Change to Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Services, 60302-60303 [2017-27202]

Download as PDF 60302 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 243 / Wednesday, December 20, 2017 / Rules and Regulations Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): ■ 2017–26–02 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39–19133; Docket No. FAA–2017–0251; Product Identifier 2016–NM–101–AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective January 24, 2018. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 757–200 series airplanes, certificated in any category, that have been converted from passenger to freighter configuration as specified in any of the VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc. supplemental type certificates (STCs) identified in paragraphs (c)(1), (c)(2), and (c)(3) of this AD. (1) STC ST03562AT (14 pallet) (https:// rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_ Library/rgstc.nsf/0/ 7239683609eb1b4086257ff1004d0f2b/$FILE/ ST03562AT.pdf). (2) STC ST04242AT (15 pallet) (https:// rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_ Library/rgstc.nsf/0/edd46d607cedd3a286257 ff1004d8d82/$FILE/ST03952AT.pdf.) (3) STC ST03952AT (combi—airplanes that can carry passenger, freight, or both in the cabin) (https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_ Guidance_Library/rgstc.nsf/0/ edd46d607cedd3a286257ff1004d8d82/$FILE/ ST03952AT.pdf). (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 52, Doors. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the main cargo door (MCD) forward-most cam latch on the forward center cam latch pair broke during flight. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct discrepancies of the MCD cam latches, latch pins, and latch pin cross bolts, which, if left undetected, could reduce the structural integrity of the MCD and result in potential loss of the MCD and rapid decompression of the airplane. ethrower on DSK3G9T082PROD with RULES (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Repetitive Inspections, Replacement, and Related Investigative and Corrective Actions At the applicable time specified in paragraph I.D., ‘‘Compliance,’’ of VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc. Service Bulletin MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, Revision 3, dated July 22, 2016 (‘‘SB MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, R3’’), except as required by paragraph (h)(1) of this AD; or within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later: Do the actions specified in paragraphs (g)(1) through (g)(4) of this AD, and do all VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:19 Dec 19, 2017 Jkt 244001 applicable related investigative and corrective actions, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of SB MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, R3, except as specified in paragraph (h)(2) of this AD. Do all applicable related investigative and corrective actions before further flight. Repeat the inspections specified in paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(4) of this AD thereafter at the applicable intervals specified in paragraph I.D., ‘‘Compliance,’’ of SB MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, R3. (1) Do a general visual inspection for any broken or missing cam latches, latch pins, and latch pin cross bolts of the MCD. (2) Do a detailed inspection for any cracks or gouges in critical areas of the cam latches and latch pins of the MCD and for any cam latches with lip deformation. (3) Replace all previously unreplaced alloy steel latch pin cross bolts with corrosion resistant steel (CRES) latch pin cross bolts of the MCD. (4) Do a high frequency eddy current (HFEC) or magnetic particle inspection for any cracks in the critical areas of cam latch 1 and cam latch 2 of the MCD. (h) Exceptions to Service Information (1) Where the ‘‘Condition’’ column of table 1 of paragraph I.D., ‘‘Compliance,’’ of SB MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, R3, refers to airplanes meeting certain conditions identified in ‘‘Condition 1,’’ for this AD, ‘‘Condition 1’’ applies to all airplanes. (2) Where the Accomplishment Instructions of SB MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, R3, specify doing actions only for airplanes that have completed a certain rig and check of the MCD, this AD requires doing those actions on all airplanes. (i) Credit for Previous Actions This paragraph provides credit for the actions specified in paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective date of this AD using VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc. Service Bulletin MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, Revision 2, dated February 18, 2016. (j) Special Flight Permit A special flight permit may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane, for a single unpressurized flight, to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (k) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (l) of this AD. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 (l) Related Information For more information about this AD, contact Samuel Belete, Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Section, Atlanta ACO Branch, 1701 Columbia Avenue, College Park, GA 30337; telephone 404–474– 5580; fax 404–474–5605; email: samuel.belete@faa.gov. (m) Material Incorporated by Reference (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. (i) VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc. Service Bulletin MAE757SF–SB–52–12/02, Revision 3, dated July 22, 2016. The date appears only on pages 1 and 3 of this document. (ii) Reserved. (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact VT Mobile Aerospace Engineering Inc., 2100 9th Street, Brookley Aeroplex, Mobile, AL 36615; telephone: 251– 379–0112; email: mae.757sf@vtmae.com; internet: https://www.vtmae.com. (4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport Standards Branch, 1601 Lind Avenue SW, Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go to: https:// www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. Issued in Renton, Washington, on December 8, 2017. Jeffrey E. Duven, Director, System Oversight Division, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2017–27169 Filed 12–19–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 91 [Docket No.: FAA–2017–1194] Change to Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Services Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Notification of changes in ADS– B services. AGENCY: This action announces changes in ADS–B services, including Traffic Information Service—Broadcast (TIS–B), for a small number of aircraft. The FAA is implementing a filter for certain ADS–B equipped aircraft SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\20DER1.SGM 20DER1 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 243 / Wednesday, December 20, 2017 / Rules and Regulations broadcasting erroneous or improper information when the broadcast information could affect the safe provision of air traffic services. Any aircraft subject to the filter will not have its ADS–B information sent to an air traffic control (ATC) facility nor will the aircraft be a client for TIS–B services. Affected aircraft will continue to receive ATC services within radar coverage using secondary radar information. DATES: The action described herein is implemented January 2, 2018. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning this action, contact: David E. Gray, Program Manager, Surveillance and Broadcast Services, AJM–232, Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Ave. SW, Wilbur Wright Building, Washington, DC 20597; telephone: 202– 267–3615; email: adsb@faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: ethrower on DSK3G9T082PROD with RULES Background In 2010, the FAA issued a final rule mandating equipage requirements and performance standards for Automatic Dependent Surveillance—Broadcast (ADS–B) Out avionics on aircraft operating in certain airspace after December 31, 2019. 75 FR 30160, May 28, 2010. Use of ADS–B Out will move air traffic control from a radar-based system to a satellite-derived aircraft location system and enhance aircraft surveillance by FAA and Department of Defense (DOD) air traffic controllers. Equipage with ADS–B avionics also provides aircraft operators with a platform for additional flight applications and services, including TIS–B,1 which improve a pilot’s situational awareness in aircraft not equipped with a traffic alert and collision avoidance system (TCAS). In deploying the ADS–B surveillance infrastructure, the FAA implemented a capability to monitor compliance with § 91.227 requirements for aircraft operating within the U.S. National Airspace System (NAS). Over the past three years, this monitoring has identified some ADS–B Out aircraft with non-performing equipment (NPE) transmitting data used by ATC and ADS–B-In-equipped aircraft that present a potential safety hazard to NAS 1 TIS–B uses secondary surveillance radars and multilateration systems to provide proximate traffic situational awareness, including position reports from aircraft not equipped with ADS–B Out. TIS– B data may not provide as much information as could be received directly from an aircraft’s ADS– B Out broadcast, because of the required data processing. The TIS–B signal is an advisory service that is not designed for aircraft surveillance or separation, and cannot be used for either purpose. VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:19 Dec 19, 2017 Jkt 244001 operations, including but not limited to: Unassigned/invalid 24-bit ICAO addresses; incorrect flight identification codes; erroneous position reports; improper avionics integrity and accuracy levels; and missing data required by applicable regulations. To reduce the potential hazard presented by NPE aircraft, the FAA is filtering individual 24-bit ICAO address codes (also known as Mode S codes) for certain aircraft from the FAA’s operational ADS–B network. The FAA is implementing an ATC filtering capability on January 2, 2018. This filtering prevents processing of data transmitted by uniquely identified NPE aircraft within FAA air traffic control systems and by the FAA TIS–B service. ATC will continue to receive transponder replies to secondary radar interrogations and will be able to provide ATC services within radar coverage to aircraft subject to the filter, using secondary radar information. Also, any aircraft with a filtered ICAO address code will continue to appear as a ‘‘target’’ to nearby aircraft with ADS– B-In equipment. Action The FAA will always filter ICAO address codes from aircraft that are transmitting the hexadecimal values ‘‘000000’’ and ‘‘FFFFFF.’’ Per ICAO technical standards which FAA surveillance systems meet, neither of these ICAO address codes should be used by any aircraft ADS–B Out transmitter or Mode S transponder. However, FAA ADS–B monitoring over the last three years indicates that approximately once per day, on average, there is a flight in the NAS using one of these incorrect ICAO address codes and indicating that the aircraft is equipped with an ADS–B-In system. Because these non-compliant codes are not unique to a single aircraft, the potential for multiple aircraft to transmit the same code could create confusion inside ADS–B and TCAS avionics, Mode S interrogators, and ATC automation systems. This confusion could cause an aircraft’s position to be incorrectly displayed or not displayed at all, thereby creating an unsafe condition in the NAS. To mitigate this risk and discourage violation of ICAO technical standards, the FAA will filter the ADS– B information from any aircraft transmitting a non-compliant address code from the FAA’s operational ATC systems. Therefore, aircraft broadcasting these incorrect ICAO address codes will be unable to receive TIS–B services. The FAA also intends to utilize the filter for other ICAO codes that are being improperly broadcast or for aircraft PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 9990 60303 whose ADS–B Out equipment has exhibited erroneous position reports that could affect the safe provision of air traffic services. The FAA may also utilize the filter for aircraft that have a known issue that could reasonably result in erroneous ADS–B reports that could affect the safe provision of ATC services. The FAA has initiated the filtering capability described in this document for aircraft transmitting non-compliant codes. For other aircraft, the FAA intends when possible to provide individual notice to owners/operators prior to utilizing the filter. This notification would describe the reason for applying the filter and steps that must be taken before an aircraft may be removed from the filter. If an aircraft owner/operator does not respond to an FAA notice of finding regarding an ADS–B avionics issue, FAA at its option may subject that aircraft to the filter without further notice. Owners and operators can identify the ICAO address filtering status of their aircraft by requesting a Public ADS–B Performance Report (PAPR) at the following web address: https:// adsbperformance.faa.gov/ PAPRRequest.aspx. Owners and operators whose aircraft are affected by application of the ICAO address filter must contact the FAA Flight Standards Service ADS–B Focus Team at adsbfocusteam@faa.gov for guidance on corrective actions and coordination for removal of aircraft from the ICAO address filter. Operators should check to insure that the ICAO address code (Mode S code) broadcast by their ADS–B equipment matches the assigned ICAO address code for their aircraft. This ICAO address code (Mode S code) can be found at: https://registry.faa.gov/ aircraftinquiry/NNum_Inquiry.aspx. Operators can verify what ICAO address code is being broadcast by their aircraft by visiting: https:// adsbperformance.faa.gov/ PAPRRequest.aspx.2 Issued in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2017. Kristen G. Burnham, Vice President, Program Management Organization, FAA Air Traffic Organization. [FR Doc. 2017–27202 Filed 12–19–17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 2 For those aircraft transmitting an erroneous ICAO code, the PAPR software will search for the Flight ID matching the entered N-registry number if it cannot locate the corresponding ICAO code. E:\FR\FM\20DER1.SGM 20DER1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 243 (Wednesday, December 20, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60302-60303]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-27202]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 91

[Docket No.: FAA-2017-1194]


Change to Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Services

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notification of changes in ADS-B services.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This action announces changes in ADS-B services, including 
Traffic Information Service--Broadcast (TIS-B), for a small number of 
aircraft. The FAA is implementing a filter for certain ADS-B equipped 
aircraft

[[Page 60303]]

broadcasting erroneous or improper information when the broadcast 
information could affect the safe provision of air traffic services. 
Any aircraft subject to the filter will not have its ADS-B information 
sent to an air traffic control (ATC) facility nor will the aircraft be 
a client for TIS-B services. Affected aircraft will continue to receive 
ATC services within radar coverage using secondary radar information.

DATES: The action described herein is implemented January 2, 2018.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning 
this action, contact: David E. Gray, Program Manager, Surveillance and 
Broadcast Services, AJM-232, Air Traffic Organization, Federal Aviation 
Administration, 600 Independence Ave. SW, Wilbur Wright Building, 
Washington, DC 20597; telephone: 202-267-3615; email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    In 2010, the FAA issued a final rule mandating equipage 
requirements and performance standards for Automatic Dependent 
Surveillance--Broadcast (ADS-B) Out avionics on aircraft operating in 
certain airspace after December 31, 2019. 75 FR 30160, May 28, 2010. 
Use of ADS-B Out will move air traffic control from a radar-based 
system to a satellite-derived aircraft location system and enhance 
aircraft surveillance by FAA and Department of Defense (DOD) air 
traffic controllers. Equipage with ADS-B avionics also provides 
aircraft operators with a platform for additional flight applications 
and services, including TIS-B,\1\ which improve a pilot's situational 
awareness in aircraft not equipped with a traffic alert and collision 
avoidance system (TCAS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ TIS-B uses secondary surveillance radars and multilateration 
systems to provide proximate traffic situational awareness, 
including position reports from aircraft not equipped with ADS-B 
Out. TIS-B data may not provide as much information as could be 
received directly from an aircraft's ADS-B Out broadcast, because of 
the required data processing. The TIS-B signal is an advisory 
service that is not designed for aircraft surveillance or 
separation, and cannot be used for either purpose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In deploying the ADS-B surveillance infrastructure, the FAA 
implemented a capability to monitor compliance with Sec.  91.227 
requirements for aircraft operating within the U.S. National Airspace 
System (NAS). Over the past three years, this monitoring has identified 
some ADS-B Out aircraft with non-performing equipment (NPE) 
transmitting data used by ATC and ADS-B-In-equipped aircraft that 
present a potential safety hazard to NAS operations, including but not 
limited to: Unassigned/invalid 24-bit ICAO addresses; incorrect flight 
identification codes; erroneous position reports; improper avionics 
integrity and accuracy levels; and missing data required by applicable 
regulations.
    To reduce the potential hazard presented by NPE aircraft, the FAA 
is filtering individual 24-bit ICAO address codes (also known as Mode S 
codes) for certain aircraft from the FAA's operational ADS-B network. 
The FAA is implementing an ATC filtering capability on January 2, 2018. 
This filtering prevents processing of data transmitted by uniquely 
identified NPE aircraft within FAA air traffic control systems and by 
the FAA TIS-B service. ATC will continue to receive transponder replies 
to secondary radar interrogations and will be able to provide ATC 
services within radar coverage to aircraft subject to the filter, using 
secondary radar information. Also, any aircraft with a filtered ICAO 
address code will continue to appear as a ``target'' to nearby aircraft 
with ADS-B-In equipment.

Action

    The FAA will always filter ICAO address codes from aircraft that 
are transmitting the hexadecimal values ``000000'' and ``FFFFFF.'' Per 
ICAO technical standards which FAA surveillance systems meet, neither 
of these ICAO address codes should be used by any aircraft ADS-B Out 
transmitter or Mode S transponder. However, FAA ADS-B monitoring over 
the last three years indicates that approximately once per day, on 
average, there is a flight in the NAS using one of these incorrect ICAO 
address codes and indicating that the aircraft is equipped with an ADS-
B-In system. Because these non-compliant codes are not unique to a 
single aircraft, the potential for multiple aircraft to transmit the 
same code could create confusion inside ADS-B and TCAS avionics, Mode S 
interrogators, and ATC automation systems. This confusion could cause 
an aircraft's position to be incorrectly displayed or not displayed at 
all, thereby creating an unsafe condition in the NAS. To mitigate this 
risk and discourage violation of ICAO technical standards, the FAA will 
filter the ADS-B information from any aircraft transmitting a non-
compliant address code from the FAA's operational ATC systems. 
Therefore, aircraft broadcasting these incorrect ICAO address codes 
will be unable to receive TIS-B services.
    The FAA also intends to utilize the filter for other ICAO codes 
that are being improperly broadcast or for aircraft whose ADS-B Out 
equipment has exhibited erroneous position reports that could affect 
the safe provision of air traffic services. The FAA may also utilize 
the filter for aircraft that have a known issue that could reasonably 
result in erroneous ADS-B reports that could affect the safe provision 
of ATC services.
    The FAA has initiated the filtering capability described in this 
document for aircraft transmitting non-compliant codes. For other 
aircraft, the FAA intends when possible to provide individual notice to 
owners/operators prior to utilizing the filter. This notification would 
describe the reason for applying the filter and steps that must be 
taken before an aircraft may be removed from the filter. If an aircraft 
owner/operator does not respond to an FAA notice of finding regarding 
an ADS-B avionics issue, FAA at its option may subject that aircraft to 
the filter without further notice.
    Owners and operators can identify the ICAO address filtering status 
of their aircraft by requesting a Public ADS-B Performance Report 
(PAPR) at the following web address: https://adsbperformance.faa.gov/PAPRRequest.aspx. Owners and operators whose aircraft are affected by 
application of the ICAO address filter must contact the FAA Flight 
Standards Service ADS-B Focus Team at [email protected] for 
guidance on corrective actions and coordination for removal of aircraft 
from the ICAO address filter.
    Operators should check to insure that the ICAO address code (Mode S 
code) broadcast by their ADS-B equipment matches the assigned ICAO 
address code for their aircraft. This ICAO address code (Mode S code) 
can be found at: https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/NNum_Inquiry.aspx. Operators can verify what ICAO address code is being 
broadcast by their aircraft by visiting: https://adsbperformance.faa.gov/PAPRRequest.aspx.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ For those aircraft transmitting an erroneous ICAO code, the 
PAPR software will search for the Flight ID matching the entered N-
registry number if it cannot locate the corresponding ICAO code.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 12, 2017.
Kristen G. Burnham,
Vice President, Program Management Organization, FAA Air Traffic 
Organization.
[FR Doc. 2017-27202 Filed 12-19-17; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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