Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of “Public Communication”, 12864-12881 [2018-06010]
Download as PDF
12864
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 83, No. 58
Monday, March 26, 2018
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
11 CFR Parts 100 and 110
[Notice 2018–06]
Internet Communication Disclaimers
and Definition of ‘‘Public
Communication’’
Federal Election Commission.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
The Federal Election
Commission requests comment on two
alternative proposals to amend its
regulations concerning disclaimers on
public communications on the internet
that contain express advocacy, solicit
contributions, or are made by political
committees. The Commission is
undertaking this rulemaking in light of
technological advances since the
Commission last revised its rules
governing internet disclaimers in 2006,
and questions from the public about the
application of those rules to internet
communications. The Commission’s
goal is to promulgate a rule that in its
text and interpretation recognizes the
paramount importance of providing the
public with the clearest disclosure of
the payor or sponsor of these public
communications on the internet.
Both proposals are intended to give
the American public easy access to
information about the persons paying
for and candidates authorizing these
internet communications, pursuant to
the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Both proposals would continue to
require disclaimers for certain internet
communications, and both would allow
certain internet communications to
provide disclaimers through alternative
technology. The proposals differ,
however, in their approach. The
Commission requests comment on all
elements of both proposals. The two
proposals need not be considered as
fixed alternatives; commenters are
encouraged to extract the best elements
of each, or suggest improvements or
alternatives, to help the Commission
fashion the best possible rule. The
Commission also requests comment on
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
Comments must be received on
or before May 25, 2018. The
Commission will hold a public hearing
on this notice on June 27, 2018. Anyone
wishing to testify at such a hearing must
file timely written comments and must
include in the written comments a
request to testify.
DATES:
All comments must be in
writing. Commenters are encouraged to
submit comments electronically via the
Commission’s website at https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?
pid=74739. Alternatively, commenters
may submit comments in paper form,
addressed to the Federal Election
Commission, Attn.: Neven F.
Stipanovic, Acting Assistant General
Counsel, 1050 First St. NE, Washington,
DC 20463. Each commenter must
provide, at a minimum, his or her first
name, last name, city, and state;
comments without this information will
not be accepted. All properly submitted
comments, including attachments, will
become part of the public record, and
the Commission will make comments
available for public viewing on the
Commission’s website and in the
Commission’s Public Records Office.
Accordingly, commenters should not
provide in their comments any
information that they do not wish to
make public, such as a home street
address, personal email address, date of
birth, phone number, social security
number, or driver’s license number, or
any information that is restricted from
disclosure, such as trade secrets or
commercial or financial information
that is privileged or confidential.
ADDRESSES:
AGENCY:
ACTION:
proposed changes to the definition of
‘‘public communication.’’ The
Commission has not made any final
decisions on any of the issues or
proposals presented in this rulemaking.
Mr.
Neven F. Stipanovic, Acting Assistant
General Counsel, or Ms. Jessica
Selinkoff, Attorney, (202) 694–1650 or
(800) 424–9530.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
The
Commission is proposing to revise its
regulations at 11 CFR 100.26 and 110.11
regarding disclaimers on
communications placed for a fee on the
internet. The Commission may provide
illustrative examples on the
Commission’s website during the
comment period.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
A. Rulemaking History
1. Definition of ‘‘Public
Communication’’
The Commission published a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (‘‘Technology
NPRM’’) in the Federal Register on
November 2, 2016.1 The Technology
NPRM comment period ended on
December 2, 2016. The Commission
received four comments in response to
the Technology NPRM.2
One of the proposals in the
Technology NPRM was to update the
definition of ‘‘public communication’’ at
11 CFR 100.26. Section 100.26 currently
defines ‘‘public communication’’ as
excluding all internet communications,
‘‘other than communications placed for
a fee on another person’s website.’’
When the Commission promulgated this
definition in 2006, it focused on
websites because that was the
predominant means of paid internet
advertising at the time. The Commission
analogized paid advertisements on
websites to the forms of mass
communication enumerated in the
definition of ‘‘public communication’’
in the Federal Election Campaign Act,
52 U.S.C. 30101–46 (‘‘the Act’’), because
‘‘each lends itself to distribution of
content through an entity ordinarily
owned or controlled by another
person.’’ internet Communications, 71
FR 18589, 18594 (Apr. 12, 2006) (‘‘2006
internet E&J’’); 52 U.S.C. 30101(22).
The Commission proposed to update
the definition by adding
communications placed for a fee on
another person’s ‘‘internet-enabled
device or application.’’ The purpose of
the proposed change was to reflect post2006 changes in internet technology 3—
1 Technological Modernization, 81 FR 76416
(Nov. 2, 2016).
2 The Commission also received four comments
in response an earlier stage of the technology
rulemaking. See Technological Modernization, 78
FR 25635 (May 2, 2013). To review those proposals
and other Commission rulemaking documents,
including comments received, visit https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?pid=84652.
3 See Amy Schatz, In Hot Pursuit of the Digital
Voter, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 2012, www.wsj.com/
articles/SB1000142405270230381290457729982006
4048072 (showing screenshots of 2012 presidential
committee advertisements on Hulu and noting
another campaign’s purchase of advertisements on
Pandora internet radio); Tanzina Vega, The Next
Political Battleground: Your Phone, CNN (May 29,
2015, 6:44 a.m.), www.cnn.com/2015/05/29/
politics/2016-presidential-campaigns-mobiletechnology (noting that ‘‘voters should expect more
political ads as they scroll through their phones
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
such as the development of mobile
applications (‘‘apps’’) on smartphones
and tablets, smart TV devices,
interactive gaming dashboards, e-book
readers, and wearable network-enabled
devices such as smartwatches and
headsets—and to make the regulatory
text more adaptable to the development
of future technologies. The Commission
asked several questions about its
proposed change, including whether the
term ‘‘internet-enabled device or
application’’ is a sufficiently clear and
technically accurate way to refer to the
various media through which paid
internet communications can be sent
and received; whether there is a better
way to refer to them; and whether it
would help to provide examples of such
paid media.
The Commission received only one
comment in response to this aspect of
the Technology NPRM.4 The comment
generally supported the proposed
revision to the definition of ‘‘public
communication’’ in section 100.26.5
The Commission has decided to
reintroduce the proposed change to the
definition of ‘‘public communication’’
in this rulemaking for the limited
purpose of determining whether the
term ‘‘internet-enabled device or
application’’ is a sufficiently clear and
technically accurate way to refer to the
various media through which paid
internet communications can be sent
and received. The term is closely tied to
the internet communication disclaimer
requirements.6
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
2. Internet Communication Disclaimers
On October 13, 2011, the Commission
published in the Federal Register an
Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (‘‘ANPRM’’) soliciting
comment on whether to modify
disclaimer requirements at 11 CFR
110.11 for certain internet
communications, or to provide
next year—much as they’ll be bombarded with ads
on television,’’ including ads using geolocation to
target ‘‘potential voters who may have downloaded
the candidate’s app’’). Indeed, a recent study has
shown that 19% of Americans access the internet
exclusively or mostly through their smartphones as
opposed to desktop or laptop computers. See Pew
Research Ctr., U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, at 3
(2015), www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_
Smartphones_0401151.pdf.
4 See Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21,
Comment on REG 2013–01 (Technological
Modernization) (Dec. 2, 2016), https://sers.fec.gov/
fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354002.
5 The comment also urged the Commission to
amend 11 CFR 100.26 ‘‘to make clear that any
expenditure beyond a de minimis amount for
internet communications is not exempt from the
definition of ‘public communication.’’’ Id. at 2.
6 The definition of ‘‘public communication’’ is
also relevant to the coordination rules, 11 CFR
109.21(c), and financing limitations, e.g., 11 CFR
100.24(b)(3), 300.32(a)(1)–(2), 300.71.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
exceptions thereto, consistent with the
Act.7 The Commission received eight
comments in response. Six of the
commenters agreed that the Commission
should update the disclaimer rules
through a rulemaking, though
commenters differed on how the
Commission should do so.
On October 18, 2016, the Commission
solicited additional comment in light of
legal and technological developments
during the five years since the ANPRM
was published.8 The Commission
received six comments during the
reopened comment period, all but one
of which supported updating the
disclaimer rules. Commenters, however,
differed on whether the Commission
should allow modified disclaimers for
all online advertisements or exempt
paid advertisements on social media
platforms from the disclaimer
requirements.
On October 10, 2017, the Commission
again solicited additional comment in
light of recent legal, factual, and
technological developments.9 During
this reopened comment period, the
Commission received submissions from
149,772 commenters (including persons
who signed on to others’ comments), of
which 147,320 indicated support for
updating or strengthening the
disclaimer rules or other government
action; 2,262 indicated opposition to
such efforts; and 190 did not indicate a
discernable preference.10
7 See internet Communication Disclaimers, 76 FR
63567 (Oct. 13, 2011).
8 See internet Communication Disclaimers;
Reopening of Comment Period and Notice of
Hearing, 81 FR 71647 (Oct. 18, 2016). The
Commission postponed the hearing announced in
that notice because few commenters expressed
interest in participating. As noted above, the
Commission will hold a hearing on the proposals
in this notice on June 27, 2018.
9 See internet Communication Disclaimers;
Reopening of Comment Period, 82 FR 46937 (Oct.
10, 2017); see also internet Communication
Disclaimers; Extension of Comment Period, 82 FR
52863 (Nov. 15, 2017) (explaining Commission’s
extension of comment period for one business day
due to technological difficulties).
10 Commission staff read and categorized each
comment in one of three broad categories: Support,
oppose, or neutral. ‘‘Support’’ included comments
supporting more stringent disclaimer rules; favoring
‘‘transparency’’; opposing application of the small
items or impracticable exceptions to online
advertisements; opposing advertising by foreign
nationals; opposing Russian interference in the
2016 election; or supporting the ‘‘Honest Ads Act’’
or any of its components. See S. 1989, 115th Cong.
(2017). ‘‘Oppose’’ included comments opposing any
rulemaking; opposing more stringent disclaimer
rules; supporting application of the small items or
impracticable exceptions to online advertising;
supporting modified disclaimers in lieu of full
disclaimers; opposing any restriction of speech,
‘‘infringement’’ of constitutional rights, or
‘‘censorship’’; or reminding the Commission to read
the Constitution. ‘‘Neutral’’ included comments
recognizing the value of disclaimers, but noting the
difficulty of providing disclaimers online;
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12865
After considering the comments from
all three comment periods and
additional deliberation, the Commission
now seeks comment on the proposed
changes described in this notice. Other
than the issues specified in this notice,
the Commission does not, in this
rulemaking, propose changes to any
other rules adopted by the Commission
in the internet Communications
rulemaking of 2006.
B. Current Statutory and Regulatory
Framework Concerning Disclaimers
A ‘‘disclaimer’’ is a statement that
must appear on certain communications
to identify who paid for it and, where
applicable, whether the communication
was authorized by a candidate. 52
U.S.C. 30120(a); 11 CFR 110.11; see also
Disclaimers, Fraudulent Solicitations,
Civil Penalties, and Personal Use of
Campaign Funds, 67 FR 76962, 76962
(Dec. 13, 2002) (‘‘2002 Disclaimer E&J’’).
The Supreme Court has recognized that
disclaimer requirements may burden
political speech, and thus must bear a
substantial relation to a sufficiently
important governmental interest. See
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310,
366–67 (2010) (‘‘Citizens United’’)
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64,
66 (1976) (‘‘Buckley’’)).
The Court has found that the
government’s interest in mandating
such disclaimers justifies the
accompanying burden on political
speech. For example, in approving the
disclaimers at issue in Citizens United,
the Court explained, ‘‘[d]isclaimer and
disclosure requirements may burden the
ability to speak, but they impose no
ceiling on campaign-related activities
and do not prevent anyone from
speaking. The Court has subjected these
requirements to exacting scrutiny,
which requires a substantial relation
between the disclosure requirement and
a sufficiently important governmental
interest.’’ Id. (internal quotation marks
and alterations removed). The Court
also held that disclaimers ‘‘provide the
electorate with information and insure
that the voters are fully informed about
the person or group who is speaking,’’
and stated that identifying the sources
of advertising enables people ‘‘to
evaluate the arguments to which they
are being subjected.’’ Id. at 368 (internal
quotations and alterations removed).
recommending modified disclaimers in some, but
not all, circumstances; appearing to make
contradictory statements in support or opposition;
presenting unclear statements of preferred action,
such as ‘‘do the right thing’’; or commenting off
topic, such as on net neutrality. Comments
addressing specific aspects of the current or
proposed rules are discussed below, as appropriate.
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
12866
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
With some exceptions, the Act and
Commission regulations require
disclaimers for public communications:
(1) Made by a political committee; (2)
that expressly advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified federal
candidate; or (3) that solicit a
contribution. 52 U.S.C. 30120(a); 11 CFR
110.11(a). Under existing regulations,
the term ‘‘public communication’’ does
not include internet communications
other than ‘‘communications placed for
a fee on another person’s website.’’ 11
CFR 100.26. In addition to these internet
public communications, ‘‘electronic
mail of more than 500 substantially
similar communications when sent by a
political committee . . . and all internet
websites of political committees
available to the general public’’ also
must have disclaimers. 11 CFR
110.11(a).
The content of the disclaimer that
must appear on a given communication
depends on who authorized and paid
for the communication. If a candidate,
an authorized committee of a candidate,
or an agent of either pays for and
authorizes the communication, then the
disclaimer must state that the
communication ‘‘has been paid for by
the authorized political committee.’’ 11
CFR 110.11(b)(l); see also 52 U.S.C.
30120(a)(1). If a public communication
is paid for by someone else, but is
authorized by a candidate, an
authorized committee of a candidate, or
an agent of either, then the disclaimer
must state who paid for the
communication and that the
communication is authorized by the
candidate, an authorized committee of
the candidate, or an agent of either. 11
CFR 110.11(b)(2); see also 52 U.S.C.
30120(a)(2). If the communication is not
authorized by a candidate, an
authorized committee of a candidate, or
an agent of either, then the disclaimer
must ‘‘clearly state the full name and
permanent street address, telephone
number, or World Wide Web address of
the person who paid for the
communication, and that the
communication is not authorized by any
candidate or candidate’s committee.’’ 11
CFR 110.11(b)(3); see also 52 U.S.C.
30120(a)(3).
Every disclaimer ‘‘must be presented
in a clear and conspicuous manner, to
give the reader, observer, or listener
adequate notice of the identity’’ of the
communication’s sponsor. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(1). While the Act and
Commission regulations impose specific
requirements for communications that
are ‘‘printed’’ or that appear on radio or
television, they do not specify
additional requirements for disclaimers
on internet advertisements. Compare 11
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
CFR 110.11(c)(1) (general ‘‘clear and
conspicuous’’ requirement for all
disclaimers), with 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)–
(4) (additional requirements for printed,
radio, and television disclaimers) and
52 U.S.C. 30120(c)–(d) (specifications
for printed, radio, and television
disclaimers).
Commission regulations set forth
limited exceptions to the general
disclaimer requirements. For example,
disclaimers are not required for
communications placed on ‘‘[b]umper
stickers, pins, buttons, pens, and similar
small items upon which the disclaimer
cannot be conveniently printed.’’ 11
CFR 110.11(f)(1)(i) (‘‘small items
exception’’). Nor are disclaimers
required for ‘‘[s]kywriting, water towers,
wearing apparel, or other means of
displaying an advertisement of such a
nature that the inclusion of a disclaimer
would be impracticable.’’ 11 CFR
110.11(f)(1)(ii) (‘‘impracticable
exception’’).
C. Application of the Disclaimer
Requirements to Internet
Communications
1. Development of Current Rule That
Paid Internet Advertisements Require
Disclaimers
The Commission first addressed
disclaimers on internet communications
in two 1995 advisory opinions regarding
the application of the Act to internet
solicitations of campaign contributions.
See Advisory Opinion 1995–35
(Alexander for President); Advisory
Opinion 1995–09 (NewtWatch PAC).11
The Commission determined that
internet solicitations are ‘‘general public
political advertising’’ 12 and, as such,
they ‘‘are permissible under the [Act]
provided that certain requirements,
including the use of appropriate
disclaimers, are met.’’ Advisory Opinion
1995–35 (Alexander for President) at 2
(characterizing conclusion in Advisory
Opinion 1995–09 (NewtWatch PAC)).
Later that year, the Commission stated
in a rulemaking that ‘‘internet
communications and solicitations that
constitute general public political
advertising require disclaimers,’’ adding
that ‘‘[t]hese communications and
others that are indistinguishable in all
material aspects from those addressed in
[Advisory Opinion 1995–09
(NewtWatch PAC)] will now be subject
to’’ the disclaimer requirement. See
11 Documents related to Commission advisory
opinions are available on the Commission’s website
at www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisory-opinions/.
12 At the time, 11 CFR 110.11 explicitly applied
to ‘‘general public political advertising.’’ The
current rule uses the term ‘‘public communication’’
as defined at 11 CFR 100.26, which includes
‘‘general public political advertising.’’
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Communications Disclaimer
Requirements, 60 FR 52069, 52071 (Oct.
5, 1995).
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002, Public Law 107–155, 116 Stat.
81 (2002) (‘‘BCRA’’), added specificity
to the disclaimer requirements
(including ‘‘stand by your ad’’
requirements for certain radio and
television communications), expanded
the scope of communications covered
by the disclaimer requirements, and
defined a new term, ‘‘public
communication,’’ that did not reference
the internet. See 52 U.S.C. 30101(22),
30120; see also 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67
FR at 76962. The Commission
promulgated rules to implement BCRA’s
changes to the disclaimer provisions of
the Act and the new statutory definition
of ‘‘public communication.’’ See 2002
Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR at 76962;
Prohibited and Excessive Contributions:
Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money, 67
FR 49064, 49111 (July 29, 2002) (‘‘NonFederal Funds E&J’’). The 2002 rules
incorporated the term ‘‘public
communication’’ to describe the general
reach of the disclaimer rules and
applied the disclaimer requirements to
political committees’ websites and
distribution of more than 500
substantially similar unsolicited emails.
Other than these two specific types of
internet-based activities by political
committees, however, internet
communications were excluded from
the regulatory definition of ‘‘public
communication’’ and, therefore, outside
the scope of the disclaimer requirements
that apply to public communications.
See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR at
76963–64; Non-Federal Funds E&J, 67
FR at 49111.
In 2006, after a court challenge to the
regulatory definition of ‘‘public
communication,’’ the Commission
revised its rules to include internet
communications ‘‘placed for a fee on
another person’s website’’ in the
definition of ‘‘public communication’’
and, therefore, within the scope of the
disclaimer rule. See 2006 internet E&J,
71 FR at 18594; see also Shays v. FEC,
337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004)
(holding, among other things, that
Commission could not wholly exclude
internet activity from the definition of
‘‘public communication’’). The
Commission explained that, under the
revised definition, ‘‘when someone such
as an individual, political committee,
labor organization or corporation pays a
fee to place a banner, video, or pop-up
advertisement on another person’s
website, the person paying makes a
‘public communication.’’’ 2006 internet
E&J, 71 FR at 18593–94. Furthermore,
the Commission explained that ‘‘the
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
placement of advertising on another
person’s website for a fee includes all
potential forms of advertising, such as
banner advertisements, streaming video,
popup advertisements, and directed
search results.’’ 13 Id.; see also id. at
18608 n.52 (noting that, as used in a
different context, ‘‘terms ‘website’ and
‘any internet or electronic publication’
are meant to encompass a wide range of
existing and developing technology’’
including ‘‘social networking
software’’). Thus, since 2006,
Commission regulations have required
disclaimer information to be included in
certain paid internet advertisements.
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
2. Application of Disclaimer Rule to
‘‘Small’’ Internet Communications
The Commission has been asked on a
number of occasions about the
application of the disclaimer
requirement to internet
communications, including small,
character- or space-limited internet
communications such as banner
advertisements; social media text, video,
or image advertisements; and directed
search results. The queries center on
whether the communications are
exempt from the disclaimer
requirements under the impracticable or
small items exceptions at 11 CFR
110.11(f)(1) or whether they may
incorporate technological modifications
to satisfy the disclaimer requirements.14
The Commission has applied the
small items exception to the general
disclaimer requirements in situations
where there are ‘‘technological
limitations on both the size and the
length of information’’ that can be
contained based on the small physical
size of the item or an external
technological constraint. Advisory
Opinion 2007–33 (Club for Growth
PAC) at 3 (declining to extend small
items exception to spoken disclaimer
13 But ‘‘when the search results are displayed as
a result of the normal function of a search engine,
and not based on any payment for the display of
a result, the search results are not forms of ‘general
public political advertising,’ ’’ and ‘‘where a search
engine returns a website hyperlink in its normal
course, and features the same hyperlink separately
as the result of a paid sponsorship arrangement, the
latter is a ‘public communication’ while the former
is not.’’ 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR at 18594 n.28.
14 See Advisory Opinion 2017–12 (Take Back
Action Fund); Advisory Opinion 2010–19 (Google);
see also Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2013–18 (Revolution Messaging) (Sept. 11,
2013); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2011–09 (Facebook) (Apr. 26, 2011). In
addition to the advisory opinion requests
concerning internet advertisements, another
advisory opinion request asked the Commission to
apply the impracticable exception in support of
truncating a political committee’s name in
disclaimers on its mass emails and on its website.
See Advisory Opinion 2013–13 (Freshman Hold’em
JFC et al.) at n.4.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
requirement); see also Advisory
Opinion 1980–42 (Hart for Senate
Campaign Committee) (applying the
exception to concert tickets); Advisory
Opinion 2002–09 (Target Wireless)
(applying the exception to characterlimited ‘‘short message service,’’ or
SMS, communications distributed
through a non-internet-based wireless
telecommunications network); 11 CFR
110.11(f)(1)(i). In the Target Wireless
advisory opinion, the Commission
considered whether disclaimers were
required on paid content distributed via
SMS communications through a noninternet-based wireless
telecommunications network. At the
time the Commission issued that
advisory opinion, technology limited
SMS content to 160 text-only characters
per message; SMS messages could not
include images; wireless telephone
carriers contractually required
consumers to pay a flat fee for a certain
number of SMS messages that
consumers could receive; and content
longer than 160 text characters would be
sent over multiple messages, which
might not be received consecutively.
Advisory Opinion 2002–09 (Target
Wireless) at 2. The Commission
concluded that the small items
exception applied to paid SMS
messages, noting ‘‘that the SMS
technology places similar limits on the
length of a political advertisement as
those that exist with bumper stickers.’’
Id. at 4.
The Commission has not exempted
any disclaimers under the small items
exception in the 15 years since it issued
the Target Wireless advisory opinion.
The Commission discussed the small
items exception in Advisory Opinion
2007–33 (Club for Growth PAC), which
concerned whether an advertiser could
‘‘dispense with’’ or ‘‘truncate’’ the
required disclaimers in 10- and 15second television advertisements. The
Commission concluded that the
advertisements did not qualify for the
small items exception.
The related impracticable exception at
11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(ii) exempts from the
disclaimer requirement advertisements
displayed via skywriting, water towers,
and wearing apparel, as well as ‘‘other
means of displaying an advertisement of
such a nature that the inclusion of a
disclaimer would be impracticable.’’
The list of communications in the rule
is not exhaustive. The Commission has
not, however, applied the impracticable
exception to a situation beyond those
listed in section 110.11(f)(1)(ii). See
Advisory Opinion 2007–33 (Club for
Growth PAC) (determining that
‘‘physical or technological limitations’’
in 10- and 15-second television
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12867
advertisements do not qualify for
impracticable exception); Advisory
Opinion 2004–10 (Metro Networks)
(determining that ‘‘live read’’ traffic
report sponsorship messages, delivered
by reporters from mobile units and
aircraft, did not present ‘‘specific
physical and technological limitations’’
to qualify for impracticable exception);
see also Advisory Opinion 2013–13
(Freshman Hold’em JFC et al.) at n.4
(concluding that ‘‘emails and web pages
. . . are not electronic communications
in which the inclusion of disclaimers
may be inherently impracticable.’’).
Nonetheless, in Advisory Opinion
2004–10 (Metro Networks), the
Commission recognized that, although
the ‘‘physical and technological
limitations’’ of a communication
medium may ‘‘not make it impracticable
to include a disclaimer at all,’’
technological or physical limitations
may extend to ‘‘one particular aspect of
the disclaimer’’ requirements. Advisory
Opinion 2004–10 (Metro Networks) at 3.
In such circumstances, the Commission
concluded that a disclaimer was
required but permitted modifications or
adaptations of the technologically or
physically limited aspects of the
communication medium. See id. at 3–4
(concluding that reporters reading
sponsorship message live from aircraft
or mobile units could read stand by
your ad language, rather than candidate
who was not physically present).
The Commission was first asked to
apply the small items exception or
impracticable exception to text-limited
internet advertisements in 2010. Google
proposed to sell AdWords search
keyword advertisements limited to 95
text characters; the proposed
advertisements would not include
disclaimers but would link to a landing
page (the purchasing political
committee’s website) on which users
would see a disclaimer. See Advisory
Opinion 2010–19 (Google). The
Commission concluded that Google’s
proposed AdWords program ‘‘under the
circumstances described . . . [was] not
in violation of the Act or Commission
regulations,’’ but the advisory opinion
did not answer whether Google
AdWords ads would qualify for the
small items or impracticable exception.
Id. at 2.
In response to two subsequent
advisory opinion requests concerning
the possible application of the small
items exception or impracticable
exception to small internet
advertisements, the Commission was
unable to issue advisory opinions by the
required four affirmative votes. See
Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2011–09 (Facebook) (Apr. 26,
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
12868
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
2011) (concerning application of
exceptions to zero-to-160 text character
ads with thumbnail size images);
Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2013–18 (Revolution
Messaging) (Sept. 11, 2013) (concerning
application of exceptions to mobile
banner ads).
Finally, the Commission considered
an advisory opinion request in 2017
asking whether paid image and video
ads on Facebook ‘‘must . . . include all,
some, or none of the disclaimer
information specified by 52 U.S.C.
30120(a).’’ Advisory Opinion Request at
4, Advisory Opinion 2017–12 (Take
Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017). The
Commission issued an opinion
concluding that the proposed Facebook
image and video advertisements ‘‘must
include all of the disclaimer
information’’ specified by the Act, but,
in reaching this conclusion,
Commissioners relied on two different
rationales, neither of which garnered the
required four affirmative votes.
Advisory Opinion 2017–12 (Take Back
Action Fund) at 1.
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
D. Proposed Revision to the Definition
of ‘‘Public Communication’’ at 11 CFR
100.26
As discussed above, the Commission
proposed in the Technology NPRM to
revise the definition of ‘‘public
communication’’ in 11 CFR 100.26 to
include communications placed for a
fee on another person’s ‘‘internetenabled device or application,’’ in
addition to communications placed for
a fee on another person’s website.
Disclaimers are required for any ‘‘public
communication’’ that contains express
advocacy or solicits a contribution, and
for all public communications by
political committees. The Commission
wants to make sure that any change to
the definition of ‘‘public
communication’’ in 11 CFR 100.26 is
appropriate as applied in the disclaimer
rule, given the complexities of internet
advertising and the rapid pace of
technological change.
Commenters in this rulemaking have
offered insight into, as one described it,
the ‘‘myriad of options for advertising
via different media and different
platforms online.’’ 15 Since the
Commission’s 2006 internet rulemaking,
the focus of internet activity has shifted
from blogging, websites, and listservs 16
15 Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 9 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358503.
16 2006 Internet E&J at 18590–91; see also Asian
Americans Advancing Justice, et al., Comment at 5
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=371144 (‘‘In 2006, blogging
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
to social media networks (Facebook,
Twitter, and LinkedIn), media sharing
networks (YouTube, Instagram, and
Snapchat), streaming applications
(Netflix, Hulu), and mobile devices and
applications. Other significant
developments include augmented and
virtual reality 17 and the ‘‘Internet of
Things’’: Wearable devices (smart
watches, smart glasses), home devices
(Amazon Echo), virtual assistants (Siri,
Alexa), smart TVs and other smart home
appliances.18 One commenter noted,
‘‘[a]s consumers move toward virtual
and augmented reality services,
wearable technology, screenless
assistants, and other emerging
technologies, there is every reason to
predict that advertisers will demand the
ability to reach voters and customers on
those technologies, and, in turn, new
advertising configurations that have not
yet been imagined will be
developed.’’ 19
Accordingly, the Commission is
reopening the definition of ‘‘public
communication’’ in 11 CFR 100.26 for
the limited purpose of determining
whether revising the definition to
include communications placed for a
fee on another person’s ‘‘internetenabled device or application,’’ in
addition to communications placed for
a fee on another person’s website,
would be a clear and technically
accurate way to refer to the various
media through which paid internet
communications can be and will be sent
and received. The Commission invites
comment on this proposal. Is it clear
from the proposed language that both
the placement-for-a-fee requirement and
the third-party requirement would
apply to websites, internet-enabled
devices, and internet applications? In
this rulemaking, the Commission is not
considering any change to the definition
of ‘‘public communication’’ other than
the terminology that should replace
‘‘website’’ as used in the definition.
E. Proposed Revision to the Disclaimer
Rules at 11 CFR 110.11
Technological developments over the
past 15 years have rendered much
current internet advertising
distinguishable from the non-internetbased SMS advertisements to which the
Commission applied the small items
exception in Advisory Opinion 2002–09
was at its height, and it seemed as if everyone
would have his or her own blog.’’).
17 See Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 9.
18 See Asian Americans Advancing Justice, et al.,
Comment at 7 (also noting potential for political
advertising on ‘‘smart refrigerators’’).
19 Google, Comment at 4–5 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358482.
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
(Target Wireless) and from the internet
advertisements the Commission
considered in promulgating the
disclaimer regulations in 2002. As
Facebook explained in a comment on
this rulemaking, ‘‘[w]hen Facebook
submitted its request for an advisory
opinion in 2011, ads on Facebook were
small and had limited space for text. Ad
formats available on Facebook have
expanded dramatically since that
time.’’ 20 Indeed, many internet
advertisements today include video,
audio, and graphic components in
addition to the text components
considered in the Target Wireless
advisory opinion. See, e.g., Advisory
Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion
2017–12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct.
31, 2017). Moreover, today, commercial
internet advertisements are subject to
other federal regulatory disclosure
regimes.21 Are the different degrees of
First Amendment protection afforded
political speech as opposed to
commercial speech relevant to any
consideration of other agencies’
disclosure regimes? 22
As noted above, the Commission’s
regulations have required disclaimer
information to be included in certain
paid internet advertisements since 2006.
Spending on digital political advertising
grew almost eightfold just between 2012
and 2016, from $159 million to $1.4
20 Facebook noted that some of its ads ‘‘continue
to be limited in size, with text limitations or
truncations based on format and placement of the
ad,’’ but that other formats ‘‘allow for additional
creative flexibility.’’ Facebook, Comment at 3 (Nov.
13, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358468 (citing Facebook, Facebook Ads
Guide, https://www.facebook.com/business/adsguide (last visited Mar. 15, 2018)); see also Fidji
Simo, An Update on Facebook Ads, Facebook
Newsroom (June 6, 2013), https://newsroom.fb.com/
news/2013/06/an-update-on-facebook-ads/
(announcing reconfiguration of ad products);
Google, Comment at 3 (noting that the ‘‘types and
varieties of digital advertisements that political
advertisers create and place throughout the web has
grown exponentially since 2011.’’).
21 See CMPLY, Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358493 (noting that regulatory disclaimer
and disclosure requirements ‘‘have been addressed
in similar contexts for marketing, financial and
pharmaceutical, without those regulators exempting
disclosures in social media channels’’).
22 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (‘‘Discussion of
public issues and debate on the qualifications of
candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the
broadest protection to such political expression in
order ‘to assure (the) unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.’ ’’) (citation omitted);
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011)
(‘‘[G]overnment’s legitimate interest in protecting
consumers from ‘commercial harms’ explains ‘why
commercial speech can be subject to greater
governmental regulation than noncommercial
speech’ ’’) (citations omitted); Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 329 (‘‘[P]olitical speech . . . is central to the
meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.’’).
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
billion.23 Many commenters expressed
the view that the need for internet
communication disclaimers has grown
along with spending on internet
political advertising.24 As one
commenter wrote, ‘‘[T]he increasing
prominence of online election
expenditures makes the failure to
update campaign finance laws to
adequately cover the internet more
dangerous with every cycle.’’ 25 The
dramatic growth in political advertising
on the internet highlights the need for
regulatory clarity in this area. As one
commenter noted, ‘‘[w]hatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution
to ever-advancing technology, the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the
press, like the First Amendment’s
command, do not vary when a new and
different medium for communication
appears.’’ 26 Other commenters noted
that the importance and value of
political advertising disclaimers do not
vary when new forms of communication
emerge.27
Thus, the Commission is proposing to
add regulatory provisions clarifying, for
various types of paid internet public
communications, the disclaimers
required and, in certain circumstances,
when a paid internet communication
may employ a modified approach to the
disclaimer requirements.
As explained below, the Commission
offers two proposals. They differ in
approach.
Alternative A proposes to apply the
full disclaimer requirements that now
apply to radio and television
communications to public
communications distributed over the
internet with audio or video
components. Alternative A also
23 See Borrell Associates, The Final Analysis:
Political Advertising in 2016, https://www.borrell
associates.com/industry-papers/free-summaries/
borrell-2016-political-advertising-analysis-execsum-jan-2017-detail (subscription required).
24 See, e.g., Sunlight Foundation, Comment at 1
(Nov. 13, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=360854 (‘‘The FEC and
Congress should act to ensure disclosures and
disclaimers are neither discretionary nor uneven
. . . [D]isclaimers and disclosures don’t mean
renouncing business or chilling speech, any more
than has been the case for TV or radio stations.’’).
25 Brennan Center for Justice, Comment at 3 (Nov.
13, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358487.
26 Institute for Free Speech, Comment at 3 (Nov.
9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358495 (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs.
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)).
27 See, e.g., BMore Indivisible, Comment at 5
(Nov. 9, 2017) https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=358504 (stating that
‘‘[p]roviding disclaimers o[n] internet and app
advertising is an extension of the role the FEC has
historically performed for traditional media. Online
media advertising transparency is increasingly
essential as Americans turn to the internet as their
primary source of information’’).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
proposes to apply the type of disclaimer
requirements that now apply to printed
public communications to text and
graphic public communications
distributed over the internet. Finally,
Alternative A would allow certain small
text or graphic public communications
distributed over the internet to satisfy
the disclaimer requirements through an
‘‘adapted disclaimer.’’
Alternative B proposes to treat
internet communications differently
from communications in traditional
media. Alternative B would require
disclaimers on internet communications
to be clear and conspicuous and to meet
the same general content requirement as
other disclaimers, without imposing the
additional disclaimer requirements that
apply to print, radio, and television
communications. Alternative B also
proposes to allow certain paid internet
advertisements to satisfy the disclaimer
requirements through an adapted
disclaimer, depending on the amount of
space or time necessary for a clear and
conspicuous disclaimer as a percentage
of the overall advertisement. In the
event that an advertisement could not
provide a disclaimer even through a
technological mechanism, Alternative B
proposes to create an exception to the
disclaimer requirement specifically for
paid internet advertisements.
The Commission requests comment
on all elements of both proposals. The
two proposals need not be considered as
fixed alternatives; commenters are
encouraged to extract the best elements
of each, or suggest improvements or
alternatives, to help the Commission
fashion the best possible rule.
1. Proposed Disclaimer Requirements
for Communications Distributed Over
the Internet—Organization
Both Alternative A and Alternative B
propose to add new paragraph (c)(5) to
11 CFR 110.11. New paragraph (c)(5) in
each proposal would provide specific
disclaimer requirements for internet
communications. This approach would
be consistent with the current structure
of the disclaimer rule at 11 CFR 110.11,
which categorizes disclaimer
requirements by the form of
communication on which they appear.
In the first paragraph of Alternative
B’s proposed section (c)(5), Alternative
B proposes to define the term ‘‘internet
communications.’’ Alternative A does
not propose to introduce or define this
term. Alternative B’s proposed
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A) defines ‘‘internet
communications’’ as email of more than
500 substantially similar
communications when sent by a
political committee; internet websites of
political committees available to the
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12869
general public; and ‘‘internet public
communications’’ as defined in
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B). Alternative B’s
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) defines
‘‘internet public communication,’’ in
turn, as any communication placed for
a fee on another person’s website or
internet-enabled device or application.
Alternative B’s proposed definition of
‘‘internet communication’’ is intended
to capture all communications
distributed via the internet that are
subject to the disclaimer requirement.
See 11 CFR 110.11(a)(1)–(3). Alternative
B’s proposed definition of ‘‘internet
public communication’’ is intended to
capture all online ‘‘public
communications,’’ as defined in 11 CFR
100.26. Are the proposed definitions
sufficiently broad to encompass new
technologies? Are they platformneutral? Should the definition of
‘‘internet public communication’’
include a reference to virtual reality,
social networking, or internet platforms?
Both Alternative A and Alternative B
propose to define additional terms:
‘‘adapted disclaimer,’’ ‘‘technological
mechanism,’’ and ‘‘indicator.’’ These
terms are discussed below.
2. Disclaimer Requirements for Video
and Audio Communications Distributed
Over the Internet
As described below, Alternative A
proposes to extend the specific
requirements for disclaimers on radio
and television communications to
public communications distributed over
the internet with audio or video
components. Under Alternative A, such
audio and video internet public
communications would also be required
to satisfy the general requirements that
apply to all public communications
requiring disclaimers. Alternative B
likewise proposes to require that radio
and television communications
distributed over the internet must
satisfy the general requirements that
apply to all public communications
requiring disclaimers. Alternative B
would not extend any additional
disclaimer requirements to such
communications.
a. Alternative A—Proposed 11 CFR
110.11(c)(5)(ii)
As noted above, the Act and
Commission regulations impose specific
requirements for disclaimers on radio
and television communications. See 52
U.S.C. 30120(d); 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)–
(4). These requirements vary, depending
on whether a candidate or another
person pays for or authorizes the
communication.
Radio communications paid for or
authorized by a candidate must include
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
12870
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
an audio statement spoken by the
candidate, identifying the candidate and
stating that the candidate has approved
the communication. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(3)(i). Radio communications
that are not paid for or authorized by a
candidate must include an audio
statement identifying the person paying
for the communication and that that
person ‘‘is responsible for the content of
this advertising.’’ 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4)(i).
Television, broadcast, cable, or
satellite communications paid for or
authorized by a candidate must include
a statement by the candidate,
identifying the candidate and stating
that the candidate has approved the
communication, either through a fullscreen view of the candidate making the
statement or by a voice-over
accompanied by a ‘‘clearly identifiable
photographic or similar image’’ of the
candidate; these communications must
also include a similar statement ‘‘in
clearly readable writing’’ at the end of
the communication. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(3)(ii)–(iii). Television,
broadcast, cable, or satellite
communications that are not paid for or
authorized by a candidate must include
the audio statement required by 11 CFR
110.11(c)(4)(i) and conveyed by a ‘‘fullscreen view of a representative’’ of the
person making the statement or in a
voice-over by such person; these
communications must also include a
similar statement ‘‘in clearly readable
writing’’ at the end of the
communication. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(4)(ii)–(iii).28
As noted above, internet
advertisements may be in the form of
audio or video communications, or may
incorporate audio or video elements.29
Alternative A is based on the premise
that these advertisements are
indistinguishable from offline
28 The Commission previously extended the
‘‘stand by your ad’’ requirements to
communications transmitted through broadcast,
cable, or satellite transmission. See 2002 Disclaimer
E&J, 67 FR at 76963 (referring to ‘‘the Commission’s
judgment that it would be unsupportable to require
a disclaimer for a television communication that
was broadcast, while not requiring a disclaimer for
the same communication merely because it was
carried on cable or satellite’’).
29 See, e.g., 5 Advertising Trends from the 2016
Presidential Election, Pandora for Brands (Dec. 8,
2016), https://pandoraforbrands.com/insight/5advertising-trends-from-the-2016-presidentialelection (urging readers ‘‘[t]o learn how Pandora can
help amplify your next political campaign’’); Amy
Schatz, In Hot Pursuit of the Digital Voter, Wall St.
J., Mar. 23, 2012, www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014
24052702303812904577299820064048072 (showing
screenshots of 2012 presidential committee
advertisements on Hulu and noting another
campaign’s purchase of advertisements on Pandora
internet radio); see also Advisory Opinion Request
at 4, Advisory Opinion 2017–12 (Take Back Action
Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
advertisements that may be distributed
on radio or television, broadcast, cable,
or satellite in all respects other than the
medium of distribution.30 Moreover,
because the audio and video
components of internet communications
with these elements do not contain
‘‘character’’ restrictions, Alternative A
proposes to apply parameters to such
communications akin to the parameters
in which disclaimers must appear on
radio and television advertisements
rather than the conditions that may
constrain ‘‘printed’’ materials on which
a disclaimer must appear.
Accordingly, in Alternative A, the
Commission proposes to provide that
public communications distributed over
the internet with audio or video
components are treated, for purposes of
the disclaimer rules, the same as
‘‘radio’’ or ‘‘television’’
communications. The Commission, in
Alternative A, proposes to do so in
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii), which
would incorporate the existing
requirements at 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3) and
(4) that apply to radio, television,
broadcast, cable, and satellite
communications, because those
provisions have been in operation for 15
years and are, therefore, familiar to
persons paying for, authorizing, and
distributing communications. Moreover,
by applying the specifications for radio
and television communications to audio
and video communications distributed
over the internet, the proposed
regulations would ensure that internet
audio ads could air on radio and
internet video ads could air on
television without having to satisfy
different disclaimer requirements.
Alternative A’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(ii) would provide that a ‘‘public
communication distributed over the
30 See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Comment at 3 (Nov. 3, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/
fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358477 (urging
extension of broadcast communication disclaimer
requirements to ‘‘analogous’’ communication
online); Rep. John Sarbanes et al., Comment at 2
(Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=358505 (noting belief of 18
Members of Congress that ‘‘it is past time for the
Commission to take action to harmonize disclaimer
requirements for paid internet communications,
regardless of size, on internet platforms with
advertisements served on other media, such as
broadcast television or radio’’); accord 2006 Internet
E&J, 71 FR at 18609 (‘‘The Commission has
consistently viewed online, internet-based
dissemination of news stories, commentaries, and
editorials to be indistinguishable from offline
television and radio broadcasts, newspapers,
magazines and periodical publications for the
purposes of applying the media exemption under
the Act’’); but see Software and Information
Industry Association, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13,
2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358508 (‘‘Digital advertising is inherently
more diverse than a simple transition of similar
content from print or broadcast television.’’).
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
internet with audio but without video,
graphic, or text components’’ must
include the statement described in 11
CFR 110.11(c)(3)(i) and (iv) if authorized
by a candidate, or the statement
described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4) if not
authorized by a candidate.
Alternative A’s proposals concerning
audio communications (like Alternative
A’s proposals for video, text, and
graphic internet communications
discussed below) incorporate the term
‘‘public communication,’’ as it exists or
may be amended, to make clear that
these provisions neither expand nor
contract the scope of the disclaimer
rules set forth at 11 CFR 110.11(a). The
proposed reference to ‘‘a public
communication distributed over the
internet with an audio component but
without video, graphic, or text
components’’ (like the reference to the
‘‘internet’’ in Alternative A’s proposals
for video, text, and graphic internet
communications discussed below) is
intended to encompass advertisements
on websites as well as those distributed
on other internet-enabled or digital
devices or applications; for audio
internet advertisements, these would
include communications on podcasts,
internet radio stations, or app
channels.31 The proposed reference to a
‘‘public communication distributed over
the internet’’ is not intended to alter the
definition of ‘‘public communication,’’
as defined in 11 CFR 100.26. Is this
clear, or should the Commission include
a cross-reference in the regulatory text?
Moreover, so as to hew most closely to
the ‘‘radio’’ provisions that Alternative
A incorporates, the proposed
amendments regarding ‘‘audio’’ internet
communications are intended to apply
to those communications with only an
audio component. The Commission
proposes to address communications
with any ‘‘video, graphic, or text
components’’ separately, as explained
below.
Alternative A’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(ii) would also provide that a
‘‘public communication distributed over
the internet with a video component’’
must include the statement described in
11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(ii)–(iv) if authorized
by a candidate, or the statement
described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4) if not
authorized by a candidate.
Because this proposal is intended to
encompass video public
communications on websites, apps, and
streaming video services, Alternative
A’s proposed new paragraph (c)(5)(ii)
31 See Software and Information Industry
Association, Comment at 3 (‘‘in-app advertising has
become one of the fastest-growing mobile ad
mediums’’).
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
would apply to a video that a political
committee pays to run as a ‘‘pre-roll’’
video on the YouTube app or appear in
a promoted YouTube.com search result,
but would not apply to the same video
posted for free on YouTube.com (since
a communication not placed for a fee
would not be a ‘‘public
communication’’).32 Unlike traditional
television, broadcast, cable, or satellite
ads, however, video advertisements
placed online may include non-video
components such as separate text, or
graphic fields. The proposed rule
regarding internet video ads thus would
differ from the existing television,
broadcast, cable, and satellite provisions
in that the proposed rule would apply
even if the communication also
included non-video components.
This aspect of Alternative A would
not explicitly address small audio or
video internet ads. The Commission
proposes to take this approach to hew
Alternative A’s proposed rules on audio
and video ads as closely as possible to
the existing disclaimer provisions for
advertisements transmitted by radio,
television, broadcast, cable, and
satellite, which do not, in paragraphs
(c)(3) or (4), account for ‘‘small’’
advertisements. Should new technology
develop that would render the provision
of a disclaimer on a particular type of
audio or video internet communication
impracticable, the Commission
anticipates that, as with current TV and
radio ads, such circumstances could be
addressed in an advisory opinion
seeking to exempt such a
communication from the disclaimer
requirements.33
The Commission seeks comment as to
whether these proposals accurately
describe audio and video
communications over the internet,
regardless of the electronic or digital
platforms on which they may be
distributed. For example, does the
Commission need to clarify or expand
the term ‘‘internet’’? Similarly, does the
Commission need to clarify the term
‘‘video’’ to address whether an
advertisement with a GIF is a
communication ‘‘with a video
component’’ or one with a ‘‘graphic’’
component? Similarly, should the
Commission expressly include or
exclude from the term ‘‘video’’ static
(i.e., non-moving) paid digital
advertisements in dynamic (i.e.,
moving) environments such as
32 See Google, Comment at 3 (describing Google
ad products on YouTube).
33 See 11 CFR 112.1 (describing advisory opinion
requests); see also Advisory Opinion 2007–33 (Club
for Growth PAC) (considering and rejecting request
to apply small items exception to disclaimers in 10and 15-second television advertisements).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
‘‘billboard’’ ads inside interactive
gaming systems, or virtual-reality and
augmented-reality platforms? 34
The Commission also welcomes
comment on any aspect of these
proposals, including the approach
towards the exceptions and, more
generally, the advisability of treating
audio and video internet
communications in the manner that
radio, television, broadcast, cable, and
satellite communications are treated.
b. Alternative B—Proposed Paragraph
(c)(5)(ii)
The proposals in Alternative B are
premised on the internet as a ‘‘unique
medium of . . . communication[]’’ 35
that poses ‘‘unique challenges with
respect to advertising disclosures.’’ 36
Although advertisements on the internet
may often look or sound like television
or radio advertisements, several
commenters focused on the differences
between internet advertising and
advertising on more traditional forms of
media. As one stated, ‘‘[d]igital
advertising is inherently more diverse
than a simple transition of similar
content from print or broadcast
television. It comes in many different
formats presented across a wide range of
technology platforms with screen size
ranging from large to very small.’’ 37
Another commenter noted that, ‘‘[i]n
addition to character-limited ads that
just feature text, there are banner ads
with images and text, video ads with
text, and audio ads that also feature a
corresponding interactive image or
video on an app.’’ 38 A third commented
on the ‘‘nearly infinite range . . . of
possible combinations of hardware,
software, add-ons, screen sizes and
resolutions, individualized settings, and
other factors . . . can affect the display
of a political communication’’ on the
internet.39 ‘‘Content that is optimized
34 See, e.g., Steve Gorman, Obama Buys First
Video Game Campaign Ads, Reuters, Oct. 17, 2008,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politicsvideogames/obama-buys-first-video-gamecampaign-ads-idUSTRE49EAGL20081017 (showing
example of static court-side ad in dynamic
basketball gaming environment).
35 Public Citizen and Free Speech for People,
Comment at 3 (Nov. 1, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/
fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358485 (expressing the
view that ‘‘disclaimers on all forms of on-line paid
campaign advertising are practical and pose little
inconvenience’’ to sponsors or recipients); see also
id. at 1 (referring to ‘‘the unique medium of internet
communications’’ in urging Commission to proceed
with rulemaking).
36 Software & Information Industry Association,
Comment at 3.
37 Id.
38 Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 9.
39 Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 5
(Nov. 8, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=358499.
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12871
for viewing on phones, tablets, and
other mobile devices is distinct from
content that appears on a desktop or
laptop computer.’’ 40 The ‘‘ways people
physically interact with content also
vary by medium (e.g., a user can
‘rollover’ content on a desktop screen to
see more information, but may not use
a mouse or view rollovers on a mobile
device).’’ 41 In addition, internet
advertisements can vary significantly in
duration. Internet ads can last for as
little as ‘‘fifteen seconds . . . or even
shorter,’’ and entire ad campaigns can
last for as little as ‘‘a few days or just
a few hours for events like flash
sales.’’ 42 Moreover, ‘‘[p]aid advertising
on the internet is constantly evolving in
nature.’’ 43
Given the rapid pace of technological
change and an inability to forecast the
future, the revisions to the disclaimer
rules proposed in Alternative B are
intended to recognize the differences
between the internet and traditional
forms of media like newspapers, radio,
and television.44 Thus, Alternative B’s
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would
require disclaimers on internet
communications to meet the general
content requirements in 11 CFR
110.11(b) and the general ‘‘clear and
conspicuous’’ requirement of 11 CFR
110.11(c)(1), but not the additional
‘‘stand by your ad’’ requirements for
radio and television communications.45
40 Facebook,
Comment at 2.
41 Id.
42 Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 11.
43 Public Citizen and Free Speech for People,
Comment at 3; see also American Federation of
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, et
al., Comment at 2 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354341
(‘‘Since the technology of the internet is rapidly
changing, and will likely continue to do so
indefinitely, the Commission’s rules in this area
must be sufficiently flexible and principle-focused
so they do not become obsolete in short order.’’).
44 See Center for Competitive Politics, Comment
at 3 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=354344; see also Campaign
Solutions, Comment at 1 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=365826
(‘‘As new and disruptive technologies change the
way we interact with technology and consume
media, we are sometimes unable to anticipate the
format of political advertising.’’); Computer &
Communications Industry Association, Comment at
13 (‘‘Campaigns are constantly trying new methods
to appeal to new voters, and political campaign
communication and advertising methods change
with every election cycle. As technology develops,
new forms of advertising could become available.’’).
45 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment
at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=358498; see also Google,
Comment at 4 (‘‘unlike broadcast advertising, which
involves an advertiser providing a static
advertisement to the broadcaster that is the same ad
every time it airs, digital ads can be dynamic’’);
Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 4 (‘‘Any
internet-related regulations should afford speakers
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
Continued
26MRP1
12872
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
The Act requires all disclaimers to
provide payment and authorization
information, regardless of the form that
the communication may take, but
imposes additional ‘‘stand by your ad’’
requirements only on television and
radio communications.46 Does the
Commission have the legal authority to
extend those requirements to internet
communications? 47 If so, should the
Commission exercise that authority? Or,
as a practical matter, do the differences
between internet advertising and radio
and television advertising make the
‘‘stand by your ad’’ requirements a poor
fit for audio and video public
communications on the internet? Some
commenters in this rulemaking
indicated that the internet is a
continuously evolving advertising
medium with a wide range of platforms,
formats, displays, duration, and
interactivity. Are the ‘‘stand by your ad’’
requirements for television and radio
communications overly inflexible by
comparison? 48 For example, television
advertisements must have both spoken
and written disclaimers. One
commenter estimated that the spoken
disclaimer can take five or more seconds
to deliver,49 and the Act requires the
written disclaimer to appear ‘‘in a
clearly readable manner . . . for a
maximum flexibility in satisfying any applicable
disclaimer requirements, rather than being tied to
specific forms of communication that may become
superseded or outmoded.’’). But see supra n.30 and
comments cited therein.
46 Compare 52 U.S.C. 30120(d) (imposing ‘‘stand
by your ad’’ requirements on radio and television
communications only) with 30104 (requiring
Commission to make disclosure reports publicly
available on internet), 30112 (requiring Commission
to maintain central site on internet).
47 The recently introduced Honest Ads Act would
amend the Act by requiring, among other things,
disclaimers on internet communications to comply
with the same ‘‘stand by your ad’’ requirements as
radio and television communications. See S. 1989,
115th Cong. § 7(b) (2017).
48 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 30120(d)(1)(B) (requiring
television advertisement authorized by candidate to
provide disclaimer through ‘‘unobscured, fullscreen view of the candidate making the statement,
or the candidate in voice-over, accompanied by a
clearly identifiable photographic or similar image of
the candidate,’’ and ‘‘in writing at the end of the
communication in a clearly readable manner with
a reasonable degree of color contrast between the
background and the printed statement, for a period
of at least 4 seconds’’), 30120(d)(2) (requiring
television advertisement not authorized by
candidate to provide disclaimer ‘‘conveyed by an
unobscured, full-screen view of a representative of
the political committee or other person making the
statement, or by a representative of such political
committee or other person in voice-over, and shall
also appear in a clearly readable manner with a
reasonable degree of color contrast between the
background and the printed statement, for a period
of at least 4 seconds’’).
49 See Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 11.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
period of at least 4 seconds.’’ 50 Is it
reasonable to impose these requirements
on paid internet advertisements? 51
Should audio or video internet ads that
are very short be required to provide full
‘‘stand by your ad’’ disclaimer
information, as the Commission has
decided in the television advertising
context? 52 Does requiring a candidate or
other individual representing the payor
to claim responsibility for a
communication by image or voice-over
(as is currently required for radio and
television communications) impose an
additional burden on the person making
the communication? Is this the type of
obligation that courts have approved in
television and radio advertising? What
additional information, if any, does this
requirement convey to a reader, viewer,
or listener about the source of the
communication?
3. Disclaimer Requirements for Text and
Graphic Communications Distributed
Over the Internet
As described below, Alternative A
proposes to extend to text and graphic
public communications distributed over
the internet that lack any video
component the specific requirements for
disclaimers on printed public
communications. Under Alternative A,
such text and graphic public
communications would also be required
to satisfy the general requirements that
apply to all public communications
requiring disclaimers. Alternative B
proposes to require all public
communications distributed over the
internet, including text and graphic
public communications, to satisfy the
general requirements that apply to all
public communications requiring
disclaimers, and does not propose to
extend any additional disclaimer
requirements to such communications.
a. Alternative A
i. Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(i)
Internet advertisements may be in the
form of text, image, and other graphic
elements with audio but without video
50 52 U.S.C. 30120(d)(1)(B)(ii), (d)(2) (emphasis
added); see also 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(iii)(B),
(c)(4)(iii)(B).
51 See Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 11 (stating that audio
advertisements on internet ‘‘could be fifteen
seconds in length or even shorter’’ and urging
Commission to ‘‘avoid rigidly extending broadcast
radio spoken-word disclaimer requirements for
radio to online platforms’’).
52 See Advisory Opinion 2007–33 (Club for
Growth PAC) (requiring full stand-by-your-ad
disclaimers in 10- and 15-second television
advertisements).
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
components; such advertisements come
‘‘in all shapes and sizes.’’ 53
Alternative A proposes to adapt the
existing requirements at 11 CFR
110.11(c)(2) that apply to printed
communications because they have
been in operation for 15 years and are,
therefore, familiar to persons paying for,
authorizing, and distributing
communications.
Alternative A’s proposed new
paragraph (c)(5)(i) would provide that a
‘‘public communication distributed over
the internet with text or graphic
components but without any video
component’’ must contain a disclaimer
that is of ‘‘sufficient type size to be
clearly readable by the recipient of the
communication,’’ a requirement adapted
from 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(i). Alternative
A’s proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i) would
further specify this ‘‘text size’’
requirement by providing that a
‘‘disclaimer that appears in letters at
least as large as the majority of the other
text in the communication satisfies the
size requirement.’’ Finally, Alternative
A’s proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i) would
require that a disclaimer be displayed
‘‘with a reasonable degree of color
contrast between the background and
the text of the disclaimer,’’ a
requirement the proposal indicates
would be satisfied if the disclaimer ‘‘is
displayed in black text on a white
background or if the degree of color
contrast between the background and
the text of the disclaimer is no less than
the color contrast between the
background and the largest text used in
the communication.’’ These proposals
are adapted from 11 CFR
110.11(c)(2)(iii).
ii. Text or Graphic Internet
Communications With Video or Audio
Components
The proposal in Alternative A
regarding a public communication
distributed over the internet ‘‘with text
or graphic components but without any
video component’’ is intended to work
in conjunction with Alternative A’s
video proposal discussed above; under
the operation of both of these parts of
Alternative A, an internet
communication that contains both text
or graphic elements and a video
component would be subject only to the
specific disclaimer rules applicable to
television, broadcast, cable, and satellite
communications that are incorporated
into Alternative A’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(ii). The Commission seeks
53 Google, Comment at 5 (describing ad products
on the Google Display Network); see also Advisory
Opinion Request 2017–12 (Take Back Action Fund)
at 4.
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
comment on this proposal. In particular,
the Commission seeks comment
regarding how users interact with
internet advertisements that contain
both text or graphic and video elements.
Is it common for users to view only the
printed or video components of an
internet advertisement that contains
both? Should the Commission require
that such communications include at
least an adapted disclaimer, see below,
on the face of the text or graphic
element? Do such adapted disclaimers
provide adequate transparency? How
important is it for adapted disclaimers
to provide information sufficient to
identify the communication’s payor on
the communication’s face? Would a
hyperlink in a communication be a
reliable way to identify the payor or
could hyperlinks prove to be transient?
Could an indicator be used to defeat
disclosure by linking to, for example,
goo.gl/nRk1H1 at publication and then,
once a complaint is filed with the
Commission, to an actual political
committee’s website? Should the
Commission consider other approaches,
such as allowing political committees to
identify themselves in adapted
disclaimers with their FEC Committee
ID numbers? Should or could the
Commission require the hyperlinks on
the adapted disclaimers of political
committees to connect to the
committees’ fec.gov pages? 54 Should
the Commission adopt rules that require
a disclaimer to be included on either the
text and graphic portion or the video
portion of an internet advertisement, or
on both portions, depending on the
proportion of the advertisement that
contains each type of content?
Alternatively, should the rules allow an
advertiser the choice between the
‘‘television’’ or ‘‘text and graphic’’
communication disclaimer rules for an
internet communication that contains
both video and text or graphic
components?
Similarly, under the operation of the
‘‘text or graphic’’ and audio proposals in
Alternative A, an internet
communication that contains both text
and graphic elements and an audio, but
not a video, component, would be
subject to the specific disclaimer rules
applicable only to text or graphic
communications. Alternative A does not
propose to include such
communications in the proposed
‘‘audio’’ rules because such
advertisements appear more like text or
graphic communications than ‘‘radio’’
54 For example: https://www.fec.gov/data/
committee/C00580100/?tab=about-committee,
where ‘‘C00580100’’ is the organization’s
Committee ID.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
ones. The Commission seeks comment
on this proposal. In particular, and as
with the proposal above, the
Commission seeks comment regarding
how users interact with internet
advertisements that contain both text or
graphic and audio elements. Is it
common for users only to view the
printed components or listen to the
audio components of an internet
advertisement that contains both?
Should the Commission instead
consider such advertisements under the
‘‘audio’’ proposals discussed above?
Should the Commission require that
such communications include both
‘‘radio’’ and text or graphic disclaimers?
Should the Commission adopt rules that
require disclaimer to be included in
either the ‘‘text or graphic’’ or audio
portion of an internet advertisement, or
on both portions, depending on the
proportion of the advertisement that
contains each type of content?
Alternatively, should the rules allow an
advertiser the choice between the
‘‘radio’’ or ‘‘text or graphic’’
communication disclaimer rules for an
internet communication that contains
both audio and text or graphic
components?
iii. Text and Graphic Internet
Communication Disclaimer Text Size
Safe Harbor
Alternative A proposes to establish a
‘‘safe harbor’’ provision identifying
disclaimer text size—‘‘letters at least as
large as the majority of the other text in
the communication’’—that clearly
satisfies the rule. This would track the
current approach for ‘‘printed’’
materials. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67
FR 76965 (describing current 12-point
type safe harbor for printed
communication disclaimers); cf.
Advisory Opinion 1995–09 (NewtWatch
PAC) at 2 (approving disclaimer on
political committee’s website that was
‘‘printed in the same size type as much
of the body of the communication’’).
The Commission recognizes that some
text or graphic internet communications
may not have a ‘‘majority’’ text size. The
possible diversity of text sizes in
internet text and graphic
communications is, in this respect,
similar to text size diversity in printed
communications currently addressed in
11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(i). As the
Commission explained when adopting
the current safe harbor in lieu of a strict
size requirement, ‘‘the vast differences
in the potential size and manner of
display of larger printed
communications would render fixed
type-size examples ineffective and
inappropriate.’’ 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67
FR 76965. Thus, for internet
PO 00000
Frm 00010
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12873
communications with text or graphic
components that are not included in the
proposed text-size safe harbor, the
intent behind Alternative A is that
questions of whether a disclaimer is of
sufficient type size to be clearly
readable would be ‘‘determined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account
the vantage point from which the
communication is intended to be seen
or read as well as the actual size of the
disclaimer text,’’ as they are under the
current rule for printed materials. Id.
Would the use of metrics minimize the
need for case-by-case determinations?
b. Alternative B—Proposed 11 CFR
110.11(c)(5)(ii)
Alternative B proposes to treat
graphic, text, audio, and video
communications on the internet equally
for disclaimer purposes. Under
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) in
Alternative B, disclaimers for all such
communications would have to meet
the general content requirement of 11
CFR 110.11(b) and be ‘‘clear and
conspicuous’’ under 11 CFR
110.11(c)(1), including disclaimers for
graphic and text communications on the
internet. Thus, the disclaimers would
have to be ‘‘presented in a clear and
conspicuous manner, to give the reader,
observer, or listener adequate notice of
the identity of the person or political
committee that paid for and, where
required, that authorized the
communication,’’ 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1).
Under Alternative B, disclaimers could
not be difficult to read or hear, and their
placement could not be easily
overlooked. Id. Is Alternative B’s
proposal to treat internet
communications differently from print,
radio, and TV communications for
disclaimer purposes a reasonable
approach to address current internet
advertisements and future
developments in internet
communications?
Alternative B does not propose to
create any safe harbors. The intent
behind Alternative B is to establish
objective criteria that would cover all
situations and minimize the need for
case-by-case determinations. Would safe
harbors nonetheless be helpful in
interpreting and applying the proposed
rule? Or do safe harbors tend to become
the de facto legal standard applied in
advisory opinions and enforcement
actions?
4. Adapted Disclaimers for Public
Communications Distributed Over the
Internet
Alternatives A and B both propose
that some public communications
distributed over the internet may satisfy
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
12874
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
the disclaimer requirement by an
‘‘adapted disclaimer,’’ which includes
an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of
the communication in conjunction with
a technological mechanism that leads to
a full disclaimer, rather than by
providing a full disclaimer on the face
of the communication itself. Some
aspects of both proposals are similar,
and some are different, in ways
highlighted below.
The discussion in this section
explains the Commission’s alternative
proposals for when a public
communication distributed over the
internet may utilize an adapted
disclaimer. Alternative A allows the use
of an adapted disclaimer when a full
disclaimer cannot fit on the face of a
text or graphic internet communication
due to technological constraints.
Alternative B allows the use of an
adapted disclaimer when a full
disclaimer would occupy more than a
certain percentage of any internet public
communication’s available time or
space. Under Alternative B, the first tier
of an adapted disclaimer would require
the identification of the payor plus an
indicator on the face of the
communication. Alternative B’s second
tier adapted disclaimer would require
only an indicator on the face of the
communication.
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
a. Alternative A—Proposed 11 CFR
110.11(c)(5)(i)(A): When a
Communication May Use Technological
Adaptations
While current text and graphic
internet advertisements are akin in
many respects to analog printed
advertisements, material differences
between them remain. Most significant
among these differences are the
availability of ‘‘micro’’ sized text and
graphic internet advertisements and the
interactive capabilities of
advertisements over the internet.55 To
ensure the disclaimer rules remain
applicable to new forms of internet
advertising that may arise, while also
reducing the need for serial revisions to
Commission regulations in light of such
developments, Alternative A proposes
adopting a provision specifically
addressing those text and graphic
internet advertisements that cannot, due
to external character or space
constraints, practically include a full
55 See Public Citizen and Free Speech for People,
Comment at 3 (noting that paid online
communications by ‘‘bots’’ ‘‘can be very short and
seamlessly integrated into social conversations.
Absent disclaimers, such messages are not likely to
be perceived as paid messages’’); see also Spot-On,
Comment at 8 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/
fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358480 (noting that ‘‘all
[online] ads link to some sort of web page or
presence’’).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
disclaimer on the face of the
communication. See Advisory Opinion
2004–10 (Metro Networks) at 3
(concluding that modifications or
adaptations to disclaimers may be
permissible in light of technologically or
physically limited aspects of a
communication).
Accordingly, under Alternative A’s
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A), a
‘‘public communication distributed over
the internet with text or graphic
components but without any video
component’’ that, ‘‘due to external
character or space constraints,’’ cannot
fit a required disclaimer must include
an ‘‘adapted disclaimer.’’ This provision
would explain the circumstances under
which a communication may use
technological adaptations, describe how
the adaptations must be presented, and
provide examples of the adaptations.
Under Alternative A, the
determination of whether a public
communication distributed over the
internet with text or graphic
components but without any video
component cannot fit a full disclaimer
is intended to be an objective one. That
is, the character or space constraints
intrinsic to the technological medium
are intended to be the relevant
consideration, not the communication
sponsor’s subjective assessment of the
‘‘difficulty’’ or ‘‘burden’’ of including a
full disclaimer. As the Supreme Court
has held in the context of broadcast
advertisements, the government’s
informational interest is sufficient to
justify disclaimer requirements even
when a speaker claims that the
inclusion of a disclaimer ‘‘decreases
both the quantity and effectiveness of
the group’s speech.’’ Citizens United,
558 U.S. at 368. Alternative A is built
upon the proposition that the
informational interest relied upon by
the Supreme Court with respect to
broadcast communications is equally
implicated in the context of text and
graphic public communications
distributed over the internet.
Alternative A’s reference to ‘‘external
character or space constraints’’ is
intended to codify the approach to those
terms as the Commission has discussed
them in the context of the small items
and impracticable exceptions discussed
above. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion
2007–33 (Club for Growth PAC) at 3
(contrasting lack of ‘‘physical or
technological limitations’’ constraining
10- and 15-second television
advertisements with ‘‘overall limit’’ and
‘‘internal limit’’ on size or length of
SMS ads); Advisory Opinion 2004–10
(Metro Networks) at 3 (discussing
‘‘physical and technological
limitations’’ of ad read live from
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
helicopter). This approach to
determining when a communication
cannot fit a required disclaimer—rather
than by the particular size of the
communication as measured by pixels,
number of characters, or other
measurement—is intended to minimize
the need for serial revisions to
Commission regulations as internet
technology may evolve. Should existing
or newly developed internet advertising
opportunities raise questions as to
whether a particular communication
may fit a disclaimer, the intent behind
Alternative A is that such questions may
be addressed in an advisory opinion
context.56 Would this approach provide
sufficient clarity about the application
of the disclaimer requirement, and the
disclaimer exceptions, to particular
communications? Should Alternative A,
if adopted, preclude the use of the small
items and impracticable exceptions for
internet public communications?
Does the ‘‘external character or space
constraints’’ approach provide
sufficiently clear guidance in light of
existing technology or technological
developments that may occur? Is it clear
what ‘‘cannot fit’’ means in the
proposed rule? Should the Commission
adopt a safe harbor indicating that ads
with particular pixel size, character
limit, or other technological
characteristic may use adapted
disclaimers? Or do safe harbors tend to
become the de facto legal standard in
advisory opinions and enforcement
actions? If the Commission were to
adopt either a bright-line rule or a safe
harbor based on pixel size, character
limit, or other technological
characteristic, what should those
technological limits be? Does the
‘‘external character or space
constraints’’ wording make clear that
business decisions to sell small ads that
are not constrained by actual
technological limitations do not justify
use of an adapted disclaimer? Are there
circumstances under which requiring a
full disclaimer to appear on the face of
an internet ad would cause the speaker
to curtail his or her message, or
purchase a larger ad, or run the ad on
a different platform? Are there
circumstances under which such a
requirement would discourage the
speaker from running the ad at all? Is
there anything about advertising on the
internet that would warrant a different
conclusion than courts have reached in
upholding the Act’s disclaimer
requirements on political advertising in
other media?
56 See
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
11 CFR 112.1.
26MRP1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
b. Alternative B—Proposed 11 CFR
110.11(c)(5)(ii)–(iv): When a
Communication May Use Technological
Adaptations
In applying the disclaimer rules to
internet public communications,
Alternative B proposes to allow any
form of paid internet advertisement—
including audio and video ads—to
utilize an adapted disclaimer under
certain conditions.57 Alternative B
proposes to establish a bright-line rule
to help speakers determine for
themselves when they may utilize an
adapted disclaimer.58 The ‘‘bright line’’
is determined by the amount of time or
space necessary to provide a full
disclaimer in an internet public
communication as a percentage of the
overall communication.59 Proposed
paragraph (c)(5)(iii) in Alternative B
suggests ‘‘ten percent of the time or
space in an internet communication’’ as
the appropriate amount. If the amount
of time or space necessary for a clear
and conspicuous disclaimer exceeds ten
percent, then the speaker may, under
Alternative B, provide an adapted
disclaimer. Is ten percent a reasonable
figure, or is it too high or too low? 60
57 Neither Alternative proposes to allow political
committees to provide disclaimers through a
technological mechanism for their email of more
than 500 substantially similar communications or
their internet websites available to the general
public.
58 See, e.g., Facebook, Comment at 3 (encouraging
‘‘a regulatory approach that provides advertisers
flexibility to meet their disclaimer obligations in
innovative ways that take full advantage of the
technological advances in communication the
internet makes possible’’); Campaign Legal Center
and Democracy 21, Comment at 2 (Nov. 14, 2011),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=98749 (‘‘Innovation, not exemption, is the
answer.’’); American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations et al.,
Comment at 2 (‘‘[R]ules in this area must be . . .
flexible and principle-focused . . . . The challenge
is to achieve both public informational goals and
provide sufficient clarity to speakers about the rules
so there is both informed compliance and
predictable enforcement’’); Computer &
Communications Industry Association, Comment at
14 (‘‘CCIA cautions against regulatory action that
does not allow for flexible solutions’’); Software &
Information Industry Association, Comment at 4
(urging ‘‘a flexible and diverse set of transparency
practices that evolve and innovate as digital content
offerings and advertising profiles continue to
evolve’’).
59 Commission regulations also apply a timespace approach to attributing expenditures for
publications and broadcast communications to
more than one candidate. See 11 CFR 106.1(a).
60 Some commenters suggested different levels at
which providing a disclaimer becomes unduly
burdensome. See Cause of Action, Comment at 4–
5 (Nov. 14, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/
showpdf.htm?docid=98750 (explaining that
California’s disclaimer requirement, ‘‘while
minimal, still takes around 15% of a Google
advertisement,’’ which ‘‘carr[ies] a high cost of
character space, even to the point of overshadowing
the communication itself’’); Center for Competitive
Politics, Comment at
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
Should the Commission adopt a
different benchmark for allowing
political speakers to use available
technology to provide disclaimers for
their internet public communications?
Is Alternative B’s proposed approach
sufficiently clear to enable speakers to
administer it for themselves rather than
seek advisory opinions before engaging
in political advertising online?
To provide clarity in determining
whether a speaker may utilize an
adapted disclaimer, proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(ii) in Alternative B also proposes
objective standards for use in measuring
time and space. For internet public
communications consisting of text,
graphics, or images, Alternative B
proposes to use characters or pixels. For
internet public communications
consisting of audio and video,
Alternative B proposes to use seconds.
These proposals are based on the
Commission’s experience with such
communications in the advisory
opinion context.61 The Commission has
limited expertise in the technical
aspects of internet advertising, however.
Are the proposed metrics of characters,
pixels, and seconds a reasonable way to
measure space and time in paid internet
advertisements? If they are, then are
they sufficiently flexible to remain
relevant as technology changes, or are
they likely to become obsolete? Should
the rule, instead, specify a percentage of
space or time without identifying the
units of measurement? Would that
provide sufficient clarity for speakers to
be able to determine for themselves
when they can utilize an adapted
disclaimer? The Commission also seeks
comment on how it should measure the
time and space that a disclaimer
occupies on an internet advertisement
containing both text or graphic and
4 (urging the Commission to ‘‘excuse disclaimers in
any internet advertising product where the number
of characters needed for a disclaimer would exceed
4% of the characters available in the advertising
product, exclusive of those reserved for the ad’s
title’’) (internal quotations omitted); Institute for
Free Speech, Comment at 4 (same); see also
American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, et al., Comment at 2 (‘‘In
no case should the disclaimer rules compel a
diminution of the speaker’s message itself in order
to accommodate the disclaimer; and, that principle
should determine whether or not an internet
advertisement . . . may omit the full, statutorily
required language, and instead link to a disclaimer
as the routine solution.’’). Certain aspects of Federal
Communications Commission rules employ a bright
line for certain political advertisement sponsorship
statements. See, e.g., 47 CFR 73.1212 (requiring
sponsors of political advertising broadcast via
television to be identified with letters that are equal
to or greater than 4% of the vertical picture height).
61 See Advisory Opinion 2017–12 (Take Back
Action Fund); Advisory Opinion Request 2013–18
(Revolution Messaging), Advisory Opinion Request
2011–09 (Facebook); Advisory Opinion 2010–19
(Google).
PO 00000
Frm 00012
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12875
audio or video elements. Should the
Commission’s disclaimer regulations
explicitly address such advertisements?
If so, how? Additionally, how should
the Commission measure pixels,
characters, and seconds in an
advertisement that may expand or
change, such as those with scrolling,
frame, carousel, or similar features?
Should the Commission incorporate in
the rule specifications for these internet
advertisement features?
5. How Adaptations Must Be Presented
on the Face of the Advertisement
The discussion in this section
explains the Commission’s alternative
proposals for what information must be
included on the face of an
advertisement that utilizes an adapted
disclaimer. Both Alternatives A and B
propose that an internet public
communication that provides an
adapted disclaimer must provide some
information on the face of the
advertisement, and both alternatives
require such information to be clear and
conspicuous and to provide notice that
further disclaimer information is
available through the technological
mechanism. Alternative A proposes one
method of presenting an adapted
disclaimer, and Alternative B proposes
two methods, in a tiered approach.
Alternative A’s approach would
require, on the face of the
advertisement, the payor’s name plus an
‘‘indicator’’ that would give notice that
further information is available.
Alternative B proposes a two-tiered
approach. Under its first tier,
Alternative B would require, on the face
of the advertisement, identification of
the payor plus an ‘‘indicator.’’ Tier one
of Alternative B differs from Alternative
A in only one material aspect:
Alternative B would allow, in lieu of a
payor’s full name, for a payor to be
identified by a clearly recognized
identifier such as an abbreviation or
acronym. Under its second tier,
Alternative B would require, on the face
of the advertisement, only an
‘‘indicator’’; neither the payor’s name
nor an identifier would be required
under tier two of Alternative B.
Alternatives A and B use similar
definitions of ‘‘adapted disclaimer’’ and
‘‘indicator.’’
a. Alternative A—One Tier: Name Plus
Indicator
Alternative A’s proposed rule would
explain that an ‘‘adapted disclaimer’’
means ‘‘an abbreviated disclaimer on
the face of a communication in
conjunction with an indicator through
which a reader can locate the full
disclaimer required’’ under 11 CFR
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
12876
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
110.11(c)(5)(i). The proposal would
further clarify that the adapted
disclaimer ‘‘must indicate the person or
persons who paid for the
communication in letters of sufficient
size to be clearly readable by a recipient
of the communication.’’
Alternative A is proposing that
adapted disclaimers include a payor’s
name on the face of the communication
for several reasons. First, the inclusion
of such information would signal to a
recipient that the communication is,
indeed, a paid advertisement. This is
especially important on the internet
where paid content can be targeted to a
particular user and appear
indistinguishable from the unpaid
content that user views, unlike
traditional media like radio or
television, where paid content is
transmitted to all users in the same
manner and is usually offset in some
way from editorial content.62 Second,
the inclusion of the payor’s name would
allow persons viewing the
communication on any device, even if
the recipient does not view the full
disclaimer, to know ‘‘the person or
group who is speaking’’ and could,
therefore, assist voters in identifying the
source of advertising so they are better
‘‘able to evaluate the arguments to
which they are being subjected.’’
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368
(internal quotations and alterations
removed). Alternative A is based on the
premise that a technological mechanism
to reach a full disclaimer provided by
shortened URL and without the payor’s
name would not provide, on the face of
the communication, the same
informational value.63 Third, some
commenters suggested that the
Commission and the public not rely on
social media platforms’ voluntary
efforts 64 to identify paid
62 See, e.g., Center for Digital Democracy,
Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/
fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358502 (noting that
‘‘native advertising’’ online ‘‘purposefully blurs the
distinctions between editorial content and
advertising’’); Twitter, Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358496 (noting that, absent paid ‘‘Promoted’’
tag, Promoted Tweets ‘‘look and act just like regular
Tweets’’); Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Comment at 4 (‘‘Online platforms use algorithms to
target ads with a level of granularity that has not
been possible before’’).
63 See Electronic Privacy Information Center,
Comment at 3 (explaining that ‘‘URL shortening
tools such as goo.gl and bit.ly can take lengthy
hyperlinks and reduce them to just a few characters.
This would allow an ad with character limitations
to provide a URL that linked to a full disclaimer.’’).
64 See, e.g., BMore Indivisible, Comment at 5
(stating that ‘‘Given the history of technology and
social media companies—and their nearly total
reliance on advertising for corporate profits — the
American people and the FEC cannot rely on them
to regulate themselves when it comes to disclosing
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
communications (such as by a tag that
a communication is ‘‘paid,’’
‘‘sponsored,’’ or ‘‘promoted’’).65 As a
preliminary matter, the Commission
lacks any enforcement mechanism to
ensure compliance with such voluntary
efforts, which, by definition, may be
modified or abandoned at any time. In
addition, tags that identify whether an
advertisement is ‘‘paid,’’ ‘‘sponsored,’’
or ‘‘promoted,’’ do not necessarily
identify who paid, sponsored, or
promoted the advertisement,66 and even
that limited information may disappear
when a paid communication is shared
with other social media users.
To further help voters evaluate the
message, Alternative A proposes to
require that information about the payor
be of a size to ‘‘be clearly readable.’’ As
with the size requirements for text and
graphic internet communications
described above, Alternative A intends
that questions of whether a disclaimer is
of sufficient type size to be clearly
readable would be ‘‘determined on a
case-by-case basis, taking into account
the vantage point from which the
communication is intended to be seen
or read as well as the actual size of the
disclaimer text,’’ as they are under the
current rule. 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR
76965. Would a case-by-case ‘‘clearly
readable’’ standard provide sufficient
guidance to advertisers regarding the
necessary size of an adapted disclaimer?
As a component of adapted
disclaimers, Alternative A proposes to
require the use of an ‘‘indicator,’’ which
it defines in proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(i)(B) as ‘‘any visible or audible
element of an internet communication
the source of political advertisements. Legislative
action is uncertain and may be incomplete. The
FEC must act to fully regulate internet political
advertising disclaimers’’); Center for American
Progress, Comment at 2–3 (Nov. 9, 2017) https://
sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358489
(stating that ‘‘To some extent, these companies have
already taken steps toward proving more
transparency for online political ads. While we
commend those efforts, they are no substitute for
action by the FEC. Such efforts vary from one
company to another, with no consistent mechanism
for enforcement and no meaningful guidance for
new entrants. Clear and consistent rules should be
in place for all technology companies, to ensure
adequate transparency both now and in the
future’’).
65 See, e.g., Twitter, Comment at 2 (describing
‘‘promoted’’ tweet label); Rob Goldman, Update on
Our Advertising Transparency and Authenticity
Efforts, Facebook Newsroom (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/update-onour-advertising-transparency-andauthenticityefforts/ (indicating that, starting in summer 2018,
Facebook ‘‘advertisers will have to include a
disclosure in their election-related ads, which
reads: ‘Paid for by.’ ’’).
66 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment
at 4 (noting current ability to ‘‘publish anonymous
election related advertisements on Facebook via an
advertising account linked to a pseudonymous
Facebook page’’).
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
that is presented in a clear and
conspicuous manner, to give the reader,
observer, or listener adequate notice that
further disclaimer information is
available by a technological mechanism.
An indicator is not clear and
conspicuous if it is difficult to see, read,
or hear, or if the placement is easily
overlooked.’’ Alternative A adds in
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B): ‘‘[a]n
indicator may take any form including,
but not limited to, words, images,
sounds, symbols, and icons.’’ What are
the advantages and disadvantages of this
approach? What would be the
advantages and disadvantages of the
Commission’s designing and
promulgating a single indicator to be
used across all media and platforms?
b. Alternative B—Two Tiers: Indicator
Plus Payor Identification or IndicatorOnly
Alternative B’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(ii) would explain that an ‘‘adapted
disclaimer’’ means ‘‘an abbreviated
disclaimer on the face of the
communication in conjunction with a
technological mechanism by which a
reader can locate the disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements’’ of
11 CFR 110.11(b) and (c)(1).
Alternative B proposes a two-tiered
approach to the information that must
be presented on the face of an internet
public communication utilizing an
adapted disclaimer. Under Alternative
B’s first tier, in proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(iii), an adapted disclaimer
consists of an abbreviated disclaimer
that includes an ‘‘indicator’’ and
identifies the payor by full name or by
‘‘a clearly recognized abbreviation,
acronym, or other unique identifier by
which the payor is commonly known,’’
in lieu of the full name. Under
Alternative B’s second tier, in proposed
paragraph (c)(5)(iv) described below, an
adapted disclaimer consists of an
abbreviated disclaimer that need
include only an ‘‘indicator.’’ Under both
tiers—indicator-plus-payor
identification and indicator-only—the
internet public communication would
have to provide a full disclaimer
through a technological mechanism,
described below.67
Under the first tier, described in
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii), an
advertisement could identify the payor
by the payor’s full name or by a clearly
67 Given that Alternative B would allow payors to
use a technological mechanism to provide
disclaimers for any form of paid public
communication on the internet, including audio
and video communcations, it proposes to require
the payor’s name to be ‘‘clear and conspicuous’’
rather than ‘‘clearly readable,’’ as under Alternative
A.
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
recognized abbreviation, acronym, or
other unique identifier by which the
payor is commonly known. Thus, for
example, if the Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee were to pay for a
Facebook advertisement, the
advertisement could state that it was
paid for by the DSCC, @DSCC, or
DSCC.org, while providing the
committee’s full name in a disclaimer
through a technological mechanism, as
described below. This flexibility is
intended to address internet public
communications that might not
otherwise conveniently or practicably
accommodate the payor’s name, such as
character-limited ads, or where the
payor’s name is unusually lengthy, or
where the payor wishes to use the ad to
promote its social media brand.68
This proposal is modeled after a
longstanding provision in the
Commission’s regulations that allows a
separate segregated fund to include in
its name a ‘‘clearly recognized
abbreviation or acronym by which [its]
connected organization is commonly
known.’’ 11 CFR 102.14(c). The
Commission seeks comment on whether
the proposal provides sufficient clarity
for a payor to determine whether there
is a ‘‘clearly recognized’’ abbreviation,
acronym, or other unique identifier by
which the payor is ‘‘commonly known.’’
Should the Commission prescribe
standards for use in making that
determination? Is there a risk of
confusion if two groups are commonly
known by the same acronym, or does
ready access to a full disclaimer (no
more than one technological step away)
help to alleviate any potential for
confusion? Does the potential for
confusion increase if the person viewing
or listening to a political advertisement
is unfamiliar with the person or group
sponsoring the ad? If so, does ready
access to the full disclaimer through a
technological mechanism help to
alleviate any such risk?
Under the second tier, described in
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iv),
Alternative B would allow a speaker to
include only an ‘‘indicator’’ on the face
of an internet public communication, if
the space or time necessary for a clear
68 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2010–19 (Google) (Aug. 5, 2010) (asking to
include URL to payor’s website in lieu of disclaimer
in severely character-limited internet ads, with
disclaimer on landing page); Advisory Opinion
Request, Advisory Opinion 2013–13 (Freshman
Hold’Em JFC et al.) (Aug. 21, 2013) (asking to use
shortened form of name and URL in disclaimer,
where joint fundraising committee-payor’s name
included names of 18 participating committees);
Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion
2017–05 (Great America PAC, et al.) (June 2, 2017)
(asking to use payor’s Twitter handle in
disclaimers).
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
and conspicuous tier-one adapted
disclaimer under proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(iii) would exceed a certain
percentage of the overall
communication, and provide the full
disclaimer through a technological
mechanism. Under Alternative B, the
term ‘‘indicator’’ has the same meaning
under both the first and second tiers, as
described further below. Again,
Alternative B’s second tier proposes to
use ten percent as the determining
figure and to measure ‘‘time or space’’
in terms of characters, pixels, and
seconds. Is ten percent a reasonable
figure, or is it too high or too low? Are
characters, pixels, and seconds
reasonable metrics? How should
characters, pixels, or seconds be
determined when an internet public
communication combines text, graphic,
and video elements, such as an ad with
text fields surrounding a video or a GIF?
Alternative B’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(ii)(B) clarifies the ‘‘abbreviated
disclaimer’’ information aspect of the
‘‘adapted disclaimer’’ definition in
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii). It would
require the abbreviated disclaimer on
the face of a communication to be
presented in a clear and conspicuous
manner. An abbreviated disclaimer
would not be clear and conspicuous if
it is difficult to see, read, or hear, or if
the placement is easily overlooked.
Proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(D)
provides that an ‘‘indicator’’ is any
visible or audible element of an internet
public communication that gives notice
to persons reading, observing, or
listening to the communication that
they may read, observe, or listen to a
disclaimer satisfying the general
requirements of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and
(c)(1) through a technological
mechanism.69 Under Alternative B, an
indicator may take any form, including
words (such as ‘‘paid for by’’ or
‘‘sponsored by’’), a website URL, or an
image, sound, symbol, or icon. For
example, under Alternative B a severely
character-limited public internet
communication could include an
indicator stating ‘‘Paid for by,’’ ‘‘Paid
by,’’ ‘‘Sponsored by,’’ ‘‘Ad by,’’ or
providing the URL to the payor’s
website, if a reader could move his or
her cursor over the words or link to a
landing page and see the full
69 The proposed reference to the person
‘‘observing’’ an internet communication derives
from the existing requirement that ‘‘[a] disclaimer
. . . must be presented in a clear and conspicuous
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener
adequate notice of the identify of the person or
political committee that paid for and . . .
authorized the communication.’’ 11 CFR
110.11(c)(1) (emphasis added). As used in
Alternative B, it is intended to be synonymous with
‘‘viewer.’’
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12877
disclaimer.70 Would this proposal
promote disclosure and transparency by
addressing extremely space- or timeconstrained paid internet ads? Does an
indicator alone provide sufficient
guidance that the full disclaimer is
available through a technological
mechanism? Would this proposal help
to ensure that voters have easy access to
the full statutorily prescribed disclaimer
for more online communications, while
providing greater flexibility to political
advertisers on the internet? Or would an
indicator that takes the form of a
hyperlink, for example, be prone to
manipulation? Should the Commission
require an indicator to take a specific
form or to include specific language?
In their comments on the ANPRM,
Google and Twitter said that they intend
to require each political advertisement
on their platforms to bear a special
designation that will allow viewers to
obtain additional information about the
sponsor of the ad.71 Should the
Commission allow sponsors of
extremely space- or time-limited paid
internet advertisements to use platformprovided designations as their
indicators, if such disclaimers meet all
of the requirements for providing a
disclaimer through a technological
mechanism? Or do the limitations
inherent in platform-provided
designations, discussed above, argue
against doing so? In any event, under
Alternative B, the responsibility for
ensuring that the disclaimer provided
through a technological mechanism
complies with the disclaimer
requirement would remain with the
person paying for the communication,
and would not fall on the internet
platform hosting it.
6. Adaptations Utilizing One-Step
Technological Mechanism
Alternatives A and B both propose
that a technological mechanism used to
provide access to a full disclaimer must
do so within one step.
70 This provision is similar to the existing
regulatory allowance for disclaimers on printed
communications, which generally provides that
‘‘[t]he disclaimer need not appear on the front or
cover page of the communication as long as it
appears within the communication.’’ 11 CFR
110.11(c)(2)(iv).
71 Google, Comment at 1, 6–7, 11–12 (explaining
‘‘Why This Ad’’ icon for election-related
advertisements on Search, YouTube, and Display);
Twitter, Comment at 4 (explaining ‘‘political ad
indicator’’ for ‘‘electioneering ads’’ on Twitter); see
also Facebook, Comment at 3 (‘‘[A]llowing ads to
include an icon or other obvious indicator that
more information about an ad is available via quick
navigation (like a single click) would give clear
guidance on how to include disclaimers in new
technologies as they are developed.’’).
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
12878
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
b. Alternative B—Associated With
Adapted Disclaimer
Because the provision of an ad payor’s
name is necessary but not always
sufficient to meet the Act’s disclaimer
requirement,72 Alternative A requires a
mechanism to provide the additional
required information. Alternative A’s
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A) would
specify that the technological
mechanism used to provide the full
disclaimer must be ‘‘associated with’’
the indicator and allow a recipient of
the communication to locate the full
disclaimer ‘‘by navigating no more than
one step away from the adapted
disclaimer.’’ This means that the
additional technological step should be
apparent in the context of the
communication and the disclaimer,
once reached, should be ‘‘clear and
conspicuous’’ and otherwise satisfy the
full requirements of 11 CFR 110.11(c).
Moreover, this proposed requirement is
intended to notify a recipient of the
communication that further information
about or from the payor is available and
that the recipient may find that
information with minimal investment of
additional effort.73 Thus, for example, a
hyperlink underlying the ‘‘paid for’’
language would be ‘‘associated with’’
the full disclaimer at the landing page
located one step away from the
communication and to which the link
leads. One commenter suggested that
‘‘the Commission should allow people
and entities subject to disclaimer
requirements to satisfy them through
any reasonable technological means’’
rather than through a particular
technology.74 Should the Commission
explicitly include a requirement that a
technological mechanism be
‘‘reasonable’’ or can the reasonableness
requirement for such mechanisms be
assumed?
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
a. Alternative A—Associated With
‘‘Indicator’’ in Advertisement
Alternative B’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(i)(C) defines the term
‘‘technological mechanism’’ as any use
of technology that enables the person
reading, observing, or listening to an
internet public communication to read,
observe, or listen to a disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements of
paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) without
navigating more than one step away
from the internet public
communication, and is associated with
an adapted disclaimer as provided in
proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii). Thus,
by definition, the technological
mechanism must be ‘‘associated with’’
the abbreviated disclaimer on the face of
the internet communication itself, and
must not require the person reading,
observing, or listening to an internet
communication to navigate more than
one step away to read, observe, or listen
to the disclaimer. The additional
technological step under Alternative B
should be apparent in the context of the
communication, and the disclaimer
provided through alternative technical
means must be ‘‘clear and conspicuous’’
under 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1). Should a
technological mechanism be deemed to
be ‘‘associated with’’ the abbreviated
disclaimer on the face of an internet
public communication if the person
reading, observing, or listening to the
communication can read, observe, or
listen to a disclaimer by clicking
anywhere on the communication? If a
person can access the full disclaimer by
clicking anywhere on a communication,
should the abbreviated disclaimer even
be required on the face of the
communication? Are there
circumstances where an adapted
disclaimer would be preferable to a full
disclaimer, even if the full disclaimer
would take up ten percent or less of the
time or space in the internet public
communication?
72 See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 30120(a) (requiring payment
and authorization statements and, if not authorized
by a candidate, a payor’s street address, telephone
number, or ‘‘World Wide Web’’ address); Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of
the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 94th Cong. 141
(1976) (testimony of Antonin Scalia, Asst. Att’y
Gen’l) (testifying, in response to question about
proposal to amend Act to require payor name and
authorization statement, that ‘‘[t]he principle seems
to me a good one’’ that ‘‘seems to me like a sensible
provision’’ to minimize risk that ‘‘candidate’s
campaign can be run by somebody other than the
candidate’’).
73 See, e.g., MCCI, Comment at 2 (Nov. 12, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=360063 (asking, rhetorically, ‘‘Who doesn’t
know how to click a link in an ad?’’ in arguing for
short word like ‘‘ad’’ or ‘‘paid’’ with hyperlink by
which readers ‘‘will ultimately be able to track
material back to its source’’).
74 Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 4.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
7. Examples of Technological
Mechanisms in Adapted Disclaimers
Alternatives A and B provide similar
lists of possible technological
mechanisms.
a. Alternative A—Illustrative List of
Mechanisms
Alternative A provides a list of
examples of ‘‘technological mechanisms
for the provision of the full disclaimer’’
including, but not limited to, ‘‘hoverover mechanisms, pop-up screens,
scrolling text, rotating panels, or
hyperlinks to a landing page with the
full disclaimer.’’ This illustrative list
incorporates examples of one-step
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
technological mechanisms the
Commission has seen utilized by
advisory opinion requestors and other
federal and state agency disclosure
regulations.75 The list is intended to
provide guidance while retaining
flexibility for advertisers to utilize other
existing technological mechanisms or
new mechanisms that may arise in the
future.
Should the Commission allow
advertisers to include different parts of
a full disclaimer in different frames or
components of text or graphic internet
advertisements (such as a disclaimer
split between two character-limited text
fields, one above an image and one
below)? Several commenters noted the
importance of ensuring that disclaimers
are visible across devices or platforms
and expressed concern that some
technological mechanisms may not be
functional across all devices or
platforms.76 Should the Commission
incorporate into the rule a requirement
that any technological mechanism used
must be accessible by all recipients of
that communication, including those
75 See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 2010–19 (Google)
(addressing proposal to provide disclaimer by
hyperlink to landing page containing full
disclaimer); Fed. Trade Comm’n, .com Disclosures:
How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital
Advertising 10 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/
files/documents/plain-language/bus41-dot-comdisclosures-information-about-onlineadvertising.pdf (permitting disclosure to ‘‘be
provided by using a hyperlink’’); id. at 12 (allowing
‘‘mouse-over’’ display if effective on mobile
devices); id. at 13–14 (allowing disclosures by pop
ups and interstitial pages); id. at 16 (allowing
scrolling text or rotating panels in spaceconstrained banner ad to present required
disclosures); Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, sec.
18450.4(b)(3)(G)(1) (permitting ‘‘link to a web page
with disclosure information’’); id. at (b)(3)(G)(1)
(allowing disclaimer ‘‘displayed via rollover
display’’); Md. Code. Regs. 33.13.07(D)(2)(b)(i)
(permitting ‘‘viewer to click’’ and be ‘‘taken to a
landing or home page’’ with disclaimer); see also
First Gen. Counsel’s Report at 5 n.19, MUR 6911
(Frankel) (noting respondent committee’s claim that
‘‘its Twitter profile contains a link to the
campaign’s website that contains a disclaimer’’);
Interactive Advertising Bureau, Comment at 3 (Nov.
10, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?
docid=358484 (advocating a rule allowing for
flexibility in disclaimer provision, such as by click
through links); CMPLY, Comment at 2–3 and 9–11
(describing several ‘‘short-form’’ disclosure
solutions within character-limited social media
platforms).
76 See, e.g., Asian Americans Advancing Justice,
et al., Comment at 9–11 (presenting statistics
showing that persons of color are more likely to
consume information on internet than television
and are more likely to do so via mobile devices than
display (desktop) platforms); CMPLY, Comment at
2 (noting that ‘‘ ‘roll over’ or ‘hover’ disclosures . . .
have significant limitations in social media
platforms and . . . do not function within the user
interfaces of mobile devices, where the majority of
social media engagement takes place and where we
have seen the largest increases in internet and
broadband usage’’).
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
accessing the communication on mobile
devices?
b. Alternative B—Illustrative List of
Mechanisms
Alternative B’s proposed paragraph
(c)(5)(i)(C) provides the same examples
of technological mechanisms as
Alternative A, with two exceptions.
First, because Alternative B does not
limit the use of technological
mechanisms to internet
communications with text or graphic
components and anticipates that
technology will develop to enable
speakers to provide future disclaimers
in ways that might not be available
today, it includes ‘‘voice-over’’ as an
example. Second, Alternative B
proposes to refer to ‘‘mouse-over’’ and
‘‘roll-over’’ as examples, in addition to
‘‘hover-over.’’ Are these additional
references useful, or are they already
subsumed under ‘‘hover-over’’? Should
the list of examples be further expanded
or refined?
8. Proposed Exceptions to Disclaimer
Rules for Internet Public
Communications
a. Alternative A
No Proposal.
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
b. Alternative B
Alternative B proposes to codify a
preference for including full disclaimers
in paid internet advertisements, with
alternative approaches available
utilizing technological mechanisms.
Although Alternative B is intended to
make it easier for internet
communications to meet the disclaimer
requirement, some internet public
communications might not be able to
comply with the disclaimer
requirement, either now or as
technology and advertising practices
change. Thus, Alternative B proposes to
exempt from the disclaimer requirement
any internet public communication that
can provide neither a disclaimer in the
communication itself nor an adapted
disclaimer as provided in proposed
paragraph (c)(5).
The proposed exception in
Alternative B is intended to replace the
small items and impracticable
exceptions for internet public
communication, so that the small items
and impracticable exceptions would no
longer apply to such communications.
The small items and impracticable
exceptions both predate the digital age,
and the Commission has faced
challenges in applying them to internet
communications. Despite several
requests, the Commission has issued
only one advisory opinion in which a
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
majority of Commissioners agreed that a
disclaimer exception applied to digital
communications. See Advisory Opinion
2002–09 (Target Wireless). Statements
by individual Commissioners indicate a
difference of opinion regarding the
application of the exceptions to internet
communications.77
Alternative B’s proposed paragraph
(f)(1)(iv) exempts from the disclaimer
requirement any paid internet
advertisement that cannot provide a
disclaimer in the communication itself
nor an adapted disclaimer under
proposed paragraph (c)(5). Is the
exception as currently proposed
sufficiently clear? The proposed
exception provides as an example static
banner ads on small internet-enabled
mobile devices that cannot link to a
landing page controlled by the person
paying for the communication.78 Do
such ads exist? Should Alternative B’s
proposed exception apply to
advertisements that technically can link
to a website with a full disclaimer but
do not do so? Does the Commission
have statutory authority to adopt
exceptions to the disclaimer
requirements?
If the Commission adopts either the
single-tier adapted disclaimer approach
of Alternative A or the two-tier
approach of Alternative B, would there
be a need to exempt any internet public
communications from the disclaimer
requirement? Or would the adaptations
adequately address any technological
limitations? Would adopting any new
exception to the disclaimer requirement
for internet public communications lead
to manipulation and abuse of the
exception? If so, what can the
Commission do to minimize the risk of
manipulation and abuse, and enhance
disclosure? Conversely, if the
77 See Advisory Opinion 2017–12 (Take Back
Action Fund), Concurring Statement of
Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Dec. 21, 2017),
Concurring Statement of Vice Chair Caroline C.
Hunter and Commissioners Lee E. Goodman and
Matthew S. Petersen (Dec. 14, 2017); Advisory
Opinion Request 2013–18 (Revolution Messaging),
Statement for the Record by Vice Chair Ann M.
Ravel, Commissioner Steven T. Walther, and
Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Feb. 27, 2014);
Advisory Opinion 2010–19 (Google), Concurring
Statement of Chairman Matthew S. Petersen (Dec.
30, 2010), Statement for the Record by
Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter (Dec. 17, 2016),
and Concurring Statement of Vice Chair Cynthia L.
Bauerly, Commissioner Steven T. Walther, and
Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Dec. 16, 2010).
78 The Commission considered static banner ads
on small internet-enabled mobile devices in
Advisory Opinion Request 2013–18 (Revolution
Messaging). In that advisory opinion request, the
requestor asked the Commission to recognize small
(320 × 50 pixels) static banner ads on smartphones
as exempt from the disclaimer requirement under
the ‘‘small items’’ exception. The Commission did
not approve a response by the required four
affirmative votes.
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12879
Commission decides not to adopt a new
exception for internet public
communications, what effect would that
decision have on political discourse on
the internet? Could such a decision,
coupled with uncertainty over the
application of the existing exceptions to
internet public communications,
potentially chill political speech on the
internet?
F. Conclusion
The Commission welcomes comment
on any aspect of Alternatives A and B.
Additionally, the Commission seeks
comment addressing how differences
between online platforms, providers,
and presentations may affect the
application of any of the proposed
disclaimer rules for text, graphic, video,
and audio internet advertisements in
Alternative A, or for internet public
communications generally in
Alternative B. Among other topics, the
Commission seeks comment on whether
the ability to zoom or otherwise expand
the size of some digital communications
affects any of these proposals. Similarly,
the Commission seeks comment on the
interaction between the proposed
definition of ‘‘public communication’’
and the proposed disclaimer rules in
Alternatives A and B. The Commission
is particularly interested in comment
detailing the challenges and
opportunities persons have experienced
in complying with (and receiving
disclosure from) similar state and
federal disclaimer or disclosure regimes.
Given the development and
proliferation of the internet as a mode
of political communication, and the
expectation that continued
technological advances will further
enhance the quantity of information
available to voters online, the
Commission welcomes comment on
whether the proposed rules allow for
flexibility to address future
technological developments while
honoring the important function of
providing disclaimers to voters.
Certification of No Effect Pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 605(b) (Regulatory Flexibility
Act)
The Commission certifies that the
attached proposed rules, if adopted,
would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. The proposed rules would
clarify and update existing regulatory
language, codify certain existing
Commission precedent regarding
internet communications, and provide
political committees and other entities
with more flexibility in meeting the
Act’s disclaimer requirements. The
proposed rules would not impose new
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
12880
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
recordkeeping, reporting, or financial
obligations on political committees or
commercial vendors. The Commission
therefore certifies that the proposed
rules, if adopted, would not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
List of Subjects
11 CFR Part 100
Elections.
11 CFR Part 110
Campaign funds, Political committees
and parties.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, the Federal Election
Commission proposes to amend 11 CFR
parts 100 and 110, as follows:
PART 100—SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
(52 U.S.C. 30101)
1. The authority citation for part 100
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 52 U.S.C. 30101, 30104,
30111(a)(8), and 30114(c).
§ 100.26
[Amended]
2. Amend § 100.26 by removing
‘‘website’’ and adding in its place
‘‘website or internet-enabled device or
application’’.
■
PART 110—CONTRIBUTION AND
EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS AND
PROHIBITIONS
3. The authority citation for part 110
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 52 U.S.C. 30101(8), 30101(9),
30102(c)(2), 30104(i)(3), 30111(a)(8), 30116,
30118, 30120, 30121, 30122, 30123, 30124,
and 36 U.S.C. 510.
Alternative A
■ 4. In § 110.11, add paragraph (c)(5) to
read as follows:
§ 110.11 Communications; advertising;
disclaimers (52 U.S.C. 30120).
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(5) Specific requirements for internet
communications. In addition to the
general requirements of paragraphs (b)
and (c)(1) of this section, a disclaimer
required by paragraph (a) of this section
that appears on a public communication
distributed over the internet must
comply with the following:
(i) A public communication
distributed over the internet with text or
graphic components but without any
video component must contain a
disclaimer that is of sufficient type size
to be clearly readable by the recipient of
the communication. A disclaimer that
appears in letters at least as large as the
majority of the other text in the
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
communication satisfies the size
requirement of this paragraph. A
disclaimer under this paragraph must be
displayed with a reasonable degree of
color contrast between the background
and the text of the disclaimer. A
disclaimer satisfies the color contrast
requirement of this paragraph if it is
displayed in black text on a white
background or if the degree of color
contrast between the background and
the text of the disclaimer is no less than
the color contrast between the
background and the largest text used in
the communication.
(A) A public communication
distributed over the internet with text or
graphic components but without any
video component that, due to external
character or space constraints, cannot fit
a required disclaimer must include an
adapted disclaimer. For purposes of this
paragraph, an adapted disclaimer means
an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of
a communication in conjunction with
an indicator through which a reader can
locate the full disclaimer required by
paragraph (c)(5)(i). The adapted
disclaimer must indicate the person or
persons who paid for the
communication in letters of sufficient
size to be clearly readable by a recipient
of the communication. The
technological mechanism in an adapted
disclaimer must be associated with the
indicator and must allow a recipient of
the communication to locate the full
disclaimer by navigating no more than
one step away from the adapted
disclaimer. Technological mechanisms
for the provision of the full disclaimer
include, but are not limited to, hoverover mechanisms, pop-up screens,
scrolling text, rotating panels, or
hyperlinks to a landing page with the
full disclaimer.
(B) As used in paragraph (c)(5), an
indicator is any visible or audible
element of an internet communication
that is presented in a clear and
conspicuous manner to give the reader,
observer, or listener adequate notice that
further disclaimer information is
available by a technological mechanism.
An indicator is not clear and
conspicuous if it is difficult to see, read,
or hear, or if the placement is easily
overlooked. An indicator may take any
form including, but not limited to,
words, images, sounds, symbols, and
icons.
(ii) A public communication
distributed over the internet with an
audio component but without video,
graphic, or text components must
include the statement described in
paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (iv) of this
section if authorized by a candidate, or
the statement described in paragraph
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
(c)(4) of this section if not authorized by
a candidate. A public communication
distributed over the internet with a
video component must include the
statement described in paragraphs
(c)(3)(ii)–(iv) of this section if
authorized by a candidate, or the
statement described in paragraph (c)(4)
of this section if not authorized by a
candidate.
*
*
*
*
*
Alternative B
■ 5. Amend § 110.11 as follows:
■ a. Add paragraph (c)(5).
■ b. Add paragraph (f)(1)(iv).
The additions read as follows:
§ 110.11 Communications; advertising;
disclaimers (52 U.S.C. 30120).
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(5) Specific requirements for internet
communications. (i) For purposes of this
section:
(A) The term internet communication
means electronic mail of more than 500
substantially similar communications
when sent by a political committee; all
internet websites of political committees
available to the general public; and any
internet public communication as
defined in paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) of this
section;
(B) The term internet public
communication means any
communication placed for a fee on
another person’s website or internetenabled device or application;
(C) The term technological
mechanism refers to any use of
technology that enables the person
reading, observing, or listening to an
internet public communication to read,
observe, or listen to a disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements of
paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section
without navigating more than one step
away from the internet public
communication, and is associated with
an adapted disclaimer as provided in
paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section. A
technological mechanism may take any
form including, but not limited to,
hover-over; mouse-over; voice-over; rollover; pop-up screen; scrolling text;
rotating panels; and click-through or
hyperlink to a landing page; and
(D) The term indicator refers to any
visible or audible element of an internet
public communication that gives notice
to persons reading, observing, or
listening to the internet public
communication that they may read,
observe, or listen to a disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements of
paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section
through a technological mechanism. An
indicator may take any form including,
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 / Proposed Rules
but not limited to, words such as ‘‘Paid
for by,’’ ‘‘Paid by,’’ ‘‘Sponsored by,’’ or
‘‘Ad by’’; website URL; image; sound;
symbol; and icon.
(ii) Every internet communication for
which a disclaimer is required by
paragraph (a) of this section must satisfy
the general requirements of paragraphs
(b) and (c)(1) of this section, except an
internet public communication may
include an adapted disclaimer under the
circumstances described in paragraphs
(c)(5)(iii)–(c)(5)(iv) of this section. For
purposes of this paragraph, an adapted
disclaimer means an abbreviated
disclaimer on the face of the
communication in conjunction with a
technological mechanism by which a
reader can locate the disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements of
paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section.
Any internet public communication that
includes an adapted disclaimer must
comply with the following:
(A) The internet public
communication must provide a
disclaimer satisfying the general
requirements of paragraphs (b) and
(c)(1) of this section through a
technological mechanism as described
in paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) of this section.
(B) The internet public
communication must present the
abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the
communication in a clear and
conspicuous manner. An abbreviated
disclaimer is not clear and conspicuous
if it is difficult to read, hear, or observe,
or if the placement is easily overlooked.
(C) For an internet public
communication consisting of text,
graphics, or images, time or space must
be measured in [characters or pixels].
(D) For an internet public
communication consisting of audio or
video, time or space must be measured
in [seconds].
(iii) If the time or space required for
a disclaimer satisfying the general
requirements of paragraphs (b) and
(c)(1) of this section would exceed [ten]
percent of the time or space in an
internet public communication, then the
abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the
communication must include an
indicator and identify the person who
paid for the internet public
communication by the person’s full
name or by a clearly recognized
abbreviation, acronym, or other unique
identifier by which the person is
commonly known.
(iv) If the time or space required for
an abbreviated disclaimer under
paragraph (c)(5)(iii) of this section
would exceed [ten] percent of the time
or space in the internet public
communication, then the abbreviated
disclaimer on the face of the
VerDate Sep<11>2014
18:14 Mar 23, 2018
Jkt 244001
communication must include an
indicator.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) Exceptions.
(1) * * *
(iv) Any internet public
communication that cannot provide a
disclaimer on the face of the internet
public communication itself nor an
adapted disclaimer as provided in
paragraph (c)(5) of this section, such as
a static banner ad on a small internetenabled device that cannot link to a
landing page of the person paying for
the internet public communication. The
provisions of paragraph (f)(1)(i)–(iii) of
this section do not apply to internet
public communications.
*
*
*
*
*
On behalf of the Commission,
Dated: March 20, 2018.
Caroline C. Hunter,
Chair, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. 2018–06010 Filed 3–23–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715–01–P
BUREAU OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION
12 CFR Chapter X
[Docket No. CFPB–2018–0012]
Request for Information Regarding the
Bureau’s Inherited Regulations and
Inherited Rulemaking Authorities
Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection.
ACTION: Request for information.
AGENCY:
The Bureau of Consumer
Financial Protection (Bureau) is seeking
comments and information from
interested parties to assist the Bureau in
considering whether, consistent with its
statutory authority to prescribe rules
pursuant to the Federal consumer
financial laws, the Bureau should
amend the regulations or exercise the
rulemaking authorities that it inherited
from certain other Federal agencies.
DATES: Comments must be received by
June 25, 2018.
ADDRESSES: You may submit responsive
information and other comments,
identified by Docket No. CFPB–2018–
0012, by any of the following methods:
• Electronic: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Email: FederalRegisterComments@
cfpb.gov. Include Docket No. CFPB–
2018–0012 in the subject line of the
message.
• Mail: Comment Intake, Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 1700 G
Street NW, Washington, DC 20552.
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
12881
• Hand Delivery/Courier: Comment
Intake, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, 1700 G Street NW, Washington,
DC 20552.
Instructions: The Bureau encourages
the early submission of comments. All
submissions must include the document
title and docket number. Please note the
number of the topic on which you are
commenting at the top of each response
(you do not need to address all topics).
Because paper mail in the Washington,
DC area and at the Bureau is subject to
delay, commenters are encouraged to
submit comments electronically. In
general, all comments received will be
posted without change to https://
www.regulations.gov. In addition,
comments will be available for public
inspection and copying at 1700 G Street
NW, Washington, DC 20552, on official
business days between the hours of 10
a.m. and 5 p.m. eastern time. You can
make an appointment to inspect the
documents by telephoning 202–435–
7275.
All submissions in response to this
request for information, including
attachments and other supporting
materials, will become part of the public
record and subject to public disclosure.
Proprietary information or sensitive
personal information, such as account
numbers or Social Security numbers, or
names of other individuals, should not
be included. Submissions will not be
edited to remove any identifying or
contact information.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Thomas L. Devlin and Kristin
McPartland, Senior Counsels, Office of
Regulations, at 202–435–7700. If you
require this document in an alternative
electronic format, please contact CFPB_
Accessibility@cfpb.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Congress
established the Bureau in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act) and
therein set forth the Bureau’s purpose,
objectives, and functions.1 Pursuant to
that Act, on July 21, 2011, the
‘‘consumer financial protection
functions’’ previously vested in certain
other Federal agencies transferred to the
1 Public Law 111–203, 124 Stat. 2081 (2010)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. 1693a et seq.). Section 1021
of the Dodd-Frank Act states that the Bureau shall
seek to implement and, where applicable, enforce
Federal consumer financial law consistently for the
purpose of ensuring that all consumers have access
to markets for consumer financial products and
services and that markets for consumer financial
products and services are fair, transparent, and
competitive. Section 1021 also authorized the
Bureau to exercise its authorities under Federal
consumer financial law for the purposes of ensuring
that, with respect to consumer financial products
and services, five specific objectives are met.
E:\FR\FM\26MRP1.SGM
26MRP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 58 (Monday, March 26, 2018)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 12864-12881]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-06010]
========================================================================
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 58 / Monday, March 26, 2018 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 12864]]
FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
11 CFR Parts 100 and 110
[Notice 2018-06]
Internet Communication Disclaimers and Definition of ``Public
Communication''
AGENCY: Federal Election Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Election Commission requests comment on two
alternative proposals to amend its regulations concerning disclaimers
on public communications on the internet that contain express advocacy,
solicit contributions, or are made by political committees. The
Commission is undertaking this rulemaking in light of technological
advances since the Commission last revised its rules governing internet
disclaimers in 2006, and questions from the public about the
application of those rules to internet communications. The Commission's
goal is to promulgate a rule that in its text and interpretation
recognizes the paramount importance of providing the public with the
clearest disclosure of the payor or sponsor of these public
communications on the internet.
Both proposals are intended to give the American public easy access
to information about the persons paying for and candidates authorizing
these internet communications, pursuant to the Federal Election
Campaign Act. Both proposals would continue to require disclaimers for
certain internet communications, and both would allow certain internet
communications to provide disclaimers through alternative technology.
The proposals differ, however, in their approach. The Commission
requests comment on all elements of both proposals. The two proposals
need not be considered as fixed alternatives; commenters are encouraged
to extract the best elements of each, or suggest improvements or
alternatives, to help the Commission fashion the best possible rule.
The Commission also requests comment on proposed changes to the
definition of ``public communication.'' The Commission has not made any
final decisions on any of the issues or proposals presented in this
rulemaking.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before May 25, 2018. The
Commission will hold a public hearing on this notice on June 27, 2018.
Anyone wishing to testify at such a hearing must file timely written
comments and must include in the written comments a request to testify.
ADDRESSES: All comments must be in writing. Commenters are encouraged
to submit comments electronically via the Commission's website at
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?pid=74739. Alternatively,
commenters may submit comments in paper form, addressed to the Federal
Election Commission, Attn.: Neven F. Stipanovic, Acting Assistant
General Counsel, 1050 First St. NE, Washington, DC 20463. Each
commenter must provide, at a minimum, his or her first name, last name,
city, and state; comments without this information will not be
accepted. All properly submitted comments, including attachments, will
become part of the public record, and the Commission will make comments
available for public viewing on the Commission's website and in the
Commission's Public Records Office. Accordingly, commenters should not
provide in their comments any information that they do not wish to make
public, such as a home street address, personal email address, date of
birth, phone number, social security number, or driver's license
number, or any information that is restricted from disclosure, such as
trade secrets or commercial or financial information that is privileged
or confidential.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Neven F. Stipanovic, Acting
Assistant General Counsel, or Ms. Jessica Selinkoff, Attorney, (202)
694-1650 or (800) 424-9530.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing to revise its
regulations at 11 CFR 100.26 and 110.11 regarding disclaimers on
communications placed for a fee on the internet. The Commission may
provide illustrative examples on the Commission's website during the
comment period.
A. Rulemaking History
1. Definition of ``Public Communication''
The Commission published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(``Technology NPRM'') in the Federal Register on November 2, 2016.\1\
The Technology NPRM comment period ended on December 2, 2016. The
Commission received four comments in response to the Technology
NPRM.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Technological Modernization, 81 FR 76416 (Nov. 2, 2016).
\2\ The Commission also received four comments in response an
earlier stage of the technology rulemaking. See Technological
Modernization, 78 FR 25635 (May 2, 2013). To review those proposals
and other Commission rulemaking documents, including comments
received, visit https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/rulemaking.htm?pid=84652.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the proposals in the Technology NPRM was to update the
definition of ``public communication'' at 11 CFR 100.26. Section 100.26
currently defines ``public communication'' as excluding all internet
communications, ``other than communications placed for a fee on another
person's website.'' When the Commission promulgated this definition in
2006, it focused on websites because that was the predominant means of
paid internet advertising at the time. The Commission analogized paid
advertisements on websites to the forms of mass communication
enumerated in the definition of ``public communication'' in the Federal
Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. 30101-46 (``the Act''), because ``each
lends itself to distribution of content through an entity ordinarily
owned or controlled by another person.'' internet Communications, 71 FR
18589, 18594 (Apr. 12, 2006) (``2006 internet E&J''); 52 U.S.C.
30101(22).
The Commission proposed to update the definition by adding
communications placed for a fee on another person's ``internet-enabled
device or application.'' The purpose of the proposed change was to
reflect post-2006 changes in internet technology \3\--
[[Page 12865]]
such as the development of mobile applications (``apps'') on
smartphones and tablets, smart TV devices, interactive gaming
dashboards, e-book readers, and wearable network-enabled devices such
as smartwatches and headsets--and to make the regulatory text more
adaptable to the development of future technologies. The Commission
asked several questions about its proposed change, including whether
the term ``internet-enabled device or application'' is a sufficiently
clear and technically accurate way to refer to the various media
through which paid internet communications can be sent and received;
whether there is a better way to refer to them; and whether it would
help to provide examples of such paid media.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See Amy Schatz, In Hot Pursuit of the Digital Voter, Wall
St. J., Mar. 23, 2012, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577299820064048072 (showing screenshots of
2012 presidential committee advertisements on Hulu and noting
another campaign's purchase of advertisements on Pandora internet
radio); Tanzina Vega, The Next Political Battleground: Your Phone,
CNN (May 29, 2015, 6:44 a.m.), www.cnn.com/2015/05/29/politics/2016-presidential-campaigns-mobile-technology (noting that ``voters
should expect more political ads as they scroll through their phones
next year--much as they'll be bombarded with ads on television,''
including ads using geolocation to target ``potential voters who may
have downloaded the candidate's app''). Indeed, a recent study has
shown that 19% of Americans access the internet exclusively or
mostly through their smartphones as opposed to desktop or laptop
computers. See Pew Research Ctr., U.S. Smartphone Use in 2015, at 3
(2015), www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission received only one comment in response to this aspect
of the Technology NPRM.\4\ The comment generally supported the proposed
revision to the definition of ``public communication'' in section
100.26.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ See Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21, Comment on REG
2013-01 (Technological Modernization) (Dec. 2, 2016), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354002.
\5\ The comment also urged the Commission to amend 11 CFR 100.26
``to make clear that any expenditure beyond a de minimis amount for
internet communications is not exempt from the definition of `public
communication.''' Id. at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has decided to reintroduce the proposed change to
the definition of ``public communication'' in this rulemaking for the
limited purpose of determining whether the term ``internet-enabled
device or application'' is a sufficiently clear and technically
accurate way to refer to the various media through which paid internet
communications can be sent and received. The term is closely tied to
the internet communication disclaimer requirements.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The definition of ``public communication'' is also relevant
to the coordination rules, 11 CFR 109.21(c), and financing
limitations, e.g., 11 CFR 100.24(b)(3), 300.32(a)(1)-(2), 300.71.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Internet Communication Disclaimers
On October 13, 2011, the Commission published in the Federal
Register an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (``ANPRM'')
soliciting comment on whether to modify disclaimer requirements at 11
CFR 110.11 for certain internet communications, or to provide
exceptions thereto, consistent with the Act.\7\ The Commission received
eight comments in response. Six of the commenters agreed that the
Commission should update the disclaimer rules through a rulemaking,
though commenters differed on how the Commission should do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ See internet Communication Disclaimers, 76 FR 63567 (Oct.
13, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 18, 2016, the Commission solicited additional comment in
light of legal and technological developments during the five years
since the ANPRM was published.\8\ The Commission received six comments
during the reopened comment period, all but one of which supported
updating the disclaimer rules. Commenters, however, differed on whether
the Commission should allow modified disclaimers for all online
advertisements or exempt paid advertisements on social media platforms
from the disclaimer requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See internet Communication Disclaimers; Reopening of Comment
Period and Notice of Hearing, 81 FR 71647 (Oct. 18, 2016). The
Commission postponed the hearing announced in that notice because
few commenters expressed interest in participating. As noted above,
the Commission will hold a hearing on the proposals in this notice
on June 27, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On October 10, 2017, the Commission again solicited additional
comment in light of recent legal, factual, and technological
developments.\9\ During this reopened comment period, the Commission
received submissions from 149,772 commenters (including persons who
signed on to others' comments), of which 147,320 indicated support for
updating or strengthening the disclaimer rules or other government
action; 2,262 indicated opposition to such efforts; and 190 did not
indicate a discernable preference.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See internet Communication Disclaimers; Reopening of Comment
Period, 82 FR 46937 (Oct. 10, 2017); see also internet Communication
Disclaimers; Extension of Comment Period, 82 FR 52863 (Nov. 15,
2017) (explaining Commission's extension of comment period for one
business day due to technological difficulties).
\10\ Commission staff read and categorized each comment in one
of three broad categories: Support, oppose, or neutral. ``Support''
included comments supporting more stringent disclaimer rules;
favoring ``transparency''; opposing application of the small items
or impracticable exceptions to online advertisements; opposing
advertising by foreign nationals; opposing Russian interference in
the 2016 election; or supporting the ``Honest Ads Act'' or any of
its components. See S. 1989, 115th Cong. (2017). ``Oppose'' included
comments opposing any rulemaking; opposing more stringent disclaimer
rules; supporting application of the small items or impracticable
exceptions to online advertising; supporting modified disclaimers in
lieu of full disclaimers; opposing any restriction of speech,
``infringement'' of constitutional rights, or ``censorship''; or
reminding the Commission to read the Constitution. ``Neutral''
included comments recognizing the value of disclaimers, but noting
the difficulty of providing disclaimers online; recommending
modified disclaimers in some, but not all, circumstances; appearing
to make contradictory statements in support or opposition;
presenting unclear statements of preferred action, such as ``do the
right thing''; or commenting off topic, such as on net neutrality.
Comments addressing specific aspects of the current or proposed
rules are discussed below, as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After considering the comments from all three comment periods and
additional deliberation, the Commission now seeks comment on the
proposed changes described in this notice. Other than the issues
specified in this notice, the Commission does not, in this rulemaking,
propose changes to any other rules adopted by the Commission in the
internet Communications rulemaking of 2006.
B. Current Statutory and Regulatory Framework Concerning Disclaimers
A ``disclaimer'' is a statement that must appear on certain
communications to identify who paid for it and, where applicable,
whether the communication was authorized by a candidate. 52 U.S.C.
30120(a); 11 CFR 110.11; see also Disclaimers, Fraudulent
Solicitations, Civil Penalties, and Personal Use of Campaign Funds, 67
FR 76962, 76962 (Dec. 13, 2002) (``2002 Disclaimer E&J''). The Supreme
Court has recognized that disclaimer requirements may burden political
speech, and thus must bear a substantial relation to a sufficiently
important governmental interest. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310, 366-67 (2010) (``Citizens United'') (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 64, 66 (1976) (``Buckley'')).
The Court has found that the government's interest in mandating
such disclaimers justifies the accompanying burden on political speech.
For example, in approving the disclaimers at issue in Citizens United,
the Court explained, ``[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements may
burden the ability to speak, but they impose no ceiling on campaign-
related activities and do not prevent anyone from speaking. The Court
has subjected these requirements to exacting scrutiny, which requires a
substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a
sufficiently important governmental interest.'' Id. (internal quotation
marks and alterations removed). The Court also held that disclaimers
``provide the electorate with information and insure that the voters
are fully informed about the person or group who is speaking,'' and
stated that identifying the sources of advertising enables people ``to
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.'' Id. at 368
(internal quotations and alterations removed).
[[Page 12866]]
With some exceptions, the Act and Commission regulations require
disclaimers for public communications: (1) Made by a political
committee; (2) that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a
clearly identified federal candidate; or (3) that solicit a
contribution. 52 U.S.C. 30120(a); 11 CFR 110.11(a). Under existing
regulations, the term ``public communication'' does not include
internet communications other than ``communications placed for a fee on
another person's website.'' 11 CFR 100.26. In addition to these
internet public communications, ``electronic mail of more than 500
substantially similar communications when sent by a political committee
. . . and all internet websites of political committees available to
the general public'' also must have disclaimers. 11 CFR 110.11(a).
The content of the disclaimer that must appear on a given
communication depends on who authorized and paid for the communication.
If a candidate, an authorized committee of a candidate, or an agent of
either pays for and authorizes the communication, then the disclaimer
must state that the communication ``has been paid for by the authorized
political committee.'' 11 CFR 110.11(b)(l); see also 52 U.S.C.
30120(a)(1). If a public communication is paid for by someone else, but
is authorized by a candidate, an authorized committee of a candidate,
or an agent of either, then the disclaimer must state who paid for the
communication and that the communication is authorized by the
candidate, an authorized committee of the candidate, or an agent of
either. 11 CFR 110.11(b)(2); see also 52 U.S.C. 30120(a)(2). If the
communication is not authorized by a candidate, an authorized committee
of a candidate, or an agent of either, then the disclaimer must
``clearly state the full name and permanent street address, telephone
number, or World Wide Web address of the person who paid for the
communication, and that the communication is not authorized by any
candidate or candidate's committee.'' 11 CFR 110.11(b)(3); see also 52
U.S.C. 30120(a)(3).
Every disclaimer ``must be presented in a clear and conspicuous
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener adequate notice of
the identity'' of the communication's sponsor. 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1).
While the Act and Commission regulations impose specific requirements
for communications that are ``printed'' or that appear on radio or
television, they do not specify additional requirements for disclaimers
on internet advertisements. Compare 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1) (general
``clear and conspicuous'' requirement for all disclaimers), with 11 CFR
110.11(c)(2)-(4) (additional requirements for printed, radio, and
television disclaimers) and 52 U.S.C. 30120(c)-(d) (specifications for
printed, radio, and television disclaimers).
Commission regulations set forth limited exceptions to the general
disclaimer requirements. For example, disclaimers are not required for
communications placed on ``[b]umper stickers, pins, buttons, pens, and
similar small items upon which the disclaimer cannot be conveniently
printed.'' 11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(i) (``small items exception''). Nor are
disclaimers required for ``[s]kywriting, water towers, wearing apparel,
or other means of displaying an advertisement of such a nature that the
inclusion of a disclaimer would be impracticable.'' 11 CFR
110.11(f)(1)(ii) (``impracticable exception'').
C. Application of the Disclaimer Requirements to Internet
Communications
1. Development of Current Rule That Paid Internet Advertisements
Require Disclaimers
The Commission first addressed disclaimers on internet
communications in two 1995 advisory opinions regarding the application
of the Act to internet solicitations of campaign contributions. See
Advisory Opinion 1995-35 (Alexander for President); Advisory Opinion
1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC).\11\ The Commission determined that internet
solicitations are ``general public political advertising'' \12\ and, as
such, they ``are permissible under the [Act] provided that certain
requirements, including the use of appropriate disclaimers, are met.''
Advisory Opinion 1995-35 (Alexander for President) at 2 (characterizing
conclusion in Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC)). Later that
year, the Commission stated in a rulemaking that ``internet
communications and solicitations that constitute general public
political advertising require disclaimers,'' adding that ``[t]hese
communications and others that are indistinguishable in all material
aspects from those addressed in [Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch
PAC)] will now be subject to'' the disclaimer requirement. See
Communications Disclaimer Requirements, 60 FR 52069, 52071 (Oct. 5,
1995).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Documents related to Commission advisory opinions are
available on the Commission's website at www.fec.gov/data/legal/advisory-opinions/.
\12\ At the time, 11 CFR 110.11 explicitly applied to ``general
public political advertising.'' The current rule uses the term
``public communication'' as defined at 11 CFR 100.26, which includes
``general public political advertising.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Public Law 107-155, 116
Stat. 81 (2002) (``BCRA''), added specificity to the disclaimer
requirements (including ``stand by your ad'' requirements for certain
radio and television communications), expanded the scope of
communications covered by the disclaimer requirements, and defined a
new term, ``public communication,'' that did not reference the
internet. See 52 U.S.C. 30101(22), 30120; see also 2002 Disclaimer E&J,
67 FR at 76962. The Commission promulgated rules to implement BCRA's
changes to the disclaimer provisions of the Act and the new statutory
definition of ``public communication.'' See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR
at 76962; Prohibited and Excessive Contributions: Non-Federal Funds or
Soft Money, 67 FR 49064, 49111 (July 29, 2002) (``Non-Federal Funds
E&J''). The 2002 rules incorporated the term ``public communication''
to describe the general reach of the disclaimer rules and applied the
disclaimer requirements to political committees' websites and
distribution of more than 500 substantially similar unsolicited emails.
Other than these two specific types of internet-based activities by
political committees, however, internet communications were excluded
from the regulatory definition of ``public communication'' and,
therefore, outside the scope of the disclaimer requirements that apply
to public communications. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR at 76963-64;
Non-Federal Funds E&J, 67 FR at 49111.
In 2006, after a court challenge to the regulatory definition of
``public communication,'' the Commission revised its rules to include
internet communications ``placed for a fee on another person's
website'' in the definition of ``public communication'' and, therefore,
within the scope of the disclaimer rule. See 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR
at 18594; see also Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004)
(holding, among other things, that Commission could not wholly exclude
internet activity from the definition of ``public communication''). The
Commission explained that, under the revised definition, ``when someone
such as an individual, political committee, labor organization or
corporation pays a fee to place a banner, video, or pop-up
advertisement on another person's website, the person paying makes a
`public communication.''' 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR at 18593-94.
Furthermore, the Commission explained that ``the
[[Page 12867]]
placement of advertising on another person's website for a fee includes
all potential forms of advertising, such as banner advertisements,
streaming video, popup advertisements, and directed search results.''
\13\ Id.; see also id. at 18608 n.52 (noting that, as used in a
different context, ``terms `website' and `any internet or electronic
publication' are meant to encompass a wide range of existing and
developing technology'' including ``social networking software'').
Thus, since 2006, Commission regulations have required disclaimer
information to be included in certain paid internet advertisements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ But ``when the search results are displayed as a result of
the normal function of a search engine, and not based on any payment
for the display of a result, the search results are not forms of
`general public political advertising,' '' and ``where a search
engine returns a website hyperlink in its normal course, and
features the same hyperlink separately as the result of a paid
sponsorship arrangement, the latter is a `public communication'
while the former is not.'' 2006 internet E&J, 71 FR at 18594 n.28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Application of Disclaimer Rule to ``Small'' Internet Communications
The Commission has been asked on a number of occasions about the
application of the disclaimer requirement to internet communications,
including small, character- or space-limited internet communications
such as banner advertisements; social media text, video, or image
advertisements; and directed search results. The queries center on
whether the communications are exempt from the disclaimer requirements
under the impracticable or small items exceptions at 11 CFR
110.11(f)(1) or whether they may incorporate technological
modifications to satisfy the disclaimer requirements.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund);
Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google); see also Advisory Opinion
Request, Advisory Opinion 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging) (Sept. 11,
2013); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (Facebook)
(Apr. 26, 2011). In addition to the advisory opinion requests
concerning internet advertisements, another advisory opinion request
asked the Commission to apply the impracticable exception in support
of truncating a political committee's name in disclaimers on its
mass emails and on its website. See Advisory Opinion 2013-13
(Freshman Hold'em JFC et al.) at n.4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has applied the small items exception to the general
disclaimer requirements in situations where there are ``technological
limitations on both the size and the length of information'' that can
be contained based on the small physical size of the item or an
external technological constraint. Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for
Growth PAC) at 3 (declining to extend small items exception to spoken
disclaimer requirement); see also Advisory Opinion 1980-42 (Hart for
Senate Campaign Committee) (applying the exception to concert tickets);
Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless) (applying the exception to
character-limited ``short message service,'' or SMS, communications
distributed through a non-internet-based wireless telecommunications
network); 11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(i). In the Target Wireless advisory
opinion, the Commission considered whether disclaimers were required on
paid content distributed via SMS communications through a non-internet-
based wireless telecommunications network. At the time the Commission
issued that advisory opinion, technology limited SMS content to 160
text-only characters per message; SMS messages could not include
images; wireless telephone carriers contractually required consumers to
pay a flat fee for a certain number of SMS messages that consumers
could receive; and content longer than 160 text characters would be
sent over multiple messages, which might not be received consecutively.
Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless) at 2. The Commission
concluded that the small items exception applied to paid SMS messages,
noting ``that the SMS technology places similar limits on the length of
a political advertisement as those that exist with bumper stickers.''
Id. at 4.
The Commission has not exempted any disclaimers under the small
items exception in the 15 years since it issued the Target Wireless
advisory opinion. The Commission discussed the small items exception in
Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC), which concerned whether
an advertiser could ``dispense with'' or ``truncate'' the required
disclaimers in 10- and 15-second television advertisements. The
Commission concluded that the advertisements did not qualify for the
small items exception.
The related impracticable exception at 11 CFR 110.11(f)(1)(ii)
exempts from the disclaimer requirement advertisements displayed via
skywriting, water towers, and wearing apparel, as well as ``other means
of displaying an advertisement of such a nature that the inclusion of a
disclaimer would be impracticable.'' The list of communications in the
rule is not exhaustive. The Commission has not, however, applied the
impracticable exception to a situation beyond those listed in section
110.11(f)(1)(ii). See Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC)
(determining that ``physical or technological limitations'' in 10- and
15-second television advertisements do not qualify for impracticable
exception); Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) (determining that
``live read'' traffic report sponsorship messages, delivered by
reporters from mobile units and aircraft, did not present ``specific
physical and technological limitations'' to qualify for impracticable
exception); see also Advisory Opinion 2013-13 (Freshman Hold'em JFC et
al.) at n.4 (concluding that ``emails and web pages . . . are not
electronic communications in which the inclusion of disclaimers may be
inherently impracticable.'').
Nonetheless, in Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks), the
Commission recognized that, although the ``physical and technological
limitations'' of a communication medium may ``not make it impracticable
to include a disclaimer at all,'' technological or physical limitations
may extend to ``one particular aspect of the disclaimer'' requirements.
Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) at 3. In such circumstances,
the Commission concluded that a disclaimer was required but permitted
modifications or adaptations of the technologically or physically
limited aspects of the communication medium. See id. at 3-4 (concluding
that reporters reading sponsorship message live from aircraft or mobile
units could read stand by your ad language, rather than candidate who
was not physically present).
The Commission was first asked to apply the small items exception
or impracticable exception to text-limited internet advertisements in
2010. Google proposed to sell AdWords search keyword advertisements
limited to 95 text characters; the proposed advertisements would not
include disclaimers but would link to a landing page (the purchasing
political committee's website) on which users would see a disclaimer.
See Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google). The Commission concluded that
Google's proposed AdWords program ``under the circumstances described .
. . [was] not in violation of the Act or Commission regulations,'' but
the advisory opinion did not answer whether Google AdWords ads would
qualify for the small items or impracticable exception. Id. at 2.
In response to two subsequent advisory opinion requests concerning
the possible application of the small items exception or impracticable
exception to small internet advertisements, the Commission was unable
to issue advisory opinions by the required four affirmative votes. See
Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 2011-09 (Facebook) (Apr. 26,
[[Page 12868]]
2011) (concerning application of exceptions to zero-to-160 text
character ads with thumbnail size images); Advisory Opinion Request,
Advisory Opinion 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging) (Sept. 11, 2013)
(concerning application of exceptions to mobile banner ads).
Finally, the Commission considered an advisory opinion request in
2017 asking whether paid image and video ads on Facebook ``must . . .
include all, some, or none of the disclaimer information specified by
52 U.S.C. 30120(a).'' Advisory Opinion Request at 4, Advisory Opinion
2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017). The Commission issued
an opinion concluding that the proposed Facebook image and video
advertisements ``must include all of the disclaimer information''
specified by the Act, but, in reaching this conclusion, Commissioners
relied on two different rationales, neither of which garnered the
required four affirmative votes. Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back
Action Fund) at 1.
D. Proposed Revision to the Definition of ``Public Communication'' at
11 CFR 100.26
As discussed above, the Commission proposed in the Technology NPRM
to revise the definition of ``public communication'' in 11 CFR 100.26
to include communications placed for a fee on another person's
``internet-enabled device or application,'' in addition to
communications placed for a fee on another person's website.
Disclaimers are required for any ``public communication'' that contains
express advocacy or solicits a contribution, and for all public
communications by political committees. The Commission wants to make
sure that any change to the definition of ``public communication'' in
11 CFR 100.26 is appropriate as applied in the disclaimer rule, given
the complexities of internet advertising and the rapid pace of
technological change.
Commenters in this rulemaking have offered insight into, as one
described it, the ``myriad of options for advertising via different
media and different platforms online.'' \15\ Since the Commission's
2006 internet rulemaking, the focus of internet activity has shifted
from blogging, websites, and listservs \16\ to social media networks
(Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn), media sharing networks (YouTube,
Instagram, and Snapchat), streaming applications (Netflix, Hulu), and
mobile devices and applications. Other significant developments include
augmented and virtual reality \17\ and the ``Internet of Things'':
Wearable devices (smart watches, smart glasses), home devices (Amazon
Echo), virtual assistants (Siri, Alexa), smart TVs and other smart home
appliances.\18\ One commenter noted, ``[a]s consumers move toward
virtual and augmented reality services, wearable technology, screenless
assistants, and other emerging technologies, there is every reason to
predict that advertisers will demand the ability to reach voters and
customers on those technologies, and, in turn, new advertising
configurations that have not yet been imagined will be developed.''
\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment at
9 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358503.
\16\ 2006 Internet E&J at 18590-91; see also Asian Americans
Advancing Justice, et al., Comment at 5 (Nov. 13, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=371144 (``In 2006, blogging
was at its height, and it seemed as if everyone would have his or
her own blog.'').
\17\ See Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment
at 9.
\18\ See Asian Americans Advancing Justice, et al., Comment at 7
(also noting potential for political advertising on ``smart
refrigerators'').
\19\ Google, Comment at 4-5 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358482.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, the Commission is reopening the definition of ``public
communication'' in 11 CFR 100.26 for the limited purpose of determining
whether revising the definition to include communications placed for a
fee on another person's ``internet-enabled device or application,'' in
addition to communications placed for a fee on another person's
website, would be a clear and technically accurate way to refer to the
various media through which paid internet communications can be and
will be sent and received. The Commission invites comment on this
proposal. Is it clear from the proposed language that both the
placement-for-a-fee requirement and the third-party requirement would
apply to websites, internet-enabled devices, and internet applications?
In this rulemaking, the Commission is not considering any change to the
definition of ``public communication'' other than the terminology that
should replace ``website'' as used in the definition.
E. Proposed Revision to the Disclaimer Rules at 11 CFR 110.11
Technological developments over the past 15 years have rendered
much current internet advertising distinguishable from the non-
internet-based SMS advertisements to which the Commission applied the
small items exception in Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless) and
from the internet advertisements the Commission considered in
promulgating the disclaimer regulations in 2002. As Facebook explained
in a comment on this rulemaking, ``[w]hen Facebook submitted its
request for an advisory opinion in 2011, ads on Facebook were small and
had limited space for text. Ad formats available on Facebook have
expanded dramatically since that time.'' \20\ Indeed, many internet
advertisements today include video, audio, and graphic components in
addition to the text components considered in the Target Wireless
advisory opinion. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion
2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017). Moreover, today,
commercial internet advertisements are subject to other federal
regulatory disclosure regimes.\21\ Are the different degrees of First
Amendment protection afforded political speech as opposed to commercial
speech relevant to any consideration of other agencies' disclosure
regimes? \22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Facebook noted that some of its ads ``continue to be
limited in size, with text limitations or truncations based on
format and placement of the ad,'' but that other formats ``allow for
additional creative flexibility.'' Facebook, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13,
2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358468 (citing
Facebook, Facebook Ads Guide, https://www.facebook.com/business/ads-guide (last visited Mar. 15, 2018)); see also Fidji Simo, An Update
on Facebook Ads, Facebook Newsroom (June 6, 2013), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2013/06/an-update-on-facebook-ads/ (announcing
reconfiguration of ad products); Google, Comment at 3 (noting that
the ``types and varieties of digital advertisements that political
advertisers create and place throughout the web has grown
exponentially since 2011.'').
\21\ See CMPLY, Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358493 (noting that regulatory
disclaimer and disclosure requirements ``have been addressed in
similar contexts for marketing, financial and pharmaceutical,
without those regulators exempting disclosures in social media
channels'').
\22\ See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (``Discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the
operation of the system of government established by our
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to
such political expression in order `to assure (the) unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.' '') (citation omitted); Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (``[G]overnment's
legitimate interest in protecting consumers from `commercial harms'
explains `why commercial speech can be subject to greater
governmental regulation than noncommercial speech' '') (citations
omitted); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 329 (``[P]olitical speech . .
. is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, the Commission's regulations have required
disclaimer information to be included in certain paid internet
advertisements since 2006. Spending on digital political advertising
grew almost eightfold just between 2012 and 2016, from $159 million to
$1.4
[[Page 12869]]
billion.\23\ Many commenters expressed the view that the need for
internet communication disclaimers has grown along with spending on
internet political advertising.\24\ As one commenter wrote, ``[T]he
increasing prominence of online election expenditures makes the failure
to update campaign finance laws to adequately cover the internet more
dangerous with every cycle.'' \25\ The dramatic growth in political
advertising on the internet highlights the need for regulatory clarity
in this area. As one commenter noted, ``[w]hatever the challenges of
applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic
principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First
Amendment's command, do not vary when a new and different medium for
communication appears.'' \26\ Other commenters noted that the
importance and value of political advertising disclaimers do not vary
when new forms of communication emerge.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See Borrell Associates, The Final Analysis: Political
Advertising in 2016, https://www.borrellassociates.com/industry-papers/free-summaries/borrell-2016-political-advertising-analysis-exec-sum-jan-2017-detail (subscription required).
\24\ See, e.g., Sunlight Foundation, Comment at 1 (Nov. 13,
2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=360854 (``The
FEC and Congress should act to ensure disclosures and disclaimers
are neither discretionary nor uneven . . . [D]isclaimers and
disclosures don't mean renouncing business or chilling speech, any
more than has been the case for TV or radio stations.'').
\25\ Brennan Center for Justice, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358487.
\26\ Institute for Free Speech, Comment at 3 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358495 (quoting Brown
v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011)).
\27\ See, e.g., BMore Indivisible, Comment at 5 (Nov. 9, 2017)
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358504 (stating that
``[p]roviding disclaimers o[n] internet and app advertising is an
extension of the role the FEC has historically performed for
traditional media. Online media advertising transparency is
increasingly essential as Americans turn to the internet as their
primary source of information'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, the Commission is proposing to add regulatory provisions
clarifying, for various types of paid internet public communications,
the disclaimers required and, in certain circumstances, when a paid
internet communication may employ a modified approach to the disclaimer
requirements.
As explained below, the Commission offers two proposals. They
differ in approach.
Alternative A proposes to apply the full disclaimer requirements
that now apply to radio and television communications to public
communications distributed over the internet with audio or video
components. Alternative A also proposes to apply the type of disclaimer
requirements that now apply to printed public communications to text
and graphic public communications distributed over the internet.
Finally, Alternative A would allow certain small text or graphic public
communications distributed over the internet to satisfy the disclaimer
requirements through an ``adapted disclaimer.''
Alternative B proposes to treat internet communications differently
from communications in traditional media. Alternative B would require
disclaimers on internet communications to be clear and conspicuous and
to meet the same general content requirement as other disclaimers,
without imposing the additional disclaimer requirements that apply to
print, radio, and television communications. Alternative B also
proposes to allow certain paid internet advertisements to satisfy the
disclaimer requirements through an adapted disclaimer, depending on the
amount of space or time necessary for a clear and conspicuous
disclaimer as a percentage of the overall advertisement. In the event
that an advertisement could not provide a disclaimer even through a
technological mechanism, Alternative B proposes to create an exception
to the disclaimer requirement specifically for paid internet
advertisements.
The Commission requests comment on all elements of both proposals.
The two proposals need not be considered as fixed alternatives;
commenters are encouraged to extract the best elements of each, or
suggest improvements or alternatives, to help the Commission fashion
the best possible rule.
1. Proposed Disclaimer Requirements for Communications Distributed Over
the Internet--Organization
Both Alternative A and Alternative B propose to add new paragraph
(c)(5) to 11 CFR 110.11. New paragraph (c)(5) in each proposal would
provide specific disclaimer requirements for internet communications.
This approach would be consistent with the current structure of the
disclaimer rule at 11 CFR 110.11, which categorizes disclaimer
requirements by the form of communication on which they appear.
In the first paragraph of Alternative B's proposed section (c)(5),
Alternative B proposes to define the term ``internet communications.''
Alternative A does not propose to introduce or define this term.
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A) defines ``internet
communications'' as email of more than 500 substantially similar
communications when sent by a political committee; internet websites of
political committees available to the general public; and ``internet
public communications'' as defined in paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B).
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) defines ``internet
public communication,'' in turn, as any communication placed for a fee
on another person's website or internet-enabled device or application.
Alternative B's proposed definition of ``internet communication'' is
intended to capture all communications distributed via the internet
that are subject to the disclaimer requirement. See 11 CFR
110.11(a)(1)-(3). Alternative B's proposed definition of ``internet
public communication'' is intended to capture all online ``public
communications,'' as defined in 11 CFR 100.26. Are the proposed
definitions sufficiently broad to encompass new technologies? Are they
platform-neutral? Should the definition of ``internet public
communication'' include a reference to virtual reality, social
networking, or internet platforms?
Both Alternative A and Alternative B propose to define additional
terms: ``adapted disclaimer,'' ``technological mechanism,'' and
``indicator.'' These terms are discussed below.
2. Disclaimer Requirements for Video and Audio Communications
Distributed Over the Internet
As described below, Alternative A proposes to extend the specific
requirements for disclaimers on radio and television communications to
public communications distributed over the internet with audio or video
components. Under Alternative A, such audio and video internet public
communications would also be required to satisfy the general
requirements that apply to all public communications requiring
disclaimers. Alternative B likewise proposes to require that radio and
television communications distributed over the internet must satisfy
the general requirements that apply to all public communications
requiring disclaimers. Alternative B would not extend any additional
disclaimer requirements to such communications.
a. Alternative A--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii)
As noted above, the Act and Commission regulations impose specific
requirements for disclaimers on radio and television communications.
See 52 U.S.C. 30120(d); 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)-(4). These requirements
vary, depending on whether a candidate or another person pays for or
authorizes the communication.
Radio communications paid for or authorized by a candidate must
include
[[Page 12870]]
an audio statement spoken by the candidate, identifying the candidate
and stating that the candidate has approved the communication. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(3)(i). Radio communications that are not paid for or
authorized by a candidate must include an audio statement identifying
the person paying for the communication and that that person ``is
responsible for the content of this advertising.'' 11 CFR
110.11(c)(4)(i).
Television, broadcast, cable, or satellite communications paid for
or authorized by a candidate must include a statement by the candidate,
identifying the candidate and stating that the candidate has approved
the communication, either through a full-screen view of the candidate
making the statement or by a voice-over accompanied by a ``clearly
identifiable photographic or similar image'' of the candidate; these
communications must also include a similar statement ``in clearly
readable writing'' at the end of the communication. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(3)(ii)-(iii). Television, broadcast, cable, or satellite
communications that are not paid for or authorized by a candidate must
include the audio statement required by 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4)(i) and
conveyed by a ``full-screen view of a representative'' of the person
making the statement or in a voice-over by such person; these
communications must also include a similar statement ``in clearly
readable writing'' at the end of the communication. 11 CFR
110.11(c)(4)(ii)-(iii).\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ The Commission previously extended the ``stand by your ad''
requirements to communications transmitted through broadcast, cable,
or satellite transmission. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR at 76963
(referring to ``the Commission's judgment that it would be
unsupportable to require a disclaimer for a television communication
that was broadcast, while not requiring a disclaimer for the same
communication merely because it was carried on cable or
satellite'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As noted above, internet advertisements may be in the form of audio
or video communications, or may incorporate audio or video
elements.\29\ Alternative A is based on the premise that these
advertisements are indistinguishable from offline advertisements that
may be distributed on radio or television, broadcast, cable, or
satellite in all respects other than the medium of distribution.\30\
Moreover, because the audio and video components of internet
communications with these elements do not contain ``character''
restrictions, Alternative A proposes to apply parameters to such
communications akin to the parameters in which disclaimers must appear
on radio and television advertisements rather than the conditions that
may constrain ``printed'' materials on which a disclaimer must appear.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ See, e.g., 5 Advertising Trends from the 2016 Presidential
Election, Pandora for Brands (Dec. 8, 2016), https://pandoraforbrands.com/insight/5-advertising-trends-from-the-2016-presidential-election (urging readers ``[t]o learn how Pandora can
help amplify your next political campaign''); Amy Schatz, In Hot
Pursuit of the Digital Voter, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 2012,
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303812904577299820064048072
(showing screenshots of 2012 presidential committee advertisements
on Hulu and noting another campaign's purchase of advertisements on
Pandora internet radio); see also Advisory Opinion Request at 4,
Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund) (Oct. 31, 2017).
\30\ See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment
at 3 (Nov. 3, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358477 (urging extension of broadcast
communication disclaimer requirements to ``analogous'' communication
online); Rep. John Sarbanes et al., Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358505 (noting belief
of 18 Members of Congress that ``it is past time for the Commission
to take action to harmonize disclaimer requirements for paid
internet communications, regardless of size, on internet platforms
with advertisements served on other media, such as broadcast
television or radio''); accord 2006 Internet E&J, 71 FR at 18609
(``The Commission has consistently viewed online, internet-based
dissemination of news stories, commentaries, and editorials to be
indistinguishable from offline television and radio broadcasts,
newspapers, magazines and periodical publications for the purposes
of applying the media exemption under the Act''); but see Software
and Information Industry Association, Comment at 3 (Nov. 13, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358508 (``Digital
advertising is inherently more diverse than a simple transition of
similar content from print or broadcast television.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, in Alternative A, the Commission proposes to provide
that public communications distributed over the internet with audio or
video components are treated, for purposes of the disclaimer rules, the
same as ``radio'' or ``television'' communications. The Commission, in
Alternative A, proposes to do so in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii),
which would incorporate the existing requirements at 11 CFR
110.11(c)(3) and (4) that apply to radio, television, broadcast, cable,
and satellite communications, because those provisions have been in
operation for 15 years and are, therefore, familiar to persons paying
for, authorizing, and distributing communications. Moreover, by
applying the specifications for radio and television communications to
audio and video communications distributed over the internet, the
proposed regulations would ensure that internet audio ads could air on
radio and internet video ads could air on television without having to
satisfy different disclaimer requirements.
Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would provide that a
``public communication distributed over the internet with audio but
without video, graphic, or text components'' must include the statement
described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(i) and (iv) if authorized by a
candidate, or the statement described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4) if not
authorized by a candidate.
Alternative A's proposals concerning audio communications (like
Alternative A's proposals for video, text, and graphic internet
communications discussed below) incorporate the term ``public
communication,'' as it exists or may be amended, to make clear that
these provisions neither expand nor contract the scope of the
disclaimer rules set forth at 11 CFR 110.11(a). The proposed reference
to ``a public communication distributed over the internet with an audio
component but without video, graphic, or text components'' (like the
reference to the ``internet'' in Alternative A's proposals for video,
text, and graphic internet communications discussed below) is intended
to encompass advertisements on websites as well as those distributed on
other internet-enabled or digital devices or applications; for audio
internet advertisements, these would include communications on
podcasts, internet radio stations, or app channels.\31\ The proposed
reference to a ``public communication distributed over the internet''
is not intended to alter the definition of ``public communication,'' as
defined in 11 CFR 100.26. Is this clear, or should the Commission
include a cross-reference in the regulatory text? Moreover, so as to
hew most closely to the ``radio'' provisions that Alternative A
incorporates, the proposed amendments regarding ``audio'' internet
communications are intended to apply to those communications with only
an audio component. The Commission proposes to address communications
with any ``video, graphic, or text components'' separately, as
explained below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See Software and Information Industry Association, Comment
at 3 (``in-app advertising has become one of the fastest-growing
mobile ad mediums'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would also provide
that a ``public communication distributed over the internet with a
video component'' must include the statement described in 11 CFR
110.11(c)(3)(ii)-(iv) if authorized by a candidate, or the statement
described in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(4) if not authorized by a candidate.
Because this proposal is intended to encompass video public
communications on websites, apps, and streaming video services,
Alternative A's proposed new paragraph (c)(5)(ii)
[[Page 12871]]
would apply to a video that a political committee pays to run as a
``pre-roll'' video on the YouTube app or appear in a promoted
YouTube.com search result, but would not apply to the same video posted
for free on YouTube.com (since a communication not placed for a fee
would not be a ``public communication'').\32\ Unlike traditional
television, broadcast, cable, or satellite ads, however, video
advertisements placed online may include non-video components such as
separate text, or graphic fields. The proposed rule regarding internet
video ads thus would differ from the existing television, broadcast,
cable, and satellite provisions in that the proposed rule would apply
even if the communication also included non-video components.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See Google, Comment at 3 (describing Google ad products on
YouTube).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This aspect of Alternative A would not explicitly address small
audio or video internet ads. The Commission proposes to take this
approach to hew Alternative A's proposed rules on audio and video ads
as closely as possible to the existing disclaimer provisions for
advertisements transmitted by radio, television, broadcast, cable, and
satellite, which do not, in paragraphs (c)(3) or (4), account for
``small'' advertisements. Should new technology develop that would
render the provision of a disclaimer on a particular type of audio or
video internet communication impracticable, the Commission anticipates
that, as with current TV and radio ads, such circumstances could be
addressed in an advisory opinion seeking to exempt such a communication
from the disclaimer requirements.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See 11 CFR 112.1 (describing advisory opinion requests);
see also Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC) (considering
and rejecting request to apply small items exception to disclaimers
in 10- and 15-second television advertisements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission seeks comment as to whether these proposals
accurately describe audio and video communications over the internet,
regardless of the electronic or digital platforms on which they may be
distributed. For example, does the Commission need to clarify or expand
the term ``internet''? Similarly, does the Commission need to clarify
the term ``video'' to address whether an advertisement with a GIF is a
communication ``with a video component'' or one with a ``graphic''
component? Similarly, should the Commission expressly include or
exclude from the term ``video'' static (i.e., non-moving) paid digital
advertisements in dynamic (i.e., moving) environments such as
``billboard'' ads inside interactive gaming systems, or virtual-reality
and augmented-reality platforms? \34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See, e.g., Steve Gorman, Obama Buys First Video Game
Campaign Ads, Reuters, Oct. 17, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-videogames/obama-buys-first-video-game-campaign-ads-idUSTRE49EAGL20081017 (showing example of static court-
side ad in dynamic basketball gaming environment).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission also welcomes comment on any aspect of these
proposals, including the approach towards the exceptions and, more
generally, the advisability of treating audio and video internet
communications in the manner that radio, television, broadcast, cable,
and satellite communications are treated.
b. Alternative B--Proposed Paragraph (c)(5)(ii)
The proposals in Alternative B are premised on the internet as a
``unique medium of . . . communication[]'' \35\ that poses ``unique
challenges with respect to advertising disclosures.'' \36\ Although
advertisements on the internet may often look or sound like television
or radio advertisements, several commenters focused on the differences
between internet advertising and advertising on more traditional forms
of media. As one stated, ``[d]igital advertising is inherently more
diverse than a simple transition of similar content from print or
broadcast television. It comes in many different formats presented
across a wide range of technology platforms with screen size ranging
from large to very small.'' \37\ Another commenter noted that, ``[i]n
addition to character-limited ads that just feature text, there are
banner ads with images and text, video ads with text, and audio ads
that also feature a corresponding interactive image or video on an
app.'' \38\ A third commented on the ``nearly infinite range . . . of
possible combinations of hardware, software, add-ons, screen sizes and
resolutions, individualized settings, and other factors . . . can
affect the display of a political communication'' on the internet.\39\
``Content that is optimized for viewing on phones, tablets, and other
mobile devices is distinct from content that appears on a desktop or
laptop computer.'' \40\ The ``ways people physically interact with
content also vary by medium (e.g., a user can `rollover' content on a
desktop screen to see more information, but may not use a mouse or view
rollovers on a mobile device).'' \41\ In addition, internet
advertisements can vary significantly in duration. Internet ads can
last for as little as ``fifteen seconds . . . or even shorter,'' and
entire ad campaigns can last for as little as ``a few days or just a
few hours for events like flash sales.'' \42\ Moreover, ``[p]aid
advertising on the internet is constantly evolving in nature.'' \43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ Public Citizen and Free Speech for People, Comment at 3
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358485
(expressing the view that ``disclaimers on all forms of on-line paid
campaign advertising are practical and pose little inconvenience''
to sponsors or recipients); see also id. at 1 (referring to ``the
unique medium of internet communications'' in urging Commission to
proceed with rulemaking).
\36\ Software & Information Industry Association, Comment at 3.
\37\ Id.
\38\ Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment at
9.
\39\ Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 5 (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358499.
\40\ Facebook, Comment at 2.
\41\ Id.
\42\ Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment at
11.
\43\ Public Citizen and Free Speech for People, Comment at 3;
see also American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations, et al., Comment at 2 (Dec. 19, 2016), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354341 (``Since the technology
of the internet is rapidly changing, and will likely continue to do
so indefinitely, the Commission's rules in this area must be
sufficiently flexible and principle-focused so they do not become
obsolete in short order.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the rapid pace of technological change and an inability to
forecast the future, the revisions to the disclaimer rules proposed in
Alternative B are intended to recognize the differences between the
internet and traditional forms of media like newspapers, radio, and
television.\44\ Thus, Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii)
would require disclaimers on internet communications to meet the
general content requirements in 11 CFR 110.11(b) and the general
``clear and conspicuous'' requirement of 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1), but not
the additional ``stand by your ad'' requirements for radio and
television communications.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See Center for Competitive Politics, Comment at 3 (Dec. 19,
2016), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=354344; see also
Campaign Solutions, Comment at 1 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=365826 (``As new and
disruptive technologies change the way we interact with technology
and consume media, we are sometimes unable to anticipate the format
of political advertising.''); Computer & Communications Industry
Association, Comment at 13 (``Campaigns are constantly trying new
methods to appeal to new voters, and political campaign
communication and advertising methods change with every election
cycle. As technology develops, new forms of advertising could become
available.'').
\45\ See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment at 2 (Nov. 9,
2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358498; see also
Google, Comment at 4 (``unlike broadcast advertising, which involves
an advertiser providing a static advertisement to the broadcaster
that is the same ad every time it airs, digital ads can be
dynamic''); Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 4 (``Any
internet-related regulations should afford speakers maximum
flexibility in satisfying any applicable disclaimer requirements,
rather than being tied to specific forms of communication that may
become superseded or outmoded.''). But see supra n.30 and comments
cited therein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 12872]]
The Act requires all disclaimers to provide payment and
authorization information, regardless of the form that the
communication may take, but imposes additional ``stand by your ad''
requirements only on television and radio communications.\46\ Does the
Commission have the legal authority to extend those requirements to
internet communications? \47\ If so, should the Commission exercise
that authority? Or, as a practical matter, do the differences between
internet advertising and radio and television advertising make the
``stand by your ad'' requirements a poor fit for audio and video public
communications on the internet? Some commenters in this rulemaking
indicated that the internet is a continuously evolving advertising
medium with a wide range of platforms, formats, displays, duration, and
interactivity. Are the ``stand by your ad'' requirements for television
and radio communications overly inflexible by comparison? \48\ For
example, television advertisements must have both spoken and written
disclaimers. One commenter estimated that the spoken disclaimer can
take five or more seconds to deliver,\49\ and the Act requires the
written disclaimer to appear ``in a clearly readable manner . . . for a
period of at least 4 seconds.'' \50\ Is it reasonable to impose these
requirements on paid internet advertisements? \51\ Should audio or
video internet ads that are very short be required to provide full
``stand by your ad'' disclaimer information, as the Commission has
decided in the television advertising context? \52\ Does requiring a
candidate or other individual representing the payor to claim
responsibility for a communication by image or voice-over (as is
currently required for radio and television communications) impose an
additional burden on the person making the communication? Is this the
type of obligation that courts have approved in television and radio
advertising? What additional information, if any, does this requirement
convey to a reader, viewer, or listener about the source of the
communication?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Compare 52 U.S.C. 30120(d) (imposing ``stand by your ad''
requirements on radio and television communications only) with 30104
(requiring Commission to make disclosure reports publicly available
on internet), 30112 (requiring Commission to maintain central site
on internet).
\47\ The recently introduced Honest Ads Act would amend the Act
by requiring, among other things, disclaimers on internet
communications to comply with the same ``stand by your ad''
requirements as radio and television communications. See S. 1989,
115th Cong. Sec. 7(b) (2017).
\48\ See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 30120(d)(1)(B) (requiring television
advertisement authorized by candidate to provide disclaimer through
``unobscured, full-screen view of the candidate making the
statement, or the candidate in voice-over, accompanied by a clearly
identifiable photographic or similar image of the candidate,'' and
``in writing at the end of the communication in a clearly readable
manner with a reasonable degree of color contrast between the
background and the printed statement, for a period of at least 4
seconds''), 30120(d)(2) (requiring television advertisement not
authorized by candidate to provide disclaimer ``conveyed by an
unobscured, full-screen view of a representative of the political
committee or other person making the statement, or by a
representative of such political committee or other person in voice-
over, and shall also appear in a clearly readable manner with a
reasonable degree of color contrast between the background and the
printed statement, for a period of at least 4 seconds'').
\49\ See Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment
at 11.
\50\ 52 U.S.C. 30120(d)(1)(B)(ii), (d)(2) (emphasis added); see
also 11 CFR 110.11(c)(3)(iii)(B), (c)(4)(iii)(B).
\51\ See Computer & Communications Industry Association, Comment
at 11 (stating that audio advertisements on internet ``could be
fifteen seconds in length or even shorter'' and urging Commission to
``avoid rigidly extending broadcast radio spoken-word disclaimer
requirements for radio to online platforms'').
\52\ See Advisory Opinion 2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC)
(requiring full stand-by-your-ad disclaimers in 10- and 15-second
television advertisements).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Disclaimer Requirements for Text and Graphic Communications
Distributed Over the Internet
As described below, Alternative A proposes to extend to text and
graphic public communications distributed over the internet that lack
any video component the specific requirements for disclaimers on
printed public communications. Under Alternative A, such text and
graphic public communications would also be required to satisfy the
general requirements that apply to all public communications requiring
disclaimers. Alternative B proposes to require all public
communications distributed over the internet, including text and
graphic public communications, to satisfy the general requirements that
apply to all public communications requiring disclaimers, and does not
propose to extend any additional disclaimer requirements to such
communications.
a. Alternative A
i. Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(i)
Internet advertisements may be in the form of text, image, and
other graphic elements with audio but without video components; such
advertisements come ``in all shapes and sizes.'' \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Google, Comment at 5 (describing ad products on the Google
Display Network); see also Advisory Opinion Request 2017-12 (Take
Back Action Fund) at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative A proposes to adapt the existing requirements at 11 CFR
110.11(c)(2) that apply to printed communications because they have
been in operation for 15 years and are, therefore, familiar to persons
paying for, authorizing, and distributing communications.
Alternative A's proposed new paragraph (c)(5)(i) would provide that
a ``public communication distributed over the internet with text or
graphic components but without any video component'' must contain a
disclaimer that is of ``sufficient type size to be clearly readable by
the recipient of the communication,'' a requirement adapted from 11 CFR
110.11(c)(2)(i). Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i) would
further specify this ``text size'' requirement by providing that a
``disclaimer that appears in letters at least as large as the majority
of the other text in the communication satisfies the size
requirement.'' Finally, Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)
would require that a disclaimer be displayed ``with a reasonable degree
of color contrast between the background and the text of the
disclaimer,'' a requirement the proposal indicates would be satisfied
if the disclaimer ``is displayed in black text on a white background or
if the degree of color contrast between the background and the text of
the disclaimer is no less than the color contrast between the
background and the largest text used in the communication.'' These
proposals are adapted from 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(iii).
ii. Text or Graphic Internet Communications With Video or Audio
Components
The proposal in Alternative A regarding a public communication
distributed over the internet ``with text or graphic components but
without any video component'' is intended to work in conjunction with
Alternative A's video proposal discussed above; under the operation of
both of these parts of Alternative A, an internet communication that
contains both text or graphic elements and a video component would be
subject only to the specific disclaimer rules applicable to television,
broadcast, cable, and satellite communications that are incorporated
into Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii). The Commission
seeks
[[Page 12873]]
comment on this proposal. In particular, the Commission seeks comment
regarding how users interact with internet advertisements that contain
both text or graphic and video elements. Is it common for users to view
only the printed or video components of an internet advertisement that
contains both? Should the Commission require that such communications
include at least an adapted disclaimer, see below, on the face of the
text or graphic element? Do such adapted disclaimers provide adequate
transparency? How important is it for adapted disclaimers to provide
information sufficient to identify the communication's payor on the
communication's face? Would a hyperlink in a communication be a
reliable way to identify the payor or could hyperlinks prove to be
transient? Could an indicator be used to defeat disclosure by linking
to, for example, goo.gl/nRk1H1 at publication and then, once a
complaint is filed with the Commission, to an actual political
committee's website? Should the Commission consider other approaches,
such as allowing political committees to identify themselves in adapted
disclaimers with their FEC Committee ID numbers? Should or could the
Commission require the hyperlinks on the adapted disclaimers of
political committees to connect to the committees' fec.gov pages? \54\
Should the Commission adopt rules that require a disclaimer to be
included on either the text and graphic portion or the video portion of
an internet advertisement, or on both portions, depending on the
proportion of the advertisement that contains each type of content?
Alternatively, should the rules allow an advertiser the choice between
the ``television'' or ``text and graphic'' communication disclaimer
rules for an internet communication that contains both video and text
or graphic components?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ For example: https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00580100/?tab=about-committee, where ``C00580100'' is the organization's
Committee ID.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, under the operation of the ``text or graphic'' and audio
proposals in Alternative A, an internet communication that contains
both text and graphic elements and an audio, but not a video,
component, would be subject to the specific disclaimer rules applicable
only to text or graphic communications. Alternative A does not propose
to include such communications in the proposed ``audio'' rules because
such advertisements appear more like text or graphic communications
than ``radio'' ones. The Commission seeks comment on this proposal. In
particular, and as with the proposal above, the Commission seeks
comment regarding how users interact with internet advertisements that
contain both text or graphic and audio elements. Is it common for users
only to view the printed components or listen to the audio components
of an internet advertisement that contains both? Should the Commission
instead consider such advertisements under the ``audio'' proposals
discussed above? Should the Commission require that such communications
include both ``radio'' and text or graphic disclaimers? Should the
Commission adopt rules that require disclaimer to be included in either
the ``text or graphic'' or audio portion of an internet advertisement,
or on both portions, depending on the proportion of the advertisement
that contains each type of content? Alternatively, should the rules
allow an advertiser the choice between the ``radio'' or ``text or
graphic'' communication disclaimer rules for an internet communication
that contains both audio and text or graphic components?
iii. Text and Graphic Internet Communication Disclaimer Text Size Safe
Harbor
Alternative A proposes to establish a ``safe harbor'' provision
identifying disclaimer text size--``letters at least as large as the
majority of the other text in the communication''--that clearly
satisfies the rule. This would track the current approach for
``printed'' materials. See 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 76965 (describing
current 12-point type safe harbor for printed communication
disclaimers); cf. Advisory Opinion 1995-09 (NewtWatch PAC) at 2
(approving disclaimer on political committee's website that was
``printed in the same size type as much of the body of the
communication''). The Commission recognizes that some text or graphic
internet communications may not have a ``majority'' text size. The
possible diversity of text sizes in internet text and graphic
communications is, in this respect, similar to text size diversity in
printed communications currently addressed in 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(i).
As the Commission explained when adopting the current safe harbor in
lieu of a strict size requirement, ``the vast differences in the
potential size and manner of display of larger printed communications
would render fixed type-size examples ineffective and inappropriate.''
2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 76965. Thus, for internet communications
with text or graphic components that are not included in the proposed
text-size safe harbor, the intent behind Alternative A is that
questions of whether a disclaimer is of sufficient type size to be
clearly readable would be ``determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the vantage point from which the communication is intended
to be seen or read as well as the actual size of the disclaimer text,''
as they are under the current rule for printed materials. Id. Would the
use of metrics minimize the need for case-by-case determinations?
b. Alternative B--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii)
Alternative B proposes to treat graphic, text, audio, and video
communications on the internet equally for disclaimer purposes. Under
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) in Alternative B, disclaimers for all
such communications would have to meet the general content requirement
of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and be ``clear and conspicuous'' under 11 CFR
110.11(c)(1), including disclaimers for graphic and text communications
on the internet. Thus, the disclaimers would have to be ``presented in
a clear and conspicuous manner, to give the reader, observer, or
listener adequate notice of the identity of the person or political
committee that paid for and, where required, that authorized the
communication,'' 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1). Under Alternative B, disclaimers
could not be difficult to read or hear, and their placement could not
be easily overlooked. Id. Is Alternative B's proposal to treat internet
communications differently from print, radio, and TV communications for
disclaimer purposes a reasonable approach to address current internet
advertisements and future developments in internet communications?
Alternative B does not propose to create any safe harbors. The
intent behind Alternative B is to establish objective criteria that
would cover all situations and minimize the need for case-by-case
determinations. Would safe harbors nonetheless be helpful in
interpreting and applying the proposed rule? Or do safe harbors tend to
become the de facto legal standard applied in advisory opinions and
enforcement actions?
4. Adapted Disclaimers for Public Communications Distributed Over the
Internet
Alternatives A and B both propose that some public communications
distributed over the internet may satisfy
[[Page 12874]]
the disclaimer requirement by an ``adapted disclaimer,'' which includes
an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the communication in
conjunction with a technological mechanism that leads to a full
disclaimer, rather than by providing a full disclaimer on the face of
the communication itself. Some aspects of both proposals are similar,
and some are different, in ways highlighted below.
The discussion in this section explains the Commission's
alternative proposals for when a public communication distributed over
the internet may utilize an adapted disclaimer. Alternative A allows
the use of an adapted disclaimer when a full disclaimer cannot fit on
the face of a text or graphic internet communication due to
technological constraints. Alternative B allows the use of an adapted
disclaimer when a full disclaimer would occupy more than a certain
percentage of any internet public communication's available time or
space. Under Alternative B, the first tier of an adapted disclaimer
would require the identification of the payor plus an indicator on the
face of the communication. Alternative B's second tier adapted
disclaimer would require only an indicator on the face of the
communication.
a. Alternative A--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(i)(A): When a
Communication May Use Technological Adaptations
While current text and graphic internet advertisements are akin in
many respects to analog printed advertisements, material differences
between them remain. Most significant among these differences are the
availability of ``micro'' sized text and graphic internet
advertisements and the interactive capabilities of advertisements over
the internet.\55\ To ensure the disclaimer rules remain applicable to
new forms of internet advertising that may arise, while also reducing
the need for serial revisions to Commission regulations in light of
such developments, Alternative A proposes adopting a provision
specifically addressing those text and graphic internet advertisements
that cannot, due to external character or space constraints,
practically include a full disclaimer on the face of the communication.
See Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) at 3 (concluding that
modifications or adaptations to disclaimers may be permissible in light
of technologically or physically limited aspects of a communication).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See Public Citizen and Free Speech for People, Comment at 3
(noting that paid online communications by ``bots'' ``can be very
short and seamlessly integrated into social conversations. Absent
disclaimers, such messages are not likely to be perceived as paid
messages''); see also Spot-On, Comment at 8 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358480 (noting that ``all
[online] ads link to some sort of web page or presence'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accordingly, under Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A),
a ``public communication distributed over the internet with text or
graphic components but without any video component'' that, ``due to
external character or space constraints,'' cannot fit a required
disclaimer must include an ``adapted disclaimer.'' This provision would
explain the circumstances under which a communication may use
technological adaptations, describe how the adaptations must be
presented, and provide examples of the adaptations.
Under Alternative A, the determination of whether a public
communication distributed over the internet with text or graphic
components but without any video component cannot fit a full disclaimer
is intended to be an objective one. That is, the character or space
constraints intrinsic to the technological medium are intended to be
the relevant consideration, not the communication sponsor's subjective
assessment of the ``difficulty'' or ``burden'' of including a full
disclaimer. As the Supreme Court has held in the context of broadcast
advertisements, the government's informational interest is sufficient
to justify disclaimer requirements even when a speaker claims that the
inclusion of a disclaimer ``decreases both the quantity and
effectiveness of the group's speech.'' Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
368. Alternative A is built upon the proposition that the informational
interest relied upon by the Supreme Court with respect to broadcast
communications is equally implicated in the context of text and graphic
public communications distributed over the internet.
Alternative A's reference to ``external character or space
constraints'' is intended to codify the approach to those terms as the
Commission has discussed them in the context of the small items and
impracticable exceptions discussed above. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion
2007-33 (Club for Growth PAC) at 3 (contrasting lack of ``physical or
technological limitations'' constraining 10- and 15-second television
advertisements with ``overall limit'' and ``internal limit'' on size or
length of SMS ads); Advisory Opinion 2004-10 (Metro Networks) at 3
(discussing ``physical and technological limitations'' of ad read live
from helicopter). This approach to determining when a communication
cannot fit a required disclaimer--rather than by the particular size of
the communication as measured by pixels, number of characters, or other
measurement--is intended to minimize the need for serial revisions to
Commission regulations as internet technology may evolve. Should
existing or newly developed internet advertising opportunities raise
questions as to whether a particular communication may fit a
disclaimer, the intent behind Alternative A is that such questions may
be addressed in an advisory opinion context.\56\ Would this approach
provide sufficient clarity about the application of the disclaimer
requirement, and the disclaimer exceptions, to particular
communications? Should Alternative A, if adopted, preclude the use of
the small items and impracticable exceptions for internet public
communications?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ See 11 CFR 112.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Does the ``external character or space constraints'' approach
provide sufficiently clear guidance in light of existing technology or
technological developments that may occur? Is it clear what ``cannot
fit'' means in the proposed rule? Should the Commission adopt a safe
harbor indicating that ads with particular pixel size, character limit,
or other technological characteristic may use adapted disclaimers? Or
do safe harbors tend to become the de facto legal standard in advisory
opinions and enforcement actions? If the Commission were to adopt
either a bright-line rule or a safe harbor based on pixel size,
character limit, or other technological characteristic, what should
those technological limits be? Does the ``external character or space
constraints'' wording make clear that business decisions to sell small
ads that are not constrained by actual technological limitations do not
justify use of an adapted disclaimer? Are there circumstances under
which requiring a full disclaimer to appear on the face of an internet
ad would cause the speaker to curtail his or her message, or purchase a
larger ad, or run the ad on a different platform? Are there
circumstances under which such a requirement would discourage the
speaker from running the ad at all? Is there anything about advertising
on the internet that would warrant a different conclusion than courts
have reached in upholding the Act's disclaimer requirements on
political advertising in other media?
[[Page 12875]]
b. Alternative B--Proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii)-(iv): When a
Communication May Use Technological Adaptations
In applying the disclaimer rules to internet public communications,
Alternative B proposes to allow any form of paid internet
advertisement--including audio and video ads--to utilize an adapted
disclaimer under certain conditions.\57\ Alternative B proposes to
establish a bright-line rule to help speakers determine for themselves
when they may utilize an adapted disclaimer.\58\ The ``bright line'' is
determined by the amount of time or space necessary to provide a full
disclaimer in an internet public communication as a percentage of the
overall communication.\59\ Proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii) in
Alternative B suggests ``ten percent of the time or space in an
internet communication'' as the appropriate amount. If the amount of
time or space necessary for a clear and conspicuous disclaimer exceeds
ten percent, then the speaker may, under Alternative B, provide an
adapted disclaimer. Is ten percent a reasonable figure, or is it too
high or too low? \60\ Should the Commission adopt a different benchmark
for allowing political speakers to use available technology to provide
disclaimers for their internet public communications? Is Alternative
B's proposed approach sufficiently clear to enable speakers to
administer it for themselves rather than seek advisory opinions before
engaging in political advertising online?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ Neither Alternative proposes to allow political committees
to provide disclaimers through a technological mechanism for their
email of more than 500 substantially similar communications or their
internet websites available to the general public.
\58\ See, e.g., Facebook, Comment at 3 (encouraging ``a
regulatory approach that provides advertisers flexibility to meet
their disclaimer obligations in innovative ways that take full
advantage of the technological advances in communication the
internet makes possible''); Campaign Legal Center and Democracy 21,
Comment at 2 (Nov. 14, 2011), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=98749 (``Innovation, not exemption, is the
answer.''); American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations et al., Comment at 2 (``[R]ules in this area must be .
. . flexible and principle-focused . . . . The challenge is to
achieve both public informational goals and provide sufficient
clarity to speakers about the rules so there is both informed
compliance and predictable enforcement''); Computer & Communications
Industry Association, Comment at 14 (``CCIA cautions against
regulatory action that does not allow for flexible solutions'');
Software & Information Industry Association, Comment at 4 (urging
``a flexible and diverse set of transparency practices that evolve
and innovate as digital content offerings and advertising profiles
continue to evolve'').
\59\ Commission regulations also apply a time-space approach to
attributing expenditures for publications and broadcast
communications to more than one candidate. See 11 CFR 106.1(a).
\60\ Some commenters suggested different levels at which
providing a disclaimer becomes unduly burdensome. See Cause of
Action, Comment at 4-5 (Nov. 14, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=98750 (explaining that California's disclaimer
requirement, ``while minimal, still takes around 15% of a Google
advertisement,'' which ``carr[ies] a high cost of character space,
even to the point of overshadowing the communication itself'');
Center for Competitive Politics, Comment at 4 (urging the Commission
to ``excuse disclaimers in any internet advertising product where
the number of characters needed for a disclaimer would exceed 4% of
the characters available in the advertising product, exclusive of
those reserved for the ad's title'') (internal quotations omitted);
Institute for Free Speech, Comment at 4 (same); see also American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, et
al., Comment at 2 (``In no case should the disclaimer rules compel a
diminution of the speaker's message itself in order to accommodate
the disclaimer; and, that principle should determine whether or not
an internet advertisement . . . may omit the full, statutorily
required language, and instead link to a disclaimer as the routine
solution.''). Certain aspects of Federal Communications Commission
rules employ a bright line for certain political advertisement
sponsorship statements. See, e.g., 47 CFR 73.1212 (requiring
sponsors of political advertising broadcast via television to be
identified with letters that are equal to or greater than 4% of the
vertical picture height).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To provide clarity in determining whether a speaker may utilize an
adapted disclaimer, proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) in Alternative B also
proposes objective standards for use in measuring time and space. For
internet public communications consisting of text, graphics, or images,
Alternative B proposes to use characters or pixels. For internet public
communications consisting of audio and video, Alternative B proposes to
use seconds. These proposals are based on the Commission's experience
with such communications in the advisory opinion context.\61\ The
Commission has limited expertise in the technical aspects of internet
advertising, however. Are the proposed metrics of characters, pixels,
and seconds a reasonable way to measure space and time in paid internet
advertisements? If they are, then are they sufficiently flexible to
remain relevant as technology changes, or are they likely to become
obsolete? Should the rule, instead, specify a percentage of space or
time without identifying the units of measurement? Would that provide
sufficient clarity for speakers to be able to determine for themselves
when they can utilize an adapted disclaimer? The Commission also seeks
comment on how it should measure the time and space that a disclaimer
occupies on an internet advertisement containing both text or graphic
and audio or video elements. Should the Commission's disclaimer
regulations explicitly address such advertisements? If so, how?
Additionally, how should the Commission measure pixels, characters, and
seconds in an advertisement that may expand or change, such as those
with scrolling, frame, carousel, or similar features? Should the
Commission incorporate in the rule specifications for these internet
advertisement features?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ See Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund);
Advisory Opinion Request 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging), Advisory
Opinion Request 2011-09 (Facebook); Advisory Opinion 2010-19
(Google).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. How Adaptations Must Be Presented on the Face of the Advertisement
The discussion in this section explains the Commission's
alternative proposals for what information must be included on the face
of an advertisement that utilizes an adapted disclaimer. Both
Alternatives A and B propose that an internet public communication that
provides an adapted disclaimer must provide some information on the
face of the advertisement, and both alternatives require such
information to be clear and conspicuous and to provide notice that
further disclaimer information is available through the technological
mechanism. Alternative A proposes one method of presenting an adapted
disclaimer, and Alternative B proposes two methods, in a tiered
approach.
Alternative A's approach would require, on the face of the
advertisement, the payor's name plus an ``indicator'' that would give
notice that further information is available. Alternative B proposes a
two-tiered approach. Under its first tier, Alternative B would require,
on the face of the advertisement, identification of the payor plus an
``indicator.'' Tier one of Alternative B differs from Alternative A in
only one material aspect: Alternative B would allow, in lieu of a
payor's full name, for a payor to be identified by a clearly recognized
identifier such as an abbreviation or acronym. Under its second tier,
Alternative B would require, on the face of the advertisement, only an
``indicator''; neither the payor's name nor an identifier would be
required under tier two of Alternative B. Alternatives A and B use
similar definitions of ``adapted disclaimer'' and ``indicator.''
a. Alternative A--One Tier: Name Plus Indicator
Alternative A's proposed rule would explain that an ``adapted
disclaimer'' means ``an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of a
communication in conjunction with an indicator through which a reader
can locate the full disclaimer required'' under 11 CFR
[[Page 12876]]
110.11(c)(5)(i). The proposal would further clarify that the adapted
disclaimer ``must indicate the person or persons who paid for the
communication in letters of sufficient size to be clearly readable by a
recipient of the communication.''
Alternative A is proposing that adapted disclaimers include a
payor's name on the face of the communication for several reasons.
First, the inclusion of such information would signal to a recipient
that the communication is, indeed, a paid advertisement. This is
especially important on the internet where paid content can be targeted
to a particular user and appear indistinguishable from the unpaid
content that user views, unlike traditional media like radio or
television, where paid content is transmitted to all users in the same
manner and is usually offset in some way from editorial content.\62\
Second, the inclusion of the payor's name would allow persons viewing
the communication on any device, even if the recipient does not view
the full disclaimer, to know ``the person or group who is speaking''
and could, therefore, assist voters in identifying the source of
advertising so they are better ``able to evaluate the arguments to
which they are being subjected.'' Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368
(internal quotations and alterations removed). Alternative A is based
on the premise that a technological mechanism to reach a full
disclaimer provided by shortened URL and without the payor's name would
not provide, on the face of the communication, the same informational
value.\63\ Third, some commenters suggested that the Commission and the
public not rely on social media platforms' voluntary efforts \64\ to
identify paid communications (such as by a tag that a communication is
``paid,'' ``sponsored,'' or ``promoted'').\65\ As a preliminary matter,
the Commission lacks any enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance
with such voluntary efforts, which, by definition, may be modified or
abandoned at any time. In addition, tags that identify whether an
advertisement is ``paid,'' ``sponsored,'' or ``promoted,'' do not
necessarily identify who paid, sponsored, or promoted the
advertisement,\66\ and even that limited information may disappear when
a paid communication is shared with other social media users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ See, e.g., Center for Digital Democracy, Comment at 2 (Nov.
9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358502
(noting that ``native advertising'' online ``purposefully blurs the
distinctions between editorial content and advertising''); Twitter,
Comment at 2 (Nov. 9, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358496 (noting that, absent paid ``Promoted'' tag,
Promoted Tweets ``look and act just like regular Tweets'');
Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment at 4 (``Online
platforms use algorithms to target ads with a level of granularity
that has not been possible before'').
\63\ See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment at 3
(explaining that ``URL shortening tools such as goo.gl and bit.ly
can take lengthy hyperlinks and reduce them to just a few
characters. This would allow an ad with character limitations to
provide a URL that linked to a full disclaimer.'').
\64\ See, e.g., BMore Indivisible, Comment at 5 (stating that
``Given the history of technology and social media companies--and
their nearly total reliance on advertising for corporate profits --
the American people and the FEC cannot rely on them to regulate
themselves when it comes to disclosing the source of political
advertisements. Legislative action is uncertain and may be
incomplete. The FEC must act to fully regulate internet political
advertising disclaimers''); Center for American Progress, Comment at
2-3 (Nov. 9, 2017) https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358489 (stating that ``To some extent, these
companies have already taken steps toward proving more transparency
for online political ads. While we commend those efforts, they are
no substitute for action by the FEC. Such efforts vary from one
company to another, with no consistent mechanism for enforcement and
no meaningful guidance for new entrants. Clear and consistent rules
should be in place for all technology companies, to ensure adequate
transparency both now and in the future'').
\65\ See, e.g., Twitter, Comment at 2 (describing ``promoted''
tweet label); Rob Goldman, Update on Our Advertising Transparency
and Authenticity Efforts, Facebook Newsroom (Oct. 27, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/10/update-on-our-advertising-transparency-andauthenticity-efforts/ (indicating that, starting in
summer 2018, Facebook ``advertisers will have to include a
disclosure in their election-related ads, which reads: `Paid for
by.' '').
\66\ See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment at 4 (noting
current ability to ``publish anonymous election related
advertisements on Facebook via an advertising account linked to a
pseudonymous Facebook page'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To further help voters evaluate the message, Alternative A proposes
to require that information about the payor be of a size to ``be
clearly readable.'' As with the size requirements for text and graphic
internet communications described above, Alternative A intends that
questions of whether a disclaimer is of sufficient type size to be
clearly readable would be ``determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
into account the vantage point from which the communication is intended
to be seen or read as well as the actual size of the disclaimer text,''
as they are under the current rule. 2002 Disclaimer E&J, 67 FR 76965.
Would a case-by-case ``clearly readable'' standard provide sufficient
guidance to advertisers regarding the necessary size of an adapted
disclaimer?
As a component of adapted disclaimers, Alternative A proposes to
require the use of an ``indicator,'' which it defines in proposed
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) as ``any visible or audible element of an
internet communication that is presented in a clear and conspicuous
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener adequate notice that
further disclaimer information is available by a technological
mechanism. An indicator is not clear and conspicuous if it is difficult
to see, read, or hear, or if the placement is easily overlooked.''
Alternative A adds in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B): ``[a]n indicator
may take any form including, but not limited to, words, images, sounds,
symbols, and icons.'' What are the advantages and disadvantages of this
approach? What would be the advantages and disadvantages of the
Commission's designing and promulgating a single indicator to be used
across all media and platforms?
b. Alternative B--Two Tiers: Indicator Plus Payor Identification or
Indicator-Only
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii) would explain that an
``adapted disclaimer'' means ``an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of
the communication in conjunction with a technological mechanism by
which a reader can locate the disclaimer satisfying the general
requirements'' of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and (c)(1).
Alternative B proposes a two-tiered approach to the information
that must be presented on the face of an internet public communication
utilizing an adapted disclaimer. Under Alternative B's first tier, in
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii), an adapted disclaimer consists of an
abbreviated disclaimer that includes an ``indicator'' and identifies
the payor by full name or by ``a clearly recognized abbreviation,
acronym, or other unique identifier by which the payor is commonly
known,'' in lieu of the full name. Under Alternative B's second tier,
in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iv) described below, an adapted disclaimer
consists of an abbreviated disclaimer that need include only an
``indicator.'' Under both tiers--indicator-plus-payor identification
and indicator-only--the internet public communication would have to
provide a full disclaimer through a technological mechanism, described
below.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Given that Alternative B would allow payors to use a
technological mechanism to provide disclaimers for any form of paid
public communication on the internet, including audio and video
communcations, it proposes to require the payor's name to be ``clear
and conspicuous'' rather than ``clearly readable,'' as under
Alternative A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the first tier, described in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii),
an advertisement could identify the payor by the payor's full name or
by a clearly
[[Page 12877]]
recognized abbreviation, acronym, or other unique identifier by which
the payor is commonly known. Thus, for example, if the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee were to pay for a Facebook advertisement,
the advertisement could state that it was paid for by the DSCC, @DSCC,
or DSCC.org, while providing the committee's full name in a disclaimer
through a technological mechanism, as described below. This flexibility
is intended to address internet public communications that might not
otherwise conveniently or practicably accommodate the payor's name,
such as character-limited ads, or where the payor's name is unusually
lengthy, or where the payor wishes to use the ad to promote its social
media brand.\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ See, e.g., Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory Opinion 2010-
19 (Google) (Aug. 5, 2010) (asking to include URL to payor's website
in lieu of disclaimer in severely character-limited internet ads,
with disclaimer on landing page); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2013-13 (Freshman Hold'Em JFC et al.) (Aug. 21, 2013)
(asking to use shortened form of name and URL in disclaimer, where
joint fundraising committee-payor's name included names of 18
participating committees); Advisory Opinion Request, Advisory
Opinion 2017-05 (Great America PAC, et al.) (June 2, 2017) (asking
to use payor's Twitter handle in disclaimers).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposal is modeled after a longstanding provision in the
Commission's regulations that allows a separate segregated fund to
include in its name a ``clearly recognized abbreviation or acronym by
which [its] connected organization is commonly known.'' 11 CFR
102.14(c). The Commission seeks comment on whether the proposal
provides sufficient clarity for a payor to determine whether there is a
``clearly recognized'' abbreviation, acronym, or other unique
identifier by which the payor is ``commonly known.'' Should the
Commission prescribe standards for use in making that determination? Is
there a risk of confusion if two groups are commonly known by the same
acronym, or does ready access to a full disclaimer (no more than one
technological step away) help to alleviate any potential for confusion?
Does the potential for confusion increase if the person viewing or
listening to a political advertisement is unfamiliar with the person or
group sponsoring the ad? If so, does ready access to the full
disclaimer through a technological mechanism help to alleviate any such
risk?
Under the second tier, described in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iv),
Alternative B would allow a speaker to include only an ``indicator'' on
the face of an internet public communication, if the space or time
necessary for a clear and conspicuous tier-one adapted disclaimer under
proposed paragraph (c)(5)(iii) would exceed a certain percentage of the
overall communication, and provide the full disclaimer through a
technological mechanism. Under Alternative B, the term ``indicator''
has the same meaning under both the first and second tiers, as
described further below. Again, Alternative B's second tier proposes to
use ten percent as the determining figure and to measure ``time or
space'' in terms of characters, pixels, and seconds. Is ten percent a
reasonable figure, or is it too high or too low? Are characters,
pixels, and seconds reasonable metrics? How should characters, pixels,
or seconds be determined when an internet public communication combines
text, graphic, and video elements, such as an ad with text fields
surrounding a video or a GIF?
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii)(B) clarifies the
``abbreviated disclaimer'' information aspect of the ``adapted
disclaimer'' definition in proposed paragraph (c)(5)(ii). It would
require the abbreviated disclaimer on the face of a communication to be
presented in a clear and conspicuous manner. An abbreviated disclaimer
would not be clear and conspicuous if it is difficult to see, read, or
hear, or if the placement is easily overlooked.
Proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(D) provides that an ``indicator'' is
any visible or audible element of an internet public communication that
gives notice to persons reading, observing, or listening to the
communication that they may read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements of 11 CFR 110.11(b) and (c)(1)
through a technological mechanism.\69\ Under Alternative B, an
indicator may take any form, including words (such as ``paid for by''
or ``sponsored by''), a website URL, or an image, sound, symbol, or
icon. For example, under Alternative B a severely character-limited
public internet communication could include an indicator stating ``Paid
for by,'' ``Paid by,'' ``Sponsored by,'' ``Ad by,'' or providing the
URL to the payor's website, if a reader could move his or her cursor
over the words or link to a landing page and see the full
disclaimer.\70\ Would this proposal promote disclosure and transparency
by addressing extremely space- or time-constrained paid internet ads?
Does an indicator alone provide sufficient guidance that the full
disclaimer is available through a technological mechanism? Would this
proposal help to ensure that voters have easy access to the full
statutorily prescribed disclaimer for more online communications, while
providing greater flexibility to political advertisers on the internet?
Or would an indicator that takes the form of a hyperlink, for example,
be prone to manipulation? Should the Commission require an indicator to
take a specific form or to include specific language?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ The proposed reference to the person ``observing'' an
internet communication derives from the existing requirement that
``[a] disclaimer . . . must be presented in a clear and conspicuous
manner, to give the reader, observer, or listener adequate notice of
the identify of the person or political committee that paid for and
. . . authorized the communication.'' 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1) (emphasis
added). As used in Alternative B, it is intended to be synonymous
with ``viewer.''
\70\ This provision is similar to the existing regulatory
allowance for disclaimers on printed communications, which generally
provides that ``[t]he disclaimer need not appear on the front or
cover page of the communication as long as it appears within the
communication.'' 11 CFR 110.11(c)(2)(iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In their comments on the ANPRM, Google and Twitter said that they
intend to require each political advertisement on their platforms to
bear a special designation that will allow viewers to obtain additional
information about the sponsor of the ad.\71\ Should the Commission
allow sponsors of extremely space- or time-limited paid internet
advertisements to use platform-provided designations as their
indicators, if such disclaimers meet all of the requirements for
providing a disclaimer through a technological mechanism? Or do the
limitations inherent in platform-provided designations, discussed
above, argue against doing so? In any event, under Alternative B, the
responsibility for ensuring that the disclaimer provided through a
technological mechanism complies with the disclaimer requirement would
remain with the person paying for the communication, and would not fall
on the internet platform hosting it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Google, Comment at 1, 6-7, 11-12 (explaining ``Why This
Ad'' icon for election-related advertisements on Search, YouTube,
and Display); Twitter, Comment at 4 (explaining ``political ad
indicator'' for ``electioneering ads'' on Twitter); see also
Facebook, Comment at 3 (``[A]llowing ads to include an icon or other
obvious indicator that more information about an ad is available via
quick navigation (like a single click) would give clear guidance on
how to include disclaimers in new technologies as they are
developed.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Adaptations Utilizing One-Step Technological Mechanism
Alternatives A and B both propose that a technological mechanism
used to provide access to a full disclaimer must do so within one step.
[[Page 12878]]
a. Alternative A--Associated With ``Indicator'' in Advertisement
Because the provision of an ad payor's name is necessary but not
always sufficient to meet the Act's disclaimer requirement,\72\
Alternative A requires a mechanism to provide the additional required
information. Alternative A's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(A) would
specify that the technological mechanism used to provide the full
disclaimer must be ``associated with'' the indicator and allow a
recipient of the communication to locate the full disclaimer ``by
navigating no more than one step away from the adapted disclaimer.''
This means that the additional technological step should be apparent in
the context of the communication and the disclaimer, once reached,
should be ``clear and conspicuous'' and otherwise satisfy the full
requirements of 11 CFR 110.11(c). Moreover, this proposed requirement
is intended to notify a recipient of the communication that further
information about or from the payor is available and that the recipient
may find that information with minimal investment of additional
effort.\73\ Thus, for example, a hyperlink underlying the ``paid for''
language would be ``associated with'' the full disclaimer at the
landing page located one step away from the communication and to which
the link leads. One commenter suggested that ``the Commission should
allow people and entities subject to disclaimer requirements to satisfy
them through any reasonable technological means'' rather than through a
particular technology.\74\ Should the Commission explicitly include a
requirement that a technological mechanism be ``reasonable'' or can the
reasonableness requirement for such mechanisms be assumed?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ See, e.g., 52 U.S.C. 30120(a) (requiring payment and
authorization statements and, if not authorized by a candidate, a
payor's street address, telephone number, or ``World Wide Web''
address); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of
the S. Comm. on Rules and Admin., 94th Cong. 141 (1976) (testimony
of Antonin Scalia, Asst. Att'y Gen'l) (testifying, in response to
question about proposal to amend Act to require payor name and
authorization statement, that ``[t]he principle seems to me a good
one'' that ``seems to me like a sensible provision'' to minimize
risk that ``candidate's campaign can be run by somebody other than
the candidate'').
\73\ See, e.g., MCCI, Comment at 2 (Nov. 12, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=360063 (asking, rhetorically,
``Who doesn't know how to click a link in an ad?'' in arguing for
short word like ``ad'' or ``paid'' with hyperlink by which readers
``will ultimately be able to track material back to its source'').
\74\ Coolidge-Reagan Foundation, Comment at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Alternative B--Associated With Adapted Disclaimer
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) defines the term
``technological mechanism'' as any use of technology that enables the
person reading, observing, or listening to an internet public
communication to read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer satisfying
the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) without
navigating more than one step away from the internet public
communication, and is associated with an adapted disclaimer as provided
in proposed 11 CFR 110.11(c)(5)(ii). Thus, by definition, the
technological mechanism must be ``associated with'' the abbreviated
disclaimer on the face of the internet communication itself, and must
not require the person reading, observing, or listening to an internet
communication to navigate more than one step away to read, observe, or
listen to the disclaimer. The additional technological step under
Alternative B should be apparent in the context of the communication,
and the disclaimer provided through alternative technical means must be
``clear and conspicuous'' under 11 CFR 110.11(c)(1). Should a
technological mechanism be deemed to be ``associated with'' the
abbreviated disclaimer on the face of an internet public communication
if the person reading, observing, or listening to the communication can
read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer by clicking anywhere on the
communication? If a person can access the full disclaimer by clicking
anywhere on a communication, should the abbreviated disclaimer even be
required on the face of the communication? Are there circumstances
where an adapted disclaimer would be preferable to a full disclaimer,
even if the full disclaimer would take up ten percent or less of the
time or space in the internet public communication?
7. Examples of Technological Mechanisms in Adapted Disclaimers
Alternatives A and B provide similar lists of possible
technological mechanisms.
a. Alternative A--Illustrative List of Mechanisms
Alternative A provides a list of examples of ``technological
mechanisms for the provision of the full disclaimer'' including, but
not limited to, ``hover-over mechanisms, pop-up screens, scrolling
text, rotating panels, or hyperlinks to a landing page with the full
disclaimer.'' This illustrative list incorporates examples of one-step
technological mechanisms the Commission has seen utilized by advisory
opinion requestors and other federal and state agency disclosure
regulations.\75\ The list is intended to provide guidance while
retaining flexibility for advertisers to utilize other existing
technological mechanisms or new mechanisms that may arise in the
future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ See, e.g., Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google) (addressing
proposal to provide disclaimer by hyperlink to landing page
containing full disclaimer); Fed. Trade Comm'n, .com Disclosures:
How to Make Effective Disclosures in Digital Advertising 10 (2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/bus41-dot-com-disclosures-information-about-online-advertising.pdf (permitting
disclosure to ``be provided by using a hyperlink''); id. at 12
(allowing ``mouse-over'' display if effective on mobile devices);
id. at 13-14 (allowing disclosures by pop ups and interstitial
pages); id. at 16 (allowing scrolling text or rotating panels in
space-constrained banner ad to present required disclosures); Cal.
Code Regs. tit. 2, sec. 18450.4(b)(3)(G)(1) (permitting ``link to a
web page with disclosure information''); id. at (b)(3)(G)(1)
(allowing disclaimer ``displayed via rollover display''); Md. Code.
Regs. 33.13.07(D)(2)(b)(i) (permitting ``viewer to click'' and be
``taken to a landing or home page'' with disclaimer); see also First
Gen. Counsel's Report at 5 n.19, MUR 6911 (Frankel) (noting
respondent committee's claim that ``its Twitter profile contains a
link to the campaign's website that contains a disclaimer'');
Interactive Advertising Bureau, Comment at 3 (Nov. 10, 2017), https://sers.fec.gov/fosers/showpdf.htm?docid=358484 (advocating a rule
allowing for flexibility in disclaimer provision, such as by click
through links); CMPLY, Comment at 2-3 and 9-11 (describing several
``short-form'' disclosure solutions within character-limited social
media platforms).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Should the Commission allow advertisers to include different parts
of a full disclaimer in different frames or components of text or
graphic internet advertisements (such as a disclaimer split between two
character-limited text fields, one above an image and one below)?
Several commenters noted the importance of ensuring that disclaimers
are visible across devices or platforms and expressed concern that some
technological mechanisms may not be functional across all devices or
platforms.\76\ Should the Commission incorporate into the rule a
requirement that any technological mechanism used must be accessible by
all recipients of that communication, including those
[[Page 12879]]
accessing the communication on mobile devices?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ See, e.g., Asian Americans Advancing Justice, et al.,
Comment at 9-11 (presenting statistics showing that persons of color
are more likely to consume information on internet than television
and are more likely to do so via mobile devices than display
(desktop) platforms); CMPLY, Comment at 2 (noting that `` `roll
over' or `hover' disclosures . . . have significant limitations in
social media platforms and . . . do not function within the user
interfaces of mobile devices, where the majority of social media
engagement takes place and where we have seen the largest increases
in internet and broadband usage'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Alternative B--Illustrative List of Mechanisms
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) provides the same
examples of technological mechanisms as Alternative A, with two
exceptions. First, because Alternative B does not limit the use of
technological mechanisms to internet communications with text or
graphic components and anticipates that technology will develop to
enable speakers to provide future disclaimers in ways that might not be
available today, it includes ``voice-over'' as an example. Second,
Alternative B proposes to refer to ``mouse-over'' and ``roll-over'' as
examples, in addition to ``hover-over.'' Are these additional
references useful, or are they already subsumed under ``hover-over''?
Should the list of examples be further expanded or refined?
8. Proposed Exceptions to Disclaimer Rules for Internet Public
Communications
a. Alternative A
No Proposal.
b. Alternative B
Alternative B proposes to codify a preference for including full
disclaimers in paid internet advertisements, with alternative
approaches available utilizing technological mechanisms. Although
Alternative B is intended to make it easier for internet communications
to meet the disclaimer requirement, some internet public communications
might not be able to comply with the disclaimer requirement, either now
or as technology and advertising practices change. Thus, Alternative B
proposes to exempt from the disclaimer requirement any internet public
communication that can provide neither a disclaimer in the
communication itself nor an adapted disclaimer as provided in proposed
paragraph (c)(5).
The proposed exception in Alternative B is intended to replace the
small items and impracticable exceptions for internet public
communication, so that the small items and impracticable exceptions
would no longer apply to such communications. The small items and
impracticable exceptions both predate the digital age, and the
Commission has faced challenges in applying them to internet
communications. Despite several requests, the Commission has issued
only one advisory opinion in which a majority of Commissioners agreed
that a disclaimer exception applied to digital communications. See
Advisory Opinion 2002-09 (Target Wireless). Statements by individual
Commissioners indicate a difference of opinion regarding the
application of the exceptions to internet communications.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ See Advisory Opinion 2017-12 (Take Back Action Fund),
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Dec. 21,
2017), Concurring Statement of Vice Chair Caroline C. Hunter and
Commissioners Lee E. Goodman and Matthew S. Petersen (Dec. 14,
2017); Advisory Opinion Request 2013-18 (Revolution Messaging),
Statement for the Record by Vice Chair Ann M. Ravel, Commissioner
Steven T. Walther, and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Feb. 27,
2014); Advisory Opinion 2010-19 (Google), Concurring Statement of
Chairman Matthew S. Petersen (Dec. 30, 2010), Statement for the
Record by Commissioner Caroline C. Hunter (Dec. 17, 2016), and
Concurring Statement of Vice Chair Cynthia L. Bauerly, Commissioner
Steven T. Walther, and Commissioner Ellen L. Weintraub (Dec. 16,
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative B's proposed paragraph (f)(1)(iv) exempts from the
disclaimer requirement any paid internet advertisement that cannot
provide a disclaimer in the communication itself nor an adapted
disclaimer under proposed paragraph (c)(5). Is the exception as
currently proposed sufficiently clear? The proposed exception provides
as an example static banner ads on small internet-enabled mobile
devices that cannot link to a landing page controlled by the person
paying for the communication.\78\ Do such ads exist? Should Alternative
B's proposed exception apply to advertisements that technically can
link to a website with a full disclaimer but do not do so? Does the
Commission have statutory authority to adopt exceptions to the
disclaimer requirements?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ The Commission considered static banner ads on small
internet-enabled mobile devices in Advisory Opinion Request 2013-18
(Revolution Messaging). In that advisory opinion request, the
requestor asked the Commission to recognize small (320 x 50 pixels)
static banner ads on smartphones as exempt from the disclaimer
requirement under the ``small items'' exception. The Commission did
not approve a response by the required four affirmative votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Commission adopts either the single-tier adapted disclaimer
approach of Alternative A or the two-tier approach of Alternative B,
would there be a need to exempt any internet public communications from
the disclaimer requirement? Or would the adaptations adequately address
any technological limitations? Would adopting any new exception to the
disclaimer requirement for internet public communications lead to
manipulation and abuse of the exception? If so, what can the Commission
do to minimize the risk of manipulation and abuse, and enhance
disclosure? Conversely, if the Commission decides not to adopt a new
exception for internet public communications, what effect would that
decision have on political discourse on the internet? Could such a
decision, coupled with uncertainty over the application of the existing
exceptions to internet public communications, potentially chill
political speech on the internet?
F. Conclusion
The Commission welcomes comment on any aspect of Alternatives A and
B. Additionally, the Commission seeks comment addressing how
differences between online platforms, providers, and presentations may
affect the application of any of the proposed disclaimer rules for
text, graphic, video, and audio internet advertisements in Alternative
A, or for internet public communications generally in Alternative B.
Among other topics, the Commission seeks comment on whether the ability
to zoom or otherwise expand the size of some digital communications
affects any of these proposals. Similarly, the Commission seeks comment
on the interaction between the proposed definition of ``public
communication'' and the proposed disclaimer rules in Alternatives A and
B. The Commission is particularly interested in comment detailing the
challenges and opportunities persons have experienced in complying with
(and receiving disclosure from) similar state and federal disclaimer or
disclosure regimes. Given the development and proliferation of the
internet as a mode of political communication, and the expectation that
continued technological advances will further enhance the quantity of
information available to voters online, the Commission welcomes comment
on whether the proposed rules allow for flexibility to address future
technological developments while honoring the important function of
providing disclaimers to voters.
Certification of No Effect Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) (Regulatory
Flexibility Act)
The Commission certifies that the attached proposed rules, if
adopted, would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The proposed rules would clarify and update
existing regulatory language, codify certain existing Commission
precedent regarding internet communications, and provide political
committees and other entities with more flexibility in meeting the
Act's disclaimer requirements. The proposed rules would not impose new
[[Page 12880]]
recordkeeping, reporting, or financial obligations on political
committees or commercial vendors. The Commission therefore certifies
that the proposed rules, if adopted, would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
List of Subjects
11 CFR Part 100
Elections.
11 CFR Part 110
Campaign funds, Political committees and parties.
For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Federal Election
Commission proposes to amend 11 CFR parts 100 and 110, as follows:
PART 100--SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS (52 U.S.C. 30101)
0
1. The authority citation for part 100 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 52 U.S.C. 30101, 30104, 30111(a)(8), and 30114(c).
Sec. 100.26 [Amended]
0
2. Amend Sec. 100.26 by removing ``website'' and adding in its place
``website or internet-enabled device or application''.
PART 110--CONTRIBUTION AND EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS AND PROHIBITIONS
0
3. The authority citation for part 110 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 52 U.S.C. 30101(8), 30101(9), 30102(c)(2),
30104(i)(3), 30111(a)(8), 30116, 30118, 30120, 30121, 30122, 30123,
30124, and 36 U.S.C. 510.
Alternative A
0
4. In Sec. 110.11, add paragraph (c)(5) to read as follows:
Sec. 110.11 Communications; advertising; disclaimers (52 U.S.C.
30120).
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(5) Specific requirements for internet communications. In addition
to the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this
section, a disclaimer required by paragraph (a) of this section that
appears on a public communication distributed over the internet must
comply with the following:
(i) A public communication distributed over the internet with text
or graphic components but without any video component must contain a
disclaimer that is of sufficient type size to be clearly readable by
the recipient of the communication. A disclaimer that appears in
letters at least as large as the majority of the other text in the
communication satisfies the size requirement of this paragraph. A
disclaimer under this paragraph must be displayed with a reasonable
degree of color contrast between the background and the text of the
disclaimer. A disclaimer satisfies the color contrast requirement of
this paragraph if it is displayed in black text on a white background
or if the degree of color contrast between the background and the text
of the disclaimer is no less than the color contrast between the
background and the largest text used in the communication.
(A) A public communication distributed over the internet with text
or graphic components but without any video component that, due to
external character or space constraints, cannot fit a required
disclaimer must include an adapted disclaimer. For purposes of this
paragraph, an adapted disclaimer means an abbreviated disclaimer on the
face of a communication in conjunction with an indicator through which
a reader can locate the full disclaimer required by paragraph
(c)(5)(i). The adapted disclaimer must indicate the person or persons
who paid for the communication in letters of sufficient size to be
clearly readable by a recipient of the communication. The technological
mechanism in an adapted disclaimer must be associated with the
indicator and must allow a recipient of the communication to locate the
full disclaimer by navigating no more than one step away from the
adapted disclaimer. Technological mechanisms for the provision of the
full disclaimer include, but are not limited to, hover-over mechanisms,
pop-up screens, scrolling text, rotating panels, or hyperlinks to a
landing page with the full disclaimer.
(B) As used in paragraph (c)(5), an indicator is any visible or
audible element of an internet communication that is presented in a
clear and conspicuous manner to give the reader, observer, or listener
adequate notice that further disclaimer information is available by a
technological mechanism. An indicator is not clear and conspicuous if
it is difficult to see, read, or hear, or if the placement is easily
overlooked. An indicator may take any form including, but not limited
to, words, images, sounds, symbols, and icons.
(ii) A public communication distributed over the internet with an
audio component but without video, graphic, or text components must
include the statement described in paragraphs (c)(3)(i) and (iv) of
this section if authorized by a candidate, or the statement described
in paragraph (c)(4) of this section if not authorized by a candidate. A
public communication distributed over the internet with a video
component must include the statement described in paragraphs
(c)(3)(ii)-(iv) of this section if authorized by a candidate, or the
statement described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section if not
authorized by a candidate.
* * * * *
Alternative B
0
5. Amend Sec. 110.11 as follows:
0
a. Add paragraph (c)(5).
0
b. Add paragraph (f)(1)(iv).
The additions read as follows:
Sec. 110.11 Communications; advertising; disclaimers (52 U.S.C.
30120).
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(5) Specific requirements for internet communications. (i) For
purposes of this section:
(A) The term internet communication means electronic mail of more
than 500 substantially similar communications when sent by a political
committee; all internet websites of political committees available to
the general public; and any internet public communication as defined in
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(B) of this section;
(B) The term internet public communication means any communication
placed for a fee on another person's website or internet-enabled device
or application;
(C) The term technological mechanism refers to any use of
technology that enables the person reading, observing, or listening to
an internet public communication to read, observe, or listen to a
disclaimer satisfying the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and
(c)(1) of this section without navigating more than one step away from
the internet public communication, and is associated with an adapted
disclaimer as provided in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section. A
technological mechanism may take any form including, but not limited
to, hover-over; mouse-over; voice-over; roll-over; pop-up screen;
scrolling text; rotating panels; and click-through or hyperlink to a
landing page; and
(D) The term indicator refers to any visible or audible element of
an internet public communication that gives notice to persons reading,
observing, or listening to the internet public communication that they
may read, observe, or listen to a disclaimer satisfying the general
requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section through a
technological mechanism. An indicator may take any form including,
[[Page 12881]]
but not limited to, words such as ``Paid for by,'' ``Paid by,''
``Sponsored by,'' or ``Ad by''; website URL; image; sound; symbol; and
icon.
(ii) Every internet communication for which a disclaimer is
required by paragraph (a) of this section must satisfy the general
requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section, except an
internet public communication may include an adapted disclaimer under
the circumstances described in paragraphs (c)(5)(iii)-(c)(5)(iv) of
this section. For purposes of this paragraph, an adapted disclaimer
means an abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the communication in
conjunction with a technological mechanism by which a reader can locate
the disclaimer satisfying the general requirements of paragraphs (b)
and (c)(1) of this section. Any internet public communication that
includes an adapted disclaimer must comply with the following:
(A) The internet public communication must provide a disclaimer
satisfying the general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of
this section through a technological mechanism as described in
paragraph (c)(5)(i)(C) of this section.
(B) The internet public communication must present the abbreviated
disclaimer on the face of the communication in a clear and conspicuous
manner. An abbreviated disclaimer is not clear and conspicuous if it is
difficult to read, hear, or observe, or if the placement is easily
overlooked.
(C) For an internet public communication consisting of text,
graphics, or images, time or space must be measured in [characters or
pixels].
(D) For an internet public communication consisting of audio or
video, time or space must be measured in [seconds].
(iii) If the time or space required for a disclaimer satisfying the
general requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c)(1) of this section would
exceed [ten] percent of the time or space in an internet public
communication, then the abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the
communication must include an indicator and identify the person who
paid for the internet public communication by the person's full name or
by a clearly recognized abbreviation, acronym, or other unique
identifier by which the person is commonly known.
(iv) If the time or space required for an abbreviated disclaimer
under paragraph (c)(5)(iii) of this section would exceed [ten] percent
of the time or space in the internet public communication, then the
abbreviated disclaimer on the face of the communication must include an
indicator.
* * * * *
(f) Exceptions.
(1) * * *
(iv) Any internet public communication that cannot provide a
disclaimer on the face of the internet public communication itself nor
an adapted disclaimer as provided in paragraph (c)(5) of this section,
such as a static banner ad on a small internet-enabled device that
cannot link to a landing page of the person paying for the internet
public communication. The provisions of paragraph (f)(1)(i)-(iii) of
this section do not apply to internet public communications.
* * * * *
On behalf of the Commission,
Dated: March 20, 2018.
Caroline C. Hunter,
Chair, Federal Election Commission.
[FR Doc. 2018-06010 Filed 3-23-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6715-01-P