Arms Sales Notification, 49197-49200 [2017-22965]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
• Office of the Secretary

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 204 (Tuesday, October 24, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 49197-49200]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-22965]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

[Transmittal No. 17-28]


Arms Sales Notification

AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.

ACTION: Arms sales notice.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text 
of an arms sales notification.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, 
[email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, 
[email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is 
published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-
164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 17-28 with 
attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology.


[[Page 49198]]


    Dated: October 18, 2017.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
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Transmittal No. 17-28
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
    (i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia
    (ii) Total Estimated Value:

Major Defense Equipment *...............................     $ 9 billion
Other...................................................     $ 6 billion
                                                         ---------------
  TOTAL.................................................     $15 billion
 

    (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or 
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
    Major Defense Equipment (MDE):

Forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Launchers
Three hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor Missiles
Sixteen (16) THAAD Fire Control and Communications Mobile Tactical 
Station Group
Seven (7) AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars

    Non-MDE:
    Also included are THAAD Battery maintenance equipment, forty-three 
(43) prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, 
trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance 
equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/
repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel 
training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor 
technical and logistics personnel support services, facilities 
construction, studies, and other related elements of logistics and 
program support.

    (iv) Military Departments: Missile Defense Agency (XX-I-WIB, XX-I-
WIC); Army (XX-B-TFP, XX-B-BDP, XX-B-ZAO, XX-B-DAH, XX-B-ZAQ, XX-B-OZY, 
XX-B-HFA); NSA (XX-M-AAG)
    (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-I-WIA Basic, 2 February 2015; 
Amendment 1, 25 August 2016
    (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be 
Paid: None
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or 
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex
    (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: October 6, 2017

    *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.

POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Saudi Arabia--Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Related Support 
Equipment and Services

    The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of 
forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launchers, 
three hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor Missiles, sixteen (16) 
THAAD Fire Control and Communications Mobile Tactical Station Group, 
seven (7) AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars. Also included are THAAD Battery 
maintenance equipment, forty-three (43) prime movers (trucks), 
generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, 
tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system 
integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications and 
technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, 
U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel 
support services, facilities construction, studies, and other related 
elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $15 
billion.
    This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national 
security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a 
friendly country. This sale furthers U.S. national security and foreign 
policy interests, and supports the long-term security of Saudi Arabia 
and the Gulf region in the face of Iranian and other regional threats. 
This potential sale will substantially increase Saudi Arabia's 
capability to defend itself against the growing ballistic missile 
threat in the region. THAAD's exo-atmospheric, hit-to-kill capability 
will add an upper-tier to Saudi Arabia's layered missile defense 
architecture and will support modernization of the Royal Saudi Air 
Defense Force (RSADF). Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing 
this equipment into its armed forces.
    The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the 
basic military balance in the region.
    The principal contractors for the THAAD system are Lockheed Martin 
Space Systems Corporation, Dallas, TX, Camden, AR, Troy, AL and 
Huntsville, AL; and Raytheon Corporation, Andover, MA. There are no 
known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential 
sale.
    Implementation of this proposed sale will require one hundred 
eleven (111) contractor representatives and eighteen (18) U.S. 
Government personnel in country for an extended period of time.
    There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a 
result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 17-28
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
    (vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
    1. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) Ballistic 
Missile Defense (BMD) System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL/SECRET 
components and critical/sensitive technology. The THAAD Fire Unit is a 
ground-based, forward deployable terminal missile defense system that 
represents significant technological advances. The THAAD system 
continues to hold a technology lead over other terminal ballistic 
missile systems. THAAD is the first weapon system with both endo- and 
exo- atmospheric capability developed specifically to defend against 
ballistic missiles. The higher altitude and theater-wide protection 
offered by THAAD provides more protection of larger areas than lower-
tier systems alone. THAAD is designed to defend against short, medium, 
and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The THAAD system consists of 
four major components: Fire Control/Communications, Radar, Launchers, 
and Interceptor Missiles.
    2. The THAAD BMD System contains sensitive/critical technology, 
primarily in the area of defense and production know-how and primarily 
inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related 
to certain critical components. Information on operational 
effectiveness with respect to countermeasures and counter-
countermeasures, low observable technologies, select software 
documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET.
    3. The THAAD BMD System contains Controlled Cryptographic Items 
(CCI) that are used for both system internal links and for external 
communications. These items consist of key loading devices, network 
encryptors, secure telephones, voice radios, tactical data radios, and 
mission data radios. Specific CCI used for the Saudi Arabia case will 
be determined through the COMSEC Release Request (CRR) process, 
initiated through USCENTCOM once an interoperability requirement has 
been established. NSA will identify releasable items, in parallel with 
staffing and validation of the CRR by the Joint Staff. The Committee 
for National Security Systems (CNSS) reviews and provides final 
approval of the items and quantities.
    4. AN/VRC-90, AN/VRC-91, AN/VRC-92 are different configurations of

[[Page 49200]]

the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) family. 
SINCGARS is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant voice and 
data communications of command, control, targeting, and technical 
information for the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. 
The spread-spectrum frequency hopping Electronic Counter-Counter 
Measures (ECCM) technology resident in the radio is sensitive but 
UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, the frequency-hopping algorithms used to 
generate the ECCM waveform are unique to the country of ownership and 
cannot be manipulated by potential adversaries for use or interference 
with other countries possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential 
adversary come into possession of one of these radios, they would have 
the potential to intercept operational command, control, and targeting 
information. This potential problem is mitigated by the fact that the 
customer can secure information passed over the radio network using a 
commercial grade security capability equivalent to an Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit encryption system whose keys are 
controlled by the customer country.
    5. As with the SINCGARS family of radios, the AN/PRC-117 is a 
tactical radio providing ECCM jam-resistant secure communications for 
exchange of command, control, and targeting information within the 
THAAD system tactical radio network. ECCM capabilities are sensitive 
but UNCLASSIFIED and algorithms for these jam-resistant waveforms are 
unique to the customer country. Unlike the SINCGARS radios, the AN/PRC-
117 uses Type 1 encryption. When loaded with U.S. crypto keys, the 
system is then CLASSIFIED up to SECRET. Should a potential adversary 
come into possession of one of these radios, the customer country can 
quickly remotely rekey remaining radios, preventing potential 
adversaries from understanding received command, control, and targeting 
information.
    6. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver 
(DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map background displaying 
the user's location. Unlike commercial grade GPS receivers capable of 
receiving Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the 
DAGR is capable of receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS 
satellite signals provide significantly more accurate location data 
than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGRs is possible due to 
the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM). The SAASM is 
an encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the 
benefit of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to 
display incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within the 
DAGR is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM capabilities are 
sensitive due to the system's ability to access restricted PPS GPS 
satellite signals and to prevent spoofing. While sensitive, the ability 
of potential adversaries to exploit the system is limited.
    7. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are also 
resident in the THAAD GPS timing system. The THAAD system requires 
highly precise timing hacks in order accurately track and engage 
targets. The PPS signals generated by GPS satellites provide this 
precise timing information. The SAASM device resident in the timing 
system permits receipt of this precise PPS timing data. The SAASM is an 
encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit 
of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display 
incorrect data. The SAASM capability within the timing system is 
sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED.
    8. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge 
of specific hardware, the information could be used to develop 
countermeasures which might reduce weapons system effectiveness or be 
used in the development of a system with similar or advanced 
capabilities.
    9. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can provide 
substantially the same degree of protection for sensitive technology 
being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment 
program is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and 
national security objectives outlined in the policy justification.
    10. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal 
are authorized for release and export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

[FR Doc. 2017-22965 Filed 10-23-17; 8:45 am]
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