Representation-Case Procedures, 58783-58790 [2017-26904]

Agencies

• National Labor Relations Board

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 239 (Thursday, December 14, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 58783-58790]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-26904]


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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

29 CFR Parts 101 and 102

RIN 3142-AA12


Representation-Case Procedures

AGENCY: National Labor Relations Board.

ACTION: Request for information.

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SUMMARY: The National Labor Relations Board (the Board) is seeking 
information from the public regarding its representation election 
regulations (the Election Regulations), with a specific focus on 
amendments to the Board's representation case procedures adopted by the 
Board's final rule published on December 15, 2014 (the Election Rule or 
Rule). As part of its ongoing efforts to more effectively administer 
the National Labor Relations Act (the Act or the NLRA) and to further 
the purposes of the Act, the Board has an interest in reviewing the 
Election Rule to evaluate whether the Rule should be: Retained without 
change, retained with modifications, or rescinded, possibly while 
making changes to the prior Election Regulations that were in place 
before the Rule's adoption. Regarding these questions, the Board 
believes it will be helpful to solicit and consider public responses to 
this request for information.

DATES: Responses to this request for information must be received by 
the Board on or before February 12, 2018. No late responses will be 
accepted. Responses are limited to 25 pages.

ADDRESSES: You may submit responses by the following methods: 
Internet--Electronic responses may be submitted by going to 
www.nlrb.gov and following the link to submit responses to this request 
for information. The Board encourages electronic filing. Delivery--If 
you do not have the ability to submit your response electronically, 
responses may be submitted by mail to: Roxanne Rothschild, Deputy 
Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street 
SE, Washington, DC 20570. Because of security precautions, the Board 
experiences delays in U.S. mail delivery. You should take this into 
consideration when preparing to meet the deadline for submitting 
responses. It is not necessary to submit responses by mail if they have 
been filed electronically on www.nlrb.gov. If you submit responses by 
mail, the Board recommends that you confirm receipt of your delivered 
responses by checking www.nlrb.gov to confirm that your response is 
posted there (allowing time for receipt by mail). Only responses 
submitted as described above will be accepted; ex parte communications 
received by the Board will be made part of the record and will be 
treated as responses only insofar as appropriate.
    The Board requests that responses include full citations or 
internet links to any authority relied upon. All responses submitted to 
www.nlrb.gov will be posted on the Agency's public website as soon 
after receipt as practicable without making any changes to the 
responses, including changes to personal information provided. The 
Board cautions responders not to include in the body of their responses 
personal information such as Social Security numbers, personal 
addresses, personal telephone numbers, and personal email addresses, as 
such submitted information will become viewable by the public when the 
responses are posted online. It is the responders' responsibility to 
safeguard their information. The responders' email addresses will not 
be posted on the Agency website unless they choose to include that 
information as part of their responses.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Roxanne Rothschild, Deputy Executive 
Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, 1015 Half Street SE, 
Washington, DC 20570, (202) 273-2917 (this is not a toll-free number), 
1-866-315-6572 (TTY/TDD).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    On December 15, 2014, the Board published the Election Rule, which 
amended the Board's prior Election Regulations. 79 FR 74308 (December 
15, 2014). The Election Rule was adopted after public comment periods 
in which tens of thousands of public comments were received. The Rule 
was approved by a three-member Board majority, with two Board members 
expressing dissenting views. Thereafter, the Rule was submitted for 
review by Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act. In March 
2015, majorities in both houses of Congress voted in favor of a joint 
resolution disapproving the Board's rule and declaring that it should 
have no force or effect. President Obama vetoed this resolution on 
March 31, 2015. The amendments adopted by the final rule became 
effective on April 14, 2015, and have been applicable to all 
representation cases filed on or after that date. Multiple parties 
initiated lawsuits challenging the facial validity of the Election 
Rule, and those challenges were rejected. See Associated Builders & 
Contractors of Texas, Inc. v.

[[Page 58784]]

NLRB, 826 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2015), affg. No. 1-15-CV-026 RP, 2015 WL 
3609116 (W.D. Tex. June 1, 2015); Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. NLRB, 
118 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D.D.C. 2015). These rulings did not preclude the 
possibility that the Election Rule might be invalid as applied in 
particular cases.

II. Authority Regarding Board Review of the 2014 Election Rule 
Amendments

    Agencies have the authority to reconsider past decisions and rules 
and to retain, revise, replace, and rescind decisions and rules. See 
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-515 (2009); 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983); National Ass'n of 
Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038-1039,1043 (DC Cir. 2012).
    The Election Rule has been in effect for more than 2 years. The 
current five-member Board includes only two members who participated in 
the 2014 rulemaking: Member Pearce, who joined the majority vote to 
adopt the final rule, and Chairman Miscimarra, who joined former Member 
Johnson in dissent. In addition to the proceedings described above, and 
other congressional hearings and proposed legislation, numerous cases 
litigated before the Board have presented significant issues concerning 
application of the Election Rule. See, e.g., UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 
365 NLRB No. 113 (2017); European Imports, Inc., 365 NLRB No. 41 
(2017); Yale University, 365 NLRB No. 40 (2017); Brunswick Bowling 
Products, LLC, 364 NLRB No. 96 (2016).

III. Request for Information From the Public

    The Board invites information relating to the following questions:
    1. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained without change?
    2. Should the 2014 Election Rule be retained with modifications? If 
so, what should be modified?
    3. Should the 2014 Election Rule be rescinded? If so, should the 
Board revert to the Election Regulations that were in effect prior to 
the 2014 Election Rule's adoption, or should the Board make changes to 
the prior Election Regulations? If the Board should make changes to the 
prior Election Regulations, what should be changed?

IV. Response to the Dissents

    It is surprising that the Board lacks unanimity about merely posing 
three questions about the 2014 Election Rule, when none of the 
questions suggests a single change in the Board's representation-
election procedures. Nonetheless, two dissenting colleagues object to 
the request for information regarding the Election Rule because, among 
other things, they believe that (i) the Election Rule has worked 
effectively (or even, in Member Pearce's estimation, essentially 
flawlessly), (ii) any request for information from the public about the 
Rule is premature, (iii) merely requesting information reveals a 
predetermination on our part to revise or rescind the Election Rule, 
and (iv) future changes will be based on ``alternative facts'' and 
``manufactur[ed]'' rationales.
    It is the Board's duty to periodically conduct an objective and 
critical review of the effectiveness and appropriateness of our rules. 
In any event, our dissenting colleagues would answer the above Question 
1 in the affirmative: They believe the Election Rule should be retained 
without change. That is their opinion. However, the Board is seeking 
the opinions of others: Unions, employers, associations, labor-law 
practitioners, academics, members of Congress, and anyone from the 
general public who wishes to provide information relating to the 
questions posed above. In addition, we welcome the views of the General 
Counsel and also the Regional Directors, whose experience working with 
the 2014 Election Rule makes them a valuable resource.
    One thing is clear: Issuing the above request for information is 
unlike the process followed by the Board majority that adopted the 2014 
Election Rule. The rulemaking process that culminated in the 2014 
Election Rule (like the process followed prior to issuance of the 
election rule adopted by Members Pearce and Becker in 2011) started 
with a lengthy proposed rule that outlined dozens of changes in the 
Board's election procedures, without any prior request for information 
from the public regarding the Board's election procedures. By contrast, 
the above request does not suggest even a single specific change in 
current representation-election procedures. Again, the Board merely 
poses three questions, two of which contemplate the possible retention 
of the 2014 Election Rule.\1\
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    \1\ Member McFerran contends that the Board's open-ended request 
``depart[s] from the norms of rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedure Act.'' Her contention is misplaced. The Board is merely 
requesting information. We are not engaged in rulemaking.
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V. Dissenting Views of Member Mark Gaston Pearce and Member Lauren 
McFerran

    Member Pearce, dissenting.
    I dissent from the Notice and Request for Information, which should 
more aptly be titled a ``Notice and Quest for Alternative Facts.'' It 
ignores the Final Rule's success in improving the Board's 
representation-case procedures and judicial rejection of dissenting 
Members Miscimarra and Johnson's legal pronouncements about the Final 
Rule.
    Some two and a half years ago, the National Labor Relations Board 
concluded lengthy rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure 
Act to reexamine our representation-case procedures. We had proposed a 
number of targeted solutions to discrete problems identified with the 
Board's methods of processing petitions for elections with a goal of 
removing unnecessary barriers to the fair and expeditious resolution of 
representation cases. The rulemaking sought to simplify representation-
case procedures, codify best practices, increase transparency and 
uniformity across regions, eliminate duplicative and unnecessary 
litigation, and modernize rules concerning documents and communication 
in light of changing technology. After a painstaking three and a half 
year process, involving the consideration of tens of thousands of 
comments generated over two separate comment periods totaling 141 days, 
and 4 days of hearings with live questioning by the Board Members, we 
issued a final rule that became effective on April 14, 2015. 
Representation-Case Procedures, 79 FR 74308 (Dec. 15, 2014).
    The Final Rule was careful and comprehensive--spanning over 100 
pages of the Federal Register's triple-column format in explaining the 
25 changes ultimately made to the Board's rules and regulations. For 
each change, the Final Rule identified the problem to be ameliorated, 
catalogued every type of substantive response from the public, and set 
forth the Board's analysis as to why the proposed amendment was either 
being adopted, discarded or modified.\1\
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    \1\ See Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 826 F.3d 215, 229 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that the Board 
``conducted an exhaustive and lengthy review of the issues, 
evidence, and testimony, responded to contrary arguments, and 
offered factual and legal support for its final conclusions''); 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America v. NLRB, 118 
F.Supp.3d 171, 220 (D.D.C. 2015) (``[T]he Board engaged in a 
comprehensive analysis of a multitude of issues relating to the need 
for and the propriety of the Final Rule, and it directly addressed 
the commenters' many concerns[.]'').

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[[Page 58785]]

    Complying with the rulemaking process, and dealing with the deluge 
of public comments generated, was not an easy task for our Agency. 
Thousands of staff hours were expended; research and training was 
required into statutes and procedures with which we were unfamiliar; 
expensive licensing was purchased for software to sort, and websites to 
house, the tens of thousands of comments received; and contributions 
were made from all corners of the Agency. Through this extensive 
process, the fundamental questions were asked and answered. The amended 
procedures have now been in place for some two and a half years, and my 
colleagues show no serious justification for calling them into 
question.
    Indeed, it is with some irony that I am reminded of the sentiment 
expressed in dissent to the Final Rule in 2014 that ``the countless 
number of hours spent by Board personnel in rulemaking'' would be 
better spent expeditiously processing cases. 79 FR at 74457. Yet, in 
the past 9 months, the Board's case output has fallen precipitously,\2\ 
and we face the specter of budget cuts that could further hamper our 
ability to perform our statutory mission. Now, the majority will burden 
the Agency with the exercise of continued rulemaking in an area that 
has already been thoroughly addressed.
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    \2\ Comparing the period February 1 through October 2017, to the 
equivalent nine-month period from 2016, the Board's output of 
contested unfair labor practice decisions and published 
representation case decisions has been reduced by approximately 45 
percent (i.e., a drop in excess of 100 cases). Searches in the 
Board's NxGen case processing software show that from February 1, 
2017, to October 31, 2017, the Board issued 136 decisions in 
contested unfair labor practice cases and published representation 
cases, while from February 1, 2016, to October 31, 2016, the Board 
issued 247 such decisions.
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    As a consequence, our attention will be diverted from case 
processing to explore the rollback of a Final Rule that has provided a 
bounty of beneficial changes, and which applies equally to initial 
organizing campaigns and efforts to decertify incumbent unions. A non-
exhaustive list includes:
     Parties may now use modern technology to electronically 
file and serve petitions and other documents, thereby saving time and 
money, and affording non-filing parties the earliest possible notice.
     Petitions and election objections must be supported, and 
must be served on other parties.
     Board procedures are more transparent, and more meaningful 
information is more widely available at earlier stages of our 
proceedings.
     Issues in dispute are clarified, and parties are enabled 
to make more informed judgments about whether to enter into election 
agreements.
     Across regions, employees' Section 7 rights are afforded 
more equal treatment, the timing of hearings is more predictable, and 
litigation is more efficient and uniform.
     Parties are more often spared the expense of litigating, 
and the Board is more often spared the burden of deciding, issues that 
are not necessary to determine whether a question of representation 
exists, and which may be mooted by election results.
     The Board enjoys the benefit of a regional director 
decision in all representation cases.
     Board practice more closely adheres to the statutory 
directive that requests for review not stay any action of the regional 
director unless specifically ordered by the Board.
     Nonemployer parties are able to communicate about election 
issues with voters using modern means of communication such as email, 
texts and cell phones, and are less likely to challenge voters out of 
ignorance.
     Notices of Election are more informative, and more often 
electronically disseminated.
     Employees voting subject to challenge are more easily 
identified, and the chances are lessened of their ballots being 
comingled.
    And all of this has been accomplished while processing 
representation cases more expeditiously from petition, to election, to 
closure.
    So why would the majority suggest rescinding all of these benefits 
to the Agency, employees, employers, and unions? In evaluating that 
question, it is worthwhile to remind ourselves of a basic tenet of 
administrative law: while an agency rule, once adopted, is not frozen 
in place, the agency must offer valid reasons for changing it and must 
fairly account for the benefits lost as a result of the change. 
Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. U.S., 391 F.3d 338, 351-352 (1st 
Cir. 2004).
    None of the reasons offered by today's majority constitutes a 
persuasive justification for requesting information from the public, 
let alone for rescinding or modifying the Final Rule. The majority 
notes that the Final Rule has been in effect for more than two years. 
But the fact that two years have transpired since the Final Rule was 
adopted hardly constitutes a reason for rescinding or modifying it. The 
Board has a wealth of casehandling information that can be obtained 
through an analysis of our own records. And because the Board has 
access to all regional director pre- and post-election decisions, and 
because parties may request Board review of any action taken by the 
regional directors, the Board already is aware of the nature of any 
complaints about how the Final Rule has worked in particular cases. As 
for reverting to the prior representation rules, the public already had 
the opportunity to comment on whether they should be maintained or 
modified.
    The majority next points to a change in Board member composition, 
but by itself, that is not a sufficient reason for rescinding, 
modifying, or requesting information from the public concerning the 
Final Rule. The majority also cites a grand total of four cases (out of 
the many cases) applying the Final Rule, but none provides any reason 
to invite public comment on the Final Rule, much less for the Board to 
reconsider it. While the majority also cites congressional efforts to 
overturn the Final Rule, they did not succeed, and cannot be used to 
demonstrate that the Final Rule contravenes our governing statute. As 
the courts have recognized, ``It is well-established that `the view of 
a later Congress cannot control the interpretation of an earlier 
enacted statute.' '' Huffman v. OPM, 263 F.3d 1341, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (quoting O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 90 (1996)). 
Finally, as the majority is forced to concede, every legal challenge to 
the Final Rule has been struck down by the courts.
    In evaluating the appropriateness of the Notice and Request for 
Information, it is also worth journeying back in time to consider the 
pronouncements and dire predictions voiced by then-Members Miscimarra 
and Johnson about the Final Rule when it issued. In considering these 
matters, the reader need not take my word, for the dissent appears in 
the Federal Register.
    Suffice it to say that the Final Rule's dissenters were so wrong 
about so much. They did not simply disagree with the Board's judgments, 
but instead claimed that the Final Rule violated the NLRA, the APA, and 
the U.S. Constitution.
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule's amendments 
contradicted our statute and were otherwise impermissibly arbitrary. 79 
FR at 74431. It was wrong on both counts. See Associated Builders and 
Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(The ``rule, on its face, does not violate the National Labor Relations 
Act or the Administrative Procedure Act[.]''); Chamber of Commerce of 
the United States of America v. NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 3d 171, 220 (D.D.C. 
2015) (rejecting

[[Page 58786]]

claims that the Final Rule contravenes either the NLRA or the 
Constitution or is arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of the Board's 
discretion).
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule's primary purpose 
and effect was to shorten the time from the filing of petition to the 
conduct of the election, and that this violated the NLRA and was 
otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 79 FR at 74430, 74433-74435. It was 
wrong on all three counts. See ABC of Texas, 826 F.3d at 227-228 
(noting that the Board properly considered delay in scheduling 
elections and that the Board also reasoned that the final rule was 
necessary to further ``a variety of additional permissible goals and 
interests''); Chamber of Commerce, 118 F.Supp.3d at 218-219 (rejecting 
claim that the Rule promotes speed in holding elections at the expense 
of all other statutory goals and requirements, and noting that many of 
the Rule's provisions do not relate to the length of the election 
cycle).
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule's granting regional 
directors discretion to defer litigation of individual eligibility 
issues at the pre-election hearing was contrary to the statute and was 
arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. 79 FR at 74430, 
74436-74438, 74444-74446. The courts rejected those arguments. See 
Chamber of Commerce, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 181, 195-203 (``Granting 
regional directors the discretion to decline to hear evidence on 
individual voter eligibility and inclusion issues does not violate the 
NLRA [and] is not arbitrary and capricious.''); ABC of Texas, 826 F.3d 
at 220-223. See also Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 2015 WL 3609116 * 2, *7 (W.D. Tex. 2015).
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule violated the Act 
and the Constitution by infringing on protected speech and by providing 
an insufficient time period for employees to understand the issues 
before having to vote, thereby compelling them to vote now, understand 
later. (79 FR at 74430-74431, 74436, 74438). But these claims were also 
rejected by the courts. See Chamber of Commerce, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 
181-182, 189, 206-208, 220 (``The elimination of the presumptive pre-
election waiting period does not violate the NLRA or the First 
Amendment'' and ``[p]laintiffs have failed to show that the Final Rule 
inhibits . . . debate in any meaningful way.''); ABC of Texas, 826 F.3d 
at 220, 226-227 (rejecting claim that ``the cumulative effect of the 
rule change improperly shortens the overall pre-election period in 
violation of the `free speech' provision of the Act'' or inhibits 
meaningful debate).
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule ran afoul of the 
APA because the Board failed to demonstrate a need for the amendments. 
79 FR 74431, 74434. Here again, the courts rejected that contention. 
See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 219-220 (``the Board 
has offered grounds to show that the issues targeted by the Final Rule 
were sufficiently tangible to warrant action''); ABC of Texas, 826 F.3d 
at 227-229.
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule's accelerated 
deadlines and hearing provisions violated employers' due process rights 
and the NLRA's appropriate hearing requirement. 79 FR at 74431-74442, 
74451. Wrong. See Chamber of Commerce, 118 F.Supp.3d at 177, 205-206 
(due process challenge does ``not withstand close inspection'' because, 
among other reasons, it is ``predicated on mischaracterizations of what 
the Final Rule actually provides''); Associated Builders and 
Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. NLRB, 2015 WL 3609116 *2, *5-*7, affd, 
826 F.3d at 220, 222-223 (``the rule changes to the pre-election 
hearing did not exceed the boundaries of the Board's statutory 
authority'').
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule's provision making 
Board review of regional director post-election determinations 
discretionary contravened the Board's duty to oversee the election 
process and was arbitrary and capricious. 79 FR at 74431, 74449-74451. 
Wrong again. See Chamber of Commerce, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 215-218 
(rejecting claims that ``the Final Rule's `elimination of mandatory 
Board review of post-election disputes . . . contravenes the Board's 
`statutory obligation to oversee the election process''' and is 
arbitrary and capricious).
    The Final Rule dissent pronounced that the Rule's voter list 
provisions were not rationally justified or consistent with the Act, 
did not adequately address privacy concerns, and imposed unreasonable 
compliance burdens on employers. 79 FR at 74452, 74455. Wrong on all 
counts. See Chamber of Commerce, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 209-215 (``The 
Employee Information Disclosure Requirement [in the Rule's voter list 
provisions] does not violate the NLRA,'' and ``is not arbitrary and 
capricious;'' the Board did not act arbitrarily in concluding that 
``the [r]equirement ensures fair and free employee choice'' and 
``facilitates the public interest;'' and ``the Board engaged in a 
lengthy and thorough analysis of the privacy risks and other concerns 
raised by the commenters before reaching its conclusion that the 
Employee Information Disclosure Requirement was warranted.''); ABC of 
Texas, 826 F.3d at 223-226 (rejecting claims that the voter list 
provisions violate the NLRA and conflict with federal laws that protect 
employee privacy; that the provisions ``are arbitrary and capricious 
under the APA because the rule disregards employees' privacy 
concerns,'' and ``place an undue, substantial burden on employers''); 
see also Associated Builders and Contractors of Texas, Inc. v. NLRB, 
2015 WL 3609116 *2, *8-*11.
    Apart from their wrong-headed views concerning the legal merits of 
the Rule, the Final Rule dissenters made a number of erroneous 
predictions regarding how the Final Rule would work in practice. But as 
far-fetched as I found these speculations in 2014, one can now see that 
these predictions are refuted by the Board's actual experience 
administering the Final Rule. A quick review of several published 
agency statistics shows some of their most notable speculations of 
dysfunction to be completely unfounded.
    The Final Rule dissenters speculated that the changes made by the 
Rule would drive down the Board's historically high rate of elections 
conducted by agreement of the parties either because the Final Rule 
does not provide enough time to reach agreement, 79 FR 74442, or 
because parties can no longer stipulate to mandatory Board review of 
post-election disputes, 79 FR 74450. They argued, ``[e]ven if the 
percentage of election agreements decreases by a few points, the 
resulting increase in pre- and post-election litigation will likely 
negate any reduction of purported delay due to the Final Rule's 
implementation.'' 79 FR at 74450. But they were wrong. Following the 
Final Rule's implementation, the Board's election agreement rate has 
actually increased.\3\
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    \3\ See Percentage of Elections Conducted Pursuant to Election 
Agreements in FY2017, www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections (reporting a post-Final Rule election 
agreement rate of 91.7% in fiscal year (FY) 2017; past versions of 
this chart reported a post-Final Rule election agreement rate of 
91.7% in FY 2016, and pre-Final Rule election agreement rates of 
91.1% for both FY 2014 and FY 2013).
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    Additionally, the Final Rule dissenters claimed that the Rule would 
do little to address those few representation cases that in their view 
involved too much delay, namely those cases that take more than 56 days 
to process from petition to election. 79 FR at 74456-57.\4\ But, in 
fact, the

[[Page 58787]]

percentage of elections that were conducted more than 56 days from 
petition has decreased since the Final Rule was adopted.\5\ Moreover, 
for contested cases--the category which consistently failed to meet the 
56-day target--the Final Rule has reduced the median time from petition 
to election by more than three weeks.\6\
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    \4\ See also 79 FR at 74434 (The dissenters highlighted pre-
Final Rule fiscal year 2013 as a period in which 94.3% of elections 
were conducted within 56 days of the petition as a means of 
concluding that ``by the Board's own measures, less than 6% of 
elections were unduly `delayed.' ''). Of course, as explained in the 
Final Rule, the Board disagreed that only those cases taking more 
than 56 days were worthy of attention. 79 FR at 74317.
    \5\ See Performance Accountability Reports, FYs 2013-2017, 
www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/reports (reporting that, pre-Final 
Rule, the Agency processed 94.3% of its representation cases from 
petition to election in 56 days in FY 2013 and 95.7% in FY 2014, as 
compared to post-Final Rule rates of 99.1% in FY 2016 and 98.5% in 
FY 2017).
    \6\ See Median Days from Petition to Election, www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections (reporting post-
Final Rule median processing times for contested cases as 36 days in 
FY 2017 and 35 days in FY 2016, as compared to pre-Final Rule median 
processing times ranging from 59 to 67 days in FYs 2008 to 2014). 
See also Annual Review of Revised R-Case Rules, www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/annual-review-revised-r-case-rules (reporting 
that in the first calendar year following the Final Rule's 
implementation, the median time to process contested cases from 
petition to election fell from 64 to 34 days).
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    The Final Rule dissent further hypothesized that whatever time-
savings might be achieved in processing cases from petition to 
election, there was a likelihood that ``the overall time needed to 
resolve post-election issues will increase.'' 79 FR at 74435. Here 
again, the dissent was wrong. The Agency's 100-day closure rate--which 
by definition takes into account a representation case's overall 
processing time--is better than ever. In FY 2017, the second fiscal 
year following the Final Rule's implementation, the Agency achieved a 
historic high of closing 89.9% of its representation cases within 100 
days of a petition's filing. And in FY 2016, the first fiscal year 
following the Final Rule's implementation, the Agency's representation 
case closure rate of 87.6% outpaced all but one of the six years 
preceding the Final Rule.\7\
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    \7\ See Performance Accountability Reports, fiscal years 2013-
2017, www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/reports (indicating the 
following representation case 100-day closure rates: FY 2017-89.9%, 
FY 2016-87.6%, FY 2014-88.1%; FY 2013-87.4%; FY 2012-84.5%; FY 2011-
84.7%; FY 2010-86.3%; FY 2009-84.4%).
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    All of the foregoing raises the question: If the Final Rule 
dissent's claims of statutory infirmity have been roundly rejected by 
the courts, and the predictions that the Final Rule would cause 
procedural dysfunction have been undercut by agency experience, why is 
comment being solicited as to whether the Final Rule should be further 
amended or rescinded? The answer would appear to be all too clear. When 
the actual facts do not support the current majority's preferred 
outcome, the new Members join Chairman Miscimarra to look for 
``alternative facts'' to justify rolling back the Agency's progress in 
the representation-case arena.
    It is indeed unfortunate that when historians examine how our 
Agency functioned during this tumultuous time, they will have no choice 
but to conclude that the Board abandoned its role as an independent 
agency and chose to cast aside reasoned deliberation in pursuit of an 
arbitrary exercise of power.
    Accordingly, I dissent.
    Member McFerran, dissenting.
    On April 14, 2015--after thousands of public comments submitted 
over two periods spanning 141 days, four days of public hearings, and 
over a hundred, dense Federal Register pages of analysis--a 
comprehensive update of NLRB election rules and procedures took effect. 
The Election Rule was designed to simplify and modernize the Board's 
representation process, to establish greater transparency and 
consistency in administration, and to better provide for the fair and 
expeditious resolution of representation cases. As stated in the Rule's 
Federal Register preamble:

    While retaining the essentials of existing representation case 
procedures, these amendments remove unnecessary barriers to the fair 
and expeditious resolution of representation cases. They simplify 
representation-case procedures, codify best practices, and make them 
more transparent and uniform across regions. Duplicative and 
unnecessary litigation is eliminated. Unnecessary delay is reduced. 
Procedures for Board review are simplified. Rules about documents 
and communications are modernized in light of changing technology.

79 FR 74308 (Dec. 15, 2014).
    During the short, two-and-a-half years since the Rule's 
implementation, there has been nothing to suggest that the Rule is 
either failing to accomplish these objectives or that it is causing any 
of the harms predicted by its critics. As Member Pearce catalogs in his 
dissent, by every available metric the Rule appears to have met the 
Board's expectations, refuting predictions about the Rule's supposedly 
harmful consequences. The majority makes no effort to rebut Member 
Pearce's comprehensive analysis. The preliminary available data thus 
indicates that the rule is achieving its intended goals--without 
altering the ``playing field'' for unions or employers in the election 
process.\1\ The validity of the Rule, moreover, has been upheld in 
every court where it has been challenged.\2\ In short, the Rule appears 
to be a success so far.
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    \1\ See NLRB, Annual Review of Revised R-Case Rules, available 
at https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/annual-review-revised-r-case-rules (showing, in comparison between pre- and post-
Rule representation cases, modest decrease in time elapsed from 
petition to election, no substantial change in party win-rates, and 
largely stable number of elections agreed to by stipulation); NLRB, 
Graphs and Data, Petitions and Elections, available at https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/graphs-data/petitions-and-elections 
(showing similar outcomes, based on fiscal-year data on 
representation cases).
    \2\ See Assoc. Builders and Contractors v. NLRB, 826 F.3d 215 
(5th Cir. 2016) (rejecting multiple facial challenges to Rule); 
Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 118 F. Supp. 3d 171 (D.D.C. 2015) 
(same).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nonetheless, today a new Board majority issues a Request for 
Information (RFI) seeking public opinion about whether to retain, 
repeal, or modify the Rule--and signaling its own desire to reopen the 
Rule. Of course, administrative agencies ought to evaluate the 
effectiveness of their actions, whether in the context of rulemaking or 
adjudication, and public input can serve an important role in 
conducting such evaluations.\3\ But the nature and timing of this RFI, 
along with its faulty justifications, suggests that the majority's 
interest lies not in acquiring objective data upon which to gauge the 
early effectiveness of the Rule, but instead in manufacturing a 
rationale for a subsequent rollback of the Rule in light of the change 
in the composition of the Board. Because it seems as if the RFI is a 
mere fig leaf to provide cover for an unjustified attack on a years-
long, comprehensive effort to make the Board's election processes more 
efficient and effective, I cannot support it. I would remain open, 
however, to a genuine effort to gather useful information about the 
Rule's effectiveness to this point.
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    \3\ I have no objection at all to seeking public participation 
in the Board's policymaking, as reflected in the Board's standard 
practice of inviting amicus briefs in major cases, including those 
where the Board is reconsidering precedent. Ironically, the new 
majority has now broken with that practice for no good reason in 
reversing recent precedent. See, e.g., UPMC, 365 NLRB No. 153 (2017) 
(Member McFerran, dissenting). I hope this unfortunate omission does 
not signal a permanent change to the Board's approach in seeking 
public input in major cases.
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    I. The RFI is premature, poorly crafted, and unlikely to solicit 
meaningful feedback.
    Initially, it seems premature to seek public comment on the Rule a 
mere two-and-a-half years after the Rule's

[[Page 58788]]

implementation.\4\ The Rule has been in place for less time at this 
point than the rulemaking process took from beginning to end.\5\ 
Moreover, as noted, so far the Rule appears to be achieving its stated 
ends without producing the dire consequences some purported to fear. In 
short, there does not appear to be any present basis or need for this 
RFI.
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    \4\ I would be surprised if even the most ardent advocates of 
regulatory review would support such a short regulatory lookback 
period. Indeed, Section 610 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, for 
example, contemplates that agencies may take up to 10 years--
significantly longer than our 2-plus years' experience with the 
Rule--before they may adequately assess a rule's effectiveness. See 
5 U.S.C. 610 (providing that agencies shall develop plan ``for the 
review of such rules adopted after the effective date of this 
chapter within ten years of the publication of such rules as the 
final rule'').
    \5\ The Board's original notice of proposed rulemaking was 
published on June 22, 2011. The final rule upheld by the courts was 
published on December 15, 2014, with an effective date of April 14, 
2015.
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    Nevertheless, as stated, I am not opposed to genuine efforts to 
meaningfully evaluate the Rule's performance to date. But I believe 
that any useful request for information would have to seek 
comprehensive information on the precise effects of the specific 
changes made by the Rule.\6\ In my view, such detailed information is 
essential to facilitating meaningful analysis of the Rule's 
effectiveness, and to determining whether this or any future request 
for information is warranted. In fact, precisely because agencies 
benefit most from receiving specific rather than generalized feedback, 
an agency's typical request for information (unlike this RFI) follows 
the agency's assessment and identification of what particular 
information would be useful in evaluating a rule's effectiveness.\7\ 
Indeed, other agencies' requests for information have often posed 
specific questions reflecting their own considered analysis of what 
aspects of rulemaking might require further inquiry and are geared 
toward the acquisition of concrete facts from the public.\8\
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    \6\ For example, to assess the success of some of the Rule's 
intended new efficiencies, it would be useful to have quantitative 
data on: Motions for extensions and motions to file a document out-
of-time; missed deadlines; motions for stays of election or other 
extraordinary relief; eligibility issues deferred until after the 
election, and whether such issues were mooted by the election 
results. This type of data would be valuable not only to decision 
makers at the Agency, but also to the public in determining how to 
evaluate and comment on the effectiveness of the Rule.
    \7\ The majority states that it is the Board's duty to 
periodically review its rules. Without a doubt, the Board must 
monitor its rules to be sure that they are meeting their goals and 
to help the Board better effectuate the statute. But choosing to 
reopen the Election Rule now is highly dubious. The Board has many 
longstanding rules--addressing issues from industry jurisdiction to 
health care bargaining units--which have never been reviewed after 
promulgation. Yet the majority chooses the newly-minted Election 
Rule, among all others, for attention--with no explanation for its 
choice. Given the resources required of both the agency and 
interested parties when the Board revisits a rule, the Board's 
periodic review should reflect the exercise of reasoned judgment. In 
this case, the majority has failed to identify any reasonable basis 
for seeking public input on the Election Rule at this time. Nor has 
the majority made any effort to obtain or analyze easily available 
data that conceivably could support issuing an RFI.
    \8\ See, e.g., Dept. of the Treasury, Proprietary Trading and 
Certain Interests in and Relationships With Covered Funds (Volcker 
Rule); Request for Public Input, 82 FR 36692, Aug 7, 2017 
(enumerating lengthy list of specific, data-oriented questions); 
Dept. of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Admin., Request for 
Information Regarding the Fiduciary Rule and Prohibited Transaction 
Exemptions, 82 FR 31278, July 6, 2017 (same).
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    The majority's request is not framed to solicit detailed data, or 
even informed feedback. The broad questions it poses, absent any 
empirical context, amount to little more than an open-ended ``raise-
your-hand-if-you-don't-like-the-Rule'' straw poll. That is hardly a 
sound approach to gathering meaningful feedback.
    The irony, of course, is that, if the majority were sincerely 
interested in beginning to assess the Rule's effectiveness, the best 
initial source of empirical, objective data lies within the Agency 
itself. The Board's regional offices process and oversee the litigation 
of every single election petition filed under the Rule. All the 
majority needs to do is ask the Board's General Counsel to prepare a 
comprehensive report highlighting all relevant factual elements of the 
processing of election petitions over the past 2-plus years.\9\ If the 
resulting data were to suggest that, after such a short time on the 
books, the Rule is in need of refinement, or that additional public 
input could enhance the Board's understanding of the Rule's 
functioning, the Board might then craft tailored questions designed to 
elicit meaningful, constructive feedback.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ The majority makes the odd suggestion that the RFI--a 
measure directed to the general public--is somehow also the most 
effective way to obtain information from the General Counsel. This 
is nonsensical. The General Counsel supervises the Board's 
representation proceedings under a delegation of authority from the 
Board, and the Board is obviously able to direct the General Counsel 
to provide whatever relevant information it requests, without 
issuing an RFI or initiating a rulemaking.
    In any event, although I was not a participant in the earlier 
rulemaking process, it is clear from the Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking that the Board based its proposals on a thorough, pre-
rulemaking analysis of relevant data and agency experience that 
enabled it to seek public comment on specific, carefully-crafted 
policy proposals. In short, the Board did its homework before 
seeking public participation. The majority's current effort is 
utterly lacking the same foundation. The majority curiously seems to 
view this as an attribute, rather than a manifest departure from the 
norms of rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Unfortunately, in addition to framing a vague, unfounded inquiry 
that is unlikely to solicit useful information, the majority's request 
also establishes an unnecessarily rushed comment process that is likely 
to frustrate those interested parties who might actually hope to 
provide meaningful input. To the extent members of the public wish to 
provide informed feedback on the Rule, they will need information. In 
the absence of a comprehensive analysis from the General Counsel, 
outside parties are likely to seek relevant data on the Rule's 
functioning through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. The 
public's acquisition and analysis of such data through the FOIA process 
will involve the assembly and submission of FOIA requests, which in 
turn may require the agency to survey and compile extensive data for 
each such request. Thereafter parties will have to take stock of any 
data acquired through FOIA before being in a position to give informed 
feedback on the Rule. This process could take far more than the 60 days 
provided for comment by the RFI. Indeed, during the 2014 rulemaking 
process leading up to the Election Rule, the Chamber of Commerce, well 
into the 60-day comment period, sought an extension to give it more 
time to both request and analyze FOIA data. While it was ultimately 
determined that the comment period should not be extended under the 
circumstances at the time, the Chamber's effort highlights the 
relevance of FOIA data and the time-intensiveness of parties' analysis 
of such data. My colleagues' failure to allot time to account for the 
parties' information-gathering process only confirms that the RFI is 
not designed to solicit and yield well-informed responses that might 
genuinely assist the Board's evaluation of the Rule.
    II. The RFI is a transparent effort to manufacture a justification 
for revising the Rule.
    As emphasized, I fully support the notion that the Board should 
take care to ensure that its rules and regulations are serving their 
intended purposes. I would welcome a genuine opportunity to receive and 
review meaningful information on the Rule's performance at an 
appropriate time. But this hurried effort to solicit a ``show of 
hands'' of public opinion without the benefit of meaningful data (or 
even thoughtfully framed points of inquiry) bears none of the hallmarks 
of a genuine effort at regulatory review.\10\ Gathering useful

[[Page 58789]]

information is demonstrably not the purpose of this RFI. Instead, this 
RFI is a transparent effort to manufacture a justification for 
reopening the Rule. No legitimate justification exists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The majority suggests that my view that the rule has been a 
success thus far is just one ``opinion,'' and that they are merely 
soliciting a wider range of opinions from the public to better 
assess the Rule. But the fact that public opinion on the Rule may be 
divided--as it was during and after the rulemaking process--is not a 
reason for the Board to revisit the Rule. Canvassing public opinion 
might make sense if it were done in a manner that first gathered and 
considered evidence on the Rule's functioning, and framed any 
questions in a way that actually requested useful substantive 
feedback on the agency's own analysis.
    But the open-ended solicitation we have here, without the 
benefit of data or analysis, is not a productive way to enlist 
public opinion. As the dissenters to the Election Rule observed, 
including Chairman Miscimarra, the rulemaking was of ``immense scope 
and highly technical nature,'' and it generated ``an unprecedented 
number of comments, espousing widely divergent views.'' 79 FR 74430, 
74459. It is accurate to say that the Rule is both comprehensive and 
technical, and that the public holds polarized views thereon. Yet 
now the majority broadly seeks public opinion on the fate of the 
Rule without offering any data or analysis of its own to provide a 
foundation for the public's assessment. Ultimately, they provide no 
persuasive explanation of how soliciting public input in the absence 
of any agency analysis or proposals--input that, as noted, is 
tantamount to a ``thumbs up or thumbs down'' movie review--will 
provide a foundation for an effective rulemaking process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Supreme Court has made clear that, when an agency is 
considering modifying or rescinding a valid existing rule, it must 
treat the governing rule as the status quo and must provide ``good 
reasons'' to justify a departure from it. See Federal Communications 
Commission v. Fox Television, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Obviously, 
determining whether there are ``good reasons'' for departing from an 
existing policy requires an agency to have a reasonable understanding 
of the policy and how it is functioning. Only with such an 
understanding can the agency recognize whether there is a good basis 
for taking a new approach and explain why. Id. at 515-516. Indeed, even 
when an agency is only beginning to explore possible revisions to an 
existing rule, the principles of reasoned decision-making demand a 
deliberative approach, informed by the agency's own experience 
administering the existing rule.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ See, e.g., Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., Request for 
Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 FR 
69504, 69505-06, Dec. 1, 2006 (``[T]he subject matter areas [of this 
RFI] are derived from comments at . . . stakeholder meetings and 
also from (1) rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States and 
other federal courts over the past twelve years; (2) the 
Department's experience in administering the law; and (3) public 
input presented in numerous Congressional hearings and public 
comments filed with the Office of Management and Budget . . . in 
connection with three annual reports to Congress regarding the Costs 
and Benefits of Federal regulations in 2001, 2002, 2004. . . . 
During this process, the Department has heard a variety of concerns 
expressed about the FMLA.''); cf. Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour 
Div., Request for Information; Defining and Delimiting the 
Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside 
Sales and Computer Employees, 82 FR 34616, July 26, 2017 (rule 
enjoined by court, and Department faced with legal questions 
concerning its analysis and justification for aspects of rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If this RFI asked the public specific, well-crafted questions 
geared toward a neutral assessment of the Rule's functioning--and was 
based on a foundation of internal evidence or experience suggesting 
there was a problem with the Rule's implementation thus far--there 
would be far less basis to doubt the majority's reasons for revisiting 
it.\12\ Indeed, the majority's reticence to focus this inquiry on the 
agency's own data--the most straightforward source of information about 
how the Rule is working--is puzzling. The majority's failure to take 
this basic step suggests that they would rather not let objective facts 
get in the way of an effort to find some basis to justify reopening the 
Rule. Hence the majority instead poses the vague questions in this RFI, 
which belie any ``good reasons'' for revisiting the Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ Indeed, if it were properly founded in objective data 
indicating significant problems with the rule in its implementation, 
I might well join such an effort to assess the effectiveness of the 
Rule, as I subscribe to the view that timely, informed public input 
can be vital to making good public policy. In contrast, my 
colleagues in the majority seem to take the view that soliciting the 
views of the public is good only when it furthers their 
predetermined purposes. In a recent Board decision where public 
input would have had a far greater likelihood of aiding the Board's 
decision-making process, they nonetheless dismissed the possibility 
that such input might be useful in order to more hastily issue a 
decision reversing Board precedent. See UPMC, 365 NLRB No. 153 
(2017). In that case, the public's own experiential data and legal 
and policy arguments would have had immediate relevance; yet the 
Board took the drastic step of reversing precedent without the 
benefit of such. It seems clear that they seek public input here, 
however heedlessly, so that they can point to negative public 
feedback about the rule as an (inadequate) procedural precursor to 
justify reopening the rulemaking process under the APA; whereas in 
UPMC the adjudicative reversal of precedent did not require the same 
procedural formality, and thus they took a more expedient route to 
accomplish their goal in that case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Further, in the preamble to this RFI the majority has failed to 
identify, much less establish, any ``good reasons'' to revisit or to 
consider reopening the Rule at this time. The majority summarily cites 
congressional votes, hearings, and proposed (but never-passed) 
legislation as reasons to issue this RFI. Although such congressional 
actions might raise concern over a rule's actual effectiveness in other 
circumstances, here--where criticism was leveled in the absence of any 
meaningful experience under the Rule--they seem to signify little more 
than partisan opposition to the Rule.\13\ Reasoned decision-making is 
not a matter of partisanship.
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    \13\ Similarly, the unfounded criticism of the Rule as it was 
adopted, both among its legal challengers and the Board members who 
dissented from the Rule, is not a sound basis for this RFI. As the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia made clear 
in rejecting a challenge to the Rule: ``[The Rule's challengers'] 
dramatic pronouncements are predicated on mischaracterizations of 
what the Final Rule actually provides and the disregard of 
provisions that contradict plaintiffs' narrative. And the claims 
that the regulation contravenes the NLRA are largely based upon 
statutory language or legislative history that has been excerpted or 
paraphrased in a misleading fashion. Ultimately, the statutory and 
constitutional challenges do not withstand close inspection.'' 
Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, supra, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 177. That 
court further pointed out that rhetoric like ``quickie election,'' 
employed by the Rule's challengers and borrowed from the Board 
members who dissented from the Rule, were part of a vague, 
conclusory, and argumentative set of attacks. Id. at 189.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The majority also asserts that ``numerous'' cases litigated before 
the Board have raised ``significant'' issues concerning its 
application. Of course, many issues concerning the proper 
interpretation and application of the Rule can and should be resolved 
in adjudication, where they arise. In fact, the four recent cases the 
majority cites involved case-specific applications of the Rule that 
offer little if any insight into how well the Rule is working 
overall.\14\ More broadly, as stated, all legal challenges to the Rule 
have been soundly rejected by the courts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ If any conclusion can be gleaned from these four cases, it 
is that they were processed in just the manner contemplated by the 
Rule: Fostering efficiency while preserving the fairness of the 
proceedings. For example, in UPS Ground Freight, 365 NLRB No. 113 
(2017), the employer complained about the conduct and timing of a 
pre-election hearing, but it did not establish any prejudice to its 
ability to fully make its arguments. In other words, the procedures 
under the Rule were prompt and resulted in no unfairness. In Yale 
University, 365 NLRB No. 40 (2017), and European Imports, 365 NLRB 
No. 41 (2017), the Board refused to stay an election, but allowed 
parties to preserve their pre-election claims--thus leaving the 
substantive legal claims intact, while making the process more 
efficient by deferring resolution until after the election, at which 
time the election results may have mooted those claims. In Brunswick 
Bowling, 364 NLRB No. 96 (2016), the Board emphasized the importance 
of position statements, which were intended under the Rule to narrow 
the issues for pre-election hearings, but also noted that a party's 
failure to file one did not affect a regional director's independent 
statutory duties with respect to representation petitions.
     In any event, a better measure of the Rule's early 
effectiveness, which I advocate for below, would be a thorough 
internal Agency review of all the cases processed under the Rule, 
including those that have not come before the Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Last, although not mentioned by the majority, no one has petitioned 
the Board to revisit the Rule or for new rulemaking on the Board's 
election processes. Perhaps the absence of such a petition is 
attributable to all of the

[[Page 58790]]

circumstances described above. Perhaps it is explained by the common-
sense notion that the Agency's and the public's limited experience with 
the Rule would make such a petition glaringly premature. See 5 U.S.C. 
553(e).\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ Indeed, another argument to defer any examination of the 
Rule's effectiveness until a later date is that a longer timeframe 
would yield a larger body of cases that presumably would provide 
more representative and meaningful insights into its performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The only remaining asserted justification for considering 
revisiting the Rule at this early stage is the majority's express 
reliance on the change in the composition of the Board.\16\ This 
certainly is not a ``good reason'' for revisiting a past administrative 
action, particularly in the context of rulemaking. See generally Motor 
Vehicles Manufacturers v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Yet, I fear 
this is the origin of the RFI, and regrettably so. The Board has long 
and consistently rejected motions to reconsider its decisions based on 
a change in the composition of the Board. See, e.g., Brown & Root Power 
& Mfg., 2014 WL 4302554 (Aug. 29, 2014); Visiting Nurse Health System, 
Inc., 338 NLRB 1074 (2003); Wagner Iron Works, 108 NLRB 1236 (1954). We 
should continue to exercise such restraint with respect to the Rule, 
unless and until a day comes when we discover or are presented with a 
legitimate basis for taking action. Today, however, is manifestly not 
that day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ I reject the majority's implied suggestion that my joining 
the Board since the Rule was enacted somehow supports today's effort 
to revisit the Rule. I begin with the proposition that the Rule, 
promulgated under notice-and-comment and upheld by the courts, is 
governing law--whether or not particular Board members disagreed 
with its adoption or would have disagreed, had they been on the 
Board at the time. As explained, I would support revisiting the Rule 
only if there were some reasoned basis to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result, it should come as no surprise to the majority if a 
court called upon to review any changes ultimately made to the Rule 
looks back skeptically at the origins of the rulemaking effort. The RFI 
is easily viewed as simply a scrim through which the majority is 
attempting to project a distorted view of the Rule's current 
functioning and thereby justify a partisan effort to roll it back. Cf. 
United Steelworkers v. Pendergrass, 819 F.2d 1263, 1268 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(``Some of the questions [in an ANPRM] could hardly have been posed 
with the serious intention of obtaining meaningful information, since 
the answers are self-evident.''). Such opportunism is wholly 
inconsistent with the principles of reasoned Agency decision-making. It 
is equally inconsistent with our shared commitment to administer the 
Act in a manner designed to fairly and faithfully serve Congressional 
policy and to protect the legitimate interests of the employees, 
unions, and employers covered by the Act. Whatever one thinks of the 
Rule, the Agency, its staff, and the public deserve better.

VI. Conclusion

    The Board invites interested parties to submit responses during the 
public response period and welcomes pertinent information regarding the 
above questions.

Roxanne Rothschild,
Deputy Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board.
[FR Doc. 2017-26904 Filed 12-12-17; 4:15 pm]
 BILLING CODE P