Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request, 29843-29844 [2017-13778]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 125 / Friday, June 30, 2017 / Notices
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Submission for OMB Review;
Comment Request
Under 44 U.S.C. 3506(e) and 13 U.S.C.
Section 9, the U.S. Census Bureau is
seeking comments on revisions to the
confidentiality pledge it provides to its
respondents under Title 13, United
States Code, Section 9. These revisions
are required by the passage and
implementation of provisions of the
Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act
of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501 note), which
require the Secretary of Homeland
Security to provide Federal civilian
agencies’ information technology
systems with cybersecurity protection
for their Internet traffic. More details on
this announcement are presented in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section
below. The previous notice for public
comment, titled ‘‘Agency Information
Collection Activities; Request for
Comments; Revision of the
Confidentiality Pledge under Title 13
United States Code, Section 9’’ was
published in the Federal Register on
December 23, 2016 (Vol. 81, No. 247,
pp. 94321–94324), allowing for a 60 day
comment period. The Census Bureau
received two comments, which are
addressed within this notice.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
I. Background
On December 18, 2015, Congress
passed the Federal Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2015 (the Act) (6
U.S.C. 1501 note). The Act requires the
Department of Homeland Security to
deploy for use by other agencies a
program with the ‘‘capability to detect
cybersecurity risks in network traffic
transiting or traveling to or from an
agency information system.’’ 1 The Act
requires each agency to ‘‘apply and
continue to utilize the capabilities to all
information traveling between an
agency information system and any
information system other than an
agency information system.’’ 2 The DHS
program is known as EINSTEIN, and
DHS currently operates version 3A
(E3A). Importantly, the Act provides
that DHS may use the information
collected through EINSTEIN ‘‘only to
protect information and information
systems from cybersecurity risks.’’ 3 The
1 Sec. 230(b)(1)(A) of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 151(b)(1)(A)), as added by section
223((a)(6) of the Federal Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2015.
2 Section 223 (b)(1)(A) (6 U.S.C. 151 note) of the
Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015.
3 Section 230(c)(3) of the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 151(c)(3)), as added by section
223(a)(6) of the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement
Act of 2015.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:32 Jun 29, 2017
Jkt 241001
Act does not authorize DHS to use
information collected through
EINSTEIN for any other purposes,
including law enforcement purposes.
In response to the passage of the Act,
the Census Bureau considered whether
it should revise its confidentially
pledge. The Census Bureau’s Center for
Survey Measurement (CSM) joined the
interagency Statistical Community of
Practice and Engagement (SCOPE)
Confidentiality Pledge Revision
Subcommittee, which developed and
evaluated the revision to the
confidentiality pledge language. SCOPE
and CSM conducted remote and inperson cognitive testing of the potential
revised confidentiality pledge. The
Census Bureau based its revised
confidentiality pledge on the results of
these tests. The revised confidentiality
pledge utilizes the language the Census
Bureau determined would best
communicate the essential information
to respondents while not negatively
affecting response rates. The following
is the revised statistical confidentiality
pledge for the Census Bureau’s data
collections:
The U.S. Census Bureau is required by
law to protect your information. The
Census Bureau is not permitted to
publicly release your responses in a way
that could identify you. Per the Federal
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015,
your data are protected from
cybersecurity risks through screening of
the systems that transmit your data.
On December 23, 2016, the Census
Bureau requested comments on the
revised confidentiality pledge. During
the public comment period, the Census
Bureau received two comments from the
Asian Americans Advancing Justice
(AAJC) and American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee (ADC).
II. Comments and Responses
In response to the Census Bureau’s
revised confidentiality pledge, AAJC
and the ADC provided comments and
suggestions to the Census Bureau. These
comments and suggestions, along with
the Census Bureau’s responses are
below.
1. The AAJC and the ADC both
expressed concerns about the effect of
the revised confidentiality pledge on the
accuracy of the results of the Census
Bureau’s survey.
Response: The Census Bureau is
committed to collecting the most
complete and accurate data. The Census
Bureau takes the collection and
protection of respondent information
very seriously and has since the first
Decennial Census in 1790. As a
statistical agency committed to ensuring
the collection and publication of
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
29843
accurate data, the Census Bureau
continually conducts extensive research
and testing to inform census and survey
design. This research and testing
confirms key technologies, outreach and
promotional strategies, data collection
methods, and management and response
processes to allow the Census Bureau to
maximize response rates and ensure the
accuracy of the data collected. We also
uphold a strong data stewardship
culture to ensure that any decisions we
make will fulfill our legal and ethical
obligations to respect your privacy and
protect the confidentiality of your
information. The revised confidentiality
pledge utilizes language that the Census
Bureau determined, after cognitive
testing, would not negatively affect
response rates, and hence the accuracy
of the survey results.
2. The ‘‘ADC has serious concerns on
the ability of [DHS] to . . . access . . .
people’s personal information on the
server.’’
Response: E3A does not provide DHS
with access to a respondent’s personal
information. E3A does not currently
decrypt respondent information or scan
data at rest on Census Bureau
information systems. Moreover, the Act
limits the use of any information
collected, stating that the DHS may use
information obtained through activities
authorized under this section ‘‘only to
protect information and information
systems from cybersecurity risks.’’ (6
U.S.C. 151(c)(3)).
EINSTEIN also provides greater
protection for the Census Bureau’s
information and information systems
than would otherwise exist. EINSTEIN
enables DHS to detect cyber threat
indicators traveling or transiting to or
from one agency’s information system,
and to share those indicators with other
agencies, thereby making all agencies’
information systems more secure. The
necessity of providing DHS limited
access to such information—information
which DHS can only use for
cybersecurity purposes—is not only
required by the Federal Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act, but has a net positive
impact of the security of information
respondents provide to the Census
Bureau.
3. The ADC is concerned that ‘‘there
is a lack of safeguards in place on who
has access to information through
EINSTEIN.’’
Response: In addition to the
safeguards contained in the Act, the
Census Bureau works with DHS to
protect information DHS may access
through EINSTEIN. These additional
safeguards cover the collection,
retention, use, and disclosure of
information. The safeguards also
E:\FR\FM\30JNN1.SGM
30JNN1
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
29844
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 125 / Friday, June 30, 2017 / Notices
include notification and reporting
requirements in the unlikely event that
any unauthorized access, use, or
dissemination of any Census Bureau
information would occur.
To reiterate, the information at issue
is not a respondent’s personal
information, rather, it is cyber threat
information. E3A does not provide DHS
with access to a respondent’s personal
information. E3A does not currently
decrypt respondent information or scan
data at rest on Census Bureau
information systems.
4. The ADC is concerned that the
revised confidentiality pledge ‘‘raises
flags on improper use of such
information.’’
Response: The Act limits DHS’s use of
information collected pursuant to the
Act to the protection of ‘‘information
and information systems from
cybersecurity risks.’’ To be clear, DHS’s
use of the information for any other
purpose would be unlawful.
5. The AAJC suggests that the
protections contained in Title 13 and
the Confidential Information Protection
and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA),
both of which limit the use and
disclosure of information collected,
should control the information at issue.
Response: Pursuant to the Act, each
agency must ‘‘apply and continue to
utilize the capabilities to all information
traveling between an agency
information system and any information
system other than an agency
information system.’’ Congress
authorized that, notwithstanding the
protections previously afforded to
information by other laws, such as Title
13, for the purpose of protecting agency
information systems from cyber attacks,
DHS may access information transiting
and traveling to or from an agency
information system. Census Bureau
employees remain subject to the
penalties contained in Title 13,
including a federal prison sentence of
up to five years and a fine of up to
$250,000, or both.
6. The AAJC suggests that either the
Census Bureau employees ‘‘perform
Einstein 3A functions for Census Bureau
internet traffic’’ or that ‘‘DHS employees
monitoring Census Bureau internet
traffic under Einstein 3A take the
current Title 13 confidentiality pledge.’’
Response: The Act provides DHS
access to network traffic transiting or
traveling to or from the Census Bureau’s
information systems, notwithstanding
the protections previously afforded to
information by other laws, such as Title
13. The Act also requires each agency to
‘‘apply and continue to utilize the
capabilities to all information traveling
between an agency information system
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:32 Jun 29, 2017
Jkt 241001
and any information system other than
an agency information system.’’
In addition to the safeguards
contained in the Act, the Census Bureau
works with DHS to safeguard
respondent information. These
additional safeguards cover the
collection, retention, use, and disclosure
of information. The safeguards also
include notification and reporting
requirements that would apply in the
unlikely event that any unauthorized
access, use, or dissemination of any
Census Bureau information would
occur.
III. Data
Agency: U.S. Census Bureau,
Department of Commerce.
Title: Revision of the Confidentiality
Pledge under Title 13 United States
Code, Section 9.
OMB Control Number: 0607–0993.
Form Number(s): None.
Affected Public: All survey
respondents to Census Bureau data
collections.
Legal Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3506(e) and
13 U.S.C. Section 9.
This information collection request
may be viewed at www.reginfo.gov.
Follow the instructions to view
Department of Commerce collections
currently under review by OMB.
IV. Request for Comments
Comments are invited on the
necessity and efficacy of the Census
Bureau’s revised confidentiality pledge
above. Comments submitted in response
to this notice will become a matter of
public record. Comments should be sent
within 30 days of publication of this
notice to OIRA_Submission@
omb.eop.gov or fax to (202)395–5806.
Dated: June 27, 2017.
Sarah Brabson,
NOAA PRA Clearance Officer on behalf of
the Department of Commerce.
[FR Doc. 2017–13778 Filed 6–29–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–07–P
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration
RIN 0648–XF304
Fisheries of the South Atlantic;
Southeast Data, Assessment, and
Review (SEDAR); Public Meetings;
Cancellation
National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
Commerce.
AGENCY:
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Notice of change of schedule for
SEDAR 56 South Atlantic Black Sea
Bass Assessment Webinars.
ACTION:
The SEDAR 56 assessment of
the South Atlantic stock of black seabass
will consist of a series webinars. Due to
changes to the schedule for the stock
assessment, webinars scheduled for
Thursday, July 20, 2017 and
Wednesday, August 16, 2017 have been
cancelled. See SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION.
DATES: This notice serves to cancel the
previously scheduled July 20, 2017 and
August 16, 2017 webinars.
ADDRESSES: SEDAR address: South
Atlantic Fishery Management Council,
4055 Faber Place Drive, Suite 201, N.
Charleston, SC 29405;
www.sedarweb.org.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Julia
Byrd, SEDAR Coordinator, 4055 Faber
Place Drive, Suite 201, North
Charleston, SC 29405; phone: (843) 571–
4366; email: julia.byrd@safmc.net.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
original notice published in the Federal
Register on March 29, 2017 (82 FR
15495).
The Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic,
and Caribbean Fishery Management
Councils, in conjunction with NOAA
Fisheries and the Atlantic and Gulf
States Marine Fisheries Commissions,
have implemented the Southeast Data,
Assessment and Review (SEDAR)
process, a multi-step method for
determining the status of fish stocks in
the Southeast Region. The product of
the SEDAR webinar series will be a
report which compiles and evaluates
potential datasets and recommends
which datasets are appropriate for
assessment analyses, and describes the
fisheries, evaluates the status of the
stock, estimates biological benchmarks,
projects future population conditions,
and recommends research and
monitoring needs. Participants for
SEDAR Workshops are appointed by the
Gulf of Mexico, South Atlantic, and
Caribbean Fishery Management
Councils and NOAA Fisheries Southeast
Regional Office, Highly Migratory
Species Management Division, and
Southeast Fisheries Science Center.
Participants include: Data collectors and
database managers; stock assessment
scientists, biologists, and researchers;
constituency representatives including
fishermen, environmentalists, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs);
international experts; and staff of
Councils, Commissions, and state and
federal agencies.
During its June 2017 meeting, the
South Atlantic Fishery Management
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\30JNN1.SGM
30JNN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 125 (Friday, June 30, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 29843-29844]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-13778]
[[Page 29843]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Submission for OMB Review; Comment Request
Under 44 U.S.C. 3506(e) and 13 U.S.C. Section 9, the U.S. Census
Bureau is seeking comments on revisions to the confidentiality pledge
it provides to its respondents under Title 13, United States Code,
Section 9. These revisions are required by the passage and
implementation of provisions of the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement
Act of 2015 (6 U.S.C. 1501 note), which require the Secretary of
Homeland Security to provide Federal civilian agencies' information
technology systems with cybersecurity protection for their Internet
traffic. More details on this announcement are presented in the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. The previous notice for public
comment, titled ``Agency Information Collection Activities; Request for
Comments; Revision of the Confidentiality Pledge under Title 13 United
States Code, Section 9'' was published in the Federal Register on
December 23, 2016 (Vol. 81, No. 247, pp. 94321-94324), allowing for a
60 day comment period. The Census Bureau received two comments, which
are addressed within this notice.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On December 18, 2015, Congress passed the Federal Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2015 (the Act) (6 U.S.C. 1501 note). The Act
requires the Department of Homeland Security to deploy for use by other
agencies a program with the ``capability to detect cybersecurity risks
in network traffic transiting or traveling to or from an agency
information system.'' \1\ The Act requires each agency to ``apply and
continue to utilize the capabilities to all information traveling
between an agency information system and any information system other
than an agency information system.'' \2\ The DHS program is known as
EINSTEIN, and DHS currently operates version 3A (E3A). Importantly, the
Act provides that DHS may use the information collected through
EINSTEIN ``only to protect information and information systems from
cybersecurity risks.'' \3\ The Act does not authorize DHS to use
information collected through EINSTEIN for any other purposes,
including law enforcement purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Sec. 230(b)(1)(A) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 151(b)(1)(A)), as added by section 223((a)(6) of the Federal
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015.
\2\ Section 223 (b)(1)(A) (6 U.S.C. 151 note) of the Federal
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015.
\3\ Section 230(c)(3) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6
U.S.C. 151(c)(3)), as added by section 223(a)(6) of the Federal
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to the passage of the Act, the Census Bureau considered
whether it should revise its confidentially pledge. The Census Bureau's
Center for Survey Measurement (CSM) joined the interagency Statistical
Community of Practice and Engagement (SCOPE) Confidentiality Pledge
Revision Subcommittee, which developed and evaluated the revision to
the confidentiality pledge language. SCOPE and CSM conducted remote and
in-person cognitive testing of the potential revised confidentiality
pledge. The Census Bureau based its revised confidentiality pledge on
the results of these tests. The revised confidentiality pledge utilizes
the language the Census Bureau determined would best communicate the
essential information to respondents while not negatively affecting
response rates. The following is the revised statistical
confidentiality pledge for the Census Bureau's data collections:
The U.S. Census Bureau is required by law to protect your
information. The Census Bureau is not permitted to publicly release
your responses in a way that could identify you. Per the Federal
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015, your data are protected from
cybersecurity risks through screening of the systems that transmit your
data.
On December 23, 2016, the Census Bureau requested comments on the
revised confidentiality pledge. During the public comment period, the
Census Bureau received two comments from the Asian Americans Advancing
Justice (AAJC) and American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC).
II. Comments and Responses
In response to the Census Bureau's revised confidentiality pledge,
AAJC and the ADC provided comments and suggestions to the Census
Bureau. These comments and suggestions, along with the Census Bureau's
responses are below.
1. The AAJC and the ADC both expressed concerns about the effect of
the revised confidentiality pledge on the accuracy of the results of
the Census Bureau's survey.
Response: The Census Bureau is committed to collecting the most
complete and accurate data. The Census Bureau takes the collection and
protection of respondent information very seriously and has since the
first Decennial Census in 1790. As a statistical agency committed to
ensuring the collection and publication of accurate data, the Census
Bureau continually conducts extensive research and testing to inform
census and survey design. This research and testing confirms key
technologies, outreach and promotional strategies, data collection
methods, and management and response processes to allow the Census
Bureau to maximize response rates and ensure the accuracy of the data
collected. We also uphold a strong data stewardship culture to ensure
that any decisions we make will fulfill our legal and ethical
obligations to respect your privacy and protect the confidentiality of
your information. The revised confidentiality pledge utilizes language
that the Census Bureau determined, after cognitive testing, would not
negatively affect response rates, and hence the accuracy of the survey
results.
2. The ``ADC has serious concerns on the ability of [DHS] to . . .
access . . . people's personal information on the server.''
Response: E3A does not provide DHS with access to a respondent's
personal information. E3A does not currently decrypt respondent
information or scan data at rest on Census Bureau information systems.
Moreover, the Act limits the use of any information collected, stating
that the DHS may use information obtained through activities authorized
under this section ``only to protect information and information
systems from cybersecurity risks.'' (6 U.S.C. 151(c)(3)).
EINSTEIN also provides greater protection for the Census Bureau's
information and information systems than would otherwise exist.
EINSTEIN enables DHS to detect cyber threat indicators traveling or
transiting to or from one agency's information system, and to share
those indicators with other agencies, thereby making all agencies'
information systems more secure. The necessity of providing DHS limited
access to such information--information which DHS can only use for
cybersecurity purposes--is not only required by the Federal
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, but has a net positive impact of the
security of information respondents provide to the Census Bureau.
3. The ADC is concerned that ``there is a lack of safeguards in
place on who has access to information through EINSTEIN.''
Response: In addition to the safeguards contained in the Act, the
Census Bureau works with DHS to protect information DHS may access
through EINSTEIN. These additional safeguards cover the collection,
retention, use, and disclosure of information. The safeguards also
[[Page 29844]]
include notification and reporting requirements in the unlikely event
that any unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of any Census
Bureau information would occur.
To reiterate, the information at issue is not a respondent's
personal information, rather, it is cyber threat information. E3A does
not provide DHS with access to a respondent's personal information. E3A
does not currently decrypt respondent information or scan data at rest
on Census Bureau information systems.
4. The ADC is concerned that the revised confidentiality pledge
``raises flags on improper use of such information.''
Response: The Act limits DHS's use of information collected
pursuant to the Act to the protection of ``information and information
systems from cybersecurity risks.'' To be clear, DHS's use of the
information for any other purpose would be unlawful.
5. The AAJC suggests that the protections contained in Title 13 and
the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act
(CIPSEA), both of which limit the use and disclosure of information
collected, should control the information at issue.
Response: Pursuant to the Act, each agency must ``apply and
continue to utilize the capabilities to all information traveling
between an agency information system and any information system other
than an agency information system.'' Congress authorized that,
notwithstanding the protections previously afforded to information by
other laws, such as Title 13, for the purpose of protecting agency
information systems from cyber attacks, DHS may access information
transiting and traveling to or from an agency information system.
Census Bureau employees remain subject to the penalties contained in
Title 13, including a federal prison sentence of up to five years and a
fine of up to $250,000, or both.
6. The AAJC suggests that either the Census Bureau employees
``perform Einstein 3A functions for Census Bureau internet traffic'' or
that ``DHS employees monitoring Census Bureau internet traffic under
Einstein 3A take the current Title 13 confidentiality pledge.''
Response: The Act provides DHS access to network traffic transiting
or traveling to or from the Census Bureau's information systems,
notwithstanding the protections previously afforded to information by
other laws, such as Title 13. The Act also requires each agency to
``apply and continue to utilize the capabilities to all information
traveling between an agency information system and any information
system other than an agency information system.''
In addition to the safeguards contained in the Act, the Census
Bureau works with DHS to safeguard respondent information. These
additional safeguards cover the collection, retention, use, and
disclosure of information. The safeguards also include notification and
reporting requirements that would apply in the unlikely event that any
unauthorized access, use, or dissemination of any Census Bureau
information would occur.
III. Data
Agency: U.S. Census Bureau, Department of Commerce.
Title: Revision of the Confidentiality Pledge under Title 13 United
States Code, Section 9.
OMB Control Number: 0607-0993.
Form Number(s): None.
Affected Public: All survey respondents to Census Bureau data
collections.
Legal Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3506(e) and 13 U.S.C. Section 9.
This information collection request may be viewed at
www.reginfo.gov. Follow the instructions to view Department of Commerce
collections currently under review by OMB.
IV. Request for Comments
Comments are invited on the necessity and efficacy of the Census
Bureau's revised confidentiality pledge above. Comments submitted in
response to this notice will become a matter of public record. Comments
should be sent within 30 days of publication of this notice to
OIRA_Submission@omb.eop.gov or fax to (202)395-5806.
Dated: June 27, 2017.
Sarah Brabson,
NOAA PRA Clearance Officer on behalf of the Department of Commerce.
[FR Doc. 2017-13778 Filed 6-29-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-07-P