III and IV Price Formula Final
Rule: 78 FR 24334.
36 7 CFR 1170.8.
37 FMMO Class III and IV Price Formula Final
Rule: 78 FR 24334.
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the basis of a formal rulemaking record
in that proceeding.
Institute witnesses stressed that
California manufacturers would be
competitively harmed should California
FMMO minimum classified prices not
reflect a solely western location value.
This decision finds that California
manufacturers would not face
competitive harm with the adoption of
the uniform FMMO prices. Western
manufacturing handlers who purchase
milk pooled on the Pacific Northwest
and Arizona FMMOs already routinely
pay these prices. The record reflects that
the Institute’s primary concern was the
adoption of the current FMMO price
formulas for California, coupled with
the adoption of the inclusive pooling
provisions contained in Proposal 1. The
provisions recommended by this
decision allow handlers to elect to not
pool milk used in manufacturing as
determined appropriate for their
individual business operations. Further,
the proposed California FMMO
provisions would not prohibit handlers
and producers from utilizing the Dairy
Forward Pricing Program 38 to forward
contract for pooled manufacturing milk.
Other Solids Price. Currently, the
FMMO system determines the other
solids price using the same basic
formula used to determine the other
component prices: Commodity price,
less a make allowance, times a yield
factor, using dry whey as the NDPSRreferenced commodity price. As the
market price for dry whey moves and is
reflected in the NDPSR price, it moves
the other solids price moves
accordingly.
At the hearing, the Institute proposed
an alternative method for computing the
whey value in the other solids formula.
The Institute argued, in testimony and
post-hearing brief, that dry whey is not
an appropriate reference commodity for
California because little dry whey is
produced in the state. Instead, they
testified that prices from the more
commonly produced WPC–34 should be
used. The Institute provided evidence
regarding WPC–34 production in
California. The record contains
testimony explaining how WPC–34 and
dry whey production practices and
manufacturing costs differ.
This decision finds that the prices
adopted in the California FMMO should
be uniform with all current FMMOs and
be reflective of the dry whey market.
Therefore, it is not appropriate on the
basis of this hearing record to adopt a
change in other solids pricing for only
one FMMO. While, the data and
testimony presented by the Institute
38 7
CFR part 1145.
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may warrant further consideration for
that purpose, to consider such a change
for only one FMMO is not appropriate.
While an academic expert did provide
testimony on the record about a WPC–
34 manufacturing cost survey, results of
the survey, which would be of interest
if such a proposal was being evaluated,
were not available.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
in response to the recommended
decision supported the Class III and IV
price formulas contained in the
proposed California FMMO. Their
comments reiterated that because
manufactured dairy products, including
those manufactured in California,
compete in a national market, classified
prices paid by all regulated handlers
should reflect that national market
through the uniform, national Class III
and IV end-product price formulas.
Additional comments submitted by
Select, CDC, and WUD supported
adoption of the end-product price
formulas contained in the recommended
decision. These entities were of the
opinion that through national uniform
manufacturing prices, California
producers would receive the same
prices as producers in the rest of the
country, and milk movements would be
based on economic decisions, not
government regulation.
Comments filed by the Institute,
Hilmar and Leprino took exception to
the classified prices contained in the
proposed California FMMO. The
Institute maintained that the
Department did not properly analyze all
record evidence nor indicate what
record evidence was accepted and
rejected when making its determination.
The Institute specifically took exception
to the factors contained in the Class III
price formula, arguing that they did not
take into account local marketing
conditions that demonstrate higher
manufacturing costs and lower Class III
product values. The Institute was of the
opinion that the Department provided
no basis for why record evidence on
whey data was not considered.
Hilmar argued that the Department
relied on past decisions and outdated
data to wrongly conclude that the
proposed California FMMO should
contain the same price formulas as the
current 10 FMMOs. Hilmar objected to
the recommended decision’s finding
that adoption of the proposed price
formulas would not result in
competitive harm. Hilmar provided
extensive comments on the competitive
harm, in the form of loss in
manufacturing revenue, profits, or
market share they assert would result if
the proposed California FMMO is
established.
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Hilmar reiterated comments similar to
the Institute’s that the proposed price
formulas are not justified because they
do not take into account local marketing
conditions. It contended that the
proposed price formulas would require
California manufacturers to pay more
for milk than is needed to clear the
market and make a profit. Hilmar argued
that because the Department did not
rule on each proposed finding of fact,
interested parties do not know what
data did or did not factor into the
Department’s recommendation.
Hilmar also took exception with the
Department’s finding that changes to the
pricing formulas should be done on a
national, not individual market level.
Hilmar concluded that adoption of the
proposed California FMMO as
contained in the recommended decision
would, at a minimum, put California
manufacturers in a less competitive
position than they are in now. It further
objected to waiting for a future national
hearing to address any changes to the
national uniform end-product product
formulas.
Leprino was of the opinion that the
Department did not consider record
evidence regarding local California
marketing conditions that they assert
should result in different product price
formula factors. Leprino wrote the
Department incorrectly found the
national uniform minimum regulated
price structure should remain
throughout the FMMO system,
including a proposed California FMMO.
Leprino reiterated a California FMMO
should have different price formulas
that recognize the different
manufacturing costs, commodity prices
received, and whey products produced
in California.
Leprino contended that incorporation
of Western-based commodity prices and
manufacturing allowances, as contained
in Proposal 2, was the only method for
accurately valuing manufactured dairy
products produced in California. It also
reiterated support for deriving the whey
value in the Class III product price
formula through liquid whey rather than
dry whey values, the latter being more
representative of California whey
production.
Leprino noted that a national hearing
should be held to address these factors
throughout the FMMO system, and that
promulgation of a California FMMO
should be delayed until such hearing is
held.
Comments filed by Cacique Cheese
(Cacique), Farmdale Creamery, and
Pacific Gold Creamery took exception to
the proposed end-product price
formulas as appropriate for the
California market. Cacique argued that
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the recommended make allowances
underestimate the cost of manufacturing
and should be updated to reflect current
costs. Cacique took exception to the
Department’s finding to price other
solids on dry whey, instead of proposed
liquid whey. Pacific Gold was of the
opinion that regional differences should
be accounted for through a Westernbased price series and Californiaspecific make allowances.
As detailed above, the primary theme
of exceptions filed regarding the
recommend price formulas revolve
around the assertion that the
Department ignored record evidence
demonstrating local market conditions
warrant different price formulas for
California. Commenters suggested that
because a California FMMO is only now
being proposed, the pricing formulas in
a California FMMO must only reflect the
local marketing conditions of California.
Additional exceptions were raised that
the Department did not rule on every
proposed finding of fact and only took
Official Notice of a selected number of
documents that were requested by
stakeholders in post-hearing and reply
briefs.
The decision to recommend
promulgating a California FMMO and
its specific provisions was based on the
entire hearing record. The record reveals
that during Order Reform, end-product
price formulas were found to be an
appropriate methodology for reflecting
the national market for manufactured
products as well as the local marketing
conditions for the consolidated orders.
Because of California’s prominence in
the national marketplace, California
local marketing conditions were
considered and factored into the endproduct price formulas when those
formulas were established, even though
California did not join the FMMO
system at that time.
As proposed, California regulated
handlers would pay FMMO minimum
classified prices that already account for
their local marketing conditions, rather
than a different set of state-regulated
prices. By incorporating manufacturing
costs and commodity prices received
throughout the country, FMMO
minimum classified prices reflect
national supply and demand conditions.
California products, sold throughout the
country, are an integral part of the
national supply and demand conditions
of manufactured products. Therefore,
adoption of these national end-product
price formulas, without change, into a
California FMMO is appropriate as they
will continue to include California local
marketing conditions and meet the
pricing requirement of the AMAA.
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It should be noted that regulated
handler minimum prices throughout the
country are currently affected by
California marketing conditions through
California plants whose DPMRP prices
are incorporated in the NDPSR, and
through California manufacturing costs
that were incorporated into the current
FMMO manufacturing allowances. In a
national uniform pricing system, it is
appropriate for California plants that
become regulated by a FMMO to pay
minimum classified prices that likewise
incorporate local marketing conditions
in other parts of the country through the
same factors.
This final decision continues to find
that any change to the nationally
coordinated pricing system should be
considered through a national
rulemaking. FMMOs hearings are
requested by the industry. To delay
implementation of a California FMMO
for a national pricing hearing that may
or may not be requested, as suggested by
some commenters, is not appropriate.
Evidence was introduced in the
record regarding specific California
manufacturing costs, commodities
produced, and prices received.
However, the FMMO system has a
nationally coordinated pricing system
and any changes to that system must be
evaluated together in a rulemaking
where all industry stakeholders can
participate and all factors can be
considered. While changes to the
nationally coordinated FMMO pricing
system may or may not be found to
provide for more orderly marketing
conditions, the current pricing system
already takes into account marketing
conditions from throughout the country,
including California, which are
incorporated in the pricing system on a
monthly basis.
Comments received took exception to
the finding that adoption of the
recommended price formulas would not
cause competitive harm by citing
examples of reduced revenue, profits,
and market share. The REIA released in
conjunction with this decision
demonstrates there would be an impact
in all sectors of the industry and
throughout the country. This final
decision continues to find the
recommended end-product price
formulas appropriate for California and
clarifies that manufacturers would not
face competitive harm in the form of
different minimum regulated prices
than their competitors located in the
other FMMOs.
One comment received stated that
because the CSO had already increased
prices to offset higher milk production
costs, adoption of a California FMMO
with higher minimum prices is not
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warranted. Throughout this decision, it
has been repeated that adoption of the
recommended end-product price
formulas is warranted because they
more accurately reflect the national
commodity markets where dairy
products are sold. The recommended
decision did not find, nor does this final
decision find, that these price formulas
should be adopted in order to offset
higher milk production costs, except to
the extent that the prices indirectly
reflect higher production costs through
the supply and demand conditions that
generate the resulting commodity prices
received.
Some commenters took exception to
the fact that the Department did not rule
on each offered finding of fact presented
in post-hearing and reply briefs. The
Department is required to discuss
relevant issues and the evidence relied
upon in making its findings. The
recommended decision encompassed
those issues, taking into account
arguments made on all sides of the
issues presented. Particularized rulings
on every argument presented by
interested parties are not required.
In its post-hearing brief, the Institute
filed a Negative Inference Motion
asserting that because the Cooperatives
did not enter into the record of this
proceeding a study they commissioned
evaluating their proposed milk pricing
provisions, the Department should
conclude that the study results
contradict the Cooperatives’ justification
for adopting the price formulas
contained in Proposal 1 without a need
to draw any inferences about documents
not in the record.
It is left to the discretion of the trier
of fact to determine whether or not a
negative inference will be drawn from
the failure to present any specific piece
of evidence under one party’s exclusive
control. The Department finds that the
recommended pricing provisions are
properly based on testimony of those
witnesses who appeared and the
evidence that has been presented by all
parties on the record.
Class II Pricing. The FMMO system
currently prices milk used in Class II
products uniformly. The Class II skim
milk price is computed as the advanced
Class IV skim price plus $0.70 per cwt.
The Class II butterfat price is the Class
III butterfat price for the month, plus
$0.007 per pound. The $0.70 differential
between the Class IV and Class II skim
milk prices adopted in the Order Reform
Final Decision was an estimate of the
cost of drying condensed milk and rewetting the solids for use in Class II
products.
The record reflects, and this decision
continues to find, that milk pricing in
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the FMMO system should be as uniform
as possible. Therefore, this decision
finds that Class II pricing in the
California FMMO should be the same as
in current FMMOs. Class II pricing in
the California FMMO would result in
forward pricing the skim portion of
Class II while pricing butterfat on a
current basis. Butterfat used in Class II
products competes on a current-month
basis with butterfat used in cheese and
butter, and its price should be
determined on the basis of the same
month’s value.
No comments or exceptions were
received in regard to the Class II price
as proposed in the recommended
decision.
Class I Pricing. Currently, FMMOs
determine Class I prices as the higher of
the advanced Class III or Class IV price,
plus a location-specific differential
referred to as a Class I differential. Class
I differentials have been determined for
every county in the continental United
States, including those in California.39
Class I prices paid in all current
FMMO’s are on a skim/butterfat basis.
Handlers who fortify their Class I
products have the NFDM or condensed
skim used to fortify classified as a Class
IV use, and pay the Class I price for the
volumetric increase attributed to
fortification.
The Cooperatives have proposed that
the California FMMO adopt the same
Class I pricing structure: the higher of
the advanced Class III or Class IV price
plus a Class I differential based on the
plant location. They argued that the
Class I price surface was designed as a
nationally coordinated structure and
already includes differential levels for
all California counties. According to the
Cooperatives, any change to the Class I
differential surface should be done
through a national rulemaking hearing
where all interested parties can
participate.
The Institute argued, in testimony and
post-hearing briefs, that the Class I
differential surface adopted as part of
Order Reform did not consider
California in its inception, and is not
appropriate for adoption here. The
Institute did not offer an alternative.
This decision continues to find that
the Class I price formula contained in
Proposal 1, and as currently used in all
current FMMOs, and proposed in the
recommended decision, would be
appropriate for the proposed California
FMMO. This decision finds that prices
for milk pooled on the California FMMO
and used in Class I products should be
location-specific, since Class I products
generally compete on a more local
39 7
40 Federal Order Reform Final Decision: 64 FR
16044.
CFR 1000.52.
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market. Therefore, the Class I
differential surface that applies in all
current FMMOs continues to be
recommended for the California FMMO.
As such, Class I prices for milk pooled
on the California FMMO would be
determined by the higher of the
advanced Class III or Class IV milk price
announced on or before the 23rd day of
the preceding month, adjusted by the
Class I differential at a plant’s location.
This decision continues to
recommend for a California FMMO the
same Class I differential surface used in
the current FMMOs. Contrary to
Institute testimony, this differential
surface was determined through a
United States Dairy Sector Simulator
(USDSS) model that included California
supply and demand factors. An
academic expert testifying in this
proceeding was one of the lead authors
of the model and stated that California
was included when the model was
constructed. This price surface was
designed to facilitate the movement of
milk to Class I markets without causing
disorderly marketing conditions within
or across markets. Therefore, it is not
appropriate on the basis of this hearing
record to make a change to the
nationally coordinated Class I price
surface.
Prior to January 1, 2000, there were 31
FMMOs. As part of the 1996 Farm Bill,
the Department was instructed by
Congress to consolidate the existing
orders into as few as 10, and no more
than 14, FMMOs, reserving one place
for California. Since California
stakeholders did not express a desire to
enter the FMMO system at that time, the
Order Reform process only considered
the FMMO marketing areas in existence
at the time for consolidation. In the
Order Reform Final Decision, the
reference to ‘‘not including the State of
California’’ 40 pertained to determining
appropriate consolidated marketing
areas, not the analysis pertaining to
Class I pricing, which included
California.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
supported the proposed Class I price
surface and concurred that California
market conditions were considered
when the surface was first established.
Their comments stressed that the
nationally coordinated price surface
accounted for California market
conditions and is appropriate for
adoption in the proposed California
FMMO.
Exceptions filed by the Institute in
response to the recommended decision
continued to assert that California was
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not considered when the price surface
was developed and the Department did
not provide an evidentiary citation from
which to conclude otherwise. The Order
Reform Recommended Decision
outlined the committee process
undertaken by the Department to
address specific issues during the
Reform process. The decision explained
that partnerships were established with
two university consortia to provide
expert analysis on issues relating to
price structure. The decision referenced
two published papers by researchers at
Cornell University, ‘‘U.S. Dairy Sector
Simulator: A Spatially Disaggregated
Model of the U.S. Dairy Industry’’
(USDSS) and ‘‘An Economic and
Mathematical Description of the U.S.
Dairy Sector Simulator’’.41 The
Department also explained the USDSS
model results were used as a basis for
developing the Class I price surface.42
The ‘‘U.S. Dairy Sector Simulator: A
Spatially Disaggregated Model of the
U.S. Dairy Industry’’ paper 43 expressly
explains how the USDSS transshipment
model took into account milk
production, manufacturing and
consumption points for all states,
including California. This final decision
continues to find that California
marketing conditions were accounted
for in the development of the FMMO
Class I price surface, and therefore
inclusion of that price surface in a
California FMMO is appropriate.
The Institute argued in their
exceptions the Department did not take
into account changes in the dairy
industry after Federal Order Reform
which should lead to a finding that a
different price surface for California is
justified.
As reiterated in other parts of this
decision, establishing a California
FMMO is not done in isolation.
California is seeking to enter a Federally
regulated system with current policy
predicated on a system of nationally
coordinated regulated prices. This
includes the current Class I price
surface. The record of this proceeding
demonstrates that California market
conditions, which continue to be
reflected in the price formulas, were
considered when the end-product
pricing and Class I price surface
provisions were developed. This
nationally coordinated system has been
41 Federal Order Reform Proposed Rule: 63 FR
4802.
42 Federal Order Reform Proposed Rule: 63 FR
4807.
43 Official Notice is taken of: Cornell University:
U.S. Dairy Sector Simulator: A Spatially
Disaggregated Model of the U.S. Dairy Industry,
November 1996. https://dairymarkets.org/pubPod/
pubs/SP9606.pdf.
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in place since January 1, 2000, and this
decision does not find it appropriate on
the basis of this record to alter the
system for one region of the country.
Three-Factor FMMO Class I Pricing
and Fortification. The Institute
proposed that California Class I prices
be paid on a 3-factor basis: Butterfat,
nonfat solids, and fluid carrier, as well
as incorporate a fortification credit
similar to what is currently provided for
in the CSO. The fortification credit
offered in Proposal 2 provides a credit
to a Class I handler’s pool obligation for
the NFDM or condensed skim milk a
handler uses to fortify Class I products
to meet the State’s higher nonfat solids
content requirement. The proposed
fortification credit would be paid out of
the California FMMO marketwide pool
funds.
The Institute explained these two
features are currently provided for in
the CSO and work together to
financially assist Class 1 handlers in
meeting the State-mandated higher
nonfat solids content for Class 1
products. The Institute explained that
handlers receiving high solids milk pay
a higher Class 1 price, but use less
solids to fortify Class 1 products, and
thus incur less cost to meet the state’s
nonfat solids standards for fluid milk
products. Conversely, handlers
purchasing low solids content milk pay
a lower Class 1 price, but then incur a
higher cost to fortify their Class 1
products. The Cooperatives supported
this concept in their post-hearing brief.
The record of this proceeding does
not contain sufficient evidence to justify
deviation from the uniform FMMO
treatment of Class I pricing. Therefore,
Class I milk pooled on the proposed
California FMMO is proposed to be paid
on a skim and butterfat basis. This
uniform treatment would avoid
disorderly marketing with adjacent or
other Federal orders, as otherwise
handlers could engage in inefficient
milk movements solely for the purpose
of seeking a Class I price advantage.
Comments and exceptions received in
response to the recommended decision
uniformly supported 3-factor Class I
pricing.
The Institute, Dean, HP Hood, and
Kroger requested that the Department
reconsider this issue. The Institute was
of the opinion that the State-mandated
higher nonfat solids standard, a local
marketing condition, should be
recognized in the California FMMO
through 3-factor Class I pricing and the
fortification allowances outlined in
Proposal 2.
Dean said the Department did not
provide an adequate justification to
reject 3-factor Class I pricing, which
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they contend would prevent disorderly
marketing conditions and was
supported by the Cooperatives in their
reply-brief. Dean reiterated its hearing
arguments that 3-factor Class I pricing is
necessary to avoid unequal raw product
costs for products requiring fortification
to meet state-mandated standards and
would remove incentives for processors
to seek higher nonfat solids content
producer milk. Dean contended that
without 3-factor Class I pricing,
fortification costs between handlers
would vary such that handlers would
face non-uniform raw milk costs for the
same end product. Dean wrote that the
Department erred when finding for
uniform Class I pricing among all
FMMOs instead of recognizing the local
California marketing conditions that
Dean contends require 3-factor Class I
pricing.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
and CDC supported the reconsideration
of 3-factor Class I pricing but did not
support reconsideration of the
fortification credits denied in the
recommended decision.
This decision continues to find that
additional fortification credits as
contained in Proposal 2 are not justified.
The record indicates the CSO
fortification credit system was designed
in response to California’s legislatively
mandated higher nonfat solids standard
for Class 1 products. The record does
not address how incorporation of the
CSO fortification credit system would
operate in the context of the existing
FMMO fortification classification
provisions without resulting in a double
credit for fortification. Dean contends in
their exceptions that the proposed
fortification credits are for the handling
of fortification ingredients, not a
reduction in the cost of those
ingredients and therefore would not be
double counting.
The record indicates the current CSO
fortification credit system accounts for
the fortification ingredients as Class 1
and then provides the handler with a
per pound fortification credit based on
the amount of the nonfat solids in the
fortifying ingredient used. This is
different than how current FMMOs
provide for fortification by allocating
the fortifying ingredients to Class IV,
and then classifying the incremental
volume increase as Class I. If the
fortification credits provided for in
Proposal 2 were adopted, it would result
in the handler not only receiving the
lower Class IV allocation for its
fortifying ingredients (as opposed to
accounting for them as Class 1 as is
currently done under the CSO), but they
would then also receive a handling
credit based on the amount of product
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used to fortify. This would result in the
handler receiving two forms of credit for
fortifying, as opposed to only one form
of credit currently provided for in some
way in both the FMMO and CSO.
Furthermore, the record of this
proceeding does not provide a
justification for why the fortification
credit levels contained in Proposal 2 are
appropriate. Those credit levels, of
$0.1985 per pound of nonfat solids in
nonfat dry milk and $0.0987 per pound
of nonfat solids in condensed milk,
were established by CSO. No evidence
was presented at the hearing to justify
how the credits for handling were
determined and why they might still be
set at appropriate levels.
In regard to 3-factor pricing, record
evidence offered by proponents
concentrated on the pricing impact for
reduced fat and lowfat milk products
that have to be fortified to meet
minimum state requirements using
theoretical component tests for milk
supplies. While record evidence does
examine how 3-factor pricing would
equalize costs between reduced fat and
lowfat products, the analysis is
incomplete as it does not address the
net effect of such pricing across all Class
I products, including whole and nonfat
milk. Considering that a typical fluid
processor makes a full array of Class I
products, the total impact must be
considered, given that each product has
its own associated costs per gallon and
a fluid processor would not typically
process one or two products. Lastly,
theoretical component tests may
provide an understanding of
relationships in manufacturing costs of
different products. However, in the
absence of actual tests of Class I handler
milk supplies and an analysis
encompassing the net effect across all
Class I products, record evidence is not
sufficient to justify deviation from 2factor pricing of Class I milk.
Producer’s Value of Milk
Currently, six of the 10 FMMOs
utilize multiple component pricing to
determine both the handler’s and
producer’s value of milk. In those six
orders, producers are paid for the
pounds of butterfat, pounds of protein,
pounds of other solids of milk pooled,
as well as a per hundredweight (cwt)
price known as the producer price
differential (PPD). The PPD reflects the
producer’s pro rata share of the value of
Class I, Class II, and Class IV use in the
market relative to Class III use. The
Class III butterfat, protein, and other
solids prices are the same component
prices charged to handlers based on the
value of the use of milk in Class III. In
four of these six FMMOs, there is an
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adjustment to the producer’s payment
for the somatic cell count (SCC) of the
producers’ milk.
Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 seek to pay
producers on a multiple component
basis for the milk they produce. As will
be discussed below, the proposals differ
on how they would apply a PPD to
producer payments. Unlike Proposal 2,
Proposal 1 does not specify a somatic
cell adjustment to the producer’s value
of milk.
The record reflects that milk use in
California is concentrated in
manufactured dairy products. In 2015,
California Class 1 utilization was 13
percent, Class 2 and Class 3 utilization
combined was 8.6 percent, while 78.4
percent was used in Class 4a and Class
4b products (cheese, butter and dried
milk powders). As California is clearly
a manufacturing market, it is
appropriate for producers to be paid for
the components they produce that are
valued by the manufacturers. Therefore,
this final decision continues to
recommend producer payments on a
multiple component basis. Producers
would be paid for the butterfat, protein,
and other solids components in their
producer milk and for the cwt of milk
pooled.
This decision continues to propose
that producers under the proposed
California FMMO be paid a PPD
calculated in the same manner as in six
current FMMOs. The PPD represents to
the producer the value from the Class I,
Class II, and Class IV uses they are
entitled to share for supplying the
market and participating in the FMMO
pool. In general, the PPD is computed
by deducting the Class III component
values from the total value of milk in
the pool, and then dividing the result by
the total pounds of producer milk in the
pool. The PPD paid to producers
participating in the California FMMO
pool would be adjusted to reflect the
applicable producer location adjustment
for the handler location where their
milk is received.
Therefore, under the proposed
California FMMO, the minimum
payment to producers would be
determined by summing the result of:
Multiplying the hundredweight of a
producer’s milk pooled by the PPD
adjusted for handler location;
multiplying the pounds of butterfat in
the producer’s milk by the butterfat
price; multiplying the pounds of protein
in a producer’s milk by the protein
price; and multiplying the pounds of
other solids in a producer’s milk by the
other solids price.
Proponents of Proposal 1 proposed
distributing the PPD value across the
butterfat, protein and other solids
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components, based on the average value
each component contributed to the
Class III price during the previous year.
The Cooperatives purported that the
PPD is confusing to producers,
particularly when it is negative, and
spreading the value of the PPD across
the components would be a simpler
method of distribution.
The PPD is the difference between
value associated with all the milk
pooled during the month and the
producers’ value for the butterfat,
protein, and other solids priced at the
Class III component prices for the
month. In general, if the marketwide
utilization value of all milk in the pool,
on a per cwt basis, is greater than the
marketwide utilization value of the
producer’s components priced at Class
III component values, dairy farmers
receive a positive PPD.
A negative PPD occurs when the
value of the priced producer
components in the pool exceeds the
total value generated by all classes of
milk. This is possible since all producer
components are priced at the Class III
components values, but pooled milk is
utilized in all four classes, each with its
own separately derived value.
Specifically, negative PPDs can
happen when large increases occur in
NDPSR survey prices from one month to
the next, resulting in the Class III price
(announced at the close of the month)
exceeding, or being in a close
relationship to, the Class I price
(announced in advance of the month).
Negative PPDs can also occur in markets
with a large Class IV use when the Class
IV price is significantly lower than the
Class III price. A negative PPD does not
mean that there is less total revenue
available to producers. It often means
the Class III component values are high
relative to Class I prices. Because
component values are the biggest
portion of a producer’s total revenue,
high component prices coupled with
negative PPDs often result in higher
overall revenue to producers than when
component prices are lower and PPDs
are large and positive.
This final decision does not find
justification for distributing the PPD
through the component prices as offered
in Proposal 1. Current FMMO producers
receive and understand that the PPD
represents the additional value from the
higher classified markets that they are
able to share because they participate in
the FMMO. This includes months when
the PPD is negative.
While the proponents claim a
negative PPD is confusing, this decision
continues to find that distributing the
PPD through the component prices
would distort market signals to
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producers. As in the current FMMOs, a
negative PPD in the California FMMO
would inform producers that
component values are rising rapidly.
Regulated FMMO prices should not
block those market signals. Producers in
other FMMOs have been able to adapt
to a multiple component pricing system
that incorporates an announced PPD.
This decision finds that California
producers can do the same.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives,
the Institute and MPC in response to the
recommended decision expressed
support for the proposed producer milk
pricing provisions. The Cooperatives
noted in their comments they did not
object to the PPD provisions as
proposed in the recommended decision.
Comments filed by NAJ also
expressed support for the producer
payment provisions, and contended any
changes to the producer price formulas
should occur through a national
hearing.
Four of the current FMMOs provide
for a SCC adjustment on producer milk
values. The CSO does not include any
such adjustment. Proposal 1 did not
include a provision for a SCC adjuster,
and a Cooperative witness specifically
testified against its inclusion. Proposal 2
included a SCC adjuster, but no
Proposal 2 witnesses testified regarding
this aspect of their proposal. This final
decision does not recommend a SCC
adjuster for the California FMMO, as the
record does not contain evidence to
support its inclusion.
This final decision proposes that
handlers regulated by the California
FMMO should be allowed to make
various deductions from a producer’s
milk check, identical to what is allowed
in the current FMMOs. These
deductions include such things as
hauling expenses and National Dairy
Promotion Program charges, as well as
other authorized deductions such as
insurance payments, feed bills,
equipment expenses, and other dairyrelated expenses. Authorized
deductions from the producer’s check
must be authorized in writing by the
producer. For the California FMMO,
authorized deductions would
necessarily include any assessment
identified by CDFA for the payment of
California quota values. A quota
assessment would be authorized upon
announcement by CDFA; it would not
have to be authorized in writing by the
producer.
Some hearing witnesses suggested
that changes to the FMMO pricing
system need to be considered in a
separate rulemaking proceeding before
California producers vote on a FMMO.
Similar arguments were presented in
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some comments and exceptions filed in
response to the recommended decision.
This final decision finds no justification
for California producers to wait for a
decision on a California FMMO until
after what would most likely be a
lengthy proceeding on national FMMO
pricing. California producers should
have the opportunity to vote on whether
to join the FMMO system and adopt the
provisions recommended in this
decision with the full awareness that
prices can be re-evaluated at a future
hearing.
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8. Pooling
This section addresses the pooling
provisions of the proposed California
FMMO. A summary of the proposals,
hearing testimony, post-hearing briefs,
and comments on and exceptions to the
recommended decision related to
pooling provisions is provided below.
Additionally, the proposed treatment of
out-of-state milk is addressed in this
section, as one of the initial proposals
submitted to AMS sought to allow
handlers to elect partially regulated
distributing plant status with respect to
milk received from farmers located
outside of the marketing area. The
proposal would have continued the
reported practice of handlers paying the
plant blend price—instead of the
market’s blend price—for milk
produced from outside of the state,
since such interstate transactions cannot
be regulated by the CSO. Essentially, the
proposal addressed whether out-of-state
milk should be incorporated into the
proposed California FMMO marketwide
pool. Therefore, the topic is addressed
in this section.
This final decision recommends
pooling provisions for a California
FMMO conceptually similar to those in
the 10 current FMMOs, but tailored for
the California market. The
recommended pooling provisions are
performance-based and are designed to
identify those producers who
consistently supply the Class I market
and therefore should share in the
revenues from the market. There would
be no regulatory difference in producer
payments for milk based on the location
of the dairy farm where it was
produced.
Summary of Testimony
A Cooperative witness testified
regarding the pooling provisions
contained in Proposal 1. The witness
said the Proposal 1 pooling provisions
are designed to address the wide
disparity between current producer and
handler prices in California and those
under the FMMO system. The witness
stated that in order to design adequate
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California pooling standards, the
Cooperatives evaluated historical
producer blend prices using both CSO
classified prices and the proposed
California FMMO classified prices, from
January 2000 through July 2015. The
witness estimated that producer blend
prices would have averaged $14.65 per
cwt using CSO classified prices and
$15.22 per cwt using the proposed
California FMMO classified prices, an
average difference of $0.57 per cwt. The
witness’s analysis showed that in every
month, the estimated CSO blend price
was less than the FMMO blend price,
and that when considering only the
most recent data (January 2015 through
July 2015), the average difference was
$0.86 per cwt. The witness stressed that
to bring California producer blend
prices into closer alignment with
FMMO producer blend prices, the
pooling provisions of a California
FMMO must require the pooling of all
classified use values.
The witness was of the opinion that
California’s combination of low
utilization in the higher valued classes
(Class 1, 2, and 3) and a stateadministered quota program requires
strict pooling provisions to prevent
handlers from electing not to pool a
significant portion of California milk
each month. The witness was of the
opinion that when the California
overbase price is below Class 4a or 4b
prices, there is an incentive to not pool
milk in those classes because the
handler can avoid a payment into the
marketwide pool. The witness stated
that from January 2000 through July
2015, the California overbase price was
below either the Class 4a or 4b price 91
percent of the time. Thus, in those
months, if all milk had not been pooled,
producers would have received different
minimum prices: Those producers
whose milk was pooled would have
received the minimum FMMO blend
price, while the producers whose milk
was not pooled would have had the
potential to receive a higher price
because the handler could have avoided
sharing the additional revenue with all
the producers in the market through the
marketwide pool. This concern
regarding producer price disparity was
reiterated in the Cooperatives’ posthearing brief.
The Cooperative witness added that
even after adjusting producer blend
prices to account for quota payments
(¥$0.37), transportation credits
(¥$0.09), and RQAs ($0.03), there
would have been a financial incentive to
not pool a significant portion of
California milk in most months. Using
the pricing provisions contained in
Proposal 1, the witness estimated that
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from August 2012 through July 2015,
handlers would have chosen not to pool
Class III or Class IV milk 94 percent of
the time. The consequence, the witness
emphasized, would not only be unstable
producer prices, but the inability of the
FMMO to achieve uniform producer
prices. The witness stressed that to
accumulate the revenue needed to
provide adequate, uniform producer
blend prices and facilitate orderly
marketing, all the milk delivered to
California plants must be pooled.
Provisions requiring all milk to be
pooled cannot be found in any other
current FMMO.
However, the witness explained that
FMMO pooling provisions have always
been tailored to the market, and the
pooling provisions contained in
Proposal 1 are no different. The
Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief stressed
California’s need to have tailored
pooling provisions that are different
from other FMMOs. The Cooperatives’
brief reiterated that allowing for milk to
not be pooled would inhibit a California
producer’s ability to receive the national
FMMO prices they are seeking.
The Cooperative witness proceeded to
describe the pooling provisions
contained in Proposal 1. The witness
explained that under Proposal 1, any
California plant receiving milk from
California farms would be qualified as a
pool plant, and all California milk
delivered to that plant would be
qualified as producer milk. The witness
said Proposal 1 also provides for plants
located outside of the marketing area
that demonstrate adequate service to the
California Class I market to qualify as
pool plants on the order. The witness
highlighted an additional provision that
would regulate all plants located in
Churchill County, Nevada, and
receiving milk from farms located in
Churchill County or California.
According to the witness, producers in
the Churchill County milkshed have
historically supplied milk to the
California Class 1 market, and this
provision would ensure they could
remain affiliated. The witness proposed
the partially regulated distributing plant
(PRDP) provision should be the same as
in other FMMOs: A plant qualifies as a
PRDP if not more than 25 percent of its
total route disposition is within the
marketing area.
The Cooperative witness defined a
producer as any dairy farmer producing
Grade A milk received by a pool plant
or a cooperative handler. This definition
would allow dairy farmers located
inside or outside of the marketing area
to qualify as producers under the order,
the witness added. The witness said a
majority of the producer milk pooled on
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a California FMMO would be milk
received by a pool plant directly from
qualified producers or cooperative
handlers. Proposal 1 also contains a
provision to allow producer milk to be
pooled on the order if the milk is
received by a cooperative handler, the
witness noted.
The Cooperative witness explained
that Proposal 1 would prohibit milk
from being diverted to nonpool plants
outside of the marketing area and
qualifying for pooling on a California
FMMO until five days’ production is
delivered to a pool plant; subsequent
diversions would be limited according
to the amount the plant delivers to
distributing plants. The witness said the
California market appears to have an
adequate reserve supply of Class I milk,
so strict diversion limit standards are
needed to ensure that additional milk
being pooled is needed in the market.
The Cooperative witness provided
examples of previous FMMO changes
that the witness described as significant
policy shifts, including the elimination
of individual handler pools in favor of
marketwide pools, the regulation of
large producer-handlers, adoption of
multiple component pricing, and the
establishment of transportation credit
programs. The witness said that in these
examples the Department found it
appropriate to significantly deviate from
historical precedent because market
conditions justified such changes. The
witness stated Federal Order Reform
provided a FMMO foundation national
in scope, while also allowing for some
provisions to be tailored to meet the
marketing conditions of individual
orders. The witness concluded the
AMAA provides the Department the
flexibility to tailor pooling provisions,
and Proposal 1 recognizes the unique
needs of the California market.
Another Cooperative witness offered
testimony modifying Proposal 1 to
include call provisions. The witness
explained that call provisions are
currently contained in the CSO, and
while not often utilized, their existence
alone encourages milk to be supplied to
fluid processing plants when needed.
As proposed, the witness said, call
provisions should only be used on a
temporary basis when the market’s milk
supply cannot meet distributing plant
demand, not when an individual
distributing plant is short on milk.
The Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief
reiterated the justification for the
inclusive pooling provisions contained
in Proposal 1. The brief stressed the
AMAA authorizes the pooling of milk,
irrespective of use.
The Cooperatives’ post-hearing brief
also offered a modification to extend
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exempt plant status to small plants that
process products other than, or in
addition to, fluid milk products. The
modification would increase the exempt
plant production limit from route sales
under 150,000 pounds of fluid milk
product to sales under 300,000 pounds
of milk in Class I, II, III or IV products
during the month. The brief explained
this would allow for small fluid and
manufacturing plants to be exempt from
the pricing and pooling provisions of
the order that would otherwise be
required to participate in the
marketwide pool under Proposal 1.
A witness testifying on behalf of WUD
said that without inclusive pooling
provisions, as outlined in Proposal 1,
handlers could opt not to pool large
amounts of milk. The witness said this
would have a substantial impact on the
pool value and consequently lower
blend prices to those producers who
remain pooled.
An Institute witness testified
regarding the pooling provisions
contained in Proposal 2. The witness
explained how current FMMO
provisions work together to assure an
adequate milk supply for fluid use.
First, said the witness, higher Class I
revenues attract producers and producer
milk to participate in the pool, then
pooling provisions direct the producer
milk to fluid plants. Class I plants,
which by regulation are required to be
pooled and pay the higher Class I price,
receive in exchange the assurance that
the regulations provide them an
adequate supply of milk, the witness
explained. The witness summarized a
previous USDA decision finding that
performance-based pooling provisions
are the appropriate method for
determining those producers who are
eligible to share in the marketwide pool.
The witness stressed performance-based
pooling provisions are essential in
maintaining orderly milk movements to
Class I.
The Institute witness objected to the
Cooperatives’ assertion that Class I
premiums would be sufficient to move
milk to Class I use. The witness was of
the opinion that Class I plants already
pay a high regulated Class I price and
they should not have to pay additional
over-order Class I premiums to attract
milk to their plant. The witness
questioned the purpose of Class I
differentials if the use of premiums
would be the primary way to attract
milk for fluid uses in a California
FMMO.
The Institute witness also spoke to
Proposal 1’s dependence on
transportation credits to ensure the
Class I market is served. The witness
was of the opinion that transportation
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credits are not an appropriate substitute
for performance-based pooling
standards.
The Institute witness testified that
Proposal 1 provides no incentive for
plants to serve the Class I market in
order to qualify its producers to share in
the market’s Class I revenues. Instead,
said the witness, Proposal 1 would
allow plants to gain access to Class I
revenues for their producers without
bearing any burden in servicing the
Class I market, thus making pooling
provisions ineffective.
Another issue the Institute witness
highlighted was inclusive pooling
provisions in combination with
regulated classified prices that are not
market-clearing. The witness asserted
that if regulated classified prices are set
above what plants can pay for that milk,
many of those plants would exit the
industry and available market plant
capacity would shrink. According to the
witness, this would lead to uneconomic
milk movements, as excess milk would
need to find willing processing capacity.
The Institute witness opposed
Proposal 1’s provision to automatically
grant pooling status to any dairy
manufacturing plant located in
Churchill County, Nevada. The witness
said that all plants, whether located in
state or out of state, should qualify for
pooling by meeting appropriate
performance-based pooling standards.
The Institute witness concluded that
pooling standards play a pivotal role in
ensuring consumers an adequate supply
of fluid milk. Inclusive pooling
challenges the usefulness of pooling
standards by allowing producers and
handlers to benefit from the pool
without actually being required to serve
the Class I market, the witness said. The
witness urged the Department to adopt
the performance-based pooling
standards contained in Proposal 2.
The Institute’s post-hearing brief
reiterated its position that the
Department’s policy has consistently
ensured marketwide pool proceeds are
distributed to those who demonstrate
service to the Class I market. The brief
maintained this standard should be
upheld through performance-based
pooling standards in a California
FMMO. The Institute stressed the
inclusion of provisions to recognize the
California quota program is not an
adequate justification to exclude
performance-based pooling standards.
The Institute also raised the issue in
its post-hearing brief that adoption of
mandatory pooling in California would
result in trade barriers prohibited by the
AMAA. The brief stressed that with no
way to avoid minimum regulatory
pricing, California handlers would be at
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a disadvantage, since handlers regulated
by other FMMOs can elect not to pool
milk and avoid minimum regulated
prices. The Institute was of the opinion
that if manufacturing handlers couldn’t
elect not to pool, they would be
discouraged from expanding plant
capacity to handle surplus milk because
they would be required to pay prices
above market-clearing values for that
surplus. Lastly, as it pertains to the
proposed pooling provisions, the
Institute expressed the opinion that
inclusive pooling would de facto
regulate farmers, something expressly
prohibited by the AMAA.
A Dean Foods witness, on behalf of
the Institute, testified regarding specific
pooling provisions contained in
Proposal 2. The witness revised
Proposal 2 and expressed support for
the distributing plant in-area route
disposition standard of 25 percent
offered by the Cooperatives. The witness
explained the Class I route disposition
levels that determine a plant’s pool
status are set by each of the individual
orders, depending on the Class I
utilization of the market, among other
factors. The witness was of the opinion
that a 25 percent in-area route
disposition standard is appropriate for a
California FMMO with a low Class I
utilization.
The Dean Foods witness also
supported the unit pooling provision
provided in Proposal 2. The witness
testified that the unit pooling provision
would allow two or more plants,
operated by the same handler and
located in the marketing area, to qualify
for pooling as a unit by meeting the total
and in-area route disposition standards
as an individual distributing plant.
Proposal 2 would require one of the
plants to qualify as a distributing plant
and other plant(s) in the unit to process
50 percent or more of the total milk
processed or diverted by the plant into
Class I or II products.
The witness expressed concern that
the pooling provisions contained in
Proposal 1 would not ensure an
adequate milk supply to meet Dean
Foods’ needs because the provisions
offered no incentive to supply Class I
plants.
A Hilmar consultant testified on
behalf of the Institute regarding the pool
supply plant performance standards
contained in Proposal 2. The witness
explained the proposed supply plant
performance standards and diversion
limits would establish the volume of
milk that could be associated with the
California marketwide pool. The
witness said that 10 percent is an
appropriate base shipping standard for
supply plants seeking to be pooled on
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a California FMMO. The witness
explained this standard is similar to that
in the Upper Midwest FMMO, which
has a similar Class I utilization. The
witness described Proposal 2’s sliding
scale system that would automatically
change the supply plant shipping
standard based on market Class I
utilization over the previous three
months. The witness was of the opinion
that the sliding scale system would
ensure the Class I market is adequately
served by automatically adjusting,
should there be a change in the market’s
Class I utilization.
The Hilmar consultant witness also
described different performance
standards proposed for pool supply
plants that receive quota milk. Proposal
2 would require 60 percent, or a volume
equivalent, of a pool supply plant’s
quota receipts to be delivered to pool
distributing plants, the witness said.
The witness was of the opinion this
additional requirement on quota milk
would ensure that Class I needs would
always be met. However, if additional
milk is needed, that responsibility
would fall first on quota milk, as the
Market Administrator would have the
ability to adjust the quota milk shipping
standard up to 85 percent if warranted.
The witness added that this additional
standard on quota milk is similar to
provisions in the CSO.
The Hilmar consultant witness also
testified that servicing the fluid milk
needs of the market, the responsibility
of quota milk to service the fluid
market, and flexibility and supply chain
efficiency should guide the Department
in its decision making. The witness
highlighted additional proposed
provisions that would provide
regulatory flexibility, such as allowing
for split-plants, the pooling of supply
plant systems, and a provision to allow
the Market Administrator to investigate
market conditions and adjust shipping
percentages if warranted by current
market conditions.
The Hilmar consultant witness also
addressed what Hilmar believes are
appropriate producer milk provisions
for a California FMMO, namely
provisions modeled after the Upper
Midwest FMMO. The witness was of the
opinion that an appropriate producer
touch-base standard would be the lesser
of one-day’s production or 48,000
pounds of milk, delivered to a pool
plant during the first month the dairy
farmer is a producer. In the following
months, explained the witness, the
producer’s milk would be eligible for
diversion to nonpool plants and still be
pooled and priced under the terms of a
California FMMO. The witness testified
that handlers should not be allowed to
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pool more than 125 percent of the
volume they pooled during the previous
month, except during March when the
appropriate limit should be 135 percent,
due to the fewer number of days in
February. The witness testified that the
Institute relied on justification and
methodology provided in Upper
Midwest FMMO rulemaking decisions
to determine appropriate repooling
standards for a California FMMO.
In addition, the Hilmar consultant
witness said that a California FMMO
should not allow milk to be
simultaneously pooled on a FMMO and
a State order with marketwide pooling.
Handlers, or a group of handlers, should
be penalized if they attempt to not pool
large volumes of Class III or Class IV
milk to avoid pooling standards, the
witness added.
A Leprino witness expressed
opposition to mandatory-regulated
minimum prices as advanced in
Proposal 1. The witness characterized
the inclusive pooling provisions of
Proposal 1 as actually being mandatory
minimum pricing provisions because
they would cause all California milk to
be pooled and priced under the terms of
the FMMO. The witness explained how
the CSO has applied minimum
regulated pricing to all Grade A milk
produced and processed in the state for
decades, which the witness believed has
led to negative market impacts. For
example, the witness described how
mandatory pricing and pooling has
reduced competition across
manufactured product classes and
lessened incentives for milk to move to
higher-valued uses.
The Leprino witness did not
characterize the CSO as disorderly, but
rather explained how there had been
periods of dysfunction when CDFA set
regulated minimum prices that
exceeded market-clearing levels, leading
to overproduction of milk. The witness
added that when there have been
periods of large milk surpluses, milk has
been shipped and sold outside of the
state at discounted rates. The witness
said this led to losses for California
producers that could have been reduced
under a more flexible regulatory
scheme.
The Leprino witness stressed that a
California FMMO should have
voluntary pricing and pooling for
manufactured milk, as is the case in all
other FMMOs. The witness was of the
opinion this promotes market efficiency,
allowing milk to move to its highest
valued use. In its brief, Leprino stated
that the inclusive pooling provisions
that would regulate all milk are overreaching and inconsistent with the goals
of the AMAA. Leprino stated that
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inclusive pooling standards combined
with overvalued pricing formulas would
result in a disorderly California market.
Another witness appeared on behalf
of HP Hood in support of adoption of
Proposal 2. HP Hood operates fluid milk
processing facilities in California and in
existing FMMO areas, and is a member
of the Institute. The witness testified
that if a California FMMO were adopted
that included inclusive pooling, there
would be an oversupply of California
milk, leading to decreased investment in
dairy product manufacturing facilities.
The witness supported a California
FMMO that allows for optional milk
pooling for non-fluid milk uses.
A Gallo Farms consultant witness
testified that unlike under other
FMMOs, Proposal 1 would not allow
handlers the option not to pool
manufacturing milk, which would lead
to disorderly marketing conditions and
increased operational costs for cheese
plants. The witness supported the
ability of cheese plants to elect not to
pool milk, as provided in Proposal 2.
A witness spoke on behalf of Nestle
S.A. (Nestle) in support of Proposal 2.
Nestle is the world’s largest food
company, headquartered in
Switzerland. Its U.S. operations include
Nestle USA, Nestle Nutrition, Nestle
Purina Pet Care Company, and Nestle
Waters North America.
The Nestle witness was of the opinion
that milk marketing in California is
orderly. However, if a California FMMO
is adopted, Nestle supports Proposal 2,
which would allow for optional pooling
of manufactured milk. The witness
stated that in all current FMMOs,
handlers have the option to pool
manufacturing milk. Inclusive pooling
as contained in Proposal 1, according to
the witness, would place Nestle at a
disadvantage with competitors in other
FMMOs that can avoid regulated
minimum prices. Should mandatory
pooling standards, in conjunction with
the higher regulated prices contained in
Proposal 1 be adopted, the witness
asserted that Nestle would seek to move
more of its manufacturing outside of the
state.
The Nestle witness added that the
vast majority of the manufactured dairy
powder products it utilizes in its
international plants are purchased in
California. The witness said that if
California regulated prices increase and
pooling becomes mandatory, Nestle
would look elsewhere globally to
replace those products. The witness
concluded that Nestle would like to see
a consistent approach to regulations in
all FMMOs so that its business could
continue to be competitive and grow.
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Proposal 4 was submitted by
Ponderosa Dairy (Ponderosa) in
response to the Cooperatives’ original
Proposal 1. Proposal 4 would amend the
provisions that regulate payments by a
handler operating a partially-regulated
distributing plant—under either
Proposal 1 or Proposal 2—to allow
handlers to elect partially regulated
distributing plant status with respect to
milk received from out-of-state farms.
A consultant witness on behalf of
Ponderosa testified in support of
Proposal 4. The witness described past
judicial decisions regarding the
treatment of out-of-state milk delivered
to California handlers. According to the
witness, out-of-state producers cannot
currently obtain quota, are not eligible
for transportation benefits under the
CSO, and do not participate in the CSO
marketwide pool. Instead, the witness
said, they negotiate separate prices with
the California handlers who buy their
milk. The witness speculated that outof-state producers receive the plant’s
blend price, although that practice is
neither enforced nor verified by CDFA.
The Ponderosa consultant witness
outlined the provisions of Proposal 4,
which would modify the standard
payment provisions for partiallyregulated plants under a California
FMMO.
Proposal 4 would allow California
handlers to elect partially-regulated
status with respect to milk from out-ofstate producers, and out-of-state milk
would be classified according to the
plant’s overall utilization and receive
the plant blend price. Since the milk
would not be pooled under the FMMO,
it would not necessarily receive the
marketwide blend price. The witness
clarified that although the out-of-state
milk would be isolated for payment
purposes, the handler’s status as a fully
regulated pool plant should not be lost
if it otherwise meets the definition of a
pool plant.
The Ponderosa consultant witness
said that features of Proposal 4 are
similar to those of individual handler
pools that are no longer provided in the
FMMO system. Such accommodation is
needed, the witness said, to counter the
inherent inequalities of California’s
unique quota system, which would
otherwise disadvantage out-of-state
producers. In the witness’s opinion, the
provisions of Proposal 4 should be
contained in any California FMMO
recommended by the Department, as
they would establish a regulated and
audited pricing mechanism to ensure
out-of-state producers receive at least
the price they would have if they
shipped to an otherwise fully-regulated
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plant—something that is not provided
in the CSO.
A witness representing Ponderosa
explained that Ponderosa Dairy was
founded in southern Nevada to supply
raw milk to the Rockview plant in
southern California with the expectation
of receiving the plant blend price
reflective of Rockview’s plant utilization
even though the plant was regulated by
the CSO. With a Class 1 utilization of
approximately 85 percent, the witness
said that the plant blend price
compensates Ponderosa for its inability
to participate in the California quota
program and for the higher
transportation expenses to haul its milk
280 miles to Rockview.
Another Nevada producer,
representing Desert Hills Dairy (Desert
Hills), a dairy farm with 4,000 cows that
delivers 50 percent of its production to
California processing plants, testified in
opposition to any California FMMO.
However, the witness said that should a
FMMO be adopted, Proposal 4 should
be included as it most closely resembles
the current CSO provisions for out-ofstate milk. The witness testified that
Desert Hills receives the plant blend
price for the milk shipped to California,
and that the dairy farm pays all
transportation costs. The Desert Hills
witness said it would be harmed
financially if Proposal 4 is not adopted.
Otherwise, the witness claimed, its milk
would be pooled on a California FMMO
and the price it currently receives for
milk shipped to California would be
reduced by more than $1.00 per cwt.
Without addressing Ponderosa’s
concern that out-of-state producers are
unable to own quota, the Cooperatives
modified Proposal 1 in their posthearing brief. Modified Proposal 1
would provide for the payment of a
blend price adjuster to out-of-state
producers so that those producers’ total
receipts would not be diminished by the
deduction of quota premium payments
from the marketwide pool.
The Cooperatives’ brief argued that
out-of-state producers have taken
advantage of the fact that the CSO
cannot regulate out-of-state milk and
have sold milk to California Class 1
handlers for prices higher than the CSO
regulated blend price but lower than the
CSO classified use value. According to
the Cooperatives, modified Proposal 1
would not erect trade barriers as it
would provide for uniform payment to
California producers in similar
circumstances by establishing uniform
payments for milk covered by quota,
and establishing a uniform blend price
for milk not covered by quota.
An Institute witness explained that
under Proposal 2, out-of-state producers
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would receive the traditional FMMO
blend price for their milk pooled on a
California FMMO. That blend price, the
witness said, would be determined
before the value of quota is deducted
from total marketwide pool revenues.
According to the witness, out-of-state
producers, who could never own quota
under California’s current laws, and instate producers should be paid
uniformly through a traditional FMMO
blend price calculation.
The Institute witness explained they
originally considered proposing the
establishment of two marketwide pools
or blend price calculations. The first
would pay out-of-state producers, and
then the second would recalculate and
apportion all the remaining funds to
California producers in the pool on the
bases of quota/non-quota prices and
whether handlers elected to pool their
milk. But the witness said that upon
further consideration they realized this
solution would present additional
problems.
The Institute witness provided
hypothetical examples of two producers
shipping into the same California plant
receiving different prices by virtue of
their farms’ locations. The witness was
of the opinion that this treatment would
erect a trade barrier, provide nonuniform payments to producers, and
violate the AMAA.
The Institute witness said Proposal 2
would address these issues by providing
for out-of-state producers to receive the
traditional FMMO blend price for their
milk pooled on a California FMMO.
According to the witness, no trade
barrier would be erected with respect to
out-of-state milk by paying the
traditional blend to out-of-state
producers rather than the non-quota
price. A consultant witness representing
Hilmar supported the Institute’s
position regarding the treatment of outof-state milk.
Ponderosa’s reply brief argued that
the Cooperatives’ proposed remedy—the
out-of-state adjustment rate—would not
resolve the discriminatory trade barrier
issue raised in Ponderosa’s initial brief.
Ponderosa asserted the mechanics of the
Cooperatives’ proposal are unclear, but
they seemed to add complication to the
pooling process without fairly
compensating out-of-state producers for
their inability to participate in the quota
program. According to Ponderosa, outof-state producers can never realize the
historic and ongoing benefits of quota
ownership and can only avoid
discriminatory treatment by being
allowed to receive the plant blend price.
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Findings
Two fundamentally different pooling
philosophies have been proposed in this
proceeding. The first, contained in
Proposal 1, has been termed ‘‘inclusive
pooling’’ and would automatically pool
all California produced milk delivered
to California plants, similar to how milk
currently becomes pooled by the CSO.
The Cooperatives are of the opinion that
any change that would allow handlers
to opt not to pool milk would be
disorderly in an industry where all of
the milk has historically been regulated.
The Cooperatives testified that because
California has a high percentage of both
Class III and Class IV milk, in any given
month handlers would elect to not pool
a large portion of one of those classes of
milk because of price. The Cooperatives
estimated there could be an incentive to
not pool one or both classes of
manufacturing milk 94 percent of the
time. The resulting fluctuation in
uniform producer prices, they claim,
would be disorderly.
The second pooling philosophy,
offered by the Institute, relies on
performance-based pooling standards
that are more typical of the 10 current
FMMOs. These standards require the
pooling of plants with predominantly
Class I milk sales. Handlers have the
option of pooling Class II, III and IV
milk diverted to unregulated plants. The
provisions set out standards for which
plants, producers, and producer milk
are eligible to be pooled and priced by
the FMMO. The Institute testified that
the inclusive pooling standards offered
in Proposal 1 are not authorized by the
AMAA, and that performance-based
pooling standards are the only means of
ensuring that Class I demand is always
met.
The pooling standards of all current
FMMOs are contained in the Pool Plant,
Producer and Producer Milk provisions
of an order. Taken together, these
provisions are intended to ensure an
adequate supply of milk is available to
meet the Class I needs of the market and
provide the criteria for determining
which producers have demonstrated a
reasonable measure of service to the
Class I market and thereby should share
in the marketwide distribution of pool
proceeds. Performance-based pooling
standards provide a viable method for
determining those eligible to share in
the marketwide pool. It is primarily the
additional revenue generated from the
higher-valued Class I use of milk that
adds value to the pool, and it is
reasonable to expect that only producers
who consistently bear the costs of
supplying the market’s fluid needs
should share in the returns arising from
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higher-valued Class I sales. Therefore,
FMMOs require the pooling of milk
received at pool distributing plants,
which is predominately Class I milk.
Pooling of Class II, III and IV milk is
optional at unregulated plants. Handlers
of Class II, III and IV uses of milk qualify
their milk to be pooled by meeting the
pooling and performance standards of
an order. By delivering a portion of their
milk receipts to Class I distributing
plants, handlers can benefit from the
marketwide pool and receive the
difference between their use-value of
milk and the order’s blend price in
order to pay their producer suppliers
the uniform producer blend price. The
record supports adoption of
performance-based pooling provisions
as appropriate for the proposed
California FMMO.
Ten public comments filed in regard
to the recommended decision supported
the recommended pooling provisions,
agreeing that they would be consistent
with those in other FMMOs, would
fairly determine those producers and
milk eligible to participate in the
marketwide pool, and would enable
dairy product manufacturers to manage
costs and remain competitive in the
national market.
The Institute, which continued to
argue against the need for a California
FMMO, nevertheless concurred with the
Department’s position that performancebased pooling standards are the
appropriate method for determining
handlers who are ready, willing, and
able to serve the fluid market and
should share the benefits of the Class I
market. Similar sentiments were
expressed in comments from HP Hood,
Select, Kroger, Farmdale, NAJ, Dean,
and an anonymous commenter, noting
that the pooling provisions in the
proposed California FMMO would be
consistent with the Department’s
principles and with other FMMOs in the
system. Kroger added that the
recommended pooling provisions and
performance standards are appropriately
tailored to local California marketing
conditions.
Cacique noted in their comment that
the ability to opt out of the marketwide
pool allows manufacturers to compete
fairly with their counterparts elsewhere
in the country. A comment from Pacific
Gold added that voluntary depooling is
essential to ensure survival for
California cheese manufacturers, who
would otherwise be faced with Class III
prices that are too high under Proposal
1, prices that would not recognize the
cost to make or transport California
cheese to market.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
took exception to the proposed pooling
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provisions and continued to support the
inclusive pooling provisions in Proposal
1. The Cooperatives reiterated their
argument that California FMMO
provisions should be tailored to address
local marketing conditions. The
Cooperatives argued that relying on
pooling provisions that work in other
FMMOs because of certain similarities
such as Class I utilization fails to
recognize California’s unique market
characteristics, such as the size and
location of its handlers, wide
differences in location differentials, and
high Class III and IV utilization. The
Cooperatives stressed that divergence
from the prevailing performance-based
pooling model is authorized under the
AMAA and is necessary for California.
DFA filed a separate comment to
supplement the Cooperatives’ comments
and exceptions. DFA concurred with the
Cooperatives on the need for inclusive
pooling, and opined that voluntary
pooling in California would create
disparate producer prices and shifting
handler advantages on a scale different
from any other FMMO.
A comment submitted by WUD stated
that allowing high percentages of milk
to go in and out of the pool each month
would undermine the pool’s integrity
and lead to unstable producer pricing.
WUD said that allowing depooling
defeats the California industry’s purpose
for seeking a FMMO—to enjoy class
prices like the rest of the country. CDC
echoed WUD’s sentiment, commenting
that less certainty about milk prices
would jeopardize California’s dairy farm
futures and fail to establish orderly
marketing.
While the Cooperatives have
continued to argue that inclusive
pooling is authorized by the AMAA, the
analysis of the record of this proceeding,
including the comments on and
exceptions to the recommended
decision, finds that performance-based
pooling standards remain the
appropriate method for identifying the
producers and producer milk that serve
the Class I market. Therefore,
performance-based pooling provisions,
tailored to the local market, are
recommended for a California FMMO.
Pool Plant. The Pool Plant definition
for each order provides the standards to
identify plants engaged in serving the
fluid needs of the marketing area and
that receive milk eligible to share in the
marketwide pool. The Pool Plant
provisions proposed in this final
decision reflect a combination of those
offered in both Proposal 1 and Proposal
2. Both proposals recommended similar
distributing plant and supply plant
provisions. However, Proposal 1 would
automatically regulate any plant located
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in California that receives milk from a
producer located in the marketing area,
while the remaining proposed pool
plant provisions (both distributing plant
and supply plant provisions) would
apply to only plants located outside of
the marketing area. As discussed earlier,
this decision continues to find that
pooling provisions should be
performance based, and therefore it is
not appropriate to propose provisions
that would regulate plants based solely
on location.
There are two performance standards
applicable to distributing plants. First,
this decision continues to find that a
minimum of 25 percent of the total
quantity of fluid milk products
physically received at a pool
distributing plant (excluding
concentrated milk received from
another plant by agreement for other
than Class I use) should be disposed of
as route disposition or transferred in the
form of packaged fluid milk products to
other distributing plants. This decision
continues to find that a 25 percent route
disposition standard for the proposed
California FMMO is adequate to
determine those plants that are
sufficiently associated with the fluid
market. The second criterion is an ‘‘inarea’’ standard and is designed to
recognize plants that have an adequate
association with the fluid market in the
California marketing area. The record
supports the adoption of the same inarea standard that is found in the 10
current FMMOs, specifying that 25
percent of the pool distributing plant’s
route distribution or transfers must be to
outlets in the marketing area.
The Pool Plant definition would also
provide for regulation of distributing
plants that distribute ultra-pasteurized
or aseptically-processed fluid milk
products. The record evidence shows
that plants specializing in these types of
products tend to have irregular
distribution patterns that could cause
plants to shift regulatory status. This
shifting can be considered disorderly to
the producers and cooperatives who
supply those plants. Regulating those
plants according to their location, as is
done in other FMMOs, would provide
regulatory stability, and continues to be
proposed for a California FMMO. Under
current FMMOs, these plants are
regulated in the marketing areas where
they are located, as long as they process
a minimum percentage of their milk
receipts into ultra-pasteurized or
aseptically-processed fluid milk
products during the month.
The record indicates that both the
Cooperatives and the Institute used the
Upper Midwest FMMO, which contains
a 15 percent standard for distributing
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plants producing ultra-pasteurized or
aseptically-processed products, as a
template for pooling provisions.
However, as explained in the Federal
Order Reform Final Decision,44 this
standard in each order was set equal to
the total route disposition standard
required for pool distributing plants in
the respective FMMOs. In this final
decision, the pool distributing plant
standard continues to be proposed at 25
percent. Accordingly, this final decision
continues to propose that plants located
in the marketing area that process at
least 25 percent of their total quantity of
fluid milk products into ultrapasteurized or aseptically-processed
fluid milk products would be fully
regulated by the proposed California
FMMO.
Performance standards for pool
supply plants are designed to attract an
adequate supply of milk to meet the
demands of the fluid milk market by
encouraging pool supply plants to move
milk to pool distributing plants that
service the marketing area. The record
shows that California utilizes significant
volumes of manufacturing milk, while
California Class 1 utilization in 2015
was only 13 percent.
The recommended decision proposed
that a pool supply plant should deliver
at least 10 percent of its total milk
receipts from producers, including milk
diverted by the handler, to plants
(qualified as pool distributing plants,
plants in a distributing plant unit,
producer-handlers, partially regulated
distributing plants, or distributing
plants fully regulated by another order)
each month in order to qualify all of the
milk associated with the supply plant
for pricing and pooling under a
California FMMO.
In response to the recommended
decision, the Cooperatives commented
that a lower supply plant shipping
standard of 7.5 percent would prevent
uneconomic deliveries made just for the
sake of pool eligibility. According to the
Cooperatives, the recommended 10
percent performance standard would
likely disrupt current supply
relationships and cause disorder. The
Cooperatives noted that the supply
plant shipping standard for the Upper
Midwest FMMO had recently been
lowered, which should signal a
comparably appropriate level for
California. In any event, the commenter
added that the Market Administrator
should be authorized to adjust the level
as appropriate.
MPC also urged the Department to
propose a lower supply plant shipping
44 Federal Order Reform Final Decision: 64 FR
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standard to better reflect California’s
geography and market characteristics
and encourage maximum pool
participation.
This final decision continues to find
that the recommended 10 percent
supply plant shipping standard would
be appropriate for the proposed
California FMMO. The record of this
proceeding lacks data from which to
justify changing the proposed standard.
Given the market’s approximate Class I
utilization and the fact that the Market
Administrator would be able to make
adjustments in response to changing
circumstances, the standard is
reasonable and should help identify the
milk that should be associated with the
pool. The adjustment to the Upper
Midwest FMMO standards was based on
market conditions in that marketing area
and does not automatically justify a
similar adjustment to the proposed
standards for California.
To prevent uneconomic shipments of
milk solely for the purpose of pool
qualification, this final decision
continues to propose two additional
pooling provisions. First, a unit pooling
provision is proposed that would allow
two or more plants located in the
marketing area and operated by the
same handler to qualify for pooling as
one unit. This would apply as long as
one or more of the plants in the unit
qualified as a pool distributing plant
and the other plant(s) processed at least
50 percent of its bulk fluid milk
products into Class I or II products. The
unit pooling provision is designed to
provide regulatory flexibility and deter
uneconomic milk movements in
markets, like California, where there is
often specialization in plant operations.
Second, a system pooling provision is
proposed to allow two or more supply
plants, located in the marketing area
and operated by one or more handlers,
to qualify for pooling as a system by
meeting the supply plant shipping
requirements jointly as a single plant.
The system pooling provision
recognizes the role supply plants play in
balancing the market’s fluid needs,
while ensuring that the plants in the
system are consistent market suppliers
and therefore eligible to benefit from
participation in the marketwide pool.
Both unit and system pooling provisions
are included in other FMMOs.
The Cooperative and Institute
witnesses testified in support of
authorizing the market administrator to
adjust shipping percentages if warranted
by changing market conditions. Public
comments filed in response to the
recommended decision supported the
inclusion of such a provision. This final
decision continues to find it appropriate
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to adopt such a provision, should the
market administrator conclude, after
conducting an investigation, that
adjusting shipping standards for supply
plants and systems of supply plants to
encourage shipments of milk to meet
Class I demand, or to prevent
uneconomic shipments of milk, is
warranted. This provision would ensure
that California FMMO provisions can
quickly be adapted to changing market
conditions and that orderly marketing
can be maintained. Additionally, this
flexibility would negate the need to add
call provisions, as advanced by the
Cooperatives, to ensure that fluid milk
demand is always met.
Like other FMMOs, the proposed
California FMMO would allow a plant,
qualifying as a pool plant in the
immediately preceding three months, to
be granted relief from performance
standards for no more than two
consecutive months if it is determined
by the market administrator that it
cannot meet the performance standards
because of circumstances beyond the
control of the handler operating the
plant. Examples of such circumstances
include natural disaster, breakdown of
equipment, or work stoppage.
In their post-hearing brief, the
Cooperatives offered a modification to
the exempt plant definition that would
expand exempt plant status to plants
with less than 150,000 pounds of Class
I route disposition, and less than
300,000 pounds of total Class I, II, III or
IV milk usage during the month. This
modification was offered to exempt
smaller manufacturing plants that
would otherwise be regulated under the
inclusive pooling provisions of Proposal
1. However, since any size plant with
manufacturing uses could elect not to
participate in the marketwide pool
under the proposed California FMMO,
there is no need to alter the exempt
plant definition.
Proposal 2 offered a sliding scale
supply plant shipping standard that
would automatically be adjusted if the
average Class I utilization percentage
over the prior three months changed.
Justification provided for this provision
centered on administrative ease and
flexibility of the regulations to change in
order to reflect market conditions
without necessitating a formal
rulemaking hearing. However, under the
proposed supply plant shipping
standards, the market administrator
would have flexibility to adjust supply
plant shipping standards if warranted
by changing market conditions.
Therefore, it is not necessary to
incorporate automatic adjustments to
the standards.
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This final decision does not propose
separate pooling standards for plants
receiving California quota milk, as
offered in Proposal 2. As discussed
previously, this decision continues to
find that proper recognition of the
California quota program could be
through an authorized deduction from
producer payments, if deemed
appropriate by CDFA. Therefore, it
would not be appropriate for the supply
plant shipping standards to differ on the
basis of whether a plant receives quota
milk.
Proposal 1 contained a provision that
would regulate a plant located in
Churchill County, Nevada, receiving
milk from producers within the county
or in the California marketing area. The
Cooperatives argued that currently a
plant located in Churchill County has a
long standing association with the
California market, and this provision
would ensure the plant would remain
associated within the FMMO
framework. The recommended decision
did not find it appropriate to regulate a
supply plant based on its location and
not in combination with some form of
performance standard. No public
comments were submitted on this
finding. This final decision continues to
find it unnecessary to include such a
provision. If the Churchill County plant
meets the pool plant provisions of the
recommended California FMMO, and
thus demonstrates an adequate
association to the market, then that
plant would become regulated and
enjoy the benefits of participating in a
California FMMO marketwide pool.
Lastly, this final decision continues to
propose the incorporation of provisions
contained in all other FMMOs,
implementing the provisions of the Milk
Regulatory Equity Act of 2005 (MREA).
The MREA amended the AMAA to
ensure regulatory equity between and
among dairy farmers and handlers for
sales of packaged fluid milk in FMMO
areas and into certain non-Federally
regulated milk marketing areas from
Federal milk marketing areas.
Incorporation of these provisions is
required to ensure that the proposed
California FMMO does not violate the
MREA. No comments were received
regarding this proposal, other than the
previously mentioned comments
generally supporting the provisions that
are similar in all FMMOs.
Producer. The Producer definition
identifies dairy farmers supplying the
market with milk for fluid use, or who
are at least capable of doing so if
necessary. Producers are eligible to
share in the revenue that accrues from
the marketwide pooling of milk. The
Producer provisions proposed in
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Proposals 1 and 2 were virtually
identical. This final decision continues
to find that the proposed California
FMMO should recognize a producer as
any person who produces Grade A milk
that is received at a pool plant directly
from the producer or diverted from the
plant, or received by a cooperative in its
capacity as a handler. A dairy farmer
would not be considered a producer
under more than one FMMO with
respect to the same milk. Additionally,
the proposed California FMMO would
exempt producer-handlers and exempt
plants from the pricing provisions, so
the term producer would not apply to a
producer-handler, or any dairy farmer
whose milk is delivered to an exempt
plant, excluding producer milk diverted
to such exempt plant.
The Cooperatives proposed an
additional provision that would identify
dairy farmers who had lost their Grade
A permit for more than 30 consecutive
days as dairy farmers for other markets
and therefore would lose their ability to
qualify as a producer on a California
FMMO for 12 consecutive months. The
Cooperatives explained that this
provision was part of the inclusive
pooling provisions and was designed to
prevent producers from voluntarily
giving up their Grade A status to avoid
regulation. This final decision continues
to recommend performance-based
pooling provisions, making such a
provision as proposed by the
Cooperatives unnecessary. The
performance-based pooling provisions
would serve to identify dairy farmers
who meet the producer definition and
should be entitled to share in the
marketwide pool. Under the proposed
order, any dairy farmer who delivers
Grade A milk to a pool plant would be
considered a producer.
Producer milk. The Producer Milk
definition identifies the milk of
producers that is eligible for inclusion
in the marketwide pool. The proposed
definition reflects a combination of the
provisions contained in Proposals 1 and
2, and upholds the performance-based
pooling philosophy advanced in this
final decision.
This decision finds that, for the
proposed California FMMO, producer
milk should be defined as the milk of a
producer that is received at a pool plant
or received by a cooperative association
in its capacity as a handler.
The proposed California FMMO must
also provide for the diversion of
producer milk to facilitate its orderly
and efficient disposition when not
needed for fluid use. Diversion
provisions are needed to ensure that
milk pooled on the order but not used
for Class I purposes is part of the
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legitimate reserve supply of Class I
handlers. Providing for milk diversion is
a desirable and necessary FMMO feature
because it facilitates the orderly and
efficient disposition of milk when it is
not needed for fluid use.
Accordingly, the proposed California
FMMO would allow a pool plant to
divert milk to another pool plant, and
pool plants and cooperatives in their
capacity as handlers could also divert
milk to nonpool plants located in
California, or in the surrounding states
of Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon. Milk
could not be diverted to a nonpool plant
and remain priced and pooled under the
terms of the proposed California FMMO
unless at least one day of the dairy
farmer’s production was physically
received as producer milk at a pool
plant during the first month the dairy
farmer was qualifying as a producer on
the order. Given the large supply of milk
for manufacturing use in California, the
record supports a one-day ‘‘touch base’’
provision during the first month to
define the producer milk that should be
included in a California marketwide
pool. Proposal 2 offered an alternative
touch base standard of the lesser of oneday’s production or 48,000 pounds. This
final decision continues to find that a
one-day touch base standard is an
adequate demonstration of a dairy
farmer’s ability to service the market.
Conversely, a higher standard, such as
the five-day standard contained in
Proposal 1, could lead to uneconomic
milk movements for the sole purpose of
meeting regulatory standards.
It is equally appropriate to safeguard
against excessive milk supplies
becoming associated with the market, as
the proposed California FMMO one-day
touch base standard could lead to milk
from far distances associating with a
California marketwide pool without
actually being available to service the
market’s fluid needs. Therefore, this
final decision proposes that diversions
be limited to 100 percent minus the
supply plant shipping percentage (or 90
percent of all milk being pooled by the
handler). Diversions would further be
limited to nonpool plants within
California and its surrounding states.
This limit should allow the economic
movement of milk to balance the fluid
needs of the market, while
simultaneously preventing the milk of
distant producers from associating with
the California FMMO pool, and thus
receiving the order’s blend price, when
most of the milk is diverted to distant
plants and not a legitimate reserve
supply of the market.
The proposed California FMMO
includes repooling limits of 125 percent
for the months of April through
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February, and 135 percent for the month
of March, of the producer milk receipts
pooled by the handler in the previous
month. The record contains evidence
that other FMMOs have experienced
large swings in the volume of milk
pooled on the order. This volatility was
attributed to manufacturing handlers
opting to not pool all their eligible milk
in order to avoid payment to the
marketwide pool for a given month. The
Department has found unrestricted
repooling conditions in some FMMO’s
to be inequitable and contrary to the
intent of the FMMO system based on the
hearing record of those proceedings.45
The recommended decision found that
the proposed repooling limits would not
prevent manufacturing handlers or
cooperatives from electing to not pool
milk, but they should serve to maintain
and enhance orderly marketing by
encouraging participation in the
marketwide pooling of all classified
uses of milk.
In comments to the recommended
decision, the Institute was of the
opinion that the proposed repooling
standards were an appropriate starting
level given the lack of historical
California data that could be used as a
basis for change.
In their comments to the
recommended decision, the
Cooperatives and MPC supported
lowering the repooling standards to 110
percent in order to further discourage
handlers from electing to not pool large
volumes of milk if inclusive pooling
standards are not adopted.
Cacique commented that the
recommended repooling limits
proposed for California are more
restrictive than those in other low Class
I utilization orders and advocated for
uniform repooling limits throughout the
FMMO system.
Hilmar noted that even through the
proposed California FMMO would
provide manufacturers the option to not
pool, the proposed repooling limits
would competitively harm California
manufacturers who compete with
manufacturers in nearby FMMOs
(Pacific Northwest and Arizona) whose
provisions do not contain repooling
limits.
In their exceptions to the
recommended decision, DFA cautioned
that significant volumes of milk could
be depooled under the proposed
California FMMO, a condition that the
Department previously characterized as
disorderly. DFA explained that because
45 Official Notice is taken of: Upper Midwest
Final Decision: 71 FR 54136, Central Final
Decision: 71 FR 54152, and Mideast Final Decision:
71 FR 54172.
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of the relatively high percentages of
both Class III and Class IV utilization in
California, repooling standards would
not adequately deter handlers from
electing to not pool large volumes of
milk from month-to-month. Using
updated hearing data, DFA provided an
analysis to demonstrate how handlers
could opt to not pool large volumes of
milk in one month and then opt to pool
essentially 100 percent of its milk the
following month without any financial
penalty.
Several factors were considered when
evaluating the need for repooling
standards and the appropriate levels.
When determining appropriate levels, it
was important to not set levels so low
that they could not account for normal
fluctuations in production volumes due
to the number of days in each month
and to the natural seasonality of milk
production and manufacturing. As well,
handlers need the ability to absorb
unexpected surpluses while continuing
to have the option to pool all the
producer milk associated with that
handler. If repooling limits are too
restrictive, handlers may be unwilling to
manufacture additional milk volumes
because they would not have the
flexibility to pool the additional milk
volume.
This final decision continues to find
repooling standards are justified for the
proposed California FMMO to ensure
orderly marketing conditions. The
hearing record reflects that the proposed
repooling standards were offered
because of the similarities between
California and the Upper Midwest
FMMO, which currently has the same
repooling standards.
Typically, when determining
repooling standards, record data
considered includes monthly and daily
fluctuations in handler pooled volumes.
As California is currently regulated by
the CSO, which does not provide for
voluntary pooling, there is no data on
the record to discern which milk plants
would qualify as pool plants, and how
much milk would be associated with
those plants on the recommended
California FMMO. Lacking additional
record evidence, the proposed 125 and
135 percent repooling standards serve as
a starting point for identifying a
handler’s consistent supply of milk
available to service the market’s fluid
milk needs under a California FMMO.
FMMOs are tailored to the local Class
I market and therefore their provisions
may not be identical in all cases. The
Hilmar comment mentioned that two of
California’s neighboring marketing areas
have no repooling limits which Hilmar
claims put California manufacturers at a
competitive disadvantage as they would
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be subject to repooling limits. The
pooling provisions for those areas were
established based on the dairy industry
market characteristics of those
marketing order areas. Likewise, the
pooling provisions proposed in this
final decision are intended to fit the
specific needs of the California milk
market.
It should be noted that any milk
delivered to a pool distributing plant in
excess of the previous month’s pooled
volume would not be subject to the
repooling standards. The recommended
California FMMO would also authorize
the market administrator to waive these
restrictions for new handlers, or for
existing handlers with significant
changes in their milk supplies due to
unusual circumstances.
Lastly, milk that is subject to
inclusion and participation in a Stateauthorized marketwide equalization
pool and classification system should
not be considered producer milk.
Without such exclusion, milk could be
simultaneously pooled on a California
FMMO and on a marketwide
equalization pool administered by
another government entity, resulting in
a double payment on the same milk and
giving rise to competitive equity issues
between producers.
The record indicates that milk serving
the California Class 1 market, but
produced from outside the state, is not
currently priced and pooled under the
CSO. According to witnesses, out-ofstate producers commonly receive the
plant blend price. Proposal 4 seeks to
allow plants that would otherwise
qualify as fully regulated distributing
plants to elect partially regulated
distributing plant status with respect to
milk received from out-of-state farms. If
Proposal 4 were adopted, the proposed
California FMMO would enforce
payment to out-of-state producers of at
least the plant blend price on the outof-state milk and out-of-state producers
would presumably continue to receive
the same prices they do now.
Throughout the hearing, California
producers extolled the virtues of joining
the FMMO system and enjoying system
wide uniform product classification and
pricing, which they believed would put
them on a level-playing field with their
producer counterparts across the
country. In an effort to fairly
compensate out-of-state producers while
accommodating the California quota
program under the proposed FMMO,
proponents offered various payment
alternatives. Under the modified
provisions of Proposal 1, out-of-state
producers would be entitled to a
uniform blend price adjusted for quota.
Under Proposal 2, out-of-state producers
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would be entitled to the traditional
FMMO blend price calculated before
quota premiums are paid.
Proponents of Proposal 4 argued that
out-of-state producers should be
allowed to continue receiving the plant
blend price for milk shipped to plants
regulated under a California FMMO to
compensate for the fact that they have
not historically been entitled to own
and benefit from California quota and
cannot expect to do so in the future.
Under Proposal 4, otherwise fully
regulated handlers could elect partially
regulated distributing plant status with
respect to out-of-state milk, for which
they would pay the plant’s blend price,
based on classified use.
The record reflects that out-of-state
milk is not priced and pooled by the
CSO because the State of California, like
all other states, is prohibited from
regulating interstate commerce. One
benefit of Federal regulation is the
ability to regulate interstate milk
marketing. FMMO provisions ensure
that all milk servicing a market’s Class
I needs is appropriately classified and
priced, and the producers who supply
that milk share in the marketwide
revenues from all Class I sales in the
market.
A key feature of FMMOs is that
producer milk is classified and priced at
the plant where it is utilized, regardless
of its source. Similarly situated handlers
pay at least the class prices under each
order, and producers are paid at least
the order’s minimum uniform blend
price, determined through marketwide
pooling. This allows producers to share
equally in the classified use value of
milk in the market, while minimizing
uneconomic milk movements.
Three commenters, the Cooperatives,
CDC and MPC, supported the
recommended regulation of milk from
outside the state, which would be
pooled on the proposed California
FMMO in the same manner of treatment
as in other FMMOs. CDC wrote that
California producers have been harmed
by out-of-state milk sales not subject to
the CSO because handlers can purchase
that milk for less than the price of CSO
pooled milk. Both the Cooperatives and
MPC commented that regulating out-ofstate milk would enhance orderly
marketing.
As explained earlier, this final
decision continues to propose that a
California FMMO operate independent
of the State’s quota program. Under the
proposed provisions, no quota premium
would be subtracted from the FMMO
pool, and all producers delivering to
regulated pool plants under the order
would be paid at least the same
minimum producer blend price, less
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authorized deductions. Therefore, all
producers would be paid uniformly, as
specified by the uniform payments
provision of the AMAA.
Accordingly, this final decision
continues to find no justification for
differential producer treatment for milk
servicing California’s Class I needs
when it is produced outside the
marketing area. If an out-of-state dairy
farmer qualifies as a producer under the
proposed California FMMO, the
producer’s milk would be priced and
pooled uniformly with the milk of all
other producers serving the Class I
market.
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9. Transportation Credits
Transportation credits were contained
in both Proposals 1 and 2 to reimburse
handlers for part of the cost of
transporting milk to Class I and/or Class
II use. This final decision continues to
propose no transportation credit
provisions for a California FMMO.
Summary of Testimony
A witness appearing on behalf of the
Cooperatives testified in support of the
transportation credit provisions
contained in Proposal 1. The witness
said that transportation credits are
needed because Class I differentials are
not high enough to cover the cost of
moving milk from the Central Valley
where most of the milk is produced, to
Class I distributing plants, which are
primarily located on the coast where
most of the population resides.
The Cooperative witness utilized
April 2013 to October 2014 CDFA
hauling cost data of milk deliveries to
plants with Class 1, 2 and/or 3
utilization, and compared it to the
proposed California FMMO Class I
differentials that would be applicable
for comparable hauls. The witness said
the average cost to haul a load of milk
from a supply region to a demand region
was $0.75 per cwt, with a range of $0.35
to $1.82 per cwt. According to the
witness, in all instances, the difference
in FMMO Class I differentials between
the two locations was much less than
the actual haul cost, therefore an
additional cost recovery mechanism is
needed to assure orderly movements of
milk to Class I plants.
The Cooperative witness explained
that Proposal 1 contains transportation
credit provisions similar to the current
CSO where marketwide pool monies are
used to provide a credit for farm-toplant milk movements within
designated transportation zones to
handlers with greater than 50 percent
Class 1, 2, and/or 3 utilization. The
witness said that the transportation
credit zones represent current market
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procurement patterns where
transportation credit assistance is
necessary, and a similar credit system
should be incorporated into a California
FMMO. The witness stressed that the
proposed credits would be mileage and
transaction based, with a reimbursement
rate cap of 175 miles,46 and a fuel cost
adjustor. The witness noted that the
transportation credit rate would be
calculated on a per-farm basis, so one
haul route could have more than one
farm stop and each farm stop would be
eligible individually for a transportation
credit. In their post-hearing brief, the
Cooperatives modified their proposal to
allow for milk outside the marketing
area to be eligible for transportation
credits.
The Cooperative witness explained
that their proposed reimbursement
equations were a result of Cooperative
members’ transportation cost data
analyzed by the Pacific Northwest
FMMO office. The Cooperatives
requested that the FMMO office analyze
the data and determine cost equations
based on actual observed costs, minus
$0.30 per cwt, which represents the
producer’s responsibility for a local
haul. The witness said that the resulting
equations are valid because they
calculated a $5.205 million payment,
which was close to the actual observed
costs of $5.261 million. The witness
explained that because diesel prices are
a key variable cost to transportation, a
monthly fuel cost adjustor is needed to
ensure that the transportation credit
provisions maintain an accurate
reflection of costs. The witness noted
that Proposal 1 does not contain
transportation credit reimbursement for
plant-to-plant milk movements.
The Cooperative witness elaborated
that Proposal 1 seeks to pay all
producers the same FMMO blend price,
unadjusted for location. Therefore the
incentive to supply milk to Class I
plants is borne solely through their
proposed transportation credit
provisions. The witness said that
because all producers share in the
higher valued class uses, it is
appropriate that they share in the cost
of supplying and balancing those
markets by using marketwide pool
monies to provide a handler credit on
those milk movements.
The Institute, in its post-hearing brief,
expressed support for the transportation
credit provisions contained in Proposal
1, subject to the transportation credits
being adjusted for the difference in
location differentials.
46 The mileage rate cap was modified at the
hearing to 175 miles.
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A witness representing Ponderosa
testified that any proposed California
FMMO should allow for transportation
credits of out-of-state milk that serves
the California Class I and/or Class II
market. The witness explained that
Ponderosa experiences high
transportation costs because they haul
their milk approximately 280 miles to a
southern California Class I plant. The
witness was of the opinion that this
milk should be eligible for
transportation credits if it is serving the
California fluid market.
Findings
The record of this proceeding reflects
that the California fluid market is
structured such that some handlers and
cooperative associations rely on the
current CSO transportation credit
system to assist them in making an
adequate milk supply available for fluid
use. The record reveals the Los Angeles,
San Francisco, San Diego, and
Sacramento metropolitan areas contain
an overwhelming majority of the state’s
population, as well as the Class I plants
servicing those areas. However, these
plants must often source milk from milk
production regions of the state located
farther away. The record reveals that
this supply/demand imbalance, coupled
with flat producer pricing, necessitated
the development of the CSO
transportation credits for milk deliveries
from designated supply regions to Class
1, 2, and/or 3 handlers located in
demand regions where a majority of the
population resides. The Cooperatives
designed their transportation credit
proposal to replicate the transportation
credits currently paid by the CSO on
farm-to-plant milk shipments, but
attempted to make the proposed system
more transaction based.
As previously discussed, this decision
does not recommend flat producer
pricing. The record of this proceeding
supports the finding that producer
payments should be adjusted to reflect
the applicable producer location
adjustment for the handler location
where their milk is received. Therefore,
the incentive to producers to supply
Class I plants is embodied within the
proposed producer payment provisions.
As in all FMMOs, producers are
responsible for finding a market for their
milk, and consequently bear the cost of
transporting their milk to a plant.
Therefore the record of this proceeding
does not support reducing the
producers’ value of the marketwide pool
through the payment of transportation
credits to handlers.
Comments filed by the Cooperatives
took exception with the Department’s
finding on this issue. According to the
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Cooperatives, the proposed Class I price
differentials do not adequately account
for the higher cost of moving milk from
production points to California Class I
markets. The Cooperatives argued that
failure to provide transportation credits
undermines the foundation of the
FMMO system by eroding both producer
and handler price uniformity. The
Cooperatives reiterated their position
that the Department should adopt Class
I transportation credits at rates indicated
in Proposal 1, adjusted for the location
price difference between the point of
origin and the receiving plant. In their
exceptions, the Cooperatives proposed
that the credits be processor-, not
producer-funded. The Cooperatives
opined that if a system of transportation
credits is not adopted, the California
FMMO as proposed would lead to
significant tension between similarly
located producers supplying local
manufacturers and those supplying
distant Class I plants. The Cooperatives
argued that either the Class I plants
would pay significant over order
charges on all milk delivered to them,
or that supplying producers would need
to accept significantly less in their
mailbox price than neighboring
producers supplying local markets.
Comments filed by Dean Foods
expressed support for the Cooperatives’
position on transportation credits. Other
commenters opined that the proposed
Class I differentials would not be
adequate to draw the necessary milk
supplies to the Southern California
deficit area, and argued that lack of
transportation assistance of some sort
would be detrimental to producers,
handlers, and ultimately consumers.
Comments filed by HP Hood
recognized that while Class I
differentials were intended to attract
milk to processing plants, California has
long had a transportation assistance
program funded through the pool that
has helped attract milk to fluid plants.
Comments filed by Kroger noted that
both the Cooperatives and the Institute
offered workable proposals for
transportation assistance. Kroger stated
that existing location differentials are
not adequate to draw enough milk into
the Southern California deficit area,
which is why the CSO adopted its
current system of transportation credits
and allowances.
Comments filed by the Institute urged
the Department to reconsider its
position on transportation credits, but
agreed with the Department’s finding
that flat producer pricing must not be
implemented in a California FMMO.
Comments filed by MPC supported
the Department’s recommendation and
reiterated its opposition to any
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producer-funded transportation subsidy
system that would deduct producer
revenue from the pool.
This decision continues to find that
including a producer-funded
transportation credit program in a
California FMMO is not warranted. In
their exceptions, the Cooperatives
suggested implementing a processorfunded transportation credit program.
This suggestion was not part of any
proposal evaluated at the hearing and
the record lacks evident to support its
adoption.
Currently, the CSO uses a flat
producer payment, which contains no
built-in incentive for moving milk from
production to population areas. The
CSO accomplishes this milk movement
through transportation credits.
Implementing a FMMO would change
the current CSO flat producer payment
structure into a Class I differential
structure with higher differentials for
California’s population centers. The
incentive to producers to supply Class
I plants is therefore embodied within
the FMMO Class I differential structure,
as producers would receive the higher
location differential for supplying plants
located in major metropolitan areas, as
the cost to supply those plants is higher.
Some commenters noted that this would
result in neighboring producers
receiving different prices based on
where there milk is delivered. The
objective of the producer price surface
is to encourage producers to service
Class I plants through a higher location
differential. While this will lead to
producers receiving different prices,
those producers receiving the higher
differential also incur higher costs to
service those plants. If additional
monies are needed above minimum
classified prices to supply Class I plants,
marketplace principles should dictate
the source and amount of those
additional funds.
10. Miscellaneous and Administrative
Provisions
This section discusses the various
miscellaneous and administrative
provisions necessary to administer the
proposed California FMMO. All current
FMMOs contain administrative
provisions that provide for the handler
reporting dates, announcements by the
Market Administrator, and payment
dates necessary to administer the
provisions of the FMMOs. A California
FMMO likewise needs similar
administrative provisions to ensure its
proper administration. The provisions
outlined below generally conform to
provisions contained in the 10 current
FMMOs with reporting and payment
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dates tailored to the California dairy
market.
Findings
Handler Reports. Handlers subject to
a California FMMO would be required
to submit monthly reports detailing the
sources and uses of milk and milk
products so market average use values,
or uniform prices, could be determined
and administered. Under a California
FMMO, handler reports of receipts and
utilization would be due by the 9th day
following the end of the month. To
ensure the minimum payments to
producers are made in accordance with
the terms of a California FMMO,
handlers would need to report producer
payroll by the 20th day following the
end of the month to the Market
Administrator.
Announcements by the Market
Administrator. In the course of
administering a California FMMO, the
Market Administrator would be
required to make several
announcements each month with
respect to classification, class prices and
component prices, an ‘‘equivalent
price’’ when necessary, and various
producer prices. Under a California
FMMO, the Market Administrator
would make these announcements on or
before the 14th day following the end of
the month.
Producer-Settlement Fund. Handlers
regulated by a California FMMO would
be required to pay minimum class
prices for the milk received from
producers. These minimum values
would be aggregated in a California
FMMO marketwide pool so producers
could receive a uniform price or blend
price for their milk. The equalization of
a handler’s use value of milk and the
uniform value would occur through the
producer-settlement fund established
and administered by the Market
Administrator.
The producer-settlement fund ensures
all handlers would be able to return the
market blend price to producers whose
milk was pooled under the order.
Payments into the producer-settlement
fund would be made each month by
handlers whose total classified use
value of milk exceeds the values of such
milk calculated at the announced
producer prices. In a California FMMO,
handlers would be required to pay into
the producer-settlement fund by the
16th day following the end of the
month.
Payments out of the producersettlement fund would be made each
month to any handler whose use value
is below the value of their milk at
producer prices. Under a California
FMMO, the Market Administrator
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would distribute payments from the
producer-settlement fund by the 18th
day following the end of the month.
This transfer of funds would enable
handlers with a classified use value of
milk below the average for the market to
pay their producers the same uniform
price as handlers whose classified use
value of milk exceeds the market
average.
In view of the need to make timely
payments to handlers from the
producer-settlement fund, it is essential
that money due to the fund is received
by the due date. Accordingly, payment
to the producer-settlement fund is
considered made upon receipt of funds
by the Market Administrator. Payment
cannot be received on a non-business
day. Therefore, if the due date for a
payment, including a payment to or
from the producer-settlement fund, falls
on a Saturday, Sunday, or national
holiday, the payment would not be due
until the next business day.
Payments to Producers and
Cooperative Associations. The AMAA
states that handlers must pay the
uniform price to all producers and
producer associations. As under other
FMMOs, a California FMMO would
provide for proper deductions
authorized by the producer in writing.
Such authorized deductions would be
expenses unrelated to the minimum
value of milk in the transaction between
the producer and handler. The proposed
California FMMO would also allow a
deduction for any assessment
announced by CDFA for the
administration of the California quota
program. The producer would not need
to authorize this deduction in writing.
As in other FMMOs, producer
associations would be allowed to
‘‘reblend’’ their payments to their
producer members. The Capper
Volstead Act and the AMAA make it
clear that cooperative associations are
unique in this regard.
A California FMMO would require
handlers to make at least one partial
payment to producers in advance of the
announcement of the applicable
uniform prices. The partial payment rate
for milk received during the first 15
days of the month could not be less than
the lowest announced class price for the
preceding month, and would be paid to
producers by the last day of the month.
The final payment for milk under a
California FMMO would be required to
be made so that it is received by
producers no later than the 19th day
after the end of the month.
Handlers would pay Cooperatives for
bulk milk and skim milk, and for bulk
milk received by transfer from a
cooperative’s pool plant, on the terms
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described for individual producers, with
the exception that payment would be
due one day earlier. An earlier payment
date for cooperative associations is
warranted because it would then give
cooperative associations the time they
need to distribute payments to
individual producer members.
All payment dates specified in the
proposed California FMMO are receipt
dates. Since payment cannot be received
on a non-business day, payment dates
that fall on a Saturday, Sunday, or
national holiday would be delayed until
the next business day. While this has
the effect of delaying payments to
cooperatives and producers, the delay is
offset by the shift from ‘‘date of
payment’’ to ‘‘date of payment receipt.’’
Payment Obligation of a Partially
Regulated Distributing Plant. All
FMMOs provide a method for
determining the payment obligations
due to producers by handlers that
operate plants not fully regulated under
any Federal order. These unregulated
handlers are not required to account to
dairy farmers for their milk at classified
prices or to return a minimum uniform
price to producers who have supplied
the handler with milk. However, such
handlers may sell fluid milk products
on routes in a regulated area in
competition with handlers who are fully
regulated. To address this, FMMOs
provide a minimum degree of regulation
to all handlers who have route sales in
a regulated marketing area. Partial
regulation preserves the integrity of the
FMMO classified pricing and pooling
provisions and assures that orderly
marketing conditions are maintained.
Without these provisions, milk prices
under an order would not be uniform
among handlers competing for sales in
the marketing area, a milk pricing
requirement of the AMAA. Like the
other FMMOs, a California FMMO
would partially regulate handlers who
have route sales into the marketing area,
but do not meet the threshold to be fully
regulated.
The proposed California FMMO
provides regulatory options for a
partially regulated plant handler. All
partially regulated plant handlers would
account to the California FMMO
producer-settlement fund on the volume
of packaged Class I sales in the
California marketing area that exceeds
receipts previously priced as Class I
under a FMMO. Under the first option,
a payment could be made by the
partially regulated plant handler into
the producer-settlement fund of the
California FMMO at a rate equal to the
difference between the Class I price and
the California FMMO uniform price.
Under the second option, the operator of
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a partially regulated plant handler could
pay any positive difference between the
gross obligation of the plant, had it been
fully regulated, and the actual payments
made for its milk supply. This is
commonly referred to as the Wichita
Option. The third option applies to a
partially regulated plant handler that is
subject to a marketwide pool operated
under the authority of a state. In this last
case, the partially regulated plant
handler would account to the producer
settlement fund at the difference
between the Federal order Class I value
and the value at which the handler
accounts to the State order pool on such
route sales, but not less than zero.
Adjustment of Accounts. Current
FMMOs provide for the audit of handler
reports by the Market Administrator.
The Market Administrator may adjust,
based on verification of handler records,
any amount due to or from the Market
Administrator, or to a producer or
cooperative association. Adjustments
can affect the Producer-Settlement
Fund, the Administrative Fund, and/or
the Marketing Service Fund. A
California FMMO would likewise
provide for the adjustment of handler
accounts based on audits of handler
reports and records. The Market
Administrator would promptly notify
the handler of any necessary
adjustments so that payments could be
made on or before the next date for the
payment related to the adjustment.
Charges for Overdue Accounts. The
proposed California FMMO provisions
require handlers to make payments to
producers and cooperatives by the dates
described earlier in this section.
Payments not made by the specified due
dates would be subject to a late payment
charge of 1 percent per month by the
Market Administrator and would accrue
to the administrative fund. Additional
late payment charges would accrue on
any amounts that continue to be late on
the corresponding due dates each
succeeding month.
Assessment of Order Administration.
The AMAA provides that the cost of
order administration be financed by an
assessment on handlers. Under the
proposed California FMMO, a maximum
rate of $0.08 per cwt would apply to all
of a handler’s receipts pooled under the
order. The specific rate would be
announced by the Market
Administrator. Partially-regulated
handlers would be assessed the same
administrative rate on their volume of
Class I route disposition inside of the
marketing area. The money paid to the
administrative fund is each handler’s
proportionate share of the cost of
administering the FMMO.
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Deduction for Marketing Services. The
proposed California FMMO would
provide marketing services to producers
for whom cooperative associations do
not perform services. Such services
include providing market information
and establishing or verifying weights,
samples, and tests of milk received from
such producers. In accordance with the
AMAA, these marketing services are
intended to benefit all nonmember
producers under a California FMMO.
Accordingly, as is uniform in the
current FMMOs, each handler regulated
by a California FMMO would be
allowed to deduct a maximum of $0.07
per cwt from amounts due each
producer for whom a cooperative
association does not provide such
services. The specific allowable rate
would be announced by the Market
Administrator and would be subtracted
from the handler’s obligation.
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11. Ruling on Official Notice
Documents
In accordance with 7 CFR 900.8,
USDA published a Request for Public
Comments (82 FR 37827; published
August 14, 2017) (request) inviting
interested parties to submit comments
on whether various documents were
relevant to the material issues of this
proceeding. Three public comments
were received. All the commenters
supported taking official notice of the
documents listed in the request.
Accordingly, official notice is taken of
the documents listed in the notice (82
FR 37827).
In addition to the documents
referenced above, commenters
highlighted the unintentional omission
of 31 documents for consideration.
Those documents are either previous
Federal Register publications, USDA
and CDFA publically available data, or
previous AMS publications. As all of
these documents are published
government resources, the Department
does not object to their inclusion in the
hearing record. Three of the 31
documents were already contained in
the list within the request, but two did
not reflect the exact lines referenced in
the requests for official notice. As a
result, AMS is taking official notice of
the 29 documents as listed below. A
complete list of these documents, along
with links and sources to access them,
is available at www.ams.usda.gov/
caorder.
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)
Data and Publications:
• AMS FMMO Reform Basic Formula
Price Committee, Preliminary Report,
April 1997;
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• AMS FMMO Reform Classification
Committee, Preliminary Report,
November 1996;
• AMS FMMO Reform Identical
Provisions Committee, Preliminary
Report, November 1996;
• AMS FMMO Reform Price Structure
Committee, Preliminary Report,
November 1996; and
• AMS National Dairy Product Sales
Reports National Average Survey Prices
for Commodity Butter and Nonfat Dry
Milk, January 2016–July 2016
California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA) Data and
Publications:
• CDFA Commodity Butter Market
Price Reports, January 2016–July 2016;
• CDFA Nonfat Dry Milk Market Price
Reports, January 2016–July 2016;
USDA Office of the Chief Economist
Publication:
• North American Drought Monitor
Map: April 2017, released May 12, 2017;
Federal Register Publications:
• 30 FR 13143, 13144 regarding milk
in the Tampa Bay marketing area,
October 1965;
• 31 FR 7062, 7065 regarding a Puget
Sound, Washington, market area
expansion and amendments to
producer-handler definition, May 1966;
• 34 FR 960, 962 regarding milk in
the Georgia marketing area, January
1969;
• 46 FR 21944, 21950–21951
regarding milk in the Southwestern
Idaho and Eastern Oregon marketing
area, April 1981;
• 47 FR 5214, 5125–5128 regarding
milk in the Alabama-West Florida
marketing area, February 1982;
• 52 FR 38240 regarding Milk in the
Chicago marketing area, October 1987;
• 53 FR 49154, 49169–49170
regarding milk in the OregonWashington and Puget Sound-Inland
Empire marketing areas, December
1988;
• 54 FR 27179, 27182 regarding milk
in the Texas and Southwest Plains
marketing areas, June 1989;
• 56 FR 42240, 42248 regarding milk
in the Rio Grande Valley and Other
Marketing Areas, August 1991;
• 59 FR 12436, 12461–12462
regarding milk in the Minneapolis-St.
Paul and Other Marketing Areas, March
1976;
• 64 FR 16026–16169 regarding milk
in the Northeast and Other Marketing
Areas, April 1999;
• 67 FR 67906, 67939 regarding Milk
in the Northeast and Other Marketing
Areas, November 2002;
• 68 FR 37674, 37678 regarding Milk
in the Upper Midwest Marketing Area,
April 2004;
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• 69 FR 18834, 18838 regarding Milk
in the Pacific Northwest Marketing
Area, April 2004;
• 69 FR 19292, 19298 regarding Milk
in the Mideast Marketing Area, April
2004;
• 69 FR 57233, 57238–57239
regarding Milk in the Northeast and
Other Marketing Areas, September 2004;
• 70 FR 4932, 4943 regarding Milk in
the Northeast Marketing Area, January
2005;
• 70 FR 74166, 74185–74186, 74188
regarding amendments to the Pacific
Northwest and Arizona-Las Vegas
Marketing Areas, December 2005;
• 71 FR 54152, 54157 regarding Milk
in the Central Marketing Area,
September 2006;
• 75 FR 10122, 10151–1015 regarding
Milk in the Northeast and Other
Marketing Areas, March 2010; and
• 79 FR 12963, 12976 regarding Milk
in the Appalachian, Florida and
Southeast Marketing Areas, March 2014.
12. Rulings on Proposed Findings,
Conclusions, and Exceptions
In accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
557(c), USDA has analyzed and reached
a conclusion on all material issues of
facts, law, and discretion presented on
the record. Briefs, proposed findings
and conclusions, comments and
exceptions, and the evidence in the
record were considered in making the
findings and conclusions set forth in
this final decision. To the extent that the
suggested findings and conclusions filed
by interested parties are inconsistent
with the findings and conclusions of
this final decision, the requests to make
such findings or reach such conclusions
are denied for the reasons stated in this
decision.
General Findings
(a) The proposed marketing agreement
and order, and all of the terms and
conditions thereof, will tend to
effectuate the declared policy of the Act;
(b) The parity prices of milk, as
determined pursuant to Section 2 of the
AMAA, are not reasonable in view of
the price of feeds, available supplies of
feeds, and other economic conditions
that affect market supply and demand
for the milk in the marketing area, and
the minimum prices specified in the
proposed marketing agreement and
order are such prices as will reflect the
aforesaid factors, insure a sufficient
quantity of pure and wholesome milk,
and be in the public interest; and
(c) The proposed marketing agreement
and order will regulate the handling of
milk in the same manner as, and will be
applicable only to, persons in the
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respective classes of industrial and
commercial activity specified in the
marketing agreement and order upon
which a hearing has been held.
(d) All milk and milk products
handled by handlers covered by the
proposed marketing agreement and
order are in the current of interstate
commerce or directly burden, obstruct,
or affect interstate commerce in milk or
its products; and
(e) It is hereby found that the
necessary expense of the market
administrator for the maintenance and
functioning of such agency will require
the payment by each handler, as their
pro rata share of such expense, 8 cents
per hundredweight or such lesser
amount as the Secretary may prescribe
with respect to the milk specified in
§ 1051.85 of the aforesaid tentative
marketing agreement and the order.
(This order shall not become effective
until the requirements of 7 CFR 900.14
of the rules of practice and procedure
governing proceedings to formulate
marketing agreements and marketing
orders have been met.)
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Marketing Agreement and Order
The proposed order regulating the
handling of milk in the California
marketing area is recommended as the
detailed and appropriate means by
which the foregoing conclusions may be
carried out. The proposed marketing
agreement is not included in this
decision because the regulatory
provisions thereof would be the same as
those contained in the order, as hereby
proposed to be established.
Referendum Order To Determine
Producer Approval; Determination of
Representative Period; and Designation
of Referendum Agent
It is hereby directed that a referendum
be conducted and completed on or
before the 45th day from the date this
decision is published in the Federal
Register, in accordance with the
procedures for the conduct of referenda
[7 CFR 900.300–311], to determine
whether the issuance of the order
regulating the handling of milk in the
California marketing area is approved or
favored by producers, as defined under
the terms of the order, who during such
representative period were engaged in
the production of milk for sale within
the aforesaid marketing area. The
representative period for the conduct of
such referenda is hereby determined to
be May 2017.
The agent of the Secretary of
Agriculture to conduct such referenda is
hereby designated to be the Director of
Operations and Accountability, Dairy
Program, AMS, USDA.
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List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 1051
Milk marketing orders.
■ For the reasons stated in the preamble,
the Agricultural Marketing Service
proposes to add 7 CFR part 1051 to read
as follows:
PART 1051—MILK IN THE CALIFORNIA
MARKETING AREA
Subpart A—Order Regulating Handling
General Provisions
Sec.
1051.1 General provisions.
Definitions
1051.2 California marketing area.
1051.3 Route disposition.
1051.4 Plant.
1051.5 Distributing plant.
1051.6 Supply plant.
1051.7 Pool plant.
1051.8 Nonpool plant.
1051.9 Handler.
1051.10 Producer-handler.
1051.11 California quota program.
1051.12 Producer.
1051.13 Producer milk.
1051.14 Other source milk.
1051.15 Fluid milk product.
1051.16 Fluid cream product.
1051.17 [Reserved]
1051.18 Cooperative association.
1051.19 Commercial food processing
establishment.
Market Administrator, Continuing
Obligations, and Handler Responsibilities
1051.25 Market administrator.
1051.26 Continuity and separability of
provisions.
1051.27 Handler responsibility for records
and facilities.
1051.28 Termination of obligations.
Handler Reports
1051.30 Reports of receipts and utilization.
1051.31 Payroll reports.
1051.32 Other reports.
Subpart B—Milk Pricing
Classification of Milk
1051.40 Classes of utilization.
1051.41 [Reserved]
1051.42 Classification of transfers and
diversions.
1051.43 General classification rules.
1051.44 Classification of producer milk.
1051.45 Market administrator’s reports and
announcements concerning
classification.
1051.61 Computation of producer price
differential.
1051.62 Announcement of producer prices.
Subpart C—Payments for Milk
Producer Payments
1051.70 Producer-settlement fund.
1051.71 Payments to the producersettlement fund.
1051.72 Payments from the producersettlement fund.
1051.73 Payments to producers and to
cooperative associations.
1051.74 [Reserved]
1051.75 Plant location adjustments for
producer milk and nonpool milk.
1051.76 Payments by a handler operating a
partially regulated distributing plant.
1051.77 Adjustment of accounts.
1051.78 Charges on overdue accounts.
Administrative Assessment and Marketing
Service Deduction
1051.85 Assessment for order
administration.
1051.86 Deduction for marketing services.
Subpart D—Miscellaneous Provisions
1051.90 Dates.
Authority: 7 U.S.C. 601–608.
Subpart A—Order Regulating Handling
General Provisions
§ 1051.1
The terms, definitions, and provisions
in part 1000 of this chapter apply to this
part unless otherwise specified. In this
part, all references to sections in part
1000 refer to part 1000 of this chapter.
Definitions
§ 1051.2
California
All of the State of California.
§ 1051.3
Producer Price Differential
1051.60 Handler’s value of milk.
§ 1051.6
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California marketing area.
The marketing area means all territory
within the bounds of the following
states and political subdivisions,
including all piers, docks, and wharves
connected therewith and all craft
moored thereat, and all territory
occupied by government (municipal,
State, or Federal) reservations,
installations, institutions, or other
similar establishments if any part
thereof is within any of the listed states
or political subdivisions:
Class Prices
1051.50 Class prices, component prices,
and advanced pricing factors.
1051.51 Class I differential and price.
1051.52 Adjusted Class I differentials.
1051.53 Announcement of class prices,
component prices, and advanced pricing
factors.
1051.54 Equivalent price.
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General provisions.
Route disposition.
See § 1000.3 of this chapter.
§ 1051.4
Plant.
See § 1000.4 of this chapter.
§ 1051.5
Distributing plant.
See § 1000.5 of this chapter.
Supply plant.
See § 1000.6 of this chapter.
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§ 1051.7
Pool plant.
Pool plant means a plant, unit of
plants, or system of plants as specified
in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this
section, but excluding a plant specified
in paragraph (h) of this section. The
pooling standards described in
paragraphs (c) and (f) of this section are
subject to modification pursuant to
paragraph (g) of this section:
(a) A distributing plant, other than a
plant qualified as a pool plant pursuant
to paragraph (b) of this section or
§ llll.7(b) of any other Federal milk
order, from which during the month 25
percent or more of the total quantity of
fluid milk products physically received
at the plant (excluding concentrated
milk received from another plant by
agreement for other than Class I use) are
disposed of as route disposition or are
transferred in the form of packaged fluid
milk products to other distributing
plants. At least 25 percent of such route
disposition and transfers must be to
outlets in the marketing area.
(b) Any distributing plant located in
the marketing area which during the
month processed at least 25 percent of
the total quantity of fluid milk products
physically received at the plant
(excluding concentrated milk received
from another plant by agreement for
other than Class I use) into ultrapasteurized or aseptically-processed
fluid milk products.
(c) A supply plant from which the
quantity of bulk fluid milk products
shipped to (and physically unloaded
into) plants described in paragraph
(c)(1) of this section is not less than 10
percent of the Grade A milk received
from dairy farmers (except dairy farmers
described in § 1051.12(b) of this
chapter) and handlers described in
§ 1000.9(c) of this chapter, including
milk diverted pursuant to § 1051.13 of
this chapter, subject to the following
conditions:
(1) Qualifying shipments may be
made to plants described in paragraphs
(c)(1)(i) through (iv) of this section,
except that whenever shipping
requirements are increased pursuant to
paragraph (g) of this section, only
shipments to pool plants described in
paragraphs (a), (b), and (d) of this
section shall count as qualifying
shipments for the purpose of meeting
the increased shipments:
(i) Pool plants described in
§ 1051.7(a), (b), and (d) of this chapter;
(ii) Plants of producer-handlers;
(iii) Partially regulated distributing
plants, except that credit for such
shipments shall be limited to the
amount of such milk classified as Class
I at the transferee plant; and
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(iv) Distributing plants fully regulated
under other Federal orders, except that
credit for shipments to such plants shall
be limited to the quantity shipped to
(and physically unloaded into) pool
distributing plants during the month
and credits for shipments to other order
plants shall not include any such
shipments made on the basis of agreedupon Class II, Class III, or Class IV
utilization.
(2) Concentrated milk transferred
from the supply plant to a distributing
plant for an agreed-upon use other than
Class I shall be excluded from the
supply plant’s shipments in computing
the supply plant’s shipping percentage.
(d) Two or more plants operated by
the same handler and located in the
marketing area may qualify for pool
status as a unit by meeting the total and
in-area route disposition requirements
of a pool distributing plant specified in
paragraph (a) of this section and subject
to the following additional
requirements:
(1) At least one of the plants in the
unit must qualify as a pool plant
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section;
(2) Other plants in the unit must
process Class I or Class II products,
using 50 percent or more of the total
Grade A fluid milk products received in
bulk form at such plant or diverted
therefrom by the plant operator in Class
I or Class II products; and
(3) The operator of the unit has filed
a written request with the market
administrator prior to the first day of the
month for which such status is desired
to be effective. The unit shall continue
from month-to-month thereafter without
further notification. The handler shall
notify the market administrator in
writing prior to the first day of any
month for which termination or any
change of the unit is desired.
(e) A system of two or more supply
plants operated by one or more handlers
may qualify for pooling by meeting the
shipping requirements of paragraph (c)
of this section in the same manner as a
single plant subject to the following
additional requirements:
(1) Each plant in the system is located
within the marketing area. Cooperative
associations or other handlers may not
use shipments pursuant to § 1000.9(c) of
this chapter to qualify supply plants
located outside the marketing area;
(2) The handler(s) establishing the
system submits a written request to the
market administrator on or before July
15 requesting that such plants qualify as
a system for the period of August
through July of the following year. Such
request will contain a list of the plants
participating in the system in the order,
beginning with the last plant, in which
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the plants will be dropped from the
system if the system fails to qualify.
Each plant that qualifies as a pool plant
within a system shall continue each
month as a plant in the system through
the following July unless the handler(s)
establishing the system submits a
written request to the market
administrator that the plant be deleted
from the system or that the system be
discontinued. Any plant that has been
so deleted from a system, or that has
failed to qualify in any month, will not
be part of any system for the remaining
months through July. The handler(s)
that have established a system may add
a plant operated by such handler(s) to
a system if such plant has been a pool
plant each of the 6 prior months and
would otherwise be eligible to be in a
system, upon written request to the
market administrator no later than the
15th day of the prior month. In the
event of an ownership change or the
business failure of a handler who is a
participant in a system, the system may
be reorganized to reflect such changes if
a written request to file a new marketing
agreement is submitted to the market
administrator; and
(3) If a system fails to qualify under
the requirements of this paragraph (e),
the handler responsible for qualifying
the system shall notify the market
administrator which plant or plants will
be deleted from the system so that the
remaining plants may be pooled as a
system. If the handler fails to do so, the
market administrator shall exclude one
or more plants, beginning at the bottom
of the list of plants in the system and
continuing up the list as necessary until
the deliveries are sufficient to qualify
the remaining plants in the system.
(f) Any distributing plant, located
within the marketing area as described
in § 1051.2 of this chapter:
(1) From which there is route
disposition and/or transfers of packaged
fluid milk products in any non-federally
regulated marketing area(s) located
within one or more States that require
handlers to pay minimum prices for raw
milk, provided that 25 percent or more
of the total quantity of fluid milk
products physically received at such
plant (excluding concentrated milk
received from another plant by
agreement for other than Class 1 use) is
disposed of as route disposition and/or
is transferred in the form of packaged
fluid milk products to other plants. At
least 25 percent of such route
disposition and/or transfers, in
aggregate, are in any non-federally
regulated marketing area(s) located
within one or more States that require
handlers to pay minimum prices for raw
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milk. Subject to the following
exclusions:
(i) The plant is described in
§ 1051.7(a), (b), or (e) of this chapter;
(ii) The plant is subject to the pricing
provisions of a State-operated milk
pricing plan which provides for the
payment of minimum class prices for
raw milk;
(iii) The plant is described in
§ 1000.8(a) or (e) of this chapter; or
(iv) A producer-handler described in
§ 1051.10 of this chapter with less than
three million pounds during the month
of route disposition and/or transfers of
packaged fluid milk products to other
plants.
(2) [Reserved]
(g) The applicable shipping
percentages of paragraphs (c) and (e) of
this section and § 1051.13(d)(2) and (3)
of this chapter may be increased or
decreased, for all or part of the
marketing area, by the market
administrator if the market
administrator finds that such
adjustment is necessary to encourage
needed shipments or to prevent
uneconomic shipments. Before making
such a finding, the market administrator
shall investigate the need for adjustment
either on the market administrator’s
own initiative or at the request of
interested parties if the request is made
in writing at least 15 days prior to the
month for which the requested revision
is desired effective. If the investigation
shows that an adjustment of the
shipping percentages might be
appropriate, the market administrator
shall issue a notice stating that an
adjustment is being considered and
invite data, views, and arguments. Any
decision to revise an applicable
shipping or diversion percentage must
be issued in writing at least one day
before the effective date.
(h) The term pool plant shall not
apply to the following plants:
(1) A producer-handler as defined
under any Federal order;
(2) An exempt plant as defined in
§ 1000.8(e) of this chapter;
(3) A plant located within the
marketing area and qualified pursuant
to paragraph (a) of this section which
meets the pooling requirements of
another Federal order, and from which
more than 50 percent of its route
disposition has been in the other
Federal order marketing area for 3
consecutive months;
(4) A plant located outside any
Federal order marketing area and
qualified pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section that meets the pooling
requirements of another Federal order
and has had greater route disposition in
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such other Federal order’s marketing
area for 3 consecutive months;
(5) A plant located in another Federal
order marketing area and qualified
pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section
that meets the pooling requirements of
such other Federal order and does not
have a majority of its route disposition
in this marketing area for 3 consecutive
months, or if the plant is required to be
regulated under such other Federal
order without regard to its route
disposition in any other Federal order
marketing area;
(6) A plant qualified pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section which also
meets the pooling requirements of
another Federal order and from which
greater qualifying shipments are made
to plants regulated under the other
Federal order than are made to plants
regulated under the order in this part, or
the plant has automatic pooling status
under the other Federal order; and
(7) That portion of a regulated plant
designated as a nonpool plant that is
physically separate and operated
separately from the pool portion of such
plant. The designation of a portion of a
regulated plant as a nonpool plant must
be requested in advance and in writing
by the handler and must be approved by
the market administrator.
(i) Any plant that qualifies as a pool
plant in each of the immediately
preceding 3 months pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this section or the
shipping percentages in paragraph (c) of
this section that is unable to meet such
performance standards for the current
month because of unavoidable
circumstances determined by the market
administrator to be beyond the control
of the handler operating the plant, such
as a natural disaster (ice storm, wind
storm, flood, fire, earthquake,
breakdown of equipment, or work
stoppage, shall be considered to have
met the minimum performance
standards during the period of such
unavoidable circumstances, but such
relief shall not be granted for more than
2 consecutive months.
§ 1051.8
Nonpool plant.
See § 1000.8 of this chapter.
§ 1051.9
Handler.
See § 1000.9 of this chapter.
§ 1051.10
Producer-handler.
Producer-handler means a person
who operates a dairy farm and a
distributing plant from which there is
route disposition in the marketing area,
from which total route disposition and
packaged sales of fluid milk products to
other plants during the month does not
exceed 3 million pounds, and who the
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market administrator has designated a
producer-handler after determining that
all of the requirements of this section
have been met.
(a) Requirements for designation.
Designation of any person as a
producer-handler by the market
administrator shall be contingent upon
meeting the conditions set forth in
paragraphs (a)(1) through (5) of this
section. Following the cancellation of a
previous producer-handler designation,
a person seeking to have their producerhandler designation reinstated must
demonstrate that these conditions have
been met for the preceding month:
(1) The care and management of the
dairy animals and the other resources
and facilities designated in paragraph
(b)(1) of this section necessary to
produce all Class I milk handled
(excluding receipts from handlers fully
regulated under any Federal order) are
under the complete and exclusive
control, ownership, and management of
the producer-handler and are operated
as the producer-handler’s own
enterprise and at its sole risk.
(2) The plant operation designated in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section at which
the producer-handler processes and
packages, and from which it distributes,
its own milk production is under the
complete and exclusive control,
ownership, and management of the
producer-handler and is operated as the
producer-handler’s own enterprise and
at its sole risk.
(3) The producer-handler neither
receives at its designated milk
production resources and facilities nor
receives, handles, processes, or
distributes at or through any of its
designated milk handling, processing, or
distributing resources and facilities
other source milk products for
reconstitution into fluid milk products
or fluid milk products derived from any
source other than:
(i) Its designated milk production
resources and facilities (own farm
production);
(ii) Pool handlers and plants regulated
under any Federal order within the
limitation specified in paragraph (c)(2)
of this section; or
(iii) Nonfat milk solids which are
used to fortify fluid milk products.
(4) The producer-handler is neither
directly nor indirectly associated with
the business control or management of,
nor has a financial interest in, another
handler’s operation; nor is any other
handler so associated with the
producer-handler’s operation.
(5) No milk produced by the herd(s)
or on the farm(s) that supplies milk to
the producer-handler’s plant operation
is:
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(i) Subject to inclusion and
participation in a marketwide
equalization pool under a milk
classification and pricing program
under the authority of a State
government maintaining marketwide
pooling of returns; or
(ii) Marketed in any part as Class I
milk to the non-pool distributing plant
of any other handler.
(b) Designation of resources and
facilities. Designation of a person as a
producer-handler shall include the
determination of what shall constitute
milk production, handling, processing,
and distribution resources and facilities,
all of which shall be considered an
integrated operation, under the sole and
exclusive ownership of the producerhandler.
(1) Milk production resources and
facilities shall include all resources and
facilities (milking herd(s), buildings
housing such herd(s), and the land on
which such buildings are located) used
for the production of milk which are
solely owned, operated, and which the
producer-handler has designated as a
source of milk supply for the producerhandler’s plant operation. However, for
purposes of this paragraph (b)(1), any
such milk production resources and
facilities which do not constitute an
actual or potential source of milk supply
for the producer-handler’s operation
shall not be considered a part of the
producer-handler’s milk production
resources and facilities.
(2) Milk handling, processing, and
distribution resources and facilities
shall include all resources and facilities
(including store outlets) used for
handling, processing, and distributing
fluid milk products which are solely
owned by, and directly operated or
controlled by the producer-handler or in
which the producer-handler in any way
has an interest, including any
contractual arrangement, or over which
the producer-handler directly or
indirectly exercises any degree of
management control.
(3) All designations shall remain in
effect until canceled pursuant to
paragraph (c) of this section.
(c) Cancellation. The designation as a
producer-handler shall be canceled
upon determination by the market
administrator that any of the
requirements of paragraph (a)(1) through
(5) of this section are not continuing to
be met, or under any of the conditions
described in paragraph (c)(1), (2), or (3)
of this section. Cancellation of a
producer-handler’s status pursuant to
this paragraph (c) shall be effective on
the first day of the month following the
month in which the requirements were
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not met or the conditions for
cancellation occurred.
(1) Milk from the milk production
resources and facilities of the producerhandler, designated in paragraph (b)(1)
of this section, is delivered in the name
of another person as producer milk to
another handler.
(2) The producer-handler handles
fluid milk products derived from
sources other than the milk production
facilities and resources designated in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, except
that it may receive at its plant, or
acquire for route disposition, fluid milk
products from fully regulated plants and
handlers under any Federal order if
such receipts do not exceed 150,000
pounds monthly. This limitation shall
not apply if the producer-handler’s
own-farm production is less than
150,000 pounds during the month.
(3) Milk from the milk production
resources and facilities of the producerhandler is subject to inclusion and
participation in a marketwide
equalization pool under a milk
classification and pricing plan operating
under the authority of a State
government.
(d) Public announcement. The market
administrator shall publicly announce:
(1) The name, plant location(s), and
farm location(s) of persons designated as
producer-handlers;
(2) The names of those persons whose
designations have been cancelled; and
(3) The effective dates of producerhandler status or loss of producerhandler status for each. Such
announcements shall be controlling
with respect to the accounting at plants
of other handlers for fluid milk products
received from any producer-handler.
(e) Burden of establishing and
maintaining producer-handler status.
The burden rests upon the handler who
is designated as a producer-handler to
establish through records required
pursuant to § 1000.27 of this chapter
that the requirements set forth in
paragraph (a) of this section have been
and are continuing to be met, and that
the conditions set forth in paragraph (c)
of this section for cancellation of the
designation do not exist.
(f) Any producer-handler with Class I
route dispositions and/or transfers of
packaged fluid milk products in the
marketing area described in § 1131.2 of
this chapter of this chapter shall be
subject to payments into the Order 1131
producer settlement fund on such
dispositions pursuant to § 1000.76(a) of
this chapter and payments into the
Order 1131 administrative fund,
provided such dispositions are less than
three million pounds in the current
month and such producer-handler had
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total Class I route dispositions and/or
transfers of packaged fluid milk
products from own farm production of
three million pounds or more the
previous month. If the producer-handler
has Class I route dispositions and/or
transfers of packaged fluid milk
products into the marketing area
described in § 1131.2 of this chapter of
three million pounds or more during the
current month, such producer-handler
shall be subject to the provisions
described in § 1131.7 of this chapter or
§ 1000.76(a) of this chapter.
§ 1051.11
California quota program.
California Quota Program means the
applicable provisions of the California
Food and Agriculture Code, and related
provisions of the pooling plan
administered by the California
Department of Food and Agriculture
(CDFA).
§ 1051.12
Producer.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, producer means any
person who produces milk approved by
a duly constituted regulatory agency for
fluid consumption as Grade A milk and
whose milk is:
(1) Received at a pool plant directly
from the producer or diverted by the
plant operator in accordance with
§ 1051.13 of this chapter; or
(2) Received by a handler described in
§ 1000.9(c) of this chapter.
(b) Producer shall not include:
(1) A producer-handler as defined in
any Federal order;
(2) A dairy farmer whose milk is
received at an exempt plant, excluding
producer milk diverted to the exempt
plant pursuant to § 1051.13(d) of this
chapter;
(3) A dairy farmer whose milk is
received by diversion at a pool plant
from a handler regulated under another
Federal order if the other Federal order
designates the dairy farmer as a
producer under that order and that milk
is allocated by request to a utilization
other than Class I; and
(4) A dairy farmer whose milk is
reported as diverted to a plant fully
regulated under another Federal order
with respect to that portion of the milk
so diverted that is assigned to Class I
under the provisions of such other
order.
§ 1051.13
Producer milk.
Except as provided for in paragraph
(e) of this section, producer milk means
the skim milk (or the skim equivalent of
components of skim milk), including
nonfat components, and butterfat in
milk of a producer that is:
(a) Received by the operator of a pool
plant directly from a producer or a
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handler described in § 1000.9(c) of this
chapter. All milk received pursuant to
this paragraph (a) shall be priced at the
location of the plant where it is first
physically received;
(b) Received by a handler described in
§ 1000.9(c) of this chapter in excess of
the quantity delivered to pool plants;
(c) Diverted by a pool plant operator
to another pool plant. Milk so diverted
shall be priced at the location of the
plant to which diverted; or
(d) Diverted by the operator of a pool
plant or a cooperative association
described in § 1000.9(c) of this chapter
to a nonpool plant located in the States
of California, Arizona, Nevada, or
Oregon, subject to the following
conditions:
(1) Milk of a dairy farmer shall not be
eligible for diversion unless at least one
day’s production of such dairy farmer is
physically received as producer milk at
a pool plant during the first month the
dairy farmer is a producer. If a dairy
farmer loses producer status under the
order in this part (except as a result of
a temporary loss of Grade A approval or
as a result of the handler of the dairy
farmer’s milk failing to pool the milk
under any order), the dairy farmer’s
milk shall not be eligible for diversion
unless at least one day’s production of
the dairy farmer has been physically
received as producer milk at a pool
plant during the first month the dairy
farmer is re-associated with the market;
(2) The quantity of milk diverted by
a handler described in § 1000.9(c) of this
chapter may not exceed 90 percent of
the producer milk receipts reported by
the handler pursuant to § 1051.30(c) of
this chapter provided that not less than
10 percent of such receipts are delivered
to plants described in § 1051.7(c)(1)(i)
through (iii) of this chapter. These
percentages are subject to any
adjustments that may be made pursuant
to § 1051.7(g) of this chapter; an
(3) The quantity of milk diverted to
nonpool plants by the operator of a pool
plant described in § 1051.7(a), (b) or (d)
of this chapter may not exceed 90
percent of the Grade A milk received
from dairy farmers (except dairy farmers
described in § 1051.12(b) of this
chapter) including milk diverted
pursuant to this section. These
percentages are subject to any
adjustments that may be made pursuant
to § 1051.7(g) of this chapter.
(4) Diverted milk shall be priced at
the location of the plant to which
diverted.
(e) Producer milk shall not include
milk of a producer that is subject to
inclusion and participation in a
marketwide equalization pool under a
milk classification and pricing program
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imposed under the authority of a State
government maintaining marketwide
pooling of returns.
(f) The quantity of milk reported by a
handler pursuant to either
§ 1051.30(a)(1) or (c)(1) of this chapter
for April through February may not
exceed 125 percent, and for March may
not exceed 135 percent, of the producer
milk receipts pooled by the handler
during the prior month. Milk diverted to
nonpool plants reported in excess of
this limit shall be removed from the
pool. Milk in excess of this limit
received at pool plants, other than pool
distributing plants, shall be classified
pursuant to § 1000.44(a)(3)(v) and (b) of
this chapter. The handler must
designate, by producer pick-up, which
milk is to be removed from the pool. If
the handler fails to provide this
information, the market administrator
will make the determination. The
following provisions apply:
(1) Milk shipped to and physically
received at pool distributing plants in
excess of the previous month’s pooled
volume shall not be subject to the 125
or 135 percent limitation;
(2) Producer milk qualified pursuant
to § __.13 of any other Federal Order
and continuously pooled in any Federal
Order for the previous six months shall
not be included in the computation of
the 125 or 135 percent limitation;
(3) The market administrator may
waive the 125 or 135 percent limitation:
(i) For a new handler on the order,
subject to the provisions of paragraph
(f)(4) of this section; or
(ii) For an existing handler with
significantly changed milk supply
conditions due to unusual
circumstances; and
(4) A bloc of milk may be considered
ineligible for pooling if the market
administrator determines that handlers
altered the reporting of such milk for the
purpose of evading the provisions of
this paragraph (f).
§ 1051.14
Other source milk.
See § 1000.14 of this chapter.
§ 1051.15
Fluid milk product.
See § 1000.15 of this chapter.
§ 1051.16
Fluid cream product.
See § 1000.16 of this chapter.
§ 1051.17
[Reserved]
§ 1051.18
Cooperative association.
See § 1000.18 of this chapter.
§ 1051.19 Commercial food processing
establishment.
See § 1000.19 of this chapter.
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Market Administrator, Continuing
Obligations, and Handler
Responsibilities
§ 1051.25
Market administrator.
See § 1000.25 of this chapter.
§ 1051.26 Continuity and separability of
provisions.
See § 1000.26 of this chapter.
§ 1051.27 Handler responsibility for
records and facilities.
See § 1000.27 of this chapter.
§ 1051.28
Termination of obligations.
See § 1000.28 of this chapter.
Handler Reports
§ 1051.30 Reports of receipts and
utilization.
Each handler shall report monthly so
that the market administrator’s office
receives the report on or before the 9th
day after the end of the month, in the
detail and on the prescribed forms, as
follows:
(a) Each handler that operates a pool
plant shall report for each of its
operations the following information:
(1) Product pounds, pounds of
butterfat, pounds of protein, pounds of
solids-not-fat other than protein (other
solids) contained in or represented by:
(i) Receipts of producer milk,
including producer milk diverted by the
reporting handler, from sources other
than handlers described in § 1000.9(c) of
this chapter; and
(ii) Receipts of milk from handlers
described in § 1000.9(c) of this chapter;
(2) Product pounds and pounds of
butterfat contained in:
(i) Receipts of fluid milk products and
bulk fluid cream products from other
pool plants;
(ii) Receipts of other source milk; and
(iii) Inventories at the beginning and
end of the month of fluid milk products
and bulk fluid cream products;
(3) The utilization or disposition of all
milk and milk products required to be
reported pursuant to this paragraph (a);
and
(4) Such other information with
respect to the receipts and utilization of
skim milk, butterfat, milk protein, and
other nonfat solids as the market
administrator may prescribe.
(b) Each handler operating a partially
regulated distributing plant shall report
with respect to such plant in the same
manner as prescribed for reports
required by paragraph (a) of this section.
Receipts of milk that would have been
producer milk if the plant had been
fully regulated shall be reported in lieu
of producer milk. The report shall show
also the quantity of any reconstituted
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skim milk in route disposition in the
marketing area.
(c) Each handler described in
§ 1000.9(c) of this chapter shall report:
(1) The product pounds, pounds of
butterfat, pounds of protein, pounds of
solids-not-fat other than protein (other
solids) contained in receipts of milk
from producers; and
(2) The utilization or disposition of
such receipts.
(d) Each handler not specified in
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section
shall report with respect to its receipts
and utilization of milk and milk
products in such manner as the market
administrator may prescribe.
§ 1051.31
Payroll reports.
(a) On or before the 20th day after the
end of each month, each handler that
operates a pool plant pursuant to
§ 1051.7 of this chapter and each
handler described in § 1000.9(c) of this
chapter shall report to the market
administrator its producer payroll for
the month, in the detail prescribed by
the market administrator, showing for
each producer the information
described in § 1051.73(f) of this chapter.
(b) Each handler operating a partially
regulated distributing plant who elects
to make payment pursuant to
§ 1000.76(b) of this chapter shall report
for each dairy farmer who would have
been a producer if the plant had been
fully regulated in the same manner as
prescribed for reports required by
paragraph (a) of this section.
§ 1051.32
Other reports.
In addition to the reports required
pursuant to §§ 1051.30 and 1051.31 of
this chapter, each handler shall report
any information the market
administrator deems necessary to verify
or establish each handler’s obligation
under the order.
Subpart B—Milk Pricing
Classification of Milk
§ 1051.40
Classes of utilization.
See § 1000.40 of this chapter.
§ 1051.41
[Reserved]
§ 1051.42 Classification of transfers and
diversions.
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See § 1000.42 of this chapter.
§ 1051.43
General classification rules.
See § 1000.43 of this chapter.
§ 1051.44
Classification of producer milk.
See § 1000.44 of this chapter.
§ 1051.45 Market administrator’s reports
and announcements concerning
classification.
See § 1000.45 of this chapter.
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Class Prices
§ 1051.50 Class prices, component prices,
and advanced pricing factors.
See § 1000.50 of this chapter.
§ 1051.51
Class I differential and price.
The Class I differential shall be the
differential established for Los Angeles
County, California, which is reported in
§ 1000.52 of this chapter. The Class I
price shall be the price computed
pursuant to § 1000.50(a) of this chapter
for Los Angeles County, California.
§ 1051.52
Adjusted Class I differentials.
See § 1000.52 of this chapter.
§ 1051.53 Announcement of class prices,
component prices, and advanced pricing
factors.
See § 1000.53 of this chapter.
§ 1051.54
Equivalent price.
See § 1000.54 of this chapter.
Producer Price Differential
§ 1051.60
Handler’s value of milk.
For the purpose of computing a
handler’s obligation for producer milk,
the market administrator shall
determine for each month the value of
milk of each handler with respect to
each of the handler’s pool plants and of
each handler described in § 1000.9(c) of
this chapter with respect to milk that
was not received at a pool plant by
adding the amounts computed in
paragraphs (a) through (h) of this section
and subtracting from that total amount
the values computed in paragraphs (i)
and (j) of this section. Unless otherwise
specified, the skim milk, butterfat, and
the combined pounds of skim milk and
butterfat referred to in this section shall
result from the steps set forth in
§ 1000.44(a), (b), and (c) of this chapter,
respectively, and the nonfat components
of producer milk in each class shall be
based upon the proportion of such
components in producer skim milk.
Receipts of nonfluid milk products that
are distributed as labeled reconstituted
milk for which payments are made to
the producer-settlement fund of another
Federal order under § 1000.76(a)(4) or
(d) of this chapter shall be excluded
from pricing under this section.
(a) Class I value.
(1) Multiply the hundredweight of
skim milk in Class I by the Class I skim
milk price; and
(2) Add an amount obtained by
multiplying the pounds of butterfat in
Class I by the Class I butterfat price; and
(b) Class II value.
(1) Multiply the pounds of nonfat
solids in Class II skim milk by the Class
II nonfat solids price; and
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(2) Add an amount obtained by
multiplying the pounds of butterfat in
Class II times the Class II butterfat price.
(c) Class III value.
(1) Multiply the pounds of protein in
Class III skim milk by the protein price;
(2) Add an amount obtained by
multiplying the pounds of other solids
in Class III skim milk by the other solids
price; and
(3) Add an amount obtained by
multiplying the pounds of butterfat in
Class III by the butterfat price.
(d) Class IV value.
(1) Multiply the pounds of nonfat
solids in Class IV skim milk by the
nonfat solids price; and
(2) Add an amount obtained by
multiplying the pounds of butterfat in
Class IV by the butterfat price.
(e) Multiply the pounds of skim milk
and butterfat overage assigned to each
class pursuant to § 1000.44(a)(11) of this
chapter and the corresponding step of
§ 1000.44(b) by the skim milk prices and
butterfat prices applicable to each class.
(f) Multiply the difference between
the current month’s Class I, II, or III
price, as the case may be, and the Class
IV price for the preceding month and by
the hundredweight of skim milk and
butterfat subtracted from Class I, II, or
III, respectively, pursuant to
§ 1000.44(a)(7) of this chapter and the
corresponding step of § 1000.44(b).
(g) Multiply the difference between
the Class I price applicable at the
location of the pool plant and the Class
IV price by the hundredweight of skim
milk and butterfat assigned to Class I
pursuant to § 1000.43(d) of this chapter
and the hundredweight of skim milk
and butterfat subtracted from Class I
pursuant to § 1000.44(a)(3)(i) through
(vi) of this chapter and the
corresponding step of § 1000.44(b),
excluding receipts of bulk fluid cream
products from plants regulated under
other Federal orders and bulk
concentrated fluid milk products from
pool plants, plants regulated under
other Federal orders, and unregulated
supply plants.
(h) Multiply the difference between
the Class I price applicable at the
location of the nearest unregulated
supply plants from which an equivalent
volume was received and the Class III
price by the pounds of skim milk and
butterfat in receipts of concentrated
fluid milk products assigned to Class I
pursuant to §§ 1000.43(d) of this chapter
and 1000.44(a)(3)(i) of this chapter and
the corresponding step of § 1000.44(b)
and the pounds of skim milk and
butterfat subtracted from Class I
pursuant to § 1000.44(a)(8) and the
corresponding step of § 1000.44(b),
excluding such skim milk and butterfat
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in receipts of fluid milk products from
an unregulated supply plant to the
extent that an equivalent amount of
skim milk or butterfat disposed of to
such plant by handlers fully regulated
under any Federal milk order is
classified and priced as Class I milk and
is not used as an offset for any other
payment obligation under any order.
(i) For reconstituted milk made from
receipts of nonfluid milk products,
multiply $1.00 (but not more than the
difference between the Class I price
applicable at the location of the pool
plant and the Class IV price) by the
hundredweight of skim milk and
butterfat contained in receipts of
nonfluid milk products that are
allocated to Class I use pursuant to
§ 1000.43(d) of this chapter.
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§ 1051.61 Computation of producer price
differential.
For each month the market
administrator shall compute a producer
price differential per hundredweight.
The report of any handler who has not
made payments required pursuant to
§ 1051.71 of this chapter for the
preceding month shall not be included
in the computation of the producer
price differential, and such handler’s
report shall not be included in the
computation for succeeding months
until the handler has made full payment
of outstanding monthly obligations.
Subject to the conditions of this
introductory paragraph, the market
administrator shall compute the
producer price differential in the
following manner:
(a) Combine into one total the values
computed pursuant to § 1051.60 of this
chapter for all handlers required to file
reports prescribed in § 1051.30 of this
chapter;
(b) Subtract the total values obtained
by multiplying each handler’s total
pounds of protein, other solids, and
butterfat contained in the milk for
which an obligation was computed
pursuant to § 1051.60 of this chapter by
the protein price, other solids price, and
the butterfat price, respectively;
(c) Add an amount equal to the minus
location adjustments and subtract an
amount equal to the plus location
adjustments computed pursuant to
§ 1051.75 of this chapter;
(d) Add an amount equal to not less
than one-half of the unobligated balance
in the producer-settlement fund;
(e) Divide the resulting amount by the
sum of the following for all handlers
included in these computations:
(1) The total hundredweight of
producer milk; and
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(2) The total hundredweight for which
a value is computed pursuant to
§ 1051.60(i) of this chapter; and
(f) Subtract not less than 4 cents nor
more than 5 cents from the price
computed pursuant to paragraph (e) of
this section. The result shall be known
as the producer price differential for the
month.
§ 1051.62
prices.
Announcement of producer
On or before the 14th day after the
end of each month, the market
administrator shall announce publicly
the following prices and information:
(a) The producer price differential;
(b) The protein price;
(c) The nonfat solids price;
(d) The other solids price;
(e) The butterfat price;
(f) The average butterfat, nonfat
solids, protein and other solids content
of producer milk; and
(g) The statistical uniform price for
milk containing 3.5 percent butterfat,
computed by combining the Class III
price and the producer price
differential.
Subpart C—Payments for Milk
Producer Payments
§ 1051.70
Producer-settlement fund.
See § 1000.70 of this chapter.
§ 1051.71 Payments to the producersettlement fund.
Each handler shall make payment to
the producer-settlement fund in a
manner that provides receipt of the
funds by the market administrator no
later than the 16th day after the end of
the month (except as provided in
§ 1000.90 of this chapter). Payment shall
be the amount, if any, by which the
amount specified in paragraph (a) of this
section exceeds the amount specified in
paragraph (b) of this section:
(a) The total value of milk to the
handler for the month as determined
pursuant to § 1051.60 of this chapter.
(b) The sum of:
(1) An amount obtained by
multiplying the total hundredweight of
producer milk as determined pursuant
to § 1000.44(c) of this chapter by the
producer price differential as adjusted
pursuant to § 1051.75 of this chapter;
(2) An amount obtained by
multiplying the total pounds of protein,
other solids, and butterfat contained in
producer milk by the protein, other
solids, and butterfat prices respectively;
and
(3) An amount obtained by
multiplying the pounds of skim milk
and butterfat for which a value was
computed pursuant to § 1051.60(i) of
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this chapter by the producer price
differential as adjusted pursuant to
§ 1051.75 of this chapter for the location
of the plant from which received.
§ 1051.72 Payments from the producersettlement fund.
No later than the 18th day after the
end of each month (except as provided
in § 1000.90 of this chapter), the market
administrator shall pay to each handler
the amount, if any, by which the
amount computed pursuant to
§ 1051.71(b) of this chapter exceeds the
amount computed pursuant to
§ 1051.71(a). If, at such time, the balance
in the producer-settlement fund is
insufficient to make all payments
pursuant to this section, the market
administrator shall reduce uniformly
such payments and shall complete the
payments as soon as the funds are
available.
§ 1051.73 Payments to producers and to
cooperative associations.
(a) Each handler shall pay each
producer for producer milk for which
payment is not made to a cooperative
association pursuant to paragraph (b) of
this section, as follows:
(1) Partial payment. For each
producer who has not discontinued
shipments as of the date of this partial
payment, payment shall be made so that
it is received by each producer on or
before the last day of the month (except
as provided in § 1000.90 of this chapter)
for milk received during the first 15
days of the month from the producer at
not less than the lowest announced
class price for the preceding month, less
proper deductions authorized in writing
by the producer.
(2) Final payment. For milk received
during the month, payment shall be
made so that it is received by each
producer no later than the 19th day after
the end of the month (except as
provided in § 1000.90 of this chapter) in
an amount not less than the sum of:
(i) The hundredweight of producer
milk received times the producer price
differential for the month as adjusted
pursuant to § 1051.75 of this chapter;
(ii) The pounds of butterfat received
times the butterfat price for the month;
(iii) The pounds of protein received
times the protein price for the month;
(iv) The pounds of other solids
received times the other solids price for
the month;
(v) Less any payment made pursuant
to paragraph (a)(1) of this section;
(vi) Less proper deductions
authorized in writing by such producer,
and plus or minus adjustments for
errors in previous payments to such
producer subject to approval by the
market administrator;
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(vii) Less deductions for marketing
services pursuant to § 1000.86 of this
chapter; and
(viii) Less deductions authorized by
CDFA for the California Quota Program
pursuant to § 1051.11 of this chapter.
(b) Payments for milk received from
cooperative association members. On or
before the day prior to the dates
specified in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of
this section (except as provided in
§ 1000.90 of this chapter), each handler
shall pay to a cooperative association for
milk from producers who market their
milk through the cooperative
association and who have authorized
the cooperative to collect such
payments on their behalf an amount
equal to the sum of the individual
payments otherwise payable for such
producer milk pursuant to paragraphs
(a)(1) and (2) of this section.
(c) Payment for milk received from
cooperative association pool plants or
from cooperatives as handlers pursuant
to § 1000.9(c). On or before the day prior
to the dates specified in paragraphs
(a)(1) and (2) of this section (except as
provided in § 1000.90 of this chapter),
each handler who receives fluid milk
products at its plant from a cooperative
association in its capacity as the
operator of a pool plant or who receives
milk from a cooperative association in
its capacity as a handler pursuant to
§ 1000.9(c) of this chapter, including the
milk of producers who are not members
of such association and who the market
administrator determines have
authorized the cooperative association
to collect payment for their milk, shall
pay the cooperative for such milk as
follows:
(1) For bulk fluid milk products and
bulk fluid cream products received from
a cooperative association in its capacity
as the operator of a pool plant and for
milk received from a cooperative
association in its capacity as a handler
pursuant to § 1000.9(c) of this chapter
during the first 15 days of the month, at
not less than the lowest announced
class prices per hundredweight for the
preceding month;
(2) For the total quantity of bulk fluid
milk products and bulk fluid cream
products received from a cooperative
association in its capacity as the
operator of a pool plant, at not less than
the total value of such products received
from the association’s pool plants, as
determined by multiplying the
respective quantities assigned to each
class under § 1000.44 of this chapter, as
follows:
(i) The hundredweight of Class I skim
milk times the Class I skim milk price
for the month plus the pounds of Class
I butterfat times the Class I butterfat
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price for the month. The Class I price to
be used shall be that price effective at
the location of the receiving plant;
(ii) The pounds of nonfat solids in
Class II skim milk by the Class II nonfat
solids price;
(iii) The pounds of butterfat in Class
II times the Class II butterfat price;
(iv) The pounds of nonfat solids in
Class IV times the nonfat solids price;
(v) The pounds of butterfat in Class III
and Class IV milk times the butterfat
price;
(vi) The pounds of protein in Class III
milk times the protein price;
(vii) The pounds of other solids in
Class III milk times the other solids
price; and
(vii) Add together the amounts
computed in paragraphs (c)(2)(i)
through (vii) of this section and from
that sum deduct any payment made
pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this
section; and
(3) For the total quantity of milk
received during the month from a
cooperative association in its capacity as
a handler under § 1000.9(c) of this
chapter as follows:
(i) The hundredweight of producer
milk received times the producer price
differential as adjusted pursuant to
§ 1051.75 of this chapter;
(ii) The pounds of butterfat received
times the butterfat price for the month;
(iii) The pounds of protein received
times the protein price for the month;
(iv) The pounds of other solids
received times the other solids price for
the month; and
(v) Add together the amounts
computed in paragraphs (c)(3)(i)
through (v) of this section and from that
sum deduct any payment made
pursuant to paragraph (c)(1) of this
section.
(d) If a handler has not received full
payment from the market administrator
pursuant to § 1051.72 of this chapter by
the payment date specified in paragraph
(a), (b), or (c) of this section, the handler
may reduce pro rata its payments to
producers or to the cooperative
association (with respect to receipts
described in paragraph (b) of this
section, prorating the underpayment to
the volume of milk received from the
cooperative association in proportion to
the total milk received from producers
by the handler), but not by more than
the amount of the underpayment. The
payments shall be completed on the
next scheduled payment date after
receipt of the balance due from the
market administrator.
(e) If a handler claims that a required
payment to a producer cannot be made
because the producer is deceased or
cannot be located, or because the
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cooperative association or its lawful
successor or assignee is no longer in
existence, the payment shall be made to
the producer-settlement fund, and in the
event that the handler subsequently
locates and pays the producer or a
lawful claimant, or in the event that the
handler no longer exists and a lawful
claim is later established, the market
administrator shall make the required
payment from the producer-settlement
fund to the handler or to the lawful
claimant, as the case may be.
(f) In making payments to producers
pursuant to this section, each handler
shall furnish each producer, except a
producer whose milk was received from
a cooperative association handler
described in § 1000.9(a) or (c) of this
chapter, a supporting statement in a
form that may be retained by the
recipient which shall show:
(1) The name, address, Grade A
identifier assigned by a duly constituted
regulatory agency, and payroll number
of the producer;
(2) The daily and total pounds, and
the month and dates such milk was
received from that producer;
(3) The total pounds of butterfat,
protein, and other solids contained in
the producer’s milk;
(4) The minimum rate or rates at
which payment to the producer is
required pursuant to the order in this
part;
(5) The rate used in making payment
if the rate is other than the applicable
minimum rate;
(6) The amount, or rate per
hundredweight, or rate per pound of
component, and the nature of each
deduction claimed by the handler; and
(7) The net amount of payment to the
producer or cooperative association.
§ 1051.74
[Reserved]
§ 1051.75 Plant location adjustments for
producer milk and nonpool milk.
For purposes of making payments for
producer milk and nonpool milk, a
plant location adjustment shall be
determined by subtracting the Class I
price specified in § 1051.51 of this
chapter from the Class I price at the
plant’s location. The difference, plus or
minus as the case may be, shall be used
to adjust the payments required
pursuant to §§ 1051.73 and 1000.76 of
this chapter.
§ 1051.76 Payments by a handler
operating a partially regulated distributing
plant.
See § 1000.76 of this chapter.
§ 1051.77
Adjustment of accounts.
See § 1000.77 of this chapter.
E:\FR\FM\02APP2.SGM
02APP2
14172
§ 1051.78
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 63 / Monday, April 2, 2018 / Proposed Rules
Charges on overdue accounts.
See § 1000.78 of this chapter.
Subpart D—Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 1051.85 Assessment for order
administration.
§ 1051.90
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS2
On or before the payment receipt date
specified under § 1051.71 of this
chapter, each handler shall pay to the
market administrator its pro rata share
of the expense of administration of the
order at a rate specified by the market
administrator that is no more than 8
cents per hundredweight with respect
to:
(a) Receipts of producer milk
(including the handler’s own
production) other than such receipts by
a handler described in § 1000.9(c) of this
chapter that were delivered to pool
plants of other handlers;
(b) Receipts from a handler described
in § 1000.9(c) of this chapter;
(c) Receipts of concentrated fluid milk
products from unregulated supply
plants and receipts of nonfluid milk
products assigned to Class I use
pursuant to § 1000.43(d) of this chapter
and other source milk allocated to Class
I pursuant to § 1000.44(a)(3) and (8) of
this chapter and the corresponding steps
of § 1000.44(b), except other source milk
that is excluded from the computations
pursuant to § 1051.60 (h) and (i) of this
chapter; and
(d) Route disposition in the marketing
area from a partially regulated
distributing plant that exceeds the skim
milk and butterfat subtracted pursuant
to § 1000.76(a)(1)(i) and (ii) of this
chapter.
19:56 Mar 30, 2018
Jkt 244001
Deduction for marketing
See § 1000.86 of this chapter.
Administrative Assessment and
Marketing Service Deduction
VerDate Sep<11>2014
§ 1051.86
services.
Dates.
See § 1000.90 of this chapter.
[Note: The following will not appear in the
Code of Federal Regulations.]
Marketing Agreement Regulating the
Handling of Milk in the Proposed
California Marketing Area
The parties hereto, in order to
effectuate the declared policy of the Act,
and in accordance with the rules of
practice and procedure effective
thereunder (7 CFR part 900), desire to
enter into this marketing agreement and
do hereby agree that the provisions
referred to in paragraph I hereof, as
augmented by the provisions specified
in paragraph II hereof, shall be and are
the provisions of this marketing
agreement as if set out in full herein.
I. The findings and determinations,
order relative to handling, and the
provisions of § 1051.1 to 1051.90 47 of
this chapter all inclusive, of the order
regulating the handling of milk in the
proposed California 48 marketing area (7
CFR part 1051 49); and
II. The following provisions:
§ 1051.91 50 of this chapter Record of
milk handled and authorization to
correct typographical errors.
47 First
and last section of order.
of order.
49 Appropriate part number.
50 Next consecutive section number.
48 Name
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 9990
(a) Record of milk handled. The
undersigned certifies that he/she
handled during the month of May
2017 51, ________hundredweight of milk
covered by this marketing agreement.
(b) Authorization to correct
typographical errors. The undersigned
hereby authorizes the Deputy
Administrator, or Acting Deputy
Administrator, Dairy Programs,
Agricultural Marketing Service, to
correct any typographical errors which
may have been made in this marketing
agreement.
Effective date. This marketing
agreement shall become effective upon
the execution of a counterpart hereof by
the Department in accordance with
section 900.14(a) of the aforesaid rules
of practice and procedure.
In Witness Whereof, the contracting
handlers, acting under the provisions of
the Act, for the purposes and subject to
the limitations herein contained and not
otherwise, have hereunto set their
respective hands and seals.
Signature
By (Name) lllllllllllllll
(Title) lllllllllllllllll
(Address) llllllllllllllll
(Seal)
Attest llllllllllllllllll
Dated: March 23, 2018.
Bruce Summers,
Acting Administrator, Agricultural Marketing
Service.
[FR Doc. 2018–06167 Filed 3–30–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–02–P
51 Appropriate
E:\FR\FM\02APP2.SGM
02APP2
representative period for the order.
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 63 (Monday, April 2, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 14110-14172]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-06167]
[[Page 14109]]
Vol. 83
Monday,
No. 63
April 2, 2018
Part II
Department of Agriculture
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Agricultural Marketing Service
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7 CFR Part 1051
Milk in California; Proposal To Establish a Federal Milk Marketing
Order; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 83 , No. 63 / Monday, April 2, 2018 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 14110]]
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DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Part 1051
[Doc. No. AO-15-0071; AMS-DA-14-0095]
Milk in California; Proposal To Establish a Federal Milk
Marketing Order
AGENCY: Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA.
ACTION: Proposed rule; order for referendum; notice of public meeting.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) proposes the issuance
of a Federal Milk Marketing Order (FMMO) regulating the handling of
milk in California. This proposed rule proposes adoption of a
California FMMO incorporating the entire state of California and would
adopt the same dairy product classification and pricing provisions used
throughout the current FMMO system. The proposed California FMMO
provides for the recognition of producer quota as administered by the
California Department of Food and Agriculture. This proposed FMMO is
subject to producer approval by referendum.
DATES: The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) will conduct a public
meeting at 9:00 a.m. on April 10, 2018, to explain and answer questions
relating to how the proposed California FMMO contained in this proposed
rule, if adopted, would operate and review the producer referendum
process that will be followed to obtain producer approval of the
proposed rule.
ADDRESSES: The public meeting will be held at the Clovis Veterans
Memorial District Building, 808 Fourth Street, Clovis, California
93612. Meeting information can be found at www.ams.usda.gov/caorder.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Erin Taylor, Acting Director, Order
Formulation and Enforcement Division, USDA/AMS/Dairy Program, STOP
0231, Room 2969-S, 1400 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC 20250-
0231, (202) 720-7311, email address: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This proposed rule, in accordance to 7 CFR
part 900.13a, is the Secretary's final decision in this proceeding and
proposes the issuance of a marketing order as defined in 7 CFR part
900.2(j). AMS finds that a FMMO for California would provide more
orderly marketing conditions in the marketing area, warranting
promulgation of a California FMMO. The record is replete with
discussion from most parties on whether disorderly marketing conditions
exist, or are even needed, to warrant promulgation of a California
FMMO. FMMOs are authorized by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. 601-674 and 7253) (AMAA). The declared
policy of the AMAA makes no mention of ``disorder,'' and AMS finds that
disorderly marketing conditions are not a requirement for an order to
be promulgated. The standard for FMMO promulgation is to ``. . .
establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions . . . ,'' (7
U.S.C. 602(4)) and AMS finds that the proposed California FMMO meets
that standard.
AMS has considered all record evidence presented at the hearing.
Pursuant to a February 14, 2018 Memorandum from Secretary of
Agriculture Sonny Perdue, Judicial Officer William Jensen conducted an
independent de novo review of the hearing record. The Judicial Officer
issued an Order on March 9, 2018 whereby he ratified all decisions and
rulings made by Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Jill Clifton during the
hearing. The Judicial Officer ratified ALJ Clifton's Certification of
the Transcript, except that he revised the list of exhibits that ALJ
Clifton identified as not having been admitted into evidence by adding
``Exhibit 108-Exhibit D'' to that list. AMS has also considered the
arguments and proposed findings submitted in post-hearing briefs,
officially noticed documents, and comments and exceptions filed in
response to the recommended decision to formulate this proposed FMMO.
The regulatory provisions proposed herein reflect California marketing
conditions, while adhering to fundamental FMMO principles that have
historically helped to maintain orderly marketing conditions, ensured a
sufficient supply of pure and wholesome milk, and been in the public
interest.
A FMMO is a regulation issued by the Secretary of Agriculture that
places certain requirements on the handling of milk in the area it
covers. Each FMMO is established under the authority of the AMAA. A
FMMO requires handlers of milk for a marketing area to pay minimum
class prices according to how the milk is used. These prices are
established under each FMMO after a public hearing where evidence is
received on the supply and demand conditions for milk in the market. A
FMMO requires that payments for milk be pooled and paid to individual
farmers or cooperative associations of farmers on the basis of a
uniform or average price. Thus, all eligible dairy farmers (producers)
share in the marketwide use-values of milk by regulated handlers.
AMS proposes the establishment of a FMMO in 7 CFR part 1051 to
regulate the handling of milk in California. Where appropriate, AMS
proposes the adoption of uniform provisions found in 7 CFR part 1000
that are have been adopted into the 10 current FMMOS established in
chapter X. These uniform provisions include, but are not limited to,
product classification, end-product price formulas, Class I
differential structure, and the producer-handler definition.\1\ This
decision recognizes the unique market structure of the California dairy
industry through tailored performance-based standards to determine
eligibility for pool participation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ References to Class I, Class II, Class III and Class IV
refer to products classified in those classes based on uniform FMMO
provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As in all current FMMOs, California handlers regulated by a
California FMMO would be responsible for accurate reporting of all milk
movements and uses, and would be required to make timely payments to
producers. The California FMMO would be administered by the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) through a Market Administrator,
who would provide essential marketing services, such as laboratory
testing, reporting verification, information collection and
publication, and producer payment enforcement.
A unique feature of the proposed order is a provision for the
recognition of the quota value specified in the California quota
program currently administered by the California Department of Food and
Agriculture (CDFA). AMS finds that the California quota program should
remain a function of CDFA in whatever manner CDFA deems appropriate.
Should CDFA continue to use producer monies to fund the quota program,
AMS finds that the proper recognition of quota values within a
California FMMO, as provided for in the Agriculture Act of 2014 (2014
Farm Bill) (Pub. L. 113-79, sec. 1410(d)), is to permit an authorized
deduction from payment to producers, in an amount determined and
announced by CDFA.
In conjunction with this proposed FMMO, AMS conducted a Regulatory
Economic Impact Analysis to determine the potential impact of
regulating California milk handlers under a FMMO on the milk supply,
product demand and prices, milk allocation in California and throughout
the United States, and impacts to consumers. As part of the
[[Page 14111]]
analysis, a regional econometric model was used to project deviations
from the USDA Agricultural Baseline Projections to 2026 \2\ under the
provisions of the proposed California FMMO. The full text of the
Regulatory Economic Impact Analysis Report and accompanying
documentation may be accessed at www.regulations.gov or
www.ams.usda.gov/caorder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Official Notice is taken of: U.S. Department of Agriculture,
Office of the Chief Economist, World Agricultural Outlook Board,
Interagency Agricultural Projections Committee, 2016, Long-term
Projections Report OCE-2016-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior documents in this proceeding:
Notice of Hearing: Issued July 27, 2015; published August 6, 2015
(80 FR 47210);
Notice To Reconvene Hearing: Issued September 25, 2015; published
September 30, 2015 (80 FR 58636);
Recommended Decision and Opportunity To File Written Exceptions:
Issued February 6, 2017; published February 14, 2017 (82 FR 10634);
Documents for Official Notice: Issued August 8, 2017; published
August 14, 2017 (82 FR 37827); and
Submission for OMB Review: Information Collection--Producer
Ballots: Issued September 27, 2017; published October 2, 2017 (82 FR
45795);
Delay of Rulemaking: Issued February 1, 2018; published February 6,
2018 (83 FR 5215);
Ratification of Record: Issued March 14, 2018; published March 19,
2018 (83 FR 11903).
This proposed rule is governed by the provisions of Sections 556
and 557 of Title 5 of the United States Code and is therefore excluded
from the requirements of Executive Order 12866.
This proposed rule is not expected to be an Executive Order 13771
regulatory action because this proposed rule is not a significant
regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.
The provisions of this proposed rule have been reviewed under
Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. They are not intended to
have a retroactive effect. If adopted, the proposed FMMO would not
preempt any state or local laws, regulations, or policies, unless they
present an irreconcilable conflict with this rule.
AMS is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, to promote
the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide
increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information
and services, and for other purposes.
The AMAA provides that administrative proceedings must be exhausted
before parties may file suit in court. Under 7 U.S.C. 608c(15)(A) of
the AMAA, any handler subject to an order may request modification or
exemption from such order by filing with USDA a petition stating that
the order, any provision of the order, or any obligation imposed in
connection with the order is not in accordance with the law. A handler
is afforded the opportunity for a hearing on the petition. After a
hearing, USDA would rule on the petition. The AMAA provides that the
district court of the United States in any district in which the
handler is an inhabitant, or has its principal place of business, has
jurisdiction in equity to review USDA's ruling on the petition,
provided a bill in equity is filed not later than 20 days after the
date of the entry of the ruling.
Civil Rights Impact Analysis
AMS has reviewed this proposed rule in accordance with Departmental
Regulation 4300-4--Civil Rights Impact Analysis (CRIA), to identify and
address potential impacts the proposal might have on any protected
groups of people. After a careful review of the proposed rule's intent
and provisions, AMS has determined that this proposed rule, if adopted,
would not limit or reduce the ability of individuals in any protected
classes to participate in the proposed FMMO, or to enjoy the
anticipated benefits of the proposed program. Any impacts on dairy
farmers and processors arising from implementation of this proposed
rule are not expected to be disproportionate for members of any
protected group on a prohibited basis.
An anonymous commenter took exception to AMS's determination with
respect to civil rights impact of the proposed rule. The commenter took
exception with AMS's conclusion that because the proposed California
FMMO would provide for orderly marketing conditions, its implementation
would not result in disparate impacts on protected classes, especially
consumers. The civil rights analysis did not consider consumers because
consumers are not a protected class. Other observations suggested by
the commenter regarding consumerism and homelessness are outside the
scope of the CRIA.
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Pursuant to the requirements set forth in the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612), AMS has considered the
economic impact of this action on small entities. Accordingly, AMS has
prepared this regulatory flexibility analysis.
The purpose of the RFA is to fit regulatory actions to the scale of
businesses subject to such actions so that small businesses will not be
unduly or disproportionately burdened. Small dairy farm businesses have
been defined by the Small Business Administration (SBA) (13 CFR
121.601) as those businesses having annual gross receipts of less than
$750,000. SBA's definition of small agricultural service firms, which
includes handlers that would be regulated under this proposed FMO,
varies depending on the product manufactured. Small fluid milk and ice
cream manufacturers are defined as having 1,000 or fewer employees.
Small butter and dry or condensed dairy product manufacturers are
defined as having 750 or fewer employees. Small cheese manufacturers
are defined as having 1,250 or fewer employees.
For the purpose of determining which California dairy farms are
``small businesses,'' the $750,000 per year criterion was used to
establish a production guideline that equates to approximately 315,000
pounds of milk per month. Although this guideline does not factor in
additional monies that may be received by dairy farmers, it is a
standard encompassing most small dairy farms. For the purpose of
determining a handler's size, if the plant is part of a larger company
operating multiple plants that collectively exceed the employee limit
for that type of manufacturing, the plant is considered a large
business even if the local plant has fewer than the defined number of
employees.
Interested persons were invited to present evidence at the hearing
on the probable regulatory and informational impact of the proposed
California FMMO on small businesses. Specific evidence on the number of
large and small dairy farms in California (above and below the
threshold of $750,000 in annual sales) was not presented at the
hearing. However, data compiled by CDFA \3\ suggests that between 5 and
15 percent of California dairy farms would be considered small business
entities. No comparable data for dairy product manufacturers was
available.
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\3\ Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, California Dairy Review,
Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2015. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/CDR/2015/CDR_SEPT_15.pdf.
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Record evidence indicates that implementing the proposed California
FMMO would not impose a disproportionate burden on small businesses.
Currently, the California dairy industry is regulated by a California
State Order (CSO) that is administered and enforced by CDFA. While the
CSO and FMMOs have differences that are discussed elsewhere
[[Page 14112]]
in this document, they both maintain similar classified pricing and
marketwide pooling functions. Therefore, it is not expected that the
proposed regulatory change will have a significant impact on California
small businesses.
The record evidence indicates that while the program is likely to
impose some costs on the regulated parties, those costs would be
outweighed by the benefits expected to accrue to the California dairy
industry. In conjunction with the publication of the recommended
decision (82 FR 10634), AMS released a Regulatory Economic Impact
Analysis (REIA) to study the possible impacts of the proposed
California FMMO. AMS received five comments related to the REIA. The
substance of those comments and AMS's response are provided in the
documentation that accompanies an updated REIA, which was prepared to
reflect the provisions proposed in this FMMO. The updated analysis may
be viewed in conjunction with this proposed FMMO (Docket No. AMS-DA-14-
0095) at www.regulations.gov.
California Dairy Market Background
The record shows that the California dairy industry accounts for
approximately 20 percent of the nation's milk supply. While its 39
million residents are concentrated in the state's coastal areas, the
majority of California's dairy farms are located in the interior
valleys, frequently at some distance from milk processing plants and
consumer population centers.
CDFA has defined and established distinct regulations for Northern
and Southern California dairy regions.\4\ According to data published
by CDFA,\5\ over 94 percent of the state's approximately 40.4 billion
pounds of milk for 2016 was produced in the Northern California region.
The five leading milk production counties in 2016 were Tulare, Merced,
Kings, Stanislaus, and Kern, together accounting for approximately 72.4
percent of the state's milk.
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\4\ Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, Stabilization and
Marketing Plan for Market Milk, as Amended, for the Northern
California Marketing Area, August 2015. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/hearings/2015/NOCAL_STAB_PLAN61.pdf.
\5\ Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, California Dairy
Statistics Annual, 2016. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/Annual/2016/2016_Statistics_Annual.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to CDFA, there were 1,392 dairy farms in California in
2016. Of those, 1,297 were located in Northern California, and 95 were
in Southern California. The statewide average number of cows per dairy
was 1,249; in Northern California, the average herd size was 1,265
cows, and in Southern California, 1,026 cows. Average milk production
for the state's 1.74 million cows was 23,265 pounds in 2016.
According to record evidence, 132 handlers reported milk receipts
to CDFA for at least one month during 2015. A CDFA February 2015 list
of California dairy product processing plants by type of product
produced \6\ shows that 35 California plants processed Class 1
products; 75 plants processed Class 2 and 3 products; 18 plants
processed Class 4a products; and 64 plants processed Class 4b
products.\7\ Some plants processed products in more than one class.
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\6\ Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, Milk and Dairy Food
Safety Branch, Milk Plant Listings. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/ahfss/Milk_and_Dairy_Food_Safety/#Plants.
\7\ References to Class 1, Class 2, Class 3, Class 4a and Class
4b refer to products classified in those categories based on the
CSO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CDFA reported \8\ that approximately 98 percent of California's
2016 milk production was market grade (Grade A), and the rest was
manufacturing grade (Grade B). Thirteen percent of the milk pooled
under the CSO was utilized by California processors as Class 1 (fluid
milk). Eight and three-tenths percent was utilized for Classes 2 and 3
(soft and frozen dairy products), 32.3 percent was utilized for Class
4a (butter and dried milk powders), and 46.4 percent was utilized for
Class 4b (cheese).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ CDFA, California Dairy Statistics Annual, 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to CDFA, total Class 1 sales in California were
approximately 642 million gallons in 2016. Record evidence shows that
annual California Class 1 sales outside the state averaged 22 million
gallons for the five years preceding 2015.
The record shows that for the five-year period from 2010 through
2014, an average of 230 million pounds of California bulk milk products
were transferred to out-of-state plants for processing each year.
During the same period, an average of 633 million pounds of milk from
outside the state was received and reported by California pool plants
each year.
Impact on Small Businesses
AMS proposes to establish a FMMO in California similar to the 10
existing FMMOs in the national system. The California dairy industry is
currently regulated under the CSO, which is similar to the proposed
FMMO in most respects. California handlers currently report milk
receipts and utilization to CDFA, which calculates handler prices based
on component values derived from finished product sales surveys.
Likewise, FMMO handlers report milk receipts and utilization to the
Market Administrators, who calculate handlers' pool obligations
according to price formulas that incorporate component prices based on
end product sales values. Under both programs, the value of handlers'
milk is pooled, and pool revenues are shared by all the pooled
producers. Thus, transitioning to the FMMO is expected to have only a
minimal impact on the reporting and regulatory responsibilities for
large or small handlers, who are already complying with similar CSO
regulations.
Pricing
Under the proposed California FMMO, uniform FMMO end-product price
formulas would replace the CDFA price formulas currently used to
calculate handler milk prices. FMMO end-product price formulas
incorporate component prices derived from national end-product sales
surveys conducted by AMS. Use of price formulas based on national
product sales would permit California producers to receive prices for
pooled milk reflective of the national market for commodity products
for which their milk is utilized. Consistent with the current FMMOs,
California FMMO Class I prices would be computed using the higher of
the Class III or IV advance prices announced the previous month, and
would be adjusted by the Class I differential for the county where the
plant is located.\9\
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\9\ FMMOs have four classifications of milk: Class I--fluid milk
products; Class II--fluid cream products, soft ``spoonable''
cheeses, ice cream, and yogurt; Class III--hard cheeses and
spreadable cheese such as cream cheese; Class IV--butter and dried
milk products.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regulated minimum prices, especially for milk used in cheese
manufacturing, are likely to be higher than what handlers would pay
under the CSO. However, pooling regulations under the proposed FMMO
would allow handlers to elect not to pool milk used in manufacturing.
This option would be available to both large and small manufacturing
handlers.
Dairy farmers whose milk is pooled on the proposed California FMMO
would receive a pro rata share of the pool revenues through the
California FMMO uniform blend price. The California FMMO would not
provide for the quota and non-quota milk pricing tiers found under the
CSO. Under the proposed California FMMO, regulated handlers would be
allowed to deduct monies, in an amount determined and announced by
CDFA, from blend prices paid to California dairy farmers for
[[Page 14113]]
pooled milk and send those monies to CDFA to administer the quota
program.
These changes are expected to affect producers and handlers of all
sizes, but are not expected to be disproportionate for small entities.
Producer-Handlers
The record shows that there are four producer-handlers \10\ in
California whose Class 1 milk production is all or partially exempt
from CSO pricing and pooling by virtue of their ``exempt quota''
holdings, representing approximately 21 million pounds of milk each
month. It is likely that these four entities would become fully
regulated by the proposed California FMMO and accountable to the
marketwide pool for all of their Class I sales in the marketing area.
By accounting to the pool for all their Class I sales in the marketing
area, the value of the marketwide pool is expected to increase,
benefiting most other large and small producers. The proposed
California FMMO makes no provision for exempting large producer-
handlers from pricing and pooling regulations under the order.
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\10\ Producer-handlers are dairy farmers who process and
distribute their own farm milk into dairy products.
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The evidentiary record shows that several smaller California
producer-handlers, whose production volume exceeds the threshold to
receive an exemption from the CSO's pricing and pooling regulations,
would likely qualify as producer-handlers under the proposed California
FMMO.\11\
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\11\ The CSO exempts producer-handlers with sales averaging less
than 500 gallons of milk per day on an annual basis and who
distribute 95 percent of their production to retail or wholesale
outlets.
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Interstate Commerce
The evidentiary record indicates that milk in interstate commerce,
which the CSO does not have authority to regulate, would be regulated
under the proposed California FMMO. Currently, California handlers who
purchase milk produced outside the state do not account to the CSO
marketwide pool for that milk. Record evidence shows approximately 425
million pounds of milk from outside the state was processed into Class
1 products at California processing plants during 2014.
Under the proposed FMMO, all Class I milk processed and distributed
in the marketing area would be subject to FMMO pricing and pooling
regulations, regardless of its origin. Thus, revenues from Class 1
sales that are not currently regulated would accrue to the California
FMMO pool and would be shared with all producers who are pooled on the
California FMMO, including out-of-state producers. If California
handlers elect to continue processing out-of-state milk into Class I
products, under the provisions of the proposed California FMMO they
would be required to pay the order's classified minimum price for that
milk. Those additional revenues would be pooled and would benefit large
and small producers who participate in the pool. Both large and small
out-of-state producers who ship milk to pool plants in California would
receive the California FMMO uniform blend price for their milk.
Classification and Fortification
Dairy product classification under the CSO and the proposed FMMO is
similar, but not identical. The table below compares CSO and FMMO
product classes.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CSO Class Equivalent FMMO Class
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Class 1................................... Class I.
Class 2 and 3............................. Class II.
Class 4b.................................. Class III.
Class 4a.................................. Class IV.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the proposed California FMMO, the classification of certain
California products would change to align with standard FMMO
classifications:
Reassigning buttermilk from CSO Class 2 to FMMO Class I
Reassigning half and half from CSO Class 1 to FMMO Class
II
Reassigning eggnog from CSO Class 2 to FMMO Class I
There are numerous instances where the CSO classifies a
product based on product type and where the product is sold.\12\ The
proposed California FMMO would classify all products based solely on
product type.
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\12\ Official Notice is taken of: CDFA, Classification of Dairy
Products. https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/dairy/pdf/PRDCLASS.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the proposed FMMO, California handlers would no longer
receive credits for fluid milk fortification. Instead, accounting for
fortification would be uniform with other FMMOs, as the fluid milk
equivalent of the milk solids used to fortify fluid milk products would
be classified as Class IV, and the increased volume of Class I product
due to fortification would be classified as Class I. The FMMO system
accounts for fortification differently than does the CSO. The record
does not indicate the net impact of this change. However, the impact is
not expected to disproportionately affect small entities.
Transportation Credits
The proposed California FMMO does not contain a transportation
credit program to encourage milk shipments to Class 1, 2, and 3 plants,
as is currently provided for in the CSO. AMS proposes that producer
payments be adjusted to reflect the applicable producer location
adjustment for the handler location where the milk is received, thus
providing the incentive to producers to supply Class I plants.
Producers are responsible for finding a market for their milk and
consequently bear the cost of transporting their milk to a plant. The
record of this proceeding does not support reducing the producers'
value of the marketwide pool by authorizing transportation credits to
handlers. This change is not expected to disproportionately impact
small business entities.
Summary
AMS continues to find that adoption of the proposed California FMMO
would promote more orderly marketing of milk in interstate commerce.
Classified milk prices under the order would reflect national prices
for manufactured products and local prices for fluid milk products,
fostering greater equality for California producers and handlers in the
markets where they compete. Under the proposed FMMO, handlers would be
assured a uniform cost for raw milk, and producers would receive
uniform payments for raw milk, regardless of its use. Small dairy
farmers and handlers are not expected to be disproportionately impacted
by the transition from CSO to FMMO regulations.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35), the ballot materials that will be used in conducting the
referendum have been submitted to and approved by OMB (0581-0300). The
forms to be used to administer the proposed California FMMO have also
been reviewed by OMB (0581-0032) and would be approved should the
California FMMO producer referendum pass.
Any additional information collection and recordkeeping
requirements that may be imposed under the proposed order would be
submitted to OMB for public comment and approval.
Secretary's Decision
Notice is hereby given of the filing with the Hearing Clerk of this
final decision with respect to the proposed marketing agreement and
order
[[Page 14114]]
regulating the handling of milk in California.
This final decision is issued pursuant to the provisions of the
AMAA and the applicable rules of practice and procedure governing the
formulation of marketing agreements and orders (7 CFR part 900). The
proposed marketing agreement and order are authorized under 7 U.S.C.
608c.
The proposed marketing agreement and order are based on the record
of a public hearing held September 22 through November 18, 2015, in
Clovis, California. The hearing was held to receive evidence on four
proposals submitted by dairy farmers, handlers, and other interested
parties. Notice of this hearing was published in the Federal Register
on August 6, 2015 (80 FR 47210).
Ninety-eight witnesses testified over the course of the 40-day
hearing. Witnesses provided a broad overview of the history and
complexity of the California dairy industry, and submitted 194 exhibits
containing supporting data, analyses, and historical information.
Upon the basis of evidence introduced at the hearing and the record
thereof, the Administrator of AMS on February 6, 2017, filed with the
Hearing Clerk, USDA, a recommended decision and Opportunity to File
Written Exceptions thereto by May 15, 2017. Twenty-nine comments or
exceptions were filed. That document also announced AMS's intent to
request approval of new information collection requirements to
implement the program. Written comments on the proposed information
collection requirements were due April 17, 2017. Two comments were
filed. AMS issued a notice regarding Documents for Official Notice,
inviting comments on whether the Department should take official notice
of numerous listed documents submitted for consideration by proponents.
The notice was issued on August 8, 2017, and published on August 14,
2017. Comments on the official notice request were due August 29, 2017.
Three supportive comments were received and are discussed later in this
decision. Lastly, AMS announced its intent to request approval of a new
information collection for ballot material to be used in a producer
referendum in a document issued on April 17, 2017, and published on
April 21, 2017. Comments on the ballot material information collection
were due June 20, 2017. One supportive comment was received. A
Submission for OMB Review seeking OMB approval of the ballot material
was issued on September 27, 2017, and published on October 2, 2017 (82
FR 45795).
The material issues presented on the record of hearing are as
follows:
1. Whether the handling of milk in the proposed marketing area is
in the current of interstate commerce, or directly burdens, obstructs,
or affects interstate commerce in milk or its products;
2. Whether economic and marketing conditions in California show a
need for a Federal marketing order that would tend to effectuate the
declared policy of the Act;
3. If an order is issued, what its provisions should be with
respect to:
a. Handlers to be regulated and milk to be priced and pooled under
the order;
b. Classification of milk, and assignment of receipts to classes of
utilization;
c. Pricing of milk;
d. Distribution of proceeds to producers; and
e. Administrative provisions.
Findings and Conclusions
The findings and conclusions on the material issues are based on
the record of the hearing and the comments and exceptions filed with
regard to the recommended decision. Discussions are organized by topic,
recognizing inevitable overlap in some areas. Topics are addressed in
the following order:
1. Regulatory Comparison
2. Overview of Proposals
3. Justification for a California FMMO
4. California Quota Program Recognition
5. Definitions and Uniform Provisions
6. Classification
7. Pricing
8. Pooling
9. Transportation Credits
10. Miscellaneous and Administrative Provisions
11. Ruling on Office Notice Documents
12. Rulings on Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Exceptions
1. Regulatory Comparison
The purpose of the following section is to provide a general
description and comparison of the major features of the California
state dairy regulatory framework and the FMMO system as provided in the
evidentiary record. A more detailed discussion of each issue is
provided in the appropriate section of this decision.
California State Order:
Currently, milk marketing in California is regulated by the CDFA.
The CSO is codified in the Pooling Plan for Market Milk, as amended,
and in two Stabilization and Marketing Plan(s) for Market Milk, as
amended, for the Northern and Southern California marketing areas.\13\
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\13\ Official Notice is taken of: Chapter 2, Part 3, Division 21
and Chapter 3, Part 3, Division 21 of the California Food and
Agriculture Code.
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Quota
The California quota program is a state-administered producer
program that entitles the quota holder to $0.195 per pound of solids-
not-fat above the CSO base and overbase price of milk.\14\ The quota
premium is funded by a deduction from the CSO marketwide pool before
the CSO overbase price is calculated. The quota program requires quota
holders to deliver milk to a pool plant at least once every 60 days.
Quota can be bought and sold, and according to record evidence,
approximately 58 percent of California dairy farms owned some volume of
quota in 2015.
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\14\ The hearing record reveals that the $0.195 per pound
solids-non-fat equates to a $1.70 per cwt of milk quota premium.
Additionally, under current CSO provisions, base and overbase prices
are equal.
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Classification
The CSO provides for the pricing of five classified use values of
milk. In general, Class 1 is milk used in fluid milk products; Class 2
is milk used in heavy cream, cottage cheese, yogurt, and sterilized
products; Class 3 is milk used in ice cream and frozen products; Class
4a is milk used in butter and dry milk products, such as nonfat dry
milk; and Class 4b is milk used in cheese--other than cottage cheese--
and whey products.
Pricing
The CSO utilizes an end-product pricing system to determine
classified prices for raw milk produced and manufactured in the State
of California. Class 1, 4a, and 4b prices are announced monthly. Class
2 and 3 prices are announced bi-monthly. Prices for all five milk
classes are component-based. Three components of milk are used to
determine prices: butterfat (fat); solids-not-fat (SNF), which includes
protein and lactose; and a fluid carrier (used in only the Class 1
price).
The CSO determines milk component prices based on commodity market
prices obtained from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), the AMS
Dairy Market News Western Dry Whey--Mostly (WDW-Mostly) price series,
and the announced nonfat dry milk (NFDM) California Weighted Average
Price (CWAP), which is determined by CDFA through weekly surveys of
California manufacturing plants.
The price for milk used in cheese manufacturing (CSO Class 4b) is a
[[Page 14115]]
central issue in this proceeding. The Class 4b price is announced
monthly and utilizes average commodity market prices for block Cheddar
cheese, butter, and dry skim whey to determine the Class 4b component
values. The average CME prices for butter and 40-pound Cheddar blocks
are adjusted by f.o.b. price adjusters, which are designed to represent
the difference between the CME price and the price California
manufacturers actually receive. The CME butter price is also reduced by
$0.10 per pound to derive the value of whey butter as it relates to
cheese processing. The value of dry skim whey is determined through a
sliding scale that provides a per hundredweight (cwt) value based on a
series of announced WDW-Mostly per pound value ranges. The sliding
scale determines dry whey's contribution to the Class 4b price, with a
floor of $0.25 per cwt and a ceiling of $0.75 per cwt when the WDW-
Mostly price equals or exceeds $0.60 per pound.
The CSO pricing system has a number of features worth highlighting.
First, under the CSO, handlers must pay at least minimum classified
prices for all Grade A milk purchased from California dairy farmers,
regardless of whether the milk is pooled on the CSO. Additionally,
Class 1 processors may claim credits against their pool obligations to
offset the cost of fortifying fluid milk to meet the State-mandated
nonfat solids content standards.
The classified use values of all the milk pooled on the CSO are
aggregated, and producers are paid on the fat and SNF component levels
in their raw milk. Producers are paid on the basis of their allocated
quota (if applicable), base, and overbase production for the month.
While the CSO pricing formulas have changed over time, in their current
form the base and overbase prices are the same. Generally, the quota
price is the overbase price plus the $1.70 per cwt quota premium.
Pooling
Almost all California-produced milk received by California pool
plants is pooled on the CSO, with some exceptions. Grade B milk is
neither pooled nor subject to minimum prices. Manufacturing plants that
do not make any Class 1 or 2 products can opt out of the pool; however,
they are still required to pay announced CSO classified minimum prices
for Grade A milk received. The requirement that quota holders must
deliver milk to a pool plant at least once every 60 days tends to limit
the amount of Grade A milk not pooled on the CSO. The decision not to
pool milk in California carries with it a stipulation that the plant
may not repool for 12 months after opting not to pool, and after
repooling, a plant cannot opt out of pooling for 12 months.
Entities recognized as producer-handlers under the CSO may be
exempt from pooling some or all of their milk. Producer-handlers are
dairy farmers who also process and distribute their dairy products.
Fully exempt (``Option 66'') producer-handlers have minimal production
volumes and are exempt from the pricing and pooling provisions of the
CSO. Producer-handlers who own exempt quota (``Option 70'') do not
account to the CSO marketwide pool for the volume of Class 1 milk
covered by their exempt quota.
The State of California cannot regulate interstate commerce;
therefore, milk from out-of-state producers cannot be regulated by the
CSO. While the record reflects that California handlers typically pay
for out-of-state milk at a price reflective of the receiving plant's
utilization, those prices are not regulated or enforced by the CSO.
Transportation Credits
The CSO provides transportation credits to producers for farm-to-
plant Class 1, 2, and 3 milk movements between designated supply zones
and plants with more than 50 percent Class 1, 2, and/or 3 utilization
in designated demand zones. The CSO also provides for transportation
allowances to handlers for plant-to-plant milk movements.
Federal Milk Marketing Orders
A FMMO is a regulation issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
(Secretary) that places certain requirements on the handling of milk in
a defined geographic marketing area. FMMOs are authorized by the AMAA.
The declared policy of the AMAA is to ``. . . establish and maintain
such orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in
interstate commerce . . .'' (7 U.S.C. 602(1)). The principal means of
meeting the objectives of the FMMO program are through the use of
classified milk pricing and the marketwide pooling of returns.
Classification
Whereas the CSO designates five classes of milk utilization, FMMOs
provide for four classes of milk utilization. FMMO Class I is milk used
in fluid milk products. Class II is milk used to produce fluid cream
products, soft ``spoonable'' products like cottage cheese, ice cream,
sour cream, and yogurt, and other products such as kefir, baking mixes,
infant formula and meal replacements, certain prepared foods, and
ingredients in other prepared food products. Class III is milk used to
produce spreadable cheeses like cream cheese, and hard cheeses, like
Cheddar, that can be crumbled, grated, or shredded. Class IV is milk
used to produce butter, evaporated, or sweetened condensed milk in
consumer-style packages, and dry milk products.
Pricing
Like the CSO, the FMMO program currently uses end-product price
formulas based on the wholesale prices of finished products to
determine the minimum classified prices handlers pay for raw milk in
the four classes of utilization. However, the FMMO pricing system has
some notable differences. While the CSO announces some classified
prices on a bi-monthly basis, FMMOs announce prices for all four milk
classes monthly. FMMOs use four components of milk to determine prices:
Butterfat, protein, nonfat solids, and other solids.
Like the CSO, the FMMO determines component prices based on
commodity prices. However, AMS administers the Dairy Product Mandatory
Reporting Program (DPMRP) to survey weekly wholesale prices of four
manufactured dairy products (cheese, butter, NFDM and dry whey), and
releases weekly average survey prices in the National Dairy Product
Sales Report (NDPSR).\15\ The FMMO product-price formulas use these
surveyed prices to determine the component values in raw milk.
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\15\ Official Notice is taken of: The Notice of Equivalent Price
Series: 77 FR 22282. The National Dairy Product Sales Report was
deemed as equivalent to the price series previously released by the
National Agricultural Statistics Service.
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As referenced previously, a central issue of this proceeding is the
pricing of milk used for cheese manufacturing (FMMO Class III). The
FMMO pricing system determines the Class III value from DPMRP surveyed
butter, cheese, and dry whey prices. The FMMO does not utilize a
sliding scale to determine the value of whey that contributes to the
Class III price.
Unlike the CSO, FMMOs do not provide for a tiered system of
producer payments. A uniform blend price is computed for each FMMO
reflecting the use of all milk in each marketwide pool. A blend price
is paid for all milk that is pooled on the FMMO, adjusted for location.
In six of the FMMOs, producers are paid for the pounds of butterfat,
pounds of protein, pounds of other solids, and cwt of milk pooled. The
cwt price is known as the producer price differential (PPD) and
reflects the
[[Page 14116]]
producer's pro rata share of the value of Class I, Class II, and Class
IV uses in the pool relative to Class III value. In the other four
FMMOs, producers are paid on a butterfat and skim basis.
Pooling
Inclusion in the FMMO marketwide pool carries with it an obligation
to be available to serve the fluid market with necessary milk supplies
throughout the year. In the FMMO system, participation in the pool is
mandatory for distributing plants that process Grade A milk into Class
I products sold in a FMMO marketing area. Handlers of manufacturing
milk (Class II, III, or IV) have the option of pooling, and pool
eligibility is based on performance standards specific to each FMMO.
FMMOs recognize the unique business structures of producer-handlers
and exempt them from the pricing and pooling regulations of the orders
based on size. Producer-handler exemptions under FMMOs are limited to
those vertically-integrated entities that produce and distribute no
more than three million pounds of packaged fluid milk products each
month.
Unlike the CSO, FMMOs are authorized to regulate the interstate
commerce connected with milk marketing. Thus, there is no
differentiated regulatory treatment for milk produced outside of a FMMO
marketing area boundary. All eligible milk is pooled and priced in the
same manner, regardless of its source.
Transportation Credits
The Appalachian and Southeast FMMOs provide for transportation
credits to offset a handler's cost of hauling supplemental milk to
Class I markets. During deficit months, handlers can apply for
transportation credits to offset the cost of supplemental milk
deliveries from outside the marketing area to meet the Class I demand
of FMMO handlers. The most significant difference from the CSO here is
that the FMMO transportation credits described are not paid from the
marketwide pool. Instead, they are paid from separate funds obtained
through monthly assessments on handlers' Class I producer milk. The
exception is the Upper Midwest FMMO, which provides transportation
credits on plant-to-plant milk movements paid from the marketwide pool.
2. Overview of Proposals
Four proposals were published in the Hearing Notice of this
proceeding. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., Land O'Lakes, Inc., and
California Dairies, Inc. jointly submitted Proposal 1. Dairy Farmers of
America, Inc. (DFA), is a national dairy-farmer owned cooperative with
approximately 14,000 members and several processing facilities located
throughout the United States, with products marketed both nationally
and internationally. Within California, DFA represents 260 members and
operates three processing facilities. Land O'Lakes (LOL) is a national
farmer-owned cooperative with over 2,200 dairy-farmer members. LOL has
processing facilities in the Upper Midwest, the eastern United States,
and the State of California, with products marketed nationally and
internationally. Within California, LOL represents 200 dairy-farmer
members and operates three processing facilities. California Dairies,
Inc. (CDI), is a California based dairy-farmer owned cooperative with
390 dairy-farmer members, six processing facilities in California, and
national and international product sales. Combined, DFA, LOL, and CDI
(Cooperatives) market approximately 75 percent of the milk produced in
California.
Proposal 1 seeks to establish a California FMMO that incorporates
the same dairy product classification and pricing provisions as those
used throughout the FMMO system. Proposal 1 also includes unique
pooling provisions, described as ``inclusive'' throughout the
proceeding, that would pool the majority of the milk produced in
California each month while also allowing for the pooling of milk
produced outside of the marketing area if it meets specific pooling
provisions. The proposal includes fortification and transportation
credits similar to those currently provided by the CSO. Lastly,
Proposal 1 provides for payment of the California quota program quota
values from the marketwide pool before the FMMO blend price is computed
each month.
Proposal 2 was submitted on behalf of the Dairy Institute of
California (Institute). The Institute is a California trade association
representing proprietary fluid milk processors, cheese manufacturers,
and cultured and frozen dairy products manufacturers in 38 plants
throughout California. Institute plants process 70 percent of the fluid
milk products, 85 percent of the cultured and frozen dairy products,
and 90 percent of the cheese manufactured in the state. The Institute's
first position is that a California FMMO should not be promulgated.
However, should USDA find justification for promulgation, the Institute
supports Proposal 2. Proposal 2 incorporates the same dairy product
classification provisions used throughout the FMMO system, as well as
pooling provisions that are consistent with those found in other FMMOs.
The Proposal 2 pooling provisions require the pooling of Class I milk,
but the pooling of milk used in manufactured products is optional.
Proposal 2 includes fortification and transportation credits similar to
those currently provided by the CSO. It also includes an additional
shrinkage allowance for extended shelf life (ESL) products above that
provided in the FMMO system. Lastly, Proposal 2 recognizes quota value
by allowing producers to opt out of the quota program, thus receiving a
FMMO blend price reflective of the market's utilization. Under Proposal
2, producers who remain in the quota program would have their blend
price monies transferred to CDFA and redistributed according to their
quota and non-quota holdings.
Proposal 3 was submitted on behalf of the California Producer
Handlers Association (CPHA). CPHA is an association of four producer-
handlers: Foster Farms Dairy, Inc. (Foster); Hollandia Dairy, Inc.;
Producers Dairy Foods, Inc. (Producers);and Rockview Dairies, Inc.
(Rockview). CPHA members own their respective dairy farms and process
that farm milk, as well as the milk of other dairy farms, for delivery
to consumers. CPHA members own exempt quota, which entitles them to
exemption from CSO pricing and pooling provisions for the volume of
Class 1 milk covered by their exempt quota. Proposal 3 seeks
recognition and continuation of CPHA members' exempt quota status under
a California FMMO.
Proposal 4 was submitted on behalf of Ponderosa Dairy (Ponderosa).
Ponderosa is a Nevada dairy farm that supplies raw milk to California
fluid milk processing plants. Ponderosa contends that disorderly
marketing conditions do not exist in California that would warrant
promulgation of a FMMO. However, if USDA finds justification for a
California FMMO, Proposal 4 seeks to allow California handlers to elect
partially-regulated plant status with regard to milk they receive from
out-of-state producers. Such allowance would enable handlers to not
pool out-of-state milk, as long as they could demonstrate that they
paid out-of-state producers an amount equal to or higher than the
market blend price.
3. Justification for a California FMMO
This section reviews and summarizes the testimony, hearing
evidence, and comments and exceptions filed regarding the recommended
decision addressing whether or not promulgation of a California FMMO is
justified. After careful consideration and review, this final decision
affirms the finding that
[[Page 14117]]
the proposed California FMMO would provide for more orderly marketing
conditions for the handling of milk in the State of California, as
provided for and authorized by the AMAA. The Secretary has found upon
the record that the proposed order and all of its terms and provisions
will tend to effectuate the declared policy of the AMAA 608 c(4).
Summary of Testimony
A Cooperative witness testified regarding current California
marketing conditions and the need for establishing a California FMMO.
According to the witness, California is the largest milk-producing
state, producing more than 20 percent of the nation's milk. The witness
stated that the pooled volume of a California FMMO would be the largest
of all FMMOs, averaging slightly below 3.4 billion pounds per month;
the Class I volume would represent the third largest, following the
Northeast and Mideast FMMOs.
The Cooperative witness testified that the primary reason
California farmers are seeking the establishment of a FMMO is to
receive prices reflective of the national commodity values for all milk
uses. The witness opined that orderly marketing is no longer attainable
through the CSO because the prices California dairy farmers receive do
not reflect the full value of their raw milk. The witness estimated
that this pricing difference has reduced California dairy farm income
by $1.5 billion since 2010. The witness maintained that Proposal 1
allows California dairy farms to receive an equitable price for their
milk, while also tailoring FMMO provisions to the California dairy
industry. The Cooperatives' post-hearing brief reflected this position.
The Cooperative witness testified that there are significant price
differences, depending on whether a producer's milk is regulated by the
CSO or a FMMO. To illustrate this difference, the witness compared
California farm milk prices to those received by producers in the
states that comprise the Upper Midwest and Pacific Northwest marketing
areas.\16\ The witness selected these areas for comparison due to the
similar milk utilization in the Upper Midwest FMMO and the geographic
proximity of the Pacific Northwest FMMO. The witness estimated that
between August 2012 and May 2015, California dairy farmers received on
average $1.85 per cwt less (ranging from $0.43-$4.27 per cwt lower)
than producers pooled on the Upper Midwest and Pacific Northwest FMMOs.
The witness used the data to emphasize a wide difference in prices for
farmers in similarly situated areas. The witness opined that a
California FMMO, as advanced in Proposal 1, would ensure California
dairy farmers receive equitable prices, more in line with those
received by their FMMO counterparts.
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\16\ Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Illinois; Oregon, Washington and
Northern Idaho, respectively.
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The Cooperative witness emphasized that while both the CSO and the
FMMOs use end-product pricing formulas to determine class prices, the
two regulatory systems use different commodity series, effective dates,
yield factors, and make allowances, which result in substantially
different prices, as highlighted above. The witness explained that
while the two regulatory systems have always had price differences,
historically CSO and FMMO prices were relatively close. According to
the witness, prices began to diverge significantly in 2007 when the CSO
established a fixed whey factor in its formula for milk used to produce
cheese. From that point forward, the witness said, price differences
have become significant and have led to market disruptions both in the
fluid and manufacturing markets.
The Cooperative witness summarized USDA's justification from the
FMMO Order Reform decision for adopting a national Class I price
surface that assigns a Class I differential for every county in the
country, including counties in California. The witness said that the
separate CSO Class 1 price surface undermines the integrity of the
nationally coordinated Class I price surface and has become a source of
disorder in California. To demonstrate the disorder, the witness
compared FMMO Class I and CSO Class 1 prices for both in-state and out-
of-state purchases. The witness said that because of the CSO and FMMO
differences in both classified price formulas and Class I/1 price
surfaces, the Class 1 price paid by California handlers is almost
always lower than what it otherwise would be if FMMO Class I prices
were applicable for those same purchases.
The Cooperative witness presented a similar comparison between CSO
Class 1 prices and Class I prices in FMMO areas that were likely
competitors. The witness said that under FMMO regulations, the
difference in Class I prices between two FMMO areas is attributed to
the difference in the Class I differential at the two locations. For
example, the witness explained, the Class I price difference between
two plants, one located in a $2.10 zone and another in the $2.00 zone,
would be $0.10 per cwt. However, when the witness compared Class 1
prices in California and a competing FMMO area, the price difference
was always greater than the difference in differentials. For example,
the FMMO differential in the Los Angeles/San Diego market is $2.10,
while the differential in neighboring Phoenix is $2.35, a difference of
$0.25. However, said the witness, when comparing the actual CSO Class 1
price in Los Angeles/San Diego with the FMMO Class I price in Phoenix
from August 2012 to July 2015, the difference averaged $0.62. The
witness concluded that these observed price differences undermine a
nationally-coordinated pricing structure and contribute to disorderly
marketing, where fluid milk handlers pay different minimum prices
depending on where they are regulated.
The Cooperative witness also provided testimony on the CSO and FMMO
price disparities for manufacturing milk. The witness testified that
FMMO Class II, III, and IV prices reflect national prices for products
manufactured in these classes. If Proposal 1 is adopted, the witness
said, California handlers would pay the same uniform prices as their
FMMO competitors in the national marketplace. The witness noted past
FMMO decisions that discussed the national supply and demand for
manufactured dairy products and the need for national uniform
manufacturing prices. The witness stressed that California producers
should also receive these national prices like their FMMO counterparts.
The Cooperative witness elaborated on the differences between CSO
and FMMO manufacturing class prices. When comparing FMMO Class II to
CSO Class 2 and Class 3 prices, the witness cited differences in the
commodity series used as price references, the time periods of data
used, and the length of time prices are applicable to explain the
sometimes large differences in prices under the two regulatory systems.
As a result, the witness said, Class 2 products are sometimes sold on a
spot basis to exploit short-term price differences.
The Cooperative witness presented a comparison of CSO Class 4a and
FMMO Class IV prices from January 2000 to July 2015, revealing that
over the entire time period the Class 4a price averaged $0.29 per cwt
less than the Class IV price. The witness added that over this 15-year
period, the CSO Class 4a price on an annual average basis was never
above the FMMO Class IV price.
The Cooperative witness also provided testimony on the price
disparity between CSO Class 4b and FMMO Class III price formulas. Data
from January 2000 to July 2015 revealed
[[Page 14118]]
that the CSO Class 4b price was lower than the Class III price in 161
of the 187 months examined. The witness computed the average difference
over that 15-year time period to be $0.91 per cwt, with the largest
difference of $3.24 per cwt occurring in November 2014. The witness
attributed the observed price differences to differences in the
valuation of dry whey between the CSO 4b and the FMMO Class III
formulas. The witness said that in 2007, the whey factor in the CSO
Class 4b formula became a tiered, bracketed system with a floor of
$0.25 and a ceiling of $0.75, which is reached when the WDW-Mostly
price is greater than or equal to $0.60 per pound. The witness added
that the whey value contained in the FMMO Class III price comes from
the AMS NDPSR, and reflects the mandatory reporting of dry whey sales
throughout the country. The witness estimated that from August 2012
through July 2015, the Dairy Market News (DMN) whey value contributed
$0.68 per cwt to the CSO 4b price, while the NDPSR whey value
contributed $2.39 per cwt to the FMMO Class III price. The witness
concluded that the whey cap contained in the CSO 4b price results in
lower contributions to the marketwide pool than what is observed in the
national marketplace and reflected in FMMO prices.
The Cooperative witness reiterated the consequences of having two
different regulatory pricing schemes which has led to severe
differences between the regulated markets. The witness opined that the
regulatory differences allow California handlers who purchase raw milk
and manufacture products for sale in the national marketplace to pay
substantially different regulated minimum prices than handlers
regulated by the FMMO system. The witness estimated that because of the
regulatory price differences, from August 2012 to July 2015, California
farms received, on average, $1.89 per cwt less than similarly-situated
FMMO farms. The witness concluded that this results in California farms
being in a worse competitive position than similarly situated FMMO
farms. The witness labeled this as disorderly and said that this
condition should be remedied through the adoption of Proposal 1.
The Cooperative witness also entered data estimating the value of
regulating interstate commerce through the establishment of a
California FMMO. The witness cited January 2009 through July 2015 CDFA
data that indicated a monthly average of 54.5