Kenneth N. Woliner, M.D.; Decision and Order, 7223-7226 [2018-03299]
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Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 34 / Tuesday, February 20, 2018 / Notices
under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) is whether the
holder of a DEA registration ‘‘is
currently authorized to handle
controlled substances in the [S]tate,’’
Hooper, 76 FR at 71371 (quoting Anne
Lazar Thorn, 62 FR 12847, 12848
(1997)), the Agency has also long held
that revocation is warranted even where
a practitioner has lost his state authority
by virtue of the State’s use of summary
process and the State has yet to provide
a hearing to challenge the suspension.
Bourne Pharmacy, 72 FR 18273, 18274
(2007); Wingfield Drugs, 52 FR 27070,
27071 (1987). Thus, it is of no
consequence that the Indiana Board has
employed summary process in
suspending Registrant’s state license.
What is consequential is that Registrant
is no longer currently authorized to
dispense controlled substances in
Indiana, the State in which he is
registered. I will therefore order that his
registration be revoked.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of
Registration AR1591913, issued to
James E. Ranochak, M.D., be, and it
hereby is, revoked. This Order is
effective immediately.3
Dated: February 6, 2018.
Robert W. Patterson,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018–03301 Filed 2–16–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 17–37]
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Kenneth N. Woliner, M.D.; Decision
and Order
On June 6, 2017, the Assistant
Administrator, Diversion Control
Division, Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), issued an Order
to Show Cause to Kenneth N. Woliner,
M.D. (Respondent), of Boca Raton,
Florida. The Show Cause Order
proposed the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA Certificate of
Registration No. BW6830500 on the
ground that he ‘‘do[es] not have
authority to handle controlled
substances in the State of Florida, the
[S]tate in which [he is] registered with
3 For the same reasons that led the Indiana Board
to summarily suspend Registrant’s medical license
(his indictment in federal district court on 10
counts of Conspiracy to Commit Health Care Fraud
and Distributing a Controlled Substance), I find that
the public interest necessitates that this Order be
effective immediately. 21 CFR 1316.67.
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the DEA.’’ Order to Show Cause, at 1
(citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a)(3)).
With respect to the Agency’s
jurisdiction, the Show Cause Order
alleged that Respondent is the holder of
Certificate of Registration No.
BW6830500, pursuant to which he is
authorized to dispense controlled
substances as a practitioner in schedules
II through V, at the registered address of
9325 Glades Road, Suite 104, Boca
Raton, Florida. Id. The Order also
alleged that this registration does not
expire until May 31, 2018. Id.
Regarding the substantive grounds for
the proceeding, the Show Cause Order
alleged that on December 29, 2016, the
Florida Board of Medicine ‘‘revoked
[his] authority to practice medicine,’’
and he is therefore ‘‘without authority to
handle controlled substances in Florida,
the [S]tate in which [he is] registered
with the DEA.’’ Id. Based on his ‘‘lack
of authority to [dispense] controlled
substances in . . . Florida,’’ the Order
asserted that ‘‘DEA must revoke’’ his
registration. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C.
823(f)(1) and 824(a)(3)).
The Show Cause Order notified
Respondent of (1) his right to request a
hearing on the allegations or to submit
a written statement in lieu of a hearing,
(2) the procedure for electing either
option, and (3) the consequence for
failing to elect either option. Id. at 2
(citing 21 CFR 1301.43). The Show
Cause Order also notified Respondent of
his right to submit a corrective action
plan (hereinafter, CAP) to the Assistant
Administrator, Diversion Control
Division, and the procedure for doing
so. Id. at 2–3.
On July 6, 2017, Respondent filed a
letter with the Office of Administrative
Law Judges pursuant to which he
requested a hearing on the allegations of
the Show Cause Order. Letter from
Respondent to Hearing Clerk (dated July
3, 2017) (hereinafter, Hearing Request).
In his letter, Respondent did not dispute
that his Florida medical license ‘‘was
revoked.’’ Id. at 1. He maintained,
however, that his license ‘‘was revoked
for issues not relating to controlled
substances; and that the revocation . . .
is currently under appeal at Florida’s
District Court of Appeal.’’ Id.
Respondent also advised that he ‘‘has
not been convicted of any crime, much
less one involving controlled
substances.’’ Id. Also on July 6, 2017,
Respondent submitted his CAP by letter
to the Assistant Administrator,
Diversion Control Division. Letter from
Respondent to Assistant Administrator
Louis J. Milione (dated July 3, 2017). In
his CAP, Respondent explained:
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My corrective action plan is to have my
case overturned on appeal. The Initial Brief
on the Merits was filed on 6/7/2017. Barring
the Court granting extensions of time (if
filed), the Department of Health is was [sic]
required to file their Answer Brief by 6/27/
2017, and our Reply is due 20 days after
service of the Answer Brief.
It would seem prudent for the DEA to
‘‘postpone the proceedings’’ until the 1st
District Court of Appeal rules on this matter.
Id. at 1.
Upon receipt of Respondent’s Hearing
Request and CAP, the matter was placed
on the docket of the Office of
Administrative Law Judges and assigned
to Chief Administrative Law Judge John
J. Mulrooney, II (hereinafter, CALJ). On
July 6, 2017, the CALJ issued an order
noting that Respondent was appearing
pro se and advised him ‘‘that he has the
right to seek representation by a
qualified attorney at his own expense.’’
Order Directing the Filing of
Government Evidence of Lack of State
Authority Allegation and Briefing
Schedule, at 1 & n.1 (citing 21 CFR
1316.50). The CALJ also ordered the
Government to file evidence to support
the allegation that Respondent lacks
state authority to handle controlled
substances and an accompanying
motion for summary disposition no later
than July 18, 2017. Id. The CALJ further
directed Respondent to file his response
to any summary disposition motion no
later than August 1, 2017. Id. at 2.
On July 6, 2017, the Acting Assistant
Administrator received Respondent’s
CAP letter. See Letter from Acting
Assistant Administrator Demetra Ashley
to Respondent (dated July 11, 2017)
(hereinafter CAP Rejection Ltr), at 1.
However, on July 10, 2017, before the
Acting Assistant Administrator had
ruled on Respondent’s CAP (and eight
days before its summary disposition
motion was due), the Government filed
its Motion for Summary Disposition. In
its Motion, the Government argued that
it is undisputed that the Florida Board
of Medicine revoked Respondent’s
Florida medical license. Government’s
Motion for Summary Disposition (Govt.
Mot.), at 2. The Government further
argued ‘‘that the possession of authority
to dispense controlled substances under
the laws of the State in which a
practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for
both obtaining and maintaining a
practitioner’s registration’’ under the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Id. at
3 (citation omitted). As support for its
summary disposition request, the
Government attached, inter alia, a
certified copy of the Florida Board of
Medicine’s December 29, 2016 ‘‘Final
Order’’ revoking Respondent’s license to
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practice medicine in the State of
Florida. See Govt. Mot., Appendix
(Appx.) B, at 13.1 On July 11, 2017, the
Acting Assistant Administrator rejected
Respondent’s CAP and further
‘‘determined there is no potential
modification of your [ ]CAP that could
or would alter my decision in this
regard.’’ CAP Rejection Ltr, at 1.
On August 1, 2017, Respondent filed
a responsive pleading that opposed the
Government’s Motion and requested a
stay in the proceedings. Respondent’s
Opposition to Government’s Motion for
Summary Disposition (hereinafter, Resp.
Opp. or Opposition). Although
Respondent did not dispute that his
medical license had been revoked by
Florida’s Board of Medicine, he
contended that this fact does not
categorically support the revocation of
his registration. Id. at 6 (citing Joe W.
Morgan, D.O., 78 FR 61961 (2013)). He
also argued that revoking his
registration without an administrative
hearing violates his rights under the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Id. He further argued that ‘‘the
Government has not shown that
Respondent’s DEA registration is
inconsistent with the public interest by
any factor in § 824(a)(4) because, inter
alia, (1) the ‘‘State of Florida has not
made a recommendation regarding
Respondent’s ability to prescribe
controlled substances,’’ (2) Respondent
has not been charged or convicted of a
federal or state crime related to
controlled substances, and (3) that
‘‘[t]he disciplinary event in question did
not relate to controlled substances in
any fashion.’’ Id. at 9. Finally,
Respondent argued that the Agency
should delay any decision to revoke his
registration because the Government
would not be prejudiced and he believes
that he ‘‘is very much likely to prevail
in his appeal’’ before Florida’s 1st
District Court of Appeal, which he
‘‘expected’’ would decide the merits of
his appeal ‘‘no later than September 19,
2017.’’ Id. at 10–12.
The CALJ rejected Respondent’s
request for a stay, noting that
‘‘revocation is warranted even where a
practitioner’s state authority has been
summarily suspended and the State has
yet to provide the practitioner with a
hearing to challenge the State’s action
and at which he . . . may ultimately
prevail.’’ Order Denying the
Respondent’s Request for Stay, Granting
1 The Government also attached a Declaration
from a Diversion Investigator assigned to DEA’s
West Palm Beach Office stating that the Florida
Board’s Order attached to the Government’s motion
for summary decision ‘‘is a certified copy of the
documents I obtained from the Florida Board of
Medicine.’’ Govt. Mot., Appx. C, at 1.
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the Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition, and Recommended
Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Decision of the
Administrative Law Judge (R.D.), at 4
(internal quotations and citations
omitted). The CALJ also concluded that
Respondent had no constitutional right
to a hearing before the Agency because
he ‘‘was apparently afforded a full
hearing, where he was represented by
counsel, before the [Florida] Board
revoked his medical license.’’ Id. at 4 &
n.3. The CALJ noted that DEA has
previously held ‘‘that a stay in
administrative enforcement proceedings
is ‘unlikely to ever be justified’ due to
ancillary proceedings involving the
Respondent.’’ Id. at 4 (quoting Grider
Drug #1 & Grider Drug #2, 77 FR 44070,
44104 n.97 (2012)).2 The CALJ also
rejected Respondent’s claim that the
loss of his Florida medical license
categorically supports the revocation of
his DEA registration and found
Respondent’s reliance on the Joe W.
Morgan, D.O. case and others to be
misplaced. Id. at 6 n.9.
The CALJ then found summary
disposition appropriate in this case
because ‘‘no dispute exists over the fact
that the Respondent currently lacks
state authority to handle controlled
substances in Florida due to the
Board[’s] Order dated December 29,
2017, which revoked his state license to
practice medicine.’’ Id. at 7. Reasoning
that ‘‘[b]ecause . . . Respondent lacks
state authority at the present time . . .
he is not entitled to maintain his DEA
registration,’’ the CALJ granted the
Government’s request for summary
disposition and recommended that I
revoke Respondent’s registration and
deny any pending applications. Id.
Neither party filed exceptions to the
CALJ’s Recommended Decision.3
2 I agree with this statement of the Agency’s
precedents. However, the CALJ also cited Odette L.
Campbell, 80 FR 41062 (2015), as contrary
authority. See id. The CALJ characterized Campbell
as ‘‘holding revocation proceedings in abeyance at
the post-hearing adjudication level for a lengthy
period pending the resolution of both criminal
fraud charges and concurrent state administrative
proceedings against the respondent,’’ id., even
though I have repeatedly issued final decisions
rejecting this reading of Campbell. See e.g., Judson
H. Somerville, 82 FR 21408, 21409 n.3 (2017). For
the same reasons set forth in those cases, including
the fact that Campbell involved an application and
not a revocation at the time the proceeding was
held in abeyance, I again reject the CALJ’s reading
of Campbell.
3 Although Respondent reached out to the CALJ’s
law clerk to determine the ‘‘process for filing
‘exceptions,’ ’’ and the law clerk advised
Respondent of that process and directed
Respondent to 21 CFR 1316.66, the administrative
record does not include any exceptions filed by
Respondent. Aug. 8, 2008 Email from Law Clerk to
Respondent, at 1. Government counsel was carbon
copied on the entire email exchange. See id.
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Thereafter, the record was forwarded to
my Office for Final Agency Action.
Having reviewed the record, I adopt the
CALJ’s factual finding that Respondent’s
medical license has been revoked and
his ultimate conclusion that Respondent
does not hold authority under Florida
law to handle controlled substances, the
State in which he holds his registration
with the Agency, and is thus not
entitled to maintain his registration. I
also adopt the CALJ’s ruling rejecting
Respondent’s request for a stay of this
proceeding. I further adopt the CALJ’s
recommendation that I revoke his
registration and deny any pending
application. I make the following factual
findings.
Findings of Fact
Respondent is a holder of DEA
Certificate of Registration No.
BW6830500, pursuant to which he is
authorized to dispense controlled
substances in schedules II through V as
a practitioner, at the address of Holistic
Family Medicine, LLC, 9325 Glades
Road, Suite 104, Boca Raton, Florida.
Govt. Mot., Appx. A. This registration
does not expire until May 31, 2018. Id.
On December 29, 2016, the Florida
Board of Medicine issued a final order
revoking Respondent’s license to
practice medicine in the State of
Florida. Govt. Mot., Appx. B, at 13. The
Florida Board adopted the
recommended order of the state
administrative law judge who
conducted a hearing at which
Respondent was present and
represented by counsel. Id. at 1. The
Board considered the Recommended
Order, Exceptions to the Recommended
Order and Response to Exceptions, and
adopted the conclusions of law set forth
in the Recommended Order,4 and
ordered that Respondent’s Florida
license to practice medicine be revoked
as of December 29, 2016. Id. at 13.
On August 28, 2017, the 1st District
Court of Appeals of Florida affirmed the
decision and final order of the Florida
Department of Health revoking
Respondent’s license to practice
medicine, and denied rehearing on
October 9, 2017. Kenneth Woliner, M.D.
v. Department of Health, No. 1D17–682,
slip op. at 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st
District Aug. 28, 2017), and reh’g denied
2017 WL 3696794 (October 9, 2017). I
take official notice of this unpublished
decision 5 and find that Respondent
4 The Recommended Order of the Florida
Administrative Law Judge was not included in the
Government’s evidence.
5 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
an agency ‘‘may take official notice of facts at any
stage in a proceeding—even in the final decision.’’
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney General’s Manual on
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does not possess authority to practice
medicine in the State of Florida, the
State in which he is registered.
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Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the
Attorney General is authorized to
suspend or revoke a registration issued
under section 823 of the CSA, ‘‘upon a
finding that the registrant . . . has had
his State license . . . suspended [or]
revoked . . . by competent State
authority and is no longer authorized by
State law to engage in the . . .
dispensing of controlled substances.’’
Also, DEA has long held that the
possession of authority to dispense
controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which a practitioner engages
in professional practice is a
fundamental condition for obtaining
and maintaining a practitioner’s
registration. See, e.g., James L. Hooper,
76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied,
481 Fed. Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); see
also Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR
27616 (1978) (‘‘State authorization to
dispense or otherwise handle controlled
substances is a prerequisite to the
issuance and maintenance of a Federal
controlled substances registration.’’).
This rule derives from the text of two
provisions of the CSA. First, Congress
defined ‘‘the term ‘practitioner’ [to]
mean[ ] a . . . physician . . . or other
person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in
which he practices . . . to distribute,
dispense, [or] administer . . . a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21). Second, in setting the
requirements for obtaining a
practitioner’s registration, Congress
directed that ‘‘[t]he Attorney General
shall register practitioners . . . if the
applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of
the State in which he practices.’’ 21
U.S.C. 823(f).
Here, the dispositive question is
whether Respondent is currently
authorized to dispense controlled
substances in Florida, the State in
which he is registered. It is undisputed
that Florida’s Board of Medicine
revoked Respondent’s license to
practice medicine. In his
recommendation, the CALJ also stated
the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance
with the APA and DEA’s regulations, Respondent
is ‘‘entitled on timely request to an opportunity to
show to the contrary.’’ 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21
CFR 1316.59(e). To allow Respondent the
opportunity to refute the facts of which I take
official notice, Respondent may file a motion for
reconsideration within 15 calendar days of service
of this order which shall commence on the date this
order is mailed.
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that ‘‘no dispute exists over the fact that
the Respondent currently lacks state
authority to handle controlled
substances in Florida due to the
Board[’s] Order . . . which revoked his
state license to practice medicine.’’ R.D.,
at 7.
Respondent, however, argues in his
Opposition that ‘‘[t]he State of Florida
has not made a recommendation
regarding Respondent’s ability to
prescribe controlled substances’’—
casting doubt on the CALJ’s statement
that it is undisputed that Respondent
lacks this ability. Resp. Opp. at 9. Thus,
the question of whether Respondent is
currently authorized to dispense
controlled substances in Florida is in
dispute.
This question is not a question of fact
but of law. If this question were purely
a fact question, as the CALJ suggests,
then summary disposition in this case
would have been inappropriate.
However, I find that this dispositive
question is a disputed legal question,
not a question of fact. Specifically,
under Florida law, a ‘‘ ‘[p]ractitioner’ ’’
includes ‘‘a physician licensed under
chapter 458’’ of the Florida statutes, and
a ‘‘ ‘[p]hysician’ ’’ under chapter 458
‘‘means a person who is licensed to
practice medicine in’’ Florida. Fla. Stat.
§§ 893.02(23), 458.305(4). Florida law
also states that the ‘‘[p]ractice of
medicine,’’ in turn, ‘‘means the
diagnosis, treatment, operation, or
prescription for any human disease,
pain, injury, deformity, or other
physical or mental condition.’’ Id.
§ 458.305(3). Thus, I find that Florida
law prohibits Respondent from
dispensing controlled substances within
the meaning of the CSA because, when
the Florida Board of Medicine revoked
his license to practice medicine on
December 29, 2016, it had the legal
effect of also taking away Respondent’s
authority to issue any prescriptions for
any ‘‘physical or mental condition.’’ See
Christina B. Paylan, M.D., 80 FR 69979,
69979 (2015) (holding that Respondent
‘‘lacks authority under Florida law to
dispense controlled substances within
the meaning of the CSA’’ because
‘‘Respondent’s license ‘to practice as a
medical doctor’ ’’ had been suspended)
(citing Fla. Stat. §§ 458.305(3), (4));
Reams v. State, 279 So. 2d 839, 842 (Fla.
1973) (holding that prescribing
‘‘vitamins or food’’ rather than
‘‘medicines’’ without a medical license
constitutes an unlicensed practice of
medicine under Florida law).
Accordingly, as a matter of law,
Respondent lacked the authority to
handle controlled substances in Florida
beginning on December 29, 2016 (when
the Florida Board of Medicine revoked
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7225
his State medical license), and he is
therefore not entitled to maintain his
DEA registration.
Moreover, because ‘‘the controlling
question’’ in a proceeding brought
under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) is whether the
holder of a DEA registration ‘‘is
currently authorized to handle
controlled substances in the [S]tate,’’
Hooper, 76 FR at 71371 (quoting Anne
Lazar Thorn, 62 FR 12847, 12848
(1997)), the Agency has also long held
that revocation is warranted even where
a practitioner has lost his state authority
by virtue of the State’s use of summary
process and the State has yet to provide
a hearing to challenge the suspension.
Bourne Pharmacy, 72 FR 18273, 18274
(2007); Wingfield Drugs, 52 FR 27070,
27071 (1987). For the same reasons,
given that the Florida Board of Medicine
had revoked Respondent’s state license,
it is of no consequence that Respondent
could have prevailed on his appeal to
the 1st District Court of Appeals of
Florida.6 In any event, and as already
noted, that court has since affirmed the
revocation of Respondent’s medical
license.
As for Respondent’s CAP, I conclude
that there were adequate grounds for
denying it. Specifically, Respondent’s
position in his CAP is identical to his
principal argument seeking a stay of
summary disposition of the Show Cause
Order that I have already rejected;
namely, that his DEA registration
should not be revoked until the
conclusion of his appeal to Florida’s 1st
District Court of Appeal. Thus, I agree
with the Agency’s denial of
Respondent’s CAP for the same reasons
I set forth above for denying
Respondent’s identical argument to stay
summary disposition. In addition, like
his stay argument, the need to address
the adequacy of Respondent’s CAP is
now moot because his appeal was
denied.
I will therefore reject Respondent’s
CAP and adopt the CALJ’s
recommendation that I revoke
Respondent’s registration and deny any
6 Similarly, and contrary to Respondent’s claim,
Due Process did not require the CALJ to delay
summary disposition of the case until his appeal to
the First District Court of Appeals of Florida had
been decided. Resp. Opp. at 10–12. Rather, Due
Process required the CALJ to provide Respondent
the opportunity to respond to the Order to Show
Cause and the Government’s Motion for Summary
Disposition. The CALJ did provide Respondent
such an opportunity, and the Respondent did so
respond.
I also agree with the CALJ’s recommendation
(R.D. at 6 n.9) that I reject, and I do reject,
Respondent’s argument that revocation is not
required in this case based on the Joe W. Morgan
case and the other Agency precedent cited by
Respondent.
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pending applications to renew or
modify his registration. See R.D. at 7.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 824(a), as well
as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA
Certificate of Registration No.
BW6830500, issued to Kenneth N.
Woliner, M.D., be, and it hereby is,
revoked. I further order that any
pending application of Kenneth N.
Woliner to renew or modify the above
registration, or any pending application
of Kenneth N. Woliner for any other
registration, be, and it hereby is, denied.
This Order is effective immediately.7
Dated: February 7, 2018.
Robert W. Patterson,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018–03299 Filed 2–16–18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employee Benefits Security
Administration
Technical Corrections to Exemptions
From Certain Prohibited Transaction
Restrictions
Employee Benefits Security
Administration, Labor.
ACTION: Notice of technical corrections.
AGENCY:
On December 29, 2017 the
Department of Labor (the Department)
published notices of exemptions in the
Federal Register granting relief from
certain of the prohibited transaction
restrictions of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA or
the Act) and/or the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (the Code). This notice
includes technical corrections to those
published prohibited transaction
exemptions (PTEs): PTE 2017–03,
JPMorgan Chase & Co., D–11906; PTE
2017–04, Deutsche Investment
Management Americas Inc. (DIMA) and
Certain Current and Future Asset
Management Affiliates of Deutsche Bank
AG, D–11908; PTE 2017–05, Citigroup
Inc., D–11909; PTE 2017–06, Barclays
Capital Inc., D–11910; PTE 2017–07,
UBS Assets Management (Americas)
Inc.; UBS Realty Investors LLC; UBS
Hedge Fund Solutions LLC; UBS
O’Connor LLC; and Certain Future
Affiliates in UBS’s Asset Management
and Wealth Management Americas
Divisions, D–11907.
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
7 For the same reasons which led the Florida
Board of Medicine to revoke Respondent’s medical
license, I conclude that the public interest
necessitates that this Order be effective
immediately. 21 CFR 1316.67.
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JPMorgan Chase Co. (JPMC or the
Applicant) Located in New York, New
York
[Prohibited Transaction Exemption (PTE)
2017–03; Exemption Application No. D–
11906].
Discussion
On December 29, 2017, the
Department published PTE 2017–03 in
the Federal Register at 82 FR 61816.
PTE 2017–03 is an administrative
exemption from the prohibited
transaction provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(the Act), and the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, that permits certain
entities with specified relationships to
JPMC to continue to rely upon the relief
provided by PTE 84–14 1 for a period of
five years, notwithstanding JPMC’s
criminal conviction (the Conviction).
The Department granted PTE 2017–03 to
ensure that Covered Plans 2 whose
assets are managed by a JPMC Affiliated
QPAM or a JPMC Related QPAM may
continue to benefit from the relief
provided by PTE 84–14. The exemption
is effective from January 10, 2018
through January 9, 2023.
The Department has decided to make
certain technical and clarifying
corrections to the exemption, as
described below.
Technical Corrections
Sections I(g) and I(m)
The Department’s response to
Comment 36 on page 61833 of the
exemption states: ‘‘Section I(g) requires
two specific entities, JPMC and the
Investment Bank of JPMorgan Chase
Bank, to refrain from providing
investment management services to
plans. . . . Thus, with respect to
Sections I(g) and (m), the obligations
imposed extend exclusively to JPMC
and the Investment Bank of JPMorgan
Chase Bank. . . . The Department also
believes that the potential for
disqualification of all JPMC Affiliated
QPAMs under this agreement will serve
1 49 FR 9494, March 13, 1984, as corrected at 50
FR 41430 (October 10, 1985), as amended at 70 FR
49305 (August 23, 2005) and as amended at 75 FR
38837 (July 6, 2010), hereinafter referred to as PTE
84–14 or the QPAM Exemption.
2 A ‘‘Covered Plan’’ is a plan subject to Part 4 of
Title 1 of ERISA (‘‘ERISA-covered plan’’) or a plan
subject to Section 4975 of the Code (‘‘IRA’’), with
respect to which a JPMC Affiliated QPAM relies on
PTE 84–14, or with respect to which a JPMC
Affiliated QPAM (or any JPMC affiliate) has
expressly represented that the manager qualifies as
a QPAM or relies on the QPAM class exemption
(PTE 84–14). A Covered Plan does not include an
ERISA-covered Plan or IRA to the extent the JPMC
Affiliated QPAM has expressly disclaimed reliance
on QPAM status or PTE 84–14 in entering into its
contract, arrangement, or agreement with the ERISA
covered plan or IRA.
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
as additional incentive for JPMC and
JPMorgan Chase Bank to comply in
good-faith with the provisions of
Sections I(g) and (m).’’
The Department is revising its
response to Comment 36 by removing
references to ‘‘the Investment Bank of
JPMorgan Chase Bank’’ because Section
I(g) and I(m) do not apply to such entity.
Similarly, the Department is also
removing the phrase ‘‘JPMorgan Chase
Bank’’ from the sentence that reads,
‘‘[t]he Department also believes that the
potential for disqualification of all JPMC
Affiliated QPAMs under this agreement
will serve as additional incentive for
JPMC and JPMorgan Chase Bank to
comply in good-faith with the
provisions of Sections I(g) and (m).’’
Section I(h)(1)(vii)
The Department is adding the term
‘‘as reasonably possible’’ to the first
sentence of the first full paragraph on
page 61821 of the preamble to the
exemption. As revised, the first sentence
of the first full paragraph on page 61821
now reads: ‘‘The Department has
revised the term ‘corrected promptly’ to
be consistent with the Department’s
intent that violations or compliance
failures be corrected ‘as soon as
reasonably possible upon discovery or
as soon as reasonably possible after the
QPAM reasonably should have known
of the noncompliance (whichever is
earlier).’ ’’
Section I(i)(10)
Section I(i)(10) of the exemption
states: ‘‘(10) Each JPMC Affiliated
QPAM and the auditor must submit to
[the Office of Exemption
Determinations] OED: Any engagement
agreement(s) entered into pursuant to
the engagement of the auditor under this
exemption, no later than two (2) months
after the execution of any such
engagement agreement.’’
The Department is revising Section
I(i)(10) of the exemption to clarify the
timing requirements for submission of
the auditor agreements. As revised,
Section I(i)(10) of the exemption now
states: ‘‘(10) Any engagement agreement
with an auditor to perform the audits
required under the terms of this
exemption must be submitted to OED by
March 9, 2018 if the agreement was
executed on or prior to January 10,
2018. Any engagement agreement(s)
entered into subsequent to January 10,
2018 must be submitted to OED no later
than two (2) months after the execution
of such engagement agreement.’’
Section I(j)(7)
Section I(j)(7) of the exemption states:
‘‘(7) By July 9, 2018, each JPMC
E:\FR\FM\20FEN1.SGM
20FEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 34 (Tuesday, February 20, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 7223-7226]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2018-03299]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 17-37]
Kenneth N. Woliner, M.D.; Decision and Order
On June 6, 2017, the Assistant Administrator, Diversion Control
Division, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), issued an Order to
Show Cause to Kenneth N. Woliner, M.D. (Respondent), of Boca Raton,
Florida. The Show Cause Order proposed the revocation of Respondent's
DEA Certificate of Registration No. BW6830500 on the ground that he
``do[es] not have authority to handle controlled substances in the
State of Florida, the [S]tate in which [he is] registered with the
DEA.'' Order to Show Cause, at 1 (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and
824(a)(3)).
With respect to the Agency's jurisdiction, the Show Cause Order
alleged that Respondent is the holder of Certificate of Registration
No. BW6830500, pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense
controlled substances as a practitioner in schedules II through V, at
the registered address of 9325 Glades Road, Suite 104, Boca Raton,
Florida. Id. The Order also alleged that this registration does not
expire until May 31, 2018. Id.
Regarding the substantive grounds for the proceeding, the Show
Cause Order alleged that on December 29, 2016, the Florida Board of
Medicine ``revoked [his] authority to practice medicine,'' and he is
therefore ``without authority to handle controlled substances in
Florida, the [S]tate in which [he is] registered with the DEA.'' Id.
Based on his ``lack of authority to [dispense] controlled substances in
. . . Florida,'' the Order asserted that ``DEA must revoke'' his
registration. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f)(1) and 824(a)(3)).
The Show Cause Order notified Respondent of (1) his right to
request a hearing on the allegations or to submit a written statement
in lieu of a hearing, (2) the procedure for electing either option, and
(3) the consequence for failing to elect either option. Id. at 2
(citing 21 CFR 1301.43). The Show Cause Order also notified Respondent
of his right to submit a corrective action plan (hereinafter, CAP) to
the Assistant Administrator, Diversion Control Division, and the
procedure for doing so. Id. at 2-3.
On July 6, 2017, Respondent filed a letter with the Office of
Administrative Law Judges pursuant to which he requested a hearing on
the allegations of the Show Cause Order. Letter from Respondent to
Hearing Clerk (dated July 3, 2017) (hereinafter, Hearing Request). In
his letter, Respondent did not dispute that his Florida medical license
``was revoked.'' Id. at 1. He maintained, however, that his license
``was revoked for issues not relating to controlled substances; and
that the revocation . . . is currently under appeal at Florida's
District Court of Appeal.'' Id. Respondent also advised that he ``has
not been convicted of any crime, much less one involving controlled
substances.'' Id. Also on July 6, 2017, Respondent submitted his CAP by
letter to the Assistant Administrator, Diversion Control Division.
Letter from Respondent to Assistant Administrator Louis J. Milione
(dated July 3, 2017). In his CAP, Respondent explained:
My corrective action plan is to have my case overturned on
appeal. The Initial Brief on the Merits was filed on 6/7/2017.
Barring the Court granting extensions of time (if filed), the
Department of Health is was [sic] required to file their Answer
Brief by 6/27/2017, and our Reply is due 20 days after service of
the Answer Brief.
It would seem prudent for the DEA to ``postpone the
proceedings'' until the 1st District Court of Appeal rules on this
matter.
Id. at 1.
Upon receipt of Respondent's Hearing Request and CAP, the matter
was placed on the docket of the Office of Administrative Law Judges and
assigned to Chief Administrative Law Judge John J. Mulrooney, II
(hereinafter, CALJ). On July 6, 2017, the CALJ issued an order noting
that Respondent was appearing pro se and advised him ``that he has the
right to seek representation by a qualified attorney at his own
expense.'' Order Directing the Filing of Government Evidence of Lack of
State Authority Allegation and Briefing Schedule, at 1 & n.1 (citing 21
CFR 1316.50). The CALJ also ordered the Government to file evidence to
support the allegation that Respondent lacks state authority to handle
controlled substances and an accompanying motion for summary
disposition no later than July 18, 2017. Id. The CALJ further directed
Respondent to file his response to any summary disposition motion no
later than August 1, 2017. Id. at 2.
On July 6, 2017, the Acting Assistant Administrator received
Respondent's CAP letter. See Letter from Acting Assistant Administrator
Demetra Ashley to Respondent (dated July 11, 2017) (hereinafter CAP
Rejection Ltr), at 1. However, on July 10, 2017, before the Acting
Assistant Administrator had ruled on Respondent's CAP (and eight days
before its summary disposition motion was due), the Government filed
its Motion for Summary Disposition. In its Motion, the Government
argued that it is undisputed that the Florida Board of Medicine revoked
Respondent's Florida medical license. Government's Motion for Summary
Disposition (Govt. Mot.), at 2. The Government further argued ``that
the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which a practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for both obtaining and maintaining
a practitioner's registration'' under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA). Id. at 3 (citation omitted). As support for its summary
disposition request, the Government attached, inter alia, a certified
copy of the Florida Board of Medicine's December 29, 2016 ``Final
Order'' revoking Respondent's license to
[[Page 7224]]
practice medicine in the State of Florida. See Govt. Mot., Appendix
(Appx.) B, at 13.\1\ On July 11, 2017, the Acting Assistant
Administrator rejected Respondent's CAP and further ``determined there
is no potential modification of your [ ]CAP that could or would alter
my decision in this regard.'' CAP Rejection Ltr, at 1.
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\1\ The Government also attached a Declaration from a Diversion
Investigator assigned to DEA's West Palm Beach Office stating that
the Florida Board's Order attached to the Government's motion for
summary decision ``is a certified copy of the documents I obtained
from the Florida Board of Medicine.'' Govt. Mot., Appx. C, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 1, 2017, Respondent filed a responsive pleading that
opposed the Government's Motion and requested a stay in the
proceedings. Respondent's Opposition to Government's Motion for Summary
Disposition (hereinafter, Resp. Opp. or Opposition). Although
Respondent did not dispute that his medical license had been revoked by
Florida's Board of Medicine, he contended that this fact does not
categorically support the revocation of his registration. Id. at 6
(citing Joe W. Morgan, D.O., 78 FR 61961 (2013)). He also argued that
revoking his registration without an administrative hearing violates
his rights under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. He
further argued that ``the Government has not shown that Respondent's
DEA registration is inconsistent with the public interest by any factor
in Sec. 824(a)(4) because, inter alia, (1) the ``State of Florida has
not made a recommendation regarding Respondent's ability to prescribe
controlled substances,'' (2) Respondent has not been charged or
convicted of a federal or state crime related to controlled substances,
and (3) that ``[t]he disciplinary event in question did not relate to
controlled substances in any fashion.'' Id. at 9. Finally, Respondent
argued that the Agency should delay any decision to revoke his
registration because the Government would not be prejudiced and he
believes that he ``is very much likely to prevail in his appeal''
before Florida's 1st District Court of Appeal, which he ``expected''
would decide the merits of his appeal ``no later than September 19,
2017.'' Id. at 10-12.
The CALJ rejected Respondent's request for a stay, noting that
``revocation is warranted even where a practitioner's state authority
has been summarily suspended and the State has yet to provide the
practitioner with a hearing to challenge the State's action and at
which he . . . may ultimately prevail.'' Order Denying the Respondent's
Request for Stay, Granting the Government's Motion for Summary
Disposition, and Recommended Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and Decision of the Administrative Law Judge (R.D.), at 4
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The CALJ also concluded
that Respondent had no constitutional right to a hearing before the
Agency because he ``was apparently afforded a full hearing, where he
was represented by counsel, before the [Florida] Board revoked his
medical license.'' Id. at 4 & n.3. The CALJ noted that DEA has
previously held ``that a stay in administrative enforcement proceedings
is `unlikely to ever be justified' due to ancillary proceedings
involving the Respondent.'' Id. at 4 (quoting Grider Drug #1 & Grider
Drug #2, 77 FR 44070, 44104 n.97 (2012)).\2\ The CALJ also rejected
Respondent's claim that the loss of his Florida medical license
categorically supports the revocation of his DEA registration and found
Respondent's reliance on the Joe W. Morgan, D.O. case and others to be
misplaced. Id. at 6 n.9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ I agree with this statement of the Agency's precedents.
However, the CALJ also cited Odette L. Campbell, 80 FR 41062 (2015),
as contrary authority. See id. The CALJ characterized Campbell as
``holding revocation proceedings in abeyance at the post-hearing
adjudication level for a lengthy period pending the resolution of
both criminal fraud charges and concurrent state administrative
proceedings against the respondent,'' id., even though I have
repeatedly issued final decisions rejecting this reading of
Campbell. See e.g., Judson H. Somerville, 82 FR 21408, 21409 n.3
(2017). For the same reasons set forth in those cases, including the
fact that Campbell involved an application and not a revocation at
the time the proceeding was held in abeyance, I again reject the
CALJ's reading of Campbell.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The CALJ then found summary disposition appropriate in this case
because ``no dispute exists over the fact that the Respondent currently
lacks state authority to handle controlled substances in Florida due to
the Board['s] Order dated December 29, 2017, which revoked his state
license to practice medicine.'' Id. at 7. Reasoning that ``[b]ecause .
. . Respondent lacks state authority at the present time . . . he is
not entitled to maintain his DEA registration,'' the CALJ granted the
Government's request for summary disposition and recommended that I
revoke Respondent's registration and deny any pending applications. Id.
Neither party filed exceptions to the CALJ's Recommended
Decision.\3\ Thereafter, the record was forwarded to my Office for
Final Agency Action. Having reviewed the record, I adopt the CALJ's
factual finding that Respondent's medical license has been revoked and
his ultimate conclusion that Respondent does not hold authority under
Florida law to handle controlled substances, the State in which he
holds his registration with the Agency, and is thus not entitled to
maintain his registration. I also adopt the CALJ's ruling rejecting
Respondent's request for a stay of this proceeding. I further adopt the
CALJ's recommendation that I revoke his registration and deny any
pending application. I make the following factual findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Although Respondent reached out to the CALJ's law clerk to
determine the ``process for filing `exceptions,' '' and the law
clerk advised Respondent of that process and directed Respondent to
21 CFR 1316.66, the administrative record does not include any
exceptions filed by Respondent. Aug. 8, 2008 Email from Law Clerk to
Respondent, at 1. Government counsel was carbon copied on the entire
email exchange. See id.
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Findings of Fact
Respondent is a holder of DEA Certificate of Registration No.
BW6830500, pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense controlled
substances in schedules II through V as a practitioner, at the address
of Holistic Family Medicine, LLC, 9325 Glades Road, Suite 104, Boca
Raton, Florida. Govt. Mot., Appx. A. This registration does not expire
until May 31, 2018. Id.
On December 29, 2016, the Florida Board of Medicine issued a final
order revoking Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State
of Florida. Govt. Mot., Appx. B, at 13. The Florida Board adopted the
recommended order of the state administrative law judge who conducted a
hearing at which Respondent was present and represented by counsel. Id.
at 1. The Board considered the Recommended Order, Exceptions to the
Recommended Order and Response to Exceptions, and adopted the
conclusions of law set forth in the Recommended Order,\4\ and ordered
that Respondent's Florida license to practice medicine be revoked as of
December 29, 2016. Id. at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The Recommended Order of the Florida Administrative Law
Judge was not included in the Government's evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 28, 2017, the 1st District Court of Appeals of Florida
affirmed the decision and final order of the Florida Department of
Health revoking Respondent's license to practice medicine, and denied
rehearing on October 9, 2017. Kenneth Woliner, M.D. v. Department of
Health, No. 1D17-682, slip op. at 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st District
Aug. 28, 2017), and reh'g denied 2017 WL 3696794 (October 9, 2017). I
take official notice of this unpublished decision \5\ and find that
Respondent
[[Page 7225]]
does not possess authority to practice medicine in the State of
Florida, the State in which he is registered.
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\5\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an agency
``may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--
even in the final decision.'' U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm.
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979). In accordance with the APA and
DEA's regulations, Respondent is ``entitled on timely request to an
opportunity to show to the contrary.'' 5 U.S.C. 556(e); see also 21
CFR 1316.59(e). To allow Respondent the opportunity to refute the
facts of which I take official notice, Respondent may file a motion
for reconsideration within 15 calendar days of service of this order
which shall commence on the date this order is mailed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Discussion
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized
to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 823 of the
CSA, ``upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State
license . . . suspended [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority
and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . .
dispensing of controlled substances.'' Also, DEA has long held that the
possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the
laws of the State in which a practitioner engages in professional
practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a
practitioner's registration. See, e.g., James L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371
(2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 Fed. Appx. 826 (4th Cir. 2012); see
also Frederick Marsh Blanton, 43 FR 27616 (1978) (``State authorization
to dispense or otherwise handle controlled substances is a prerequisite
to the issuance and maintenance of a Federal controlled substances
registration.'').
This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the CSA.
First, Congress defined ``the term `practitioner' [to] mean[ ] a . . .
physician . . . or other person licensed, registered or otherwise
permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to
distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in
the course of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in
setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner's registration,
Congress directed that ``[t]he Attorney General shall register
practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . .
controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he
practices.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f).
Here, the dispositive question is whether Respondent is currently
authorized to dispense controlled substances in Florida, the State in
which he is registered. It is undisputed that Florida's Board of
Medicine revoked Respondent's license to practice medicine. In his
recommendation, the CALJ also stated that ``no dispute exists over the
fact that the Respondent currently lacks state authority to handle
controlled substances in Florida due to the Board['s] Order . . . which
revoked his state license to practice medicine.'' R.D., at 7.
Respondent, however, argues in his Opposition that ``[t]he State of
Florida has not made a recommendation regarding Respondent's ability to
prescribe controlled substances''--casting doubt on the CALJ's
statement that it is undisputed that Respondent lacks this ability.
Resp. Opp. at 9. Thus, the question of whether Respondent is currently
authorized to dispense controlled substances in Florida is in dispute.
This question is not a question of fact but of law. If this
question were purely a fact question, as the CALJ suggests, then
summary disposition in this case would have been inappropriate.
However, I find that this dispositive question is a disputed legal
question, not a question of fact. Specifically, under Florida law, a ``
`[p]ractitioner' '' includes ``a physician licensed under chapter 458''
of the Florida statutes, and a `` `[p]hysician' '' under chapter 458
``means a person who is licensed to practice medicine in'' Florida.
Fla. Stat. Sec. Sec. 893.02(23), 458.305(4). Florida law also states
that the ``[p]ractice of medicine,'' in turn, ``means the diagnosis,
treatment, operation, or prescription for any human disease, pain,
injury, deformity, or other physical or mental condition.'' Id. Sec.
458.305(3). Thus, I find that Florida law prohibits Respondent from
dispensing controlled substances within the meaning of the CSA because,
when the Florida Board of Medicine revoked his license to practice
medicine on December 29, 2016, it had the legal effect of also taking
away Respondent's authority to issue any prescriptions for any
``physical or mental condition.'' See Christina B. Paylan, M.D., 80 FR
69979, 69979 (2015) (holding that Respondent ``lacks authority under
Florida law to dispense controlled substances within the meaning of the
CSA'' because ``Respondent's license `to practice as a medical doctor'
'' had been suspended) (citing Fla. Stat. Sec. Sec. 458.305(3), (4));
Reams v. State, 279 So. 2d 839, 842 (Fla. 1973) (holding that
prescribing ``vitamins or food'' rather than ``medicines'' without a
medical license constitutes an unlicensed practice of medicine under
Florida law).
Accordingly, as a matter of law, Respondent lacked the authority to
handle controlled substances in Florida beginning on December 29, 2016
(when the Florida Board of Medicine revoked his State medical license),
and he is therefore not entitled to maintain his DEA registration.
Moreover, because ``the controlling question'' in a proceeding
brought under 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) is whether the holder of a DEA
registration ``is currently authorized to handle controlled substances
in the [S]tate,'' Hooper, 76 FR at 71371 (quoting Anne Lazar Thorn, 62
FR 12847, 12848 (1997)), the Agency has also long held that revocation
is warranted even where a practitioner has lost his state authority by
virtue of the State's use of summary process and the State has yet to
provide a hearing to challenge the suspension. Bourne Pharmacy, 72 FR
18273, 18274 (2007); Wingfield Drugs, 52 FR 27070, 27071 (1987). For
the same reasons, given that the Florida Board of Medicine had revoked
Respondent's state license, it is of no consequence that Respondent
could have prevailed on his appeal to the 1st District Court of Appeals
of Florida.\6\ In any event, and as already noted, that court has since
affirmed the revocation of Respondent's medical license.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Similarly, and contrary to Respondent's claim, Due Process
did not require the CALJ to delay summary disposition of the case
until his appeal to the First District Court of Appeals of Florida
had been decided. Resp. Opp. at 10-12. Rather, Due Process required
the CALJ to provide Respondent the opportunity to respond to the
Order to Show Cause and the Government's Motion for Summary
Disposition. The CALJ did provide Respondent such an opportunity,
and the Respondent did so respond.
I also agree with the CALJ's recommendation (R.D. at 6 n.9)
that I reject, and I do reject, Respondent's argument that
revocation is not required in this case based on the Joe W. Morgan
case and the other Agency precedent cited by Respondent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As for Respondent's CAP, I conclude that there were adequate
grounds for denying it. Specifically, Respondent's position in his CAP
is identical to his principal argument seeking a stay of summary
disposition of the Show Cause Order that I have already rejected;
namely, that his DEA registration should not be revoked until the
conclusion of his appeal to Florida's 1st District Court of Appeal.
Thus, I agree with the Agency's denial of Respondent's CAP for the same
reasons I set forth above for denying Respondent's identical argument
to stay summary disposition. In addition, like his stay argument, the
need to address the adequacy of Respondent's CAP is now moot because
his appeal was denied.
I will therefore reject Respondent's CAP and adopt the CALJ's
recommendation that I revoke Respondent's registration and deny any
[[Page 7226]]
pending applications to renew or modify his registration. See R.D. at
7.
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and
824(a), as well as 28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificate of
Registration No. BW6830500, issued to Kenneth N. Woliner, M.D., be, and
it hereby is, revoked. I further order that any pending application of
Kenneth N. Woliner to renew or modify the above registration, or any
pending application of Kenneth N. Woliner for any other registration,
be, and it hereby is, denied. This Order is effective immediately.\7\
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\7\ For the same reasons which led the Florida Board of Medicine
to revoke Respondent's medical license, I conclude that the public
interest necessitates that this Order be effective immediately. 21
CFR 1316.67.
Dated: February 7, 2018.
Robert W. Patterson,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2018-03299 Filed 2-16-18; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P