Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, 49984-50044 [2017-22093]
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 207 / Friday, October 27, 2017 / Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Part 3
[Docket ID OCC–2017–0018]
RIN 1557–AE10
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 217
[Regulation Q; Docket No. R–1576]
RIN 7100 AE–74
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 324
RIN 3064–AE59
Simplifications to the Capital Rule
Pursuant to the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act
of 1996
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, Treasury; the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System; and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
In March 2017, the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (collectively, the
agencies) submitted a report to Congress
pursuant to the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of
1996, in which they committed to
meaningfully reduce regulatory burden,
especially on community banking
organizations. Consistent with that
commitment, the agencies are inviting
public comment on a notice of proposed
rulemaking that would simplify
compliance with certain aspects of the
capital rule. A majority of the proposed
simplifications would apply solely to
banking organizations that are not
subject to the advanced approaches
capital rule (non-advanced approaches
banking organizations). Specifically, the
agencies are proposing that nonadvanced approaches banking
organizations apply a simpler regulatory
capital treatment for: Mortgage servicing
assets; certain deferred tax assets arising
from temporary differences; investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions; and capital issued
by a consolidated subsidiary of a
banking organization and held by third
parties (minority interest). More
generally, the proposal also includes
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SUMMARY:
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revisions to the treatment of certain
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures that are
designed to address comments regarding
the current definition of high volatility
commercial real estate exposure under
the capital rule’s standardized
approach. Under the standardized
approach, the proposed revisions to the
treatment of acquisition, development,
or construction exposures would not
apply to existing exposures that are
outstanding or committed prior to any
final rule’s effective date.
In addition to the proposed
simplifications, the agencies also are
proposing various additional
clarifications and technical amendments
to the agencies’ capital rule, which
would apply to both non-advanced
approaches banking organizations and
advanced approaches banking
organizations.
DATES: Comments must be received by
December 26, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be
directed to:
OCC: Because paper mail in the
Washington, DC area and at the OCC is
subject to delay, commenters are
encouraged to submit comments
through the Federal eRulemaking Portal
or email, if possible. Please use the title
‘‘Simplifications to the Capital Rule
Pursuant to the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of
1996’’ to facilitate the organization and
distribution of the comments. You may
submit comments by any of the
following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal—
‘‘regulations.gov’’: Go to
www.regulations.gov. Enter ‘‘Docket ID
OCC–2017–0018’’ in the Search Box and
click ‘‘Search.’’ Click on ‘‘Comment
Now’’ to submit public comments.
• Click on the ‘‘Help’’ tab on the
Regulations.gov home page to get
information on using Regulations.gov,
including instructions for submitting
public comments.
• Email: regs.comments@
occ.treas.gov.
• Mail: Legislative and Regulatory
Activities Division, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th
Street SW., Suite 3E–218, Mail Stop
9W–11, Washington, DC 20219.
• Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th
Street SW., Suite 3E–218, Mail Stop
9W–11, Washington, DC 20219.
• Fax: (571) 465–4326.
Instructions: You must include
‘‘OCC’’ as the agency name and ‘‘Docket
ID OCC–2017–0018’’ in your comment.
In general, the OCC will enter all
comments received into the docket and
publish them on the Regulations.gov
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Web site without change, including any
business or personal information that
you provide such as name and address
information, email addresses, or phone
numbers. Comments received, including
attachments and other supporting
materials, are part of the public record
and subject to public disclosure. Do not
include any information in your
comment or supporting materials that
you consider confidential or
inappropriate for public disclosure.
You may review comments and other
related materials that pertain to this
rulemaking action by any of the
following methods:
• Viewing Comments Electronically:
Go to www.regulations.gov. Enter
‘‘Docket ID OCC–2017–0018’’ in the
Search box and click ‘‘Search.’’ Click on
‘‘Open Docket Folder’’ on the right side
of the screen and then ‘‘Comments.’’
Comments can be filtered by clicking on
‘‘View All’’ and then using the filtering
tools on the left side of the screen.
• Click on the ‘‘Help’’ tab on the
Regulations.gov home page to get
information on using Regulations.gov.
Supporting materials may be viewed by
clicking on ‘‘Open Docket Folder’’ and
then clicking on ‘‘Supporting
Documents.’’ The docket may be viewed
after the close of the comment period in
the same manner as during the comment
period.
Viewing Comments Personally: You
may personally inspect and photocopy
comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street
SW., Washington, DC 20219. For
security reasons, the OCC requires that
visitors make an appointment to inspect
comments. You may do so by calling
(202) 649–6700 or, for persons who are
deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202)
649–5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be
required to present valid governmentissued photo identification and submit
to security screening in order to inspect
and photocopy comments.
Board: You may submit comments,
identified by Docket No. R–1576; RIN
7100 AE–74, by any of the following
methods:
• Agency Web site: https://
www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Email: regs.comments@
federalreserve.gov. Include docket
number in the subject line of the
message.
• Fax: (202) 452–3819 or (202) 452–
3102.
• Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 207 / Friday, October 27, 2017 / Proposed Rules
Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue NW., Washington,
DC 20551. All public comments are
available from the Board’s Web site at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/
generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as
submitted, unless modified for technical
reasons. Accordingly, comments will
not be edited to remove any identifying
or contact information. Public
comments may also be viewed
electronically or in paper form in Room
3515, 1801 K Street NW. (between 18th
and 19th Streets NW.), Washington, DC
20006 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
on weekdays. FDIC: You may submit
comments, identified by RIN 3064–
AE59 by any of the following methods:
• Agency Web site: https://
www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/propose.html. Follow
instructions for submitting comments
on the Agency Web site.
• Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Secretary, Attention: Comments/Legal
ESS, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20429.
• Hand Delivered/Courier: Comments
may be hand-delivered to the guard
station at the rear of the 550 17th Street
Building (located on F Street) on
business days between 7:00 a.m. and
5:00 p.m.
• Email: comments@FDIC.gov.
Include the RIN 3064–AE59 on the
subject line of the message.
• Public Inspection: All comments
received must include the agency name
and RIN 3064–AE66 for this rulemaking.
All comments received will be posted
without change to https://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/, including any
personal information provided. Paper
copies of public comments may be
ordered from the FDIC Public
Information Center, 3501 North Fairfax
Drive, Room E–1002, Arlington, VA
22226 by telephone at (877) 275–3342 or
(703) 562–2200.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC: Mark Ginsberg, Senior Risk
Expert (202) 649–6983; or Benjamin
Pegg, Risk Expert (202) 649–7146,
Capital and Regulatory Policy; or Carl
Kaminski, Special Counsel, or Rima
Kundnani, Attorney, Legislative and
Regulatory Activities Division, (202)
649–5490, for persons who are deaf or
hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649–5597,
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, 400 7th Street SW.,
Washington, DC 20219.
Board: Constance M. Horsley, Deputy
Associate Director, (202) 452–5239; Juan
Climent, Manager, (202) 872–7526;
Elizabeth MacDonald, Manager, (202)
475–6316; Andrew Willis, Supervisory
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Financial Analyst, (202) 912–4323; Sean
Healey, Supervisory Financial Analyst,
(202) 912–4611 or Matthew McQueeney,
Senior Financial Analyst, (202) 452–
2942, Division of Supervision and
Regulation; or Benjamin McDonough,
Assistant General Counsel (202) 452–
2036; David W. Alexander, Counsel
(202) 452–2877, or Mark Buresh, Senior
Attorney (202) 452–5270, Legal
Division, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th and C
Streets NW., Washington, DC 20551. For
the hearing impaired only,
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf
(TDD), (202) 263–4869.
FDIC: Benedetto Bosco, Chief, Capital
Policy Section; bbosco@fdic.gov; David
Riley, Senior Policy Analyst, Capital
Policy Section; dariley@fdic.gov;
Michael Maloney, Senior Policy
Analyst, mmaloney@fdic.gov; Stephanie
Efron, Senior Policy Analyst, sefron@
fdic.gov; regulatorycapital@fdic.gov;
Capital Markets Branch, Division of Risk
Management Supervision, (202) 898–
6888; or Catherine Wood, Counsel,
cawood@fdic.gov; Rachel Ackmann,
Counsel, rackmann@fdic.gov; Michael
Phillips, Counsel, mphillips@fdic.gov;
Supervision Branch, Legal Division,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC
20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction and Summary of the Proposed
Simplifications of the Capital Rule
II. Proposed Simplifications of and Revisions
to the Capital Rule
A. HVADC Exposures
1. Background
2. Scope of the HVADC Exposure
Definition
3. Exemptions From the HVADC Exposure
Definition
a. Removal of the Contributed Capital
Exemption Under HVADC Exposure
b. One- to Four-Family Residential
Properties
c. Community Development Projects
d. Agricultural Exposures
4. Permanent Loans
5. Risk Weight for HVADC Exposures
6. Retaining the HVCRE Exposure
Definition Under the Advanced
Approaches Rule
7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
B. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and
Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
1. Background
2. Simplifying the Capital Treatment for
MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and
Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
a. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
b. Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
c. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced
Approaches Banking Organizations
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C. Minority Interest
1. Background
2. Simplifying the Regulatory Capital
Limitations for Minority Interest
III. Technical Amendments to the Capital
Rule
IV. Abbreviations
V. Regulatory Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
C. Plain Language
D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995 Determination
E. Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
I. Introduction and Summary of the
Proposed Simplifications of the Capital
Rule
The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Board),
and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the
agencies) are issuing this notice of
proposed rulemaking (proposal or
proposed rule) with the goal of reducing
regulatory compliance burden,
particularly on community banking
organizations, by simplifying certain
aspects of the agencies’ rules revising
their risk-based and leverage capital
requirements (capital rule).1
In 2013, the agencies adopted the
capital rule to address weaknesses that
became apparent during the financial
crisis of 2007–08. Principally, the
capital rule strengthened the capital
requirements applicable to banking
organizations 2 supervised by the
agencies by improving both the quality
and quantity of banking organizations’
regulatory capital, and increasing the
risk-sensitivity of the capital rule.3
The capital rule provides two
methodologies for determining riskweighted assets: (i) The standardized
approach and (ii) the advanced
approaches, which include both the
internal ratings-based approach and the
advanced measurement approach (the
1 The Board and the OCC issued a joint final rule
on October 11, 2013 (78 FR 62018) and the FDIC
issued a substantially identical interim final rule on
September 10, 2013 (78 FR 55340). In April 2014,
the FDIC adopted the interim final rule as a final
rule with no substantive changes. 79 FR 20754
(April 14, 2014).
2 Banking organizations subject to the agencies’
capital rule include national banks, state member
banks, state nonmember banks, savings
associations, and top-tier bank holding companies
and savings and loan holding companies domiciled
in the United States not subject to the Board’s Small
Bank Holding Company Policy Statement (12 CFR
part 225, appendix C), but excluding certain savings
and loan holding companies that are substantially
engaged in insurance underwriting or commercial
activities or that are estate trusts, and bank holding
companies and savings and loan holding companies
that are employee stock ownership plans.
3 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 3 (OCC);
12 CFR part 324 (FDIC).
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advanced approaches).4 The
standardized approach applies to all
banking organizations that are subject to
the agencies’ risk-based capital
regulations, whereas the advanced
approaches apply only to certain large
or internationally active banking
organizations (advanced approaches
banking organizations).5
The agencies have received numerous
questions regarding various aspects of
the capital rule since its adoption in
2013. In addition, in connection with
the agencies’ review under the
Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996
(EGRPRA),6 for which the agencies
sought comment through Federal
Register notices published in 2014 and
2015, the agencies received over 230
comment letters from insured
depository institutions, trade
associations, consumer and community
groups, and other interested parties.7
The agencies also received numerous
oral and written comments from
panelists and the public at outreach
meetings.8 Some of these comments
were similar to the comments that the
agencies had already received regarding
the capital rule, including, for example,
that the capital rule is unduly
burdensome and complex. The agencies
thoroughly reviewed these comments
and issued a Joint Report to Congress:
Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act (the 2017
EGRPRA report) in March 2017.9 In the
2017 EGRPRA report, the agencies
highlighted their intent to meaningfully
reduce regulatory burden, especially on
community banking organizations,
while at the same time maintaining
safety and soundness and the quality
4 12 CFR part 217, subparts D & E; 12 CFR part
3 (OCC), Subparts D & E; 12 CFR part 324, subparts
D & E (FDIC).
5 12 CFR 217.1(c), 12 CFR 217.100(b) (Board); 12
CFR 3.1(c), 12 CFR 3.100(b) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.1(c),
12 CFR 324.100(b) (FDIC). Those smaller and less
complex banking organizations that do not apply
the advanced approaches are referred to as ‘‘nonadvanced approaches banking organizations’’ in
this proposal.
6 EGRPRA requires that regulations prescribed by
the agencies be reviewed at least once every 10
years. The purpose of this review is to identify,
with input from the public, outdated or
unnecessary regulations and consider how to
reduce regulatory burden on insured depository
institutions while, at the same time, ensuring their
safety and soundness and the safety and soundness
of the financial system. Public Law 104–208, 110
Stat. 3009 (1996).
7 79 FR 32172 (June 4, 2014); 80 FR 7980
(February 13, 2015); 80 FR 32046 (June 5, 2015);
and 80 FR 79724 (December 23, 2015).
8 Comments received during the EGRPRA review
process and transcripts of outreach meetings can be
found at https://egrpra.ffiec.gov/.
9 82 FR 15900 (March 30, 2017).
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and quantity of regulatory capital in the
banking system.
In particular, the agencies indicated
in the 2017 EGRPRA report that they
would develop a proposed rule to
simplify the capital rule by considering
amendments to (i) replace the
standardized approach’s treatment of
high volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposures with a simpler
treatment for most acquisition,
development, or construction
exposures; and, for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations, to (ii)
simplify the current regulatory capital
treatment for mortgage servicing assets
(MSAs), deferred tax assets (DTAs)
arising from temporary differences that
an institution could not realize through
net operating loss carrybacks (temporary
difference DTAs), and investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions; and (iii) simplify the
calculation for the amount of capital
that can count toward regulatory
requirements in cases in which a
banking organization’s consolidated
subsidiary has issued capital that is held
by third parties (minority interest).
Consistent with the 2017 EGRPRA
report, the agencies are proposing a
number of modifications to the capital
rule that are aimed at reducing
regulatory burden. First, the agencies
are proposing to replace the existing
HVCRE exposure category as applied in
the standardized approach with a newly
defined exposure category called high
volatility acquisition, development, or
construction (HVADC) exposure. The
proposed HVADC exposure definition is
intended to be substantially simpler to
implement as it removes the most
complex exclusion contained in the
current HVCRE exposure definition. In
addition, the proposed rule simplifies
and clarifies certain exemptions, and
clarifies the scope of exposures captured
by the HVADC exposure definition.
While some of the simplifications and
clarifications may increase the scope
and others may decrease it, in the
aggregate, it is likely that more
acquisition, development, or
construction loans would be captured
under the proposed HVADC exposure
definition than under the current
HVCRE exposure definition.
Accordingly, the agencies are proposing
to apply a lower risk weight to the
proposed HVADC exposure category.
The proposed risk weight for HVADC
exposures would be 130 percent, a
reduction from the 150 percent risk
weight that currently applies to HVCRE
exposures under the capital rule’s
standardized approach. The new
HVADC exposure definition would only
apply to exposures originated on or after
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the final rule’s effective date. As
described further below, the proposed
rule would not revise the treatment of
HVCRE exposures for purposes of
calculating the amount of capital
required under the advanced
approaches. However, for purposes of
calculating their capital requirements
going forward under the standardized
approach, advanced approaches banking
organizations would use the proposed
HVADC exposure category.
Second, the agencies are proposing to
simplify the current regulatory capital
treatment of MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations. As
explained further below, for these
banking organizations, the proposal
would eliminate (i) the capital rule’s 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold that applies
individually to MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock; (ii) the
aggregate 15 percent common equity tier
1 capital deduction threshold that
subsequently applies on a collective
basis across such items; (iii) the 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold for non-significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions;
and (iv) the deduction treatment for
significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
not in the form of common stock.10
Under the proposal, for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations, the
capital rule would no longer have
distinct treatments for significant and
non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
Instead of imposing these complex
treatments for MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions, the proposal would require
that non-advanced approaches banking
organizations deduct from common
equity tier 1 capital any amount of
MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
that individually exceeds 25 percent of
common equity tier 1 capital (the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold). Consistent with
the capital rule, under the proposal, a
banking organization would continue to
10 12 CFR 217.22(c) and (d) (Board); 12 CFR
3.22(c) and (d) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.22 (c) and (d)
(FDIC).
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apply a 250 percent risk weight to any
MSAs or temporary DTAs not
deducted.11 However, for investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not
deducted, the proposal would require a
banking organization to risk weight each
non-deducted exposure according to the
exposure category of the investment.
Advanced approaches banking
organizations, however, would be
required to continue to apply the
deduction and risk-weighting treatments
in the capital rule for MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
Third, the agencies are proposing a
significantly simpler methodology for
non-advanced approaches banking
organizations to calculate minority
interest limitations.12 The existing
capital rule’s limitations for common
equity tier 1 minority interest, tier 1
minority interest, and total capital
minority interest are based on the
capital requirements and capital ratios
of each of a banking organization’s
consolidated subsidiaries that has
issued capital instruments that are held
by third parties. The proposal would
require that non-advanced approaches
banking organizations limit minority
interest based on the banking
organization’s capital levels rather than
on its subsidiaries’ capital ratios.
Specifically, a non-advanced
approaches banking organization would
be allowed to include common equity
tier 1, tier 1, and total capital minority
interest up to and including 10 percent
of the banking organization’s common
equity tier 1, tier 1, and total capital
(before the inclusion of any minority
interest), respectively. Advanced
approaches banking organizations,
however, would be required to continue
to apply the treatment of minority
interest provided in the existing capital
rule.
The agencies anticipate that the
simplifications described above would
lead to a reduction of regulatory
reporting burden for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations.
Following the publication of this
proposed rule, the agencies would
propose for public comment
corresponding changes to regulatory
reporting forms and instructions.
11 The agencies note that they are not proposing
to change the current treatment of DTAs arising
from timing differences that could be realized
through net operating loss carrybacks. Such DTAs
are not subject to deduction and are assigned a 100
percent risk weight.
12 12 CFR 217.21(Board); 12 CFR 3.21 (OCC); 12
CFR 324.21 (FDIC).
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The proposed rule would also make
certain technical changes to the capital
rule, including some changes to the
advanced approaches rule, such as
clarifying revisions, updating crossreferences, and correcting typographical
errors.
In August 2017, in anticipation of this
proposal, the agencies invited public
comment on a proposed rule to extend
the capital rule’s transitional provisions
for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs,
and investments in the capital of
consolidated financial institutions and
certain minority interest requirements
(transitions NPR).13 If the transitions
NPR is finalized substantially as
proposed, the capital treatment
proposed in the transitions NPR would
remain effective until such time as the
changes proposed in this proposal
would be finalized and become effective
or the finalized transitions NPR is
otherwise superseded.
II. Proposed Simplifications of and
Revisions to the Capital Rule
A. HVADC Exposures
1. Background
The capital rule currently defines an
HVCRE exposure as any credit facility
that, prior to conversion to permanent
financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or
construction of real property, unless the
facility finances one- to four-family
residential properties, certain
agricultural or community development
exposures, or commercial real estate
projects where the borrower meets
certain contributed capital requirements
and other prudential criteria. In the
preamble to the capital rule, the
agencies noted that their supervisory
experience had demonstrated that these
exposures, compared to other
commercial real estate exposures,
presented heightened risks for which
banking organizations should hold
additional capital, and accordingly
adopted a 150 percent risk weight for
HVCRE exposures under the
standardized approach.
Since the adoption of the capital rule,
the agencies have received numerous
questions regarding various aspects of
the HVCRE exposure definition.
Community banking organizations, in
particular, have asserted that the
definition is unclear, overly complex,
burdensome to implement, and not
applied consistently across banking
organizations. For example, banking
organizations submitted comments and
questions to the agencies regarding the
treatment of multi-purpose loan
13 82
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facilities under the HVCRE exposure
definition, including loans used to
finance both the purchase of equipment
and the acquisition, development, or
construction of real property. Banking
organizations also asked for clarification
regarding the various exemptions from
the HVCRE exposure definition,
including the exemptions for (i) one- to
four-family residential properties, (ii)
community development exposures,
and (iii) exposures where borrowers met
the contributed capital requirements (as
discussed in more detail in section
II.A.3.a. below).
After evaluating the comments and
questions from the industry following
the publication of the capital rule, as
well as the feedback from the public
received during the review process
leading to the 2017 EGRPRA report, the
agencies are proposing to amend the
treatment in the standardized approach
for credit facilities that finance
acquisition, development, or
construction activities, with the goal of
simplifying the treatment of these
exposures. The agencies are proposing
to replace the HVCRE exposure category
as applied in the standardized approach
with a newly defined exposure category
termed HVADC exposure that would
apply to credit facilities that finance
acquisition, development, or
construction activities. As compared to
the HVCRE exposure definition, the
proposed HVADC exposure definition
would not include the contributed
capital exemption. Additionally, the
proposed definition of HVADC exposure
provides greater clarity on which
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures have relatively
more risk and merit a higher risk weight
than the current definition of HVCRE
exposure by including a ‘‘primarily
finances’’ test. The HVADC exposure
definition also includes a definition of
‘‘permanent loan’’ to clearly articulate
when an exposure ceases being an
HVADC exposure under the propose
rule. Both the ‘‘primarily finances’’ test
and the definition of ‘‘permanent loan’’
are explained in more detail below.
With the introduction of a ‘‘primarily
finances’’ test and ‘‘permanent loan’’
definition, the scope of included or
excluded exposures under the proposed
HVADC exposure definition will likely
be different from those captured under
the current HVCRE exposure definition
and will vary across individual banking
organizations. In total, the agencies
believe that the simpler HVADC
exposure definition likely would
capture more acquisition, development,
or construction exposures than are
currently captured by the definition of
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HVCRE exposure. In recognition of the
potentially expanded scope, the
agencies are proposing to reduce the
standardized approach risk weight for
HVADC exposures, relative to the
current risk weight for HVCRE
exposures.
Under the proposed rule, an HVADC
exposure would receive a 130 percent
risk weight as opposed to the 150
percent risk weight assigned to HVCRE
exposures under the existing
standardized approach. The proposed
rule would require higher risk weights
for certain acquisition, development, or
construction exposures and lower risk
weights for others. Additionally, to
mitigate the potential burden on
banking organizations of having to reevaluate all of their acquisition,
development, or construction exposures
against the new HVADC exposure
definition, the proposal, under the
standardized approach, would contain a
grandfathering provision to retain the
capital rule’s treatment for acquisition,
development, or construction exposures
outstanding or committed as of the
effective date of any final rule (as
discussed in more detail in section
II(A)(5)). The proposed revisions to the
standardized approach are intended to
be responsive to concerns about the
difficulties of implementing the HVCRE
exposure definition, while maintaining
capital requirements commensurate
with the risk profiles of different credit
facilities that finance acquisition,
development, or construction activities.
2. Scope of the HVADC Exposure
Definition
Under the proposed rule, the capital
rule would define an HVADC exposure
as a credit facility that primarily
finances or refinances: (i) The
acquisition of vacant or developed land;
(ii) the development of land to prepare
to erect new structures, including, but
not limited to, the laying of sewers or
water pipes and demolishing existing
structures; or (iii) the construction of
buildings or dwellings, or other
improvements including additions or
alterations to existing structures. Like
the current HVCRE exposure definition,
the proposed HVADC exposure
definition is purpose-based. Therefore,
an acquisition, development, or
construction exposure that is not
secured by real property could be
considered an HVADC exposure if the
purpose of the facility is primarily to
finance any of the aforementioned
activities. For purposes of the proposed
HVADC exposure definition, an
exposure would be classified as an
HVADC exposure only if the lending
facility ‘‘primarily finances’’
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acquisition, development, or
construction activities, meaning that
more than 50 percent of the funds (e.g.,
loan proceeds) will be used for
acquisition, development, or
construction activities. In order to make
this determination, a banking
organization would review the proposed
use of the funds, and if more than 50
percent of the funds is intended for
acquisition, development, or
construction activities, then the facility
would meet the ‘‘primarily finances’’
requirement and would fall within the
scope of the HVADC exposure
definition, unless one or more of the
exemption criteria are met.
For example, assume a borrower
intends to use part of an $8 million loan
to acquire and develop a tract of land for
a real estate project. Of the $8 million
total, $4.5 million will be disbursed for
acquisition, development, or
construction purposes (e.g., buying and
developing the land and building the
structure) and $3.5 million will be used
to purchase equipment to be used in the
completed structure. Because more than
half of the funds are used for
acquisition, development, or
construction purposes, the loan would
be considered an HVADC exposure. Any
funds or land contributed by the
borrower would not impact this
determination, as the determination is
based on the use of the loan proceeds.
The agencies note that the inclusion of
the ‘‘primarily finances’’ test may also
lead banking organizations to exclude
certain multi-purpose credit facilities
which finance construction and other
activities, such as equipment financing,
from the definition of an HVADC
exposure. As a general matter, the
agencies expect every acquisition,
development, or construction
transaction to be supported by the
documentation of sources and uses of
funds tailored to the specific project,
and the agencies expect each banking
organization to have a process in place
to review the intended use of funds for
an acquisition, development, or
construction project, consistent with
prudent underwriting practices.
Question 1: The agencies seek
comment on whether the scope of the
HVADC exposure definition presents
operational concerns and is clear.
Specifically, what, if any, operational
challenges would banking organizations
expect when determining whether more
than 50 percent of the loan proceeds
will be used for acquisition,
development, or construction purposes?
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3. Exemptions From the HVADC
Exposure Definition
a. Removal of the Contributed Capital
Exemption Under HVADC Exposure
Banking organizations have expressed
concern regarding the contributed
capital exemption under which
exposures are not considered HVCRE
exposures if (i) at the origination of the
loan, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is
less than or equal to the relevant
supervisory LTV ratio standard; 14 (ii)
before the advancement of funds, the
borrower has contributed capital to the
project in the form of cash (including
cash paid for land) or readily marketable
securities of at least 15 percent of the
real estate’s ‘‘as-completed’’ market
value; and (iii) any internally generated
capital must be contractually required to
stay in the project for the life of the
project. Banking organizations have
asserted that the conditions for meeting
this exemption are unclear, complex,
and burdensome to implement. Further,
the agencies have received numerous
questions from banking organizations on
the minimum 15 percent borrower
capital contribution requirement, which
is measured as a percentage of a
project’s ‘‘as completed’’ market value.
After considering comments from
banking organizations regarding both
the complexity of the contributed
capital exemption, as well as the
potential inconsistent application of the
exemption that results, the agencies are
proposing to not include a contributed
capital exemption within the HVADC
exposure definition. The agencies
considered various means to clarify or
modify the contributed capital
exemption in a manner consistent with
the goals of simplifying the capital rule.
However, the agencies view the
alternative approaches that retain the
contributed capital exemption as
comparably complex and inconsistent
with the goal of simplifying the capital
rule.
Question 2: The agencies seek
comment on the degree to which the
proposed HVADC exposure definition
would simplify and enhance
consistency in the treatment for credit
facilities financing real estate
acquisition, development, or
construction. What other simplifications
should the agencies consider to improve
the simplicity and consistent treatment
of these credit facilities?
14 12 CFR part 208, subpart J, Appendix C
(Board); 12 CFR part 34, subpart D, Appendix A
(OCC); 12 CFR part 365, subpart A, Appendix A
(FDIC).
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b. One- to Four-Family Residential
Properties
The proposed definition of an HVADC
exposure would exempt credit facilities
that finance the acquisition,
development, or construction of one- to
four-family residential properties,
similar to the exemption in the HVCRE
exposure definition. For purposes of
both HVADC and HVCRE exposures, the
financing of one- to four-family
residential properties would include
both loans to construct one- to fourfamily residential structures and loans
that combine the land acquisition,
development, or construction of one- to
four-family structures, either with or
without a sales contract, including lot
development loans. Therefore, credit
facilities financing the construction of
one- to four-family residential structures
for which no buyer has been identified
would be included in the exemption for
one- to four-family residential
properties.
In response to questions about
whether the term ‘‘residential
properties’’ for these purposes includes
the acquisition, development, or
construction of condominiums or
cooperatives, the agencies are clarifying
that, generally, a loan that finances the
acquisition, development, or
construction of condominiums and
cooperatives would not qualify for the
one- to four-family residential
properties exemption, except in the
instance where the project contains
fewer than five individual dwelling
units. Thus, condominiums,
cooperatives, and apartment buildings
would generally be treated as
multifamily properties and would not
qualify for the one- to four-family
residential properties exemption. If each
unit in a project is separated from other
units by a dividing wall that extends
from ground to roof (e.g., row houses or
townhouses), then each unit would be
considered a single family residential
property and thus exempt from the
HVADC exposure category. Further, the
acquisition, development, or
construction of multiple residential
properties, each containing a one- to
four-family dwelling unit (such as a
loan to finance tract development),
would qualify for the one- to four-family
residential property exemption. Loans
used solely to acquire undeveloped land
would not, however, qualify for the oneto four-family residential property
exemption.
Question 3: The agencies request
comment on whether the proposed
exemption for one- to four-family
residential properties in the HVADC
exposure category is clear such that a
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banking organization could readily
identify which residential loans would
be exempt from the HVADC exposure
category. What, if any, additional
clarification would facilitate identifying
one- to four-family residential properties
for this purpose? The agencies also
solicit comment on all aspects of the
HVADC exposure category, including
the proposed scope and exemptions.
c. Community Development Projects
The HVCRE exposure definition
exempts community development
projects.15 The proposed HVADC
exposure definition would continue to
exempt community development
projects. However, the agencies are
proposing to simplify the definition by
removing the reference to the broader
statutory citations, 12 U.S.C. 24
(Eleventh) and 12 U.S.C. 338a. Under
the proposed rule, all credit facilities
financing the acquisition, development,
or construction of real property projects
for which the primary purpose is
community development, as defined by
the agencies’ Community Reinvestment
Act rules, would be exempt from the
HVADC exposure category. In addition,
the agencies are proposing to remove
the exception to the exemption for
activities that promote economic
development by financing businesses or
farms that meet the size eligibility
standards of the Small Business
Administration’s (SBA) Development
Company or Small Business Investment
Company programs (13 CFR 121.301) or
have gross annual revenues of $1
million or less, unless they meet another
exemption in the rule. Such loans are
required to have a community
development purpose under interagency
guidance. The proposed simplified
exemption for community development
projects is not intended to substantively
alter the scope of the exemption for
community development projects set
forth in the current HVCRE exposure
definition.
Question 4: The agencies seek
comment on whether the proposed
community development exemption is
clear. What, if any, additional
clarification would help banking
organizations identify exposures that
meet the community development
exemption? Please describe any
implementation challenges with the
exemption.
d. Agricultural Exposures
The proposed HVADC exposure
definition would exclude credit
15 12 CFR part 25 (national banks) (OCC); 12 CFR
part 195 (federal savings associations) (OCC); 12
CFR part 228 (Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC).
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facilities that finance the purchase or
development of agricultural land and
would not substantively modify the
current exemption for agricultural land
development set forth in the current
HVCRE exposure definition.16 The
agencies note that the term
‘‘agricultural’’ is broadly defined and
would include, for example, timberland
or fish farms. However, the term
‘‘agricultural,’’ as it is used here, would
not include manufacturing or processing
plants related to agricultural products,
such as a dairy processing plant.
4. Permanent Loans
The proposed HVADC exposure
definition would exclude an exposure
that is considered to be a permanent
loan. In response to banking
organizations’ requests for clarification
of the term ‘‘permanent financing’’ as it
is used in the current HVCRE exposure
definition, the proposed HVADC
exposure definition includes a
definition of ‘‘permanent loan.’’ A
permanent loan for purposes of the
proposed HVADC exposure definition
would mean a prudently underwritten
loan 17 that has a clearly identified
ongoing source of repayment sufficient
to service amortizing principal and
interest payments aside from the sale of
the property. The proposed rule would
not require that the current loan
payments be amortizing in order for a
loan to meet the definition of a
permanent loan.
For many acquisition, development,
or construction projects, the source of
repayment will be derived from the
property once the project is completed
and tenants begin paying rent or the
property otherwise begins to produce
income. Additionally, the agencies
recognize that for loans financing
owner-occupied acquisition,
development, or construction projects,
the owner may have sufficient capacity
at origination to repay the loan from
ongoing operations, without relying on
proceeds from the sale or lease of the
16 The proposed rule would make a minor
clarification to the definition of HVCRE exposure by
changing the term ‘‘non-agricultural’’ to
‘‘commercial or residential development.’’
17 The agencies are clarifying that a loan is
expected to be prudently underwritten in order to
meet the definition of a permanent loan. The
Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending
Policies provide standards for banking
organizations in developing such written policies,
limits, and standards. 12 CFR part 208, subpart J,
Appendix C (Board); 12 CFR part 34, subpart D,
Appendix A (OCC); 12 CFR part 365, subpart A,
Appendix A (FDIC). Banking organizations are
required to adopt and maintain written policies that
establish appropriate limits and standards for
extensions of credit related to real estate. 12 CFR
208.51 (Board); 12 CFR 34.62 (OCC); 12 CFR 365.2
(FDIC).
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property, in which case the loan would
be considered a permanent loan and
thus excluded from the HVADC
exposure definition, assuming it was
prudently underwritten. For example, a
prudently underwritten loan to a
company that obtains financing to
construct an additional facility that does
not rely on the lease income from the
facility to repay the loan, and instead
relies on cash flows from other sources
to cover amortizing principal and
interest payments, may be considered a
permanent loan and excluded from
HVADC.
The agencies are also clarifying that
bridge loans generally would not qualify
as permanent loans as the property is
not generating sufficient revenue to
make amortizing principal and interest
payments. The agencies believe
financing for bridge loans poses greater
credit risk than permanent loans, and,
therefore, should be subject to a higher
risk weight.
Finally, even if a credit facility does
not meet the definition of a permanent
loan at origination, it could
subsequently meet the definition as the
property generates additional revenue
sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments. In such
a case, the facility may become exempt
from the HVADC exposure category,
provided the loan was prudently
underwritten at origination.
Question 5: The agencies seek
comment on the clarity of the exemption
for permanent loans in the proposed
HVADC exposure definition and the
ease with which banking organizations
can determine whether an exposure
qualifies for this exemption. What, if
any, additional clarification would help
banking organizations identify
exposures that meet the permanent loan
exemption?
5. Risk Weight for HVADC Exposures
Currently, under the standardized
approach, an HVCRE exposure receives
a 150 percent risk weight. Under the
proposed rule, an HVADC exposure
would receive a 130 percent risk weight.
The agencies believe the reduced risk
weight for HVADC exposures is
appropriate in recognition of the
potentially broader scope of the
definition, and that this change would
not result in a significant change in the
aggregate minimum capital required
under the capital rule. Specifically, by
including exposures regardless of the
amount of the borrower’s contributed
equity, some exposures that would be
included in the HVADC exposure
category may, while remaining riskier
than other commercial real estate loans,
have risk-reducing qualities, such as
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lower LTV ratios and higher borrowercontributed capital relative to exposures
currently in the HVCRE exposures
category.
However, to mitigate the potential
burden on banking organizations of
having to re-evaluate all of their
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures against the new
HVADC exposure definition, the
proposal, under the standardized
approach, would contain a
grandfathering provision for outstanding
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures. The proposal,
under the standardized approach,
would retain the capital rule’s HVCRE
exposure definition and exposure
category treatment for all outstanding
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures as of the
effective date of any final rule. Only
new acquisition, development, or
construction exposures originated on or
after the effective date of a final rule
would need to be evaluated against the
new HVADC exposure definition.
Therefore, a banking organization would
maintain an exposure’s risk weight as
determined prior to the effective date of
a final rule under the HVCRE exposure
definition. For example, if an
outstanding acquisition, development,
or construction exposure is classified as
an HVCRE exposure under the capital
rule, then the exposure would continue
to have a 150 percent risk weight until
the exposure is converted to permanent
financing or is sold or paid in full. For
the purposes of this grandfathering
provision, permanent financing refers to
the existing HVCRE exposure definition,
which relies on a banking organization’s
underwriting criteria for long-term
mortgage loans. If an outstanding
acquisition, development, or
construction exposure is exempt from
the HVCRE exposure category under the
capital rule, then the exposure would
continue to receive its applicable risk
weight under the capital rule (e.g., 100
percent risk weight), assuming the
exposure is not past due.
Based upon data reported on the
Consolidated Financial Statements for
Holding Companies (FR Y–9C) and on
Call Reports for insured depository
institutions as of June 30, 2017,
approximately 80 percent of banking
organizations report holdings of
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures, excluding oneto four-family residential properties,
and approximately 40 percent of
banking organizations report some
holdings of HVCRE exposures risk
weighted at 150 percent. As highlighted
above, the proposed treatment may
result in a 130 percent risk weight for
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certain future exposures that would
have received either a 100 or a 150
percent risk weight under the capital
rule’s treatment. It may also result in
certain loans that would have received
a 150 percent risk weight under the
current rule receiving a 100 percent risk
weight under the proposed rule. At the
individual banking organization level, a
banking organization currently with a
higher proportion of HVCRE exposures
relative to its total acquisition,
development, or construction exposures
may see a decrease in its capital
requirements on new acquisition,
development, or construction loans
going forward. Conversely, a banking
organization that currently has a higher
proportion of acquisition, development,
or construction exposures deemed to be
excluded from the HVCRE exposure
definition may see an increase in its
capital requirements on new
acquisition, development, or
construction loans to the extent those
exposures do not otherwise qualify for
the exemptions under the proposed
HVADC exposure definition going
forward. Because of the lack of granular
data on acquisition, development, or
construction loans in the regulatory
reports and since agencies cannot
predict how banking organizations may
structure such exposures in the future,
the agencies cannot estimate with
precision the future impact of the
proposed HVADC exposure definition at
an individual banking organization
level. The agencies further note that the
proposed grandfathering provision,
which may lessen regulatory
compliance burden by preventing
banking organizations from having to reevaluate their existing acquisition,
development, or construction exposures
under the new HVADC exposure
definition, also would limit the
potential impact of the treatment of
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures under the
proposed HVADC exposures definition
on banking organizations’ regulatory
capital.
Although the agencies anticipate that
the proposed rule may lead to the
assignment of higher risk weights to
certain acquisition, development, or
construction exposures going forward,
the agencies believe that the simplified
definition for HVADC exposures may
lead to a reduced regulatory compliance
burden in classifying acquisition,
development, or construction
exposures. The agencies also expect that
the revised definition would result in
increased consistency in the treatment
of acquisition, development, or
construction exposures. The agencies
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believe that the proposed definition
strikes an appropriate balance between
risk-sensitivity and complexity.
Question 6: The agencies seek
comment on the agencies’ goal of
achieving an appropriate balance
between the proposed calibration and
expanded scope of application for
HVADC exposures. The agencies are
interested in any additional data on the
impact of the proposed rule’s capital
treatment of HVCRE exposures and the
new capital treatment of HVADC
exposures on bank holding companies,
savings and loan holding companies,
and insured depository institutions,
both in the aggregate and on an
individual banking organization level.
Question 7: What are the pros and
cons of the grandfathering provision
and does it sufficiently mitigate the
compliance burden of having to reevaluate all acquisition, development,
or construction exposures against the
new HVADC exposure definition? Are
there alternatives to the proposed
grandfathering provision that the
agencies should consider?
6. Retaining the HVCRE Exposure
Definition Under the Advanced
Approaches
As noted above, the agencies are not
proposing to make substantive revisions
to the advanced approaches as part of
this rulemaking. The proposed
introduction of the HVADC exposure
category would apply only to the
calculation of risk-weighted assets
under the standardized approach.
The HVCRE exposure category was
introduced in the standardized
approach as part of the revisions to the
capital rule to address the agencies’
concern that such exposures had been
insufficiently capitalized prior to and
during the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
Banking organizations have commented
on and raised concerns about this
exposure category and its corresponding
150 percent risk weight in the
standardized approach since its
introduction, and specifically during the
2017 EGRPRA process. Because
concerns expressed by banking
organizations regarding the HVCRE
exposure definition emanated primarily
from its implementation in the
standardized approach, the agencies do
not believe it is necessary to make
corresponding changes to the definition
in the advanced approaches. The
advanced approaches do not rely on a
single risk weight for HVCRE exposure,
instead requiring banking organizations
to categorize and assign risk parameters
to these exposures, as well as subject
them to higher capital requirements
through an asset value correlation
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factor. Thus, treatment of this exposure
category in the advanced approaches
diverges substantially from its treatment
in the standardized approach, and the
agencies are not proposing to replace
the existing HVCRE exposure definition
under the advanced approaches.
Accordingly, advanced approaches
banking organizations would continue
to use the HVCRE exposure definition to
calculate their advanced approaches
risk-weighted assets, while using the
HVADC exposure definition for the
purpose of calculating their riskweighted assets under the standardized
approach.
Question 8: The agencies request
comment on whether it would be
appropriate to replace the HVCRE
exposure definition, as it is used in the
advanced approaches, with the
proposed HVADC exposure definition.
What, if any, challenges do advanced
approaches banking organizations face
as a result of the agencies maintaining
the existing HVCRE exposure definition
for purposes of the advanced
approaches while also proposing to
adopt the more expansive HVADC
exposure definition for purposes of the
standardized approach? What, if any,
changes should the agencies consider to
address these challenges?
7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
The agencies have previously issued
FAQs to provide clarity on the existing
HVCRE exposure definition. If the
agencies adopt the proposal as final,
they will consider whether to revise or
rescind some or all of the HVCRE
exposure-related FAQs. As the agencies
are considering comments received on
this proposal, the agencies would
consider whether to issue any updated
guidance related to the HVCRE exposure
definition as it pertains to its use in the
advanced approaches.18
B. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs,
and Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
1. Background
The capital rule currently requires
that a banking organization deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital the
amounts of MSAs, temporary difference
DTAs, and significant investments in
18 ‘‘Frequently Asked Questions on the
Regulatory Capital Rule,’’ OCC Bulletin 2015–23
(April 6, 2016), available at: https://www.occ.gov/
news-issuances/bulletins/2015/bulletin-201523.html. ‘‘SR 15–6: Interagency Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) on the Regulatory Capital Rules’’
(April 5, 2015), available at: https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/
sr1506.htm; FDIC FIL 16–2015, available at https://
www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/
fil15016.html.
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49991
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock that individually exceed 10
percent of the banking organization’s
common equity tier 1 capital.19 In
addition, any amount not deducted as a
result of the individual 10 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold must be deducted from a
banking organization’s common equity
tier 1 capital if that amount exceeds 15
percent of the banking organization’s
common equity tier 1 capital. Beginning
January 1, 2018, any amount of these
three items that a banking organization
does not deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital will be risk weighted at
250 percent (until that time, such items
are risk weighted at 100 percent).20 21
The capital rule further requires
deductions from regulatory capital if a
banking organization holds (i) nonsignificant investments in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
above a certain threshold 22 or (ii)
significant investments in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
that are not in the form of common
stock. Specifically, the capital rule
requires that a banking organization
deduct from its regulatory capital any
amount of the organization’s nonsignificant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
that exceeds 10 percent of the banking
organization’s common equity tier 1
capital (the 10 percent threshold for
non-significant investments) 23 in
19 A significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution where the banking organization
owns more than 10 percent of the issued and
outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution (significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution).
12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR
324.2 (FDIC).
20 Beginning on January 1, 2018, the calculation
of the aggregate 15 percent common equity tier 1
capital deduction threshold for these items will
become stricter as any amount above 15 percent of
common equity tier 1, less the amount of those
items already deducted as a result of the 10 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold,
will be deducted from a banking organization’s
common equity tier 1. 12 CFR 217.22(d) (Board); 12
CFR 3.22(d) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(d) (FDIC).
21 See the agencies’ notice of proposed
rulemaking that was issued on August 25, 2017 (82
FR 40495).
22 A non-significant investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution is defined as
an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution where the institution owns 10
percent or less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated financial
institution (non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution).
12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR
324.2 (FDIC).
23 12 CFR 217.22(c)(4) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(4)
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(c)(4) (FDIC).
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accordance with the corresponding
deduction approach of the capital
rule.24 In addition, significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
not in the form of common stock also
must be deducted from regulatory
capital in their entirety in accordance
with the corresponding deduction
approach.25
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2. Simplifying the Capital Treatment for
MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and
Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
As highlighted in numerous questions
and comments received by the agencies
through both the EGRPRA process and
their respective supervisory processes,
community banking organizations have
indicated that they find the deduction
approach for MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions to be complex and
burdensome. In addition, two banking
organization commenters asserted in the
public comment period for the EGRPRA
process that the revisions to the
treatment of MSAs in the capital rule
were unduly restrictive for community
banks.26
The agencies are proposing changes
applicable to MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions to simplify their treatment
while at the same time ensuring an
appropriate regulatory capital treatment
to address safety and soundness
concerns. Specifically, and consistent
with the agencies’ statements in the
2017 EGRPRA report, the proposed rule
would, for non-advanced approaches
banking organizations, replace the
capital rule’s individual 10 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
thresholds for MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock and eliminate
the aggregate 15 percent common equity
tier 1 capital deduction threshold for
such items. The proposal would require
that a non-advanced approaches
banking organization deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital any
amounts of MSAs, temporary difference
DTAs, and investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
that, individually, exceed 25 percent of
the banking organization’s common
24 12 CFR 217.22(c)(2) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(2)
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(c)(2) (FDIC).
25 12 CFR 217.22(c)(5) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(5)
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(c)(5) (FDIC).
26 82 FR 15908 (March 30, 2017).
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equity tier 1 capital (after certain
deductions and adjustments) (the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold). The agencies
believe that this change would
appropriately balance risk-sensitivity
and complexity for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations. The
imposition of the 25 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold
is expected to avoid, in a simple
manner, unsafe and unsound
concentration levels of MSAs,
temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions.
Although the agencies expect that the
proposed simplifications for the
treatment of MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions would reduce regulatory
compliance burden, the agencies do not
expect a significant impact on the
capital ratios for most non-advanced
approaches banking organizations as a
result of these simplifications. Those
non-advanced approaches banking
organizations with relatively substantial
holdings of MSAs or temporary
difference DTAs could, however,
experience a regulatory capital benefit
as a result of the proposed
simplifications.
a. MSAs and Temporary Difference
DTAs
In addition to the proposed 25 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold, any amounts of MSAs or
temporary difference DTAs that are not
deducted would be risk weighted at 250
percent, consistent with the capital rule.
The agencies note that some banking
organizations suggested in the public
comments associated with the revisions
to the capital rule that the deductions
for MSAs and temporary difference
DTAs were unnecessarily burdensome,
and urged the agencies to eliminate the
requirements altogether and revert to
the treatment for these items under the
capital framework that was applicable
before 2013. Additionally, through the
EGRPRA comment process, two
commenters suggested raising the
deduction threshold for MSAs from 10
percent to 100 percent of common
equity tier 1 capital.
The agencies have long limited the
inclusion of intangible and higher-risk
assets in regulatory capital due to the
relatively high level of uncertainty
regarding the ability of banking
organizations to realize value from these
assets, especially under adverse
financial conditions. The agencies
believe that it is therefore important to
retain regulatory capital restrictions for
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MSAs and temporary difference DTAs.
Temporary difference DTAs are assets
from which banking organizations may
not be able to realize value, especially
under adverse financial conditions. A
banking organization’s ability to realize
its temporary difference DTAs is
dependent on future taxable income;
thus, the proposed limitation would
continue to protect against the
possibility that the banking organization
would need to establish or increase
valuation allowances for DTAs during
periods of financial stress. In the case of
MSAs, the proposed treatment for MSAs
would continue to protect banking
organizations from sudden fluctuations
in the value of MSAs and from the
potential inability of such banking
organizations to quickly divest of MSAs
at their full estimated value during
periods of financial stress.
Under section 475 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) (12
U.S.C. 1828 note), the amount of readily
marketable purchased mortgage
servicing assets (PMSAs) that an insured
depository institution may include in
regulatory capital cannot be more than
90 percent of the PMSAs’ fair value.
Section 475 of FDICIA provides the
agencies with the authority to remove
the 90 percent limitation on PMSAs,
subject to a joint determination by the
agencies that its removal would not
have an adverse effect on the deposit
insurance fund or the safety and
soundness of insured depository
institutions. The agencies determined
that the treatment of MSAs (including
PMSAs) under the capital rule was
consistent with a determination that the
90 percent limitation could be removed
because the treatment under the capital
rule (that is, applying a 250 percent risk
weight to any non-deducted MSAs) was
more conservative than the FDICIA fair
value limitation and a 100 percent risk
weight, which was the risk weight
applied to MSAs under the regulatory
capital framework prior to 2013.27
Because the proposed rule would
require that MSAs above the 25 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold be deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital and would maintain
the 250 percent risk weight for nondeducted MSAs (including PMSAs), the
agencies believe that the treatment of
MSAs under the proposed rule would
be consistent with a determination that
the 90 percent fair value limitation is
not necessary.
27 78 FR 62018, 62069–70 (October 13, 2013)
(FRB, OCC); 78 FR 55340, 55388–89 (September 10,
2013) (FDIC).
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b. Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
As mentioned above, the proposal
would impose the 25 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold
on investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions. A
banking organization would make any
required deduction under the
corresponding deduction approach.
This proposed treatment removes, for
non-advanced approaches banking
organizations, the distinctions among
different categories of investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the capital rule (namely
non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions, significant investment in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are in the form of
common stock, and significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
that are not in the form of common
stock). In order to avoid added
complexity and regulatory burden, the
agencies are not proposing a specific
methodology dictating which specific
investments a non-advanced approaches
banking organization must deduct and
which it must risk weight in cases
where the firm is exceeding the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold for investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. The agencies believe that
they can address any safety and
soundness concerns that arise from this
flexible treatment through the
supervisory process. The agencies
believe the proposed treatment for
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
would reduce complexity while
maintaining appropriate incentives to
reduce interconnectedness among
banking organizations.
Under the proposed rule, nonadvanced approaches banking
organizations would be required to risk
weight any investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
that are not deducted according to the
relevant treatment for the exposure
category of the investment. For example,
the appropriate risk weight for equity
exposures would generally be either 300
or 400 percent, depending on whether
the equity exposures are publicly
traded, unless such exposures are
assigned a preferential risk weight of
100 percent, as described below.28
The capital rule allows banking
organizations to apply a preferential risk
weight of 100 percent to the aggregated
28 12 CFR 217.52 and 53 (Board); 12 CFR 3.52 and
53 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.52 and 53 (FDIC).
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adjusted carrying value of equity
exposures that do not exceed 10 percent
of a banking organization’s total capital
(non-significant equity exposures). The
application of this risk weight (i)
requires a banking organization to
follow an enumerated process for
calculating adjusted carrying value and
(ii) mandates the equity exposures that
must be included first in determining
whether the threshold has been reached.
The capital rule currently excludes
significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock from being
eligible for a 100 percent risk weight.
The proposal would eliminate this
exclusion for non-advanced approaches
banking organizations.29 The agencies
believe that this revised approach
would appropriately balance simplicity
and risk-sensitivity for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations by
applying a single definition of
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
and consolidating the different
deduction treatments for investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
c. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced
Approaches Banking Organizations
Advanced approaches banking
organizations would continue to apply
the capital rule’s current treatment for
MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions.30
The agencies believe that the more
complex capital deduction treatments in
the capital rule are appropriate for
advanced approaches banking
organizations, because their size,
complexity, and international exposure
warrant a risk-sensitive treatment that
more aggressively reduces potential
interconnectedness among such firms.
Accordingly, advanced approaches
banking organizations would be
required to continue applying the
individual 10 percent common equity
tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, as
well as the aggregate 15 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold, for investments in MSAs,
29 Equity exposures that exceed, in the aggregate,
10 percent of a non-advanced approaches banking
organization’s total capital would then be assigned
a risk weight based upon the approaches available
in sections 52 and 53 of the capital rule. 12 CFR
217.52 and 53 (Board); 12 CFR 3.52 and 53 (OCC);
12 CFR 324.52 and 53 (FDIC).
30 The agencies are making nonsubstantive
changes to the definitions of non-significant
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution and significant investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in section 2 of the capital rule in order
to maintain the current treatment of these items for
advanced approaches banking organizations.
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temporary difference DTAs, and
significant investments in
unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock when
calculating their capital requirements
under the capital rule. Advanced
approaches banking organizations
would also continue to apply the capital
rule’s treatment for non-significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
and significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of
common stock.
Question 9: What impact would the
agencies’ proposed changes to the
treatment of MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations have
on (i) risks to the safety and soundness
of the banking system and (ii) regulatory
burden on non-advanced approaches
banking organizations? If possible,
please provide relevant data to support
comments.
Question 10: What are the benefits
and drawbacks of (i) the proposed
elimination of the 250 percent risk
weight for significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock and (ii) the proposed riskweighting methodology for investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions when such
investments are in the form of equity
exposures?
Question 11: What, if any, operational
challenges does the proposed treatment
of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs,
and investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
pose? What, if any, modifications
should the agencies consider to address
such challenges?
C. Minority Interest
1. Background
The capital rule limits the amount of
capital issued by consolidated
subsidiaries and not owned by the
parent banking organization (minority
interest) that a banking organization
may include in regulatory capital. For
example, tier 1 minority interest is
created when a consolidated subsidiary
of the banking organization issues tier 1
capital to third parties. Given that
minority interest is generally not
available to absorb losses at the banking
organization’s consolidated level, the
agencies strongly believe that inclusion
of minority interest in a banking
organization’s regulatory capital should
be limited. The restrictions in the
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capital rule relating to minority interest
are currently based on the amount of
capital held by the consolidated
subsidiary relative to the amount of
capital the subsidiary would need to
hold to avoid any restrictions on capital
distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under the capital rule’s
capital conservation buffer framework.
Many community banking organizations
have asserted that the capital rule’s
current calculation of the minority
interest limitation is complex and
results in burdensome and confusing
regulatory capital reporting instructions.
2. Simplifying the Regulatory Capital
Limitations for Minority Interest
Under the proposal, the agencies
would replace for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations the
existing calculations limiting the
inclusion of minority interest in
regulatory capital with a simpler
calculation. Specifically, the proposed
rule would allow non-advanced
approaches banking organizations to
include: (i) Common equity tier 1
minority interest up to 10 percent of the
parent banking organization’s common
equity tier 1 capital; (ii) tier 1 minority
interest up to 10 percent of the parent
banking organization’s tier 1 capital;
and (iii) total capital minority interest
up to 10 percent of the parent banking
organization’s total capital. In each case,
the parent banking organization’s
regulatory capital for purposes of these
limitations would be measured before
the inclusion of any minority interest
and after the deductions from and
adjustments to the regulatory capital of
the parent banking organization
described in sections 22(a) and (b) of the
capital rule.31 The agencies believe that
removing the current complex
calculation for the amount of includable
minority interest reduces regulatory
burden without reducing the safety and
soundness of non-advanced approaches
banking organizations because the
proposed minority interest limitations
are simpler to calculate and still
appropriately restrictive. The agencies
do not expect a significant impact on
the capital ratios for most non-advanced
approaches banking organizations as a
result of these simplifications.
The agencies remain focused on
ensuring that the capital requirements
applied to banking organizations are
appropriately tailored to an
organization’s size, complexity, and risk
profile. Accordingly, the largest and
most internationally active banking
31 12 CFR 217.22(a) and (b) (Board); 12 CFR
3.22(a) and (b) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(a) and (b)
(FDIC).
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organizations should be required to
comply with stricter or more complex
regulations, where appropriate,
commensurate with their size,
complexity, and risk profile. The
agencies are therefore not proposing to
change the more risk-sensitive minority
interest calculation for advanced
approaches banking organizations.
Given the potential complexity in the
capital structure of the largest and most
systemically important institutions, the
agencies believe that maintaining the
more risk-sensitive approach for these
firms better ensures they do not
overstate capital ratios at the
consolidated level as a result of
overcapitalized subsidiaries, thereby
protecting the safety and soundness of
the banking sector.
Question 12: What would be (i) the
benefits and drawbacks and (ii) effects
on regulatory burden of the agencies’
proposed revisions to the quantitative
limits for including minority interests in
regulatory capital for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations? The
agencies solicit comment on all aspects
of the proposed changes to the inclusion
of minority interests in regulatory
capital for non-advanced approaches
banking organizations. If possible,
please provide relevant data to support
comments.
III. Technical Amendments to the
Capital Rule
The proposed rule would make
certain technical corrections and
clarifications to the capital rule. The
agencies have identified typographical
and technical errors in several
provisions of the capital rule that
warrant clarification or updating. The
agencies are, therefore, proposing to
revise the capital rule as described
below. Most of the proposed corrections
or technical changes are selfexplanatory. In addition, there are
several incorrect or imprecise crossreferences that the agencies propose to
change in an effort to better clarify the
capital rule’s requirements, as well as
other changes to references necessary to
implement the simplifications described
previously in this preamble.
In section 1, the proposed rule would
clarify that the capital adequacy
standards do not apply to Federal
branches and agencies of foreign banks
that are regulated by the OCC. The OCC
regulates Federal branches and agencies
of foreign banks.32
In section 2, the proposed rule would
correct an error in the definition of
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution by
32 12
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12 CFR 324.11(a)(2)(i).
U.S.C. 3101–3111.
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changing the word ‘‘and’’ to ‘‘or.’’ This
would clarify that an instrument
qualifying for the definition can be
either recognized as capital for
regulatory purposes by a primary
supervisor of an unconsolidated
financial institution or can be part of the
equity under U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) of an
unconsolidated unregulated financial
institution.
The proposed rule would add ‘‘the
European Stability Mechanism’’ and
‘‘the European Financial Stability
Facility’’ to the capital rule with respect
to (i) the definition of eligible guarantor
in section 2, (ii) the list of entities
eligible for a zero percent risk weight in
section 32(b), (iii) the list of equity
exposures eligible for a zero percent risk
weight in section 52(b)(1), (iv) the list of
entities eligible for assignment of a
rating grade associated with a
probability of default of less than 0.03
percent in section 131(d)(2), and (v)
certain supranational entities and
multilateral development bank debt
positions eligible for assignment of a 0.0
percent specific risk weighting factor in
section 210(b)(2)(ii). The proposed rule
would also exclude such entities from
the definition of (i) corporate exposure
in section 2, (ii) private sector credit
exposure in section 11, and (iii)
corporate debt position in section 202.
The agencies are making this change
because the European Stability
Mechanism and the European Financial
Stability Facility were in early stages of
operation and excluded from the capital
rule when it was finalized in 2013. The
proposal would update the list of
entities included or excluded, as
applicable, for these purposes in the
standardized approach and advanced
approaches of the capital rule and the
market risk capital rule.
The agencies are making technical
amendments to section 11(a) of the
capital rule, on the capital conservation
buffer, to clarify the calculation of a
banking organization’s maximum
payout amount for a specific calendar
quarter. First, the proposal would clarify
that the eligible retained income during
a specific current calendar quarter is the
banking organization’s net income,
calculated in accordance with the
instructions for the Call Report or the
FR Y–9C, as appropriate, for the four
calendar quarters preceding the current
calendar quarter.33 Second, the proposal
would clarify that the key inputs for the
calculation of a banking organization’s
capital conservation buffer during the
current calendar quarter are the banking
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organization’s regulatory capital ratios
as of the last day of the previous
calendar quarter.34
In section 20(d)(5) for the Board’s and
OCC’s capital rule, the proposed rule
would provide that the reference to
AOCI opt-out election is section 22(b)(2)
instead of section 20(b)(2).
In section 20(c) of the capital rule, the
OCC’s and FDIC’s regulations
mistakenly provide that cash dividend
payments on additional tier 1 capital
instruments may not be subject to a
‘‘limit’’ imposed by the contractual
terms governing the instrument. This
requirement was intended to apply only
to common equity tier 1 capital
instruments, and not to additional tier 1
capital instruments. The proposed rule
would harmonize the language of the
agencies’ capital rule in section 20(c) by
removing this requirement for
additional tier 1 instruments.
In a new section 20(f) of the Board’s
capital rule, for purposes of clarity and
enforceability, the proposed rule would
create a stand-alone requirement that a
Board-regulated banking organization
may not repurchase or redeem any
common equity tier 1 capital, additional
tier 1, or tier 2 capital instrument
without the prior approval of the Board.
This requirement already exists in the
capital rule as a requirement for each
definition of common equity tier 1,
additional tier 1, and tier 2 capital
instruments in sections 20(b)(iii),
20(c)(iv), and 20(d)(x), respectively.
In section 22(g) of the capital rule, the
proposed rule would remove specific
references to assets to exclude from risk
weighting if already deducted from
regulatory capital. The effect of this
proposed change would be to exclude
from standardized total risk-weighted
assets and, as applicable, advanced
approaches total risk-weighted assets
any items deducted from capital, not
only the items specifically enumerated.
In section 22(h) of the capital rule, the
proposed rule would replace inaccurate
terminology with the properly defined
terms ‘‘investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution’’
and ‘‘investment in the [AGENCY]regulated institution’s own capital
instrument,’’ as described in section 2.
The proposed rule would revise, for
purposes of clarity, the capital rule’s
sections 32(d)(2)(iii) and (iv), and create
a new section 32(d)(2)(v). The revised
section 32(d)(2)(iii) would require
banking organizations to ‘‘assign a 20
percent risk weight to an exposure that
is a self-liquidating, trade-related
contingent item that arises from the
34 12 CFR 217.11(a)(3)(i); 12 CFR 3.11(a)(3)(i); and
12 CFR 324.11(a)(3)(i).
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movement of goods and that has a
maturity of three months or less to a
foreign bank whose home country has a
CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD
member with no CRC.’’ This
requirement is currently embedded in
section 32(d)(2)(iii) of the capital rule,
together with rule text related to the risk
weighting of exposures to a foreign bank
whose home country is not a member of
the OECD and does not have a CRC.
This latter provision would become a
stand-alone requirement in the revised
section 32(d)(2)(iv) under the proposed
rule. In addition, the proposed rule
would reassign the current section
32(d)(2)(iv) text as a new section
32(d)(2)(v).
In sections 34(c)(1) and 34(c)(2)(i) of
the capital rule, the proposed rule
would provide that the counterparty
credit risk capital requirement
references subpart D of the capital rule
in its entirety rather than just section 32
of subpart D.
In sections 35(b)(3)(ii), 35(b)(4)(ii),
35(c)(3)(ii), 35(c)(4)(ii), 36(c), 37(b)(2)(i),
38(e)(2), 42(j)(2)(ii)(A), 133(b)(3)(ii), and
133(c)(3)(ii) of the capital rule, the
proposed rule would provide that the
risk weight substitution references
subpart D in its entirety rather than just
section 32 of subpart D.
In section 61 of the capital rule, the
proposed rule would clarify the
requirement that a non-advanced
approaches banking organization with
$50 billion or more in total consolidated
assets would need to complete the
disclosure requirements described in
sections 62 and 63, unless it is a
consolidated subsidiary of a bank
holding company, savings and loan
holding company, or depository
institution that is subject to the
disclosure requirements of section 62, or
a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking
organization that is subject to
comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction.
Table 8 of section 63 of the capital
rule describes information related to
securitization exposures that banking
organizations are required to disclose.
The capital rule revised the risk-based
capital treatment of these items,
including the regulatory capital
treatment of after-tax gain-on-sale
resulting from a securitization and
credit-enhancing interest-only strips
that do not constitute after-tax gain-onsale. Because Table 8 does not properly
reflect these revisions, the agencies
propose to update line (i)(2) under
quantitative disclosures to appropriately
reflect these revisions.
In section 210(b)(2)(vii) of the Board’s
capital rule, the proposed rule would
add references to U.S. intermediate
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holding companies to clarify for these
firms how to calculate capital
requirements related to securitization
positions under the Board’s market risk
capital rule depending on whether they
are using the advanced approaches to
calculate risk-weighted assets.
In table 4 of section 300 of the capital
rule, the proposed rule would revise the
title ‘‘Transition adjustments’’ to
reference section 22(b)(1)(iii) rather than
section 22(b)(2).
In section 300(c)(2) of the Board’s
capital rule, the proposed rule would
clarify that the mergers and acquisitions
that can potentially affect the inclusion
of certain non-qualifying capital
instruments in a Board-regulated
banking organization’s regulatory
capital would have occurred after
December 31, 2013.
As discussed, the 2013 revisions to
the capital rule required banking
organizations to increase both the
quality and quantity of regulatory
capital. As a result, some items that
previously were included in the
calculation of regulatory capital became
excluded, and the amounts of required
regulatory capital relative to certain
exposure types increased. As part of the
capital rule rulemaking, the agencies
established transition provisions to
phase in many of these requirements
over several years in order to give
banking organizations sufficient time to
adjust and adapt to the requirements of
the rule. Many of the transition
provisions continue to be in effect, and
include ongoing phase-ins to the
calculation of capital.
During the development of this
proposal, the agencies recognized the
capital rule would automatically enact
stricter treatments for items potentially
impacted by this proposal on January 1,
2018, while the agencies are
simultaneously working through the
rulemaking process to provide burden
relief to non-advanced approaches
banking organizations for the very same
items. To address this concern, in
August 2017, the agencies invited
public comment on a proposed rule to
extend the current treatment under the
transition provisions of the capital rule
for certain regulatory capital deductions
and risk weights and certain minority
interest requirements.35 The comment
35 82 FR 40495 (August 25, 2017). Items impacted
by the transition NPR include, for non-advanced
approaches banking institutions, (i) MSAs; (ii)
temporary difference DTAs; (iii) significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions in the form of common stock;
(iv) non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions; (v) significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the form of
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period for the transitions NPR expired
on September 25, 2017.
In the transitions NPR, the agencies
explained that the proposed extension
was intended to limit burden on
banking organizations by maintaining
the transitions in effect for 2017 while
the agencies developed potential
simplifications to the treatment of
affected items under the capital rule.
The current proposal reflects the
simplifications referenced by the
agencies in the transitions NPR. If the
transition extensions proposed in the
transitions NPR are finalized, the
scheduled recalibrations under the
transition provisions of the capital rule
would be halted for the affected items
and the treatment in effect for 2017
would continue until further action by
the agencies. As described in the
transitions NPR, the agencies expect
that the transition extensions would
cease to be appropriate upon
completion of the agencies’
simplifications rulemaking process.
If the transition extensions are not
finalized, all the transition provisions
currently in the capital rule would
remain in effect, including a final,
stricter recalibration to the treatment of
items discussed in the transitions NPR
beginning January 1, 2018, for all
banking organizations covered by the
agencies’ capital rule. Thus, whether or
not the transition extensions in the
transitions NPR are implemented, the
agencies believe that the transitions
would cease to be appropriate upon the
agencies’ adoption of a final rule in
conjunction with the rulemaking
process for the proposed
simplifications. Accordingly, in
connection with this simplification
proposal, the agencies propose to
remove the transition provisions
applicable to MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions, and minority interest, all of
which are currently scheduled to end in
2018.
Question 13: The agencies solicit
comments on the proposed technical
amendments to the capital rule. What,
if any, potentially unintended
consequences do the proposed changes
pose and how should the agencies
consider addressing such consequences?
What, if any, additional technical
amendments not already identified by
the agencies in this proposed rule would
be appropriate for the agencies to
consider and why?
common stock; and (vi) common equity tier 1
minority interest, tier 1 minority interest, and total
capital minority interest exceeding the limitations
on minority interest in the capital rule.
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Question 14: While the proposed rule
addresses comments received during the
EGRPRA review regarding the
complexity of the risk based capital
standards, the agencies seek comment
on additional alternatives to simplify
and streamline the regulatory capital
rules. The agencies recognize the
difficulties in achieving simplification of
the risk based capital standards,
particularly the burden related to their
calculation and reporting, and the
potential disparate impact to smaller
and medium sized banks relative to
their GSIB counterparts.
Therefore, the agencies seek comment
on whether they should consider a
fundamental change to the manner in
which banking organizations calculate
and comply with minimum capital
standards such as through the use of a
simple U.S. GAAP based equity to assets
ratio (leverage ratio) for non-GSIB
banks. If so, what would be the
appropriate definition and level for the
ratio? Also, what relief should be
realized upon implementation of this
capital standard relative to changes in
the call report and other reporting
standards?
Question 15: The agencies also seek
comment on whether they should
consider more comprehensive
simplifications to the capital rule for
small and medium-sized banking
organizations by, for example, further
simplifying risk-weighted assets and the
definition of capital, or reducing the
number of regulatory capital ratios,
consistent with legal requirements.
What specific simplifications should the
agencies consider and why?
IV. Abbreviations
ADC Acquisition, Development, or
Construction
BHC Bank Holding Company
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRC Country Risk Classification
DTA Deferred Tax Asset
EGRPRA Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996
FAQ Frequently Asked Question
FR Federal Register
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
GAAP U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles
GSIB Global Systemically Important Bank
Holding Company
HVADC High Volatility Acquisition,
Construction, or Development
HVCRE High Volatility Commercial Real
Estate
IHC U.S. Intermediate Holding Company
LTV Loan-to-Value
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MSA Mortgage Servicing Asset
NPR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
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OCC Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
OECD Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PD Probability of Default
PMSA Purchased Mortgage Servicing Asset
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
RCDRIA Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIN Regulation Identifier Number
SBA Small Business Administration
SLHC Savings and Loan Holding Company
SMB State Member Banks
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995
U.S.C. United States Code
V. Regulatory Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
Certain provisions of the proposed
rule contain ‘‘collection of information’’
requirements within the meaning of the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501–3521). In accordance
with the requirements of the PRA, the
agencies may not conduct or sponsor,
and the respondent is not required to
respond to, an information collection
unless it displays a currently-valid
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) control number. The revised
disclosure requirements are found in
section _.63 of the proposed rule. The
OMB control number for the OCC is
1557–0318, Board is 7100–0313, and
FDIC is 3064–0153. These information
collections will be extended for three
years, with revision. The information
collection requirements contained in
this proposed rulemaking have been
submitted by the OCC and FDIC to OMB
for review and approval under section
3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3507(d))
and section 1320.11 of the OMB’s
implementing regulations (5 CFR 1320).
The Board reviewed the proposed rule
under the authority delegated to the
Board by OMB.
Comments are invited on:
a. Whether the collections of
information are necessary for the proper
performance of the Board’s functions,
including whether the information has
practical utility;
b. The accuracy or the estimate of the
burden of the information collections,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
c. Ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to
be collected;
d. Ways to minimize the burden of the
information collections on respondents,
including through the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; and
e. Estimates of capital or startup costs
and costs of operation, maintenance,
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and purchase of services to provide
information.
All comments will become a matter of
public record. Comments on aspects of
this notice that may affect reporting,
recordkeeping, or disclosure
requirements and burden estimates
should be sent to the addresses listed in
the ADDRESSES section of this document.
A copy of the comments may also be
submitted to the OMB desk officer by
mail to U.S. Office of Management and
Budget, 725 17th Street NW., #10235,
Washington, DC 20503; facsimile to
(202) 395–6974; or email to oira_
submission@omb.eop.gov, Attention,
Federal Banking Agency Desk Officer.
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Proposed Information Collection
Title of Information Collection:
Recordkeeping and Disclosure
Requirements Associated with Capital
Adequacy.
Frequency: Quarterly, annual.
Affected Public: Businesses or other
for-profit.
Respondents:
OCC: National banks, state member
banks, state nonmember banks, and
state and Federal savings associations.
Board: State member banks (SMBs),
bank holding companies (BHCs), U.S.
intermediate holding companies (IHCs),
savings and loan holding companies
(SLHCs), and global systemically
important bank holding companies
(GSIBs).
FDIC: State nonmember banks, state
savings associations, and certain
subsidiaries of those entities.
Current Actions: Section _.63 of the
proposed rule would (1) replace the
standardized approach’s treatment of
high volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposures with a simpler
treatment for most high volatility
acquisition, development, or
construction (HVADC) exposures and
(2) break out the disclosures in Table 8
to include (i) after-tax gain-on-sale on a
securitization that has been deducted
from common equity tier 1 capital and
(ii) credit-enhancing interest-only strip
that is assigned a 1,250 percent risk
weight. There are no changes in burden
associated with the proposed
rulemaking. However, in order to be
consistent across the agencies, the
agencies are applying a conforming
methodology for calculating the burden
estimates. The agencies believe that any
changes to the information collections
associated with the proposed rule are
the result of the conforming
methodology and not the result of the
proposed rule changes.
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PRA Burden Estimates
OCC
OMB control number: 1557–0318.
Estimated number of respondents:
1,365.
Estimated average hours per response:
Minimum Capital Ratios
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—16.
Standardized Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)—122.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)—226.25.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)—
131.25.
Advanced Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)—460.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—540.77.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)—
20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)—280.
Disclosure (Ongoing)—5.78.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)—35.
Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088
hours initial setup, 64,513 hours for
ongoing.
Board
Agency form number: FR Q.
OMB control number: 7100–0313.
Estimated number of respondents:
1,431.
Estimated average hours per response:
Minimum Capital Ratios
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—16.
Standardized Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)—122.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)—226.25.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)—
131.25.
Advanced Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)—460.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—540.77.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)—
20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)—280.
Disclosure (Ongoing)—5.78.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)—35.
Disclosure (Table 13 quarterly)—5.
Risk-based Capital Surcharge for GSIBs
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)—0.5.
Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088
hours initial setup, 78,183 hours for
ongoing.
FDIC
OMB control number: 3064–0153.
Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088
hours initial setup, 138,391 hours for
ongoing. Notably, the FDIC’s estimated
annual burden hours remain unchanged
from its last OMB submission. A
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breakdown of the burden associated
with the current information collection
for 3064–0153 is contained in the
FDIC’s notice published on July 26,
2017 (82 FR 34668).
The proposed rule will also require
changes to the Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income (Call Reports)
(FFIEC 031, FFIEC 041, and FFIEC 051;
OMB No. 1557–0081, 7100–0036, and
3064–0052), Consolidated Financial
Statements for Holding Companies (FR
Y–9C; OMB No. 7100–0128), and
Capital Assessments and Stress Testing
(FR Y–14A and Q; OMB No. 7100–
0341), which will be addressed in a
separate Federal Register notice.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
OCC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act,
5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., (RFA), requires an
agency, in connection with a proposed
rule, to prepare an Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis describing the
impact of the rule on small entities
(defined by the Small Business
Administration (SBA) for purposes of
the RFA to include commercial banks
and savings institutions with total assets
of $550 million or less and trust
companies with total assets of $38.5
million or less) or to certify that the
proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
As of June 30, 2017, the OCC
supervises 907 small entities.36
The rule would apply to all OCCsupervised entities that are not subject
to the advanced approaches risk-based
capital rules, and thus potentially
affects a substantial number of small
entities. The OCC has determined that
153 such entities engage in affected
activities to an extent that they would
be impacted directly by the proposed
rule. Although a substantial number of
small entities would be impacted by the
proposed rule, the OCC does not find
that this impact is economically
significant. To determine whether a
proposed rule would have a significant
effect, the OCC considers whether
projected cost increases associated with
the proposed rule are greater than or
equal to either 5 percent of a small
bank’s total annual salaries and benefits
or 2.5 percent of an OCC-supervised
small entity’s total non-interest expense.
The value of the change in capital
36 The OCC calculated the number of small
entities using the SBA’s size thresholds for
commercial banks and savings institutions, and
trust companies, which are $550 million and $38.5
million, respectively. Consistent with the General
Principles of Affiliation, 13 CFR 121.103(a), the
OCC counted the assets of affiliated financial
institutions when determining whether to classify
a national bank or Federal savings association as a
small entity.
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exceeded these thresholds for 1 of the
907 OCC-supervised small entities.
Therefore, the OCC certifies that the
proposed rule would not have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of OCC-supervised
small entities.
Board: The Board is providing an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis
with respect to this proposed rule. As
discussed in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION, the proposal would revise
the treatment of certain assets under the
capital rule and would also make
various corrections and clarifications to
the capital rule to address issues that
have been identified since the rule was
issued. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5
U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA), generally
requires that an agency prepare and
make available an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis in connection with a
notice of proposed rulemaking. Under
regulations issued by the Small
Business Administration, a small entity
includes a bank, bank holding company,
or savings and loan holding company
with assets of $550 million or less
(small banking organization).37 As of
June 30, 2017, there were approximately
3,451 small bank holding companies,
224 small savings and loan holding
companies, and 566 small state member
banks.
Aspects of the proposed rule would
apply to all state member banks, as well
as all bank holding companies and
savings and loan holding companies
that are subject to the Board’s regulatory
capital rule. Certain portions of the
proposed rule would not apply to state
member banks, bank holding
companies, and savings and loan
holding companies that are subject to
the advanced approaches. In general,
the Board’s capital rule only applies to
bank holding companies and savings
and loan holding companies that are not
subject to the Board’s Small Bank
Holding Company Policy Statement,
which applies to bank holding
companies and savings and loan
holding companies with less than $1
billion in total assets that also meet
certain additional criteria.38 Thus, most
bank holding companies and savings
and loan holding companies that would
be subject to the proposed rule exceed
the $550 million asset threshold at
which a banking organization would
qualify as a small banking organization.
37 See 13 CFR 121.201. Effective July 14, 2014, the
Small Business Administration revised the size
standards for banking organizations to $550 million
in assets from $500 million in assets. 79 FR 33647
(June 12, 2014).
38 See 12 CFR 217.1(c)(1)(ii) and (iii); 12 CFR part
225, appendix C; 12 CFR 238.9.
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Given that the proposed rule does not
impact the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements that affected small
banking organizations are currently
subject to, there would be no change to
the information that small banking
organizations must track and report. The
agencies anticipate updating the
relevant reporting forms at a later date
to the extent necessary to align with the
capital rule.
For purposes of the standardized
approach, the proposal would replace
the exposure category HVCRE with the
exposure category HVADC. HVADC
exposure is expected to generally cover
a broader range of exposures than
HVCRE exposure. However, the
proposal would assign a 130 percent
risk weight to HVADC exposures, as
opposed to the 150 percent risk weight
currently assigned to HVCRE exposures.
Based upon data reported on the FR Y–
9C and on Call Report information, as of
June 30, 2017, about 80 percent of small
state member banks, small bank holding
companies, and small savings and loan
holding companies report holdings of
acquisition, development, or
construction exposures, excluding oneto four-family residential properties,
and about 30 percent of state member
banks, small bank holding companies,
and small savings and loan holding
companies report some holdings of
HVCRE exposures risk weighted at 150
percent. The Board expects that the
expanded scope and reduced riskweight of HVADC exposure relative to
HVCRE exposure would result in
roughly equivalent capital requirements
under the proposal as currently
provided by the capital rule.
For non-advanced approaches
banking organizations, the proposal
would revise the capital deductions for
MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions by
raising the threshold at which such
items must be deducted and simplifying
the number and interaction of required
deductions. The Board expects that the
proposal would result in slightly lower
capital requirements compared to the
capital rule for a few small banking
organizations that currently deduct
MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and/
or investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions.
Because so few banking organizations
are currently subject to these
deductions, the number of affected
banking organizations appears to be
minimal.
Also for non-advanced approaches
banking organizations, the proposal
would simplify the requirements related
to the inclusion of minority interest of
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subsidiaries in capital. The Board
expects that the proposal would
generally result in more minority
interest being includable in capital than
is permitted under the current rule.
However, only a few small banking
organizations currently include
minority interest in capital and minority
interest represents a significant portion
of capital for very few banking
organizations. As a result, the impact of
this portion of the proposal is not
expected to be significant.
The remaining proposed revisions to
the capital rule consist of technical
corrections and clarifications that have
been identified since the rule was
issued. None of these revisions
constitutes a significant change to the
capital rule and the impact of these
revisions on banking organizations is
expected to be immaterial.
The Board does not believe that the
proposed rule duplicates, overlaps, or
conflicts with any other Federal rules.
In addition, there are no significant
alternatives to the proposed rule other
than retention of the current rule. In
light of the foregoing, the Board does
not believe that the proposed rule, if
adopted in final form, would have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
Nonetheless, the Board seeks comment
on whether the proposed rule would
impose undue burdens on, or have
unintended consequences for, small
organizations, and whether there are
ways such potential burdens or
consequences could be minimized in a
manner consistent with the purpose of
the proposed rule. A final regulatory
flexibility analysis will be conducted
after consideration of comments
received during the public comment
period.
FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act
(RFA) generally requires that, in
connection with a notice of proposed
rulemaking, an agency prepare and
make available for public comment an
initial regulatory flexibility analysis
describing the impact of the proposed
rule on small entities.39 The Small
Business Administration has defined
‘‘small entities’’ to include banking
organizations with total assets of less
than or equal to $550 million.40 The
FDIC is providing an initial regulatory
flexibility analysis with respect to this
proposed rule.
The FDIC supervises 3,717 depository
institutions,41 of which, 2,990 are
39 5
U.S.C. 601 et seq.
CFR 121.201 (as amended, effective
December 2, 2014).
41 FDIC-supervised institutions are set forth in 12
U.S.C. 1813(q)(2).
40 13
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defined as small banking entities by the
terms of the RFA.42 This proposed rule
would replace the existing HVCRE
exposure category with a new HVADC
exposure category that would receive a
130 percent risk weight. The proposed
rule also would remove the individual
and aggregate deduction thresholds and
replace them with individual, higher
deduction thresholds for: (i) MSAs; (ii)
temporary differences DTAs; and (iii)
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions.
Finally, the proposed rule would amend
the methodology that determines the
amount of minority interest that is
includable in regulatory capital.
According to Call Report data as of June
30, 2017, 2,589 FDIC-supervised small
banking entities reported some amount
of acquisition, development or
construction loans, MSAs, DTAs,
deductions related to investments in
unconsolidated financial institutions, or
minority interests that could be affected
by this rule making.
HVADC
According to Call Report data as of
June 30, 2017, there were 2,338 FDICsupervised small banking entities that
reported approximately $14.4 billion of
acquisition, development or
construction loans excluding one- to
four-family residential projects (nonresidential ADC loans). Of these entities,
817 FDIC-supervised small banking
entities reported that approximately
$3.6 billion of these non-residential
ADC loans would meet the current
definition of an HVCRE exposure and
would qualify for the 150 percent risk
weight. We assume that the remainder
of the non-residential ADC loans
received a 100 percent risk weight as a
result of meeting one or more of the
currently available exemptions from the
current definition of HVCRE. These
exemptions relate to either the amount
of contributed capital or because the
exposure is an agricultural or farm loan,
community development loan, or
permanent financing. The FDIC is
unable to determine the mix of
exemptions from the HVCRE definition
that FDIC-supervised small banking
entities rely upon when assigning the
100 percent risk weight because of
limitations in the Call Report data.
Under the proposed rule some future
non-residential ADC loans made by a
small banking entity that are currently
reported as an HVCRE exposure may
receive a 100 percent risk weight or a
130 percent risk-weight treatment
instead of the 150 percent risk-weight
treatment under the current rule.
42 FDIC
Call Report, June 30, 2017.
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Concurrently, some future nonresidential ADC loans made by a small
banking entity may receive a 130
percent risk-weight treatment instead of
the 100 percent risk-weight treatment
under the contributed capital
exemption. These loans also may
continue to receive a 100 percent risk
weight if they qualify under other
exemptions of the proposed rule as an
agricultural or farm loan, community
development loan, a permanent loan as
that term is clarified in the proposal, or
a loan that is not ‘‘primarily’’ to finance
non-residential ADC as defined in the
proposal. As with the current rule, all
acquisition, development, or
construction loans related to one- to
four-family residential properties would
continue to receive a 100 percent risk
weight.
In the absence of Call Report
information about the eligibility of
current non-residential ADC loans for
the various proposed exemptions or
how the structure of future nonresidential ADC loans will compare to
current non-residential ADC loans, the
FDIC estimates the maximum amount of
capital that could be required under the
proposed rule if it were applied to FDICsupervised small banking entities’
current portfolio of non-residential ADC
loans (that is, ignoring the
grandfathering provision and assuming
FDIC-supervised small banking entities
make no adjustments to their loan
structures in response to the rule) and
assuming that no non-residential ADC
loans qualify for the exemptions as
agricultural or farm loans, community
development loans, or permanent loans,
or are excluded due to the ‘‘primarily
finances’’ test. Assuming that all
currently held acquisition,
development, or construction exposures
excluding one- to four-family exposures,
currently risk weighted at 100 percent
will be risk-weighted at 130 percent
(rather than remaining at 100 percent
under potentially available exemptions),
and that all HVCRE exposures risk
weighted at 150 percent will be risk
weighted at 130 percent (rather than 100
percent under potentially available
exemptions), the FDIC estimates that
there could be a maximum increase in
risk weighted assets of approximately
$2.6 billion, or less than one percent of
the aggregate risk weighted assets for the
2,338 FDIC-supervised small banking
entities. The FDIC believes that even
this relatively small change to aggregate
risk weighted assets is overstated
because it is likely that a significant
amount of small bank lending would
meet one or more of the qualifying
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exemptions.43 As such, the FDIC
believes that any change in capital
requirements under the proposed
HVADC treatment compared to the
current HVCRE treatment would be
modest.
Threshold Deductions
The proposed rule would change the
regulatory capital treatment of MSAs,
temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
FDIC-supervised small banking entities.
It does so by removing the individual
and aggregate deduction thresholds for
these assets and by adopting a single 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold for each type of
asset. According to June 30, 2017 Call
Report data, at least 1,618 FDICsupervised small banking entities
reported holding some MSAs, DTAs,
and deductions due to investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. Only 45 small institutions
reported deductions for holdings across
these different assets. The FDIC
estimates that the proposed rule would
pose an immediate aggregated net
benefit of $45.5 million in the form of
an increase in tier 1 capital to those
institutions that currently have to
calculate a deduction. The FDIC expects
that the proposed rule would yield
future benefits to affected FDICsupervised small banking entities by
reducing the likelihood of a regulatory
capital deduction due to holding these
asset types. In particular, the proposal
would remove a significant capital
constraint on FDIC-supervised small
banking entities that specialize in
mortgage servicing. The proposed
increase in threshold deduction makes
it less likely that a small banking entity
would exit or reduce its activity in the
mortgage servicing market.
Minority Interest
The proposed rule would remove the
capital rule’s limitation on the inclusion
of minority interest in regulatory
capital. It does so by allowing FDICsupervised small banking entities to
43 For example, for as of June 30, 2017 Call Report
data, for the 2,338 FDIC-supervised small banking
entities included in this analysis, approximately
24% of all non-ADC commercial real estate loans
were secured by Farmland and approximately 36%
were secured by Owner Occupied Nonfarm,
Nonresidential properties (a proxy in this analysis
for permanent loans as defined in the HVADC
definition). If the proportion of non-ADC lending
related to these exposure categories were to be
assumed consistent with the amount of nonresidential ADC lending to these exposure
categories, then as much as 60% of all nonresidential ADC loans would be excluded from the
definition of HVADC solely based upon the
agricultural and permanent loan exemptions alone.
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include minority interest up to 10
percent of the parent banking
organization’s common equity tier 1, tier
1, or total capital, not including the
minority interest. The FDIC estimates
that 16 FDIC-supervised small banking
entities would be affected by the
proposed inclusion of minority interest
in regulatory capital calculations. The
FDIC estimates that these FDICsupervised small banking entities will
likely experience a net aggregated
benefit of $2.5 million in the form of an
increase in tier 1 capital due to the
inclusion of minority interest. The FDIC
expects that the proposed rule would
yield future benefits for affected FDICsupervised small banking entities by
reducing the likelihood that minority
interest would not be included in a
small banking entity’s regulatory
capital.
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Compliance Costs
Finally, FDIC-supervised small
banking entities are likely to incur some
implementation costs in order to
comply with the proposed rule. These
costs would encompass changes to their
systems designed to calculate, manage,
and report risk-weighted assets and
regulatory capital. Given the limited
nature of the changes necessary to
comply with the proposed rule, the
implementation costs are expected to be
minimal. Additionally, the FDIC
believes that the proposed changes
would help reduce some of the
compliance costs associated with these
regulations in the long-term by making
them easier to apply.
The proposed rule does not impact
the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements that affect FDICsupervised small banking entities and
there would be no change to the
information that FDIC-supervised small
banking entities must track and report.
The FDIC anticipates updating the
relevant reporting forms at a later date
to the extent necessary to align with the
capital rule.
Question 1. For FDIC-supervised
small banking entities, would the
proposed rule reduce the compliance
costs associated with the capital rules?
If so, how?
Conclusion
The threshold-deduction and
minority-interest provisions of the
proposed rule would increase the
amount of eligible regulatory capital for
a limited number of FDIC-supervised
small banking entities currently subject
to deductions or limitations on these
items, as described above. The HVADC
provisions of the proposed rules would
affect far more FDIC-supervised small
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banking entities, with effects that will
vary across institutions and are difficult
to estimate. Risk weights for some new
ADC exposures will be reduced from
150 percent under the current HVCRE
treatment, to 130 percent or 100 percent
under the proposed rule if certain
exemptions apply. Risk weights for
other new ADC exposures will either
remain at the currently required 100
percent (if available exemptions apply)
or increase to 130 percent. However, the
Call Reports do not provide data about
the volumes of ADC loans currently
eligible for HVCRE exemptions for
agriculture, community development or
permanent financing, or that would be
eligible going forward under the
proposed clarification of the permanent
financing exemption or the proposed
‘‘primarily finances’’ test. As a result,
the net effect on regulatory capital
requirements of the proposed HVADC
treatment is difficult to estimate with
any precision. As noted earlier,
however, the FDIC’s upper bound
estimate (that ignores the grandfathering
provision and gives no credit for all the
HVADC exemptions previously
described) is that risk-weighted assets of
the FDIC-supervised small banking
entities affected by the rule would
increase less than one percent. This
upper bound estimate gives some
comfort that the actual regulatory
capital effects of the proposed HVADC
treatment are likely to be modest. The
FDIC welcomes comments or data from
the institutions it supervises that would
enhance our ability to more precisely
estimate the net effects of the proposed
rule on regulatory capital ratios.
The FDIC does not believe that the
proposed rule duplicates, overlaps, or
conflicts with any other Federal rules.
In addition, there does not appear to be
any significant alternatives to the
proposed rule other than retention of
the current rule. In light of the foregoing
discussion, the FDIC does not believe
that the proposed rule, if adopted in
final form, would have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Nonetheless,
the FDIC seeks comment on whether the
proposed rule would impose undue
burdens on, or have unintended
consequences for, small organizations,
and whether there are ways such
potential burdens or consequences
could be minimized in a manner
consistent with the purpose of the
proposed rule. A final regulatory
flexibility analysis will be conducted
after consideration of comments
received during the public comment
period.
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C. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act requires the Federal banking
agencies to use plain language in all
proposed and final rules published after
January 1, 2000. The agencies have
sought to present the proposed rule in
a simple and straightforward manner,
and invite comment on the use of plain
language. For example:
• Have the agencies organized the
material to suit your needs? If not, how
could they present the proposed rule
more clearly?
• Are the requirements in the
proposed rule clearly stated? If not, how
could the proposed rule be more clearly
stated?
• Do the regulations contain technical
language or jargon that is not clear? If
so, which language requires
clarification?
• Would a different format (grouping
and order of sections, use of headings,
paragraphing) make the regulation
easier to understand? If so, what
changes would achieve that?
• Would more, but shorter, sections
be better? If so, which sections should
be changed?
• What other changes can the
agencies incorporate to make the
regulation easier to understand?
D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 Determination
The OCC analyzed the proposed rule
under the factors set forth in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under this
analysis, the OCC considered whether
the proposed rule includes a Federal
mandate that may result in the
expenditure by State, local, and Tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
in any one year (adjusted for inflation).
The OCC has determined that this
proposed rule would not result in
expenditures by State, local, and Tribal
governments, or the private sector, of
$100 million or more in any one year.44
Accordingly, the OCC has not prepared
44 The OCC estimates that proposed rule would
lead to an aggregate increase in reported regulatory
capital of $4.7 billion for national banks and
Federal savings associations compared to the
amount they would report if they were required to
continue to apply the capital requirements. The
OCC estimates that this increase in reported
regulatory capital—which could allow banking
organizations to increase their leverage and thus
increase their tax deductions for interest paid on
debt—would have a total aggregate value of
approximately $112.8 million per year across all
directly impacted OCC-supervised entities (that is,
national banks and federal savings associations not
subject to the advanced approaches risk-based
capital rule).
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a written statement to accompany this
proposal.
PART 3—CAPITAL ADEQUACY
STANDARDS
E. Riegle Community Development and
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
Subpart A—General Provisions
The Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994 (RCDRIA) requires that each
Federal banking agency, in determining
the effective date and administrative
compliance requirements for new
regulations that impose additional
reporting, disclosure, or other
requirements on insured depository
institutions, consider, consistent with
principles of safety and soundness and
the public interest, any administrative
burdens that such regulations would
place on depository institutions,
including small depository institutions,
and customers of depository
institutions, as well as the benefits of
such regulations. In addition, new
regulations and amendments to
regulations that impose additional
reporting, disclosures, or other new
requirements on insured depository
institutions generally must take effect
on the first day of a calendar quarter
that begins on or after the date on which
the regulations are published in final
form.45
The agencies note that comment on
these matters has been solicited in other
sections of this SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section, and that the
requirements of RCDRIA will be
considered as part of the overall
rulemaking process. In addition, the
agencies also invite any other comments
that further will inform the agencies’
consideration of RCDRIA.
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 3
Administrative practice and
procedure, Capital, National banks,
Risk.
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12 CFR Part 324
Administrative practice and
procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital
adequacy, Savings associations, State
non-member banks.
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
For the reasons set out in the joint
preamble, the OCC proposes to amend
12 CFR part 3 as follows.
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2. Section 3.1 is amended by revising
paragraph (a) to read as follows:
■
§ 3.1 Purpose, applicability, reservation of
authority, and timing.
(a) Purpose. This part establishes
minimum capital requirements and
overall capital adequacy standards for
national banks and Federal savings
associations. This part does not apply to
Federal branches and agencies of foreign
banks. This part includes methodologies
for calculating minimum capital
requirements, public disclosure
requirements related to the capital
requirements, and transition provisions
for the application of this part.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 3. Section 3.2 is amended by revising
the definitions of ‘‘corporate exposure,’’
‘‘eligible guarantor,’’ ‘‘high volatility
commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure,’’ and ‘‘International Lending
Supervision Act,’’ ‘‘Investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ and ‘‘Significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution’’;
and adding in alphabetical order the
definitions of ‘‘high volatility
acquisition, development, or
construction (HVADC) exposure.’’ and
‘‘Nonsignificant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ to read as follows:
Definitions.
*
Administrative practice and
procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital,
Federal Reserve System, Holding
companies.
U.S.C. 4802.
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a,
1463, 1464, 1818, 1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n
note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).
§ 3.2
12 CFR Part 217
45 12
1. The authority citation for part 3
continues to read as follows:
■
*
*
*
*
Corporate exposure means an
exposure to a company that is not:
(1) An exposure to a sovereign, the
Bank for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, a multi-lateral
development bank (MDB), a depository
institution, a foreign bank, a credit
union, or a public sector entity (PSE);
(2) An exposure to a GSE;
(3) A residential mortgage exposure;
(4) A pre-sold construction loan;
(5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
(6) A high volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure or a high volatility commercial
real estate (HVCRE) exposure;
(7) A cleared transaction;
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(8) A default fund contribution;
(9) A securitization exposure;
(10) An equity exposure; or
(11) An unsettled transaction.
(12) A policy loan; or
(13) A separate account.
*
*
*
*
*
Eligible guarantor means:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for
International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan
Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European
Stability Mechanism, the European
Financial Stability Facility, a
multilateral development bank (MDB), a
depository institution, a bank holding
company, a savings and loan holding
company, a credit union, a foreign bank,
or a qualifying central counterparty; or
(2) An entity (other than a special
purpose entity):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is
issued or anytime thereafter, has issued
and outstanding an unsecured debt
security without credit enhancement
that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not
positively correlated with the credit risk
of the exposures for which it has
provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company
engaged predominately in the business
of providing credit protection (such as
a monoline bond insurer or re-insurer).
*
*
*
*
*
High volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure means a credit facility that is
originated on or after [effective date]
and that:
(1) Primarily finances or refinances
the:
(i) Acquisition of vacant or developed
land;
(ii) Development of land to prepare to
erect new structures including, but not
limited to, the laying of sewers or water
pipes and demolishing existing
structures; or
(iii) Construction of buildings,
dwellings, or other improvements
including additions or alterations to
existing structures; and
(2) Is not a credit facility that finances
or refinances:
(i) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(ii) Real property projects that would
have the primary purpose of
‘‘community development’’ as defined
under 12 CFR part 25 (national banks)
and 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings
associations); or
(iii) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, including, but not
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limited to, all land used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for commercial or
residential development; and
(3) Is not a permanent loan. A
permanent loan for purposes of this
definition means a prudently
underwritten loan that has a clearly
identified ongoing source of repayment
sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments aside
from the sale of the property. For
purposes of this section, a permanent
loan does not include a loan that
finances or refinances a stabilization
period or unsold lots or units of for-sale
projects.
High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure, for purposes of
Subpart D, means a credit facility that
is either outstanding or committed prior
to [effective date] and, prior to
conversion to permanent financing,
finances or has financed the acquisition,
development, or construction (ADC) of
real property, unless the facility
finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in
community development under 12
U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
as applicable, or as a ‘‘qualified
investment’’ under 12 CFR part 25
(national bank), 12 CFR part 195
(Federal savings association) and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity
described in 12 CFR 25.12(g)(3)
(national banks) and 12 CFR
195.12(g)(3) (Federal savings
associations), unless it is otherwise
described in paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or
(4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, which includes all
land known to be used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for non-agricultural
commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in
which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than
or equal to the applicable maximum
supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the
Board’s real estate lending standards at
12 CFR part 34, subpart D (national
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banks) and 12 CFR part 160, subparts A
and B (Federal savings associations);
(ii) The borrower has contributed
capital to the project in the form of cash
or unencumbered readily marketable
assets (or has paid development
expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15
percent of the real estate’s appraised ‘‘as
completed’’ value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the
amount of capital required by paragraph
(4)(ii) of this definition before the
Board-regulated institution advances
funds under the credit facility, and the
capital contributed by the borrower, or
internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the
project throughout the life of the project.
The life of a project concludes only
when the credit facility is converted to
permanent financing or is sold or paid
in full. Permanent financing may be
provided by the Board-regulated
institution that provided the ADC
facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the Boardregulated institution’s underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
*
*
*
*
*
International Lending Supervision Act
means the International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901
et seq.).
*
*
*
*
*
Investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
means a net long position calculated in
accordance with § 3.22(h) in an
instrument that is recognized as capital
for regulatory purposes by the primary
supervisor of an unconsolidated
regulated financial institution or is an
instrument that is part of the GAAP
equity of an unconsolidated unregulated
financial institution, including direct,
indirect, and synthetic exposures to
capital instruments, excluding
underwriting positions held by the
national bank or Federal savings
association for five or fewer business
days.
*
*
*
*
*
Non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution means an investment by an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution where the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association owns 10 percent or
less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
*
*
*
*
*
Significant investment in the capital
of an unconsolidated financial
institution means an investment by an
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advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution where the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association owns more than 10
percent of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 4. Section 3.10 is amended by revising
paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read as follows:
§ 3.10
Minimum capital requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) * * *
(H) The credit equivalent amount of
all off-balance sheet exposures of the
national bank or Federal savings
association, excluding repo-style
transactions, repurchase or reverse
repurchase or securities borrowing or
lending transactions that qualify for
sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and
derivative transactions, determined
using the applicable credit conversion
factor under § 3.33(b), provided,
however, that the minimum credit
conversion factor that may be assigned
to an off-balance sheet exposure under
this paragraph is 10 percent; and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 5. Section 3.11 is amended by revising
paragraphs (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i),
and Table 1 to read as follows:
§ 3.11 Capital conservation buffer and
countercyclical capital buffer amount.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Eligible retained income. The
eligible retained income of a national
bank or Federal savings association is
the national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s net income, calculated in
accordance with the instructions to the
Call Report, for the four calendar
quarters preceding the current calendar
quarter, net of any distributions and
associated tax effects not already
reflected in net income.
*
*
*
*
*
(iv) Private sector credit exposure.
Private sector credit exposure means an
exposure to a company or an individual
that is not an exposure to a sovereign,
the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European
Financial Stability Facility, the
International Monetary Fund, a MDB, a
PSE, or a GSE.
(3) Calculation of capital conservation
buffer. (i) A national bank’s or Federal
savings association’s capital
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conservation buffer is equal to the
lowest of the following ratios, calculated
as of the last day of the previous
calendar quarter:
(A) The national bank or Federal
savings association’s common equity
tier 1 capital ratio minus the national
bank or Federal savings association’s
minimum common equity tier 1 capital
ratio requirement under § 3.10;
(B) The national bank or Federal
savings association’s tier 1 capital ratio
minus the national bank or Federal
savings association’s minimum tier 1
capital ratio requirement under § 3.10;
and
50003
(C) The national bank or Federal
savings association’s total capital ratio
minus the national bank or Federal
savings association’s minimum total
capital ratio requirement under § 3.10;
or
*
*
*
*
*
TABLE 1 TO § 3.11—CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM PAYOUT AMOUNT
Capital conservation buffer
Maximum payout ratio
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount, and greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the national bank’s
or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount, and greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the national bank’s
or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount, and greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the national bank’s
or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
*
*
*
*
*
6. Section 3.20 is amended by revising
paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(1)(viii), (c)(2),
(d)(2), and (5) as follows:
■
§ 3.20 Capital components and eligibility
criteria for regulatory capital instruments.
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*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(4) Any common equity tier 1
minority interest, subject to the
limitations in § 3.21.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Any cash dividend payments on
the instrument are paid out of the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s net income or retained
earnings.
*
*
*
*
*
(2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to
the limitations in § 3.21, that is not
included in the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s common
equity tier 1 capital.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Total capital minority interest,
subject to the limitations set forth in
§ 3.21, that is not included in the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s tier 1 capital.
*
*
*
*
*
(5) For a national bank or Federal
savings association that makes an AOCI
opt-out election (as defined in
paragraph (b)(2) of § 3.22), 45 percent of
pretax net unrealized gains on availablefor-sale preferred stock classified as an
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equity security under GAAP and
available-for-sale equity exposures.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 7. Section 3.21 is revised to read as
follows:
§ 3.21
Minority interest.
(a) (1) Applicability. For purposes of
§ 3.20, a national bank or Federal
savings association that is not an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association is subject to
the minority interest limitations in this
paragraph (a) if a consolidated
subsidiary of the national bank or
Federal savings association has issued
regulatory capital that is not owned by
the national bank or Federal savings
association.
(2) Common equity tier 1 minority
interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank
or Federal savings association. The
amount of common equity tier 1
minority interest that a national bank or
Federal savings association may include
in common equity tier 1 capital must be
no greater than 10 percent of the sum of
all common equity tier 1 capital
elements of the national bank or Federal
savings association (not including the
common equity tier 1 minority interest
itself), less any common equity tier 1
capital regulatory adjustments and
deductions in accordance with § 3.22 (a)
and (b).
(3) Tier 1 minority interest includable
in the tier 1 capital of the national bank
or Federal savings association. The
amount of tier 1 minority interest that
a national bank or Federal savings
association may include in tier 1 capital
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No payout ratio limitation
applies.
60 percent.
40 percent.
20 percent.
0 percent.
must be no greater than 10 percent of
the sum of all tier 1 capital elements of
the national bank or Federal savings
association (not including the tier 1
minority interest itself), less any tier 1
capital regulatory adjustments and
deductions in accordance with § 3.22 (a)
and (b).
(4) Total capital minority interest
includable in the total capital of the
national bank or Federal savings
association. The amount of total capital
minority interest that a national bank or
Federal savings association may include
in total capital must be no greater than
10 percent of the sum of all total capital
elements of the national bank or Federal
savings association (not including the
total capital minority interest itself), less
any total capital regulatory adjustments
and deductions in accordance with
§ 3.22 (a) and (b).
(b) (1) Applicability. For purposes of
§ 3.20, an advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association is
subject to the minority interest
limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
(i) A consolidated subsidiary of the
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association has issued
regulatory capital that is not owned by
the national bank or Federal savings
association; and
(ii) For each relevant regulatory
capital ratio of the consolidated
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of
the subsidiary’s minimum regulatory
capital requirements plus its capital
conservation buffer.
(2) Difference in capital adequacy
standards at the subsidiary level. For
purposes of the minority interest
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calculations in this section, if the
consolidated subsidiary issuing the
capital is not subject to capital adequacy
standards similar to those of the
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, the
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association must
assume that the capital adequacy
standards of the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association apply to the subsidiary.
(3) Common equity tier 1 minority
interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank
or Federal savings association. For each
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association, the amount of
common equity tier 1 minority interest
the advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association may
include in common equity tier 1 capital
is equal to:
(i) The common equity tier 1 minority
interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
common equity tier 1 capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association, multiplied by the difference
between the common equity tier 1
capital of the subsidiary and the lower
of:
(A) The amount of common equity
tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold,
or would be required to hold pursuant
to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 3.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor; or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association that relate to the
subsidiary multiplied by
(2) The common equity tier 1 capital
ratio the subsidiary must maintain to
avoid restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 3.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
(4) Tier 1 minority interest includable
in the tier 1 capital of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association. For each
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association, the amount of tier 1
minority interest the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association may include in tier
1 capital is equal to:
(i) The tier 1 minority interest of the
subsidiary; minus
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(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
tier 1 capital that is not owned by the
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association multiplied
by the difference between the tier 1
capital of the subsidiary and the lower
of:
(A) The amount of tier 1 capital the
subsidiary must hold, or would be
required to hold pursuant to paragraph
(b) of this section, to avoid restrictions
on distributions and discretionary
bonus payments under § 3.11 or
equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary’s home country supervisor,
or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association that relate to the
subsidiary multiplied by
(2) The tier 1 capital ratio the
subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 3.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
(5) Total capital minority interest
includable in the total capital of the
national bank or Federal savings
association. For each consolidated
subsidiary of the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association, the amount of total capital
minority interest the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association may include in total
capital is equal to:
(i) The total capital minority interest
of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
total capital that is not owned by the
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association multiplied
by the difference between the total
capital of the subsidiary and the lower
of:
(A) The amount of total capital the
subsidiary must hold, or would be
required to hold pursuant to paragraph
(b) of this section, to avoid restrictions
on distributions and discretionary
bonus payments under § 3.11 or
equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary’s home country supervisor,
or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association that relate to the
subsidiary multiplied by
(2) The total capital ratio the
subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 3.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
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8. Section 3.22 is amended by revising
paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d), (g), and (h) to
read as follows:
■
§ 3.22 Regulatory capital adjustments and
deductions.
(a) * * *
(1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated
deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section; and
(ii) For an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association, goodwill that is embedded
in the valuation of a significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution in
the form of common stock (and that is
reflected in the consolidated financial
statements of the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association), in accordance with
paragraph (d) of this section;
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Deductions from regulatory capital
related to investments in capital
instruments 23—
(1) Investment in the national bank’s
or Federal savings association’s own
capital instruments. A national bank or
Federal savings association must deduct
an investment in the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s own
capital instruments as follows:
(i) A national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct an investment
in the national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own common stock
instruments from its common equity tier
1 capital elements to the extent such
instruments are not excluded from
regulatory capital under § 3.20(b)(1);
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct an investment
in the national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own additional tier 1
capital instruments from its additional
tier 1 capital elements; and
(iii) A national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct an
investment in the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s own tier 2
capital instruments from its tier 2
capital elements.
(2) Corresponding deduction
approach. For purposes of subpart C of
this part, the corresponding deduction
approach is the methodology used for
the deductions from regulatory capital
related to reciprocal cross holdings (as
described in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section), investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
a national bank or Federal savings
23 The national bank or Federal savings
association must calculate amounts deducted under
paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it
calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2
capital under § 3.20(d)(3).
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association that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association (as described in
paragraph (c)(4) of this section), nonsignificant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association (as
described in paragraph (c)(5) of this
section), and non-common stock
significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association (as
described in paragraph (c)(6) of this
section). Under the corresponding
deduction approach, a national bank or
Federal savings association must make
deductions from the component of
capital for which the underlying
instrument would qualify if it were
issued by the national bank or Federal
savings association itself, as described
in paragraphs (c)(2)(i)–(iii) of this
section. If the national bank or Federal
savings association does not have a
sufficient amount of a specific
component of capital to effect the
required deduction, the shortfall must
be deducted according to paragraph (f)
of this section.
(i) If an investment is in the form of
an instrument issued by a financial
institution that is not a regulated
financial institution, the national bank
or Federal savings association must treat
the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital
instrument if it is common stock or
represents the most subordinated claim
in liquidation of the financial
institution; and
(B) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if it is subordinated to all
creditors of the financial institution and
is senior in liquidation only to common
shareholders.
(ii) If an investment is in the form of
an instrument issued by a regulated
financial institution and the instrument
does not meet the criteria for common
equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2
capital instruments under § 3.20, the
national bank or Federal savings
association must treat the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital
instrument if it is common stock
included in GAAP equity or represents
the most subordinated claim in
liquidation of the financial institution;
(B) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if it is included in GAAP
equity, subordinated to all creditors of
the financial institution, and senior in a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding only to common
shareholders; and
(C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is
not included in GAAP equity but
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considered regulatory capital by the
primary supervisor of the financial
institution.
(iii) If an investment is in the form of
a non-qualifying capital instrument (as
defined in § 3.300(c)), the national bank
or Federal savings association must treat
the instrument as:
(A) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if such instrument was
included in the issuer’s tier 1 capital
prior to May 19, 2010; or
(B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such
instrument was included in the issuer’s
tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier
1 capital) prior to May 19, 2010.
(3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the
capital of financial institutions. A
national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct investments in
the capital of other financial institutions
it holds reciprocally, where such
reciprocal cross holdings result from a
formal or informal arrangement to swap,
exchange, or otherwise intend to hold
each other’s capital instruments, by
applying the corresponding deduction
approach.
(4) Investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions. A
national bank or Federal savings
association that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct its
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions (as
defined in § 3.2) that exceed 25 percent
of the sum of the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s common
equity tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to
common equity tier 1 capital elements
required under paragraphs (a) through
(c)(3) of this section by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.24
The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, a national bank or Federal
savings association that underwrites a
failed underwriting, with the prior
written approval of the OCC, for the
period of time stipulated by the OCC, is
not required to deduct an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution pursuant to this
paragraph (c) to the extent the
24 With the prior written approval of the OCC, for
the period of time stipulated by the OCC, a national
bank or Federal savings association that is not an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association is not required to deduct an
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution pursuant to this paragraph if
the financial institution is in distress and if such
investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution, as
determined by the OCC.
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50005
investment is related to the failed
underwriting.25
(5) Non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. (i) An advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct its nonsignificant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions (as
defined in § 3.2) that, in the aggregate,
exceed 10 percent of the sum of the
advanced approaches national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s common
equity tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to
common equity tier 1 capital elements
required under paragraphs (a) through
(c)(3) of this section (the 10 percent
threshold for non-significant
investments) by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.26
The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association that underwrites a failed
underwriting, with the prior written
approval of the OCC, for the period of
time stipulated by the OCC, is not
required to deduct a non-significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the
extent the investment is related to the
failed underwriting.27
(ii) The amount to be deducted under
this section from a specific capital
component is equal to:
(A) The advanced approaches
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s non-significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
exceeding the 10 percent threshold for
non-significant investments, multiplied
by
(B) The ratio of the advanced
approaches national bank’s or Federal
25 Any investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not
exceed the 25 percent threshold for investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
under this section must be assigned the appropriate
risk weight under subparts D or F of this part, as
applicable.
26 With the prior written approval of the OCC, for
the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association is not required to deduct a nonsignificant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to
this paragraph if the financial institution is in
distress and if such investment is made for the
purpose of providing financial support to the
financial institution, as determined by the OCC.
27 Any non-significant investments in the capital
of unconsolidated financial institutions that do not
exceed the 10 percent threshold for non-significant
investments under this section must be assigned the
appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or F
of this part, as applicable.
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savings association’s non-significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of such capital component to
the advanced approaches national
bank’s or Federal savings association’s
total non-significant investments in
unconsolidated financial institutions.
(6) Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of
common stock. An advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct its
significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
that are not in the form of common
stock by applying the corresponding
deduction approach.28 The deductions
described in this section are net of
associated DTLs in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, with the prior written
approval of the OCC, for the period of
time stipulated by the OCC, an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association that
underwrites a failed underwriting is not
required to deduct a significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such
investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
(d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
thresholds.
(1) A national bank or Federal savings
association that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association must make
deductions from regulatory capital as
described in this paragraph (d)(1).
(i) The national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the amount of each of the items set forth
in this paragraph (d)(1) that,
individually, exceeds 25 percent of the
sum of the national bank’s or Federal
savings association’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs
(a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold).29
28 With prior written approval of the OCC, for the
period of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings
association is not required to deduct a significant
investment in the capital instrument of an
unconsolidated financial institution in distress
which is not in the form of common stock pursuant
to this section if such investment is made for the
purpose of providing financial support to the
financial institution as determined by the OCC.
29 The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of
this section that is not deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital must be included in the risk-
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(ii) The national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the amount of DTAs arising from
temporary differences that the national
bank or Federal savings association
could not realize through net operating
loss carrybacks, net of any related
valuation allowances and net of DTLs,
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section. A national bank or Federal
savings association is not required to
deduct from the sum of its common
equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net
of any related valuation allowances and
net of DTLs, in accordance with
§ 3.22(e)) arising from timing differences
that the national bank or Federal savings
association could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks. The national
bank or Federal savings association
must risk weight these assets at 100
percent. For a national bank or Federal
savings association that is a member of
a consolidated group for tax purposes,
the amount of DTAs that could be
realized through net operating loss
carrybacks may not exceed the amount
that the national bank or Federal savings
association could reasonably expect to
have refunded by its parent holding
company.
(iii) The national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the amount of MSAs net of associated
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this section.
(iv) For purposes of calculating the
amount of DTAs subject to deduction
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this
section, a national bank or Federal
savings association may exclude DTAs
and DTLs relating to adjustments made
to common equity tier 1 capital under
paragraph (b) of this section. A national
bank or Federal savings association that
elects to exclude DTAs relating to
adjustments under paragraph (b) of this
section also must exclude DTLs and
must do so consistently in all future
calculations. A national bank or Federal
savings association may change its
exclusion preference only after
obtaining the prior approval of the OCC.
(2) An advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association
must make deductions from regulatory
capital as described in this paragraph
(d)(2).
(i) An advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the amount of each of
the items set forth in this paragraph
weighted assets of the national bank or Federal
savings association and assigned a 250 percent risk
weight.
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(d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10
percent of the sum of the advanced
approaches national bank’s or Federal
savings association’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs
(a) through (c) of this section (the 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold).
(A) DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association could not realize
through net operating loss carrybacks,
net of any related valuation allowances
and net of DTLs, in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. An
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association is not
required to deduct from the sum of its
common equity tier 1 capital elements
DTAs (net of any related valuation
allowances and net of DTLs, in
accordance with § 3.22(e)) arising from
timing differences that the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association could realize
through net operating loss carrybacks.
The advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association must risk
weight these assets at 100 percent. For
a national bank or Federal savings
association that is a member of a
consolidated group for tax purposes, the
amount of DTAs that could be realized
through net operating loss carrybacks
may not exceed the amount that the
national bank or Federal savings
association could reasonably expect to
have refunded by its parent holding
company.
(B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section.
(C) Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock, net of associated DTLs in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section.30 Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock subject to the 10 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold
may be reduced by any goodwill
embedded in the valuation of such
investments deducted by the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association pursuant to
30 With the prior written approval of the OCC, for
the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association is not required to deduct a
significant investment in the capital instrument of
an unconsolidated financial institution in distress
in the form of common stock pursuant to this
section if such investment is made for the purpose
of providing financial support to the financial
institution as determined by the OCC.
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paragraph (a)(1) of this section. In
addition, with the prior written
approval of the OCC, for the period of
time stipulated by the OCC, an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association that
underwrites a failed underwriting is not
required to deduct a significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution in
the form of common stock pursuant to
this paragraph (d)(2) if such investment
is related to such failed underwriting.
(ii) An advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the items listed in
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that
are not deducted as a result of the
application of the 10 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed
17.65 percent of the sum of the
advanced approaches national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s common
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus
adjustments to and deductions from
common equity tier 1 capital required
under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
section, minus the items listed in
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold). Any goodwill that
has been deducted under paragraph
(a)(1) of this section can be excluded
from the significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock.31
(iii) For purposes of calculating the
amount of DTAs subject to the 10 and
15 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds, an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association may exclude DTAs
and DTLs relating to adjustments made
to common equity tier 1 capital under
paragraph (b) of this section. An
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association that elects to
exclude DTAs relating to adjustments
under paragraph (b) of this section also
must exclude DTLs and must do so
consistently in all future calculations.
An advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association may
change its exclusion preference only
after obtaining the prior approval of the
OCC.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Treatment of assets that are
deducted. A national bank or Federal
31 The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of
this section that is not deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital pursuant to this section must
be included in the risk-weighted assets of the
advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association and assigned a 250 percent risk
weight.
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savings association must exclude from
standardized total risk-weighted assets
and, as applicable, advanced
approaches total risk-weighted assets
any item that is required to be deducted
from regulatory capital.
(h) Net long position. (1) For purposes
of calculating an investment in the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own capital instrument
and an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
under this section, the net long position
is the gross long position in the
underlying instrument determined in
accordance with paragraph (h)(2) of this
section, as adjusted to recognize a short
position in the same instrument
calculated in accordance with paragraph
(h)(3) of this section.
(2) Gross long position. The gross long
position is determined as follows:
(i) For an equity exposure that is held
directly, the adjusted carrying value as
that term is defined in § 3.51(b);
(ii) For an exposure that is held
directly and is not an equity exposure
or a securitization exposure, the
exposure amount as that term is defined
in § 3.2;
(iii) For an indirect exposure, the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s carrying value of the
investment in the investment fund,
provided that, alternatively:
(A) A national bank or Federal savings
association may, with the prior approval
of the Board, use a conservative estimate
of the amount of its investment in the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own capital instruments or
its investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
held through a position in an index; or
(B) A national bank or Federal savings
association may calculate the gross long
position for investments in the national
bank’s or Federal savings association’s
own capital instruments or investments
in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution by multiplying the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s carrying value of its
investment in the investment fund by
either:
(1) The highest stated investment
limit (in percent) for investments in the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own capital instruments or
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions as
stated in the prospectus, partnership
agreement, or similar contract defining
permissible investments of the
investment fund; or
(2) The investment fund’s actual
holdings of investments in the national
bank’s or Federal savings association’s
own capital instruments or investments
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50007
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions.
(iv) For a synthetic exposure, the
amount of the national bank’s or Federal
savings association’s loss on the
exposure if the reference capital
instrument were to have a value of zero.
(3) Adjustments to reflect a short
position. In order to adjust the gross
long position to recognize a short
position in the same instrument, the
following criteria must be met:
(i) The maturity of the short position
must match the maturity of the long
position, or the short position has a
residual maturity of at least one year
(maturity requirement); or
(ii) For a position that is a trading
asset or trading liability (whether on- or
off-balance sheet) as reported on the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association ’s Call Report, if the national
bank or Federal savings association has
a contractual right or obligation to sell
the long position at a specific point in
time and the counterparty to the
contract has an obligation to purchase
the long position if the national bank or
Federal savings association exercises its
right to sell, this point in time may be
treated as the maturity of the long
position such that the maturity of the
long position and short position are
deemed to match for purposes of the
maturity requirement, even if the
maturity of the short position is less
than one year; and
(iii) For an investment in the national
bank’s or Federal savings association’s
own capital instrument under paragraph
(c)(1) of this section or an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution under paragraphs
(c) and (d):
(A) A national bank or Federal savings
association may only net a short
position against a long position in an
investment in the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s own
capital instrument under paragraph (c)
of this section if the short position
involves no counterparty credit risk.
(B) A gross long position in an
investment in the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s own
capital instrument or an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution resulting from a
position in an index may be netted
against a short position in the same
index. Long and short positions in the
same index without maturity dates are
considered to have matching maturities.
(C) A short position in an index that
is hedging a long cash or synthetic
position in an investment in the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own capital instrument or
an investment in the capital of an
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unconsolidated financial institution can
be decomposed to provide recognition
of the hedge. More specifically, the
portion of the index that is composed of
the same underlying instrument that is
being hedged may be used to offset the
long position if both the long position
being hedged and the short position in
the index are reported as a trading asset
or trading liability (whether on- or offbalance sheet) on the national bank’s or
Federal savings association’s Call
Report, and the hedge is deemed
effective by the national bank’s or
Federal savings association ’s internal
control processes, which have not been
found to be inadequate by the OCC.
■ 9. Section 3.32 is amended by revising
paragraphs (b), (d)(2), (d)(3)(ii), (j), (k),
(l) to read as follows:
§ 3.32
General risk weights.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Certain supranational entities and
multilateral development banks (MDBs).
A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a zero percent
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank
for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i)
Except as otherwise provided under
paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3)
of this section, a national bank or
Federal savings association must assign
a risk weight to an exposure to a foreign
bank, in accordance with Table 2 to
§ 3.32, based on the CRC that
corresponds to the foreign bank’s home
country or the OECD membership status
of the foreign bank’s home country if
there is no CRC applicable to the foreign
bank’s home country.
TABLE 2 TO § 3.32—RISK WEIGHTS
FOR EXPOSURES TO FOREIGN BANKS
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Risk weight
(in percent)
CRC:
0–1 ....................................
2 ........................................
3 ........................................
4–7 ....................................
OECD Member with No CRC
Non-OECD Member with No
CRC ..................................
Sovereign Default .................
20
50
100
150
20
100
150
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 20 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank
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whose home country is a member of the
OECD and does not have a CRC.
(iii) A national bank or Federal
savings association must assign a 20
percent risk-weight to an exposure that
is a self-liquidating, trade-related
contingent item that arises from the
movement of goods and that has a
maturity of three months or less to a
foreign bank whose home country has a
CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD
member with no CRC.
(iv) A national bank or Federal
savings association must assign a 100
percent risk weight to an exposure to a
foreign bank whose home country is not
a member of the OECD and does not
have a CRC, with the exception of selfliquidating, trade-related contingent
items that arise from the movement of
goods, and that have a maturity of three
months or less, which may be assigned
a 20 percent risk weight.
(v) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 150 percent
risk weight to an exposure to a foreign
bank immediately upon determining
that an event of sovereign default has
occurred in the bank’s home country, or
if an event of sovereign default has
occurred in the foreign bank’s home
country during the previous five years.
(3) * * *
(ii) A significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock
pursuant to § 3.22(d)(2)(1)(c);
*
*
*
*
*
(j)(1) High volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposures. A national bank or Federal
savings association must assign a 130
percent risk weight to an HVADC
exposure.
(2) High-volatility commercial real
estate (HVCRE) exposures. A national
bank or Federal savings association
must assign a 150 percent risk weight to
an HVCRE exposure.
(k) Past due exposures. Except for an
exposure to a sovereign entity or a
residential mortgage exposure or a
policy loan, if an exposure is 90 days or
more past due or on nonaccrual:
(1) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 150 percent
risk weight to the portion of the
exposure that is not guaranteed or that
is unsecured;
(2) A national bank or Federal savings
association may assign a risk weight to
the guaranteed portion of a past due
exposure based on the risk weight that
applies under § 3.36 if the guarantee or
credit derivative meets the requirements
of that section; and
(3) A national bank or Federal savings
association may assign a risk weight to
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the collateralized portion of a past due
exposure based on the risk weight that
applies under § 3.37 if the collateral
meets the requirements of that section.
(l) Other assets. (1)(i) A national bank
or Federal savings association must
assign a zero percent risk weight to cash
owned and held in all offices of
subsidiary depository institutions or in
transit, and to gold bullion held in a
subsidiary depository institution’s own
vaults, or held in another depository
institution’s vaults on an allocated
basis, to the extent the gold bullion
assets are offset by gold bullion
liabilities.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a zero percent
risk weight to cash owned and held in
all offices of the national bank or
Federal savings association or in transit;
to gold bullion held in the national
bank’s or Federal savings association’s
own vaults or held in another
depository institution’s vaults on an
allocated basis, to the extent the gold
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion
liabilities; and to exposures that arise
from the settlement of cash transactions
(such as equities, fixed income, spot
foreign exchange and spot commodities)
with a central counterparty where there
is no assumption of ongoing
counterparty credit risk by the central
counterparty after settlement of the
trade and associated default fund
contributions.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 20 percent risk
weight to cash items in the process of
collection.
(3) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 100 percent
risk weight to DTAs arising from
temporary differences that the national
bank or Federal savings association
could realize through net operating loss
carrybacks.
(4) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 250 percent
risk weight to the portion of each of the
following items to the extent it is not
deducted from common equity tier 1
capital pursuant to § 3.22(d):
(i) MSAs; and
(ii) DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the national bank or
Federal savings association could not
realize through net operating loss
carrybacks.
(5) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a 100 percent
risk weight to all assets not specifically
assigned a different risk weight under
this subpart and that are not deducted
from tier 1 or tier 2 capital pursuant to
§ 3.22.
(6) Notwithstanding the requirements
of this section, a national bank or
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Federal savings association may assign
an asset that is not included in one of
the categories provided in this section to
the risk weight category applicable
under the capital rules applicable to
bank holding companies and savings
and loan holding companies at 12 CFR
part 217, provided that all of the
following conditions apply:
(i) The national bank or Federal
savings association is not authorized to
hold the asset under applicable law
other than debt previously contracted or
similar authority; and
(ii) The risks associated with the asset
are substantially similar to the risks of
assets that are otherwise assigned to a
risk weight category of less than 100
percent under this subpart.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 10. Section 3.34 is amended by
revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 3.34
OTC derivative contracts.
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(c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC
credit derivatives. (1) Protection
purchasers. A national bank or Federal
savings association that purchases an
OTC credit derivative that is recognized
under § 3.36 as a credit risk mitigant for
an exposure that is not a covered
position under subpart F is not required
to compute a separate counterparty
credit risk capital requirement under
this subpart D provided that the
national bank or Federal savings
association does so consistently for all
such credit derivatives. The national
bank or Federal savings association
must either include all or exclude all
such credit derivatives that are subject
to a qualifying master netting agreement
from any measure used to determine
counterparty credit risk exposure to all
relevant counterparties for risk-based
capital purposes.
(2) Protection providers. (i) A national
bank or Federal savings association that
is the protection provider under an OTC
credit derivative must treat the OTC
credit derivative as an exposure to the
underlying reference asset. The national
bank or Federal savings association is
not required to compute a counterparty
credit risk capital requirement for the
OTC credit derivative under this subpart
D, provided that this treatment is
applied consistently for all such OTC
credit derivatives. The national bank or
Federal savings association must either
include all or exclude all such OTC
credit derivatives that are subject to a
qualifying master netting agreement
from any measure used to determine
counterparty credit risk exposure.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph
(c)(2) apply to all relevant
counterparties for risk-based capital
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purposes unless the national bank or
Federal savings association is treating
the OTC credit derivative as a covered
position under subpart F, in which case
the national bank or Federal savings
association must compute a
supplemental counterparty credit risk
capital requirement under this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 11. Section 3.35 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii), (b)(4)(ii),
(c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
§ 3.35
Cleared transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member client national bank or Federal
savings association must apply the risk
weight appropriate for the CCP
according to this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member client national
bank or Federal savings association
must calculate a risk-weighted asset
amount for any collateral provided to a
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in
connection with a cleared transaction in
accordance with the requirements under
this subpart D.
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member national bank or Federal
savings association must apply the risk
weight appropriate for the CCP
according to this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member national bank
or Federal savings association must
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount
for any collateral provided to a CCP,
clearing member, or a custodian in
connection with a cleared transaction in
accordance with requirements under
this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 12. Section 3.36 is amend by revising
paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 3.36 Guarantees and credit derivatives:
Substitution treatment.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Substitution approach—(1) Full
coverage. If an eligible guarantee or
eligible credit derivative meets the
conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this section and the protection amount
(P) of the guarantee or credit derivative
is greater than or equal to the exposure
amount of the hedged exposure, a
national bank or Federal savings
association may recognize the guarantee
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50009
or credit derivative in determining the
risk-weighted asset amount for the
hedged exposure by substituting the risk
weight applicable to the guarantor or
credit derivative protection provider
under this subpart D for the risk weight
assigned to the exposure.
(2) Partial coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative
meets the conditions in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section and the protection
amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the exposure
amount of the hedged exposure, the
national bank or Federal savings
association must treat the hedged
exposure as two separate exposures
(protected and unprotected) in order to
recognize the credit risk mitigation
benefit of the guarantee or credit
derivative.
(i) The national bank or Federal
savings association may calculate the
risk-weighted asset amount for the
protected exposure under this subpart
D, where the applicable risk weight is
the risk weight applicable to the
guarantor or credit derivative protection
provider.
(ii) The national bank or Federal
savings association must calculate the
risk-weighted asset amount for the
unprotected exposure under this
subpart D, where the applicable risk
weight is that of the unprotected portion
of the hedged exposure.
(iii) The treatment provided in this
section is applicable when the credit
risk of an exposure is covered on a
partial pro rata basis and may be
applicable when an adjustment is made
to the effective notional amount of the
guarantee or credit derivative under
paragraphs (d), (e), or (f) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 13. Section 3.37 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) and the
paragraph headings for paragraphs (b)
and (b)(2) are being reprinted for reader
reference to read as follows:
§ 3.37
Collateralized transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) The simple approach. * * *
(2) Risk weight substitution. (i) A
national bank or Federal savings
association may apply a risk weight to
the portion of an exposure that is
secured by the fair value of financial
collateral (that meets the requirements
of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based
on the risk weight assigned to the
collateral under this subpart D. For
repurchase agreements, reverse
repurchase agreements, and securities
lending and borrowing transactions, the
collateral is the instruments, gold, and
cash the national bank or Federal
savings association has borrowed,
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purchased subject to resale, or taken as
collateral from the counterparty under
the transaction. Except as provided in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk
weight assigned to the collateralized
portion of the exposure may not be less
than 20 percent.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 14. Section 3.38 is amended by
revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 3.38
Unsettled transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(2) From the business day after the
national bank or Federal savings
association has made its delivery until
five business days after the counterparty
delivery is due, the national bank or
Federal savings association must
calculate the risk-weighted asset amount
for the transaction by treating the
current fair value of the deliverables
owed to the national bank or Federal
savings association as an exposure to
the counterparty and using the
applicable counterparty risk weight
under this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 15. Section 3.42 is amended by
revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read as
follows:
§ 3.42 Risk-weighted assets for
securitization exposures.
*
*
*
*
*
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) If the national bank or Federal
savings association purchases credit
protection from a counterparty that is
not a securitization SPE, the national
bank or Federal savings association
must determine the risk weight for the
exposure according to this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
16. Section 3.52 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to read
as follows:
■
§ 3.52 Simple risk-weight approach
(SRWA).
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity
exposures. An equity exposure to a
sovereign, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, an
MDB, and any other entity whose credit
exposures receive a zero percent risk
weight under § 3.32 may be assigned a
zero percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity
exposures. Significant investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock that are not deducted from capital
pursuant to § 3.22(d)(2) are assigned a
250 percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 17. Section 3.61 is amended to read as
follows:
§ 3.61
Purpose and scope.
Sections 3.61 through 3.63 of this
subpart establish public disclosure
requirements related to the capital
requirements described in subpart B of
this part for a national bank or Federal
savings association with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or
more as reported on the national bank’s
or Federal savings association’s most
recent year-end Call Report that is not
an advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association making
public disclosures pursuant to § 3.172.
An advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association that has
not received approval from the OCC to
exit parallel run pursuant to § 3.121(d)
is subject to the disclosure requirements
described in §§ 3.62 and 3.63. A
national bank or Federal savings
association with total consolidated
assets of $50 billion or more as reported
on the national bank’s or Federal
savings association’s most recent yearend Call Report that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association making public
disclosures subject to § 3.172 must
comply with § 3.62 unless it is a
consolidated subsidiary of a bank
holding company, savings and loan
holding company, or depository
institution that is subject to the
disclosure requirements of § 3.62 or a
subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking
organization that is subject to
comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction.
For purposes of this section, total
consolidated assets are determined
based on the average of the national
bank’s or Federal savings association ’s
total consolidated assets in the four
most recent quarters as reported on the
Call Report or the average of the
national bank or Federal savings
association’s total consolidated assets in
the most recent consecutive quarters as
reported quarterly on the national
bank’s or Federal savings association ’s
Call Report if the national bank or
Federal savings association has not filed
such a report for each of the most recent
four quarters.
■ 18. Section 3.63 is amended by
revising Table 3 and Table 8 to read as
follows:
§ 3.63 Disclosures by national bank or
Federal savings associations described in
§ 3.61.
*
*
*
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*
TABLE 3 TO § 3.63—CAPITAL ADEQUACY
Qualitative disclosures ................
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(a) A summary discussion of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s approach to assessing the
adequacy of its capital to support current and future activities.
(b) Risk-weighted assets for:
(1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
(2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and MDBs;
(3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign banks, and credit unions;
(4) Exposures to PSEs;
(5) Corporate exposures;
(6) Residential mortgage exposures;
(7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold construction loans;
(8) HVADC exposures and HVCRE exposures;
(9) Past due loans;
(10) Other assets;
(11) Cleared transactions;
(12) Default fund contributions;
(13) Unsettled transactions;
(14) Securitization exposures; and
(15) Equity exposures.
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as calculated under subpart F of this part.
(d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios:
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TABLE 3 TO § 3.63—CAPITAL ADEQUACY—Continued
(1) For the top consolidated group; and
(2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
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TABLE 8 TO § 3.63—SECURITIZATION
Qualitative Disclosures ................
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(a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with respect to a securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion of:
(1) The national bank’s or Federal savings association ’s objectives for securitizing assets, including the
extent to which these activities transfer credit risk of the underlying exposures away from the national
bank or Federal savings association to other entities and including the type of risks assumed and retained with resecuritization activity; 1
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk) inherent in the securitized assets;
(3) The roles played by the national bank or Federal savings association in the securitization process 2
and an indication of the extent of the national bank’s or Federal savings association ’s involvement in
each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the credit and market risk of securitization exposures
including how those processes differ for resecuritization exposures;
(5) The national bank’s or Federal savings association’s policy for mitigating the credit risk retained
through securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches that the national bank or Federal savings association follows for
its securitization exposures including the type of securitization exposure to which each approach applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs that the national bank or Federal savings association, as sponsor,
uses to securitize third-party exposures. The national bank or Federal savings association must indicate whether it has exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the national bank or Federal savings association manages or advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the securitization exposures that the national bank or Federal savings association has securitized or in securitization SPEs that the national bank or Federal savings association
sponsors.3
(c) Summary of the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s accounting policies for securitization activities, including:
(1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing retained or purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the previous period for valuing retained interests and
impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be securitized are valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
D of this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the balance sheet for arrangements that could require the national bank or Federal savings association to provide financial support for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes to any quantitative information since the last reporting period.
(e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the national bank or Federal savings association in
securitizations that meet the operational criteria provided in § 3.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic securitizations), by exposure type, separately for securitizations of third-party exposures for which
the bank acts only as sponsor.4
(f) For exposures securitized by the national bank or Federal savings association in securitizations that meet
the operational criteria in § 3.41:
(1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/past due categorized by exposure type; 5 and
(2) Losses recognized by the national bank or Federal savings association during the current period categorized by exposure type.6
(g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures retained or purchased categorized by exposure type; and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures categorized by exposure type.
(i)(1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures retained or purchased and the associated capital requirements for these exposures, categorized between securitization and resecuritization exposures, further categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
and
(2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of underlying exposure in the pool of any:
(i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that has been deducted from common equity tier 1 capital;
and
(ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
(j) Summary of current year’s securitization activity, including the amount of exposures securitized (by exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by exposure type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures retained or purchased categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is applied and those not applied; and
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TABLE 8 TO § 3.63—SECURITIZATION—Continued
(2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
name.
1 The national bank or Federal savings association should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates; this description
should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the national bank or Federal savings association is active.
2 For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement, sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
3 Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and personal and private trusts, to be noted
collectively.
4 ‘‘Exposures securitized’’ include underlying exposures originated by the national bank or Federal savings association, whether generated by
them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party exposures included in sponsored transactions.
Securitization transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s balance sheet and
underlying exposures acquired by the national bank or Federal savings association from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does
not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception. National banks and Federal savings associations are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge under this part.
5 Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
6 For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the national bank’s or Federal savings association’s balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the national bank or Federal savings association with respect to securitized assets.
*
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*
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*
19. Section 3.101 is amended by
adding to paragraph (b) in alphabetical
order the definition of ‘‘High volatility
commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure’’ to read as follows:
■
§ 3.101
Definitions.
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(b) * * *
High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure, for purposes of
Subpart E, means a credit facility that,
prior to conversion to permanent
financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or
construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in
community development under 12
U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
as applicable, or as a ‘‘qualified
investment’’ under 12 CFR part 25
(national banks) and 195 (Federal
savings associations), and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity
described in 12 CFR 25.12(g)(3)
(national banks) and 12 CFR
195.12(g)(3) (Federal savings
associations), unless it is otherwise
described in paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or
(4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, which includes all
land known to be used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for non-agricultural
commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in
which:
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(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than
or equal to the applicable maximum
supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the
OCC’s real estate lending standards at
12 CFR part 34, subpart D (national
banks) and 12 CFR part 160 (Federal
savings associations);
(ii) The borrower has contributed
capital to the project in the form of cash
or unencumbered readily marketable
assets (or has paid development
expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15
percent of the real estate’s appraised ‘‘as
completed’’ value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the
amount of capital required by paragraph
(4)(ii) of this definition before the
national bank or Federal savings
association advances funds under the
credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or
internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the
project throughout the life of the project.
The life of a project concludes only
when the credit facility is converted to
permanent financing or is sold or paid
in full. Permanent financing may be
provided by the national bank or
Federal savings association that
provided the ADC facility as long as the
permanent financing is subject to the
national bank’s or Federal savings
association ’s underwriting criteria for
long-term mortgage loans.
*
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*
*
■ 20. Section 3.131 is amended by
revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 3.131 Mechanics for calculating total
wholesale and retail risk-weighted assets.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD
for each wholesale obligor or retail
segment may not be less than 0.03
percent, except for exposures to or
directly and unconditionally guaranteed
by a sovereign entity, the Bank for
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International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Commission, the European
Central Bank, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or a multilateral
development bank, to which the
national bank or Federal savings
association assigns a rating grade
associated with a PD of less than 0.03
percent.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 21. Section 3.133 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:
§ 3.133
Cleared transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Clearing member client national
banks or Federal savings associations
*
*
*
*
*
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member client national bank or Federal
savings association must apply the risk
weight applicable to the CCP under
subpart D of this part.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member national bank or Federal
savings association must apply the risk
weight applicable to the CCP according
to subpart D of this part.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 22. Section 3.152 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to read
as follows:
§ 3.152 Simple risk weight approach
(SRWA).
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity
exposures. A publicly traded equity
exposure (other than an equity exposure
described in paragraph (b)(7) of this
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section and including the ineffective
portion of a hedge pair) is assigned a
300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity
exposures. An equity exposure (other
than an equity exposure described in
paragraph (b)(7) of this section) that is
not publicly traded is assigned a 400
percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 23. Section 3.202 is amended by
revising the definition of ‘‘Corporate
debt position’’ in paragraph (b) to read
as follows:
§ 3.202
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
Corporate debt position means a debt
position that is an exposure to a
company that is not a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, a multilateral
development bank, a depository
institution, a foreign bank, a credit
union, a public sector entity, a GSE, or
a securitization.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 24. Section 3.210 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read as
follows:
§ 3.210 Standardized measurement
method for specific risk.
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
*
*
(ii) Certain supranational entity and
multilateral development bank debt
positions. A national bank or Federal
savings association may assign a 0.0
percent specific risk-weighting factor to
a debt position that is an exposure to the
Bank for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 25. Section 3.300 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b) and (d) to read
as follows:
§ 3.300
Transitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions. Beginning January 1,
2014 for an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association, and beginning January 1,
2015 for a national bank or Federal
savings association that is not an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, a
national bank or Federal savings
association must make the capital
adjustments and deductions in § 3.22 in
accordance with the transition
requirements in this paragraph (b).
Beginning January 1, 2018, a national
bank or Federal savings association
must make all regulatory capital
adjustments and deductions in
accordance with § 3.22.
(1) Transition deductions from
common equity tier 1 capital. Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal
savings association, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for a national bank or
Federal savings association that is not
an advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association, and in
each case through December 31, 2017, a
national bank or Federal savings
association must make the deductions
required under § 3.22(a)(1)–(7) from
common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital
elements in accordance with the
percentages set forth in Table 2 and
Table 3 to § 3.300.
(i) A national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct the following
items from common equity tier 1 and
additional tier 1 capital in accordance
with the percentages set forth in Table
2 to § 3.300: Goodwill (§ 3.22(a)(1)),
DTAs that arise from net operating loss
and tax credit carryforwards
(§ 3.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in
connection with a securitization
exposure (§ 3.22(a)(4)), defined benefit
pension fund assets (§ 3.22(a)(5)),
expected credit loss that exceeds
eligible credit reserves (for advanced
approaches national banks and Federal
savings associations that have
completed the parallel run process and
that have received notifications from the
OCC pursuant to § 3.121(d) of subpart E)
and financial subsidiaries (§ 3.22(a)(7)),
and nonincludable subsidiaries of a
Federal savings association
(§ 3.22(a)(8)).
TABLE 2 TO § 3.300
Transition deductions
under § 3.22(a)(1) and
(7)
Transition period
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Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
Percentage of the
deductions from
common equity
tier 1 capital
Percentage of the
deductions from
common equity
tier 1 capital
Percentage of the
deductions from
tier 1 capital
100
100
100
100
100
20
40
60
80
100
80
60
40
20
0
2014 .....................................................................
2015 .....................................................................
2016 .....................................................................
2017 .....................................................................
2018, and thereafter ............................................
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct from common
equity tier 1 capital any intangible
assets other than goodwill and MSAs in
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Transition deductions
under § 3.22(a)(3)–(6)
accordance with the percentages set
forth in Table 3 to § 3.300.
(iii) A national bank or Federal
savings association must apply a 100
percent risk-weight to the aggregate
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amount of intangible assets other than
goodwill and MSAs that are not
required to be deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital under this section.
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TABLE 3 TO § 3.300
Transition deductions
under § 3.22(a)(2)—
percentage of the
deductions from
common equity
tier 1 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014 .............................................................................................................................................................
2015 .............................................................................................................................................................
2016 .............................................................................................................................................................
2017 .............................................................................................................................................................
2018, and thereafter ....................................................................................................................................
(2) Transition adjustments to common
equity tier 1 capital. Beginning January
1, 2014 for an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings
association, and beginning January 1,
2015 for a national bank or Federal
savings association that is not an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, a
national bank or Federal savings
association must allocate the regulatory
adjustments related to changes in the
fair value of liabilities due to changes in
the national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s own credit risk
(§ 3.22(b)(1)(iii)) between common
equity tier 1 capital and tier 1 capital in
accordance with the percentages set
forth in Table 4 to § 3.300.
(i) If the aggregate amount of the
adjustment is positive, the national bank
20
40
60
80
100
or Federal savings association must
allocate the deduction between common
equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in
accordance with Table 4 to § 3.300.
(ii) If the aggregate amount of the
adjustment is negative, the national
bank or Federal savings association
must add back the adjustment to
common equity tier 1 capital or to tier
1 capital, in accordance with Table 4 to
§ 3.300.
TABLE 4 TO § 3.300
Transition adjustments under § 3.22(b)(1)(iii)
Percentage of the
adjustment applied to
common equity
tier 1 capital
Transition period
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Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
20
40
60
80
100
80
60
40
20
0
2014 .................................................................................................................
2015 .................................................................................................................
2016 .................................................................................................................
2017 .................................................................................................................
2018, and thereafter ........................................................................................
(3) Transition adjustments to AOCI
for an advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association and
a national bank or Federal savings
association that has not made an AOCI
opt-out election under § 3.22(b)(2).
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, and
beginning January 1, 2015 for a national
bank or Federal savings association that
is not an advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association that
has not made an AOCI opt-out election
under § 3.22(b)(2), and in each case
through December 31, 2017, a national
bank or Federal savings association
must adjust common equity tier 1
capital with respect to the transition
AOCI adjustment amount (transition
AOCI adjustment amount):
(i) The transition AOCI adjustment
amount is the aggregate amount of a
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Percentage of the
adjustment applied to
tier 1 capital
19:58 Oct 26, 2017
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national bank’s or Federal savings
association’s:
(A) Unrealized gains on available-forsale securities that are preferred stock
classified as an equity security under
GAAP or available-for-sale equity
exposures, plus
(B) Net unrealized gains or losses on
available-for-sale securities that are not
preferred stock classified as an equity
security under GAAP or available-forsale equity exposures, plus
(C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI
attributed to defined benefit
postretirement plans resulting from the
initial and subsequent application of the
relevant GAAP standards that pertain to
such plans (excluding, at the national
bank’s or Federal savings association’s
option, the portion relating to pension
assets deducted under section 22(a)(5)),
plus
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(D) Accumulated net gains or losses
on cash flow hedges related to items
that are reported on the balance sheet at
fair value included in AOCI, plus
(E) Net unrealized gains or losses on
held-to-maturity securities that are
included in AOCI.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings
association must make the following
adjustment to its common equity tier 1
capital:
(A) If the transition AOCI adjustment
amount is positive, the appropriate
amount must be deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 5 to § 3.300.
(B) If the transition AOCI adjustment
amount is negative, the appropriate
amount must be added back to common
equity tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 5 to § 3.300.
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TABLE 5 TO § 3.300
Percentage of the
transition AOCI
adjustment amount to
be applied to common
equity tier 1 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
(iii) A national bank or Federal
savings association may include in tier
2 capital the percentage of unrealized
gains on available-for-sale preferred
stock classified as an equity security
under GAAP and available-for-sale
80
60
40
20
0
equity exposures as set forth in Table 6
to § 3.300.
TABLE 6 TO § 3.300
Percentage of
unrealized gains on
available-for-sale
preferred stock
classified as an
equity security under
GAAP and availablefor-sale equity
exposures that may
be included in
tier 2 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Minority interest—(1) [Reserved]
(2) Non-qualifying minority interest.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an
advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, and
beginning January 1, 2015 for a national
bank or Federal savings association that
is not an advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association, and
in each case through December 31,
2017, a national bank or federal savings
association may include in tier 1 capital
or total capital the percentage of the tier
36
27
18
9
0
1 minority interest and total capital
minority interest outstanding as of
January 1, 2014 that does not meet the
criteria for additional tier 1 or tier 2
capital instruments in § 3.20 (nonqualifying minority interest), as set forth
in Table 10 to § 3.300.
TABLE 10 TO § 3.300
Percentage of the
amount of surplus or
non-qualifying minority
interest that can be
included in regulatory
capital during the
transition period
Transition period
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Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
VerDate Sep<11>2014
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
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60
40
20
0
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*
*
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 207 / Friday, October 27, 2017 / Proposed Rules
*
*
*
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
For the reasons set out in the joint
preamble, part 217 of chapter II of title
12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is
proposed to be amended as follows:
PART 217—CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF
BANK HOLDING COMPANIES,
SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING
COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER
BANKS (REGULATION Q)
Subpart A—General Provisions
26. The authority citation for part 217
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321–338a,
481–486, 1462a, 1467a, 1818, 1828, 1831n,
1831o, 1831p–l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851,
3904, 3906–3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371.
27. Section 217.2 is amended by (1)
Removing the definitions of ‘‘corporate
exposure,’’ ‘‘eligible guarantor,’’ ‘‘high
volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE),’’ ‘‘investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ ‘‘non-significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,’’
and ‘‘significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ and (2) Adding the
definitions of ‘‘corporate exposure,’’
‘‘eligible guarantor,’’ ‘‘high volatility
acquisition, development, or
construction (HVADC),’’ ‘‘high volatility
commercial real estate (HVCRE),’’
‘‘International Lending Supervision
Act,’’ ‘‘investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,’’
‘‘non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ and ‘‘significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution’’ as
follows:
■
§ 217.2
Definitions.
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with PROPOSALS
*
*
*
*
*
Corporate exposure means an
exposure to a company that is not:
(1) An exposure to a sovereign, the
Bank for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, a multi-lateral
development bank (MDB), a depository
institution, a foreign bank, a credit
union, or a public sector entity (PSE);
(2) An exposure to a GSE;
(3) A residential mortgage exposure;
(4) A pre-sold construction loan;
(5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
(6) A high volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
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exposure or a high volatility commercial
real estate (HVCRE) exposure;
(7) A cleared transaction;
(8) A default fund contribution;
(9) A securitization exposure;
(10) An equity exposure; or
(11) An unsettled transaction.
(12) A policy loan; or
(13) A separate account.
*
*
*
*
*
Eligible guarantor means:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for
International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan
Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European
Stability Mechanism, the European
Financial Stability Facility, a
multilateral development bank (MDB), a
depository institution, a bank holding
company, a savings and loan holding
company, a credit union, a foreign bank,
or a qualifying central counterparty; or
(2) An entity (other than a special
purpose entity):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is
issued or anytime thereafter, has issued
and outstanding an unsecured debt
security without credit enhancement
that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not
positively correlated with the credit risk
of the exposures for which it has
provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company
engaged predominately in the business
of providing credit protection (such as
a monoline bond insurer or re-insurer).
*
*
*
*
*
High volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure means a credit facility that is
originated on or after [effective date]
and that:
(1) Primarily finances or refinances
the:
(i) Acquisition of vacant or developed
land;
(ii) Development of land to prepare to
erect new structures including, but not
limited to, the laying of sewers or water
pipes and demolishing existing
structures; or
(iii) Construction of buildings,
dwellings, or other improvements
including additions or alterations to
existing structures; and
(2) Is not a credit facility that finances
or refinances:
(i) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(ii) Real property projects that would
have the primary purpose of
‘‘community development’’ as defined
under [12 CFR part 25 (national bank),
12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings
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association) (OCC); 12 CFR part 228
(Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC)]; or
(iii) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, including, but not
limited to, all land used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for commercial or
residential development; and
(3) Is not a permanent loan. A
permanent loan for purposes of this
definition means a prudently
underwritten loan that has a clearly
identified ongoing source of repayment
sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments aside
from the sale of the property. For
purposes of this section, a permanent
loan does not include a loan that
finances or refinances a stabilization
period or unsold lots or units of for-sale
projects.
High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure, for purposes of
Subpart D, means a credit facility that
is either outstanding or committed prior
to [effective date] and, prior to
conversion to permanent financing,
finances or has financed the acquisition,
development, or construction (ADC) of
real property, unless the facility
finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in
community development under 12
U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
as applicable, or as a ‘‘qualified
investment’’ under 12 CFR part 228, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity
described in 12 CFR 208.22(a)(3) or
228.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise
described in paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or
(4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, which includes all
land known to be used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for non-agricultural
commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in
which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than
or equal to the applicable maximum
supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the
Board’s real estate lending standards at
12 CFR part 208, appendix C;
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(ii) The borrower has contributed
capital to the project in the form of cash
or unencumbered readily marketable
assets (or has paid development
expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15
percent of the real estate’s appraised ‘‘as
completed’’ value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the
amount of capital required by paragraph
(4)(ii) of this definition before the
Board-regulated institution advances
funds under the credit facility, and the
capital contributed by the borrower, or
internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the
project throughout the life of the project.
The life of a project concludes only
when the credit facility is converted to
permanent financing or is sold or paid
in full. Permanent financing may be
provided by the Board-regulated
institution that provided the ADC
facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the Boardregulated institution’s underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
*
*
*
*
*
International Lending Supervision Act
means the International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901
et seq.).
*
*
*
*
*
Investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
means a net long position calculated in
accordance with § 217.22(h) in an
instrument that is recognized as capital
for regulatory purposes by the primary
supervisor of an unconsolidated
regulated financial institution or is an
instrument that is part of the GAAP
equity of an unconsolidated unregulated
financial institution, including direct,
indirect, and synthetic exposures to
capital instruments, excluding
underwriting positions held by the
Board-regulated institution for five or
fewer business days.
*
*
*
*
*
Non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution means an investment by an
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
where the advanced approaches Boardregulated institution owns 10 percent or
less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
*
*
*
*
*
Significant investment in the capital
of an unconsolidated financial
institution means an investment by an
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
where the advanced approaches Boardregulated institution owns more than 10
percent of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 28. Section 217.10 is amended by
revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read as
follows:
§ 217.10
Minimum capital requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) * * *
(H) The credit equivalent amount of
all off-balance sheet exposures of the
Board-regulated institution, excluding
repo-style transactions, repurchase or
reverse repurchase or securities
borrowing or lending transactions that
qualify for sales treatment under U.S.
GAAP, and derivative transactions,
determined using the applicable credit
conversion factor under § 217.33(b),
provided, however, that the minimum
credit conversion factor that may be
assigned to an off-balance sheet
exposure under this paragraph is 10
percent; and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 29. Section 217.11 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iv),
(a)(3)(i), and revise Table 1 to read as
follows:
50017
§ 217.11 Capital conservation buffer,
countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
GSIB surcharge.
*
*
*
*
*
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Eligible retained income. The
eligible retained income of a Boardregulated institution is the Boardregulated institution’s net income,
calculated in accordance with the
instructions to the Call Report or the FR
Y–9C, as applicable, for the four
calendar quarters preceding the current
calendar quarter, net of any
distributions and associated tax effects
not already reflected in net income.
*
*
*
*
*
(iv) Private sector credit exposure.
Private sector credit exposure means an
exposure to a company or an individual
that is not an exposure to a sovereign,
the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European
Financial Stability Facility, the
International Monetary Fund, a MDB, a
PSE, or a GSE.
(3) * * * (i) A Board-regulated
institution’s capital conservation buffer
is equal to the lowest of the following
ratios, calculated as of the last day of the
previous calendar quarter:
(A) The Board-regulated institution’s
common equity tier 1 capital ratio
minus the Board-regulated institution’s
minimum common equity tier 1 capital
ratio requirement under § 217.10;
(B) The Board-regulated institution’s
tier 1 capital ratio minus the Boardregulated institution’s minimum tier 1
capital ratio requirement under
§ 217.10; and
(C) The Board-regulated institution’s
total capital ratio minus the Boardregulated institution’s minimum total
capital ratio requirement under
§ 217.10; or
TABLE 1 TO § 217.11—CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM PAYOUT AMOUNT
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with PROPOSALS
Capital conservation buffer
Maximum payout ratio
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical capital
buffer amount and 100 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount and 100 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge, and greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount and 75 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount and 75 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge, and greater
than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount and 50 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount and 50 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge, and greater
than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount and 25 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge.
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No payout ratio limitation
applies.
60 percent.
40 percent.
20 percent.
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TABLE 1 TO § 217.11—CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM PAYOUT AMOUNT—Continued
Capital conservation buffer
Maximum payout ratio
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount and 25 percent of the Board-regulated institution’s applicable GSIB surcharge.
*
*
*
*
*
30. Section 217.20 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(2), (d)(2),
(5) and adding a new paragraph (f) to
read as follows:
■
§ 217.20 Capital components and eligibility
criteria for regulatory capital instruments.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(4) Any common equity tier 1
minority interest, subject to the
limitations in § 217.21.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to
the limitations in § 217.21, that is not
included in the Board-regulated
institution’s common equity tier 1
capital.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Total capital minority interest,
subject to the limitations set forth in
§ 217.21, that is not included in the
Board-regulated institution’s tier 1
capital.
*
*
*
*
*
(5) For a Board-regulated institution
that makes an AOCI opt-out election (as
defined in paragraph (b)(2) of § 217.22),
45 percent of pretax net unrealized
gains on available-for-sale preferred
stock classified as an equity security
under GAAP and available-for-sale
equity exposures.
*
*
*
*
*
(f) A Board-regulated institution may
not repurchase or redeem any common
equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1, or
tier 2 capital instrument without the
prior approval of the Board.
■ 31. Section 217.21 is revised to reads
as follows:
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§ 217.21
Minority interest.
(a)(1) Applicability. For purposes of
§ 217.20, a Board-regulated institution
that is not an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution is subject to
the minority interest limitations in this
paragraph (a) if a consolidated
subsidiary of the Board-regulated
institution has issued regulatory capital
that is not owned by the Boardregulated institution.
(2) Common equity tier 1 minority
interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the Boardregulated institution. The amount of
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common equity tier 1 minority interest
that a Board-regulated institution may
include in common equity tier 1 capital
must be no greater than 10 percent of
the sum of all common equity tier 1
capital elements of the Board-regulated
institution (not including the common
equity tier 1 minority interest itself),
less any common equity tier 1 capital
regulatory adjustments and deductions
in accordance with § 217.22 (a) and (b).
(3) Tier 1 minority interest includable
in the tier 1 capital of the Boardregulated institution. The amount of tier
1 minority interest that a Boardregulated institution may include in tier
1 capital must be no greater than 10
percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital
elements of the Board-regulated
institution (not including the tier 1
minority interest itself), less any tier 1
capital regulatory adjustments and
deductions in accordance with § 217.22
(a) and (b).
(4) Total capital minority interest
includable in the total capital of the
Board-regulated institution. The amount
of total capital minority interest that a
Board-regulated institution may include
in total capital must be no greater than
10 percent of the sum of all total capital
elements of the Board-regulated
institution (not including the total
capital minority interest itself), less any
total capital regulatory adjustments and
deductions in accordance with § 217.22
(a) and (b).
(b)(1) Applicability. For purposes of
§ 217.20, an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution is subject to
the minority interest limitations in this
paragraph (b) if:
(i) A consolidated subsidiary of the
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution has issued regulatory capital
that is not owned by the Boardregulated institution; and
(ii) For each relevant regulatory
capital ratio of the consolidated
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of
the subsidiary’s minimum regulatory
capital requirements plus its capital
conservation buffer.
(2) Difference in capital adequacy
standards at the subsidiary level. For
purposes of the minority interest
calculations in this section, if the
consolidated subsidiary issuing the
capital is not subject to capital adequacy
standards similar to those of the
advanced approaches Board-regulated
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0 percent.
institution, the advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution must assume
that the capital adequacy standards of
the advanced approaches Boardregulated institution apply to the
subsidiary.
(3) Common equity tier 1 minority
interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the Boardregulated institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution,
the amount of common equity tier 1
minority interest the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
may include in common equity tier 1
capital is equal to:
(i) The common equity tier 1 minority
interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
common equity tier 1 capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution, multiplied
by the difference between the common
equity tier 1 capital of the subsidiary
and the lower of:
(A) The amount of common equity
tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold,
or would be required to hold pursuant
to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 217.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor; or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
that relate to the subsidiary multiplied
by
(2) The common equity tier 1 capital
ratio the subsidiary must maintain to
avoid restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 217.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
(4) Tier 1 minority interest includable
in the tier 1 capital of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution.
For each consolidated subsidiary of the
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, the amount of tier 1
minority interest the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
may include in tier 1 capital is equal to:
(i) The tier 1 minority interest of the
subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
tier 1 capital that is not owned by the
advanced approaches Board-regulated
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institution multiplied by the difference
between the tier 1 capital of the
subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of tier 1 capital the
subsidiary must hold, or would be
required to hold pursuant to paragraph
(b) of this section, to avoid restrictions
on distributions and discretionary
bonus payments under § 217.11 or
equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary’s home country supervisor,
or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
that relate to the subsidiary multiplied
by
(2) The tier 1 capital ratio the
subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 217.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
(5) Total capital minority interest
includable in the total capital of the
Board-regulated institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution,
the amount of total capital minority
interest the advanced approaches Boardregulated institution may include in
total capital is equal to:
(i) The total capital minority interest
of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
total capital that is not owned by the
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution multiplied by the difference
between the total capital of the
subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of total capital the
subsidiary must hold, or would be
required to hold pursuant to paragraph
(b) of this section, to avoid restrictions
on distributions and discretionary
bonus payments under § 217.11 or
equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary’s home country supervisor,
or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
that relate to the subsidiary multiplied
by
(2) The total capital ratio the
subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 217.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
■ 32. Section 217.22 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a)(1)(i), paragraphs
(c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:
§ 217.22 Regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions.
(a) * * *
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(1) * * *
(i) Goodwill, net of associated
deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section; and
(ii) For an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution, goodwill
that is embedded in the valuation of a
significant investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
in the form of common stock (and that
is reflected in the consolidated financial
statements of the advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution), in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section;
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Deductions from regulatory capital
related to investments in capital
instruments 23
(1) Investment in the Board-regulated
institution’s own capital instruments. A
Board-regulated institution must deduct
an investment in the Board-regulated
institution’s own capital instruments as
follows:
(i) A Board-regulated institution must
deduct an investment in the Boardregulated institution’s own common
stock instruments from its common
equity tier 1 capital elements to the
extent such instruments are not
excluded from regulatory capital under
§ 217.20(b)(1);
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must
deduct an investment in the Boardregulated institution’s own additional
tier 1 capital instruments from its
additional tier 1 capital elements; and
(iii) A Board-regulated institution
must deduct an investment in the
Board-regulated institution’s own tier 2
capital instruments from its tier 2
capital elements.
(2) Corresponding deduction
approach. For purposes of subpart C of
this part, the corresponding deduction
approach is the methodology used for
the deductions from regulatory capital
related to reciprocal cross holdings (as
described in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section), investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
a Board-regulated institution that is not
an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution (as described in
paragraph (c)(4) of this section), nonsignificant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution (as described in
paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and
non-common stock significant
23 The Board-regulated institution must calculate
amounts deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f)
of this section after it calculates the amount of
ALLL includable in tier 2 capital under
§ 217.20(d)(3).
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investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution (as described in
paragraph (c)(6) of this section). Under
the corresponding deduction approach,
a Board-regulated institution must make
deductions from the component of
capital for which the underlying
instrument would qualify if it were
issued by the Board-regulated
institution itself, as described in
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)–(iii) of this section.
If the Board-regulated institution does
not have a sufficient amount of a
specific component of capital to effect
the required deduction, the shortfall
must be deducted according to
paragraph (f) of this section.
(i) If an investment is in the form of
an instrument issued by a financial
institution that is not a regulated
financial institution, the Boardregulated institution must treat the
instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital
instrument if it is common stock or
represents the most subordinated claim
in liquidation of the financial
institution; and
(B) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if it is subordinated to all
creditors of the financial institution and
is senior in liquidation only to common
shareholders.
(ii) If an investment is in the form of
an instrument issued by a regulated
financial institution and the instrument
does not meet the criteria for common
equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2
capital instruments under § 217.20, the
Board-regulated institution must treat
the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital
instrument if it is common stock
included in GAAP equity or represents
the most subordinated claim in
liquidation of the financial institution;
(B) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if it is included in GAAP
equity, subordinated to all creditors of
the financial institution, and senior in a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding only to common
shareholders; and
(C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is
not included in GAAP equity but
considered regulatory capital by the
primary supervisor of the financial
institution.
(iii) If an investment is in the form of
a non-qualifying capital instrument (as
defined in § 217.300(c)), the Boardregulated institution must treat the
instrument as:
(A) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if such instrument was
included in the issuer’s tier 1 capital
prior to May 19, 2010; or
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(B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such
instrument was included in the issuer’s
tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier
1 capital) prior to May 19, 2010.
(3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the
capital of financial institutions. A
Board-regulated institution must deduct
investments in the capital of other
financial institutions it holds
reciprocally, where such reciprocal
cross holdings result from a formal or
informal arrangement to swap,
exchange, or otherwise intend to hold
each other’s capital instruments, by
applying the corresponding deduction
approach.
(4) Investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions. A
Board-regulated institution that is not
an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution must deduct its
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions (as
defined in § 217.2) that exceed 25
percent of the sum of the Boardregulated institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to
common equity tier 1 capital elements
required under paragraphs (a) through
(c)(3) of this section by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.24
The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, a Board-regulated institution
that underwrites a failed underwriting,
with the prior written approval of the
Board, for the period of time stipulated
by the Board, is not required to deduct
an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the
extent the investment is related to the
failed underwriting.25
(5) Non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. (i) An advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution must deduct
its non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions (as defined in § 217.2) that,
in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of
the sum of the advanced approaches
24 With the prior written approval of the Board,
for the period of time stipulated by the Board, a
Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution is not
required to deduct an investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to
this paragraph if the financial institution is in
distress and if such investment is made for the
purpose of providing financial support to the
financial institution, as determined by the Board.
25 Any investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not
exceed the 25 percent threshold for investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
under this section must be assigned the appropriate
risk weight under subparts D or F of this part, as
applicable.
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Board-regulated institution’s common
equity tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to
common equity tier 1 capital elements
required under paragraphs (a) through
(c)(3) of this section (the 10 percent
threshold for non-significant
investments) by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.26
The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution that
underwrites a failed underwriting, with
the prior written approval of the Board,
for the period of time stipulated by the
Board, is not required to deduct a nonsignificant investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the
extent the investment is related to the
failed underwriting.27
(ii) The amount to be deducted under
this section from a specific capital
component is equal to:
(A) The advanced approaches Boardregulated institution’s non-significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
exceeding the 10 percent threshold for
non-significant investments, multiplied
by
(B) The ratio of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution’s
non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of such capital
component to the advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution’s total nonsignificant investments in
unconsolidated financial institutions.
(6) Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of
common stock. An advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
must deduct its significant investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the
form of common stock by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.28
26 With the prior written approval of the Board,
for the period of time stipulated by the Board, an
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution is
not required to deduct a non-significant investment
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the
financial institution is in distress and if such
investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution, as
determined by the Board.
27 Any non-significant investments in the capital
of unconsolidated financial institutions that do not
exceed the 10 percent threshold for non-significant
investments under this section must be assigned the
appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or F
of this part, as applicable.
28 With prior written approval of the Board, for
the period of time stipulated by the Board, an
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution is
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The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, with the prior written
approval of the Board, for the period of
time stipulated by the Board, an
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution that underwrites a failed
underwriting is not required to deduct
a significant investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such
investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
(d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
thresholds.
(1) A Board-regulated institution that
is not an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution must make
deductions from regulatory capital as
described in this paragraph (d)(1).
(i) The Board-regulated institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the amount of each of
the items set forth in this paragraph
(d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25
percent of the sum of the Boardregulated institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs
(a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold).29
(ii) The Board-regulated institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the amount of DTAs
arising from temporary differences that
the Board-regulated institution could
not realize through net operating loss
carrybacks, net of any related valuation
allowances and net of DTLs, in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section. A Board-regulated institution is
not required to deduct from the sum of
its common equity tier 1 capital
elements DTAs (net of any related
valuation allowances and net of DTLs,
in accordance with § 217.22(e)) arising
from timing differences that the Boardregulated institution could realize
through net operating loss carrybacks.
The Board-regulated institution must
risk weight these assets at 100 percent.
For a state member bank that is a
member of a consolidated group for tax
purposes, the amount of DTAs that
not required to deduct a significant investment in
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated
financial institution in distress which is not in the
form of common stock pursuant to this section if
such investment is made for the purpose of
providing financial support to the financial
institution as determined by the Board.
29 The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of
this section that is not deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital must be included in the riskweighted assets of the Board-regulated institution
and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
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could be realized through net operating
loss carrybacks may not exceed the
amount that the state member bank
could reasonably expect to have
refunded by its parent holding
company.
(iii) The Board-regulated institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the amount of MSAs
net of associated DTLs, in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section.
(iv) For purposes of calculating the
amount of DTAs subject to deduction
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this
section, a Board-regulated institution
may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to
adjustments made to common equity
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this
section. A Board-regulated institution
that elects to exclude DTAs relating to
adjustments under paragraph (b) of this
section also must exclude DTLs and
must do so consistently in all future
calculations. A Board-regulated
institution may change its exclusion
preference only after obtaining the prior
approval of the Board.
(2) An advanced approaches Boardregulated institution must make
deductions from regulatory capital as
described in this paragraph (d)(2).
(i) An advanced approaches Boardregulated institution must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the amount of each of the items set forth
in this paragraph (d)(2) that,
individually, exceeds 10 percent of the
sum of the advanced approaches Boardregulated institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs
(a) through (c) of this section (the 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold).
(A) DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
could not realize through net operating
loss carrybacks, net of any related
valuation allowances and net of DTLs,
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section. An advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution is not
required to deduct from the sum of its
common equity tier 1 capital elements
DTAs (net of any related valuation
allowances and net of DTLs, in
accordance with § 217.22(e)) arising
from timing differences that the
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
must risk weight these assets at 100
percent. For a state member bank that is
a member of a consolidated group for
tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that
could be realized through net operating
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loss carrybacks may not exceed the
amount that the state member bank
could reasonably expect to have
refunded by its parent holding
company.
(B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section.
(C) Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock, net of associated DTLs in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section.30 Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock subject to the 10 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold
may be reduced by any goodwill
embedded in the valuation of such
investments deducted by the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this
section. In addition, with the prior
written approval of the Board, for the
period of time stipulated by the Board,
an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution that underwrites a
failed underwriting is not required to
deduct a significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2) if such
investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
(ii) An advanced approaches Boardregulated institution must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of
this section that are not deducted as a
result of the application of the 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold, and that, in
aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of the
sum of the advanced approaches Boardregulated institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, minus
adjustments to and deductions from
common equity tier 1 capital required
under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
section, minus the items listed in
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold). Any goodwill that
has been deducted under paragraph
(a)(1) of this section can be excluded
from the significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
30 With the prior written approval of the Board,
for the period of time stipulated by the Board, an
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution is
not required to deduct a significant investment in
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated
financial institution in distress in the form of
common stock pursuant to this section if such
investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as
determined by the Board.
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50021
institutions in the form of common
stock.31
(iii) For purposes of calculating the
amount of DTAs subject to the 10 and
15 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds, an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to
adjustments made to common equity
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this
section. An advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution that elects to
exclude DTAs relating to adjustments
under paragraph (b) of this section also
must exclude DTLs and must do so
consistently in all future calculations.
An advanced approaches Boardregulated institution may change its
exclusion preference only after
obtaining the prior approval of the
Board.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Treatment of assets that are
deducted. A Board-regulated institution
must exclude from standardized total
risk-weighted assets and, as applicable,
advanced approaches total riskweighted assets any item that is
required to be deducted from regulatory
capital.
(h) Net long position. (1) For purposes
of calculating an investment in the
Board-regulated institution’s own
capital instrument and an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution under this section,
the net long position is the gross long
position in the underlying instrument
determined in accordance with
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as
adjusted to recognize a short position in
the same instrument calculated in
accordance with paragraph (h)(3) of this
section.
(2) Gross long position. The gross long
position is determined as follows:
(i) For an equity exposure that is held
directly, the adjusted carrying value as
that term is defined in § 217.51(b);
(ii) For an exposure that is held
directly and is not an equity exposure
or a securitization exposure, the
exposure amount as that term is defined
in § 217.2;
(iii) For an indirect exposure, the
Board-regulated institution’s carrying
value of the investment in the
investment fund, provided that,
alternatively:
(A) A Board-regulated institution
may, with the prior approval of the
Board, use a conservative estimate of the
amount of its investment in the Board31 The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of
this section that is not deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital pursuant to this section must
be included in the risk-weighted assets of the
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution
and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
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regulated institution’s own capital
instruments or its investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution held through a position in an
index; or
(B) A Board-regulated institution may
calculate the gross long position for
investments in the Board-regulated
institution’s own capital instruments or
investments in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution by
multiplying the Board-regulated
institution’s carrying value of its
investment in the investment fund by
either:
(1) The highest stated investment
limit (in percent) for investments in the
Board-regulated institution’s own
capital instruments or investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions as stated in the prospectus,
partnership agreement, or similar
contract defining permissible
investments of the investment fund; or
(2) The investment fund’s actual
holdings of investments in the Boardregulated institution’s own capital
instruments or investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
(iv) For a synthetic exposure, the
amount of the Board-regulated
institution’s loss on the exposure if the
reference capital instrument were to
have a value of zero.
(3) Adjustments to reflect a short
position. In order to adjust the gross
long position to recognize a short
position in the same instrument, the
following criteria must be met:
(i) The maturity of the short position
must match the maturity of the long
position, or the short position has a
residual maturity of at least one year
(maturity requirement); or
(ii) For a position that is a trading
asset or trading liability (whether on- or
off-balance sheet) as reported on the
Board-regulated institution’s Call
Report, for a state member bank, or FR
Y–9C, for a bank holding company or
savings and loan holding company, as
applicable, if the Board-regulated
institution has a contractual right or
obligation to sell the long position at a
specific point in time and the
counterparty to the contract has an
obligation to purchase the long position
if the Board-regulated institution
exercises its right to sell, this point in
time may be treated as the maturity of
the long position such that the maturity
of the long position and short position
are deemed to match for purposes of the
maturity requirement, even if the
maturity of the short position is less
than one year; and
(iii) For an investment in the Boardregulated institution’s own capital
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instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of
this section or an investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution under paragraphs (c) and (d):
(A) A Board-regulated institution may
only net a short position against a long
position in an investment in the Boardregulated institution’s own capital
instrument under paragraph (c) of this
section if the short position involves no
counterparty credit risk.
(B) A gross long position in an
investment in the Board-regulated
institution’s own capital instrument or
an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
resulting from a position in an index
may be netted against a short position
in the same index. Long and short
positions in the same index without
maturity dates are considered to have
matching maturities.
(C) A short position in an index that
is hedging a long cash or synthetic
position in an investment in the Boardregulated institution’s own capital
instrument or an investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution can be decomposed to
provide recognition of the hedge. More
specifically, the portion of the index
that is composed of the same underlying
instrument that is being hedged may be
used to offset the long position if both
the long position being hedged and the
short position in the index are reported
as a trading asset or trading liability
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the
Board-regulated institution’s Call
Report, for a state member bank, or FR
Y–9C, for a bank holding company or
savings and loan holding company, as
applicable, and the hedge is deemed
effective by the Board-regulated
institution’s internal control processes,
which have not been found to be
inadequate by the Board.
■ 33. Section 217.32 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2), (d)(3)(ii),
(j), (k), (l) to read as follows:
§ 217.32
General risk weights.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Certain supranational entities and
multilateral development banks (MDBs).
A Board-regulated institution must
assign a zero percent risk weight to an
exposure to the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, or
an MDB.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i)
Except as otherwise provided under
paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3)
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of this section, a Board-regulated
institution must assign a risk weight to
an exposure to a foreign bank, in
accordance with Table 2 to § 217.32,
based on the CRC that corresponds to
the foreign bank’s home country or the
OECD membership status of the foreign
bank’s home country if there is no CRC
applicable to the foreign bank’s home
country.
TABLE 2 TO § 217.32—RISK WEIGHTS
FOR EXPOSURES TO FOREIGN BANKS
Risk weight
(in percent)
CRC:
0–1 ....................................
2 ........................................
3 ........................................
4–7 ....................................
OECD Member with No CRC
Non-OECD Member with No
CRC ..................................
Sovereign Default .................
20
50
100
150
20
100
150
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 20 percent risk weight to an
exposure to a foreign bank whose home
country is a member of the OECD and
does not have a CRC.
(iii) A Board-regulated institution
must assign a 20 percent risk-weight to
an exposure that is a self-liquidating,
trade-related contingent item that arises
from the movement of goods and that
has a maturity of three months or less
to a foreign bank whose home country
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD
member with no CRC.
(iv) A Board-regulated institution
must assign a 100 percent risk weight to
an exposure to a foreign bank whose
home country is not a member of the
OECD and does not have a CRC, with
the exception of self-liquidating, traderelated contingent items that arise from
the movement of goods, and that have
a maturity of three months or less,
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk
weight.
(v) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 150 percent risk weight to an
exposure to a foreign bank immediately
upon determining that an event of
sovereign default has occurred in the
bank’s home country, or if an event of
sovereign default has occurred in the
foreign bank’s home country during the
previous five years.
(3) * * *
(ii) A significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock
pursuant to § 217.22(d)(2)(1)(c);
(iii) and (iv) * * *
*
*
*
*
*
(j)(1) High volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
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exposures. A Board-regulated institution
must assign a 130 percent risk weight to
an HVADC exposure.
(2) High-volatility commercial real
estate (HVCRE) exposures. A Boardregulated institution must assign a 150
percent risk weight to an HVCRE
exposure.
(k) Past due exposures. Except for an
exposure to a sovereign entity or a
residential mortgage exposure or a
policy loan, if an exposure is 90 days or
more past due or on nonaccrual:
(1) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 150 percent risk weight to the
portion of the exposure that is not
guaranteed or that is unsecured;
(2) A Board-regulated institution may
assign a risk weight to the guaranteed
portion of a past due exposure based on
the risk weight that applies under
§ 217.36 if the guarantee or credit
derivative meets the requirements of
that section; and
(3) A Board-regulated institution may
assign a risk weight to the collateralized
portion of a past due exposure based on
the risk weight that applies under
§ 217.37 if the collateral meets the
requirements of that section.
(l) Other assets. (1)(i) A bank holding
company or savings and loan holding
company must assign a zero percent risk
weight to cash owned and held in all
offices of subsidiary depository
institutions or in transit, and to gold
bullion held in a subsidiary depository
institution’s own vaults, or held in
another depository institution’s vaults
on an allocated basis, to the extent the
gold bullion assets are offset by gold
bullion liabilities.
(ii) A state member bank must assign
a zero percent risk weight to cash
owned and held in all offices of the state
member bank or in transit; to gold
bullion held in the state member bank’s
own vaults or held in another
depository institution’s vaults on an
allocated basis, to the extent the gold
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion
liabilities; and to exposures that arise
from the settlement of cash transactions
(such as equities, fixed income, spot
foreign exchange and spot commodities)
with a central counterparty where there
is no assumption of ongoing
counterparty credit risk by the central
counterparty after settlement of the
trade and associated default fund
contributions.
(2) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 20 percent risk weight to cash
items in the process of collection.
(3) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 100 percent risk weight to
DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the Board-regulated
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institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks.
(4) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 250 percent risk weight to the
portion of each of the following items to
the extent it is not deducted from
common equity tier 1 capital pursuant
to § 217.22(d):
(i) MSAs; and
(ii) DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the Board-regulated
institution could not realize through net
operating loss carrybacks.
(5) A Board-regulated institution must
assign a 100 percent risk weight to all
assets not specifically assigned a
different risk weight under this subpart
and that are not deducted from tier 1 or
tier 2 capital pursuant to § 217.22.
(6) Notwithstanding the requirements
of this section, a state member bank may
assign an asset that is not included in
one of the categories provided in this
section to the risk weight category
applicable under the capital rules
applicable to bank holding companies
and savings and loan holding
companies under this part, provided
that all of the following conditions
apply:
(i) The Board-regulated institution is
not authorized to hold the asset under
applicable law other than debt
previously contracted or similar
authority; and
(ii) The risks associated with the asset
are substantially similar to the risks of
assets that are otherwise assigned to a
risk weight category of less than 100
percent under this subpart.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 34. Section 217.34 is amended by
revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 217.34
OTC derivative contracts.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC
credit derivatives. (1) Protection
purchasers. A Board-regulated
institution that purchases an OTC credit
derivative that is recognized under
§ 217.36 as a credit risk mitigant for an
exposure that is not a covered position
under subpart F is not required to
compute a separate counterparty credit
risk capital requirement under this
subpart D provided that the Boardregulated institution does so
consistently for all such credit
derivatives. The Board-regulated
institution must either include all or
exclude all such credit derivatives that
are subject to a qualifying master netting
agreement from any measure used to
determine counterparty credit risk
exposure to all relevant counterparties
for risk-based capital purposes.
(2) Protection providers. (i) A Boardregulated institution that is the
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50023
protection provider under an OTC credit
derivative must treat the OTC credit
derivative as an exposure to the
underlying reference asset. The Boardregulated institution is not required to
compute a counterparty credit risk
capital requirement for the OTC credit
derivative under this subpart D,
provided that this treatment is applied
consistently for all such OTC credit
derivatives. The Board-regulated
institution must either include all or
exclude all such OTC credit derivatives
that are subject to a qualifying master
netting agreement from any measure
used to determine counterparty credit
risk exposure.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph
(c)(2) apply to all relevant
counterparties for risk-based capital
purposes unless the Board-regulated
institution is treating the OTC credit
derivative as a covered position under
subpart F, in which case the Boardregulated institution must compute a
supplemental counterparty credit risk
capital requirement under this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 35. Section 217.35 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii), (b)(4)(ii),
(c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
§ 217.35
Cleared transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member client Board-regulated
institution must apply the risk weight
appropriate for the CCP according to
this subpart D.
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member client Boardregulated institution must calculate a
risk-weighted asset amount for any
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing
member, or custodian in connection
with a cleared transaction in accordance
with the requirements under this
subpart D.
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member Board-regulated institution
must apply the risk weight appropriate
for the CCP according to this subpart D.
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member Boardregulated institution must calculate a
risk-weighted asset amount for any
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing
member, or a custodian in connection
with a cleared transaction in accordance
with requirements under this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 36. Section 217.36 is amend by
revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
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§ 217.36 Guarantees and credit
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*
*
*
*
*
(c) Substitution approach—(1) Full
coverage. If an eligible guarantee or
eligible credit derivative meets the
conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this section and the protection amount
(P) of the guarantee or credit derivative
is greater than or equal to the exposure
amount of the hedged exposure, a
Board-regulated institution may
recognize the guarantee or credit
derivative in determining the riskweighted asset amount for the hedged
exposure by substituting the risk weight
applicable to the guarantor or credit
derivative protection provider under
this subpart D for the risk weight
assigned to the exposure.
(2) Partial coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative
meets the conditions in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section and the protection
amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the exposure
amount of the hedged exposure, the
Board-regulated institution must treat
the hedged exposure as two separate
exposures (protected and unprotected)
in order to recognize the credit risk
mitigation benefit of the guarantee or
credit derivative.
(i) The Board-regulated institution
may calculate the risk-weighted asset
amount for the protected exposure
under this subpart D, where the
applicable risk weight is the risk weight
applicable to the guarantor or credit
derivative protection provider.
(ii) The Board-regulated institution
must calculate the risk-weighted asset
amount for the unprotected exposure
under this subpart D, where the
applicable risk weight is that of the
unprotected portion of the hedged
exposure.
(iii) The treatment provided in this
section is applicable when the credit
risk of an exposure is covered on a
partial pro rata basis and may be
applicable when an adjustment is made
to the effective notional amount of the
guarantee or credit derivative under
paragraphs (d), (e), or (f) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 37. Section 217.37 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read as
follows:
§ 217.37
Collateralized transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) * * * (i) A Board-regulated
institution may apply a risk weight to
the portion of an exposure that is
secured by the fair value of financial
collateral (that meets the requirements
of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based
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on the risk weight assigned to the
collateral under this subpart D. For
repurchase agreements, reverse
repurchase agreements, and securities
lending and borrowing transactions, the
collateral is the instruments, gold, and
cash the Board-regulated institution has
borrowed, purchased subject to resale,
or taken as collateral from the
counterparty under the transaction.
Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3)
of this section, the risk weight assigned
to the collateralized portion of the
exposure may not be less than 20
percent.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 38. Section 217.38 is amended by
revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 217.38
Unsettled transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(2) From the business day after the
Board-regulated institution has made its
delivery until five business days after
the counterparty delivery is due, the
Board-regulated institution must
calculate the risk-weighted asset amount
for the transaction by treating the
current fair value of the deliverables
owed to the Board-regulated institution
as an exposure to the counterparty and
using the applicable counterparty risk
weight under this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 39. Section 217.42 is amended by
revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read as
follows:
§ 217.42 Risk-weighted assets for
securitization exposures.
*
*
*
*
*
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) If the Board-regulated institution
purchases credit protection from a
counterparty that is not a securitization
SPE, the Board-regulated institution
must determine the risk weight for the
exposure according to this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 40. Section 217.52 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to read
as follows:
§ 217.52 Simple risk-weight approach
(SRWA).
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity
exposures. An equity exposure to a
sovereign, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, an
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MDB, and any other entity whose credit
exposures receive a zero percent risk
weight under § 217.32 may be assigned
a zero percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity
exposures. Significant investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock that are not deducted from capital
pursuant to § 217.22(d)(2) are assigned a
250 percent risk weight.
(5) through (7) (ii) * * *
*
*
*
*
*
■ 41. Section 217.61 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 217.61
Purpose and scope.
Sections 217.61 through 217.63 of this
subpart establish public disclosure
requirements related to the capital
requirements described in subpart B of
this part for a Board-regulated
institution with total consolidated assets
of $50 billion or more as reported on the
Board-regulated institution’s most
recent year-end Call Report, for a state
member bank, or FR Y–9C, for a bank
holding company or savings and loan
holding company, as applicable that is
not an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution making public
disclosures pursuant to § 217.172. An
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution that has not received
approval from the Board to exit parallel
run pursuant to § 217.121(d) is subject
to the disclosure requirements described
in §§ 217.62 and 217.63. A Boardregulated institution with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or
more as reported on the Board-regulated
institution’s most recent year-end Call
Report, for a state member bank, or FR
Y–9C, for a bank holding company or
savings and loan holding company, as
applicable, that is not an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
making public disclosures subject to
§ 217.172 must comply with § 217.62
unless it is a consolidated subsidiary of
a bank holding company, savings and
loan holding company, or depository
institution that is subject to the
disclosure requirements of § 217.62 or a
subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking
organization that is subject to
comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction.
For purposes of this section, total
consolidated assets are determined
based on the average of the Boardregulated institution’s total consolidated
assets in the four most recent quarters
as reported on the Call Report, for a
state member bank, or FR Y–9C, for a
bank holding company or savings and
loan holding company, as applicable; or
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the average of the Board-regulated
institution’s total consolidated assets in
the most recent consecutive quarters as
reported quarterly on the Boardregulated institution’s Call Report, for a
state member bank, or FR Y–9C, for a
bank holding company or savings and
loan holding company, as applicable if
the Board-regulated institution has not
filed such a report for each of the most
recent four quarters.
*
*
*
*
*
42. Section 217.63 is amended by
revising Tables 3 and 8 to read as
follows:
■
§ 217.63 Disclosures by Board-regulated
institutions described in § 217.61.
*
*
*
*
*
TABLE 3 TO § 217.63—CAPITAL ADEQUACY
Qualitative disclosures ................
Quantitative disclosures ..............
*
*
*
*
(a) A summary discussion of the Board-regulated institution’s approach to assessing the adequacy of its
capital to support current and future activities.
(b) Risk-weighted assets for:
(1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
(2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and MDBs;
(3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign banks, and credit unions;
(4) Exposures to PSEs;
(5) Corporate exposures;
(6) Residential mortgage exposures;
(7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold construction loans;
(8) HVADC exposures and HVCRE exposures;
(9) Past due loans;
(10) Other assets;
(11) Cleared transactions;
(12) Default fund contributions;
(13) Unsettled transactions;
(14) Securitization exposures; and
(15) Equity exposures
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as calculated under subpart F of this part.
(d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios:
(1) For the top consolidated group; and
(2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
(e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
*
TABLE 8 TO § 217.63—SECURITIZATION
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Quantitative Disclosures ..............
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(a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with respect to a securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion of:
(1) The Board-regulated institution’s objectives for securitizing assets, including the extent to which these
activities transfer credit risk of the underlying exposures away from the Board-regulated institution to
other entities and including the type of risks assumed and retained with resecuritization activity; 1
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk) inherent in the securitized assets;
(3) The roles played by the Board-regulated institution in the securitization process 2 and an indication of
the extent of the Board-regulated institution’s involvement in each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the credit and market risk of securitization exposures
including how those processes differ for resecuritization exposures;
(5) The Board-regulated institution’s policy for mitigating the credit risk retained through securitization
and resecuritization exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches that the Board-regulated institution follows for its securitization exposures including the type of securitization exposure to which each approach applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs that the Board-regulated institution, as sponsor, uses to securitize
third-party exposures. The Board-regulated institution must indicate whether it has exposure to these
SPEs, either on- or off-balance sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the Board-regulated institution manages or advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the securitization exposures that the Board-regulated institution has securitized
or in securitization SPEs that the Board-regulated institution sponsors.3
(c) Summary of the Board-regulated institution’s accounting policies for securitization activities, including:
(1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing retained or purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the previous period for valuing retained interests and
impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be securitized are valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
D of this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the balance sheet for arrangements that could require the Boardregulated institution to provide financial support for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes to any quantitative information since the last reporting period.
(e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the Board-regulated institution in securitizations that meet
the operational criteria provided in § 217.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic securitizations), by
exposure type, separately for securitizations of third-party exposures for which the bank acts only as sponsor.4
(f) For exposures securitized by the Board-regulated institution in securitizations that meet the operational
criteria in § 217.41:
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TABLE 8 TO § 217.63—SECURITIZATION—Continued
(1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/past due categorized by exposure type; 5 and
(2) Losses recognized by the Board-regulated institution during the current period categorized by exposure type.6
(g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures retained or purchased categorized by exposure type; and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures categorized by exposure type.
(i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures retained or purchased and the associated capital
requirements for these exposures, categorized between securitization and resecuritization exposures,
further categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight bands and by risk-based capital approach
(e.g., SSFA); and
(2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of underlying exposure in the pool of any:
(i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that has been deducted from common equity tier 1 capital;
and
(ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
(j) Summary of current year’s securitization activity, including the amount of exposures securitized (by exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by exposure type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures retained or purchased categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is applied and those not applied; and
(2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
name.
1 The Board-regulated institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates; this description should be provided
for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the Board-regulated institution is active.
2 For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement, sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
3 Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and personal and private trusts, to be noted
collectively.
4 ‘‘Exposures securitized’’ include underlying exposures originated by the bank, whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in
the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the bank’s balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by the bank from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception. Banks
are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge under this part.
5 Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
6 For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the bank’s balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other
retained residual interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the bank with respect to securitized
assets.
*
*
*
*
*
43. Section 217.101 paragraph (b) is
amended by adding a definition for
‘‘high volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure’’ to read as follows:
■
§ 217.101
Definitions.
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*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure, for purposes of
Subpart E, means a credit facility that,
prior to conversion to permanent
financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or
construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in
community development under 12
U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
as applicable, or as a ‘‘qualified
investment’’ under 12 CFR part 228, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity
described in 12 CFR 208.22(a)(3) or
228.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise
described in paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or
(4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, which includes all
land known to be used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
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based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for non-agricultural
commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in
which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than
or equal to the applicable maximum
supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the
Board’s real estate lending standards at
12 CFR part 208, appendix C;
(ii) The borrower has contributed
capital to the project in the form of cash
or unencumbered readily marketable
assets (or has paid development
expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15
percent of the real estate’s appraised ‘‘as
completed’’ value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the
amount of capital required by paragraph
(4)(ii) of this definition before the
Board-regulated institution advances
funds under the credit facility, and the
capital contributed by the borrower, or
internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the
project throughout the life of the project.
The life of a project concludes only
when the credit facility is converted to
permanent financing or is sold or paid
in full. Permanent financing may be
provided by the Board-regulated
institution that provided the ADC
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facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the Boardregulated institution’s underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 44. Section 217.131 is amended by
revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 217.131 Mechanics for calculating total
wholesale and retail risk-weighted assets.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD
for each wholesale obligor or retail
segment may not be less than 0.03
percent, except for exposures to or
directly and unconditionally guaranteed
by a sovereign entity, the Bank for
International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Commission, the European
Central Bank, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or a multilateral
development bank, to which the Boardregulated institution assigns a rating
grade associated with a PD of less than
0.03 percent.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 45. Section 217.133 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:
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§ 217.133
Cleared transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member client Board-regulated
institution must apply the risk weight
applicable to the CCP under subpart D
of this part.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member Board-regulated institution
must apply the risk weight applicable to
the CCP according to subpart D of this
part.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 46. Section 217.152 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to read
as follows:
§ 217.152
(SRWA).
Simple risk weight approach
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity
exposures. A publicly traded equity
exposure (other than an equity exposure
described in paragraph (b)(7) of this
section and including the ineffective
portion of a hedge pair) is assigned a
300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity
exposures. An equity exposure (other
than an equity exposure described in
paragraph (b)(7) of this section) that is
not publicly traded is assigned a 400
percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 47. Section 217.202, paragraph (b) is
amended by revising the definition of
‘‘Corporate debt position’’ to read as
follows:
§ 217.202
Definitions.
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*
*
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*
(b) * * *
Corporate debt position means a debt
position that is an exposure to a
company that is not a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, a multilateral
development bank, a depository
institution, a foreign bank, a credit
union, a public sector entity, a GSE, or
a securitization.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 48. Section 217.210 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) and
(b)(2)(vii)(A) to read as follows:
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§ 217.210 Standardized measurement
method for specific risk.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Certain supranational entity and
multilateral development bank debt
positions. A Board-regulated institution
may assign a 0.0 percent specific riskweighting factor to a debt position that
is an exposure to the Bank for
International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
*
*
*
*
*
(vii) * * * (A) General requirements.
(1) A Board-regulated institution that is
not an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution or is a U.S.
intermediate holding company that is
required to be established or designated
pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is
not calculating risk-weighted assets
according to Subpart E must assign a
specific risk-weighting factor to a
securitization position using either the
simplified supervisory formula
approach (SSFA) in paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section (and
§ 217.211) or assign a specific riskweighting factor of 100 percent to the
position.
(2) A Board-regulated institution that
is an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution or is a U.S.
intermediate holding company that is
required to be established or designated
pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is
calculating risk-weighted assets
according to Subpart E must calculate a
specific risk add-on for a securitization
position in accordance with paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section if the Boardregulated institution and the
securitization position each qualifies to
use the SFA in § 217.143. A Boardregulated institution that is an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
or is a U.S. intermediate holding
company that is required to be
established or designated pursuant to 12
CFR 252.153 and that is calculating riskweighted assets according to Subpart E
with a securitization position that does
not qualify for the SFA under paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section may assign
a specific risk-weighting factor to the
securitization position using the SSFA
in accordance with paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section or assign a
specific risk-weighting factor of 100
percent to the position.
(3) A Board-regulated institution must
treat a short securitization position as if
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50027
it is a long securitization position solely
for calculation purposes when using the
SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this
section or the SSFA in paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 49. Section 217.300 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (3), and
(d) to read as follows:
§ 217.300
Transitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions. Beginning January 1,
2014 for an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated
institution that is not an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution,
and in each case through December 31,
2017, a Board-regulated institution must
make the capital adjustments and
deductions in § 217.22 in accordance
with the transition requirements in this
paragraph (b). Beginning January 1,
2018, a Board-regulated institution must
make all regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions in accordance with
§ 217.22.
(1) Transition deductions from
common equity tier 1 capital. Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a
Board-regulated institution that is not
an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution, and in each case
through December 31, 2017, a Boardregulated institution, must make the
deductions required under
§ 217.22(a)(1)–(7) from common equity
tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements in
accordance with the percentages set
forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to
§ 217.300.
(i) A Board-regulated institution must
deduct the following items from
common equity tier 1 and additional tier
1 capital in accordance with the
percentages set forth in Table 2 to
§ 217.300: Goodwill (§ 217.22(a)(1)),
DTAs that arise from net operating loss
and tax credit carryforwards
(§ 217.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in
connection with a securitization
exposure (§ 217.22(a)(4)), defined
benefit pension fund assets
(§ 217.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss that
exceeds eligible credit reserves (for
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institutions that have completed the
parallel run process and that have
received notifications from the Board
pursuant to § 217.121(d) of subpart E)
(§ 217.22(a)(6)), and financial
subsidiaries (§ 217.22(a)(7)).
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TABLE 2 TO § 217.300
Transition deductions
under § 217.22(a)(1)
and (7)
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must
deduct from common equity tier 1
capital any intangible assets other than
goodwill and MSAs in accordance with
Percentage of the
deductions from
common equity tier 1
capital
Percentage of the
deductions from tier
1 capital
20
40
60
80
100
Percentage of the
deductions from
common equity tier 1
capital
2014 .....................................................................
2015 .....................................................................
2016 .....................................................................
2017 .....................................................................
2018, and thereafter ............................................
Transition deductions under § 217.22(a)(3)–(6)
80
60
40
20
0
100
100
100
100
100
the percentages set forth in Table 3 to
§ 217.300.
(iii) A Board-regulated institution
must apply a 100 percent risk-weight to
the aggregate amount of intangible
assets other than goodwill and MSAs
that are not required to be deducted
from common equity tier 1 capital under
this section.
TABLE 3 TO § 217.300
Transition
deductions under
§ 217.22(a)(2)—
percentage of the
deductions from
common
equity tier 1 capital
Transition period
Calendar year
Calendar year
Calendar year
Calendar year
Calendar year
and thereafter
2014 .............................................................................................................................................................
2015 .............................................................................................................................................................
2016 .............................................................................................................................................................
2017 .............................................................................................................................................................
2018, ............................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................................
(2) Transition adjustments to common
equity tier 1 capital. Beginning January
1, 2014 for an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution, and
beginning January 1, 2015 for a Boardregulated institution that is not an
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, and in each case through
December 31, 2017, a Board-regulated
institution, must allocate the regulatory
20
40
60
80
100
regulated institution must allocate the
deduction between common equity tier
1 and tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 4 to § 217.300.
(ii) If the aggregate amount of the
adjustment is negative, the Boardregulated institution must add back the
adjustment to common equity tier 1
capital or to tier 1 capital, in accordance
with Table 4 to § 217.300.
adjustments related to changes in the
fair value of liabilities due to changes in
the Board-regulated institution’s own
credit risk (§ 217.22(b)(1)(iii)) between
common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1
capital in accordance with the
percentages set forth in Table 4 to
§ 217.300.
(i) If the aggregate amount of the
adjustment is positive, the Board-
TABLE 4 TO § 217.300
Transition adjustments under § 217.22(b)(1)(iii)
Percentage of the
adjustment applied to
common equity tier
1 capital
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with PROPOSALS
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
20
40
60
80
100
80
60
40
20
0
2014 .................................................................................................................
2015 .................................................................................................................
2016 .................................................................................................................
2017 .................................................................................................................
2018, and thereafter ........................................................................................
(3) Transition adjustments to AOCI
for an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution and a Boardregulated institution that has not made
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Percentage of the
adjustment applied to
tier 1 capital
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an AOCI opt-out election under
§ 217.22(b)(2). Beginning January 1,
2014 for an advanced approaches Boardregulated institution, and beginning
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January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated
institution that is not an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution
that has not made an AOCI opt-out
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election under § 217.22(b)(2), and in
each case through December 31, 2017, a
Board-regulated institution must adjust
common equity tier 1 capital with
respect to the transition AOCI
adjustment amount (transition AOCI
adjustment amount):
(i) The transition AOCI adjustment
amount is the aggregate amount of a
Board-regulated institution’s:
(A) Unrealized gains on available-forsale securities that are preferred stock
classified as an equity security under
GAAP or available-for-sale equity
exposures, plus
(B) Net unrealized gains or losses on
available-for-sale securities that are not
preferred stock classified as an equity
security under GAAP or available-forsale equity exposures, plus
(C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI
attributed to defined benefit
postretirement plans resulting from the
initial and subsequent application of the
relevant GAAP standards that pertain to
such plans (excluding, at the Boardregulated institution’s option, the
portion relating to pension assets
deducted under section 22(a)(5)), plus
(D) Accumulated net gains or losses
on cash flow hedges related to items
that are reported on the balance sheet at
fair value included in AOCI, plus
(E) Net unrealized gains or losses on
held-to-maturity securities that are
included in AOCI.
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must
make the following adjustment to its
common equity tier 1 capital:
(A) If the transition AOCI adjustment
amount is positive, the appropriate
amount must be deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 5 to § 217.300.
(B) If the transition AOCI adjustment
amount is negative, the appropriate
amount must be added back to common
equity tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 5 to § 217.300.
TABLE 5 TO § 217.300
Percentage of the
transition AOCI
adjustment amount to be
applied to common
equity
tier 1 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
(iii) A Board-regulated institution may
include in tier 2 capital the percentage
of unrealized gains on available-for-sale
preferred stock classified as an equity
security under GAAP and available-for-
80
60
40
20
0
sale equity exposures as set forth in
Table 6 to § 217.300.
TABLE 6 TO § 217.300
Percentage of
unrealized gains on
available-for-sale
preferred stock classified
as an equity security
under GAAP and
available-for-sale
equity exposures that
may be included in
tier 2 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
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*
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(c) * * *
(2) Mergers and acquisitions. (i) A
depository institution holding company
of $15 billion or more that acquires after
December 31, 2013 either a depository
institution holding company with total
consolidated assets of less than $15
billion as of December 31, 2009
(depository institution holding company
under $15 billion) or a depository
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20:28 Oct 26, 2017
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institution holding company that is a
2010 MHC, may include in regulatory
capital the non-qualifying capital
instruments issued by the acquired
organization up to the applicable
percentages set forth in Table 8 to
§ 217.300.
(ii) If a depository institution holding
company under $15 billion acquires
after December 31, 2013 a depository
institution holding company under $15
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36
27
18
9
0
billion or a 2010 MHC, and the resulting
organization has total consolidated
assets of $15 billion or more as reported
on the resulting organization’s FR Y–9C
for the period in which the transaction
occurred, the resulting organization may
include in regulatory capital nonqualifying instruments of the resulting
organization up to the applicable
percentages set forth in Table 8 to
§ 217.300.
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TABLE 8 TO § 217.300
Transition period
(calendar year)
Percentage of nonqualifying capital
instruments includable in
additional tier 1 or tier 2
capital for a depository
institution holding
company of $15 billion
or more
Calendar year 2014 .............................................................................................................................................................
Calendar year 2015 .............................................................................................................................................................
Calendar year 2016 and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
50
25
0
(3) Depository institution holding
companies under $15 billion and 2010
MHCs. (i) Non-qualifying capital
instruments issued by depository
institution holding companies under
$15 billion and 2010 MHCs prior to May
19, 2010, may be included in additional
tier 1 or tier 2 capital if the instrument
was included in tier 1 or tier 2 capital,
respectively, as of January 1, 2014.
(ii) Non-qualifying capital
instruments includable in tier 1 capital
are subject to a limit of 25 percent of tier
1 capital elements, excluding any nonqualifying capital instruments and after
applying all regulatory capital
deductions and adjustments to tier 1
capital.
(iii) Non-qualifying capital
instruments that are not included in tier
1 as a result of the limitation in
paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this section are
includable in tier 2 capital.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Non-qualifying minority interest.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an
advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, and beginning January 1,
2015 for a Board-regulated institution
that is not an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, a
Board-regulated institution may include
in tier 1 capital or total capital the
percentage of the tier 1 minority interest
and total capital minority interest
outstanding as of January 1, 2014 that
does not meet the criteria for additional
tier 1 or tier 2 capital instruments in
§ 217.20 (non-qualifying minority
interest), as set forth in Table 10 to
§ 217.300.
TABLE 10 TO § 217.300
Percentage of the
amount of surplus or
non-qualifying minority
interest that can be
included in regulatory
capital during the
transition period
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
*
*
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
*
*
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
*
12 CFR Part 324
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
For the reasons set out in the joint
preamble, the FDIC proposes to amend
12 CFR part 324 as follows.
PART 324—CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF
FDIC-SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS
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Subpart A—General Provisions
50. The authority citation for part 324
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b),
1816, 1818(a), 1818(b), 1818(c), 1818(t),
1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i),
1828(n), 1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909,
4808; 5371; 5412; Pub. L. 102–233, 105 Stat.
1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub.
L. 102–242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2355, as amended
by Pub. L. 103–325, 108 Stat. 2160, 2233 (12
U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102–242, 105 Stat.
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2236, 2386, as amended by Pub. L. 102–550,
106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note);
Pub. L. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (15
U.S.C. 78o–7 note).
51. Section 324.2 is amended by
removing the definitions of ‘‘corporate
exposure,’’ ‘‘eligible guarantor,’’ ‘‘high
volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure,’’ ‘‘investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ ‘‘non-significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,’’
and ‘‘significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ and adding the definitions
of ‘‘corporate exposure,’’ ‘‘eligible
guarantor,’’ ‘‘high volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure,’’ ‘‘high volatility commercial
real estate (HVCRE) exposure,’’
‘‘investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,’’
■
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80
60
40
20
0
‘‘non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,’’ and ‘‘significant
investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution’’ as
follows:
§ 324.2
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
Corporate exposure means an
exposure to a company that is not:
(1) An exposure to a sovereign, the
Bank for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, a multi-lateral
development bank (MDB), a depository
institution, a foreign bank, a credit
union, or a public sector entity (PSE);
(2) An exposure to a GSE;
(3) A residential mortgage exposure;
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(4) A pre-sold construction loan;
(5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
(6) A high volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure or a high volatility commercial
real estate (HVCRE) exposure;
(7) A cleared transaction;
(8) A default fund contribution;
(9) A securitization exposure;
(10) An equity exposure; or
(11) An unsettled transaction.
*
*
*
*
*
Eligible guarantor means:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for
International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan
Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European
Stability Mechanism, the European
Financial Stability Facility, a
multilateral development bank (MDB), a
depository institution, a bank holding
company, a savings and loan holding
company, a credit union, a foreign bank,
or a qualifying central counterparty; or
(2) An entity (other than a special
purpose entity):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is
issued or anytime thereafter, has issued
and outstanding an unsecured debt
security without credit enhancement
that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not
positively correlated with the credit risk
of the exposures for which it has
provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company
engaged predominately in the business
of providing credit protection (such as
a monoline bond insurer or re-insurer).
*
*
*
*
*
High-volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure means a credit facility that is
originated on or after [effective date]
and that:
(1) Primarily finances or refinances
the:
(i) Acquisition of vacant or developed
land;
(ii) Development of land to prepare to
erect new structures including, but not
limited to, the laying of sewers or water
pipes and demolishing existing
structures; or
(iii) Construction of buildings,
dwellings, or other improvements
including additions or alterations to
existing structures; and
(2) Is not a credit facility that finances
or refinances:
(i) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(ii) Real property projects that would
have the primary purpose of
‘‘community development’’ as defined
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under 12 CFR part 25 (national bank),
12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings
association) (OCC); 12 CFR part 228
(Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC); or
(iii) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, including, but not
limited to, all land used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for commercial or
residential development; and
(3) Is not a permanent loan. A
permanent loan for purposes of this
definition means a prudently
underwritten loan that has a clearly
identified ongoing source of repayment
sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments aside
from the sale of the property. For
purposes of this section, a permanent
loan does not include a loan that
finances or refinances a stabilization
period or unsold lots or units of for-sale
projects.
High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure, for purposes of
Subpart D, means a credit facility that
is either outstanding or committed prior
to [effective date] and, prior to
conversion to permanent financing,
finances or has financed the acquisition,
development, or construction (ADC) of
real property, unless the facility
finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in
community development under 12
U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
as applicable, or as a ‘‘qualified
investment’’ under 12 CFR part 345, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity
described in 12 CFR 345.12(g)(3), unless
it is otherwise described in paragraph
(1), (2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, which includes all
land known to be used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for non-agricultural
commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in
which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than
or equal to the applicable maximum
supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the
FDIC’s real estate lending standards at
12 CFR part 365, subpart A (state non-
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50031
member banks), 12 CFR 390.264 and
390.265 (state savings associations);
(ii) The borrower has contributed
capital to the project in the form of cash
or unencumbered readily marketable
assets (or has paid development
expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15
percent of the real estate’s appraised ‘‘as
completed’’ value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the
amount of capital required by paragraph
(4)(ii) of this definition before the FDICsupervised institution advances funds
under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or
internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the
project throughout the life of the project.
The life of a project concludes only
when the credit facility is converted to
permanent financing or is sold or paid
in full. Permanent financing may be
provided by the FDIC-supervised
institution that provided the ADC
facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the FDICsupervised institution’s underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
*
*
*
*
*
Investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
means a net long position calculated in
accordance with § 324.22(h) in an
instrument that is recognized as capital
for regulatory purposes by the primary
supervisor of an unconsolidated
regulated financial institution or is an
instrument that is part of the GAAP
equity of an unconsolidated unregulated
financial institution, including direct,
indirect, and synthetic exposures to
capital instruments, excluding
underwriting positions held by the
FDIC-supervised institution for five or
fewer business days.
*
*
*
*
*
Non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution means an investment by an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
where the advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution owns 10 percent
or less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
*
*
*
*
*
Significant investment in the capital
of an unconsolidated financial
institution means an investment by an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
where the advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution owns more than
10 percent of the issued and outstanding
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common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 52. Section 324.10 is amended by
revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read as
follows:
exposure under this paragraph is 10
percent; and
*
*
*
*
*
■ 53. Section 324.11 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i), (a)(2)(iv),
(a)(3)(i), and Table 1 to read as follows:
§ 324.10
§ 324.11 Capital conservation buffer and
countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Minimum capital requirements.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) * * *
(H) The credit equivalent amount of
all off-balance sheet exposures of the
FDIC-supervised institution, excluding
repo-style transactions, repurchase or
reverse repurchase or securities
borrowing or lending transactions that
qualify for sales treatment under U.S.
GAAP, and derivative transactions,
determined using the applicable credit
conversion factor under § 324.33(b),
provided, however, that the minimum
credit conversion factor that may be
assigned to an off-balance sheet
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Eligible retained income. The
eligible retained income of an FDICsupervised institution is the FDICsupervised institution’s net income,
calculated in accordance with the
instructions to the Call Report, for the
four calendar quarters preceding the
current calendar quarter, net of any
distributions and associated tax effects
not already reflected in net income.
*
*
*
*
*
(iv) Private sector credit exposure.
Private sector credit exposure means an
exposure to a company or an individual
that is not an exposure to a sovereign,
the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European
Financial Stability Facility, the
International Monetary Fund, an MDB,
a PSE, or a GSE.
(3) Calculation of capital conservation
buffer. (i) An FDIC-supervised
institution’s capital conservation buffer
is equal to the lowest of the following
ratios, calculated as of the last day of the
previous calendar quarter:
(A) The FDIC-supervised institution’s
common equity tier 1 capital ratio
minus the FDIC-supervised institution’s
minimum common equity tier 1 capital
ratio requirement under § 324.10;
(B) The FDIC-supervised institution’s
tier 1 capital ratio minus the FDICsupervised institution’s minimum tier 1
capital ratio requirement under
§ 324.10; and
(C) The FDIC-supervised institution’s
total capital ratio minus the FDICsupervised institution’s minimum total
capital ratio requirement under
§ 324.10; or
*
*
*
*
*
TABLE 1 TO § 324.11—CALCULATION OF MAXIMUM PAYOUT AMOUNT
Capital conservation buffer
Maximum payout ratio
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical capital
buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount, and greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount, and greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount, and greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount.
*
*
*
*
*
54. Section 324.20 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(1)(viii),
(c)(2), and (d)(2) to read as follows:
■
§ 324.20 Capital components and eligibility
criteria for regulatory capital instruments.
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*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(4) Any common equity tier 1
minority interest, subject to the
limitations in § 324.21.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Any cash dividend payments on
the instrument are paid out of the FDICsupervised institution’s net income or
retained earnings. An FDIC-supervised
institution must obtain prior FDIC
approval for any dividend payment
involving a reduction or retirement of
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capital stock in accordance with 12 CFR
303.241.
*
*
*
*
*
(2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to
the limitations in § 324.21, that is not
included in the FDIC-supervised
institution’s common equity tier 1
capital.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Total capital minority interest,
subject to the limitations set forth in
§ 324.21, that is not included in the
FDIC-supervised institution’s tier 1
capital.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 55. Section 324.21 is revised to reads
as follows:
§ 324.21
Minority interest.
(a) (1) Applicability. For purposes of
§ 324.20, an FDIC-supervised institution
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No payout ratio limitation
applies.
60 percent.
40 percent.
20 percent.
0 percent.
that is not an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution is subject to
the minority interest limitations in this
paragraph (a) if a consolidated
subsidiary of the FDIC-supervised
institution has issued regulatory capital
that is not owned by the FDICsupervised institution.
(2) Common equity tier 1 minority
interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the FDICsupervised institution. The amount of
common equity tier 1 minority interest
that an FDIC-supervised institution may
include in common equity tier 1 capital
must be no greater than 10 percent of
the sum of all common equity tier 1
capital elements of the FDIC-supervised
institution (not including the common
equity tier 1 minority interest itself),
less any common equity tier 1 capital
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regulatory adjustments and deductions
in accordance with § 324.22 (a) and (b).
(3) Tier 1 minority interest includable
in the tier 1 capital of the FDICsupervised institution. The amount of
tier 1 minority interest that an FDICsupervised may include in tier 1 capital
must be no greater than 10 percent of
the sum of all tier 1 capital elements of
the FDIC-supervised institution (not
including the tier 1 minority interest
itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory
adjustments and deductions in
accordance with § 324.22 (a) and (b).
(4) Total capital minority interest
includable in the total capital of the
FDIC-supervised institution. The
amount of total capital minority interest
that an FDIC-supervised institution may
include in total capital must be no
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all
total capital elements of the FDICsupervised institution (not including the
total capital minority interest itself), less
any total capital regulatory adjustments
and deductions in accordance with
§ 324.22 (a) and (b).
(b) (1) Applicability. For purposes of
§ 324.20, an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution is subject to the
minority interest limitations in this
paragraph (b) if:
(i) A consolidated subsidiary of the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution has issued regulatory capital
that is not owned by the FDICsupervised institution; and
(ii) For each relevant regulatory
capital ratio of the consolidated
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of
the subsidiary’s minimum regulatory
capital requirements plus its capital
conservation buffer.
(2) Difference in capital adequacy
standards at the subsidiary level. For
purposes of the minority interest
calculations in this section, if the
consolidated subsidiary issuing the
capital is not subject to capital adequacy
standards similar to those of the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, the advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution must
assume that the capital adequacy
standards of the advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution apply to the
subsidiary.
(3) Common equity tier 1 minority
interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the FDICsupervised institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
the amount of common equity tier 1
minority interest the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
may include in common equity tier 1
capital is equal to:
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(i) The common equity tier 1 minority
interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
common equity tier 1 capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution, multiplied
by the difference between the common
equity tier 1 capital of the subsidiary
and the lower of:
(A) The amount of common equity
tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold,
or would be required to hold pursuant
to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 324.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor; or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
that relate to the subsidiary multiplied
by
(2) The common equity tier 1 capital
ratio the subsidiary must maintain to
avoid restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 324.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
(4) Tier 1 minority interest includable
in the tier 1 capital of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution.
For each consolidated subsidiary of the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, the amount of tier 1
minority interest the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
may include in tier 1 capital is equal to:
(i) The tier 1 minority interest of the
subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
tier 1 capital that is not owned by the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution multiplied by the difference
between the tier 1 capital of the
subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of tier 1 capital the
subsidiary must hold, or would be
required to hold pursuant to paragraph
(b) of this section, to avoid restrictions
on distributions and discretionary
bonus payments under § 324.11 or
equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary’s home country supervisor,
or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
that relate to the subsidiary multiplied
by
(2) The tier 1 capital ratio the
subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 324.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
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50033
(5) Total capital minority interest
includable in the total capital of the
FDIC-supervised institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
the amount of total capital minority
interest the advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution may include in
total capital is equal to:
(i) The total capital minority interest
of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary’s
total capital that is not owned by the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution multiplied by the difference
between the total capital of the
subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of total capital the
subsidiary must hold, or would be
required to hold pursuant to paragraph
(b) of this section, to avoid restrictions
on distributions and discretionary
bonus payments under § 324.11 or
equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary’s home country supervisor,
or
(B)(1) The standardized total riskweighted assets of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
that relate to the subsidiary multiplied
by
(2) The total capital ratio the
subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and
discretionary bonus payments under
§ 324.11 or equivalent standards
established by the subsidiary’s home
country supervisor.
■ 56. Section 324.22 is amended by
revising paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d), (g),
and (h) to read as follows:
§ 324.22 Regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions.
(a) * * *
(1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated
deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section; and
(ii) For an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution, goodwill that is
embedded in the valuation of a
significant investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
in the form of common stock (and that
is reflected in the consolidated financial
statements of the advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution), in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this
section;
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Deductions from regulatory capital
related to investments in capital
instruments 23—
23 The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate
amounts deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f)
of this section after it calculates the amount of
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(1) Investment in the FDIC-supervised
institution’s own capital instruments.
An FDIC-supervised institution must
deduct an investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own capital
instruments as follows:
(i) An FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct an investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own common
stock instruments from its common
equity tier 1 capital elements to the
extent such instruments are not
excluded from regulatory capital under
§ 324.20(b)(1);
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct an investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own additional
tier 1 capital instruments from its
additional tier 1 capital elements; and
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct an investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own tier 2
capital instruments from its tier 2
capital elements.
(2) Corresponding deduction
approach. For purposes of subpart C of
this part, the corresponding deduction
approach is the methodology used for
the deductions from regulatory capital
related to reciprocal cross holdings (as
described in paragraph (c)(3) of this
section), investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an FDIC-supervised institution that is
not an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution (as described in
paragraph (c)(4) of this section), nonsignificant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution (as described in
paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and
non-common stock significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for
an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution (as described in
paragraph (c)(6) of this section). Under
the corresponding deduction approach,
an FDIC-supervised institution must
make deductions from the component of
capital for which the underlying
instrument would qualify if it were
issued by the FDIC-supervised
institution itself, as described in
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)–(iii) of this section.
If the FDIC-supervised institution does
not have a sufficient amount of a
specific component of capital to effect
the required deduction, the shortfall
must be deducted according to
paragraph (f) of this section.
(i) If an investment is in the form of
an instrument issued by a financial
institution that is not a regulated
financial institution, the FDICALLL includable in tier 2 capital under
§ 324.20(d)(3).
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supervised institution must treat the
instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital
instrument if it is common stock or
represents the most subordinated claim
in liquidation of the financial
institution; and
(B) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if it is subordinated to all
creditors of the financial institution and
is senior in liquidation only to common
shareholders.
(ii) If an investment is in the form of
an instrument issued by a regulated
financial institution and the instrument
does not meet the criteria for common
equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2
capital instruments under § 324.20, the
FDIC-supervised institution must treat
the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital
instrument if it is common stock
included in GAAP equity or represents
the most subordinated claim in
liquidation of the financial institution;
(B) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if it is included in GAAP
equity, subordinated to all creditors of
the financial institution, and senior in a
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding only to common
shareholders; and
(C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is
not included in GAAP equity but
considered regulatory capital by the
primary supervisor of the financial
institution.
(iii) If an investment is in the form of
a non-qualifying capital instrument (as
defined in § 324.300(c)), the FDICsupervised institution must treat the
instrument as:
(A) An additional tier 1 capital
instrument if such instrument was
included in the issuer’s tier 1 capital
prior to May 19, 2010; or
(B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such
instrument was included in the issuer’s
tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier
1 capital) prior to May 19, 2010.
(3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the
capital of financial institutions. An
FDIC-supervised institution must
deduct investments in the capital of
other financial institutions it holds
reciprocally, where such reciprocal
cross holdings result from a formal or
informal arrangement to swap,
exchange, or otherwise intend to hold
each other’s capital instruments, by
applying the corresponding deduction
approach.
(4) Investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions.
An FDIC-supervised institution that is
not an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution must deduct its
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions (as
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defined in § 324.2) that exceed 25
percent of the sum of the FDICsupervised institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to
common equity tier 1 capital elements
required under paragraphs (a) through
(c)(3) of this section by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.24
The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, an FDIC-supervised institution
that underwrites a failed underwriting,
with the prior written approval of the
FDIC, for the period of time stipulated
by the FDIC, is not required to deduct
an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the
extent the investment is related to the
failed underwriting.25
(5) Non-significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. (i) An advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution must
deduct its non-significant investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions (as defined in
§ 324.2) that, in the aggregate, exceed 10
percent of the sum of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised
institution’s common equity tier 1
capital elements minus all deductions
from and adjustments to common equity
tier 1 capital elements required under
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this
section (the 10 percent threshold for
non-significant investments) by
applying the corresponding deduction
approach.26 The deductions described
in this section are net of associated
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this section. In addition, an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
that underwrites a failed underwriting,
24 With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for
the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an FDICsupervised institution that is not an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not
required to deduct an investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to
this paragraph if the financial institution is in
distress and if such investment is made for the
purpose of providing financial support to the
financial institution, as determined by the FDIC.
25 Any investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not
exceed the 25 percent threshold for investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
under this section must be assigned the appropriate
risk weight under subparts D or F of this part, as
applicable.
26 With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for
the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is
not required to deduct a non-significant investment
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the
financial institution is in distress and if such
investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution, as
determined by the FDIC.
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with the prior written approval of the
FDIC, for the period of time stipulated
by the FDIC, is not required to deduct
a non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution pursuant to this paragraph
(c) to the extent the investment is
related to the failed underwriting.27
(ii) The amount to be deducted under
this section from a specific capital
component is equal to:
(A) The advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution’s non-significant
investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions
exceeding the 10 percent threshold for
non-significant investments, multiplied
by
(B) The ratio of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised
institution’s non-significant investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions in the form of such
capital component to the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised
institution’s total non-significant
investments in unconsolidated financial
institutions.
(6) Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of
common stock. An advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct its significant investments
in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the
form of common stock by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.28
The deductions described in this section
are net of associated DTLs in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. In
addition, with the prior written
approval of the FDIC, for the period of
time stipulated by the FDIC, an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution that underwrites a failed
underwriting is not required to deduct
a significant investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such
investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
(d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to
common equity tier 1 capital deduction
thresholds.
27 Any non-significant investments in the capital
of unconsolidated financial institutions that do not
exceed the 10 percent threshold for non-significant
investments under this section must be assigned the
appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or F
of this part, as applicable.
28 With prior written approval of the FDIC, for the
period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not
required to deduct a significant investment in the
capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial
institution in distress which is not in the form of
common stock pursuant to this section if such
investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as
determined by the FDIC.
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(1) An FDIC-supervised institution
that is not an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution must make
deductions from regulatory capital as
described in this paragraph (d)(1).
(i) The FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the amount of each of
the items set forth in this paragraph
(d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25
percent of the sum of the FDICsupervised institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs
(a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold).29
(ii) The FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements, as set forth in (d)(1),
the amount of DTAs arising from
temporary differences that the FDICsupervised institution could not realize
through net operating loss carrybacks,
net of any related valuation allowances
and net of DTLs, in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. An FDICsupervised institution is not required to
deduct from the sum of its common
equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net
of any related valuation allowances and
net of DTLs, in accordance with
§ 324.22(e)) arising from timing
differences that the FDIC-supervised
institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks. The FDICsupervised institution must risk weight
these assets at 100 percent. For an FDICsupervised institution that is a member
of a consolidated group for tax
purposes, the amount of DTAs that
could be realized through net operating
loss carrybacks may not exceed the
amount that the FDIC-supervised
institution could reasonably expect to
have refunded by its parent holding
company.
(iii) The FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital elements the amount of MSAs
net of associated DTLs, in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section.
(iv) For purposes of calculating the
amount of DTAs subject to deduction
pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this
section, an FDIC-supervised institution
may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to
adjustments made to common equity
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this
section. An FDIC-supervised institution
that elects to exclude DTAs relating to
adjustments under paragraph (b) of this
section also must exclude DTLs and
29 The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of
this section that is not deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital must be included in the riskweighted assets of the FDIC-supervised institution
and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
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50035
must do so consistently in all future
calculations. An FDIC-supervised
institution may change its exclusion
preference only after obtaining the prior
approval of the FDIC.
(2) An advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution must make
deductions from regulatory capital as
described in this paragraph (d)(2).
(i) An advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the amount of each of the items set forth
in this paragraph (d)(2) that,
individually, exceeds 10 percent of the
sum of the advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs
(a) through (c) of this section (the 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold).
(A) DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
could not realize through net operating
loss carrybacks, net of any related
valuation allowances and net of DTLs,
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section. An advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution is not required to
deduct from the sum of its common
equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net
of any related valuation allowances and
net of DTLs, in accordance with
§ 324.22(e)) arising from timing
differences that the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
could realize through net operating loss
carrybacks. The advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution must risk
weight these assets at 100 percent. For
an FDIC-supervised institution that is a
member of a consolidated group for tax
purposes, the amount of DTAs that
could be realized through net operating
loss carrybacks may not exceed the
amount that the FDIC-supervised
institution could reasonably expect to
have refunded by its parent holding
company.
(B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section.
(C) Significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock, net of associated DTLs in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section.30 Significant investments in the
30 With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for
the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is
not required to deduct a significant investment in
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated
financial institution in distress in the form of
common stock pursuant to this section if such
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capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock subject to the 10 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold
may be reduced by any goodwill
embedded in the valuation of such
investments deducted by the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this
section. In addition, with the prior
written approval of the FDIC, for the
period of time stipulated by the FDIC,
an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution that underwrites
a failed underwriting is not required to
deduct a significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2) if such
investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
(ii) An advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution must deduct from
common equity tier 1 capital elements
the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of
this section that are not deducted as a
result of the application of the 10
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold, and that, in
aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of the
sum of the advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution’s common equity
tier 1 capital elements, minus
adjustments to and deductions from
common equity tier 1 capital required
under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
section, minus the items listed in
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15
percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold). Any goodwill that
has been deducted under paragraph
(a)(1) of this section can be excluded
from the significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock.31
(iii) For purposes of calculating the
amount of DTAs subject to the 10 and
15 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds, an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to
adjustments made to common equity
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this
section. An advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution that elects to
exclude DTAs relating to adjustments
under paragraph (b) of this section also
must exclude DTLs and must do so
consistently in all future calculations.
investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as
determined by the FDIC.
31 The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of
this section that is not deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital pursuant to this section must
be included in the risk-weighted assets of the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution
and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
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An advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution may change its
exclusion preference only after
obtaining the prior approval of the
FDIC.
*
*
*
*
*
(g) Treatment of assets that are
deducted. An FDIC-supervised
institution must exclude from
standardized total risk-weighted assets
and, as applicable, advanced
approaches total risk-weighted assets
any item that is required to be deducted
from regulatory capital.
(h) Net long position. (1) For purposes
of calculating an investment in the
FDIC-supervised institution’s own
capital instrument and an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution under this section,
the net long position is the gross long
position in the underlying instrument
determined in accordance with
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as
adjusted to recognize a short position in
the same instrument calculated in
accordance with paragraph (h)(3) of this
section.
(2) Gross long position. The gross long
position is determined as follows:
(i) For an equity exposure that is held
directly, the adjusted carrying value as
that term is defined in § 324.51(b);
(ii) For an exposure that is held
directly and is not an equity exposure
or a securitization exposure, the
exposure amount as that term is defined
in § 324.2;
(iii) For an indirect exposure, the
FDIC-supervised institution’s carrying
value of the investment in the
investment fund, provided that,
alternatively:
(A) An FDIC-supervised institution
may, with the prior approval of the
FDIC, use a conservative estimate of the
amount of its investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own capital
instruments or its investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution held through a position in an
index; or
(B) An FDIC-supervised institution
may calculate the gross long position for
investments in the FDIC-supervised
institution’s own capital instruments or
investments in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution by
multiplying the FDIC-supervised
institution’s carrying value of its
investment in the investment fund by
either:
(1) The highest stated investment
limit (in percent) for investments in the
FDIC-supervised institution’s own
capital instruments or investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions as stated in the prospectus,
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partnership agreement, or similar
contract defining permissible
investments of the investment fund; or
(2) The investment fund’s actual
holdings of investments in the FDICsupervised institution’s own capital
instruments or investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
(iv) For a synthetic exposure, the
amount of the FDIC-supervised
institution’s loss on the exposure if the
reference capital instrument were to
have a value of zero.
(3) Adjustments to reflect a short
position. In order to adjust the gross
long position to recognize a short
position in the same instrument, the
following criteria must be met:
(i) The maturity of the short position
must match the maturity of the long
position, or the short position has a
residual maturity of at least one year
(maturity requirement); or
(ii) For a position that is a trading
asset or trading liability (whether on- or
off-balance sheet) as reported on the
FDIC-supervised institution’s Call
Report if the FDIC-supervised
institution has a contractual right or
obligation to sell the long position at a
specific point in time and the
counterparty to the contract has an
obligation to purchase the long position
if the FDIC-supervised institution
exercises its right to sell, this point in
time may be treated as the maturity of
the long position such that the maturity
of the long position and short position
are deemed to match for purposes of the
maturity requirement, even if the
maturity of the short position is less
than one year; and
(iii) For an investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own capital
instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of
this section or an investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution under paragraphs (c) and (d):
(A) An FDIC-supervised institution
may only net a short position against a
long position in an investment in the
FDIC-supervised institution’s own
capital instrument under paragraph (c)
of this section if the short position
involves no counterparty credit risk.
(B) A gross long position in an
investment in the FDIC-supervised
institution’s own capital instrument or
an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution
resulting from a position in an index
may be netted against a short position
in the same index. Long and short
positions in the same index without
maturity dates are considered to have
matching maturities.
(C) A short position in an index that
is hedging a long cash or synthetic
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position in an investment in the FDICsupervised institution’s own capital
instrument or an investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution can be decomposed to
provide recognition of the hedge. More
specifically, the portion of the index
that is composed of the same underlying
instrument that is being hedged may be
used to offset the long position if both
the long position being hedged and the
short position in the index are reported
as a trading asset or trading liability
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the
FDIC-supervised institution’s Call
Report and the hedge is deemed
effective by the FDIC-supervised
institution’s internal control processes,
which have not been found to be
inadequate by the FDIC.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 58. Section 324.32 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2), (d)(3)(ii),
(j), (k), and (l) to read as follows:
§ 324.32
General risk weights.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Certain supranational entities and
multilateral development banks (MDBs).
An FDIC-supervised institution must
assign a zero percent risk weight to an
exposure to the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, or
an MDB.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i)
Except as otherwise provided under
paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3)
of this section, an FDIC-supervised
institution must assign a risk weight to
an exposure to a foreign bank, in
accordance with Table 2 to § 324.32,
based on the CRC that corresponds to
the foreign bank’s home country or the
OECD membership status of the foreign
bank’s home country if there is no CRC
applicable to the foreign bank’s home
country.
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with PROPOSALS
TABLE 2 TO § 324.32—RISK WEIGHTS
FOR EXPOSURES TO FOREIGN BANKS
Risk weight
(in percent)
CRC:
0–1 .................................
2 .....................................
3 .....................................
4–7 .................................
OECD Member with No CRC
Non-OECD Member with No
CRC ..................................
Sovereign Default .................
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20
50
100
150
20
100
150
Jkt 244001
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 20 percent risk weight to
an exposure to a foreign bank whose
home country is a member of the OECD
and does not have a CRC.
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 20 percent risk-weight to
an exposure that is a self-liquidating,
trade-related contingent item that arises
from the movement of goods and that
has a maturity of three months or less
to a foreign bank whose home country
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD
member with no CRC.
(iv) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 100 percent risk weight to
an exposure to a foreign bank whose
home country is not a member of the
OECD and does not have a CRC, with
the exception of self-liquidating, traderelated contingent items that arise from
the movement of goods, and that have
a maturity of three months or less,
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk
weight.
(v) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 150 percent risk weight to
an exposure to a foreign bank
immediately upon determining that an
event of sovereign default has occurred
in the bank’s home country, or if an
event of sovereign default has occurred
in the foreign bank’s home country
during the previous five years.
(3) * * *
(ii) A significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock
pursuant to § 324.22(d)(2)(i)(c);
*
*
*
*
*
(j)(1) High-volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC)
exposures. An FDIC-supervised
institution must assign a 130 percent
risk weight to an HVADC exposure.
(2) High-volatility commercial real
estate (HVCRE) exposures. A FDICsupervised institution must assign a 150
percent risk weight to an HVCRE
exposure
(k) Past due exposures. Except for an
exposure to a sovereign entity or a
residential mortgage exposure, if an
exposure is 90 days or more past due or
on nonaccrual:
(1) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 150 percent risk weight to
the portion of the exposure that is not
guaranteed or that is unsecured;
(2) An FDIC-supervised institution
may assign a risk weight to the
guaranteed portion of a past due
exposure based on the risk weight that
applies under § 324.36 if the guarantee
or credit derivative meets the
requirements of that section; and
(3) An FDIC-supervised institution
may assign a risk weight to the
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50037
collateralized portion of a past due
exposure based on the risk weight that
applies under § 324.37 if the collateral
meets the requirements of that section.
(l) Other assets. (1) An FDICsupervised institution must assign a
zero percent risk weight to cash owned
and held in all offices of the FDICsupervised institution or in transit; to
gold bullion held in the FDICsupervised institution’s own vaults or
held in another depository institution’s
vaults on an allocated basis, to the
extent the gold bullion assets are offset
by gold bullion liabilities; and to
exposures that arise from the settlement
of cash transactions (such as equities,
fixed income, spot foreign exchange and
spot commodities) with a central
counterparty where there is no
assumption of ongoing counterparty
credit risk by the central counterparty
after settlement of the trade and
associated default fund contributions.
(2) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 20 percent risk weight to
cash items in the process of collection.
(3) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 100 percent risk weight to
DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the FDIC-supervised
institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks.
(4) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 250 percent risk weight to
the portion of each of the following
items to the extent it is not deducted
from common equity tier 1 capital
pursuant to § 324.22(d):
(i) MSAs; and
(ii) DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the FDIC-supervised
institution could not realize through net
operating loss carrybacks.
(5) An FDIC-supervised institution
must assign a 100 percent risk weight to
all assets not specifically assigned a
different risk weight under this subpart
and that are not deducted from tier 1 or
tier 2 capital pursuant to § 324.22.
(6) Notwithstanding the requirements
of this section, an FDIC-supervised
institution may assign an asset that is
not included in one of the categories
provided in this section to the risk
weight category applicable under the
capital rules applicable to bank holding
companies and savings and loan
holding companies under 12 CFR part
217, provided that all of the following
conditions apply:
(i) The FDIC-supervised institution is
not authorized to hold the asset under
applicable law other than debt
previously contracted or similar
authority; and
(ii) The risks associated with the asset
are substantially similar to the risks of
assets that are otherwise assigned to a
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risk weight category of less than 100
percent under this subpart.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 59. Section 324.34 is amended by
revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 324.34
OTC derivative contracts.
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*
*
*
*
*
(c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC
credit derivatives. (1) Protection
purchasers. An FDIC-supervised
institution that purchases an OTC credit
derivative that is recognized under
§ 324.36 as a credit risk mitigant for an
exposure that is not a covered position
under subpart F is not required to
compute a separate counterparty credit
risk capital requirement under this
subpart D provided that the FDICsupervised institution does so
consistently for all such credit
derivatives. The FDIC-supervised
institution must either include all or
exclude all such credit derivatives that
are subject to a qualifying master netting
agreement from any measure used to
determine counterparty credit risk
exposure to all relevant counterparties
for risk-based capital purposes.
(2) Protection providers. (i) An FDICsupervised institution that is the
protection provider under an OTC credit
derivative must treat the OTC credit
derivative as an exposure to the
underlying reference asset. The FDICsupervised institution is not required to
compute a counterparty credit risk
capital requirement for the OTC credit
derivative under this subpart D,
provided that this treatment is applied
consistently for all such OTC credit
derivatives. The FDIC-supervised
institution must either include all or
exclude all such OTC credit derivatives
that are subject to a qualifying master
netting agreement from any measure
used to determine counterparty credit
risk exposure.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph
(c)(2) apply to all relevant
counterparties for risk-based capital
purposes unless the FDIC-supervised
institution is treating the OTC credit
derivative as a covered position under
subpart F, in which case the FDICsupervised institution must compute a
supplemental counterparty credit risk
capital requirement under this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 60. Section 324.35 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii), (b)(4)(ii),
(c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
§ 324.35
Cleared transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
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member client FDIC-supervised
institution must apply the risk weight
appropriate for the CCP according to
this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member client FDICsupervised institution must calculate a
risk-weighted asset amount for any
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing
member, or custodian in connection
with a cleared transaction in accordance
with the requirements under this
subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member FDIC-supervised institution
must apply the risk weight appropriate
for the CCP according to this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member FDICsupervised institution must calculate a
risk-weighted asset amount for any
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing
member, or a custodian in connection
with a cleared transaction in accordance
with requirements under this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 61. Section 324.36 is amended by
revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
§ 324.36 Guarantees and credit
derivatives: Substitution treatment.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) Substitution approach—(1) Full
coverage. If an eligible guarantee or
eligible credit derivative meets the
conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of
this section and the protection amount
(P) of the guarantee or credit derivative
is greater than or equal to the exposure
amount of the hedged exposure, an
FDIC-supervised institution may
recognize the guarantee or credit
derivative in determining the riskweighted asset amount for the hedged
exposure by substituting the risk weight
applicable to the guarantor or credit
derivative protection provider under
this subpart D for the risk weight
assigned to the exposure.
(2) Partial coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative
meets the conditions in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section and the protection
amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the exposure
amount of the hedged exposure, the
FDIC-supervised institution must treat
the hedged exposure as two separate
exposures (protected and unprotected)
in order to recognize the credit risk
mitigation benefit of the guarantee or
credit derivative.
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(i) The FDIC-supervised institution
may calculate the risk-weighted asset
amount for the protected exposure
under this subpart D, where the
applicable risk weight is the risk weight
applicable to the guarantor or credit
derivative protection provider.
(ii) The FDIC-supervised institution
must calculate the risk-weighted asset
amount for the unprotected exposure
under this subpart D, where the
applicable risk weight is that of the
unprotected portion of the hedged
exposure.
(iii) The treatment provided in this
section is applicable when the credit
risk of an exposure is covered on a
partial pro rata basis and may be
applicable when an adjustment is made
to the effective notional amount of the
guarantee or credit derivative under
paragraphs (d), (e), or (f) of this section.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 62. Section 324.37 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read as
follows:
§ 324.37
Collateralized transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) Risk weight substitution. (i) An
FDIC-supervised institution may apply a
risk weight to the portion of an exposure
that is secured by the fair value of
financial collateral (that meets the
requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this
section) based on the risk weight
assigned to the collateral under this
subpart D. For repurchase agreements,
reverse repurchase agreements, and
securities lending and borrowing
transactions, the collateral is the
instruments, gold, and cash the FDICsupervised institution has borrowed,
purchased subject to resale, or taken as
collateral from the counterparty under
the transaction. Except as provided in
paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk
weight assigned to the collateralized
portion of the exposure may not be less
than 20 percent.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 63. Section 324.38 is amended by
revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 324.38
Unsettled transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(e) * * *
(2) From the business day after the
FDIC-supervised institution has made
its delivery until five business days after
the counterparty delivery is due, the
FDIC-supervised institution must
calculate the risk-weighted asset amount
for the transaction by treating the
current fair value of the deliverables
owed to the FDIC-supervised institution
as an exposure to the counterparty and
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using the applicable counterparty risk
weight under this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 64. Section 324.42 is amended by
revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read as
follows:
§ 324.42 Risk-weighted assets for
securitization exposures.
*
*
*
*
*
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) If the FDIC-supervised institution
purchases credit protection from a
counterparty that is not a securitization
SPE, the FDIC-supervised institution
must determine the risk weight for the
exposure according to this subpart D.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 65. Section 324.52 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to read
as follows:
§ 324.52 Simple risk-weight approach
(SRWA).
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity
exposures. An equity exposure to a
sovereign, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, an
MDB, and any other entity whose credit
exposures receive a zero percent risk
weight under § 324.32 may be assigned
a zero percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity
exposures. Significant investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common
stock that are not deducted from capital
pursuant to § 324.22(d)(2) are assigned a
250 percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 66. Section 324.61 is revised to read
as follows:
§ 324.61
Purpose and scope.
Sections 324.61 through 324.63 of this
subpart establish public disclosure
requirements related to the capital
requirements described in subpart B of
this part for an FDIC-supervised
institution with total consolidated assets
of $50 billion or more as reported on the
FDIC-supervised institution’s most
recent year-end Call Report that is not
an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution making public
disclosures pursuant to § 324.172. An
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution that has not received
approval from the FDIC to exit parallel
run pursuant to § 324.121(d) is subject
to the disclosure requirements described
in §§ 324.62 and 324.63. An FDICsupervised institution with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or
more as reported on the FDICsupervised institution’s most recent
year-end Call Report that is not an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution making public disclosures
subject to § 324.172 must comply with
§ 324.62 unless it is a consolidated
subsidiary of a bank holding company,
savings and loan holding company, or
depository institution that is subject to
the disclosure requirements of § 324.62
or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking
organization that is subject to
comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction.
For purposes of this section, total
consolidated assets are determined
based on the average of the FDICsupervised institution’s total
consolidated assets in the four most
recent quarters as reported on the Call
Report; or the average of the FDICsupervised institution’s total
consolidated assets in the most recent
consecutive quarters as reported
quarterly on the FDIC-supervised
institution’s Call Report if the FDICsupervised institution has not filed such
a report for each of the most recent four
quarters.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 67. Section 324.63 is amended by
revising Table 3 and Table 8 to read as
follows:
§ 324.63 Disclosures by FDIC-supervised
institutions described in § 324.61.
*
*
*
*
*
TABLE 3 TO § 324.63—CAPITAL ADEQUACY
Qualitative disclosures ................
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Quantitative disclosures ..............
*
*
*
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*
(a) A summary discussion of the FDIC-supervised institution’s approach to assessing the adequacy of its
capital to support current and future activities.
(b) Risk-weighted assets for:
(1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
(2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and MDBs;
(3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign banks, and credit unions;
(4) Exposures to PSEs;
(5) Corporate exposures;
(6) Residential mortgage exposures;
(7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold construction loans;
(8) HVADC loans;
(9) Past due loans;
(10) Other assets;
(11) Cleared transactions;
(12) Default fund contributions;
(13) Unsettled transactions;
(14) Securitization exposures; and
(15) Equity exposures.
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as calculated under subpart F of this part.
(d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based capital ratios:
(1) For the top consolidated group; and
(2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
(e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
*
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 207 / Friday, October 27, 2017 / Proposed Rules
TABLE 8 TO § 324.63—SECURITIZATION
Qualitative Disclosures ................
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Quantitative Disclosures ..............
(a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with respect to a securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion of:
(1) The FDIC-supervised institution’s objectives for securitizing assets, including the extent to which
these activities transfer credit risk of the underlying exposures away from the FDIC-supervised institution to other entities and including the type of risks assumed and retained with resecuritization activity; 1
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk) inherent in the securitized assets;
(3) The roles played by the FDIC-supervised institution in the securitization process 2 and an indication
of the extent of the FDIC-supervised institution’s involvement in each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the credit and market risk of securitization exposures
including how those processes differ for resecuritization exposures;
(5) The FDIC-supervised institution’s policy for mitigating the credit risk retained through securitization
and resecuritization exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches that the FDIC-supervised institution follows for its securitization
exposures including the type of securitization exposure to which each approach applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs that the FDIC-supervised institution, as sponsor, uses to securitize
third-party exposures. The FDIC-supervised institution must indicate whether it has exposure to these
SPEs, either on- or off-balance sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the FDIC-supervised institution manages or advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the securitization exposures that the FDIC-supervised institution has securitized
or in securitization SPEs that the FDIC-supervised institution sponsors.3
(c) Summary of the FDIC-supervised institution’s accounting policies for securitization activities, including:
(1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing retained or purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the previous period for valuing retained interests and
impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be securitized are valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
D of this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the balance sheet for arrangements that could require the FDICsupervised institution to provide financial support for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes to any quantitative information since the last reporting period.
(e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the FDIC-supervised institution in securitizations that meet
the operational criteria provided in § 324.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic securitizations), by
exposure type, separately for securitizations of third-party exposures for which the bank acts only as sponsor.4
(f) For exposures securitized by the FDIC-supervised institution in securitizations that meet the operational
criteria in § 324.41:
(1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/past due categorized by exposure type; 5 and
(2) Losses recognized by the FDIC-supervised institution during the current period categorized by exposure type.6
(g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures retained or purchased categorized by exposure type; and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures categorized by exposure type.
(i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures retained or purchased and the associated capital requirements for these exposures, categorized between securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g.,
SSFA); and
(2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of underlying exposure in the pool of any:
(i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that has been deducted from common equity tier 1 capital;
and
(ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
(j) Summary of current year’s securitization activity, including the amount of exposures securitized (by exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by exposure type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures retained or purchased categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is applied and those not applied; and
(2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
name.
1 The FDIC-supervised institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates; this description should be provided
for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the FDIC-supervised institution is active.
2 For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement, sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
3 Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and personal and private trusts, to be noted
collectively.
4 ‘‘Exposures securitized’’ include underlying exposures originated by the FDIC-supervised institution, whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization
transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the FDIC-supervised institution’s balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by
the FDIC-supervised institution from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be
shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception. FDIC-supervised institutions are required to disclose exposures regardless
of whether there is a capital charge under this part.
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5 Include
credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the FDIC-supervised institution’s balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the FDICsupervised institution with respect to securitized assets.
6 For
*
*
*
*
*
68. Section 324.101 is amended by
revising paragraph (b) adding a
definition for ‘‘high volatility
commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure’’ to read as follows:
■
§ 324.101
Definitions.
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*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure, for purposes of
Subpart E, means a credit facility that,
prior to conversion to permanent
financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or
construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential
properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in
community development under 12
U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh),
as applicable, or as a ‘‘qualified
investment’’ under 12 CFR part 345, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity
described in 12 CFR 345.12(g), unless it
is otherwise described in paragraph (1),
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of
agricultural land, which includes all
land known to be used or usable for
agricultural purposes (such as crop and
livestock production), provided that the
valuation of the agricultural land is
based on its value for agricultural
purposes and the valuation does not
take into consideration any potential
use of the land for non-agricultural
commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in
which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than
or equal to the applicable maximum
supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the
FDIC’s real estate lending standards at
12 CFR part 365, appendix C;
(ii) The borrower has contributed
capital to the project in the form of cash
or unencumbered readily marketable
assets (or has paid development
expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15
percent of the real estate’s appraised ‘‘as
completed’’ value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the
amount of capital required by paragraph
(4)(ii) of this definition before the FDICsupervised institution advances funds
under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or
internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the
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project throughout the life of the project.
The life of a project concludes only
when the credit facility is converted to
permanent financing or is sold or paid
in full. Permanent financing may be
provided by the FDIC-supervised
institution that provided the ADC
facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the FDICsupervised institution’s underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 69. Section 324.131 is amended by
revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as
follows:
§ 324.131 Mechanics for calculating total
wholesale and retail risk-weighted assets.
*
*
*
*
*
(d) * * *
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD
for each wholesale obligor or retail
segment may not be less than 0.03
percent, except for exposures to or
directly and unconditionally guaranteed
by a sovereign entity, the Bank for
International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the
European Commission, the European
Central Bank, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or a multilateral
development bank, to which the FDICsupervised institution assigns a rating
grade associated with a PD of less than
0.03 percent.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 70. Section 324.133 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:
§ 324.133
Cleared transactions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member client FDIC-supervised
institution must apply the risk weight
applicable to the CCP under subpart D
of this part.
*
*
*
*
*
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a
CCP that is not a QCCP, a clearing
member FDIC-supervised institution
must apply the risk weight applicable to
the CCP according to subpart D of this
part.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 71. Section 324.152 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to read
as follows:
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§ 324.152
(SRWA).
Simple risk weight approach
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity
exposures. A publicly traded equity
exposure (other than an equity exposure
described in paragraph (b)(7) of this
section and including the ineffective
portion of a hedge pair) is assigned a
300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity
exposures. An equity exposure (other
than an equity exposure described in
paragraph (b)(7) of this section) that is
not publicly traded is assigned a 400
percent risk weight.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 72. Section 324.202 is amended by
revising paragraph (b) the definition of
‘‘Corporate debt position’’ to read as
follows:
§ 324.202
Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
Corporate debt position means a debt
position that is an exposure to a
company that is not a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the
European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, a multilateral
development bank, a depository
institution, a foreign bank, a credit
union, a public sector entity, a GSE, or
a securitization.
*
*
*
*
*
■ 73. Section 324.210 is amended by
revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read as
follows:
§ 324.210 Standardized measurement
method for specific risk.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Certain supranational entity and
multilateral development bank debt
positions. An FDIC-supervised
institution may assign a 0.0 percent
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt
position that is an exposure to the Bank
for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
*
*
*
*
*
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74. Section 324.300 is amended by
revising paragraphs (b) and (d) to read
as follows:
■
§ 324.300
Transitions.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Regulatory capital adjustments
and deductions. Beginning January 1,
2014 for an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised
institution that is not an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
and in each case through December 31,
2017, an FDIC-supervised institution
must make the capital adjustments and
deductions in § 324.22 in accordance
with the transition requirements in this
paragraph (b). Beginning January 1,
2018, an FDIC-supervised institution
must make all regulatory capital
adjustments and deductions in
accordance with § 324.22.
(1) Transition deductions from
common equity tier 1 capital. Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for an
FDIC-supervised institution that is not
an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution, and in each case
through December 31, 2017, an FDICsupervised institution, must make the
deductions required under
§ 324.22(a)(1)–(7) from common equity
tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements in
accordance with the percentages set
forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to
§ 324.300.
(i) An FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct the following items from
common equity tier 1 and additional tier
1 capital in accordance with the
percentages set forth in Table 2 to
§ 324.300: Goodwill (§ 324.22(a)(1)),
DTAs that arise from net operating loss
and tax credit carryforwards
(§ 324.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in
connection with a securitization
exposure (§ 324.22(a)(4)), defined
benefit pension fund assets
(§ 324.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss that
exceeds eligible credit reserves (for
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institutions that have completed the
parallel run process and that have
received notifications from the FDIC
pursuant to § 324.121(d) of subpart E)
(§ 324.22(a)(6)), and financial
subsidiaries (§ 324.22(a)(7)).
TABLE 2 TO § 324.300
Transition
deductions under
§ 324.22(a)(1), (a)(7),
(a)(8), and (a)(9)
Percentage of the
deductions from
common equity tier
1 capital
year
year
year
year
year
2014 .....................................................................
2015 .....................................................................
2016 .....................................................................
2017 .....................................................................
2018, and thereafter ............................................
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must deduct from common equity tier 1
capital any intangible assets other than
goodwill and MSAs in accordance with
100
100
100
100
100
the percentages set forth in Table 3 to
§ 324.300.
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must apply a 100 percent risk-weight to
the aggregate amount of intangible
Percentage of the
deductions from
common equity tier
1 capital
Percentage of the
deductions from tier
1 capital
20
40
60
80
100
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Transition deductions under § 324.22(a)(3)–(6)
80
60
40
20
0
assets other than goodwill and MSAs
that are not required to be deducted
from common equity tier 1 capital under
this section.
TABLE 3 TO § 324.300
Transition deductions
under § 324.22(a)(2)—
percentage of the
deductions from
common equity tier
1 capital
Transition period
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Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014 .............................................................................................................................................................
2015 .............................................................................................................................................................
2016 .............................................................................................................................................................
2017 .............................................................................................................................................................
2018, and thereafter ....................................................................................................................................
(2) Transition adjustments to common
equity tier 1 capital. Beginning January
1, 2014 for an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution, and
beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDICsupervised institution that is not an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, and in each case through
December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised
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institution, must allocate the regulatory
adjustments related to changes in the
fair value of liabilities due to changes in
the FDIC-supervised institution’s own
credit risk (§ 324.22(b)(1)(iii)) between
common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1
capital in accordance with the
percentages set forth in Table 4 to
§ 324.300.
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20
40
60
80
100
(i) If the aggregate amount of the
adjustment is positive, the FDICsupervised institution must allocate the
deduction between common equity tier
1 and tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 4 to § 324.300.
(ii) If the aggregate amount of the
adjustment is negative, the FDICsupervised institution must add back
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the adjustment to common equity tier 1
capital or to tier 1 capital, in accordance
with Table 4 to § 324.300.
TABLE 4 TO § 324.300
Transition adjustments under § 324.22(b)(1)(iii)
Percentage of the
adjustment applied to
common equity tier
1 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
Percentage of the
adjustment applied to
tier 1 capital
20
40
60
80
100
80
60
40
20
0
2014 .................................................................................................................
2015 .................................................................................................................
2016 .................................................................................................................
2017 .................................................................................................................
2018, and thereafter ........................................................................................
(3) Transition adjustments to AOCI
for an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution and an FDICsupervised institution that has not made
an AOCI opt-out election under
§ 324.22(b)(2). Beginning January 1,
2014 for an advanced approaches FDICsupervised institution, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised
institution that is not an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution
and that has not made an AOCI opt-out
election under § 324.22(b)(2), and in
each case through December 31, 2017,
an FDIC-supervised institution must
adjust common equity tier 1 capital with
respect to the transition AOCI
adjustment amount (transition AOCI
adjustment amount):
(i) The transition AOCI adjustment
amount is the aggregate amount of an
FDIC-supervised institution’s:
(A) Unrealized gains on available-forsale securities that are preferred stock
classified as an equity security under
GAAP or available-for-sale equity
exposures, plus
(B) Net unrealized gains or losses on
available-for-sale securities that are not
preferred stock classified as an equity
security under GAAP or available-forsale equity exposures, plus
(C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI
attributed to defined benefit
postretirement plans resulting from the
initial and subsequent application of the
relevant GAAP standards that pertain to
such plans (excluding, at the FDICsupervised institution’s option, the
portion relating to pension assets
deducted under § 324.22(a)(5)), plus
(D) Accumulated net gains or losses
on cash flow hedges related to items
that are reported on the balance sheet at
fair value included in AOCI, plus
(E) Net unrealized gains or losses on
held-to-maturity securities that are
included in AOCI.
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution
must make the following adjustment to
its common equity tier 1 capital:
(A) If the transition AOCI adjustment
amount is positive, the appropriate
amount must be deducted from common
equity tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 5 to § 324.300.
(B) If the transition AOCI adjustment
amount is negative, the appropriate
amount must be added back to common
equity tier 1 capital in accordance with
Table 5 to § 324.300.
TABLE 5 TO § 324.300
Percentage of the
transition AOCI
adjustment amount to be
applied to common
equity tier 1 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
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(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution
may include in tier 2 capital the
percentage of unrealized gains on
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available-for-sale preferred stock
classified as an equity security under
GAAP and available-for-sale equity
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60
40
20
0
exposures as set forth in Table 6 to
§ 324.300.
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TABLE 6 TO § 324.300
Percentage of
unrealized gains on
available-for-sale
preferred stock classified
as an equity security
under GAAP and
available-for-sale
equity exposures that
may be included in
tier 2 capital
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
*
*
*
*
*
(d) Minority interest—
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Non-qualifying minority interest.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, and beginning January 1,
2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution
that is not an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, an
FDIC-supervised institution may
include in tier 1 capital or total capital
the percentage of the tier 1 minority
36
27
18
9
0
interest and total capital minority
interest outstanding as of January 1,
2014 that does not meet the criteria for
additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital
instruments in § 324.20 (non-qualifying
minority interest), as set forth in Table
9 to § 324.300.
TABLE 9 TO § 324.300
Percentage of the
amount of surplus or
non-qualifying minority
interest that can be
included in regulatory
capital during the
transition period
Transition period
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
Calendar
year
year
year
year
year
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................................
and thereafter .....................................................................................................................................
Dated: September 26, 2017.
Keith A. Noreika,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, September 27, 2017.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017–22093 Filed 10–26–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with PROPOSALS
Dated at Washington, DC, this 27th day of
September, 2017.
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20
0
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 207 (Friday, October 27, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 49984-50044]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22093]
[[Page 49983]]
Vol. 82
Friday,
No. 207
October 27, 2017
Part III
Department of the Treasury
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
12 CFR Part 3
Federal Reserve System
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
12 CFR Part 217
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
12 CFR Part 324
Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 82 , No. 207 / Friday, October 27, 2017 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 49984]]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
12 CFR Part 3
[Docket ID OCC-2017-0018]
RIN 1557-AE10
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 217
[Regulation Q; Docket No. R-1576]
RIN 7100 AE-74
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 324
RIN 3064-AE59
Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996
AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In March 2017, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (collectively, the agencies) submitted a
report to Congress pursuant to the Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, in which they committed to
meaningfully reduce regulatory burden, especially on community banking
organizations. Consistent with that commitment, the agencies are
inviting public comment on a notice of proposed rulemaking that would
simplify compliance with certain aspects of the capital rule. A
majority of the proposed simplifications would apply solely to banking
organizations that are not subject to the advanced approaches capital
rule (non-advanced approaches banking organizations). Specifically, the
agencies are proposing that non-advanced approaches banking
organizations apply a simpler regulatory capital treatment for:
Mortgage servicing assets; certain deferred tax assets arising from
temporary differences; investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions; and capital issued by a consolidated subsidiary
of a banking organization and held by third parties (minority
interest). More generally, the proposal also includes revisions to the
treatment of certain acquisition, development, or construction
exposures that are designed to address comments regarding the current
definition of high volatility commercial real estate exposure under the
capital rule's standardized approach. Under the standardized approach,
the proposed revisions to the treatment of acquisition, development, or
construction exposures would not apply to existing exposures that are
outstanding or committed prior to any final rule's effective date.
In addition to the proposed simplifications, the agencies also are
proposing various additional clarifications and technical amendments to
the agencies' capital rule, which would apply to both non-advanced
approaches banking organizations and advanced approaches banking
organizations.
DATES: Comments must be received by December 26, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be directed to:
OCC: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC is
subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments through
the Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please use the
title ``Simplifications to the Capital Rule Pursuant to the Economic
Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996'' to facilitate
the organization and distribution of the comments. You may submit
comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal--``regulations.gov'': Go to
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2017-0018'' in the Search
Box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Comment Now'' to submit public
comments.
Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page
to get information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for
submitting public comments.
Email: [email protected].
Mail: Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Suite
3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th Street SW., Suite 3E-218,
Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
Fax: (571) 465-4326.
Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and
``Docket ID OCC-2017-0018'' in your comment. In general, the OCC will
enter all comments received into the docket and publish them on the
Regulations.gov Web site without change, including any business or
personal information that you provide such as name and address
information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received,
including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the
public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any
information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider
confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to
this rulemaking action by any of the following methods:
Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2017-0018'' in the Search
box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Open Docket Folder'' on the right
side of the screen and then ``Comments.'' Comments can be filtered by
clicking on ``View All'' and then using the filtering tools on the left
side of the screen.
Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page
to get information on using Regulations.gov. Supporting materials may
be viewed by clicking on ``Open Docket Folder'' and then clicking on
``Supporting Documents.'' The docket may be viewed after the close of
the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect and
photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC
20219. For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an
appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-
6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-
5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid
government-issued photo identification and submit to security screening
in order to inspect and photocopy comments.
Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. R-1576;
RIN 7100 AE-74, by any of the following methods:
Agency Web site: https://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments at https://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Email: [email protected]. Include docket
number in the subject line of the message.
Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.
Mail: Ann E. Misback, Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal
[[Page 49985]]
Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW., Washington, DC
20551. All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as
submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, comments
will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact information.
Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in paper form in
Room 3515, 1801 K Street NW. (between 18th and 19th Streets NW.),
Washington, DC 20006 between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on weekdays. FDIC:
You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3064-AE59 by any of the
following methods:
Agency Web site: https://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html. Follow instructions for submitting comments on
the Agency Web site.
Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Attention:
Comments/Legal ESS, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th
Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.
Hand Delivered/Courier: Comments may be hand-delivered to
the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street Building (located
on F Street) on business days between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
Email: [email protected]. Include the RIN 3064-AE59 on the
subject line of the message.
Public Inspection: All comments received must include the
agency name and RIN 3064-AE66 for this rulemaking. All comments
received will be posted without change to https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/, including any personal information provided.
Paper copies of public comments may be ordered from the FDIC Public
Information Center, 3501 North Fairfax Drive, Room E-1002, Arlington,
VA 22226 by telephone at (877) 275-3342 or (703) 562-2200.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC: Mark Ginsberg, Senior Risk Expert (202) 649-6983; or Benjamin
Pegg, Risk Expert (202) 649-7146, Capital and Regulatory Policy; or
Carl Kaminski, Special Counsel, or Rima Kundnani, Attorney, Legislative
and Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 649-5490, for persons who are
deaf or hearing impaired, TTY, (202) 649-5597, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC 20219.
Board: Constance M. Horsley, Deputy Associate Director, (202) 452-
5239; Juan Climent, Manager, (202) 872-7526; Elizabeth MacDonald,
Manager, (202) 475-6316; Andrew Willis, Supervisory Financial Analyst,
(202) 912-4323; Sean Healey, Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 912-
4611 or Matthew McQueeney, Senior Financial Analyst, (202) 452-2942,
Division of Supervision and Regulation; or Benjamin McDonough,
Assistant General Counsel (202) 452-2036; David W. Alexander, Counsel
(202) 452-2877, or Mark Buresh, Senior Attorney (202) 452-5270, Legal
Division, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C
Streets NW., Washington, DC 20551. For the hearing impaired only,
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD), (202) 263-4869.
FDIC: Benedetto Bosco, Chief, Capital Policy Section;
[email protected]; David Riley, Senior Policy Analyst, Capital Policy
Section; [email protected]; Michael Maloney, Senior Policy Analyst,
[email protected]; Stephanie Efron, Senior Policy Analyst,
[email protected]; [email protected]; Capital Markets Branch,
Division of Risk Management Supervision, (202) 898-6888; or Catherine
Wood, Counsel, [email protected]; Rachel Ackmann, Counsel,
[email protected]; Michael Phillips, Counsel, [email protected];
Supervision Branch, Legal Division, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction and Summary of the Proposed Simplifications of the
Capital Rule
II. Proposed Simplifications of and Revisions to the Capital Rule
A. HVADC Exposures
1. Background
2. Scope of the HVADC Exposure Definition
3. Exemptions From the HVADC Exposure Definition
a. Removal of the Contributed Capital Exemption Under HVADC
Exposure
b. One- to Four-Family Residential Properties
c. Community Development Projects
d. Agricultural Exposures
4. Permanent Loans
5. Risk Weight for HVADC Exposures
6. Retaining the HVCRE Exposure Definition Under the Advanced
Approaches Rule
7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
B. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the
Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
1. Background
2. Simplifying the Capital Treatment for MSAs, Temporary
Difference DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated
Financial Institutions
a. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
b. Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial
Institutions
c. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking
Organizations
C. Minority Interest
1. Background
2. Simplifying the Regulatory Capital Limitations for Minority
Interest
III. Technical Amendments to the Capital Rule
IV. Abbreviations
V. Regulatory Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
C. Plain Language
D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
E. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994
I. Introduction and Summary of the Proposed Simplifications of the
Capital Rule
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board), and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (collectively, the agencies) are
issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking (proposal or proposed rule)
with the goal of reducing regulatory compliance burden, particularly on
community banking organizations, by simplifying certain aspects of the
agencies' rules revising their risk-based and leverage capital
requirements (capital rule).\1\
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\1\ The Board and the OCC issued a joint final rule on October
11, 2013 (78 FR 62018) and the FDIC issued a substantially identical
interim final rule on September 10, 2013 (78 FR 55340). In April
2014, the FDIC adopted the interim final rule as a final rule with
no substantive changes. 79 FR 20754 (April 14, 2014).
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In 2013, the agencies adopted the capital rule to address
weaknesses that became apparent during the financial crisis of 2007-08.
Principally, the capital rule strengthened the capital requirements
applicable to banking organizations \2\ supervised by the agencies by
improving both the quality and quantity of banking organizations'
regulatory capital, and increasing the risk-sensitivity of the capital
rule.\3\
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\2\ Banking organizations subject to the agencies' capital rule
include national banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks,
savings associations, and top-tier bank holding companies and
savings and loan holding companies domiciled in the United States
not subject to the Board's Small Bank Holding Company Policy
Statement (12 CFR part 225, appendix C), but excluding certain
savings and loan holding companies that are substantially engaged in
insurance underwriting or commercial activities or that are estate
trusts, and bank holding companies and savings and loan holding
companies that are employee stock ownership plans.
\3\ 12 CFR part 217 (Board); 12 CFR part 3 (OCC); 12 CFR part
324 (FDIC).
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The capital rule provides two methodologies for determining risk-
weighted assets: (i) The standardized approach and (ii) the advanced
approaches, which include both the internal ratings-based approach and
the advanced measurement approach (the
[[Page 49986]]
advanced approaches).\4\ The standardized approach applies to all
banking organizations that are subject to the agencies' risk-based
capital regulations, whereas the advanced approaches apply only to
certain large or internationally active banking organizations (advanced
approaches banking organizations).\5\
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\4\ 12 CFR part 217, subparts D & E; 12 CFR part 3 (OCC),
Subparts D & E; 12 CFR part 324, subparts D & E (FDIC).
\5\ 12 CFR 217.1(c), 12 CFR 217.100(b) (Board); 12 CFR 3.1(c),
12 CFR 3.100(b) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.1(c), 12 CFR 324.100(b) (FDIC).
Those smaller and less complex banking organizations that do not
apply the advanced approaches are referred to as ``non-advanced
approaches banking organizations'' in this proposal.
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The agencies have received numerous questions regarding various
aspects of the capital rule since its adoption in 2013. In addition, in
connection with the agencies' review under the Economic Growth and
Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA),\6\ for which the
agencies sought comment through Federal Register notices published in
2014 and 2015, the agencies received over 230 comment letters from
insured depository institutions, trade associations, consumer and
community groups, and other interested parties.\7\ The agencies also
received numerous oral and written comments from panelists and the
public at outreach meetings.\8\ Some of these comments were similar to
the comments that the agencies had already received regarding the
capital rule, including, for example, that the capital rule is unduly
burdensome and complex. The agencies thoroughly reviewed these comments
and issued a Joint Report to Congress: Economic Growth and Regulatory
Paperwork Reduction Act (the 2017 EGRPRA report) in March 2017.\9\ In
the 2017 EGRPRA report, the agencies highlighted their intent to
meaningfully reduce regulatory burden, especially on community banking
organizations, while at the same time maintaining safety and soundness
and the quality and quantity of regulatory capital in the banking
system.
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\6\ EGRPRA requires that regulations prescribed by the agencies
be reviewed at least once every 10 years. The purpose of this review
is to identify, with input from the public, outdated or unnecessary
regulations and consider how to reduce regulatory burden on insured
depository institutions while, at the same time, ensuring their
safety and soundness and the safety and soundness of the financial
system. Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
\7\ 79 FR 32172 (June 4, 2014); 80 FR 7980 (February 13, 2015);
80 FR 32046 (June 5, 2015); and 80 FR 79724 (December 23, 2015).
\8\ Comments received during the EGRPRA review process and
transcripts of outreach meetings can be found at https://egrpra.ffiec.gov/.
\9\ 82 FR 15900 (March 30, 2017).
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In particular, the agencies indicated in the 2017 EGRPRA report
that they would develop a proposed rule to simplify the capital rule by
considering amendments to (i) replace the standardized approach's
treatment of high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures
with a simpler treatment for most acquisition, development, or
construction exposures; and, for non-advanced approaches banking
organizations, to (ii) simplify the current regulatory capital
treatment for mortgage servicing assets (MSAs), deferred tax assets
(DTAs) arising from temporary differences that an institution could not
realize through net operating loss carrybacks (temporary difference
DTAs), and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions; and (iii) simplify the calculation for the amount of
capital that can count toward regulatory requirements in cases in which
a banking organization's consolidated subsidiary has issued capital
that is held by third parties (minority interest).
Consistent with the 2017 EGRPRA report, the agencies are proposing
a number of modifications to the capital rule that are aimed at
reducing regulatory burden. First, the agencies are proposing to
replace the existing HVCRE exposure category as applied in the
standardized approach with a newly defined exposure category called
high volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure. The proposed HVADC exposure definition is intended to be
substantially simpler to implement as it removes the most complex
exclusion contained in the current HVCRE exposure definition. In
addition, the proposed rule simplifies and clarifies certain
exemptions, and clarifies the scope of exposures captured by the HVADC
exposure definition. While some of the simplifications and
clarifications may increase the scope and others may decrease it, in
the aggregate, it is likely that more acquisition, development, or
construction loans would be captured under the proposed HVADC exposure
definition than under the current HVCRE exposure definition.
Accordingly, the agencies are proposing to apply a lower risk weight to
the proposed HVADC exposure category. The proposed risk weight for
HVADC exposures would be 130 percent, a reduction from the 150 percent
risk weight that currently applies to HVCRE exposures under the capital
rule's standardized approach. The new HVADC exposure definition would
only apply to exposures originated on or after the final rule's
effective date. As described further below, the proposed rule would not
revise the treatment of HVCRE exposures for purposes of calculating the
amount of capital required under the advanced approaches. However, for
purposes of calculating their capital requirements going forward under
the standardized approach, advanced approaches banking organizations
would use the proposed HVADC exposure category.
Second, the agencies are proposing to simplify the current
regulatory capital treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for
non-advanced approaches banking organizations. As explained further
below, for these banking organizations, the proposal would eliminate
(i) the capital rule's 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold that applies individually to MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock; (ii)
the aggregate 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold that subsequently applies on a collective basis across such
items; (iii) the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold for non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions; and (iv) the deduction treatment
for significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions not in the form of common stock.\10\ Under the proposal,
for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the capital rule
would no longer have distinct treatments for significant and non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
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\10\ 12 CFR 217.22(c) and (d) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c) and (d)
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22 (c) and (d) (FDIC).
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Instead of imposing these complex treatments for MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions, the proposal would require that non-advanced
approaches banking organizations deduct from common equity tier 1
capital any amount of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that
individually exceeds 25 percent of common equity tier 1 capital (the 25
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). Consistent
with the capital rule, under the proposal, a banking organization would
continue to
[[Page 49987]]
apply a 250 percent risk weight to any MSAs or temporary DTAs not
deducted.\11\ However, for investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not deducted, the proposal would
require a banking organization to risk weight each non-deducted
exposure according to the exposure category of the investment. Advanced
approaches banking organizations, however, would be required to
continue to apply the deduction and risk-weighting treatments in the
capital rule for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
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\11\ The agencies note that they are not proposing to change the
current treatment of DTAs arising from timing differences that could
be realized through net operating loss carrybacks. Such DTAs are not
subject to deduction and are assigned a 100 percent risk weight.
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Third, the agencies are proposing a significantly simpler
methodology for non-advanced approaches banking organizations to
calculate minority interest limitations.\12\ The existing capital
rule's limitations for common equity tier 1 minority interest, tier 1
minority interest, and total capital minority interest are based on the
capital requirements and capital ratios of each of a banking
organization's consolidated subsidiaries that has issued capital
instruments that are held by third parties. The proposal would require
that non-advanced approaches banking organizations limit minority
interest based on the banking organization's capital levels rather than
on its subsidiaries' capital ratios. Specifically, a non-advanced
approaches banking organization would be allowed to include common
equity tier 1, tier 1, and total capital minority interest up to and
including 10 percent of the banking organization's common equity tier
1, tier 1, and total capital (before the inclusion of any minority
interest), respectively. Advanced approaches banking organizations,
however, would be required to continue to apply the treatment of
minority interest provided in the existing capital rule.
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\12\ 12 CFR 217.21(Board); 12 CFR 3.21 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.21
(FDIC).
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The agencies anticipate that the simplifications described above
would lead to a reduction of regulatory reporting burden for non-
advanced approaches banking organizations. Following the publication of
this proposed rule, the agencies would propose for public comment
corresponding changes to regulatory reporting forms and instructions.
The proposed rule would also make certain technical changes to the
capital rule, including some changes to the advanced approaches rule,
such as clarifying revisions, updating cross-references, and correcting
typographical errors.
In August 2017, in anticipation of this proposal, the agencies
invited public comment on a proposed rule to extend the capital rule's
transitional provisions for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of consolidated financial institutions and
certain minority interest requirements (transitions NPR).\13\ If the
transitions NPR is finalized substantially as proposed, the capital
treatment proposed in the transitions NPR would remain effective until
such time as the changes proposed in this proposal would be finalized
and become effective or the finalized transitions NPR is otherwise
superseded.
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\13\ 82 FR 40495 (August 25, 2017).
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II. Proposed Simplifications of and Revisions to the Capital Rule
A. HVADC Exposures
1. Background
The capital rule currently defines an HVCRE exposure as any credit
facility that, prior to conversion to permanent financing, finances or
has financed the acquisition, development, or construction of real
property, unless the facility finances one- to four-family residential
properties, certain agricultural or community development exposures, or
commercial real estate projects where the borrower meets certain
contributed capital requirements and other prudential criteria. In the
preamble to the capital rule, the agencies noted that their supervisory
experience had demonstrated that these exposures, compared to other
commercial real estate exposures, presented heightened risks for which
banking organizations should hold additional capital, and accordingly
adopted a 150 percent risk weight for HVCRE exposures under the
standardized approach.
Since the adoption of the capital rule, the agencies have received
numerous questions regarding various aspects of the HVCRE exposure
definition. Community banking organizations, in particular, have
asserted that the definition is unclear, overly complex, burdensome to
implement, and not applied consistently across banking organizations.
For example, banking organizations submitted comments and questions to
the agencies regarding the treatment of multi-purpose loan facilities
under the HVCRE exposure definition, including loans used to finance
both the purchase of equipment and the acquisition, development, or
construction of real property. Banking organizations also asked for
clarification regarding the various exemptions from the HVCRE exposure
definition, including the exemptions for (i) one- to four-family
residential properties, (ii) community development exposures, and (iii)
exposures where borrowers met the contributed capital requirements (as
discussed in more detail in section II.A.3.a. below).
After evaluating the comments and questions from the industry
following the publication of the capital rule, as well as the feedback
from the public received during the review process leading to the 2017
EGRPRA report, the agencies are proposing to amend the treatment in the
standardized approach for credit facilities that finance acquisition,
development, or construction activities, with the goal of simplifying
the treatment of these exposures. The agencies are proposing to replace
the HVCRE exposure category as applied in the standardized approach
with a newly defined exposure category termed HVADC exposure that would
apply to credit facilities that finance acquisition, development, or
construction activities. As compared to the HVCRE exposure definition,
the proposed HVADC exposure definition would not include the
contributed capital exemption. Additionally, the proposed definition of
HVADC exposure provides greater clarity on which acquisition,
development, or construction exposures have relatively more risk and
merit a higher risk weight than the current definition of HVCRE
exposure by including a ``primarily finances'' test. The HVADC exposure
definition also includes a definition of ``permanent loan'' to clearly
articulate when an exposure ceases being an HVADC exposure under the
propose rule. Both the ``primarily finances'' test and the definition
of ``permanent loan'' are explained in more detail below. With the
introduction of a ``primarily finances'' test and ``permanent loan''
definition, the scope of included or excluded exposures under the
proposed HVADC exposure definition will likely be different from those
captured under the current HVCRE exposure definition and will vary
across individual banking organizations. In total, the agencies believe
that the simpler HVADC exposure definition likely would capture more
acquisition, development, or construction exposures than are currently
captured by the definition of
[[Page 49988]]
HVCRE exposure. In recognition of the potentially expanded scope, the
agencies are proposing to reduce the standardized approach risk weight
for HVADC exposures, relative to the current risk weight for HVCRE
exposures.
Under the proposed rule, an HVADC exposure would receive a 130
percent risk weight as opposed to the 150 percent risk weight assigned
to HVCRE exposures under the existing standardized approach. The
proposed rule would require higher risk weights for certain
acquisition, development, or construction exposures and lower risk
weights for others. Additionally, to mitigate the potential burden on
banking organizations of having to re-evaluate all of their
acquisition, development, or construction exposures against the new
HVADC exposure definition, the proposal, under the standardized
approach, would contain a grandfathering provision to retain the
capital rule's treatment for acquisition, development, or construction
exposures outstanding or committed as of the effective date of any
final rule (as discussed in more detail in section II(A)(5)). The
proposed revisions to the standardized approach are intended to be
responsive to concerns about the difficulties of implementing the HVCRE
exposure definition, while maintaining capital requirements
commensurate with the risk profiles of different credit facilities that
finance acquisition, development, or construction activities.
2. Scope of the HVADC Exposure Definition
Under the proposed rule, the capital rule would define an HVADC
exposure as a credit facility that primarily finances or refinances:
(i) The acquisition of vacant or developed land; (ii) the development
of land to prepare to erect new structures, including, but not limited
to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and demolishing existing
structures; or (iii) the construction of buildings or dwellings, or
other improvements including additions or alterations to existing
structures. Like the current HVCRE exposure definition, the proposed
HVADC exposure definition is purpose-based. Therefore, an acquisition,
development, or construction exposure that is not secured by real
property could be considered an HVADC exposure if the purpose of the
facility is primarily to finance any of the aforementioned activities.
For purposes of the proposed HVADC exposure definition, an exposure
would be classified as an HVADC exposure only if the lending facility
``primarily finances'' acquisition, development, or construction
activities, meaning that more than 50 percent of the funds (e.g., loan
proceeds) will be used for acquisition, development, or construction
activities. In order to make this determination, a banking organization
would review the proposed use of the funds, and if more than 50 percent
of the funds is intended for acquisition, development, or construction
activities, then the facility would meet the ``primarily finances''
requirement and would fall within the scope of the HVADC exposure
definition, unless one or more of the exemption criteria are met.
For example, assume a borrower intends to use part of an $8 million
loan to acquire and develop a tract of land for a real estate project.
Of the $8 million total, $4.5 million will be disbursed for
acquisition, development, or construction purposes (e.g., buying and
developing the land and building the structure) and $3.5 million will
be used to purchase equipment to be used in the completed structure.
Because more than half of the funds are used for acquisition,
development, or construction purposes, the loan would be considered an
HVADC exposure. Any funds or land contributed by the borrower would not
impact this determination, as the determination is based on the use of
the loan proceeds. The agencies note that the inclusion of the
``primarily finances'' test may also lead banking organizations to
exclude certain multi-purpose credit facilities which finance
construction and other activities, such as equipment financing, from
the definition of an HVADC exposure. As a general matter, the agencies
expect every acquisition, development, or construction transaction to
be supported by the documentation of sources and uses of funds tailored
to the specific project, and the agencies expect each banking
organization to have a process in place to review the intended use of
funds for an acquisition, development, or construction project,
consistent with prudent underwriting practices.
Question 1: The agencies seek comment on whether the scope of the
HVADC exposure definition presents operational concerns and is clear.
Specifically, what, if any, operational challenges would banking
organizations expect when determining whether more than 50 percent of
the loan proceeds will be used for acquisition, development, or
construction purposes?
3. Exemptions From the HVADC Exposure Definition
a. Removal of the Contributed Capital Exemption Under HVADC Exposure
Banking organizations have expressed concern regarding the
contributed capital exemption under which exposures are not considered
HVCRE exposures if (i) at the origination of the loan, the loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio is less than or equal to the relevant supervisory LTV
ratio standard; \14\ (ii) before the advancement of funds, the borrower
has contributed capital to the project in the form of cash (including
cash paid for land) or readily marketable securities of at least 15
percent of the real estate's ``as-completed'' market value; and (iii)
any internally generated capital must be contractually required to stay
in the project for the life of the project. Banking organizations have
asserted that the conditions for meeting this exemption are unclear,
complex, and burdensome to implement. Further, the agencies have
received numerous questions from banking organizations on the minimum
15 percent borrower capital contribution requirement, which is measured
as a percentage of a project's ``as completed'' market value.
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\14\ 12 CFR part 208, subpart J, Appendix C (Board); 12 CFR part
34, subpart D, Appendix A (OCC); 12 CFR part 365, subpart A,
Appendix A (FDIC).
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After considering comments from banking organizations regarding
both the complexity of the contributed capital exemption, as well as
the potential inconsistent application of the exemption that results,
the agencies are proposing to not include a contributed capital
exemption within the HVADC exposure definition. The agencies considered
various means to clarify or modify the contributed capital exemption in
a manner consistent with the goals of simplifying the capital rule.
However, the agencies view the alternative approaches that retain the
contributed capital exemption as comparably complex and inconsistent
with the goal of simplifying the capital rule.
Question 2: The agencies seek comment on the degree to which the
proposed HVADC exposure definition would simplify and enhance
consistency in the treatment for credit facilities financing real
estate acquisition, development, or construction. What other
simplifications should the agencies consider to improve the simplicity
and consistent treatment of these credit facilities?
[[Page 49989]]
b. One- to Four-Family Residential Properties
The proposed definition of an HVADC exposure would exempt credit
facilities that finance the acquisition, development, or construction
of one- to four-family residential properties, similar to the exemption
in the HVCRE exposure definition. For purposes of both HVADC and HVCRE
exposures, the financing of one- to four-family residential properties
would include both loans to construct one- to four-family residential
structures and loans that combine the land acquisition, development, or
construction of one- to four-family structures, either with or without
a sales contract, including lot development loans. Therefore, credit
facilities financing the construction of one- to four-family
residential structures for which no buyer has been identified would be
included in the exemption for one- to four-family residential
properties.
In response to questions about whether the term ``residential
properties'' for these purposes includes the acquisition, development,
or construction of condominiums or cooperatives, the agencies are
clarifying that, generally, a loan that finances the acquisition,
development, or construction of condominiums and cooperatives would not
qualify for the one- to four-family residential properties exemption,
except in the instance where the project contains fewer than five
individual dwelling units. Thus, condominiums, cooperatives, and
apartment buildings would generally be treated as multifamily
properties and would not qualify for the one- to four-family
residential properties exemption. If each unit in a project is
separated from other units by a dividing wall that extends from ground
to roof (e.g., row houses or townhouses), then each unit would be
considered a single family residential property and thus exempt from
the HVADC exposure category. Further, the acquisition, development, or
construction of multiple residential properties, each containing a one-
to four-family dwelling unit (such as a loan to finance tract
development), would qualify for the one- to four-family residential
property exemption. Loans used solely to acquire undeveloped land would
not, however, qualify for the one- to four-family residential property
exemption.
Question 3: The agencies request comment on whether the proposed
exemption for one- to four-family residential properties in the HVADC
exposure category is clear such that a banking organization could
readily identify which residential loans would be exempt from the HVADC
exposure category. What, if any, additional clarification would
facilitate identifying one- to four-family residential properties for
this purpose? The agencies also solicit comment on all aspects of the
HVADC exposure category, including the proposed scope and exemptions.
c. Community Development Projects
The HVCRE exposure definition exempts community development
projects.\15\ The proposed HVADC exposure definition would continue to
exempt community development projects. However, the agencies are
proposing to simplify the definition by removing the reference to the
broader statutory citations, 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh) and 12 U.S.C.
338a. Under the proposed rule, all credit facilities financing the
acquisition, development, or construction of real property projects for
which the primary purpose is community development, as defined by the
agencies' Community Reinvestment Act rules, would be exempt from the
HVADC exposure category. In addition, the agencies are proposing to
remove the exception to the exemption for activities that promote
economic development by financing businesses or farms that meet the
size eligibility standards of the Small Business Administration's (SBA)
Development Company or Small Business Investment Company programs (13
CFR 121.301) or have gross annual revenues of $1 million or less,
unless they meet another exemption in the rule. Such loans are required
to have a community development purpose under interagency guidance. The
proposed simplified exemption for community development projects is not
intended to substantively alter the scope of the exemption for
community development projects set forth in the current HVCRE exposure
definition.
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\15\ 12 CFR part 25 (national banks) (OCC); 12 CFR part 195
(federal savings associations) (OCC); 12 CFR part 228 (Board); 12
CFR part 345 (FDIC).
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Question 4: The agencies seek comment on whether the proposed
community development exemption is clear. What, if any, additional
clarification would help banking organizations identify exposures that
meet the community development exemption? Please describe any
implementation challenges with the exemption.
d. Agricultural Exposures
The proposed HVADC exposure definition would exclude credit
facilities that finance the purchase or development of agricultural
land and would not substantively modify the current exemption for
agricultural land development set forth in the current HVCRE exposure
definition.\16\ The agencies note that the term ``agricultural'' is
broadly defined and would include, for example, timberland or fish
farms. However, the term ``agricultural,'' as it is used here, would
not include manufacturing or processing plants related to agricultural
products, such as a dairy processing plant.
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\16\ The proposed rule would make a minor clarification to the
definition of HVCRE exposure by changing the term ``non-
agricultural'' to ``commercial or residential development.''
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4. Permanent Loans
The proposed HVADC exposure definition would exclude an exposure
that is considered to be a permanent loan. In response to banking
organizations' requests for clarification of the term ``permanent
financing'' as it is used in the current HVCRE exposure definition, the
proposed HVADC exposure definition includes a definition of ``permanent
loan.'' A permanent loan for purposes of the proposed HVADC exposure
definition would mean a prudently underwritten loan \17\ that has a
clearly identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service
amortizing principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the
property. The proposed rule would not require that the current loan
payments be amortizing in order for a loan to meet the definition of a
permanent loan.
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\17\ The agencies are clarifying that a loan is expected to be
prudently underwritten in order to meet the definition of a
permanent loan. The Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending
Policies provide standards for banking organizations in developing
such written policies, limits, and standards. 12 CFR part 208,
subpart J, Appendix C (Board); 12 CFR part 34, subpart D, Appendix A
(OCC); 12 CFR part 365, subpart A, Appendix A (FDIC). Banking
organizations are required to adopt and maintain written policies
that establish appropriate limits and standards for extensions of
credit related to real estate. 12 CFR 208.51 (Board); 12 CFR 34.62
(OCC); 12 CFR 365.2 (FDIC).
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For many acquisition, development, or construction projects, the
source of repayment will be derived from the property once the project
is completed and tenants begin paying rent or the property otherwise
begins to produce income. Additionally, the agencies recognize that for
loans financing owner-occupied acquisition, development, or
construction projects, the owner may have sufficient capacity at
origination to repay the loan from ongoing operations, without relying
on proceeds from the sale or lease of the
[[Page 49990]]
property, in which case the loan would be considered a permanent loan
and thus excluded from the HVADC exposure definition, assuming it was
prudently underwritten. For example, a prudently underwritten loan to a
company that obtains financing to construct an additional facility that
does not rely on the lease income from the facility to repay the loan,
and instead relies on cash flows from other sources to cover amortizing
principal and interest payments, may be considered a permanent loan and
excluded from HVADC.
The agencies are also clarifying that bridge loans generally would
not qualify as permanent loans as the property is not generating
sufficient revenue to make amortizing principal and interest payments.
The agencies believe financing for bridge loans poses greater credit
risk than permanent loans, and, therefore, should be subject to a
higher risk weight.
Finally, even if a credit facility does not meet the definition of
a permanent loan at origination, it could subsequently meet the
definition as the property generates additional revenue sufficient to
service amortizing principal and interest payments. In such a case, the
facility may become exempt from the HVADC exposure category, provided
the loan was prudently underwritten at origination.
Question 5: The agencies seek comment on the clarity of the
exemption for permanent loans in the proposed HVADC exposure definition
and the ease with which banking organizations can determine whether an
exposure qualifies for this exemption. What, if any, additional
clarification would help banking organizations identify exposures that
meet the permanent loan exemption?
5. Risk Weight for HVADC Exposures
Currently, under the standardized approach, an HVCRE exposure
receives a 150 percent risk weight. Under the proposed rule, an HVADC
exposure would receive a 130 percent risk weight. The agencies believe
the reduced risk weight for HVADC exposures is appropriate in
recognition of the potentially broader scope of the definition, and
that this change would not result in a significant change in the
aggregate minimum capital required under the capital rule.
Specifically, by including exposures regardless of the amount of the
borrower's contributed equity, some exposures that would be included in
the HVADC exposure category may, while remaining riskier than other
commercial real estate loans, have risk-reducing qualities, such as
lower LTV ratios and higher borrower-contributed capital relative to
exposures currently in the HVCRE exposures category.
However, to mitigate the potential burden on banking organizations
of having to re-evaluate all of their acquisition, development, or
construction exposures against the new HVADC exposure definition, the
proposal, under the standardized approach, would contain a
grandfathering provision for outstanding acquisition, development, or
construction exposures. The proposal, under the standardized approach,
would retain the capital rule's HVCRE exposure definition and exposure
category treatment for all outstanding acquisition, development, or
construction exposures as of the effective date of any final rule. Only
new acquisition, development, or construction exposures originated on
or after the effective date of a final rule would need to be evaluated
against the new HVADC exposure definition. Therefore, a banking
organization would maintain an exposure's risk weight as determined
prior to the effective date of a final rule under the HVCRE exposure
definition. For example, if an outstanding acquisition, development, or
construction exposure is classified as an HVCRE exposure under the
capital rule, then the exposure would continue to have a 150 percent
risk weight until the exposure is converted to permanent financing or
is sold or paid in full. For the purposes of this grandfathering
provision, permanent financing refers to the existing HVCRE exposure
definition, which relies on a banking organization's underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans. If an outstanding acquisition,
development, or construction exposure is exempt from the HVCRE exposure
category under the capital rule, then the exposure would continue to
receive its applicable risk weight under the capital rule (e.g., 100
percent risk weight), assuming the exposure is not past due.
Based upon data reported on the Consolidated Financial Statements
for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C) and on Call Reports for insured
depository institutions as of June 30, 2017, approximately 80 percent
of banking organizations report holdings of acquisition, development,
or construction exposures, excluding one- to four-family residential
properties, and approximately 40 percent of banking organizations
report some holdings of HVCRE exposures risk weighted at 150 percent.
As highlighted above, the proposed treatment may result in a 130
percent risk weight for certain future exposures that would have
received either a 100 or a 150 percent risk weight under the capital
rule's treatment. It may also result in certain loans that would have
received a 150 percent risk weight under the current rule receiving a
100 percent risk weight under the proposed rule. At the individual
banking organization level, a banking organization currently with a
higher proportion of HVCRE exposures relative to its total acquisition,
development, or construction exposures may see a decrease in its
capital requirements on new acquisition, development, or construction
loans going forward. Conversely, a banking organization that currently
has a higher proportion of acquisition, development, or construction
exposures deemed to be excluded from the HVCRE exposure definition may
see an increase in its capital requirements on new acquisition,
development, or construction loans to the extent those exposures do not
otherwise qualify for the exemptions under the proposed HVADC exposure
definition going forward. Because of the lack of granular data on
acquisition, development, or construction loans in the regulatory
reports and since agencies cannot predict how banking organizations may
structure such exposures in the future, the agencies cannot estimate
with precision the future impact of the proposed HVADC exposure
definition at an individual banking organization level. The agencies
further note that the proposed grandfathering provision, which may
lessen regulatory compliance burden by preventing banking organizations
from having to re-evaluate their existing acquisition, development, or
construction exposures under the new HVADC exposure definition, also
would limit the potential impact of the treatment of acquisition,
development, or construction exposures under the proposed HVADC
exposures definition on banking organizations' regulatory capital.
Although the agencies anticipate that the proposed rule may lead to
the assignment of higher risk weights to certain acquisition,
development, or construction exposures going forward, the agencies
believe that the simplified definition for HVADC exposures may lead to
a reduced regulatory compliance burden in classifying acquisition,
development, or construction exposures. The agencies also expect that
the revised definition would result in increased consistency in the
treatment of acquisition, development, or construction exposures. The
agencies
[[Page 49991]]
believe that the proposed definition strikes an appropriate balance
between risk-sensitivity and complexity.
Question 6: The agencies seek comment on the agencies' goal of
achieving an appropriate balance between the proposed calibration and
expanded scope of application for HVADC exposures. The agencies are
interested in any additional data on the impact of the proposed rule's
capital treatment of HVCRE exposures and the new capital treatment of
HVADC exposures on bank holding companies, savings and loan holding
companies, and insured depository institutions, both in the aggregate
and on an individual banking organization level.
Question 7: What are the pros and cons of the grandfathering
provision and does it sufficiently mitigate the compliance burden of
having to re-evaluate all acquisition, development, or construction
exposures against the new HVADC exposure definition? Are there
alternatives to the proposed grandfathering provision that the agencies
should consider?
6. Retaining the HVCRE Exposure Definition Under the Advanced
Approaches
As noted above, the agencies are not proposing to make substantive
revisions to the advanced approaches as part of this rulemaking. The
proposed introduction of the HVADC exposure category would apply only
to the calculation of risk-weighted assets under the standardized
approach.
The HVCRE exposure category was introduced in the standardized
approach as part of the revisions to the capital rule to address the
agencies' concern that such exposures had been insufficiently
capitalized prior to and during the financial crisis of 2007-2008.
Banking organizations have commented on and raised concerns about this
exposure category and its corresponding 150 percent risk weight in the
standardized approach since its introduction, and specifically during
the 2017 EGRPRA process. Because concerns expressed by banking
organizations regarding the HVCRE exposure definition emanated
primarily from its implementation in the standardized approach, the
agencies do not believe it is necessary to make corresponding changes
to the definition in the advanced approaches. The advanced approaches
do not rely on a single risk weight for HVCRE exposure, instead
requiring banking organizations to categorize and assign risk
parameters to these exposures, as well as subject them to higher
capital requirements through an asset value correlation factor. Thus,
treatment of this exposure category in the advanced approaches diverges
substantially from its treatment in the standardized approach, and the
agencies are not proposing to replace the existing HVCRE exposure
definition under the advanced approaches. Accordingly, advanced
approaches banking organizations would continue to use the HVCRE
exposure definition to calculate their advanced approaches risk-
weighted assets, while using the HVADC exposure definition for the
purpose of calculating their risk-weighted assets under the
standardized approach.
Question 8: The agencies request comment on whether it would be
appropriate to replace the HVCRE exposure definition, as it is used in
the advanced approaches, with the proposed HVADC exposure definition.
What, if any, challenges do advanced approaches banking organizations
face as a result of the agencies maintaining the existing HVCRE
exposure definition for purposes of the advanced approaches while also
proposing to adopt the more expansive HVADC exposure definition for
purposes of the standardized approach? What, if any, changes should the
agencies consider to address these challenges?
7. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
The agencies have previously issued FAQs to provide clarity on the
existing HVCRE exposure definition. If the agencies adopt the proposal
as final, they will consider whether to revise or rescind some or all
of the HVCRE exposure-related FAQs. As the agencies are considering
comments received on this proposal, the agencies would consider whether
to issue any updated guidance related to the HVCRE exposure definition
as it pertains to its use in the advanced approaches.\18\
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\18\ ``Frequently Asked Questions on the Regulatory Capital
Rule,'' OCC Bulletin 2015-23 (April 6, 2016), available at: https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2015/bulletin-2015-23.html.
``SR 15-6: Interagency Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the
Regulatory Capital Rules'' (April 5, 2015), available at: https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1506.htm; FDIC FIL
16-2015, available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2015/fil15016.html.
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B. MSAs, Temporary Difference DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of
Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
1. Background
The capital rule currently requires that a banking organization
deduct from common equity tier 1 capital the amounts of MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock that
individually exceed 10 percent of the banking organization's common
equity tier 1 capital.\19\ In addition, any amount not deducted as a
result of the individual 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold must be deducted from a banking organization's
common equity tier 1 capital if that amount exceeds 15 percent of the
banking organization's common equity tier 1 capital. Beginning January
1, 2018, any amount of these three items that a banking organization
does not deduct from common equity tier 1 capital will be risk weighted
at 250 percent (until that time, such items are risk weighted at 100
percent).20 21
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\19\ A significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution where the
banking organization owns more than 10 percent of the issued and
outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution
(significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution). 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12
CFR 324.2 (FDIC).
\20\ Beginning on January 1, 2018, the calculation of the
aggregate 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold for these items will become stricter as any amount above
15 percent of common equity tier 1, less the amount of those items
already deducted as a result of the 10 percent common equity tier 1
capital deduction threshold, will be deducted from a banking
organization's common equity tier 1. 12 CFR 217.22(d) (Board); 12
CFR 3.22(d) (OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(d) (FDIC).
\21\ See the agencies' notice of proposed rulemaking that was
issued on August 25, 2017 (82 FR 40495).
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The capital rule further requires deductions from regulatory
capital if a banking organization holds (i) non-significant investments
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution above a
certain threshold \22\ or (ii) significant investments in the capital
of an unconsolidated financial institution that are not in the form of
common stock. Specifically, the capital rule requires that a banking
organization deduct from its regulatory capital any amount of the
organization's non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that exceeds 10 percent of the
banking organization's common equity tier 1 capital (the 10 percent
threshold for non-significant investments) \23\ in
[[Page 49992]]
accordance with the corresponding deduction approach of the capital
rule.\24\ In addition, significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions not in the form of common stock
also must be deducted from regulatory capital in their entirety in
accordance with the corresponding deduction approach.\25\
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\22\ A non-significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution is defined as an investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution where the
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution (non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution). 12 CFR 217.2 (Board); 12 CFR 3.2 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.2
(FDIC).
\23\ 12 CFR 217.22(c)(4) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(4) (OCC); 12
CFR 324.22(c)(4) (FDIC).
\24\ 12 CFR 217.22(c)(2) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(2) (OCC); 12
CFR 324.22(c)(2) (FDIC).
\25\ 12 CFR 217.22(c)(5) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(c)(5) (OCC); 12
CFR 324.22(c)(5) (FDIC).
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2. Simplifying the Capital Treatment for MSAs, Temporary Difference
DTAs, and Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial
Institutions
As highlighted in numerous questions and comments received by the
agencies through both the EGRPRA process and their respective
supervisory processes, community banking organizations have indicated
that they find the deduction approach for MSAs, temporary difference
DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions to be complex and burdensome. In addition, two banking
organization commenters asserted in the public comment period for the
EGRPRA process that the revisions to the treatment of MSAs in the
capital rule were unduly restrictive for community banks.\26\
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\26\ 82 FR 15908 (March 30, 2017).
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The agencies are proposing changes applicable to MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions to simplify their treatment while at the same
time ensuring an appropriate regulatory capital treatment to address
safety and soundness concerns. Specifically, and consistent with the
agencies' statements in the 2017 EGRPRA report, the proposed rule
would, for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, replace the
capital rule's individual 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds for MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common stock and eliminate the aggregate 15
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for such
items. The proposal would require that a non-advanced approaches
banking organization deduct from common equity tier 1 capital any
amounts of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that, individually,
exceed 25 percent of the banking organization's common equity tier 1
capital (after certain deductions and adjustments) (the 25 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). The agencies believe
that this change would appropriately balance risk-sensitivity and
complexity for non-advanced approaches banking organizations. The
imposition of the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold is expected to avoid, in a simple manner, unsafe and unsound
concentration levels of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
Although the agencies expect that the proposed simplifications for
the treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions would reduce
regulatory compliance burden, the agencies do not expect a significant
impact on the capital ratios for most non-advanced approaches banking
organizations as a result of these simplifications. Those non-advanced
approaches banking organizations with relatively substantial holdings
of MSAs or temporary difference DTAs could, however, experience a
regulatory capital benefit as a result of the proposed simplifications.
a. MSAs and Temporary Difference DTAs
In addition to the proposed 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold, any amounts of MSAs or temporary difference DTAs
that are not deducted would be risk weighted at 250 percent, consistent
with the capital rule. The agencies note that some banking
organizations suggested in the public comments associated with the
revisions to the capital rule that the deductions for MSAs and
temporary difference DTAs were unnecessarily burdensome, and urged the
agencies to eliminate the requirements altogether and revert to the
treatment for these items under the capital framework that was
applicable before 2013. Additionally, through the EGRPRA comment
process, two commenters suggested raising the deduction threshold for
MSAs from 10 percent to 100 percent of common equity tier 1 capital.
The agencies have long limited the inclusion of intangible and
higher-risk assets in regulatory capital due to the relatively high
level of uncertainty regarding the ability of banking organizations to
realize value from these assets, especially under adverse financial
conditions. The agencies believe that it is therefore important to
retain regulatory capital restrictions for MSAs and temporary
difference DTAs. Temporary difference DTAs are assets from which
banking organizations may not be able to realize value, especially
under adverse financial conditions. A banking organization's ability to
realize its temporary difference DTAs is dependent on future taxable
income; thus, the proposed limitation would continue to protect against
the possibility that the banking organization would need to establish
or increase valuation allowances for DTAs during periods of financial
stress. In the case of MSAs, the proposed treatment for MSAs would
continue to protect banking organizations from sudden fluctuations in
the value of MSAs and from the potential inability of such banking
organizations to quickly divest of MSAs at their full estimated value
during periods of financial stress.
Under section 475 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) (12 U.S.C. 1828 note), the amount of
readily marketable purchased mortgage servicing assets (PMSAs) that an
insured depository institution may include in regulatory capital cannot
be more than 90 percent of the PMSAs' fair value. Section 475 of FDICIA
provides the agencies with the authority to remove the 90 percent
limitation on PMSAs, subject to a joint determination by the agencies
that its removal would not have an adverse effect on the deposit
insurance fund or the safety and soundness of insured depository
institutions. The agencies determined that the treatment of MSAs
(including PMSAs) under the capital rule was consistent with a
determination that the 90 percent limitation could be removed because
the treatment under the capital rule (that is, applying a 250 percent
risk weight to any non-deducted MSAs) was more conservative than the
FDICIA fair value limitation and a 100 percent risk weight, which was
the risk weight applied to MSAs under the regulatory capital framework
prior to 2013.\27\ Because the proposed rule would require that MSAs
above the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold
be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital and would maintain the
250 percent risk weight for non-deducted MSAs (including PMSAs), the
agencies believe that the treatment of MSAs under the proposed rule
would be consistent with a determination that the 90 percent fair value
limitation is not necessary.
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\27\ 78 FR 62018, 62069-70 (October 13, 2013) (FRB, OCC); 78 FR
55340, 55388-89 (September 10, 2013) (FDIC).
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[[Page 49993]]
b. Investments in the Capital of Unconsolidated Financial Institutions
As mentioned above, the proposal would impose the 25 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold on investments in the capital
of unconsolidated financial institutions. A banking organization would
make any required deduction under the corresponding deduction approach.
This proposed treatment removes, for non-advanced approaches banking
organizations, the distinctions among different categories of
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the capital rule (namely non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions, significant investment in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that are in the form
of common stock, and significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that are not in the form of
common stock). In order to avoid added complexity and regulatory
burden, the agencies are not proposing a specific methodology dictating
which specific investments a non-advanced approaches banking
organization must deduct and which it must risk weight in cases where
the firm is exceeding the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold for investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions. The agencies believe that they can address any
safety and soundness concerns that arise from this flexible treatment
through the supervisory process. The agencies believe the proposed
treatment for investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions would reduce complexity while maintaining appropriate
incentives to reduce interconnectedness among banking organizations.
Under the proposed rule, non-advanced approaches banking
organizations would be required to risk weight any investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions that are not deducted
according to the relevant treatment for the exposure category of the
investment. For example, the appropriate risk weight for equity
exposures would generally be either 300 or 400 percent, depending on
whether the equity exposures are publicly traded, unless such exposures
are assigned a preferential risk weight of 100 percent, as described
below.\28\
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\28\ 12 CFR 217.52 and 53 (Board); 12 CFR 3.52 and 53 (OCC); 12
CFR 324.52 and 53 (FDIC).
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The capital rule allows banking organizations to apply a
preferential risk weight of 100 percent to the aggregated adjusted
carrying value of equity exposures that do not exceed 10 percent of a
banking organization's total capital (non-significant equity
exposures). The application of this risk weight (i) requires a banking
organization to follow an enumerated process for calculating adjusted
carrying value and (ii) mandates the equity exposures that must be
included first in determining whether the threshold has been reached.
The capital rule currently excludes significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common
stock from being eligible for a 100 percent risk weight. The proposal
would eliminate this exclusion for non-advanced approaches banking
organizations.\29\ The agencies believe that this revised approach
would appropriately balance simplicity and risk-sensitivity for non-
advanced approaches banking organizations by applying a single
definition of investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions and consolidating the different deduction treatments for
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
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\29\ Equity exposures that exceed, in the aggregate, 10 percent
of a non-advanced approaches banking organization's total capital
would then be assigned a risk weight based upon the approaches
available in sections 52 and 53 of the capital rule. 12 CFR 217.52
and 53 (Board); 12 CFR 3.52 and 53 (OCC); 12 CFR 324.52 and 53
(FDIC).
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c. Regulatory Treatment for Advanced Approaches Banking Organizations
Advanced approaches banking organizations would continue to apply
the capital rule's current treatment for MSAs, temporary difference
DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.\30\ The agencies believe that the more complex capital
deduction treatments in the capital rule are appropriate for advanced
approaches banking organizations, because their size, complexity, and
international exposure warrant a risk-sensitive treatment that more
aggressively reduces potential interconnectedness among such firms.
Accordingly, advanced approaches banking organizations would be
required to continue applying the individual 10 percent common equity
tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, as well as the aggregate 15
percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold, for
investments in MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and significant
investments in unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of
common stock when calculating their capital requirements under the
capital rule. Advanced approaches banking organizations would also
continue to apply the capital rule's treatment for non-significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions and
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of common stock.
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\30\ The agencies are making nonsubstantive changes to the
definitions of non-significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution and significant investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in section 2
of the capital rule in order to maintain the current treatment of
these items for advanced approaches banking organizations.
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Question 9: What impact would the agencies' proposed changes to the
treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations have on (i) risks to the safety and
soundness of the banking system and (ii) regulatory burden on non-
advanced approaches banking organizations? If possible, please provide
relevant data to support comments.
Question 10: What are the benefits and drawbacks of (i) the
proposed elimination of the 250 percent risk weight for significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock and (ii) the proposed risk-weighting
methodology for investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions when such investments are in the form of equity exposures?
Question 11: What, if any, operational challenges does the proposed
treatment of MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions pose? What, if any,
modifications should the agencies consider to address such challenges?
C. Minority Interest
1. Background
The capital rule limits the amount of capital issued by
consolidated subsidiaries and not owned by the parent banking
organization (minority interest) that a banking organization may
include in regulatory capital. For example, tier 1 minority interest is
created when a consolidated subsidiary of the banking organization
issues tier 1 capital to third parties. Given that minority interest is
generally not available to absorb losses at the banking organization's
consolidated level, the agencies strongly believe that inclusion of
minority interest in a banking organization's regulatory capital should
be limited. The restrictions in the
[[Page 49994]]
capital rule relating to minority interest are currently based on the
amount of capital held by the consolidated subsidiary relative to the
amount of capital the subsidiary would need to hold to avoid any
restrictions on capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments
under the capital rule's capital conservation buffer framework. Many
community banking organizations have asserted that the capital rule's
current calculation of the minority interest limitation is complex and
results in burdensome and confusing regulatory capital reporting
instructions.
2. Simplifying the Regulatory Capital Limitations for Minority Interest
Under the proposal, the agencies would replace for non-advanced
approaches banking organizations the existing calculations limiting the
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital with a simpler
calculation. Specifically, the proposed rule would allow non-advanced
approaches banking organizations to include: (i) Common equity tier 1
minority interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking organization's
common equity tier 1 capital; (ii) tier 1 minority interest up to 10
percent of the parent banking organization's tier 1 capital; and (iii)
total capital minority interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking
organization's total capital. In each case, the parent banking
organization's regulatory capital for purposes of these limitations
would be measured before the inclusion of any minority interest and
after the deductions from and adjustments to the regulatory capital of
the parent banking organization described in sections 22(a) and (b) of
the capital rule.\31\ The agencies believe that removing the current
complex calculation for the amount of includable minority interest
reduces regulatory burden without reducing the safety and soundness of
non-advanced approaches banking organizations because the proposed
minority interest limitations are simpler to calculate and still
appropriately restrictive. The agencies do not expect a significant
impact on the capital ratios for most non-advanced approaches banking
organizations as a result of these simplifications.
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\31\ 12 CFR 217.22(a) and (b) (Board); 12 CFR 3.22(a) and (b)
(OCC); 12 CFR 324.22(a) and (b) (FDIC).
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The agencies remain focused on ensuring that the capital
requirements applied to banking organizations are appropriately
tailored to an organization's size, complexity, and risk profile.
Accordingly, the largest and most internationally active banking
organizations should be required to comply with stricter or more
complex regulations, where appropriate, commensurate with their size,
complexity, and risk profile. The agencies are therefore not proposing
to change the more risk-sensitive minority interest calculation for
advanced approaches banking organizations. Given the potential
complexity in the capital structure of the largest and most
systemically important institutions, the agencies believe that
maintaining the more risk-sensitive approach for these firms better
ensures they do not overstate capital ratios at the consolidated level
as a result of overcapitalized subsidiaries, thereby protecting the
safety and soundness of the banking sector.
Question 12: What would be (i) the benefits and drawbacks and (ii)
effects on regulatory burden of the agencies' proposed revisions to the
quantitative limits for including minority interests in regulatory
capital for non-advanced approaches banking organizations? The agencies
solicit comment on all aspects of the proposed changes to the inclusion
of minority interests in regulatory capital for non-advanced approaches
banking organizations. If possible, please provide relevant data to
support comments.
III. Technical Amendments to the Capital Rule
The proposed rule would make certain technical corrections and
clarifications to the capital rule. The agencies have identified
typographical and technical errors in several provisions of the capital
rule that warrant clarification or updating. The agencies are,
therefore, proposing to revise the capital rule as described below.
Most of the proposed corrections or technical changes are self-
explanatory. In addition, there are several incorrect or imprecise
cross-references that the agencies propose to change in an effort to
better clarify the capital rule's requirements, as well as other
changes to references necessary to implement the simplifications
described previously in this preamble.
In section 1, the proposed rule would clarify that the capital
adequacy standards do not apply to Federal branches and agencies of
foreign banks that are regulated by the OCC. The OCC regulates Federal
branches and agencies of foreign banks.\32\
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\32\ 12 U.S.C. 3101-3111.
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In section 2, the proposed rule would correct an error in the
definition of investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution by changing the word ``and'' to ``or.'' This would clarify
that an instrument qualifying for the definition can be either
recognized as capital for regulatory purposes by a primary supervisor
of an unconsolidated financial institution or can be part of the equity
under U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) of an
unconsolidated unregulated financial institution.
The proposed rule would add ``the European Stability Mechanism''
and ``the European Financial Stability Facility'' to the capital rule
with respect to (i) the definition of eligible guarantor in section 2,
(ii) the list of entities eligible for a zero percent risk weight in
section 32(b), (iii) the list of equity exposures eligible for a zero
percent risk weight in section 52(b)(1), (iv) the list of entities
eligible for assignment of a rating grade associated with a probability
of default of less than 0.03 percent in section 131(d)(2), and (v)
certain supranational entities and multilateral development bank debt
positions eligible for assignment of a 0.0 percent specific risk
weighting factor in section 210(b)(2)(ii). The proposed rule would also
exclude such entities from the definition of (i) corporate exposure in
section 2, (ii) private sector credit exposure in section 11, and (iii)
corporate debt position in section 202. The agencies are making this
change because the European Stability Mechanism and the European
Financial Stability Facility were in early stages of operation and
excluded from the capital rule when it was finalized in 2013. The
proposal would update the list of entities included or excluded, as
applicable, for these purposes in the standardized approach and
advanced approaches of the capital rule and the market risk capital
rule.
The agencies are making technical amendments to section 11(a) of
the capital rule, on the capital conservation buffer, to clarify the
calculation of a banking organization's maximum payout amount for a
specific calendar quarter. First, the proposal would clarify that the
eligible retained income during a specific current calendar quarter is
the banking organization's net income, calculated in accordance with
the instructions for the Call Report or the FR Y-9C, as appropriate,
for the four calendar quarters preceding the current calendar
quarter.\33\ Second, the proposal would clarify that the key inputs for
the calculation of a banking organization's capital conservation buffer
during the current calendar quarter are the banking
[[Page 49995]]
organization's regulatory capital ratios as of the last day of the
previous calendar quarter.\34\
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\33\ 12 CFR 217.11(a)(2)(i); 12 CFR 3.11(a)(2)(i); and 12 CFR
324.11(a)(2)(i).
\34\ 12 CFR 217.11(a)(3)(i); 12 CFR 3.11(a)(3)(i); and 12 CFR
324.11(a)(3)(i).
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In section 20(d)(5) for the Board's and OCC's capital rule, the
proposed rule would provide that the reference to AOCI opt-out election
is section 22(b)(2) instead of section 20(b)(2).
In section 20(c) of the capital rule, the OCC's and FDIC's
regulations mistakenly provide that cash dividend payments on
additional tier 1 capital instruments may not be subject to a ``limit''
imposed by the contractual terms governing the instrument. This
requirement was intended to apply only to common equity tier 1 capital
instruments, and not to additional tier 1 capital instruments. The
proposed rule would harmonize the language of the agencies' capital
rule in section 20(c) by removing this requirement for additional tier
1 instruments.
In a new section 20(f) of the Board's capital rule, for purposes of
clarity and enforceability, the proposed rule would create a stand-
alone requirement that a Board-regulated banking organization may not
repurchase or redeem any common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier
1, or tier 2 capital instrument without the prior approval of the
Board. This requirement already exists in the capital rule as a
requirement for each definition of common equity tier 1, additional
tier 1, and tier 2 capital instruments in sections 20(b)(iii),
20(c)(iv), and 20(d)(x), respectively.
In section 22(g) of the capital rule, the proposed rule would
remove specific references to assets to exclude from risk weighting if
already deducted from regulatory capital. The effect of this proposed
change would be to exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any
items deducted from capital, not only the items specifically
enumerated.
In section 22(h) of the capital rule, the proposed rule would
replace inaccurate terminology with the properly defined terms
``investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution'' and ``investment in the [AGENCY]-regulated institution's
own capital instrument,'' as described in section 2.
The proposed rule would revise, for purposes of clarity, the
capital rule's sections 32(d)(2)(iii) and (iv), and create a new
section 32(d)(2)(v). The revised section 32(d)(2)(iii) would require
banking organizations to ``assign a 20 percent risk weight to an
exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related contingent item that
arises from the movement of goods and that has a maturity of three
months or less to a foreign bank whose home country has a CRC of 0, 1,
2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.'' This requirement is
currently embedded in section 32(d)(2)(iii) of the capital rule,
together with rule text related to the risk weighting of exposures to a
foreign bank whose home country is not a member of the OECD and does
not have a CRC. This latter provision would become a stand-alone
requirement in the revised section 32(d)(2)(iv) under the proposed
rule. In addition, the proposed rule would reassign the current section
32(d)(2)(iv) text as a new section 32(d)(2)(v).
In sections 34(c)(1) and 34(c)(2)(i) of the capital rule, the
proposed rule would provide that the counterparty credit risk capital
requirement references subpart D of the capital rule in its entirety
rather than just section 32 of subpart D.
In sections 35(b)(3)(ii), 35(b)(4)(ii), 35(c)(3)(ii), 35(c)(4)(ii),
36(c), 37(b)(2)(i), 38(e)(2), 42(j)(2)(ii)(A), 133(b)(3)(ii), and
133(c)(3)(ii) of the capital rule, the proposed rule would provide that
the risk weight substitution references subpart D in its entirety
rather than just section 32 of subpart D.
In section 61 of the capital rule, the proposed rule would clarify
the requirement that a non-advanced approaches banking organization
with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets would need to
complete the disclosure requirements described in sections 62 and 63,
unless it is a consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company,
savings and loan holding company, or depository institution that is
subject to the disclosure requirements of section 62, or a subsidiary
of a non-U.S. banking organization that is subject to comparable public
disclosure requirements in its home jurisdiction.
Table 8 of section 63 of the capital rule describes information
related to securitization exposures that banking organizations are
required to disclose. The capital rule revised the risk-based capital
treatment of these items, including the regulatory capital treatment of
after-tax gain-on-sale resulting from a securitization and credit-
enhancing interest-only strips that do not constitute after-tax gain-
on-sale. Because Table 8 does not properly reflect these revisions, the
agencies propose to update line (i)(2) under quantitative disclosures
to appropriately reflect these revisions.
In section 210(b)(2)(vii) of the Board's capital rule, the proposed
rule would add references to U.S. intermediate holding companies to
clarify for these firms how to calculate capital requirements related
to securitization positions under the Board's market risk capital rule
depending on whether they are using the advanced approaches to
calculate risk-weighted assets.
In table 4 of section 300 of the capital rule, the proposed rule
would revise the title ``Transition adjustments'' to reference section
22(b)(1)(iii) rather than section 22(b)(2).
In section 300(c)(2) of the Board's capital rule, the proposed rule
would clarify that the mergers and acquisitions that can potentially
affect the inclusion of certain non-qualifying capital instruments in a
Board-regulated banking organization's regulatory capital would have
occurred after December 31, 2013.
As discussed, the 2013 revisions to the capital rule required
banking organizations to increase both the quality and quantity of
regulatory capital. As a result, some items that previously were
included in the calculation of regulatory capital became excluded, and
the amounts of required regulatory capital relative to certain exposure
types increased. As part of the capital rule rulemaking, the agencies
established transition provisions to phase in many of these
requirements over several years in order to give banking organizations
sufficient time to adjust and adapt to the requirements of the rule.
Many of the transition provisions continue to be in effect, and include
ongoing phase-ins to the calculation of capital.
During the development of this proposal, the agencies recognized
the capital rule would automatically enact stricter treatments for
items potentially impacted by this proposal on January 1, 2018, while
the agencies are simultaneously working through the rulemaking process
to provide burden relief to non-advanced approaches banking
organizations for the very same items. To address this concern, in
August 2017, the agencies invited public comment on a proposed rule to
extend the current treatment under the transition provisions of the
capital rule for certain regulatory capital deductions and risk weights
and certain minority interest requirements.\35\ The comment
[[Page 49996]]
period for the transitions NPR expired on September 25, 2017.
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\35\ 82 FR 40495 (August 25, 2017). Items impacted by the
transition NPR include, for non-advanced approaches banking
institutions, (i) MSAs; (ii) temporary difference DTAs; (iii)
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions in the form of common stock; (iv) non-significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions;
(v) significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock; and
(vi) common equity tier 1 minority interest, tier 1 minority
interest, and total capital minority interest exceeding the
limitations on minority interest in the capital rule.
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In the transitions NPR, the agencies explained that the proposed
extension was intended to limit burden on banking organizations by
maintaining the transitions in effect for 2017 while the agencies
developed potential simplifications to the treatment of affected items
under the capital rule. The current proposal reflects the
simplifications referenced by the agencies in the transitions NPR. If
the transition extensions proposed in the transitions NPR are
finalized, the scheduled recalibrations under the transition provisions
of the capital rule would be halted for the affected items and the
treatment in effect for 2017 would continue until further action by the
agencies. As described in the transitions NPR, the agencies expect that
the transition extensions would cease to be appropriate upon completion
of the agencies' simplifications rulemaking process.
If the transition extensions are not finalized, all the transition
provisions currently in the capital rule would remain in effect,
including a final, stricter recalibration to the treatment of items
discussed in the transitions NPR beginning January 1, 2018, for all
banking organizations covered by the agencies' capital rule. Thus,
whether or not the transition extensions in the transitions NPR are
implemented, the agencies believe that the transitions would cease to
be appropriate upon the agencies' adoption of a final rule in
conjunction with the rulemaking process for the proposed
simplifications. Accordingly, in connection with this simplification
proposal, the agencies propose to remove the transition provisions
applicable to MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions, and minority
interest, all of which are currently scheduled to end in 2018.
Question 13: The agencies solicit comments on the proposed
technical amendments to the capital rule. What, if any, potentially
unintended consequences do the proposed changes pose and how should the
agencies consider addressing such consequences? What, if any,
additional technical amendments not already identified by the agencies
in this proposed rule would be appropriate for the agencies to consider
and why?
Question 14: While the proposed rule addresses comments received
during the EGRPRA review regarding the complexity of the risk based
capital standards, the agencies seek comment on additional alternatives
to simplify and streamline the regulatory capital rules. The agencies
recognize the difficulties in achieving simplification of the risk
based capital standards, particularly the burden related to their
calculation and reporting, and the potential disparate impact to
smaller and medium sized banks relative to their GSIB counterparts.
Therefore, the agencies seek comment on whether they should
consider a fundamental change to the manner in which banking
organizations calculate and comply with minimum capital standards such
as through the use of a simple U.S. GAAP based equity to assets ratio
(leverage ratio) for non-GSIB banks. If so, what would be the
appropriate definition and level for the ratio? Also, what relief
should be realized upon implementation of this capital standard
relative to changes in the call report and other reporting standards?
Question 15: The agencies also seek comment on whether they should
consider more comprehensive simplifications to the capital rule for
small and medium-sized banking organizations by, for example, further
simplifying risk-weighted assets and the definition of capital, or
reducing the number of regulatory capital ratios, consistent with legal
requirements. What specific simplifications should the agencies
consider and why?
IV. Abbreviations
ADC Acquisition, Development, or Construction
BHC Bank Holding Company
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CRC Country Risk Classification
DTA Deferred Tax Asset
EGRPRA Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of
1996
FAQ Frequently Asked Question
FR Federal Register
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FDICIA Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
GAAP U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GSIB Global Systemically Important Bank Holding Company
HVADC High Volatility Acquisition, Construction, or Development
HVCRE High Volatility Commercial Real Estate
IHC U.S. Intermediate Holding Company
LTV Loan-to-Value
MDB Multilateral Development Bank
MSA Mortgage Servicing Asset
NPR Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PD Probability of Default
PMSA Purchased Mortgage Servicing Asset
PRA Paperwork Reduction Act
RCDRIA Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act
of 1994
RFA Regulatory Flexibility Act
RIN Regulation Identifier Number
SBA Small Business Administration
SLHC Savings and Loan Holding Company
SMB State Member Banks
UMRA Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
U.S.C. United States Code
V. Regulatory Analyses
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork
Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521). In accordance with
the requirements of the PRA, the agencies may not conduct or sponsor,
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information
collection unless it displays a currently-valid Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) control number. The revised disclosure requirements
are found in section _.63 of the proposed rule. The OMB control number
for the OCC is 1557-0318, Board is 7100-0313, and FDIC is 3064-0153.
These information collections will be extended for three years, with
revision. The information collection requirements contained in this
proposed rulemaking have been submitted by the OCC and FDIC to OMB for
review and approval under section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C.
3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of the OMB's implementing regulations (5
CFR 1320). The Board reviewed the proposed rule under the authority
delegated to the Board by OMB.
Comments are invited on:
a. Whether the collections of information are necessary for the
proper performance of the Board's functions, including whether the
information has practical utility;
b. The accuracy or the estimate of the burden of the information
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions
used;
c. Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected;
d. Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on
respondents, including through the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology; and
e. Estimates of capital or startup costs and costs of operation,
maintenance,
[[Page 49997]]
and purchase of services to provide information.
All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on
aspects of this notice that may affect reporting, recordkeeping, or
disclosure requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the
addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document. A copy of
the comments may also be submitted to the OMB desk officer by mail to
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW., #10235,
Washington, DC 20503; facsimile to (202) 395-6974; or email to
[email protected], Attention, Federal Banking Agency Desk
Officer.
Proposed Information Collection
Title of Information Collection: Recordkeeping and Disclosure
Requirements Associated with Capital Adequacy.
Frequency: Quarterly, annual.
Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
Respondents:
OCC: National banks, state member banks, state nonmember banks, and
state and Federal savings associations.
Board: State member banks (SMBs), bank holding companies (BHCs),
U.S. intermediate holding companies (IHCs), savings and loan holding
companies (SLHCs), and global systemically important bank holding
companies (GSIBs).
FDIC: State nonmember banks, state savings associations, and
certain subsidiaries of those entities.
Current Actions: Section _.63 of the proposed rule would (1)
replace the standardized approach's treatment of high volatility
commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures with a simpler treatment for
most high volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC)
exposures and (2) break out the disclosures in Table 8 to include (i)
after-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that has been deducted from
common equity tier 1 capital and (ii) credit-enhancing interest-only
strip that is assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight. There are no
changes in burden associated with the proposed rulemaking. However, in
order to be consistent across the agencies, the agencies are applying a
conforming methodology for calculating the burden estimates. The
agencies believe that any changes to the information collections
associated with the proposed rule are the result of the conforming
methodology and not the result of the proposed rule changes.
PRA Burden Estimates
OCC
OMB control number: 1557-0318.
Estimated number of respondents: 1,365.
Estimated average hours per response:
Minimum Capital Ratios
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
Standardized Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
Advanced Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 64,513
hours for ongoing.
Board
Agency form number: FR Q.
OMB control number: 7100-0313.
Estimated number of respondents: 1,431.
Estimated average hours per response:
Minimum Capital Ratios
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--16.
Standardized Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--122.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)--226.25.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--131.25.
Advanced Approach
Recordkeeping (Initial setup)--460.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--540.77.
Recordkeeping (Ongoing quarterly)--20.
Disclosure (Initial setup)--280.
Disclosure (Ongoing)--5.78.
Disclosure (Ongoing quarterly)--35.
Disclosure (Table 13 quarterly)--5.
Risk-based Capital Surcharge for GSIBs
Recordkeeping (Ongoing)--0.5.
Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 78,183
hours for ongoing.
FDIC
OMB control number: 3064-0153.
Estimated annual burden hours: 1,088 hours initial setup, 138,391
hours for ongoing. Notably, the FDIC's estimated annual burden hours
remain unchanged from its last OMB submission. A breakdown of the
burden associated with the current information collection for 3064-0153
is contained in the FDIC's notice published on July 26, 2017 (82 FR
34668).
The proposed rule will also require changes to the Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) (FFIEC 031, FFIEC 041,
and FFIEC 051; OMB No. 1557-0081, 7100-0036, and 3064-0052),
Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies (FR Y-9C; OMB
No. 7100-0128), and Capital Assessments and Stress Testing (FR Y-14A
and Q; OMB No. 7100-0341), which will be addressed in a separate
Federal Register notice.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
OCC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., (RFA),
requires an agency, in connection with a proposed rule, to prepare an
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis describing the impact of the
rule on small entities (defined by the Small Business Administration
(SBA) for purposes of the RFA to include commercial banks and savings
institutions with total assets of $550 million or less and trust
companies with total assets of $38.5 million or less) or to certify
that the proposed rule would not have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities.
As of June 30, 2017, the OCC supervises 907 small entities.\36\
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\36\ The OCC calculated the number of small entities using the
SBA's size thresholds for commercial banks and savings institutions,
and trust companies, which are $550 million and $38.5 million,
respectively. Consistent with the General Principles of Affiliation,
13 CFR 121.103(a), the OCC counted the assets of affiliated
financial institutions when determining whether to classify a
national bank or Federal savings association as a small entity.
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The rule would apply to all OCC-supervised entities that are not
subject to the advanced approaches risk-based capital rules, and thus
potentially affects a substantial number of small entities. The OCC has
determined that 153 such entities engage in affected activities to an
extent that they would be impacted directly by the proposed rule.
Although a substantial number of small entities would be impacted by
the proposed rule, the OCC does not find that this impact is
economically significant. To determine whether a proposed rule would
have a significant effect, the OCC considers whether projected cost
increases associated with the proposed rule are greater than or equal
to either 5 percent of a small bank's total annual salaries and
benefits or 2.5 percent of an OCC-supervised small entity's total non-
interest expense. The value of the change in capital
[[Page 49998]]
exceeded these thresholds for 1 of the 907 OCC-supervised small
entities.
Therefore, the OCC certifies that the proposed rule would not have
a significant economic impact on a substantial number of OCC-supervised
small entities.
Board: The Board is providing an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis with respect to this proposed rule. As discussed in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the proposal would revise the treatment of
certain assets under the capital rule and would also make various
corrections and clarifications to the capital rule to address issues
that have been identified since the rule was issued. The Regulatory
Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (RFA), generally requires that an
agency prepare and make available an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis in connection with a notice of proposed rulemaking. Under
regulations issued by the Small Business Administration, a small entity
includes a bank, bank holding company, or savings and loan holding
company with assets of $550 million or less (small banking
organization).\37\ As of June 30, 2017, there were approximately 3,451
small bank holding companies, 224 small savings and loan holding
companies, and 566 small state member banks.
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\37\ See 13 CFR 121.201. Effective July 14, 2014, the Small
Business Administration revised the size standards for banking
organizations to $550 million in assets from $500 million in assets.
79 FR 33647 (June 12, 2014).
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Aspects of the proposed rule would apply to all state member banks,
as well as all bank holding companies and savings and loan holding
companies that are subject to the Board's regulatory capital rule.
Certain portions of the proposed rule would not apply to state member
banks, bank holding companies, and savings and loan holding companies
that are subject to the advanced approaches. In general, the Board's
capital rule only applies to bank holding companies and savings and
loan holding companies that are not subject to the Board's Small Bank
Holding Company Policy Statement, which applies to bank holding
companies and savings and loan holding companies with less than $1
billion in total assets that also meet certain additional criteria.\38\
Thus, most bank holding companies and savings and loan holding
companies that would be subject to the proposed rule exceed the $550
million asset threshold at which a banking organization would qualify
as a small banking organization.
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\38\ See 12 CFR 217.1(c)(1)(ii) and (iii); 12 CFR part 225,
appendix C; 12 CFR 238.9.
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Given that the proposed rule does not impact the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements that affected small banking organizations are
currently subject to, there would be no change to the information that
small banking organizations must track and report. The agencies
anticipate updating the relevant reporting forms at a later date to the
extent necessary to align with the capital rule.
For purposes of the standardized approach, the proposal would
replace the exposure category HVCRE with the exposure category HVADC.
HVADC exposure is expected to generally cover a broader range of
exposures than HVCRE exposure. However, the proposal would assign a 130
percent risk weight to HVADC exposures, as opposed to the 150 percent
risk weight currently assigned to HVCRE exposures. Based upon data
reported on the FR Y-9C and on Call Report information, as of June 30,
2017, about 80 percent of small state member banks, small bank holding
companies, and small savings and loan holding companies report holdings
of acquisition, development, or construction exposures, excluding one-
to four-family residential properties, and about 30 percent of state
member banks, small bank holding companies, and small savings and loan
holding companies report some holdings of HVCRE exposures risk weighted
at 150 percent. The Board expects that the expanded scope and reduced
risk-weight of HVADC exposure relative to HVCRE exposure would result
in roughly equivalent capital requirements under the proposal as
currently provided by the capital rule.
For non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the proposal
would revise the capital deductions for MSAs, temporary difference
DTAs, and investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions by raising the threshold at which such items must be
deducted and simplifying the number and interaction of required
deductions. The Board expects that the proposal would result in
slightly lower capital requirements compared to the capital rule for a
few small banking organizations that currently deduct MSAs, temporary
difference DTAs, and/or investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions. Because so few banking organizations are
currently subject to these deductions, the number of affected banking
organizations appears to be minimal.
Also for non-advanced approaches banking organizations, the
proposal would simplify the requirements related to the inclusion of
minority interest of subsidiaries in capital. The Board expects that
the proposal would generally result in more minority interest being
includable in capital than is permitted under the current rule.
However, only a few small banking organizations currently include
minority interest in capital and minority interest represents a
significant portion of capital for very few banking organizations. As a
result, the impact of this portion of the proposal is not expected to
be significant.
The remaining proposed revisions to the capital rule consist of
technical corrections and clarifications that have been identified
since the rule was issued. None of these revisions constitutes a
significant change to the capital rule and the impact of these
revisions on banking organizations is expected to be immaterial.
The Board does not believe that the proposed rule duplicates,
overlaps, or conflicts with any other Federal rules. In addition, there
are no significant alternatives to the proposed rule other than
retention of the current rule. In light of the foregoing, the Board
does not believe that the proposed rule, if adopted in final form,
would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of
small entities. Nonetheless, the Board seeks comment on whether the
proposed rule would impose undue burdens on, or have unintended
consequences for, small organizations, and whether there are ways such
potential burdens or consequences could be minimized in a manner
consistent with the purpose of the proposed rule. A final regulatory
flexibility analysis will be conducted after consideration of comments
received during the public comment period.
FDIC: The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) generally requires that,
in connection with a notice of proposed rulemaking, an agency prepare
and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis describing the impact of the proposed rule on small
entities.\39\ The Small Business Administration has defined ``small
entities'' to include banking organizations with total assets of less
than or equal to $550 million.\40\ The FDIC is providing an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis with respect to this proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\40\ 13 CFR 121.201 (as amended, effective December 2, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FDIC supervises 3,717 depository institutions,\41\ of which,
2,990 are
[[Page 49999]]
defined as small banking entities by the terms of the RFA.\42\ This
proposed rule would replace the existing HVCRE exposure category with a
new HVADC exposure category that would receive a 130 percent risk
weight. The proposed rule also would remove the individual and
aggregate deduction thresholds and replace them with individual, higher
deduction thresholds for: (i) MSAs; (ii) temporary differences DTAs;
and (iii) investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. Finally, the proposed rule would amend the methodology
that determines the amount of minority interest that is includable in
regulatory capital. According to Call Report data as of June 30, 2017,
2,589 FDIC-supervised small banking entities reported some amount of
acquisition, development or construction loans, MSAs, DTAs, deductions
related to investments in unconsolidated financial institutions, or
minority interests that could be affected by this rule making.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ FDIC-supervised institutions are set forth in 12 U.S.C.
1813(q)(2).
\42\ FDIC Call Report, June 30, 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HVADC
According to Call Report data as of June 30, 2017, there were 2,338
FDIC-supervised small banking entities that reported approximately
$14.4 billion of acquisition, development or construction loans
excluding one- to four-family residential projects (non-residential ADC
loans). Of these entities, 817 FDIC-supervised small banking entities
reported that approximately $3.6 billion of these non-residential ADC
loans would meet the current definition of an HVCRE exposure and would
qualify for the 150 percent risk weight. We assume that the remainder
of the non-residential ADC loans received a 100 percent risk weight as
a result of meeting one or more of the currently available exemptions
from the current definition of HVCRE. These exemptions relate to either
the amount of contributed capital or because the exposure is an
agricultural or farm loan, community development loan, or permanent
financing. The FDIC is unable to determine the mix of exemptions from
the HVCRE definition that FDIC-supervised small banking entities rely
upon when assigning the 100 percent risk weight because of limitations
in the Call Report data.
Under the proposed rule some future non-residential ADC loans made
by a small banking entity that are currently reported as an HVCRE
exposure may receive a 100 percent risk weight or a 130 percent risk-
weight treatment instead of the 150 percent risk-weight treatment under
the current rule. Concurrently, some future non-residential ADC loans
made by a small banking entity may receive a 130 percent risk-weight
treatment instead of the 100 percent risk-weight treatment under the
contributed capital exemption. These loans also may continue to receive
a 100 percent risk weight if they qualify under other exemptions of the
proposed rule as an agricultural or farm loan, community development
loan, a permanent loan as that term is clarified in the proposal, or a
loan that is not ``primarily'' to finance non-residential ADC as
defined in the proposal. As with the current rule, all acquisition,
development, or construction loans related to one- to four-family
residential properties would continue to receive a 100 percent risk
weight.
In the absence of Call Report information about the eligibility of
current non-residential ADC loans for the various proposed exemptions
or how the structure of future non-residential ADC loans will compare
to current non-residential ADC loans, the FDIC estimates the maximum
amount of capital that could be required under the proposed rule if it
were applied to FDIC-supervised small banking entities' current
portfolio of non-residential ADC loans (that is, ignoring the
grandfathering provision and assuming FDIC-supervised small banking
entities make no adjustments to their loan structures in response to
the rule) and assuming that no non-residential ADC loans qualify for
the exemptions as agricultural or farm loans, community development
loans, or permanent loans, or are excluded due to the ``primarily
finances'' test. Assuming that all currently held acquisition,
development, or construction exposures excluding one- to four-family
exposures, currently risk weighted at 100 percent will be risk-weighted
at 130 percent (rather than remaining at 100 percent under potentially
available exemptions), and that all HVCRE exposures risk weighted at
150 percent will be risk weighted at 130 percent (rather than 100
percent under potentially available exemptions), the FDIC estimates
that there could be a maximum increase in risk weighted assets of
approximately $2.6 billion, or less than one percent of the aggregate
risk weighted assets for the 2,338 FDIC-supervised small banking
entities. The FDIC believes that even this relatively small change to
aggregate risk weighted assets is overstated because it is likely that
a significant amount of small bank lending would meet one or more of
the qualifying exemptions.\43\ As such, the FDIC believes that any
change in capital requirements under the proposed HVADC treatment
compared to the current HVCRE treatment would be modest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ For example, for as of June 30, 2017 Call Report data, for
the 2,338 FDIC-supervised small banking entities included in this
analysis, approximately 24% of all non-ADC commercial real estate
loans were secured by Farmland and approximately 36% were secured by
Owner Occupied Nonfarm, Nonresidential properties (a proxy in this
analysis for permanent loans as defined in the HVADC definition). If
the proportion of non-ADC lending related to these exposure
categories were to be assumed consistent with the amount of non-
residential ADC lending to these exposure categories, then as much
as 60% of all non-residential ADC loans would be excluded from the
definition of HVADC solely based upon the agricultural and permanent
loan exemptions alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Threshold Deductions
The proposed rule would change the regulatory capital treatment of
MSAs, temporary difference DTAs, and investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for FDIC-supervised small banking
entities. It does so by removing the individual and aggregate deduction
thresholds for these assets and by adopting a single 25 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold for each type of asset.
According to June 30, 2017 Call Report data, at least 1,618 FDIC-
supervised small banking entities reported holding some MSAs, DTAs, and
deductions due to investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions. Only 45 small institutions reported deductions
for holdings across these different assets. The FDIC estimates that the
proposed rule would pose an immediate aggregated net benefit of $45.5
million in the form of an increase in tier 1 capital to those
institutions that currently have to calculate a deduction. The FDIC
expects that the proposed rule would yield future benefits to affected
FDIC-supervised small banking entities by reducing the likelihood of a
regulatory capital deduction due to holding these asset types. In
particular, the proposal would remove a significant capital constraint
on FDIC-supervised small banking entities that specialize in mortgage
servicing. The proposed increase in threshold deduction makes it less
likely that a small banking entity would exit or reduce its activity in
the mortgage servicing market.
Minority Interest
The proposed rule would remove the capital rule's limitation on the
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital. It does so by
allowing FDIC-supervised small banking entities to
[[Page 50000]]
include minority interest up to 10 percent of the parent banking
organization's common equity tier 1, tier 1, or total capital, not
including the minority interest. The FDIC estimates that 16 FDIC-
supervised small banking entities would be affected by the proposed
inclusion of minority interest in regulatory capital calculations. The
FDIC estimates that these FDIC-supervised small banking entities will
likely experience a net aggregated benefit of $2.5 million in the form
of an increase in tier 1 capital due to the inclusion of minority
interest. The FDIC expects that the proposed rule would yield future
benefits for affected FDIC-supervised small banking entities by
reducing the likelihood that minority interest would not be included in
a small banking entity's regulatory capital.
Compliance Costs
Finally, FDIC-supervised small banking entities are likely to incur
some implementation costs in order to comply with the proposed rule.
These costs would encompass changes to their systems designed to
calculate, manage, and report risk-weighted assets and regulatory
capital. Given the limited nature of the changes necessary to comply
with the proposed rule, the implementation costs are expected to be
minimal. Additionally, the FDIC believes that the proposed changes
would help reduce some of the compliance costs associated with these
regulations in the long-term by making them easier to apply.
The proposed rule does not impact the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements that affect FDIC-supervised small banking entities and
there would be no change to the information that FDIC-supervised small
banking entities must track and report. The FDIC anticipates updating
the relevant reporting forms at a later date to the extent necessary to
align with the capital rule.
Question 1. For FDIC-supervised small banking entities, would the
proposed rule reduce the compliance costs associated with the capital
rules? If so, how?
Conclusion
The threshold-deduction and minority-interest provisions of the
proposed rule would increase the amount of eligible regulatory capital
for a limited number of FDIC-supervised small banking entities
currently subject to deductions or limitations on these items, as
described above. The HVADC provisions of the proposed rules would
affect far more FDIC-supervised small banking entities, with effects
that will vary across institutions and are difficult to estimate. Risk
weights for some new ADC exposures will be reduced from 150 percent
under the current HVCRE treatment, to 130 percent or 100 percent under
the proposed rule if certain exemptions apply. Risk weights for other
new ADC exposures will either remain at the currently required 100
percent (if available exemptions apply) or increase to 130 percent.
However, the Call Reports do not provide data about the volumes of ADC
loans currently eligible for HVCRE exemptions for agriculture,
community development or permanent financing, or that would be eligible
going forward under the proposed clarification of the permanent
financing exemption or the proposed ``primarily finances'' test. As a
result, the net effect on regulatory capital requirements of the
proposed HVADC treatment is difficult to estimate with any precision.
As noted earlier, however, the FDIC's upper bound estimate (that
ignores the grandfathering provision and gives no credit for all the
HVADC exemptions previously described) is that risk-weighted assets of
the FDIC-supervised small banking entities affected by the rule would
increase less than one percent. This upper bound estimate gives some
comfort that the actual regulatory capital effects of the proposed
HVADC treatment are likely to be modest. The FDIC welcomes comments or
data from the institutions it supervises that would enhance our ability
to more precisely estimate the net effects of the proposed rule on
regulatory capital ratios.
The FDIC does not believe that the proposed rule duplicates,
overlaps, or conflicts with any other Federal rules. In addition, there
does not appear to be any significant alternatives to the proposed rule
other than retention of the current rule. In light of the foregoing
discussion, the FDIC does not believe that the proposed rule, if
adopted in final form, would have a significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. Nonetheless, the FDIC seeks
comment on whether the proposed rule would impose undue burdens on, or
have unintended consequences for, small organizations, and whether
there are ways such potential burdens or consequences could be
minimized in a manner consistent with the purpose of the proposed rule.
A final regulatory flexibility analysis will be conducted after
consideration of comments received during the public comment period.
C. Plain Language
Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires the Federal
banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rules
published after January 1, 2000. The agencies have sought to present
the proposed rule in a simple and straightforward manner, and invite
comment on the use of plain language. For example:
Have the agencies organized the material to suit your
needs? If not, how could they present the proposed rule more clearly?
Are the requirements in the proposed rule clearly stated?
If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?
Do the regulations contain technical language or jargon
that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?
Would a different format (grouping and order of sections,
use of headings, paragraphing) make the regulation easier to
understand? If so, what changes would achieve that?
Would more, but shorter, sections be better? If so, which
sections should be changed?
What other changes can the agencies incorporate to make
the regulation easier to understand?
D. OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
The OCC analyzed the proposed rule under the factors set forth in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under
this analysis, the OCC considered whether the proposed rule includes a
Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and
Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100
million or more in any one year (adjusted for inflation). The OCC has
determined that this proposed rule would not result in expenditures by
State, local, and Tribal governments, or the private sector, of $100
million or more in any one year.\44\ Accordingly, the OCC has not
prepared
[[Page 50001]]
a written statement to accompany this proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ The OCC estimates that proposed rule would lead to an
aggregate increase in reported regulatory capital of $4.7 billion
for national banks and Federal savings associations compared to the
amount they would report if they were required to continue to apply
the capital requirements. The OCC estimates that this increase in
reported regulatory capital--which could allow banking organizations
to increase their leverage and thus increase their tax deductions
for interest paid on debt--would have a total aggregate value of
approximately $112.8 million per year across all directly impacted
OCC-supervised entities (that is, national banks and federal savings
associations not subject to the advanced approaches risk-based
capital rule).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994
The Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of
1994 (RCDRIA) requires that each Federal banking agency, in determining
the effective date and administrative compliance requirements for new
regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other
requirements on insured depository institutions, consider, consistent
with principles of safety and soundness and the public interest, any
administrative burdens that such regulations would place on depository
institutions, including small depository institutions, and customers of
depository institutions, as well as the benefits of such regulations.
In addition, new regulations and amendments to regulations that impose
additional reporting, disclosures, or other new requirements on insured
depository institutions generally must take effect on the first day of
a calendar quarter that begins on or after the date on which the
regulations are published in final form.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ 12 U.S.C. 4802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agencies note that comment on these matters has been solicited
in other sections of this Supplementary Information section, and that
the requirements of RCDRIA will be considered as part of the overall
rulemaking process. In addition, the agencies also invite any other
comments that further will inform the agencies' consideration of
RCDRIA.
List of Subjects
12 CFR Part 3
Administrative practice and procedure, Capital, National banks,
Risk.
12 CFR Part 217
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital,
Federal Reserve System, Holding companies.
12 CFR Part 324
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Capital
adequacy, Savings associations, State non-member banks.
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, the OCC proposes to
amend 12 CFR part 3 as follows.
PART 3--CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS
Subpart A--General Provisions
0
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818,
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).
0
2. Section 3.1 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.1 Purpose, applicability, reservation of authority, and
timing.
(a) Purpose. This part establishes minimum capital requirements and
overall capital adequacy standards for national banks and Federal
savings associations. This part does not apply to Federal branches and
agencies of foreign banks. This part includes methodologies for
calculating minimum capital requirements, public disclosure
requirements related to the capital requirements, and transition
provisions for the application of this part.
* * * * *
0
3. Section 3.2 is amended by revising the definitions of ``corporate
exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility commercial real
estate (HVCRE) exposure,'' and ``International Lending Supervision
Act,'' ``Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,'' and ``Significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution''; and adding in alphabetical
order the definitions of ``high volatility acquisition, development, or
construction (HVADC) exposure.'' and ``Nonsignificant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' to read as
follows:
Sec. 3.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
(1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a
public sector entity (PSE);
(2) An exposure to a GSE;
(3) A residential mortgage exposure;
(4) A pre-sold construction loan;
(5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
(6) A high volatility acquisition, development, or construction
(HVADC) exposure or a high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure;
(7) A cleared transaction;
(8) A default fund contribution;
(9) A securitization exposure;
(10) An equity exposure; or
(11) An unsettled transaction.
(12) A policy loan; or
(13) A separate account.
* * * * *
Eligible guarantor means:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying
central counterparty; or
(2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter,
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit
enhancement that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
High volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure means a credit facility that is originated on or after
[effective date] and that:
(1) Primarily finances or refinances the:
(i) Acquisition of vacant or developed land;
(ii) Development of land to prepare to erect new structures
including, but not limited to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and
demolishing existing structures; or
(iii) Construction of buildings, dwellings, or other improvements
including additions or alterations to existing structures; and
(2) Is not a credit facility that finances or refinances:
(i) One- to four-family residential properties;
(ii) Real property projects that would have the primary purpose of
``community development'' as defined under 12 CFR part 25 (national
banks) and 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings associations); or
(iii) The purchase or development of agricultural land, including,
but not
[[Page 50002]]
limited to, all land used or usable for agricultural purposes (such as
crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of the
agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes and
the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of the
land for commercial or residential development; and
(3) Is not a permanent loan. A permanent loan for purposes of this
definition means a prudently underwritten loan that has a clearly
identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the property.
For purposes of this section, a permanent loan does not include a loan
that finances or refinances a stabilization period or unsold lots or
units of for-sale projects.
High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for
purposes of Subpart D, means a credit facility that is either
outstanding or committed prior to [effective date] and, prior to
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 25 (national bank), 12 CFR
part 195 (Federal savings association) and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR
25.12(g)(3) (national banks) and 12 CFR 195.12(g)(3) (Federal savings
associations), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1),
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the Board's real estate
lending standards at 12 CFR part 34, subpart D (national banks) and 12
CFR part 160, subparts A and B (Federal savings associations);
(ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the Board-regulated
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the Board-regulated
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the Board-regulated institution's underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
International Lending Supervision Act means the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.).
* * * * *
Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with
Sec. 3.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution,
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the national bank
or Federal savings association for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution where the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association owns 10 percent or less of
the issued and outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated financial
institution.
* * * * *
Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution where the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association owns more than 10 percent
of the issued and outstanding common stock of the unconsolidated
financial institution.
* * * * *
0
4. Section 3.10 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to read
as follows:
Sec. 3.10 Minimum capital requirements.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) * * *
(H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures
of the national bank or Federal savings association, excluding repo-
style transactions, repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities
borrowing or lending transactions that qualify for sales treatment
under U.S. GAAP, and derivative transactions, determined using the
applicable credit conversion factor under Sec. 3.33(b), provided,
however, that the minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned
to an off-balance sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent;
and
* * * * *
0
5. Section 3.11 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i),
(a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i), and Table 1 to read as follows:
Sec. 3.11 Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital
buffer amount.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of a
national bank or Federal savings association is the national bank's or
Federal savings association's net income, calculated in accordance with
the instructions to the Call Report, for the four calendar quarters
preceding the current calendar quarter, net of any distributions and
associated tax effects not already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
(iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
(3) Calculation of capital conservation buffer. (i) A national
bank's or Federal savings association's capital
[[Page 50003]]
conservation buffer is equal to the lowest of the following ratios,
calculated as of the last day of the previous calendar quarter:
(A) The national bank or Federal savings association's common
equity tier 1 capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings
association's minimum common equity tier 1 capital ratio requirement
under Sec. 3.10;
(B) The national bank or Federal savings association's tier 1
capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings association's
minimum tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec. 3.10; and
(C) The national bank or Federal savings association's total
capital ratio minus the national bank or Federal savings association's
minimum total capital ratio requirement under Sec. 3.10; or
* * * * *
Table 1 to Sec. 3.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capital conservation buffer Maximum payout ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the No payout ratio
national bank's or Federal savings limitation applies.
association's applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 60 percent.
percent of the national bank's or Federal
savings association's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of
the national bank's or Federal savings
association's applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 40 percent.
percent of the national bank's or Federal
savings association's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of
the national bank's or Federal savings
association's applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 20 percent.
percent of the national bank's or Federal
savings association's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount, and
greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of
the national bank's or Federal savings
association's applicable countercyclical
capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 0 percent.
percent of the national bank's or Federal
savings association's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
6. Section 3.20 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(1)(viii),
(c)(2), (d)(2), and (5) as follows:
Sec. 3.20 Capital components and eligibility criteria for regulatory
capital instruments.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the
limitations in Sec. 3.21.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Any cash dividend payments on the instrument are paid out of
the national bank's or Federal savings association's net income or
retained earnings.
* * * * *
(2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.
3.21, that is not included in the national bank's or Federal savings
association's common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set
forth in Sec. 3.21, that is not included in the national bank's or
Federal savings association's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
(5) For a national bank or Federal savings association that makes
an AOCI opt-out election (as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of Sec.
3.22), 45 percent of pretax net unrealized gains on available-for-sale
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and
available-for-sale equity exposures.
* * * * *
0
7. Section 3.21 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 3.21 Minority interest.
(a) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec. 3.20, a national bank
or Federal savings association that is not an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association is subject to the minority
interest limitations in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary
of the national bank or Federal savings association has issued
regulatory capital that is not owned by the national bank or Federal
savings association.
(2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank or Federal savings
association. The amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest that
a national bank or Federal savings association may include in common
equity tier 1 capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of
all common equity tier 1 capital elements of the national bank or
Federal savings association (not including the common equity tier 1
minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1 capital
regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec. 3.22 (a)
and (b).
(3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of
the national bank or Federal savings association. The amount of tier 1
minority interest that a national bank or Federal savings association
may include in tier 1 capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the
sum of all tier 1 capital elements of the national bank or Federal
savings association (not including the tier 1 minority interest
itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and deductions
in accordance with Sec. 3.22 (a) and (b).
(4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital
of the national bank or Federal savings association. The amount of
total capital minority interest that a national bank or Federal savings
association may include in total capital must be no greater than 10
percent of the sum of all total capital elements of the national bank
or Federal savings association (not including the total capital
minority interest itself), less any total capital regulatory
adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec. 3.22 (a) and (b).
(b) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec. 3.20, an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association is subject to
the minority interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
(i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association has issued regulatory capital that
is not owned by the national bank or Federal savings association; and
(ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
(2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary
level. For purposes of the minority interest
[[Page 50004]]
calculations in this section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing
the capital is not subject to capital adequacy standards similar to
those of the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association, the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association must assume that the capital adequacy standards of the
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association apply
to the subsidiary.
(3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the national bank or Federal savings
association. For each consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association, the amount of common
equity tier 1 minority interest the advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association may include in common equity tier 1
capital is equal to:
(i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary;
minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, multiplied by the difference between the
common equity tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
section, to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under Sec. 3.11 or equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to
the subsidiary multiplied by
(2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under Sec. 3.11 or equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
(4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of
the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association.
For each consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association, the amount of tier 1 minority
interest the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association may include in tier 1 capital is equal to:
(i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association multiplied by the difference between the tier 1 capital of
the subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home
country supervisor, or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to
the subsidiary multiplied by
(2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home
country supervisor.
(5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital
of the national bank or Federal savings association. For each
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, the amount of total capital minority
interest the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association may include in total capital is equal to:
(i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association multiplied by the difference between the total capital of
the subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home
country supervisor, or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that relate to
the subsidiary multiplied by
(2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 3.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's home
country supervisor.
0
8. Section 3.22 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d),
(g), and (h) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.22 Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.
(a) * * *
(1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs)
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
(ii) For an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association, goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock (and that is reflected in the
consolidated financial statements of the advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association), in accordance with paragraph (d)
of this section;
* * * * *
(c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in
capital instruments \23\--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The national bank or Federal savings association must
calculate amounts deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this
section after it calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2
capital under Sec. 3.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Investment in the national bank's or Federal savings
association's own capital instruments. A national bank or Federal
savings association must deduct an investment in the national bank's or
Federal savings association's own capital instruments as follows:
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own
common stock instruments from its common equity tier 1 capital elements
to the extent such instruments are not excluded from regulatory capital
under Sec. 3.20(b)(1);
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own
additional tier 1 capital instruments from its additional tier 1
capital elements; and
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct an
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own
tier 2 capital instruments from its tier 2 capital elements.
(2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section),
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for
a national bank or Federal savings
[[Page 50005]]
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section),
non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions for an advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section),
and non-common stock significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association (as described in paragraph
(c)(6) of this section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, a
national bank or Federal savings association must make deductions from
the component of capital for which the underlying instrument would
qualify if it were issued by the national bank or Federal savings
association itself, as described in paragraphs (c)(2)(i)-(iii) of this
section. If the national bank or Federal savings association does not
have a sufficient amount of a specific component of capital to effect
the required deduction, the shortfall must be deducted according to
paragraph (f) of this section.
(i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution,
the national bank or Federal savings association must treat the
instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the
financial institution; and
(B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in
liquidation only to common shareholders.
(ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital
instruments under Sec. 3.20, the national bank or Federal savings
association must treat the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in
liquidation of the financial institution;
(B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
(C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of
the financial institution.
(iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital
instrument (as defined in Sec. 3.300(c)), the national bank or Federal
savings association must treat the instrument as:
(A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
(B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital)
prior to May 19, 2010.
(3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial
institutions. A national bank or Federal savings association must
deduct investments in the capital of other financial institutions it
holds reciprocally, where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a
formal or informal arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend
to hold each other's capital instruments, by applying the corresponding
deduction approach.
(4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. A national bank or Federal savings association that is
not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association
must deduct its investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions (as defined in Sec. 3.2) that exceed 25 percent of the
sum of the national bank's or Federal savings association's common
equity tier 1 capital elements minus all deductions from and
adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital elements required under
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions described in this
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this section. In addition, a national bank or Federal savings
association that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior
written approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the
OCC, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period
of time stipulated by the OCC, a national bank or Federal savings
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association is not required to deduct an investment
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant
to this paragraph if the financial institution is in distress and if
such investment is made for the purpose of providing financial
support to the financial institution, as determined by the OCC.
\25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association must deduct its non-significant investments
in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in
Sec. 3.2) that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the
advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings association's
common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all deductions from and
adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital elements required under
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 10 percent threshold
for non-significant investments) by applying the corresponding
deduction approach.\26\ The deductions described in this section are
net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section. In addition, an advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the
prior written approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by
the OCC, is not required to deduct a non-significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this
paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related to the failed
underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period
of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association is not required to deduct a non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution
is in distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of
providing financial support to the financial institution, as
determined by the OCC.
\27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific
capital component is equal to:
(A) The advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings
association's non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions exceeding the 10 percent
threshold for non-significant investments, multiplied by
(B) The ratio of the advanced approaches national bank's or Federal
[[Page 50006]]
savings association's non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital
component to the advanced approaches national bank's or Federal savings
association's total non-significant investments in unconsolidated
financial institutions.
(6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association must
deduct its significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock by
applying the corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, with the prior written
approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association that
underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to deduct a
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if such investment is
related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ With prior written approval of the OCC, for the period of
time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association is not required to deduct a significant
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial
institution in distress which is not in the form of common stock
pursuant to this section if such investment is made for the purpose
of providing financial support to the financial institution as
determined by the OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds.
(1) A national bank or Federal savings association that is not an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association must
make deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph
(d)(1).
(i) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25
percent of the sum of the national bank's or Federal savings
association's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under
paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section (the 25 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be
included in the risk-weighted assets of the national bank or Federal
savings association and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising
from temporary differences that the national bank or Federal savings
association could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks,
net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance
with paragraph (e) of this section. A national bank or Federal savings
association is not required to deduct from the sum of its common equity
tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any related valuation allowances
and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec. 3.22(e)) arising from timing
differences that the national bank or Federal savings association could
realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The national bank or
Federal savings association must risk weight these assets at 100
percent. For a national bank or Federal savings association that is a
member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs
that could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not
exceed the amount that the national bank or Federal savings association
could reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
(iii) The national bank or Federal savings association must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of
associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
(iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a national bank
or Federal savings association may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to
adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of
this section. A national bank or Federal savings association that
elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of
this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all
future calculations. A national bank or Federal savings association may
change its exclusion preference only after obtaining the prior approval
of the OCC.
(2) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association must make deductions from regulatory capital as described
in this paragraph (d)(2).
(i) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital elements the
amount of each of the items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that,
individually, exceeds 10 percent of the sum of the advanced approaches
national bank's or Federal savings association's common equity tier 1
capital elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity
tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this
section (the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold).
(A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association could not
realize through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related
valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this section. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association is not required to deduct from the sum of its
common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any related
valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec. 3.22(e))
arising from timing differences that the advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association could realize through net operating
loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For a
national bank or Federal savings association that is a member of a
consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be
realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the
amount that the national bank or Federal savings association could
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
(B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this section.
(C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association pursuant to
[[Page 50007]]
paragraph (a)(1) of this section. In addition, with the prior written
approval of the OCC, for the period of time stipulated by the OCC, an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association that
underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to deduct a
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution in the form of common stock pursuant to this paragraph
(d)(2) if such investment is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ With the prior written approval of the OCC, for the period
of time stipulated by the OCC, an advanced approaches national bank
or Federal savings association is not required to deduct a
significant investment in the capital instrument of an
unconsolidated financial institution in distress in the form of
common stock pursuant to this section if such investment is made for
the purpose of providing financial support to the financial
institution as determined by the OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association must deduct from common equity tier 1 capital elements the
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not
deducted as a result of the application of the 10 percent common equity
tier 1 capital deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed
17.65 percent of the sum of the advanced approaches national bank's or
Federal savings association's common equity tier 1 capital elements,
minus adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital
required under paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, minus the
items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section (the 15 percent
common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold). Any goodwill that
has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1) of this section can be
excluded from the significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common stock.\31\
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\31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association and
assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an
advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association may
exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity
tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association that elects to
exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this
section also must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all
future calculations. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association may change its exclusion preference only after
obtaining the prior approval of the OCC.
* * * * *
(g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. A national bank or
Federal savings association must exclude from standardized total risk-
weighted assets and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-
weighted assets any item that is required to be deducted from
regulatory capital.
(h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an
investment in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own
capital instrument and an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution under this section, the net long
position is the gross long position in the underlying instrument
determined in accordance with paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as
adjusted to recognize a short position in the same instrument
calculated in accordance with paragraph (h)(3) of this section.
(2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as
follows:
(i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec. 3.51(b);
(ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term
is defined in Sec. 3.2;
(iii) For an indirect exposure, the national bank's or Federal
savings association's carrying value of the investment in the
investment fund, provided that, alternatively:
(A) A national bank or Federal savings association may, with the
prior approval of the Board, use a conservative estimate of the amount
of its investment in the national bank's or Federal savings
association's own capital instruments or its investment in the capital
of an unconsolidated financial institution held through a position in
an index; or
(B) A national bank or Federal savings association may calculate
the gross long position for investments in the national bank's or
Federal savings association's own capital instruments or investments in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution by multiplying
the national bank's or Federal savings association's carrying value of
its investment in the investment fund by either:
(1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for
investments in the national bank's or Federal savings association's own
capital instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership
agreement, or similar contract defining permissible investments of the
investment fund; or
(2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the
national bank's or Federal savings association's own capital
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions.
(iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the national bank's or
Federal savings association's loss on the exposure if the reference
capital instrument were to have a value of zero.
(3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
(i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at
least one year (maturity requirement); or
(ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the national bank's
or Federal savings association 's Call Report, if the national bank or
Federal savings association has a contractual right or obligation to
sell the long position at a specific point in time and the counterparty
to the contract has an obligation to purchase the long position if the
national bank or Federal savings association exercises its right to
sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of the long
position such that the maturity of the long position and short position
are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, even if
the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
(iii) For an investment in the national bank's or Federal savings
association's own capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this
section or an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution under paragraphs (c) and (d):
(A) A national bank or Federal savings association may only net a
short position against a long position in an investment in the national
bank's or Federal savings association's own capital instrument under
paragraph (c) of this section if the short position involves no
counterparty credit risk.
(B) A gross long position in an investment in the national bank's
or Federal savings association's own capital instrument or an
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
resulting from a position in an index may be netted against a short
position in the same index. Long and short positions in the same index
without maturity dates are considered to have matching maturities.
(C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or
synthetic position in an investment in the national bank's or Federal
savings association's own capital instrument or an investment in the
capital of an
[[Page 50008]]
unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to provide
recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index
that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being hedged
may be used to offset the long position if both the long position being
hedged and the short position in the index are reported as a trading
asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the
national bank's or Federal savings association's Call Report, and the
hedge is deemed effective by the national bank's or Federal savings
association 's internal control processes, which have not been found to
be inadequate by the OCC.
0
9. Section 3.32 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2),
(d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.32 General risk weights.
* * * * *
(b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development
banks (MDBs). A national bank or Federal savings association must
assign a zero percent risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for
International Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3) of this section, a
national bank or Federal savings association must assign a risk weight
to an exposure to a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec.
3.32, based on the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home
country or the OECD membership status of the foreign bank's home
country if there is no CRC applicable to the foreign bank's home
country.
Table 2 to Sec. 3.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk weight
(in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
0-1................................................... 20
2..................................................... 50
3..................................................... 100
4-7................................................... 150
OECD Member with No CRC................................. 20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC............................. 100
Sovereign Default....................................... 150
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
20 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home
country is a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
20 percent risk-weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating,
trade-related contingent item that arises from the movement of goods
and that has a maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose
home country has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no
CRC.
(iv) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
100 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home
country is not a member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the
exception of self-liquidating, trade-related contingent items that
arise from the movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three
months or less, which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
(v) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
150 percent risk weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately
upon determining that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the
bank's home country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred
in the foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
(3) * * *
(ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.
3.22(d)(2)(1)(c);
* * * * *
(j)(1) High volatility acquisition, development, or construction
(HVADC) exposures. A national bank or Federal savings association must
assign a 130 percent risk weight to an HVADC exposure.
(2) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A
national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 150 percent
risk weight to an HVCRE exposure.
(k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
(1) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
150 percent risk weight to the portion of the exposure that is not
guaranteed or that is unsecured;
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a
risk weight to the guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on
the risk weight that applies under Sec. 3.36 if the guarantee or
credit derivative meets the requirements of that section; and
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association may assign a
risk weight to the collateralized portion of a past due exposure based
on the risk weight that applies under Sec. 3.37 if the collateral
meets the requirements of that section.
(l) Other assets. (1)(i) A national bank or Federal savings
association must assign a zero percent risk weight to cash owned and
held in all offices of subsidiary depository institutions or in
transit, and to gold bullion held in a subsidiary depository
institution's own vaults, or held in another depository institution's
vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are
offset by gold bullion liabilities.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
zero percent risk weight to cash owned and held in all offices of the
national bank or Federal savings association or in transit; to gold
bullion held in the national bank's or Federal savings association's
own vaults or held in another depository institution's vaults on an
allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by
gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures that arise from the
settlement of cash transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot
foreign exchange and spot commodities) with a central counterparty
where there is no assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the
central counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated
default fund contributions.
(2) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a 20
percent risk weight to cash items in the process of collection.
(3) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
100 percent risk weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that
the national bank or Federal savings association could realize through
net operating loss carrybacks.
(4) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
250 percent risk weight to the portion of each of the following items
to the extent it is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital
pursuant to Sec. 3.22(d):
(i) MSAs; and
(ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the national bank
or Federal savings association could not realize through net operating
loss carrybacks.
(5) A national bank or Federal savings association must assign a
100 percent risk weight to all assets not specifically assigned a
different risk weight under this subpart and that are not deducted from
tier 1 or tier 2 capital pursuant to Sec. 3.22.
(6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, a national
bank or
[[Page 50009]]
Federal savings association may assign an asset that is not included in
one of the categories provided in this section to the risk weight
category applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding
companies and savings and loan holding companies at 12 CFR part 217,
provided that all of the following conditions apply:
(i) The national bank or Federal savings association is not
authorized to hold the asset under applicable law other than debt
previously contracted or similar authority; and
(ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *
0
10. Section 3.34 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 3.34 OTC derivative contracts.
* * * * *
(c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives. (1)
Protection purchasers. A national bank or Federal savings association
that purchases an OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec.
3.36 as a credit risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered
position under subpart F is not required to compute a separate
counterparty credit risk capital requirement under this subpart D
provided that the national bank or Federal savings association does so
consistently for all such credit derivatives. The national bank or
Federal savings association must either include all or exclude all such
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk
exposure to all relevant counterparties for risk-based capital
purposes.
(2) Protection providers. (i) A national bank or Federal savings
association that is the protection provider under an OTC credit
derivative must treat the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the
underlying reference asset. The national bank or Federal savings
association is not required to compute a counterparty credit risk
capital requirement for the OTC credit derivative under this subpart D,
provided that this treatment is applied consistently for all such OTC
credit derivatives. The national bank or Federal savings association
must either include all or exclude all such OTC credit derivatives that
are subject to a qualifying master netting agreement from any measure
used to determine counterparty credit risk exposure.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the national bank
or Federal savings association is treating the OTC credit derivative as
a covered position under subpart F, in which case the national bank or
Federal savings association must compute a supplemental counterparty
credit risk capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
0
11. Section 3.35 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii),
(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.35 Cleared transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association
must apply the risk weight appropriate for the CCP according to this
subpart D.
* * * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member client national bank or Federal savings
association must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any
collateral provided to a CCP, clearing member, or custodian in
connection with a cleared transaction in accordance with the
requirements under this subpart D.
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply
the risk weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member national bank or Federal savings association
must calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided
to a CCP, clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
12. Section 3.36 is amend by revising paragraph (c) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.36 Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution treatment.
* * * * *
(c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, a national bank or Federal
savings association may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in
determining the risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by
substituting the risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit
derivative protection provider under this subpart D for the risk weight
assigned to the exposure.
(2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the
national bank or Federal savings association must treat the hedged
exposure as two separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order
to recognize the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or
credit derivative.
(i) The national bank or Federal savings association may calculate
the risk-weighted asset amount for the protected exposure under this
subpart D, where the applicable risk weight is the risk weight
applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection provider.
(ii) The national bank or Federal savings association must
calculate the risk-weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure
under this subpart D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the
unprotected portion of the hedged exposure.
(iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e),
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *
0
13. Section 3.37 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) and the
paragraph headings for paragraphs (b) and (b)(2) are being reprinted
for reader reference to read as follows:
Sec. 3.37 Collateralized transactions.
* * * * *
(b) The simple approach. * * *
(2) Risk weight substitution. (i) A national bank or Federal
savings association may apply a risk weight to the portion of an
exposure that is secured by the fair value of financial collateral
(that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based
on the risk weight assigned to the collateral under this subpart D. For
repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, and securities
lending and borrowing transactions, the collateral is the instruments,
gold, and cash the national bank or Federal savings association has
borrowed,
[[Page 50010]]
purchased subject to resale, or taken as collateral from the
counterparty under the transaction. Except as provided in paragraph
(b)(3) of this section, the risk weight assigned to the collateralized
portion of the exposure may not be less than 20 percent.
* * * * *
0
14. Section 3.38 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 3.38 Unsettled transactions.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(2) From the business day after the national bank or Federal
savings association has made its delivery until five business days
after the counterparty delivery is due, the national bank or Federal
savings association must calculate the risk-weighted asset amount for
the transaction by treating the current fair value of the deliverables
owed to the national bank or Federal savings association as an exposure
to the counterparty and using the applicable counterparty risk weight
under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
15. Section 3.42 is amended by revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to read
as follows:
Sec. 3.42 Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.
* * * * *
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) If the national bank or Federal savings association purchases
credit protection from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE,
the national bank or Federal savings association must determine the
risk weight for the exposure according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
16. Section 3.52 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to
read as follows:
Sec. 3.52 Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund,
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a
zero percent risk weight under Sec. 3.32 may be assigned a zero
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to
Sec. 3.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *
0
17. Section 3.61 is amended to read as follows:
Sec. 3.61 Purpose and scope.
Sections 3.61 through 3.63 of this subpart establish public
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described
in subpart B of this part for a national bank or Federal savings
association with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as
reported on the national bank's or Federal savings association's most
recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced approaches national
bank or Federal savings association making public disclosures pursuant
to Sec. 3.172. An advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association that has not received approval from the OCC to exit
parallel run pursuant to Sec. 3.121(d) is subject to the disclosure
requirements described in Sec. Sec. 3.62 and 3.63. A national bank or
Federal savings association with total consolidated assets of $50
billion or more as reported on the national bank's or Federal savings
association's most recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association making public
disclosures subject to Sec. 3.172 must comply with Sec. 3.62 unless
it is a consolidated subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and
loan holding company, or depository institution that is subject to the
disclosure requirements of Sec. 3.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S.
banking organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section,
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the
national bank's or Federal savings association 's total consolidated
assets in the four most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report
or the average of the national bank or Federal savings association's
total consolidated assets in the most recent consecutive quarters as
reported quarterly on the national bank's or Federal savings
association 's Call Report if the national bank or Federal savings
association has not filed such a report for each of the most recent
four quarters.
0
18. Section 3.63 is amended by revising Table 3 and Table 8 to read as
follows:
Sec. 3.63 Disclosures by national bank or Federal savings
associations described in Sec. 3.61.
* * * * *
Table 3 to Sec. 3.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures................................ (a) A summary discussion of the national bank's or
Federal savings association's approach to assessing
the adequacy of its capital to support current and
future activities.
Quantitative disclosures............................... (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
(1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
(2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
MDBs;
(3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
banks, and credit unions;
(4) Exposures to PSEs;
(5) Corporate exposures;
(6) Residential mortgage exposures;
(7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
construction loans;
(8) HVADC exposures and HVCRE exposures;
(9) Past due loans;
(10) Other assets;
(11) Cleared transactions;
(12) Default fund contributions;
(13) Unsettled transactions;
(14) Securitization exposures; and
(15) Equity exposures.
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
calculated under subpart F of this part.
(d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
capital ratios:
[[Page 50011]]
(1) For the top consolidated group; and
(2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
Table 8 to Sec. 3.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures................................ (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
respect to a securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion of:
(1) The national bank's or Federal savings
association 's objectives for securitizing assets,
including the extent to which these activities
transfer credit risk of the underlying exposures
away from the national bank or Federal savings
association to other entities and including the
type of risks assumed and retained with
resecuritization activity; \1\
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
inherent in the securitized assets;
(3) The roles played by the national bank or Federal
savings association in the securitization process
\2\ and an indication of the extent of the national
bank's or Federal savings association 's
involvement in each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
credit and market risk of securitization exposures
including how those processes differ for
resecuritization exposures;
(5) The national bank's or Federal savings
association's policy for mitigating the credit risk
retained through securitization and
resecuritization exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches that the
national bank or Federal savings association
follows for its securitization exposures including
the type of securitization exposure to which each
approach applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs that the
national bank or Federal savings association, as
sponsor, uses to securitize third-party exposures.
The national bank or Federal savings association
must indicate whether it has exposure to these
SPEs, either on- or off-balance sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the national bank or Federal savings
association manages or advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the securitization
exposures that the national bank or Federal savings
association has securitized or in securitization
SPEs that the national bank or Federal savings
association sponsors.\3\
(c) Summary of the national bank's or Federal savings
association's accounting policies for securitization
activities, including:
(1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
retained or purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
previous period for valuing retained interests and
impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
D of this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
balance sheet for arrangements that could require
the national bank or Federal savings association to
provide financial support for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes to any
quantitative information since the last reporting
period.
Quantitative Disclosures............................... (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
national bank or Federal savings association in
securitizations that meet the operational criteria
provided in Sec. 3.41 (categorized into traditional
and synthetic securitizations), by exposure type,
separately for securitizations of third-party
exposures for which the bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
(f) For exposures securitized by the national bank or
Federal savings association in securitizations that
meet the operational criteria in Sec. 3.41:
(1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
(2) Losses recognized by the national bank or
Federal savings association during the current
period categorized by exposure type.\6\
(g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
categorized by exposure type.
(i)(1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
retained or purchased and the associated capital
requirements for these exposures, categorized between
securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
and
(2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
underlying exposure in the pool of any:
(i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
has been deducted from common equity tier 1
capital; and
(ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
(j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
including the amount of exposures securitized (by
exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
exposure type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
retained or purchased categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
applied and those not applied; and
[[Page 50012]]
(2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The national bank or Federal savings association should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which
it participates; this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in
which the national bank or Federal savings association is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the national bank or Federal savings
association, whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties,
and third-party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including
underlying exposures originally on the national bank's or Federal savings association's balance sheet and
underlying exposures acquired by the national bank or Federal savings association from third-party entities)
in which the originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need
only be reported for the year of inception. National banks and Federal savings associations are required to
disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the national bank's or Federal savings
association's balance sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual
interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the
national bank or Federal savings association with respect to securitized assets.
* * * * *
0
19. Section 3.101 is amended by adding to paragraph (b) in alphabetical
order the definition of ``High volatility commercial real estate
(HVCRE) exposure'' to read as follows:
Sec. 3.101 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for
purposes of Subpart E, means a credit facility that, prior to
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 25 (national banks) and 195
(Federal savings associations), and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR
25.12(g)(3) (national banks) and 12 CFR 195.12(g)(3) (Federal savings
associations), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1),
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the OCC's real estate
lending standards at 12 CFR part 34, subpart D (national banks) and 12
CFR part 160 (Federal savings associations);
(ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the national bank or
Federal savings association advances funds under the credit facility,
and the capital contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by
the project, is contractually required to remain in the project
throughout the life of the project. The life of a project concludes
only when the credit facility is converted to permanent financing or is
sold or paid in full. Permanent financing may be provided by the
national bank or Federal savings association that provided the ADC
facility as long as the permanent financing is subject to the national
bank's or Federal savings association 's underwriting criteria for
long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
0
20. Section 3.131 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 3.131 Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail risk-
weighted assets.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a
multilateral development bank, to which the national bank or Federal
savings association assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less
than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *
0
21. Section 3.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.133 Cleared transactions.
* * * * *
(b) Clearing member client national banks or Federal savings
associations
* * * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client national bank or Federal savings association
must apply the risk weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of
this part.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member national bank or Federal savings association must apply
the risk weight applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this
part.
* * * * *
0
22. Section 3.152 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to
read as follows:
Sec. 3.152 Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph
(b)(7) of this
[[Page 50013]]
section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge pair) is
assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk
weight.
* * * * *
0
23. Section 3.202 is amended by revising the definition of ``Corporate
debt position'' in paragraph (b) to read as follows:
Sec. 3.202 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank,
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *
0
24. Section 3.210 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read
as follows:
Sec. 3.210 Standardized measurement method for specific risk.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank
debt positions. A national bank or Federal savings association may
assign a 0.0 percent specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position
that is an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements, the
European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
0
25. Section 3.300 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (d) to read
as follows:
Sec. 3.300 Transitions.
* * * * *
(b) Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions. Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a national bank
or Federal savings association that is not an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association, and in each case through
December 31, 2017, a national bank or Federal savings association must
make the capital adjustments and deductions in Sec. 3.22 in accordance
with the transition requirements in this paragraph (b). Beginning
January 1, 2018, a national bank or Federal savings association must
make all regulatory capital adjustments and deductions in accordance
with Sec. 3.22.
(1) Transition deductions from common equity tier 1 capital.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a
national bank or Federal savings association that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, a national bank or Federal savings
association must make the deductions required under Sec. 3.22(a)(1)-
(7) from common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements in accordance
with the percentages set forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to Sec. 3.300.
(i) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct the
following items from common equity tier 1 and additional tier 1 capital
in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 2 to Sec. 3.300:
Goodwill (Sec. 3.22(a)(1)), DTAs that arise from net operating loss
and tax credit carryforwards (Sec. 3.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in
connection with a securitization exposure (Sec. 3.22(a)(4)), defined
benefit pension fund assets (Sec. 3.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss
that exceeds eligible credit reserves (for advanced approaches national
banks and Federal savings associations that have completed the parallel
run process and that have received notifications from the OCC pursuant
to Sec. 3.121(d) of subpart E) and financial subsidiaries (Sec.
3.22(a)(7)), and nonincludable subsidiaries of a Federal savings
association (Sec. 3.22(a)(8)).
Table 2 to Sec. 3.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition deductions Transition deductions under Sec. 3.22(a)(3)-(6)
under Sec. 3.22(a)(1) ---------------------------------------------------
and (7)
Transition period -------------------------- Percentage of the Percentage of the
Percentage of the deductions from common deductions from tier 1
deductions from common equity tier 1 capital capital
equity tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014................ 100 20 80
Calendar year 2015................ 100 40 60
Calendar year 2016................ 100 60 40
Calendar year 2017................ 100 80 20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter 100 100 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital any intangible assets other than
goodwill and MSAs in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table
3 to Sec. 3.300.
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association must apply a
100 percent risk-weight to the aggregate amount of intangible assets
other than goodwill and MSAs that are not required to be deducted from
common equity tier 1 capital under this section.
[[Page 50014]]
Table 3 to Sec. 3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition deductions
under Sec. 3.22(a)(2)--
Transition period percentage of the
deductions from common
equity tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 20
Calendar year 2015............................ 40
Calendar year 2016............................ 60
Calendar year 2017............................ 80
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter............ 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Transition adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches national bank or
Federal savings association, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a
national bank or Federal savings association that is not an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, a national bank or Federal savings
association must allocate the regulatory adjustments related to changes
in the fair value of liabilities due to changes in the national bank's
or Federal savings association's own credit risk (Sec.
3.22(b)(1)(iii)) between common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1
capital in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 4 to
Sec. 3.300.
(i) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is positive, the
national bank or Federal savings association must allocate the
deduction between common equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in accordance
with Table 4 to Sec. 3.300.
(ii) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is negative, the
national bank or Federal savings association must add back the
adjustment to common equity tier 1 capital or to tier 1 capital, in
accordance with Table 4 to Sec. 3.300.
Table 4 to Sec. 3.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition adjustments under Sec.
-------------------3.22(b)(1)(iii)-----------------
Percentage of the
Transition period adjustment applied to Percentage of the
common equity tier 1 adjustment applied to
capital tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014.......................................... 20 80
Calendar year 2015.......................................... 40 60
Calendar year 2016.......................................... 60 40
Calendar year 2017.......................................... 80 20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter.......................... 100 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Transition adjustments to AOCI for an advanced approaches
national bank or Federal savings association and a national bank or
Federal savings association that has not made an AOCI opt-out election
under Sec. 3.22(b)(2). Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced
approaches national bank or Federal savings association, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for a national bank or Federal savings association that
is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings
association that has not made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec.
3.22(b)(2), and in each case through December 31, 2017, a national bank
or Federal savings association must adjust common equity tier 1 capital
with respect to the transition AOCI adjustment amount (transition AOCI
adjustment amount):
(i) The transition AOCI adjustment amount is the aggregate amount
of a national bank's or Federal savings association's:
(A) Unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities that are
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP or
available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
(B) Net unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities
that are not preferred stock classified as an equity security under
GAAP or available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
(C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI attributed to defined benefit
postretirement plans resulting from the initial and subsequent
application of the relevant GAAP standards that pertain to such plans
(excluding, at the national bank's or Federal savings association's
option, the portion relating to pension assets deducted under section
22(a)(5)), plus
(D) Accumulated net gains or losses on cash flow hedges related to
items that are reported on the balance sheet at fair value included in
AOCI, plus
(E) Net unrealized gains or losses on held-to-maturity securities
that are included in AOCI.
(ii) A national bank or Federal savings association must make the
following adjustment to its common equity tier 1 capital:
(A) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is positive, the
appropriate amount must be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec. 3.300.
(B) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is negative, the
appropriate amount must be added back to common equity tier 1 capital
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec. 3.300.
[[Page 50015]]
Table 5 to Sec. 3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of the
transition AOCI
Transition period adjustment amount to be
applied to common equity
tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 80
Calendar year 2015............................ 60
Calendar year 2016............................ 40
Calendar year 2017............................ 20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) A national bank or Federal savings association may include in
tier 2 capital the percentage of unrealized gains on available-for-sale
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and
available-for-sale equity exposures as set forth in Table 6 to Sec.
3.300.
Table 6 to Sec. 3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of unrealized
gains on available-for-
sale preferred stock
classified as an equity
Transition period security under GAAP and
available- for-sale
equity exposures that
may be included in tier
2 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 36
Calendar year 2015............................ 27
Calendar year 2016............................ 18
Calendar year 2017............................ 9
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(d) Minority interest--(1) [Reserved]
(2) Non-qualifying minority interest. Beginning January 1, 2014 for
an advanced approaches national bank or Federal savings association,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a national bank or Federal savings
association that is not an advanced approaches national bank or Federal
savings association, and in each case through December 31, 2017, a
national bank or federal savings association may include in tier 1
capital or total capital the percentage of the tier 1 minority interest
and total capital minority interest outstanding as of January 1, 2014
that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital
instruments in Sec. 3.20 (non-qualifying minority interest), as set
forth in Table 10 to Sec. 3.300.
Table 10 to Sec. 3.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of the amount
of surplus or non-
qualifying minority
Transition period interest that can be
included in regulatory
capital during the
transition period
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 80
Calendar year 2015............................ 60
Calendar year 2016............................ 40
Calendar year 2017............................ 20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 50016]]
* * * * *
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, part 217 of chapter
II of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is proposed to be
amended as follows:
PART 217--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF BANK HOLDING COMPANIES, SAVINGS AND
LOAN HOLDING COMPANIES, AND STATE MEMBER BANKS (REGULATION Q)
Subpart A--General Provisions
0
26. The authority citation for part 217 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 248(a), 321-338a, 481-486, 1462a, 1467a,
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-l, 1831w, 1835, 1844(b), 1851, 3904,
3906-3909, 4808, 5365, 5368, 5371.
0
27. Section 217.2 is amended by (1) Removing the definitions of
``corporate exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility
commercial real estate (HVCRE),'' ``investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,'' ``non-significant investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' and
``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,'' and (2) Adding the definitions of ``corporate
exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility acquisition,
development, or construction (HVADC),'' ``high volatility commercial
real estate (HVCRE),'' ``International Lending Supervision Act,''
``investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,'' ``non-significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,'' and ``significant investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution'' as follows:
Sec. 217.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
(1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a
public sector entity (PSE);
(2) An exposure to a GSE;
(3) A residential mortgage exposure;
(4) A pre-sold construction loan;
(5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
(6) A high volatility acquisition, development, or construction
(HVADC) exposure or a high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure;
(7) A cleared transaction;
(8) A default fund contribution;
(9) A securitization exposure;
(10) An equity exposure; or
(11) An unsettled transaction.
(12) A policy loan; or
(13) A separate account.
* * * * *
Eligible guarantor means:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying
central counterparty; or
(2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter,
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit
enhancement that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
High volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure means a credit facility that is originated on or after
[effective date] and that:
(1) Primarily finances or refinances the:
(i) Acquisition of vacant or developed land;
(ii) Development of land to prepare to erect new structures
including, but not limited to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and
demolishing existing structures; or
(iii) Construction of buildings, dwellings, or other improvements
including additions or alterations to existing structures; and
(2) Is not a credit facility that finances or refinances:
(i) One- to four-family residential properties;
(ii) Real property projects that would have the primary purpose of
``community development'' as defined under [12 CFR part 25 (national
bank), 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings association) (OCC); 12 CFR part
228 (Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC)]; or
(iii) The purchase or development of agricultural land, including,
but not limited to, all land used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for commercial or residential development; and
(3) Is not a permanent loan. A permanent loan for purposes of this
definition means a prudently underwritten loan that has a clearly
identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the property.
For purposes of this section, a permanent loan does not include a loan
that finances or refinances a stabilization period or unsold lots or
units of for-sale projects.
High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for
purposes of Subpart D, means a credit facility that is either
outstanding or committed prior to [effective date] and, prior to
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 228, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR
208.22(a)(3) or 228.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise described in
paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the Board's real estate
lending standards at 12 CFR part 208, appendix C;
[[Page 50017]]
(ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the Board-regulated
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the Board-regulated
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the Board-regulated institution's underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
International Lending Supervision Act means the International
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (12 U.S.C. 3901 et seq.).
* * * * *
Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with
Sec. 217.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution,
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the Board-
regulated institution for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution where the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution where the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution owns more than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
0
28. Section 217.10 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to
read as follows:
Sec. 217.10 Minimum capital requirements.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) * * *
(H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures
of the Board-regulated institution, excluding repo-style transactions,
repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities borrowing or lending
transactions that qualify for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and
derivative transactions, determined using the applicable credit
conversion factor under Sec. 217.33(b), provided, however, that the
minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance
sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *
0
29. Section 217.11 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i),
(a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i), and revise Table 1 to read as follows:
Sec. 217.11 Capital conservation buffer, countercyclical capital
buffer amount, and GSIB surcharge.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of a
Board-regulated institution is the Board-regulated institution's net
income, calculated in accordance with the instructions to the Call
Report or the FR Y-9C, as applicable, for the four calendar quarters
preceding the current calendar quarter, net of any distributions and
associated tax effects not already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
(iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International
Monetary Fund, a MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
(3) * * * (i) A Board-regulated institution's capital conservation
buffer is equal to the lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of
the last day of the previous calendar quarter:
(A) The Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital
ratio minus the Board-regulated institution's minimum common equity
tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec. 217.10;
(B) The Board-regulated institution's tier 1 capital ratio minus
the Board-regulated institution's minimum tier 1 capital ratio
requirement under Sec. 217.10; and
(C) The Board-regulated institution's total capital ratio minus the
Board-regulated institution's minimum total capital ratio requirement
under Sec. 217.10; or
Table 1 to Sec. 217.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capital conservation buffer Maximum payout ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the No payout ratio
Board-regulated institution's applicable limitation applies.
countercyclical capital buffer amount and 100
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 60 percent.
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount and 100 percent of the Board-regulated
institution's applicable GSIB surcharge, and
greater than 1.875 percent plus 75 percent of
the Board-regulated institution's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount and 75
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 40 percent.
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount and 75 percent of the Board-regulated
institution's applicable GSIB surcharge, and
greater than 1.25 percent plus 50 percent of
the Board-regulated institution's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount and 50
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable GSIB surcharge.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 20 percent.
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount and 50 percent of the Board-regulated
institution's applicable GSIB surcharge, and
greater than 0.625 percent plus 25 percent of
the Board-regulated institution's applicable
countercyclical capital buffer amount and 25
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable GSIB surcharge.
[[Page 50018]]
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 0 percent.
percent of the Board-regulated institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount and 25 percent of the Board-regulated
institution's applicable GSIB surcharge.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
30. Section 217.20 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(4), (c)(2),
(d)(2), (5) and adding a new paragraph (f) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.20 Capital components and eligibility criteria for
regulatory capital instruments.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the
limitations in Sec. 217.21.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.
217.21, that is not included in the Board-regulated institution's
common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set
forth in Sec. 217.21, that is not included in the Board-regulated
institution's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
(5) For a Board-regulated institution that makes an AOCI opt-out
election (as defined in paragraph (b)(2) of Sec. 217.22), 45 percent
of pretax net unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred stock
classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-sale
equity exposures.
* * * * *
(f) A Board-regulated institution may not repurchase or redeem any
common equity tier 1 capital, additional tier 1, or tier 2 capital
instrument without the prior approval of the Board.
0
31. Section 217.21 is revised to reads as follows:
Sec. 217.21 Minority interest.
(a)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec. 217.20, a Board-
regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution is subject to the minority interest limitations
in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary of the Board-
regulated institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned
by the Board-regulated institution.
(2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the Board-regulated institution. The amount of
common equity tier 1 minority interest that a Board-regulated
institution may include in common equity tier 1 capital must be no
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all common equity tier 1 capital
elements of the Board-regulated institution (not including the common
equity tier 1 minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.
217.22 (a) and (b).
(3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of
the Board-regulated institution. The amount of tier 1 minority interest
that a Board-regulated institution may include in tier 1 capital must
be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital elements
of the Board-regulated institution (not including the tier 1 minority
interest itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and
deductions in accordance with Sec. 217.22 (a) and (b).
(4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital
of the Board-regulated institution. The amount of total capital
minority interest that a Board-regulated institution may include in
total capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all
total capital elements of the Board-regulated institution (not
including the total capital minority interest itself), less any total
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.
217.22 (a) and (b).
(b)(1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec. 217.20, an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution is subject to the minority
interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
(i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned
by the Board-regulated institution; and
(ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
(2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution, the advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution must assume that the capital adequacy standards
of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution apply to the
subsidiary.
(3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the Board-regulated institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, the amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest the
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may include in common
equity tier 1 capital is equal to:
(i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary;
minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, multiplied by the difference between the common equity
tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
section, to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under Sec. 217.11 or equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary
multiplied by
(2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under Sec. 217.11 or equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
(4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of
the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, the amount of tier 1 minority interest the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution may include in tier 1 capital is
equal to:
(i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated
[[Page 50019]]
institution multiplied by the difference between the tier 1 capital of
the subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor, or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary
multiplied by
(2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor.
(5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital
of the Board-regulated institution. For each consolidated subsidiary of
the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, the amount of
total capital minority interest the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution may include in total capital is equal to:
(i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution multiplied
by the difference between the total capital of the subsidiary and the
lower of:
(A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor, or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution that relate to the subsidiary
multiplied by
(2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 217.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor.
0
32. Section 217.22 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1)(i),
paragraphs (c), (d), (g), and (h) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.22 Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.
(a) * * *
(1) * * *
(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
(ii) For an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution,
goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a significant investment
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in the form
of common stock (and that is reflected in the consolidated financial
statements of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution), in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section;
* * * * *
(c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in
capital instruments \23\
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\23\ The Board-regulated institution must calculate amounts
deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it
calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2 capital under
Sec. 217.20(d)(3).
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(1) Investment in the Board-regulated institution's own capital
instruments. A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in
the Board-regulated institution's own capital instruments as follows:
(i) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in the
Board-regulated institution's own common stock instruments from its
common equity tier 1 capital elements to the extent such instruments
are not excluded from regulatory capital under Sec. 217.20(b)(1);
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in the
Board-regulated institution's own additional tier 1 capital instruments
from its additional tier 1 capital elements; and
(iii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct an investment in
the Board-regulated institution's own tier 2 capital instruments from
its tier 2 capital elements.
(2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section),
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for
a Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this
section), non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions for an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and
non-common stock significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution (as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this
section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, a Board-regulated
institution must make deductions from the component of capital for
which the underlying instrument would qualify if it were issued by the
Board-regulated institution itself, as described in paragraphs
(c)(2)(i)-(iii) of this section. If the Board-regulated institution
does not have a sufficient amount of a specific component of capital to
effect the required deduction, the shortfall must be deducted according
to paragraph (f) of this section.
(i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution,
the Board-regulated institution must treat the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the
financial institution; and
(B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in
liquidation only to common shareholders.
(ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital
instruments under Sec. 217.20, the Board-regulated institution must
treat the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in
liquidation of the financial institution;
(B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
(C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of
the financial institution.
(iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital
instrument (as defined in Sec. 217.300(c)), the Board-regulated
institution must treat the instrument as:
(A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
[[Page 50020]]
(B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital)
prior to May 19, 2010.
(3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial
institutions. A Board-regulated institution must deduct investments in
the capital of other financial institutions it holds reciprocally,
where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a formal or informal
arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend to hold each other's
capital instruments, by applying the corresponding deduction approach.
(4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct its investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in
Sec. 217.2) that exceed 25 percent of the sum of the Board-regulated
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital
elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, a Board-regulated
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior
written approval of the Board, for the period of time stipulated by the
Board, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the
period of time stipulated by the Board, a Board-regulated
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution is not required to deduct an investment in the capital
of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this
paragraph if the financial institution is in distress and if such
investment is made for the purpose of providing financial support to
the financial institution, as determined by the Board.
\25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution must deduct its non-significant investments in the capital
of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in Sec. 217.2)
that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital
elements minus all deductions from and adjustments to common equity
tier 1 capital elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of
this section (the 10 percent threshold for non-significant investments)
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed underwriting,
with the prior written approval of the Board, for the period of time
stipulated by the Board, is not required to deduct a non-significant
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the
period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct a non-
significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution
is in distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of
providing financial support to the financial institution, as
determined by the Board.
\27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific
capital component is equal to:
(A) The advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions exceeding the 10 percent threshold for non-significant
investments, multiplied by
(B) The ratio of the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution's non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital
component to the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's
total non-significant investments in unconsolidated financial
institutions.
(6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct its
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of common stock by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions described in this
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the
Board, for the period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed
underwriting is not required to deduct a significant investment in the
capital of an unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this
paragraph (c) if such investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ With prior written approval of the Board, for the period of
time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution is not required to deduct a significant investment in
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial institution in
distress which is not in the form of common stock pursuant to this
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the
Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds.
(1) A Board-regulated institution that is not an advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution must make deductions from
regulatory capital as described in this paragraph (d)(1).
(i) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the items set forth in
this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 percent of the sum
of the Board-regulated institution's common equity tier 1 capital
elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1
capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section
(the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be
included in the risk-weighted assets of the Board-regulated
institution and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital elements the amount of DTAs arising from temporary
differences that the Board-regulated institution could not realize
through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation
allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
section. A Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct from
the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs (net of any
related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with Sec.
217.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the Board-regulated
institution could realize through net operating loss carrybacks. The
Board-regulated institution must risk weight these assets at 100
percent. For a state member bank that is a member of a consolidated
group for tax purposes, the amount of DTAs that
[[Page 50021]]
could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks may not exceed
the amount that the state member bank could reasonably expect to have
refunded by its parent holding company.
(iii) The Board-regulated institution must deduct from common
equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of associated
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
(iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, a Board-
regulated institution may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to adjustments
made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of this
section. A Board-regulated institution that elects to exclude DTAs
relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this section also must
exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all future calculations. A
Board-regulated institution may change its exclusion preference only
after obtaining the prior approval of the Board.
(2) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must make
deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph
(d)(2).
(i) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10
percent of the sum of the advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section (the 10 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).
(A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution could not realize through net
operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation allowances and
net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. An
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution is not required to
deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs
(net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance
with Sec. 217.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the advanced
approaches Board-regulated institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For a state
member bank that is a member of a consolidated group for tax purposes,
the amount of DTAs that could be realized through net operating loss
carrybacks may not exceed the amount that the state member bank could
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
(B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this section.
(C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1
capital deduction threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in
the valuation of such investments deducted by the advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this
section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the Board, for
the period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is
not required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution in the form of common stock
pursuant to this paragraph (d)(2) if such investment is related to such
failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ With the prior written approval of the Board, for the
period of time stipulated by the Board, an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution is not required to deduct a significant
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial
institution in distress in the form of common stock pursuant to this
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the
Board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the items listed in
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not deducted as a result
of the application of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of
the sum of the advanced approaches Board-regulated institution's common
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus adjustments to and deductions
from common equity tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through
(c) of this section, minus the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of
this section (the 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold). Any goodwill that has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1)
of this section can be excluded from the significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common
stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution and assigned a 250
percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution may exclude DTAs and
DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under
paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution that elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under
paragraph (b) of this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so
consistently in all future calculations. An advanced approaches Board-
regulated institution may change its exclusion preference only after
obtaining the prior approval of the Board.
* * * * *
(g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. A Board-regulated
institution must exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any
item that is required to be deducted from regulatory capital.
(h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an
investment in the Board-regulated institution's own capital instrument
and an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution under this section, the net long position is the gross long
position in the underlying instrument determined in accordance with
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as adjusted to recognize a short
position in the same instrument calculated in accordance with paragraph
(h)(3) of this section.
(2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as
follows:
(i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec. 217.51(b);
(ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term
is defined in Sec. 217.2;
(iii) For an indirect exposure, the Board-regulated institution's
carrying value of the investment in the investment fund, provided that,
alternatively:
(A) A Board-regulated institution may, with the prior approval of
the Board, use a conservative estimate of the amount of its investment
in the Board-
[[Page 50022]]
regulated institution's own capital instruments or its investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution held through a
position in an index; or
(B) A Board-regulated institution may calculate the gross long
position for investments in the Board-regulated institution's own
capital instruments or investments in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution by multiplying the Board-regulated institution's
carrying value of its investment in the investment fund by either:
(1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for
investments in the Board-regulated institution's own capital
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership agreement, or
similar contract defining permissible investments of the investment
fund; or
(2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the
Board-regulated institution's own capital instruments or investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
(iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the Board-regulated
institution's loss on the exposure if the reference capital instrument
were to have a value of zero.
(3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
(i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at
least one year (maturity requirement); or
(ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the Board-regulated
institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a
bank holding company or savings and loan holding company, as
applicable, if the Board-regulated institution has a contractual right
or obligation to sell the long position at a specific point in time and
the counterparty to the contract has an obligation to purchase the long
position if the Board-regulated institution exercises its right to
sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of the long
position such that the maturity of the long position and short position
are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement, even if
the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
(iii) For an investment in the Board-regulated institution's own
capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this section or an
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
under paragraphs (c) and (d):
(A) A Board-regulated institution may only net a short position
against a long position in an investment in the Board-regulated
institution's own capital instrument under paragraph (c) of this
section if the short position involves no counterparty credit risk.
(B) A gross long position in an investment in the Board-regulated
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution resulting from a position in an
index may be netted against a short position in the same index. Long
and short positions in the same index without maturity dates are
considered to have matching maturities.
(C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or
synthetic position in an investment in the Board-regulated
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution can be decomposed to provide
recognition of the hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index
that is composed of the same underlying instrument that is being hedged
may be used to offset the long position if both the long position being
hedged and the short position in the index are reported as a trading
asset or trading liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the
Board-regulated institution's Call Report, for a state member bank, or
FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding
company, as applicable, and the hedge is deemed effective by the Board-
regulated institution's internal control processes, which have not been
found to be inadequate by the Board.
0
33. Section 217.32 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2),
(d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.32 General risk weights.
* * * * *
(b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development
banks (MDBs). A Board-regulated institution must assign a zero percent
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3) of this section, a
Board-regulated institution must assign a risk weight to an exposure to
a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec. 217.32, based on
the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home country or the OECD
membership status of the foreign bank's home country if there is no CRC
applicable to the foreign bank's home country.
Table 2 to Sec. 217.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk weight
(in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
0-1................................................... 20
2..................................................... 50
3..................................................... 100
4-7................................................... 150
OECD Member with No CRC................................. 20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC............................. 100
Sovereign Default....................................... 150
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is a member
of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
(iii) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk-
weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related
contingent item that arises from the movement of goods and that has a
maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose home country
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.
(iv) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is not a
member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the exception of self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the
movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three months or less,
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
(v) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately upon determining
that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the bank's home
country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred in the
foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
(3) * * *
(ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.
217.22(d)(2)(1)(c);
(iii) and (iv) * * *
* * * * *
(j)(1) High volatility acquisition, development, or construction
(HVADC)
[[Page 50023]]
exposures. A Board-regulated institution must assign a 130 percent risk
weight to an HVADC exposure.
(2) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A
Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk weight to an
HVCRE exposure.
(k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign
entity or a residential mortgage exposure or a policy loan, if an
exposure is 90 days or more past due or on nonaccrual:
(1) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 150 percent risk
weight to the portion of the exposure that is not guaranteed or that is
unsecured;
(2) A Board-regulated institution may assign a risk weight to the
guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight that
applies under Sec. 217.36 if the guarantee or credit derivative meets
the requirements of that section; and
(3) A Board-regulated institution may assign a risk weight to the
collateralized portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight
that applies under Sec. 217.37 if the collateral meets the
requirements of that section.
(l) Other assets. (1)(i) A bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company must assign a zero percent risk weight to cash owned
and held in all offices of subsidiary depository institutions or in
transit, and to gold bullion held in a subsidiary depository
institution's own vaults, or held in another depository institution's
vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold bullion assets are
offset by gold bullion liabilities.
(ii) A state member bank must assign a zero percent risk weight to
cash owned and held in all offices of the state member bank or in
transit; to gold bullion held in the state member bank's own vaults or
held in another depository institution's vaults on an allocated basis,
to the extent the gold bullion assets are offset by gold bullion
liabilities; and to exposures that arise from the settlement of cash
transactions (such as equities, fixed income, spot foreign exchange and
spot commodities) with a central counterparty where there is no
assumption of ongoing counterparty credit risk by the central
counterparty after settlement of the trade and associated default fund
contributions.
(2) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 20 percent risk
weight to cash items in the process of collection.
(3) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk
weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that the Board-
regulated institution could realize through net operating loss
carrybacks.
(4) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 250 percent risk
weight to the portion of each of the following items to the extent it
is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to Sec.
217.22(d):
(i) MSAs; and
(ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the Board-
regulated institution could not realize through net operating loss
carrybacks.
(5) A Board-regulated institution must assign a 100 percent risk
weight to all assets not specifically assigned a different risk weight
under this subpart and that are not deducted from tier 1 or tier 2
capital pursuant to Sec. 217.22.
(6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, a state
member bank may assign an asset that is not included in one of the
categories provided in this section to the risk weight category
applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding companies
and savings and loan holding companies under this part, provided that
all of the following conditions apply:
(i) The Board-regulated institution is not authorized to hold the
asset under applicable law other than debt previously contracted or
similar authority; and
(ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a risk weight
category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *
0
34. Section 217.34 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 217.34 OTC derivative contracts.
* * * * *
(c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives. (1)
Protection purchasers. A Board-regulated institution that purchases an
OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec. 217.36 as a credit
risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under
subpart F is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit
risk capital requirement under this subpart D provided that the Board-
regulated institution does so consistently for all such credit
derivatives. The Board-regulated institution must either include all or
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for
risk-based capital purposes.
(2) Protection providers. (i) A Board-regulated institution that is
the protection provider under an OTC credit derivative must treat the
OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference asset.
The Board-regulated institution is not required to compute a
counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the OTC credit
derivative under this subpart D, provided that this treatment is
applied consistently for all such OTC credit derivatives. The Board-
regulated institution must either include all or exclude all such OTC
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk
exposure.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the Board-
regulated institution is treating the OTC credit derivative as a
covered position under subpart F, in which case the Board-regulated
institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit risk
capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
0
35. Section 217.35 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii),
(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.35 Cleared transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk
weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member client Board-regulated institution must
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in connection with a cleared
transaction in accordance with the requirements under this subpart D.
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight
appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member Board-regulated institution must calculate a
risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP,
clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
36. Section 217.36 is amend by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
[[Page 50024]]
Sec. 217.36 Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution
treatment.
* * * * *
(c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, a Board-regulated institution
may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the
risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by substituting the
risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection
provider under this subpart D for the risk weight assigned to the
exposure.
(2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the
Board-regulated institution must treat the hedged exposure as two
separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize
the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit
derivative.
(i) The Board-regulated institution may calculate the risk-weighted
asset amount for the protected exposure under this subpart D, where the
applicable risk weight is the risk weight applicable to the guarantor
or credit derivative protection provider.
(ii) The Board-regulated institution must calculate the risk-
weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure under this subpart
D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the unprotected portion
of the hedged exposure.
(iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e),
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *
0
37. Section 217.37 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read
as follows:
Sec. 217.37 Collateralized transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) * * * (i) A Board-regulated institution may apply a risk weight
to the portion of an exposure that is secured by the fair value of
financial collateral (that meets the requirements of paragraph (b)(1)
of this section) based on the risk weight assigned to the collateral
under this subpart D. For repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase
agreements, and securities lending and borrowing transactions, the
collateral is the instruments, gold, and cash the Board-regulated
institution has borrowed, purchased subject to resale, or taken as
collateral from the counterparty under the transaction. Except as
provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk weight assigned
to the collateralized portion of the exposure may not be less than 20
percent.
* * * * *
0
38. Section 217.38 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 217.38 Unsettled transactions.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(2) From the business day after the Board-regulated institution has
made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty
delivery is due, the Board-regulated institution must calculate the
risk-weighted asset amount for the transaction by treating the current
fair value of the deliverables owed to the Board-regulated institution
as an exposure to the counterparty and using the applicable
counterparty risk weight under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
39. Section 217.42 is amended by revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to
read as follows:
Sec. 217.42 Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.
* * * * *
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) If the Board-regulated institution purchases credit protection
from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, the Board-
regulated institution must determine the risk weight for the exposure
according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
40. Section 217.52 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to
read as follows:
Sec. 217.52 Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund,
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a
zero percent risk weight under Sec. 217.32 may be assigned a zero
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to
Sec. 217.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
(5) through (7) (ii) * * *
* * * * *
0
41. Section 217.61 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 217.61 Purpose and scope.
Sections 217.61 through 217.63 of this subpart establish public
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described
in subpart B of this part for a Board-regulated institution with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the Board-
regulated institution's most recent year-end Call Report, for a state
member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company, as applicable that is not an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution making public disclosures pursuant to Sec.
217.172. An advanced approaches Board-regulated institution that has
not received approval from the Board to exit parallel run pursuant to
Sec. 217.121(d) is subject to the disclosure requirements described in
Sec. Sec. 217.62 and 217.63. A Board-regulated institution with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the Board-
regulated institution's most recent year-end Call Report, for a state
member bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company, as applicable, that is not an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution making public disclosures subject to Sec.
217.172 must comply with Sec. 217.62 unless it is a consolidated
subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company,
or depository institution that is subject to the disclosure
requirements of Sec. 217.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking
organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section,
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the
Board-regulated institution's total consolidated assets in the four
most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report, for a state member
bank, or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan
holding company, as applicable; or
[[Page 50025]]
the average of the Board-regulated institution's total consolidated
assets in the most recent consecutive quarters as reported quarterly on
the Board-regulated institution's Call Report, for a state member bank,
or FR Y-9C, for a bank holding company or savings and loan holding
company, as applicable if the Board-regulated institution has not filed
such a report for each of the most recent four quarters.
* * * * *
0
42. Section 217.63 is amended by revising Tables 3 and 8 to read as
follows:
Sec. 217.63 Disclosures by Board-regulated institutions described in
Sec. 217.61.
* * * * *
Table 3 to Sec. 217.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures................................ (a) A summary discussion of the Board-regulated
institution's approach to assessing the adequacy of
its capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative disclosures............................... (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
(1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
(2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
MDBs;
(3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
banks, and credit unions;
(4) Exposures to PSEs;
(5) Corporate exposures;
(6) Residential mortgage exposures;
(7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
construction loans;
(8) HVADC exposures and HVCRE exposures;
(9) Past due loans;
(10) Other assets;
(11) Cleared transactions;
(12) Default fund contributions;
(13) Unsettled transactions;
(14) Securitization exposures; and
(15) Equity exposures
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
calculated under subpart F of this part.
(d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
capital ratios:
(1) For the top consolidated group; and
(2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
(e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
Table 8 to Sec. 217.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures................................ (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
respect to a securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion of:
(1) The Board-regulated institution's objectives for
securitizing assets, including the extent to which
these activities transfer credit risk of the
underlying exposures away from the Board-regulated
institution to other entities and including the
type of risks assumed and retained with
resecuritization activity; \1\
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
inherent in the securitized assets;
(3) The roles played by the Board-regulated
institution in the securitization process \2\ and
an indication of the extent of the Board-regulated
institution's involvement in each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
credit and market risk of securitization exposures
including how those processes differ for
resecuritization exposures;
(5) The Board-regulated institution's policy for
mitigating the credit risk retained through
securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches that the Board-
regulated institution follows for its
securitization exposures including the type of
securitization exposure to which each approach
applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs that the Board-
regulated institution, as sponsor, uses to
securitize third-party exposures. The Board-
regulated institution must indicate whether it has
exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance
sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the Board-regulated institution manages or
advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the securitization
exposures that the Board-regulated institution has
securitized or in securitization SPEs that the
Board-regulated institution sponsors.\3\
(c) Summary of the Board-regulated institution's
accounting policies for securitization activities,
including:
(1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
retained or purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
previous period for valuing retained interests and
impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
D of this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
balance sheet for arrangements that could require
the Board-regulated institution to provide
financial support for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes to any
quantitative information since the last reporting
period.
Quantitative Disclosures............................... (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
Board-regulated institution in securitizations that
meet the operational criteria provided in Sec.
217.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic
securitizations), by exposure type, separately for
securitizations of third-party exposures for which the
bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
(f) For exposures securitized by the Board-regulated
institution in securitizations that meet the
operational criteria in Sec. 217.41:
[[Page 50026]]
(1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
(2) Losses recognized by the Board-regulated
institution during the current period categorized
by exposure type.\6\
(g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
categorized by exposure type.
(i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
retained or purchased and the associated capital
requirements for these exposures, categorized
between securitization and resecuritization
exposures, further categorized into a meaningful
number of risk weight bands and by risk-based
capital approach (e.g., SSFA); and
(2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
underlying exposure in the pool of any:
(i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
has been deducted from common equity tier 1
capital; and
(ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
(j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
including the amount of exposures securitized (by
exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
exposure type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
retained or purchased categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
applied and those not applied; and
(2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Board-regulated institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates;
this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the Board-
regulated institution is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the bank, whether generated by them or
purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-party exposures included in
sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying exposures originally on the bank's
balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by the bank from third-party entities) in which the
originating bank does not retain any securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be
reported for the year of inception. Banks are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a
capital charge under this part.
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the bank's balance sheet) or credit-related
OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as recognition of liabilities for
probable future financial support required of the bank with respect to securitized assets.
* * * * *
0
43. Section 217.101 paragraph (b) is amended by adding a definition for
``high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure'' to read as
follows:
Sec. 217.101 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for
purposes of Subpart E, means a credit facility that, prior to
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 228, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR
208.22(a)(3) or 228.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise described in
paragraph (1), (2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the Board's real estate
lending standards at 12 CFR part 208, appendix C;
(ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the Board-regulated
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the Board-regulated
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the Board-regulated institution's underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
0
44. Section 217.131 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 217.131 Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail
risk-weighted assets.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a
multilateral development bank, to which the Board-regulated institution
assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *
0
45. Section 217.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:
[[Page 50027]]
Sec. 217.133 Cleared transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client Board-regulated institution must apply the risk
weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member Board-regulated institution must apply the risk weight
applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
0
46. Section 217.152 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to
read as follows:
Sec. 217.152 Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk
weight.
* * * * *
0
47. Section 217.202, paragraph (b) is amended by revising the
definition of ``Corporate debt position'' to read as follows:
Sec. 217.202 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank,
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *
0
48. Section 217.210 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) and
(b)(2)(vii)(A) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.210 Standardized measurement method for specific risk.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank
debt positions. A Board-regulated institution may assign a 0.0 percent
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure
to the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an
MDB.
* * * * *
(vii) * * * (A) General requirements. (1) A Board-regulated
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution or is a U.S. intermediate holding company that is required
to be established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is
not calculating risk-weighted assets according to Subpart E must assign
a specific risk-weighting factor to a securitization position using
either the simplified supervisory formula approach (SSFA) in paragraph
(b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section (and Sec. 217.211) or assign a specific
risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
(2) A Board-regulated institution that is an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution or is a U.S. intermediate holding company
that is required to be established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR
252.153 and that is calculating risk-weighted assets according to
Subpart E must calculate a specific risk add-on for a securitization
position in accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section if
the Board-regulated institution and the securitization position each
qualifies to use the SFA in Sec. 217.143. A Board-regulated
institution that is an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution
or is a U.S. intermediate holding company that is required to be
established or designated pursuant to 12 CFR 252.153 and that is
calculating risk-weighted assets according to Subpart E with a
securitization position that does not qualify for the SFA under
paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of this section may assign a specific risk-
weighting factor to the securitization position using the SSFA in
accordance with paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section or assign a
specific risk-weighting factor of 100 percent to the position.
(3) A Board-regulated institution must treat a short securitization
position as if it is a long securitization position solely for
calculation purposes when using the SFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(B) of
this section or the SSFA in paragraph (b)(2)(vii)(C) of this section.
* * * * *
0
49. Section 217.300 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (c)(2), (3),
and (d) to read as follows:
Sec. 217.300 Transitions.
* * * * *
(b) Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions. Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated institution that is
not an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, a Board-regulated institution must make
the capital adjustments and deductions in Sec. 217.22 in accordance
with the transition requirements in this paragraph (b). Beginning
January 1, 2018, a Board-regulated institution must make all regulatory
capital adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec. 217.22.
(1) Transition deductions from common equity tier 1 capital.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, a Board-
regulated institution, must make the deductions required under Sec.
217.22(a)(1)-(7) from common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements
in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to
Sec. 217.300.
(i) A Board-regulated institution must deduct the following items
from common equity tier 1 and additional tier 1 capital in accordance
with the percentages set forth in Table 2 to Sec. 217.300: Goodwill
(Sec. 217.22(a)(1)), DTAs that arise from net operating loss and tax
credit carryforwards (Sec. 217.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in connection
with a securitization exposure (Sec. 217.22(a)(4)), defined benefit
pension fund assets (Sec. 217.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss that
exceeds eligible credit reserves (for advanced approaches Board-
regulated institutions that have completed the parallel run process and
that have received notifications from the Board pursuant to Sec.
217.121(d) of subpart E) (Sec. 217.22(a)(6)), and financial
subsidiaries (Sec. 217.22(a)(7)).
[[Page 50028]]
Table 2 to Sec. 217.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition deductions Transition deductions under Sec. 217.22(a)(3)-
under Sec. -------------------------(6)-----------------------
217.22(a)(1) and (7)
Transition period -------------------------- Percentage of the Percentage of the
Percentage of the deductions from common deductions from tier 1
deductions from common equity tier 1 capital capital
equity tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014................ 100 20 80
Calendar year 2015................ 100 40 60
Calendar year 2016................ 100 60 40
Calendar year 2017................ 100 80 20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter 100 100 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital any intangible assets other than goodwill and MSAs in
accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 3 to Sec. 217.300.
(iii) A Board-regulated institution must apply a 100 percent risk-
weight to the aggregate amount of intangible assets other than goodwill
and MSAs that are not required to be deducted from common equity tier 1
capital under this section.
Table 3 to Sec. 217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition deductions
under Sec.
217.22(a)(2)--
Transition period percentage of the
deductions from common
equity tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 20
Calendar year 2015............................ 40
Calendar year 2016............................ 60
Calendar year 2017............................ 80
Calendar year 2018,........................... 100
and thereafter................................
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Transition adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated
institution that is not an advanced approaches Board-regulated
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, a Board-
regulated institution, must allocate the regulatory adjustments related
to changes in the fair value of liabilities due to changes in the
Board-regulated institution's own credit risk (Sec. 217.22(b)(1)(iii))
between common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1 capital in accordance
with the percentages set forth in Table 4 to Sec. 217.300.
(i) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is positive, the
Board-regulated institution must allocate the deduction between common
equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in accordance with Table 4 to Sec.
217.300.
(ii) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is negative, the
Board-regulated institution must add back the adjustment to common
equity tier 1 capital or to tier 1 capital, in accordance with Table 4
to Sec. 217.300.
Table 4 to Sec. 217.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition adjustments under Sec.
217.22(b)(1)(iii)
---------------------------------------------------
Transition period Percentage of the
adjustment applied to Percentage of the
common equity tier 1 adjustment applied to
capital tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014.......................................... 20 80
Calendar year 2015.......................................... 40 60
Calendar year 2016.......................................... 60 40
Calendar year 2017.......................................... 80 20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter.......................... 100 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Transition adjustments to AOCI for an advanced approaches
Board-regulated institution and a Board-regulated institution that has
not made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec. 217.22(b)(2). Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated institution that is
not an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution that has not
made an AOCI opt-out
[[Page 50029]]
election under Sec. 217.22(b)(2), and in each case through December
31, 2017, a Board-regulated institution must adjust common equity tier
1 capital with respect to the transition AOCI adjustment amount
(transition AOCI adjustment amount):
(i) The transition AOCI adjustment amount is the aggregate amount
of a Board-regulated institution's:
(A) Unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities that are
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP or
available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
(B) Net unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities
that are not preferred stock classified as an equity security under
GAAP or available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
(C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI attributed to defined benefit
postretirement plans resulting from the initial and subsequent
application of the relevant GAAP standards that pertain to such plans
(excluding, at the Board-regulated institution's option, the portion
relating to pension assets deducted under section 22(a)(5)), plus
(D) Accumulated net gains or losses on cash flow hedges related to
items that are reported on the balance sheet at fair value included in
AOCI, plus
(E) Net unrealized gains or losses on held-to-maturity securities
that are included in AOCI.
(ii) A Board-regulated institution must make the following
adjustment to its common equity tier 1 capital:
(A) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is positive, the
appropriate amount must be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec. 217.300.
(B) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is negative, the
appropriate amount must be added back to common equity tier 1 capital
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec. 217.300.
Table 5 to Sec. 217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of the
transition AOCI
Transition period adjustment amount to be
applied to common
equity tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 80
Calendar year 2015............................ 60
Calendar year 2016............................ 40
Calendar year 2017............................ 20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) A Board-regulated institution may include in tier 2 capital
the percentage of unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred
stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-
sale equity exposures as set forth in Table 6 to Sec. 217.300.
Table 6 to Sec. 217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of unrealized
gains on available-for-
sale preferred stock
classified as an equity
Transition period security under GAAP and
available-for-sale
equity exposures that
may be included in tier
2 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 36
Calendar year 2015............................ 27
Calendar year 2016............................ 18
Calendar year 2017............................ 9
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(2) Mergers and acquisitions. (i) A depository institution holding
company of $15 billion or more that acquires after December 31, 2013
either a depository institution holding company with total consolidated
assets of less than $15 billion as of December 31, 2009 (depository
institution holding company under $15 billion) or a depository
institution holding company that is a 2010 MHC, may include in
regulatory capital the non-qualifying capital instruments issued by the
acquired organization up to the applicable percentages set forth in
Table 8 to Sec. 217.300.
(ii) If a depository institution holding company under $15 billion
acquires after December 31, 2013 a depository institution holding
company under $15 billion or a 2010 MHC, and the resulting organization
has total consolidated assets of $15 billion or more as reported on the
resulting organization's FR Y-9C for the period in which the
transaction occurred, the resulting organization may include in
regulatory capital non-qualifying instruments of the resulting
organization up to the applicable percentages set forth in Table 8 to
Sec. 217.300.
[[Page 50030]]
Table 8 to Sec. 217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of non-
qualifying capital
instruments includable
in additional tier 1 or
Transition period (calendar year) tier 2 capital for a
depository institution
holding company of $15
billion or more
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 50
Calendar year 2015............................ 25
Calendar year 2016 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Depository institution holding companies under $15 billion and
2010 MHCs. (i) Non-qualifying capital instruments issued by depository
institution holding companies under $15 billion and 2010 MHCs prior to
May 19, 2010, may be included in additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital if
the instrument was included in tier 1 or tier 2 capital, respectively,
as of January 1, 2014.
(ii) Non-qualifying capital instruments includable in tier 1
capital are subject to a limit of 25 percent of tier 1 capital
elements, excluding any non-qualifying capital instruments and after
applying all regulatory capital deductions and adjustments to tier 1
capital.
(iii) Non-qualifying capital instruments that are not included in
tier 1 as a result of the limitation in paragraph (c)(3)(ii) of this
section are includable in tier 2 capital.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Non-qualifying minority interest. Beginning January 1, 2014 for
an advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for a Board-regulated institution that is not an
advanced approaches Board-regulated institution, and in each case
through December 31, 2017, a Board-regulated institution may include in
tier 1 capital or total capital the percentage of the tier 1 minority
interest and total capital minority interest outstanding as of January
1, 2014 that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1 or tier 2
capital instruments in Sec. 217.20 (non-qualifying minority interest),
as set forth in Table 10 to Sec. 217.300.
Table 10 to Sec. 217.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of the amount
of surplus or non-
qualifying minority
Transition period interest that can be
included in regulatory
capital during the
transition period
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 80
Calendar year 2015............................ 60
Calendar year 2016............................ 40
Calendar year 2017............................ 20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
12 CFR Part 324
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
For the reasons set out in the joint preamble, the FDIC proposes to
amend 12 CFR part 324 as follows.
PART 324--CAPITAL ADEQUACY OF FDIC-SUPERVISED INSTITUTIONS
Subpart A--General Provisions
0
50. The authority citation for part 324 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b),
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n),
1828(o), 1831o, 1835, 3907, 3909, 4808; 5371; 5412; Pub. L. 102-233,
105 Stat. 1761, 1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242,
105 Stat. 2236, 2355, as amended by Pub. L. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160,
2233 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 2386,
as amended by Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 4089 (12 U.S.C. 1828
note); Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1887 (15 U.S.C. 78o-7 note).
0
51. Section 324.2 is amended by removing the definitions of ``corporate
exposure,'' ``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility commercial real
estate (HVCRE) exposure,'' ``investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,'' ``non-significant investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' and
``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution,'' and adding the definitions of ``corporate exposure,''
``eligible guarantor,'' ``high volatility acquisition, development, or
construction (HVADC) exposure,'' ``high volatility commercial real
estate (HVCRE) exposure,'' ``investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution,'' ``non-significant investment in
the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution,'' and
``significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution'' as follows:
Sec. 324.2 Definitions.
* * * * *
Corporate exposure means an exposure to a company that is not:
(1) An exposure to a sovereign, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multi-lateral development bank
(MDB), a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, or a
public sector entity (PSE);
(2) An exposure to a GSE;
(3) A residential mortgage exposure;
[[Page 50031]]
(4) A pre-sold construction loan;
(5) A statutory multifamily mortgage;
(6) A high volatility acquisition, development, or construction
(HVADC) exposure or a high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure;
(7) A cleared transaction;
(8) A default fund contribution;
(9) A securitization exposure;
(10) An equity exposure; or
(11) An unsettled transaction.
* * * * *
Eligible guarantor means:
(1) A sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, the European
Commission, a Federal Home Loan Bank, Federal Agricultural Mortgage
Corporation (Farmer Mac), the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank
(MDB), a depository institution, a bank holding company, a savings and
loan holding company, a credit union, a foreign bank, or a qualifying
central counterparty; or
(2) An entity (other than a special purpose entity):
(i) That at the time the guarantee is issued or anytime thereafter,
has issued and outstanding an unsecured debt security without credit
enhancement that is investment grade;
(ii) Whose creditworthiness is not positively correlated with the
credit risk of the exposures for which it has provided guarantees; and
(iii) That is not an insurance company engaged predominately in the
business of providing credit protection (such as a monoline bond
insurer or re-insurer).
* * * * *
High-volatility acquisition, development, or construction (HVADC)
exposure means a credit facility that is originated on or after
[effective date] and that:
(1) Primarily finances or refinances the:
(i) Acquisition of vacant or developed land;
(ii) Development of land to prepare to erect new structures
including, but not limited to, the laying of sewers or water pipes and
demolishing existing structures; or
(iii) Construction of buildings, dwellings, or other improvements
including additions or alterations to existing structures; and
(2) Is not a credit facility that finances or refinances:
(i) One- to four-family residential properties;
(ii) Real property projects that would have the primary purpose of
``community development'' as defined under 12 CFR part 25 (national
bank), 12 CFR part 195 (Federal savings association) (OCC); 12 CFR part
228 (Board); 12 CFR part 345 (FDIC); or
(iii) The purchase or development of agricultural land, including,
but not limited to, all land used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for commercial or residential development; and
(3) Is not a permanent loan. A permanent loan for purposes of this
definition means a prudently underwritten loan that has a clearly
identified ongoing source of repayment sufficient to service amortizing
principal and interest payments aside from the sale of the property.
For purposes of this section, a permanent loan does not include a loan
that finances or refinances a stabilization period or unsold lots or
units of for-sale projects.
High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for
purposes of Subpart D, means a credit facility that is either
outstanding or committed prior to [effective date] and, prior to
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 345, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR
345.12(g)(3), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1),
(2)(i), (3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the FDIC's real estate
lending standards at 12 CFR part 365, subpart A (state non-member
banks), 12 CFR 390.264 and 390.265 (state savings associations);
(ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the FDIC-supervised
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the FDIC-supervised
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the FDIC-supervised institution's underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
Investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution means a net long position calculated in accordance with
Sec. 324.22(h) in an instrument that is recognized as capital for
regulatory purposes by the primary supervisor of an unconsolidated
regulated financial institution or is an instrument that is part of the
GAAP equity of an unconsolidated unregulated financial institution,
including direct, indirect, and synthetic exposures to capital
instruments, excluding underwriting positions held by the FDIC-
supervised institution for five or fewer business days.
* * * * *
Non-significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution where the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution owns 10 percent or less of the issued and outstanding
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
Significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution means an investment by an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution where the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution owns more than 10 percent of the issued and outstanding
[[Page 50032]]
common stock of the unconsolidated financial institution.
* * * * *
0
52. Section 324.10 is amended by revising paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(H) to
read as follows:
Sec. 324.10 Minimum capital requirements.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) * * *
(H) The credit equivalent amount of all off-balance sheet exposures
of the FDIC-supervised institution, excluding repo-style transactions,
repurchase or reverse repurchase or securities borrowing or lending
transactions that qualify for sales treatment under U.S. GAAP, and
derivative transactions, determined using the applicable credit
conversion factor under Sec. 324.33(b), provided, however, that the
minimum credit conversion factor that may be assigned to an off-balance
sheet exposure under this paragraph is 10 percent; and
* * * * *
0
53. Section 324.11 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(2)(i),
(a)(2)(iv), (a)(3)(i), and Table 1 to read as follows:
Sec. 324.11 Capital conservation buffer and countercyclical capital
buffer amount.
(a) * * *
(2) * * *
(i) Eligible retained income. The eligible retained income of an
FDIC-supervised institution is the FDIC-supervised institution's net
income, calculated in accordance with the instructions to the Call
Report, for the four calendar quarters preceding the current calendar
quarter, net of any distributions and associated tax effects not
already reflected in net income.
* * * * *
(iv) Private sector credit exposure. Private sector credit exposure
means an exposure to a company or an individual that is not an exposure
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European Commission, the European Stability
Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, the International
Monetary Fund, an MDB, a PSE, or a GSE.
(3) Calculation of capital conservation buffer. (i) An FDIC-
supervised institution's capital conservation buffer is equal to the
lowest of the following ratios, calculated as of the last day of the
previous calendar quarter:
(A) The FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital
ratio minus the FDIC-supervised institution's minimum common equity
tier 1 capital ratio requirement under Sec. 324.10;
(B) The FDIC-supervised institution's tier 1 capital ratio minus
the FDIC-supervised institution's minimum tier 1 capital ratio
requirement under Sec. 324.10; and
(C) The FDIC-supervised institution's total capital ratio minus the
FDIC-supervised institution's minimum total capital ratio requirement
under Sec. 324.10; or
* * * * *
Table 1 to Sec. 324.11--Calculation of Maximum Payout Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capital conservation buffer Maximum payout ratio
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Greater than 2.5 percent plus 100 percent of the No payout ratio
FDIC-supervised institution's applicable limitation applies.
countercyclical capital buffer amount.
Less than or equal to 2.5 percent plus 100 60 percent.
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount, and greater than 1.875 percent plus 75
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount.
Less than or equal to 1.875 percent plus 75 40 percent.
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount, and greater than 1.25 percent plus 50
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount.
Less than or equal to 1.25 percent plus 50 20 percent.
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount, and greater than 0.625 percent plus 25
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount.
Less than or equal to 0.625 percent plus 25 0 percent.
percent of the FDIC-supervised institution's
applicable countercyclical capital buffer
amount.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
0
54. Section 324.20 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(4),
(c)(1)(viii), (c)(2), and (d)(2) to read as follows:
Sec. 324.20 Capital components and eligibility criteria for
regulatory capital instruments.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(4) Any common equity tier 1 minority interest, subject to the
limitations in Sec. 324.21.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(1) * * *
(viii) Any cash dividend payments on the instrument are paid out of
the FDIC-supervised institution's net income or retained earnings. An
FDIC-supervised institution must obtain prior FDIC approval for any
dividend payment involving a reduction or retirement of capital stock
in accordance with 12 CFR 303.241.
* * * * *
(2) Tier 1 minority interest, subject to the limitations in Sec.
324.21, that is not included in the FDIC-supervised institution's
common equity tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Total capital minority interest, subject to the limitations set
forth in Sec. 324.21, that is not included in the FDIC-supervised
institution's tier 1 capital.
* * * * *
0
55. Section 324.21 is revised to reads as follows:
Sec. 324.21 Minority interest.
(a) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec. 324.20, an FDIC-
supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is subject to the minority interest limitations
in this paragraph (a) if a consolidated subsidiary of the FDIC-
supervised institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned
by the FDIC-supervised institution.
(2) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of
common equity tier 1 minority interest that an FDIC-supervised
institution may include in common equity tier 1 capital must be no
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all common equity tier 1 capital
elements of the FDIC-supervised institution (not including the common
equity tier 1 minority interest itself), less any common equity tier 1
capital
[[Page 50033]]
regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec. 324.22
(a) and (b).
(3) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of
the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of tier 1 minority interest
that an FDIC-supervised may include in tier 1 capital must be no
greater than 10 percent of the sum of all tier 1 capital elements of
the FDIC-supervised institution (not including the tier 1 minority
interest itself), less any tier 1 capital regulatory adjustments and
deductions in accordance with Sec. 324.22 (a) and (b).
(4) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital
of the FDIC-supervised institution. The amount of total capital
minority interest that an FDIC-supervised institution may include in
total capital must be no greater than 10 percent of the sum of all
total capital elements of the FDIC-supervised institution (not
including the total capital minority interest itself), less any total
capital regulatory adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.
324.22 (a) and (b).
(b) (1) Applicability. For purposes of Sec. 324.20, an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution is subject to the minority
interest limitations in this paragraph (b) if:
(i) A consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution has issued regulatory capital that is not owned
by the FDIC-supervised institution; and
(ii) For each relevant regulatory capital ratio of the consolidated
subsidiary, the ratio exceeds the sum of the subsidiary's minimum
regulatory capital requirements plus its capital conservation buffer.
(2) Difference in capital adequacy standards at the subsidiary
level. For purposes of the minority interest calculations in this
section, if the consolidated subsidiary issuing the capital is not
subject to capital adequacy standards similar to those of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution, the advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution must assume that the capital adequacy standards
of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution apply to the
subsidiary.
(3) Common equity tier 1 minority interest includable in the common
equity tier 1 capital of the FDIC-supervised institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, the amount of common equity tier 1 minority interest the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may include in common
equity tier 1 capital is equal to:
(i) The common equity tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary;
minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's common equity tier 1
capital that is not owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, multiplied by the difference between the common equity
tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the lower of:
(A) The amount of common equity tier 1 capital the subsidiary must
hold, or would be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this
section, to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under Sec. 324.11 or equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary's home country supervisor; or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary
multiplied by
(2) The common equity tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must
maintain to avoid restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus
payments under Sec. 324.11 or equivalent standards established by the
subsidiary's home country supervisor.
(4) Tier 1 minority interest includable in the tier 1 capital of
the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution. For each
consolidated subsidiary of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, the amount of tier 1 minority interest the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution may include in tier 1 capital is
equal to:
(i) The tier 1 minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's tier 1 capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution multiplied
by the difference between the tier 1 capital of the subsidiary and the
lower of:
(A) The amount of tier 1 capital the subsidiary must hold, or would
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor, or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary
multiplied by
(2) The tier 1 capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor.
(5) Total capital minority interest includable in the total capital
of the FDIC-supervised institution. For each consolidated subsidiary of
the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, the amount of
total capital minority interest the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution may include in total capital is equal to:
(i) The total capital minority interest of the subsidiary; minus
(ii) The percentage of the subsidiary's total capital that is not
owned by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution multiplied
by the difference between the total capital of the subsidiary and the
lower of:
(A) The amount of total capital the subsidiary must hold, or would
be required to hold pursuant to paragraph (b) of this section, to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor, or
(B)(1) The standardized total risk-weighted assets of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution that relate to the subsidiary
multiplied by
(2) The total capital ratio the subsidiary must maintain to avoid
restrictions on distributions and discretionary bonus payments under
Sec. 324.11 or equivalent standards established by the subsidiary's
home country supervisor.
0
56. Section 324.22 is amended by revising paragraphs (a)(1), (c), (d),
(g), and (h) to read as follows:
Sec. 324.22 Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions.
(a) * * *
(1)(i) Goodwill, net of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs)
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section; and
(ii) For an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
goodwill that is embedded in the valuation of a significant investment
in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution in the form
of common stock (and that is reflected in the consolidated financial
statements of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution), in
accordance with paragraph (d) of this section;
* * * * *
(c) Deductions from regulatory capital related to investments in
capital instruments \23\--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate amounts
deducted under paragraphs (c) through (f) of this section after it
calculates the amount of ALLL includable in tier 2 capital under
Sec. 324.20(d)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 50034]]
(1) Investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital
instruments. An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment
in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments as
follows:
(i) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in the
FDIC-supervised institution's own common stock instruments from its
common equity tier 1 capital elements to the extent such instruments
are not excluded from regulatory capital under Sec. 324.20(b)(1);
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in
the FDIC-supervised institution's own additional tier 1 capital
instruments from its additional tier 1 capital elements; and
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct an investment in
the FDIC-supervised institution's own tier 2 capital instruments from
its tier 2 capital elements.
(2) Corresponding deduction approach. For purposes of subpart C of
this part, the corresponding deduction approach is the methodology used
for the deductions from regulatory capital related to reciprocal cross
holdings (as described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section),
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions for
an FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution (as described in paragraph (c)(4) of this
section), non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution (as described in paragraph (c)(5) of this section), and
non-common stock significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions for an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution (as described in paragraph (c)(6) of this
section). Under the corresponding deduction approach, an FDIC-
supervised institution must make deductions from the component of
capital for which the underlying instrument would qualify if it were
issued by the FDIC-supervised institution itself, as described in
paragraphs (c)(2)(i)-(iii) of this section. If the FDIC-supervised
institution does not have a sufficient amount of a specific component
of capital to effect the required deduction, the shortfall must be
deducted according to paragraph (f) of this section.
(i) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a
financial institution that is not a regulated financial institution,
the FDIC-supervised institution must treat the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock
or represents the most subordinated claim in liquidation of the
financial institution; and
(B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is subordinated
to all creditors of the financial institution and is senior in
liquidation only to common shareholders.
(ii) If an investment is in the form of an instrument issued by a
regulated financial institution and the instrument does not meet the
criteria for common equity tier 1, additional tier 1 or tier 2 capital
instruments under Sec. 324.20, the FDIC-supervised institution must
treat the instrument as:
(A) A common equity tier 1 capital instrument if it is common stock
included in GAAP equity or represents the most subordinated claim in
liquidation of the financial institution;
(B) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if it is included in
GAAP equity, subordinated to all creditors of the financial
institution, and senior in a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or
similar proceeding only to common shareholders; and
(C) A tier 2 capital instrument if it is not included in GAAP
equity but considered regulatory capital by the primary supervisor of
the financial institution.
(iii) If an investment is in the form of a non-qualifying capital
instrument (as defined in Sec. 324.300(c)), the FDIC-supervised
institution must treat the instrument as:
(A) An additional tier 1 capital instrument if such instrument was
included in the issuer's tier 1 capital prior to May 19, 2010; or
(B) A tier 2 capital instrument if such instrument was included in
the issuer's tier 2 capital (but not includable in tier 1 capital)
prior to May 19, 2010.
(3) Reciprocal cross holdings in the capital of financial
institutions. An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct investments in
the capital of other financial institutions it holds reciprocally,
where such reciprocal cross holdings result from a formal or informal
arrangement to swap, exchange, or otherwise intend to hold each other's
capital instruments, by applying the corresponding deduction approach.
(4) Investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions. An FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct its investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in
Sec. 324.2) that exceed 25 percent of the sum of the FDIC-supervised
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements minus all
deductions from and adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital
elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\24\ The deductions
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an FDIC-supervised
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting, with the prior
written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time stipulated by the
FDIC, is not required to deduct an investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) to
the extent the investment is related to the failed underwriting.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an FDIC-supervised institution that
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not
required to deduct an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution pursuant to this paragraph if the financial
institution is in distress and if such investment is made for the
purpose of providing financial support to the financial institution,
as determined by the FDIC.
\25\ Any investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that do not exceed the 25 percent threshold for
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions
under this section must be assigned the appropriate risk weight
under subparts D or F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(5) Non-significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions. (i) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution must deduct its non-significant investments in the capital
of unconsolidated financial institutions (as defined in Sec. 324.2)
that, in the aggregate, exceed 10 percent of the sum of the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital
elements minus all deductions from and adjustments to common equity
tier 1 capital elements required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of
this section (the 10 percent threshold for non-significant investments)
by applying the corresponding deduction approach.\26\ The deductions
described in this section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. In addition, an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting,
[[Page 50035]]
with the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time
stipulated by the FDIC, is not required to deduct a non-significant
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph (c) to the extent the investment is related
to the failed underwriting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to deduct a non-significant
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
pursuant to this paragraph if the financial institution is in
distress and if such investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution, as determined by the
FDIC.
\27\ Any non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions that do not exceed the 10
percent threshold for non-significant investments under this section
must be assigned the appropriate risk weight under subparts D, E, or
F of this part, as applicable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The amount to be deducted under this section from a specific
capital component is equal to:
(A) The advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's non-
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions exceeding the 10 percent threshold for non-significant
investments, multiplied by
(B) The ratio of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution's non-significant investments in the capital of
unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of such capital
component to the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's
total non-significant investments in unconsolidated financial
institutions.
(6) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions that are not in the form of common stock. An
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct its
significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions that are not in the form of common stock by applying the
corresponding deduction approach.\28\ The deductions described in this
section are net of associated DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of
this section. In addition, with the prior written approval of the FDIC,
for the period of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches
FDIC-supervised institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is
not required to deduct a significant investment in the capital of an
unconsolidated financial institution pursuant to this paragraph (c) if
such investment is related to such failed underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ With prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of
time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution is not required to deduct a significant investment in
the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial institution in
distress which is not in the form of common stock pursuant to this
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the
FDIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) MSAs and certain DTAs subject to common equity tier 1 capital
deduction thresholds.
(1) An FDIC-supervised institution that is not an advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution must make deductions from
regulatory capital as described in this paragraph (d)(1).
(i) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the items set forth in
this paragraph (d)(1) that, individually, exceeds 25 percent of the sum
of the FDIC-supervised institution's common equity tier 1 capital
elements, less adjustments to and deductions from common equity tier 1
capital required under paragraphs (a) through (c)(3) of this section
(the 25 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(1) of this section
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital must be
included in the risk-weighted assets of the FDIC-supervised
institution and assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital elements, as set forth in (d)(1), the amount of DTAs
arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-supervised institution
could not realize through net operating loss carrybacks, net of any
related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this section. An FDIC-supervised institution is not
required to deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital
elements DTAs (net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs,
in accordance with Sec. 324.22(e)) arising from timing differences
that the FDIC-supervised institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks. The FDIC-supervised institution must risk
weight these assets at 100 percent. For an FDIC-supervised institution
that is a member of a consolidated group for tax purposes, the amount
of DTAs that could be realized through net operating loss carrybacks
may not exceed the amount that the FDIC-supervised institution could
reasonably expect to have refunded by its parent holding company.
(iii) The FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common
equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of MSAs net of associated
DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.
(iv) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to
deduction pursuant to paragraph (d)(1) of this section, an FDIC-
supervised institution may exclude DTAs and DTLs relating to
adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under paragraph (b) of
this section. An FDIC-supervised institution that elects to exclude
DTAs relating to adjustments under paragraph (b) of this section also
must exclude DTLs and must do so consistently in all future
calculations. An FDIC-supervised institution may change its exclusion
preference only after obtaining the prior approval of the FDIC.
(2) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must make
deductions from regulatory capital as described in this paragraph
(d)(2).
(i) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the amount of each of the
items set forth in this paragraph (d)(2) that, individually, exceeds 10
percent of the sum of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution's common equity tier 1 capital elements, less adjustments
to and deductions from common equity tier 1 capital required under
paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section (the 10 percent common
equity tier 1 capital deduction threshold).
(A) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution could not realize through net
operating loss carrybacks, net of any related valuation allowances and
net of DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section. An
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution is not required to
deduct from the sum of its common equity tier 1 capital elements DTAs
(net of any related valuation allowances and net of DTLs, in accordance
with Sec. 324.22(e)) arising from timing differences that the advanced
approaches FDIC-supervised institution could realize through net
operating loss carrybacks. The advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution must risk weight these assets at 100 percent. For an FDIC-
supervised institution that is a member of a consolidated group for tax
purposes, the amount of DTAs that could be realized through net
operating loss carrybacks may not exceed the amount that the FDIC-
supervised institution could reasonably expect to have refunded by its
parent holding company.
(B) MSAs net of associated DTLs, in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this section.
(C) Significant investments in the capital of unconsolidated
financial institutions in the form of common stock, net of associated
DTLs in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section.\30\ Significant
investments in the
[[Page 50036]]
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common
stock subject to the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold may be reduced by any goodwill embedded in the valuation of
such investments deducted by the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section. In addition,
with the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period of time
stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution that underwrites a failed underwriting is not required to
deduct a significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to this
paragraph (d)(2) if such investment is related to such failed
underwriting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ With the prior written approval of the FDIC, for the period
of time stipulated by the FDIC, an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution is not required to deduct a significant
investment in the capital instrument of an unconsolidated financial
institution in distress in the form of common stock pursuant to this
section if such investment is made for the purpose of providing
financial support to the financial institution as determined by the
FDIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution must deduct
from common equity tier 1 capital elements the items listed in
paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section that are not deducted as a result
of the application of the 10 percent common equity tier 1 capital
deduction threshold, and that, in aggregate, exceed 17.65 percent of
the sum of the advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution's common
equity tier 1 capital elements, minus adjustments to and deductions
from common equity tier 1 capital required under paragraphs (a) through
(c) of this section, minus the items listed in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of
this section (the 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction
threshold). Any goodwill that has been deducted under paragraph (a)(1)
of this section can be excluded from the significant investments in the
capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in the form of common
stock.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ The amount of the items in paragraph (d)(2) of this section
that is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to
this section must be included in the risk-weighted assets of the
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution and assigned a 250
percent risk weight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) For purposes of calculating the amount of DTAs subject to the
10 and 15 percent common equity tier 1 capital deduction thresholds, an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution may exclude DTAs and
DTLs relating to adjustments made to common equity tier 1 capital under
paragraph (b) of this section. An advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution that elects to exclude DTAs relating to adjustments under
paragraph (b) of this section also must exclude DTLs and must do so
consistently in all future calculations. An advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution may change its exclusion preference only after
obtaining the prior approval of the FDIC.
* * * * *
(g) Treatment of assets that are deducted. An FDIC-supervised
institution must exclude from standardized total risk-weighted assets
and, as applicable, advanced approaches total risk-weighted assets any
item that is required to be deducted from regulatory capital.
(h) Net long position. (1) For purposes of calculating an
investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instrument
and an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial
institution under this section, the net long position is the gross long
position in the underlying instrument determined in accordance with
paragraph (h)(2) of this section, as adjusted to recognize a short
position in the same instrument calculated in accordance with paragraph
(h)(3) of this section.
(2) Gross long position. The gross long position is determined as
follows:
(i) For an equity exposure that is held directly, the adjusted
carrying value as that term is defined in Sec. 324.51(b);
(ii) For an exposure that is held directly and is not an equity
exposure or a securitization exposure, the exposure amount as that term
is defined in Sec. 324.2;
(iii) For an indirect exposure, the FDIC-supervised institution's
carrying value of the investment in the investment fund, provided that,
alternatively:
(A) An FDIC-supervised institution may, with the prior approval of
the FDIC, use a conservative estimate of the amount of its investment
in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments or its
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
held through a position in an index; or
(B) An FDIC-supervised institution may calculate the gross long
position for investments in the FDIC-supervised institution's own
capital instruments or investments in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution by multiplying the FDIC-supervised institution's
carrying value of its investment in the investment fund by either:
(1) The highest stated investment limit (in percent) for
investments in the FDIC-supervised institution's own capital
instruments or investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial
institutions as stated in the prospectus, partnership agreement, or
similar contract defining permissible investments of the investment
fund; or
(2) The investment fund's actual holdings of investments in the
FDIC-supervised institution's own capital instruments or investments in
the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions.
(iv) For a synthetic exposure, the amount of the FDIC-supervised
institution's loss on the exposure if the reference capital instrument
were to have a value of zero.
(3) Adjustments to reflect a short position. In order to adjust the
gross long position to recognize a short position in the same
instrument, the following criteria must be met:
(i) The maturity of the short position must match the maturity of
the long position, or the short position has a residual maturity of at
least one year (maturity requirement); or
(ii) For a position that is a trading asset or trading liability
(whether on- or off-balance sheet) as reported on the FDIC-supervised
institution's Call Report if the FDIC-supervised institution has a
contractual right or obligation to sell the long position at a specific
point in time and the counterparty to the contract has an obligation to
purchase the long position if the FDIC-supervised institution exercises
its right to sell, this point in time may be treated as the maturity of
the long position such that the maturity of the long position and short
position are deemed to match for purposes of the maturity requirement,
even if the maturity of the short position is less than one year; and
(iii) For an investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own
capital instrument under paragraph (c)(1) of this section or an
investment in the capital of an unconsolidated financial institution
under paragraphs (c) and (d):
(A) An FDIC-supervised institution may only net a short position
against a long position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised
institution's own capital instrument under paragraph (c) of this
section if the short position involves no counterparty credit risk.
(B) A gross long position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised
institution's own capital instrument or an investment in the capital of
an unconsolidated financial institution resulting from a position in an
index may be netted against a short position in the same index. Long
and short positions in the same index without maturity dates are
considered to have matching maturities.
(C) A short position in an index that is hedging a long cash or
synthetic
[[Page 50037]]
position in an investment in the FDIC-supervised institution's own
capital instrument or an investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution can be decomposed to provide recognition of the
hedge. More specifically, the portion of the index that is composed of
the same underlying instrument that is being hedged may be used to
offset the long position if both the long position being hedged and the
short position in the index are reported as a trading asset or trading
liability (whether on- or off-balance sheet) on the FDIC-supervised
institution's Call Report and the hedge is deemed effective by the
FDIC-supervised institution's internal control processes, which have
not been found to be inadequate by the FDIC.
* * * * *
0
58. Section 324.32 is amended by revising paragraphs (b), (d)(2),
(d)(3)(ii), (j), (k), and (l) to read as follows:
Sec. 324.32 General risk weights.
* * * * *
(b) Certain supranational entities and multilateral development
banks (MDBs). An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a zero percent
risk weight to an exposure to the Bank for International Settlements,
the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the International
Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial
Stability Facility, or an MDB.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Exposures to foreign banks. (i) Except as otherwise provided
under paragraphs (d)(2)(iii), (d)(2)(v) and (d)(3) of this section, an
FDIC-supervised institution must assign a risk weight to an exposure to
a foreign bank, in accordance with Table 2 to Sec. 324.32, based on
the CRC that corresponds to the foreign bank's home country or the OECD
membership status of the foreign bank's home country if there is no CRC
applicable to the foreign bank's home country.
Table 2 to Sec. 324.32--Risk Weights for Exposures to Foreign Banks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Risk weight
(in percent)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CRC:
0-1................................................. 20
2................................................... 50
3................................................... 100
4-7................................................. 150
OECD Member with No CRC................................. 20
Non-OECD Member with No CRC............................. 100
Sovereign Default....................................... 150
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is a member
of the OECD and does not have a CRC.
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk-
weight to an exposure that is a self-liquidating, trade-related
contingent item that arises from the movement of goods and that has a
maturity of three months or less to a foreign bank whose home country
has a CRC of 0, 1, 2, or 3, or is an OECD member with no CRC.
(iv) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank whose home country is not a
member of the OECD and does not have a CRC, with the exception of self-
liquidating, trade-related contingent items that arise from the
movement of goods, and that have a maturity of three months or less,
which may be assigned a 20 percent risk weight.
(v) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk
weight to an exposure to a foreign bank immediately upon determining
that an event of sovereign default has occurred in the bank's home
country, or if an event of sovereign default has occurred in the
foreign bank's home country during the previous five years.
(3) * * *
(ii) A significant investment in the capital of an unconsolidated
financial institution in the form of common stock pursuant to Sec.
324.22(d)(2)(i)(c);
* * * * *
(j)(1) High-volatility acquisition, development, or construction
(HVADC) exposures. An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 130
percent risk weight to an HVADC exposure.
(2) High-volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposures. A
FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk weight to an
HVCRE exposure
(k) Past due exposures. Except for an exposure to a sovereign
entity or a residential mortgage exposure, if an exposure is 90 days or
more past due or on nonaccrual:
(1) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 150 percent risk
weight to the portion of the exposure that is not guaranteed or that is
unsecured;
(2) An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a risk weight to the
guaranteed portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight that
applies under Sec. 324.36 if the guarantee or credit derivative meets
the requirements of that section; and
(3) An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a risk weight to the
collateralized portion of a past due exposure based on the risk weight
that applies under Sec. 324.37 if the collateral meets the
requirements of that section.
(l) Other assets. (1) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a
zero percent risk weight to cash owned and held in all offices of the
FDIC-supervised institution or in transit; to gold bullion held in the
FDIC-supervised institution's own vaults or held in another depository
institution's vaults on an allocated basis, to the extent the gold
bullion assets are offset by gold bullion liabilities; and to exposures
that arise from the settlement of cash transactions (such as equities,
fixed income, spot foreign exchange and spot commodities) with a
central counterparty where there is no assumption of ongoing
counterparty credit risk by the central counterparty after settlement
of the trade and associated default fund contributions.
(2) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 20 percent risk
weight to cash items in the process of collection.
(3) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk
weight to DTAs arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-
supervised institution could realize through net operating loss
carrybacks.
(4) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 250 percent risk
weight to the portion of each of the following items to the extent it
is not deducted from common equity tier 1 capital pursuant to Sec.
324.22(d):
(i) MSAs; and
(ii) DTAs arising from temporary differences that the FDIC-
supervised institution could not realize through net operating loss
carrybacks.
(5) An FDIC-supervised institution must assign a 100 percent risk
weight to all assets not specifically assigned a different risk weight
under this subpart and that are not deducted from tier 1 or tier 2
capital pursuant to Sec. 324.22.
(6) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, an FDIC-
supervised institution may assign an asset that is not included in one
of the categories provided in this section to the risk weight category
applicable under the capital rules applicable to bank holding companies
and savings and loan holding companies under 12 CFR part 217, provided
that all of the following conditions apply:
(i) The FDIC-supervised institution is not authorized to hold the
asset under applicable law other than debt previously contracted or
similar authority; and
(ii) The risks associated with the asset are substantially similar
to the risks of assets that are otherwise assigned to a
[[Page 50038]]
risk weight category of less than 100 percent under this subpart.
* * * * *
0
59. Section 324.34 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 324.34 OTC derivative contracts.
* * * * *
(c) Counterparty credit risk for OTC credit derivatives. (1)
Protection purchasers. An FDIC-supervised institution that purchases an
OTC credit derivative that is recognized under Sec. 324.36 as a credit
risk mitigant for an exposure that is not a covered position under
subpart F is not required to compute a separate counterparty credit
risk capital requirement under this subpart D provided that the FDIC-
supervised institution does so consistently for all such credit
derivatives. The FDIC-supervised institution must either include all or
exclude all such credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying
master netting agreement from any measure used to determine
counterparty credit risk exposure to all relevant counterparties for
risk-based capital purposes.
(2) Protection providers. (i) An FDIC-supervised institution that
is the protection provider under an OTC credit derivative must treat
the OTC credit derivative as an exposure to the underlying reference
asset. The FDIC-supervised institution is not required to compute a
counterparty credit risk capital requirement for the OTC credit
derivative under this subpart D, provided that this treatment is
applied consistently for all such OTC credit derivatives. The FDIC-
supervised institution must either include all or exclude all such OTC
credit derivatives that are subject to a qualifying master netting
agreement from any measure used to determine counterparty credit risk
exposure.
(ii) The provisions of this paragraph (c)(2) apply to all relevant
counterparties for risk-based capital purposes unless the FDIC-
supervised institution is treating the OTC credit derivative as a
covered position under subpart F, in which case the FDIC-supervised
institution must compute a supplemental counterparty credit risk
capital requirement under this section.
* * * * *
0
60. Section 324.35 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3)(ii),
(b)(4)(ii), (c)(3)(ii), and (c)(4)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 324.35 Cleared transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk
weight appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must
calculate a risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a
CCP, clearing member, or custodian in connection with a cleared
transaction in accordance with the requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight
appropriate for the CCP according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
(4) * * *
(ii) A clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must calculate a
risk-weighted asset amount for any collateral provided to a CCP,
clearing member, or a custodian in connection with a cleared
transaction in accordance with requirements under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
61. Section 324.36 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:
Sec. 324.36 Guarantees and credit derivatives: Substitution
treatment.
* * * * *
(c) Substitution approach--(1) Full coverage. If an eligible
guarantee or eligible credit derivative meets the conditions in
paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section and the protection amount (P) of
the guarantee or credit derivative is greater than or equal to the
exposure amount of the hedged exposure, an FDIC-supervised institution
may recognize the guarantee or credit derivative in determining the
risk-weighted asset amount for the hedged exposure by substituting the
risk weight applicable to the guarantor or credit derivative protection
provider under this subpart D for the risk weight assigned to the
exposure.
(2) Partial coverage. If an eligible guarantee or eligible credit
derivative meets the conditions in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this
section and the protection amount (P) of the guarantee or credit
derivative is less than the exposure amount of the hedged exposure, the
FDIC-supervised institution must treat the hedged exposure as two
separate exposures (protected and unprotected) in order to recognize
the credit risk mitigation benefit of the guarantee or credit
derivative.
(i) The FDIC-supervised institution may calculate the risk-weighted
asset amount for the protected exposure under this subpart D, where the
applicable risk weight is the risk weight applicable to the guarantor
or credit derivative protection provider.
(ii) The FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the risk-
weighted asset amount for the unprotected exposure under this subpart
D, where the applicable risk weight is that of the unprotected portion
of the hedged exposure.
(iii) The treatment provided in this section is applicable when the
credit risk of an exposure is covered on a partial pro rata basis and
may be applicable when an adjustment is made to the effective notional
amount of the guarantee or credit derivative under paragraphs (d), (e),
or (f) of this section.
* * * * *
0
62. Section 324.37 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(i) to read
as follows:
Sec. 324.37 Collateralized transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) Risk weight substitution. (i) An FDIC-supervised institution
may apply a risk weight to the portion of an exposure that is secured
by the fair value of financial collateral (that meets the requirements
of paragraph (b)(1) of this section) based on the risk weight assigned
to the collateral under this subpart D. For repurchase agreements,
reverse repurchase agreements, and securities lending and borrowing
transactions, the collateral is the instruments, gold, and cash the
FDIC-supervised institution has borrowed, purchased subject to resale,
or taken as collateral from the counterparty under the transaction.
Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, the risk weight
assigned to the collateralized portion of the exposure may not be less
than 20 percent.
* * * * *
0
63. Section 324.38 is amended by revising paragraph (e)(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 324.38 Unsettled transactions.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(2) From the business day after the FDIC-supervised institution has
made its delivery until five business days after the counterparty
delivery is due, the FDIC-supervised institution must calculate the
risk-weighted asset amount for the transaction by treating the current
fair value of the deliverables owed to the FDIC-supervised institution
as an exposure to the counterparty and
[[Page 50039]]
using the applicable counterparty risk weight under this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
64. Section 324.42 is amended by revising paragraph (j)(2)(ii)(A) to
read as follows:
Sec. 324.42 Risk-weighted assets for securitization exposures.
* * * * *
(j) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) * * *
(A) If the FDIC-supervised institution purchases credit protection
from a counterparty that is not a securitization SPE, the FDIC-
supervised institution must determine the risk weight for the exposure
according to this subpart D.
* * * * *
0
65. Section 324.52 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1) and (4) to
read as follows:
Sec. 324.52 Simple risk-weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(1) Zero percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
to a sovereign, the Bank for International Settlements, the European
Central Bank, the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund,
the European Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability
Facility, an MDB, and any other entity whose credit exposures receive a
zero percent risk weight under Sec. 324.32 may be assigned a zero
percent risk weight.
* * * * *
(4) 250 percent risk weight equity exposures. Significant
investments in the capital of unconsolidated financial institutions in
the form of common stock that are not deducted from capital pursuant to
Sec. 324.22(d)(2) are assigned a 250 percent risk weight.
* * * * *
0
66. Section 324.61 is revised to read as follows:
Sec. 324.61 Purpose and scope.
Sections 324.61 through 324.63 of this subpart establish public
disclosure requirements related to the capital requirements described
in subpart B of this part for an FDIC-supervised institution with total
consolidated assets of $50 billion or more as reported on the FDIC-
supervised institution's most recent year-end Call Report that is not
an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution making public
disclosures pursuant to Sec. 324.172. An advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution that has not received approval from the FDIC to
exit parallel run pursuant to Sec. 324.121(d) is subject to the
disclosure requirements described in Sec. Sec. 324.62 and 324.63. An
FDIC-supervised institution with total consolidated assets of $50
billion or more as reported on the FDIC-supervised institution's most
recent year-end Call Report that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution making public disclosures subject to Sec.
324.172 must comply with Sec. 324.62 unless it is a consolidated
subsidiary of a bank holding company, savings and loan holding company,
or depository institution that is subject to the disclosure
requirements of Sec. 324.62 or a subsidiary of a non-U.S. banking
organization that is subject to comparable public disclosure
requirements in its home jurisdiction. For purposes of this section,
total consolidated assets are determined based on the average of the
FDIC-supervised institution's total consolidated assets in the four
most recent quarters as reported on the Call Report; or the average of
the FDIC-supervised institution's total consolidated assets in the most
recent consecutive quarters as reported quarterly on the FDIC-
supervised institution's Call Report if the FDIC-supervised institution
has not filed such a report for each of the most recent four quarters.
* * * * *
0
67. Section 324.63 is amended by revising Table 3 and Table 8 to read
as follows:
Sec. 324.63 Disclosures by FDIC-supervised institutions described in
Sec. 324.61.
* * * * *
Table 3 to Sec. 324.63--Capital Adequacy
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative disclosures................................ (a) A summary discussion of the FDIC-supervised
institution's approach to assessing the adequacy of
its capital to support current and future activities.
Quantitative disclosures............................... (b) Risk-weighted assets for:
(1) Exposures to sovereign entities;
(2) Exposures to certain supranational entities and
MDBs;
(3) Exposures to depository institutions, foreign
banks, and credit unions;
(4) Exposures to PSEs;
(5) Corporate exposures;
(6) Residential mortgage exposures;
(7) Statutory multifamily mortgages and pre-sold
construction loans;
(8) HVADC loans;
(9) Past due loans;
(10) Other assets;
(11) Cleared transactions;
(12) Default fund contributions;
(13) Unsettled transactions;
(14) Securitization exposures; and
(15) Equity exposures.
(c) Standardized market risk-weighted assets as
calculated under subpart F of this part.
(d) Common equity tier 1, tier 1 and total risk-based
capital ratios:
(1) For the top consolidated group; and
(2) For each depository institution subsidiary.
(e) Total standardized risk-weighted assets.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
[[Page 50040]]
Table 8 to Sec. 324.63--Securitization
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Qualitative Disclosures................................ (a) The general qualitative disclosure requirement with
respect to a securitization (including synthetic
securitizations), including a discussion of:
(1) The FDIC-supervised institution's objectives for
securitizing assets, including the extent to which
these activities transfer credit risk of the
underlying exposures away from the FDIC-supervised
institution to other entities and including the
type of risks assumed and retained with
resecuritization activity; \1\
(2) The nature of the risks (e.g. liquidity risk)
inherent in the securitized assets;
(3) The roles played by the FDIC-supervised
institution in the securitization process \2\ and
an indication of the extent of the FDIC-supervised
institution's involvement in each of them;
(4) The processes in place to monitor changes in the
credit and market risk of securitization exposures
including how those processes differ for
resecuritization exposures;
(5) The FDIC-supervised institution's policy for
mitigating the credit risk retained through
securitization and resecuritization exposures; and
(6) The risk-based capital approaches that the FDIC-
supervised institution follows for its
securitization exposures including the type of
securitization exposure to which each approach
applies.
(b) A list of:
(1) The type of securitization SPEs that the FDIC-
supervised institution, as sponsor, uses to
securitize third-party exposures. The FDIC-
supervised institution must indicate whether it has
exposure to these SPEs, either on- or off-balance
sheet; and
(2) Affiliated entities:
(i) That the FDIC-supervised institution manages or
advises; and
(ii) That invest either in the securitization
exposures that the FDIC-supervised institution has
securitized or in securitization SPEs that the FDIC-
supervised institution sponsors.\3\
(c) Summary of the FDIC-supervised institution's
accounting policies for securitization activities,
including:
(1) Whether the transactions are treated as sales or
financings;
(2) Recognition of gain-on-sale;
(3) Methods and key assumptions applied in valuing
retained or purchased interests;
(4) Changes in methods and key assumptions from the
previous period for valuing retained interests and
impact of the changes;
(5) Treatment of synthetic securitizations;
(6) How exposures intended to be securitized are
valued and whether they are recorded under subpart
D of this part; and
(7) Policies for recognizing liabilities on the
balance sheet for arrangements that could require
the FDIC-supervised institution to provide
financial support for securitized assets.
(d) An explanation of significant changes to any
quantitative information since the last reporting
period.
Quantitative Disclosures............................... (e) The total outstanding exposures securitized by the
FDIC-supervised institution in securitizations that
meet the operational criteria provided in Sec.
324.41 (categorized into traditional and synthetic
securitizations), by exposure type, separately for
securitizations of third-party exposures for which the
bank acts only as sponsor.\4\
(f) For exposures securitized by the FDIC-supervised
institution in securitizations that meet the
operational criteria in Sec. 324.41:
(1) Amount of securitized assets that are impaired/
past due categorized by exposure type; \5\ and
(2) Losses recognized by the FDIC-supervised
institution during the current period categorized
by exposure type.\6\
(g) The total amount of outstanding exposures intended
to be securitized categorized by exposure type.
(h) Aggregate amount of:
(1) On-balance sheet securitization exposures
retained or purchased categorized by exposure type;
and
(2) Off-balance sheet securitization exposures
categorized by exposure type.
(i) (1) Aggregate amount of securitization exposures
retained or purchased and the associated capital
requirements for these exposures, categorized between
securitization and resecuritization exposures, further
categorized into a meaningful number of risk weight
bands and by risk-based capital approach (e.g., SSFA);
and
(2) Aggregate amount disclosed separately by type of
underlying exposure in the pool of any:
(i) After-tax gain-on-sale on a securitization that
has been deducted from common equity tier 1
capital; and
(ii) Credit-enhancing interest-only strip that is
assigned a 1,250 percent risk weight.
(j) Summary of current year's securitization activity,
including the amount of exposures securitized (by
exposure type), and recognized gain or loss on sale by
exposure type.
(k) Aggregate amount of resecuritization exposures
retained or purchased categorized according to:
(1) Exposures to which credit risk mitigation is
applied and those not applied; and
(2) Exposures to guarantors categorized according to
guarantor creditworthiness categories or guarantor
name.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The FDIC-supervised institution should describe the structure of resecuritizations in which it participates;
this description should be provided for the main categories of resecuritization products in which the FDIC-
supervised institution is active.
\2\ For example, these roles may include originator, investor, servicer, provider of credit enhancement,
sponsor, liquidity provider, or swap provider.
\3\ Such affiliated entities may include, for example, money market funds, to be listed individually, and
personal and private trusts, to be noted collectively.
\4\ ``Exposures securitized'' include underlying exposures originated by the FDIC-supervised institution,
whether generated by them or purchased, and recognized in the balance sheet, from third parties, and third-
party exposures included in sponsored transactions. Securitization transactions (including underlying
exposures originally on the FDIC-supervised institution's balance sheet and underlying exposures acquired by
the FDIC-supervised institution from third-party entities) in which the originating bank does not retain any
securitization exposure should be shown separately but need only be reported for the year of inception. FDIC-
supervised institutions are required to disclose exposures regardless of whether there is a capital charge
under this part.
[[Page 50041]]
\5\ Include credit-related other than temporary impairment (OTTI).
\6\ For example, charge-offs/allowances (if the assets remain on the FDIC-supervised institution's balance
sheet) or credit-related OTTI of interest-only strips and other retained residual interests, as well as
recognition of liabilities for probable future financial support required of the FDIC-supervised institution
with respect to securitized assets.
* * * * *
0
68. Section 324.101 is amended by revising paragraph (b) adding a
definition for ``high volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE)
exposure'' to read as follows:
Sec. 324.101 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
High volatility commercial real estate (HVCRE) exposure, for
purposes of Subpart E, means a credit facility that, prior to
conversion to permanent financing, finances or has financed the
acquisition, development, or construction (ADC) of real property,
unless the facility finances:
(1) One- to four-family residential properties;
(2) Real property that:
(i) Would qualify as an investment in community development under
12 U.S.C. 338a or 12 U.S.C. 24 (Eleventh), as applicable, or as a
``qualified investment'' under 12 CFR part 345, and
(ii) Is not an ADC loan to any entity described in 12 CFR
345.12(g), unless it is otherwise described in paragraph (1), (2)(i),
(3) or (4) of this definition;
(3) The purchase or development of agricultural land, which
includes all land known to be used or usable for agricultural purposes
(such as crop and livestock production), provided that the valuation of
the agricultural land is based on its value for agricultural purposes
and the valuation does not take into consideration any potential use of
the land for non-agricultural commercial development or residential
development; or
(4) Commercial real estate projects in which:
(i) The loan-to-value ratio is less than or equal to the applicable
maximum supervisory loan-to-value ratio in the FDIC's real estate
lending standards at 12 CFR part 365, appendix C;
(ii) The borrower has contributed capital to the project in the
form of cash or unencumbered readily marketable assets (or has paid
development expenses out-of-pocket) of at least 15 percent of the real
estate's appraised ``as completed'' value; and
(iii) The borrower contributed the amount of capital required by
paragraph (4)(ii) of this definition before the FDIC-supervised
institution advances funds under the credit facility, and the capital
contributed by the borrower, or internally generated by the project, is
contractually required to remain in the project throughout the life of
the project. The life of a project concludes only when the credit
facility is converted to permanent financing or is sold or paid in
full. Permanent financing may be provided by the FDIC-supervised
institution that provided the ADC facility as long as the permanent
financing is subject to the FDIC-supervised institution's underwriting
criteria for long-term mortgage loans.
* * * * *
0
69. Section 324.131 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(2) to read as
follows:
Sec. 324.131 Mechanics for calculating total wholesale and retail
risk-weighted assets.
* * * * *
(d) * * *
(2) Floor on PD assignment. The PD for each wholesale obligor or
retail segment may not be less than 0.03 percent, except for exposures
to or directly and unconditionally guaranteed by a sovereign entity,
the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary
Fund, the European Commission, the European Central Bank, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or a
multilateral development bank, to which the FDIC-supervised institution
assigns a rating grade associated with a PD of less than 0.03 percent.
* * * * *
0
70. Section 324.133 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(3)(ii) and
(c)(3)(ii) to read as follows:
Sec. 324.133 Cleared transactions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member client FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk
weight applicable to the CCP under subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
(c) * * *
(3) * * *
(ii) For a cleared transaction with a CCP that is not a QCCP, a
clearing member FDIC-supervised institution must apply the risk weight
applicable to the CCP according to subpart D of this part.
* * * * *
0
71. Section 324.152 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(5) and (6) to
read as follows:
Sec. 324.152 Simple risk weight approach (SRWA).
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) 300 percent risk weight equity exposures. A publicly traded
equity exposure (other than an equity exposure described in paragraph
(b)(7) of this section and including the ineffective portion of a hedge
pair) is assigned a 300 percent risk weight.
(6) 400 percent risk weight equity exposures. An equity exposure
(other than an equity exposure described in paragraph (b)(7) of this
section) that is not publicly traded is assigned a 400 percent risk
weight.
* * * * *
0
72. Section 324.202 is amended by revising paragraph (b) the definition
of ``Corporate debt position'' to read as follows:
Sec. 324.202 Definitions.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
Corporate debt position means a debt position that is an exposure
to a company that is not a sovereign entity, the Bank for International
Settlements, the European Central Bank, the European Commission, the
International Monetary Fund, the European Stability Mechanism, the
European Financial Stability Facility, a multilateral development bank,
a depository institution, a foreign bank, a credit union, a public
sector entity, a GSE, or a securitization.
* * * * *
0
73. Section 324.210 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(2)(ii) to read
as follows:
Sec. 324.210 Standardized measurement method for specific risk.
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(2) * * *
(ii) Certain supranational entity and multilateral development bank
debt positions. An FDIC-supervised institution may assign a 0.0 percent
specific risk-weighting factor to a debt position that is an exposure
to the Bank for International Settlements, the European Central Bank,
the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund, the European
Stability Mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility, or an
MDB.
* * * * *
[[Page 50042]]
0
74. Section 324.300 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (d) to
read as follows:
Sec. 324.300 Transitions.
* * * * *
(b) Regulatory capital adjustments and deductions. Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution that
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, and in each
case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised institution must
make the capital adjustments and deductions in Sec. 324.22 in
accordance with the transition requirements in this paragraph (b).
Beginning January 1, 2018, an FDIC-supervised institution must make all
regulatory capital adjustments and deductions in accordance with Sec.
324.22.
(1) Transition deductions from common equity tier 1 capital.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised
institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-
supervised institution, must make the deductions required under Sec.
324.22(a)(1)-(7) from common equity tier 1 or tier 1 capital elements
in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 2 and Table 3 to
Sec. 324.300.
(i) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct the following items
from common equity tier 1 and additional tier 1 capital in accordance
with the percentages set forth in Table 2 to Sec. 324.300: Goodwill
(Sec. 324.22(a)(1)), DTAs that arise from net operating loss and tax
credit carryforwards (Sec. 324.22(a)(3)), a gain-on-sale in connection
with a securitization exposure (Sec. 324.22(a)(4)), defined benefit
pension fund assets (Sec. 324.22(a)(5)), expected credit loss that
exceeds eligible credit reserves (for advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institutions that have completed the parallel run process
and that have received notifications from the FDIC pursuant to Sec.
324.121(d) of subpart E) (Sec. 324.22(a)(6)), and financial
subsidiaries (Sec. 324.22(a)(7)).
Table 2 to Sec. 324.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition deductions Transition deductions under Sec. 324.22(a)(3)-
under Sec. -------------------------(6)-----------------------
324.22(a)(1), (a)(7),
(a)(8), and (a)(9)
Transition period -------------------------- Percentage of the Percentage of the
Percentage of the deductions from common deductions from tier 1
deductions from common equity tier 1 capital capital
equity tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014................ 100 20 80
Calendar year 2015................ 100 40 60
Calendar year 2016................ 100 60 40
Calendar year 2017................ 100 80 20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter 100 100 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must deduct from common equity
tier 1 capital any intangible assets other than goodwill and MSAs in
accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 3 to Sec. 324.300.
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution must apply a 100 percent risk-
weight to the aggregate amount of intangible assets other than goodwill
and MSAs that are not required to be deducted from common equity tier 1
capital under this section.
Table 3 to Sec. 324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition deductions
under Sec.
324.22(a)(2)--percentage
Transition period of the deductions from
common equity tier 1
capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 20
Calendar year 2015............................ 40
Calendar year 2016............................ 60
Calendar year 2017............................ 80
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter............ 100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2) Transition adjustments to common equity tier 1 capital.
Beginning January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised
institution that is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised
institution, and in each case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-
supervised institution, must allocate the regulatory adjustments
related to changes in the fair value of liabilities due to changes in
the FDIC-supervised institution's own credit risk (Sec.
324.22(b)(1)(iii)) between common equity tier 1 capital and tier 1
capital in accordance with the percentages set forth in Table 4 to
Sec. 324.300.
(i) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is positive, the
FDIC-supervised institution must allocate the deduction between common
equity tier 1 and tier 1 capital in accordance with Table 4 to Sec.
324.300.
(ii) If the aggregate amount of the adjustment is negative, the
FDIC-supervised institution must add back
[[Page 50043]]
the adjustment to common equity tier 1 capital or to tier 1 capital, in
accordance with Table 4 to Sec. 324.300.
Table 4 to Sec. 324.300
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transition adjustments under Sec.
324.22(b)(1)(iii)
---------------------------------------------------
Transition period Percentage of the
adjustment applied to Percentage of the
common equity tier 1 adjustment applied to
capital tier 1 capital
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014.......................................... 20 80
Calendar year 2015.......................................... 40 60
Calendar year 2016.......................................... 60 40
Calendar year 2017.......................................... 80 20
Calendar year 2018, and thereafter.......................... 100 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) Transition adjustments to AOCI for an advanced approaches FDIC-
supervised institution and an FDIC-supervised institution that has not
made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec. 324.22(b)(2). Beginning
January 1, 2014 for an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution,
and beginning January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution that
is not an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution and that has
not made an AOCI opt-out election under Sec. 324.22(b)(2), and in each
case through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised institution must
adjust common equity tier 1 capital with respect to the transition AOCI
adjustment amount (transition AOCI adjustment amount):
(i) The transition AOCI adjustment amount is the aggregate amount
of an FDIC-supervised institution's:
(A) Unrealized gains on available-for-sale securities that are
preferred stock classified as an equity security under GAAP or
available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
(B) Net unrealized gains or losses on available-for-sale securities
that are not preferred stock classified as an equity security under
GAAP or available-for-sale equity exposures, plus
(C) Any amounts recorded in AOCI attributed to defined benefit
postretirement plans resulting from the initial and subsequent
application of the relevant GAAP standards that pertain to such plans
(excluding, at the FDIC-supervised institution's option, the portion
relating to pension assets deducted under Sec. 324.22(a)(5)), plus
(D) Accumulated net gains or losses on cash flow hedges related to
items that are reported on the balance sheet at fair value included in
AOCI, plus
(E) Net unrealized gains or losses on held-to-maturity securities
that are included in AOCI.
(ii) An FDIC-supervised institution must make the following
adjustment to its common equity tier 1 capital:
(A) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is positive, the
appropriate amount must be deducted from common equity tier 1 capital
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec. 324.300.
(B) If the transition AOCI adjustment amount is negative, the
appropriate amount must be added back to common equity tier 1 capital
in accordance with Table 5 to Sec. 324.300.
Table 5 to Sec. 324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of the
transition AOCI
Transition period adjustment amount to be
applied to common
equity tier 1 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 80
Calendar year 2015............................ 60
Calendar year 2016............................ 40
Calendar year 2017............................ 20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(iii) An FDIC-supervised institution may include in tier 2 capital
the percentage of unrealized gains on available-for-sale preferred
stock classified as an equity security under GAAP and available-for-
sale equity exposures as set forth in Table 6 to Sec. 324.300.
[[Page 50044]]
Table 6 to Sec. 324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of unrealized
gains on available-for-
sale preferred stock
classified as an equity
Transition period security under GAAP and
available-for-sale
equity exposures that
may be included in tier
2 capital
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 36
Calendar year 2015............................ 27
Calendar year 2016............................ 18
Calendar year 2017............................ 9
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
(d) Minority interest--
(1) [Reserved]
(2) Non-qualifying minority interest. Beginning January 1, 2014 for
an advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, and beginning
January 1, 2015 for an FDIC-supervised institution that is not an
advanced approaches FDIC-supervised institution, and in each case
through December 31, 2017, an FDIC-supervised institution may include
in tier 1 capital or total capital the percentage of the tier 1
minority interest and total capital minority interest outstanding as of
January 1, 2014 that does not meet the criteria for additional tier 1
or tier 2 capital instruments in Sec. 324.20 (non-qualifying minority
interest), as set forth in Table 9 to Sec. 324.300.
Table 9 to Sec. 324.300
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percentage of the amount
of surplus or non-
qualifying minority
Transition period interest that can be
included in regulatory
capital during the
transition period
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calendar year 2014............................ 80
Calendar year 2015............................ 60
Calendar year 2016............................ 40
Calendar year 2017............................ 20
Calendar year 2018 and thereafter............. 0
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated: September 26, 2017.
Keith A. Noreika,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency.
By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, September 27, 2017.
Ann E. Misback,
Secretary of the Board.
Dated at Washington, DC, this 27th day of September, 2017.
By order of the Board of Directors.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Robert E. Feldman,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2017-22093 Filed 10-26-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P