Waiver of Flight Termination Receiver Qualification by Similarity Deficiencies, 29798-29800 [2017-13567]
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29798
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 125 / Friday, June 30, 2017 / Proposed Rules
Revision 01, or A340–27–5067, Revision 01,
all dated December 5, 2016, as applicable.
(4) If, during any inspection of the removed
THSA required by paragraph (h)(1) of this
AD, any discrepancy specified in the
Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, Revision 01,
A340–27–4203, Revision 01, or A340–27–
5067, Revision 01, all dated December 5,
2016, as applicable, is detected, before
further flight, replace the THSA with a
serviceable part (as defined in paragraph (i)
of this AD), in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, Revision 01,
A340–27–4203, Revision 01, or A340–27–
5067, Revision 01, all dated December 5,
2016, as applicable.
(i) Definition of Serviceable THSA
For the purpose of this AD, a serviceable
THSA is a part that has accumulated less
than 4,000 FH or 1,000 FC (for Airbus Model
A330, A340–200, or A340–300 airplanes) or
4,000 FH or 800 FC (for Airbus Model A340–
500 or A340–600 airplanes), whichever
occurs first since the first flight of the
airplane, or since the last overhaul of the
THSA, or since the last detailed visual
inspection of the THSA in accordance with
the Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A330–27–3218, Revision 01,
A340–27–4203, Revision 01, or A340–27–
5067, Revision 01, all dated December 5,
2016, as applicable.
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(j) Credit for Previous Actions
This paragraph provides credit for actions
required by paragraphs (g), (h)(1), (h)(3), and
(h)(4) of this AD, if those actions were
performed before the effective date of this AD
using the service information specified in
paragraph (j)(1), (j)(2), or (j)(3) of this AD.
(1) Airbus Service Bulletin A330–27–3218,
Revision 00, dated July 1, 2016.
(2) Airbus Service Bulletin A340–27–4203,
Revision 00, dated July 1, 2016.
(3) Airbus Service Bulletin A340–27–5067,
Revision 00, dated July, 1 2016.
(k) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this
AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane
Directorate, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your
request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the International Branch,
send it to attention of the person identified
in paragraph (l)(2) of this AD. Information
may be emailed to: 9-ANM-116-AMOCREQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal
inspector, the manager of the local flight
standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any
requirement in this AD to obtain corrective
actions from a manufacturer, the action must
be accomplished using a method approved
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15:56 Jun 29, 2017
Jkt 241001
by the Manager, International Branch, ANM–
116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA; or
the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA); or Airbus’s EASA Design
Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by
the DOA, the approval must include the
DOA-authorized signature.
(3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except
as required by paragraph (h)(2) of this AD: If
any service information contains procedures
or tests that are identified as RC, those
procedures and tests must be done to comply
with this AD; any procedures or tests that are
not identified as RC are recommended. Those
procedures and tests that are not identified
as RC may be deviated from using accepted
methods in accordance with the operator’s
maintenance or inspection program without
obtaining approval of an AMOC, provided
the procedures and tests identified as RC can
be done and the airplane can be put back in
an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or
changes to procedures or tests identified as
RC require approval of an AMOC.
(l) Related Information
(1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing
Airworthiness Information (MCAI) EASA AD
2017–044, dated March 9, 2017, for related
information. This MCAI may be found in the
AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for and
locating Docket No. FAA–2017–0627.
(2) For more information about this AD,
contact Vladimir Ulyanov, Aerospace
Engineer, International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601
Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
telephone 425–227–1138; fax 425–227–1149.
(3) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness
Office–EAL, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte,
31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33
5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 45 80; email
airworthiness.A330-A340@airbus.com;
Internet https://www.airbus.com. You may
view this service information at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information
on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425–227–1221.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on June 22,
2017.
John P. Piccola, Jr.,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017–13780 Filed 6–29–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 417
Waiver of Flight Termination Receiver
Qualification by Similarity Deficiencies
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of waiver.
AGENCY:
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
This notice concerns three
petitions for waiver submitted to the
FAA by Rocket Lab USA Inc. (RL) for
the Flight Termination Receiver (FTR)
Qualification by Similarity (QBS): A
petition to waive the requirement that a
component may be qualified based on
similarity to a component that has
already been qualified for use only if the
environments encountered by the
previously qualified component during
its qualification or flight history were
equal or more severe than the Rocket
Lab qualification environments; a
petition to waive the Electromagnetic
Interference and Compatibility (EMI/
EMC) on the same units; and a petition
to waive the requirement that the same
manufacturer must produce the
qualified and the unqualified
component in the same location using
identical tools and manufacturing
processes. The FAA grants these three
petitions.
DATES: Issued in Washington, DC, on
May 15, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
technical questions concerning this
waiver, contact Michael Wiktowy,
Licensing Program Lead, Commercial
Space Transportation—Licensing and
Evaluation Division, 800 Independence
Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591;
telephone: (202) 267–7287; email:
Michael.Wiktowy@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
Background
RL submitted a petition to the FAA’s
Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (AST) requesting relief
from regulatory requirements for a
launch license for flight of Electron test
flight missions from Mahia, New
Zealand. Specifically, RL requested
relief from 14 CFR E417.7(f)(2) and (5),
Qualification Testing and Analysis by
Similarity for the Flight Termination
Receiver. For Qualification, the Flight
Termination Receiver is required to
meet Table E417.19–2, which states
with note (5): ‘‘The same three sample
components must undergo each test
designated with an X. For a test
designated with a quantity of less than
three, each sample component tested
must be one of the original three sample
components.’’ For Qualification Testing
and Analysis by Similarity, Part 417
Appendix E section 417.7(f) provides
the requirements a launch operator must
satisfy in order to qualify or re-qualify
a flight termination system component’s
design through qualification by
similarity to tests performed on
identical or similar hardware. Section
E417.7(f)(2) states that to qualify
component ‘‘A’’ based on similarity to
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component ‘‘B’’, that has already been
qualified for use, a launch operator must
demonstrate that the environment
encountered by ‘‘B’’ must have been
equal to or more severe than the
qualification environments required for
‘‘A’’. Specifically, RL used different
components for the random vibration
qualification test and the EMI/EMC
qualification test instead of the original
three qualification sample components
used for the other tests under
E417.7(f)(2). Section E417.7(f)(5)
requires that the same manufacturer
produce ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B’’ in the same
location using identical tools and
manufacturing processes. Specifically,
RL’s sample ‘‘A’’ and ‘‘B’’ were
manufactured at different locations with
different manufacturing processes.
The FAA licenses the launch of a
launch vehicle and reentry of a reentry
vehicle under authority granted to the
Secretary of Transportation in the
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984,
as amended and re-codified by 51 U.S.C.
Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509),
and delegated to the FAA Administrator
and the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, who
exercises licensing authority under
Chapter 509.
RL is a private commercial space
flight company. RL seeks to lower the
cost and increase the frequency of
access to space for small payloads,
potentially expanding the opportunity
for space services and research. RL’s
petition for waiver addresses all
upcoming Electron test flights that RL
plans to launch from the Mahia
Peninsula, New Zealand. The Electron
launch is the first planned test flight
from the privately-owned Rocket Lab
Launch Complex at Mahia Peninsula in
Hawkes Bay, New Zealand. The launch
location is capable of hosting launches
to the northeast, east, and south. The
area within 20 NM surrounding the
launch site is extremely remote, and has
a low population density. The launch
flight corridor will have minimal impact
on air and marine traffic.
Waiver Criteria
Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive
a license requirement if the waiver (1)
will not jeopardize public health and
safety, safety of property; (2) will not
jeopardize national security and foreign
policy interests of the United States; and
(3) will be in the public interest. See 51
U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) (2011); 14 CFR
404.5(b) (2011).
Section E417.7(f)(2) and (5) Waiver
Petition
Section E417.7(f)(2) requires a launch
operator wishing to qualify a
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component’s design through
qualification by similarity to tests
performed on identical or similar
hardware to demonstrate that the
environments encountered by the
component during its qualification or
flight history were equal to or more
severe than the qualification
environments required for a component
that has already been qualified for use.
Section E417.7(f)(5) requires a launch
operator qualifying a component’s
design as discussed above to
demonstrate that the same manufacturer
produced both the qualified component
and the component the launch operator
wishes to qualify in the same location
using identical tools and manufacturing
processes. For reasons described below,
the FAA waives the requirements in
section E417.7(f)(2) and (5) to allow RL
to use components in its flight
termination system that were qualified
by similarity to more than one qualified
component.
In deciding whether or not to issue a
waiver, the FAA had to analyze whether
the waiver: (1) Would jeopardize public
health and safety or safety of property;
(2) would jeopardize national security
and foreign policy interests of the
United States; and (3) was in the public
interest. See 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14
CFR 404.5(b).
i. Public Health and Safety and Safety
of Property
Part 417 contains requirements for
qualification and acceptance testing of
flight termination system components
based on the approach used at the
federal launch ranges. At federal launch
ranges, flight termination system
components are tested according to
federal range-approved test procedures
and requirements. Verification methods
include test, analysis, and inspection.
As an alternative to testing, components
of an FTS are sometimes qualified by
similarity. A component that has been
qualified through testing for one launch
vehicle may be approved for use on a
different launch vehicle if it can be
shown that the environments in which
it must operate on the second vehicle
are no harsher than those of the first.
Also, with limited additional testing,
the component may be qualified for a
more severe environment. Although RL
did not complete each of the
qualification by similarity requirements
for its flight termination receiver as
required by the regulations, the failsafe
design of the Electron’s flight
termination system combined with the
remoteness of the operating area allow
the FAA to find that RL’s activities will
not jeopardize public health and safety
and safety of property.
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29799
RL procured the Electron launch
vehicle’s flight termination receiver
from Vendor A, who performed several
qualification and delta qualification
tests. A delta qualification test extends
the tested environments to cover
specific tests or levels that were not
previously covered. RL submitted a
Qualification by Similarity Analysis
Report to the FAA, referencing three
previous groups of similar flight
termination receiver qualification and
delta qualification tests performed by
Vendor A. Group 1 was subjected to
most of the qualification testing
required by 14 CFR Table E417.19–2,
with three exceptions: (a) Group 1 did
not satisfy 14 CFR E417.7(f)(2) because
the random vibration qualification
environment encountered by Group 1
was not equal to or more severe than the
random vibration qualification
environment required for the Electron
flight termination receivers, falling
below for approximately 3.5% over the
required 20 Hz to 2000 Hz test band; (b)
Group 1 was not subjected to EMI/EMC
testing; and (c) Group 1 did not meet the
requirements of 14 CFR E417.7(f)(5)
because it was not produced in the same
manufacturing location using identical
tools and manufacturing processes as
the Rocket Lab Electron flight
termination receivers. Group 1’s
deficiencies were mitigated by two
subsequent delta qualification tests on 2
groups (referred to herein as Group 2
and Group 3) of similar receivers. Group
2 satisfied Electron’s required random
vibration qualification test levels for the
entire required test band, and Group 2
was manufactured in the same location
using identical tools and manufacturing
processes as Electron flight termination
receivers. Group 3 successfully passed
EMI/EMC qualification testing.
Group 1 also did not meet the
requirements of 14 CFR E417.7(f)(5)
because Group 1 was not produced in
the same manufacturing location using
identical tools and manufacturing
processes as Group 2 and Electron flight
termination receivers. Vendor A
originally outsourced one of the flight
termination receiver’s printed circuit
boards to another supplier. In late 2013,
Vendor A upgraded its internal
equipment and process, and assembled
the printed circuit boards in-house.
Group 1 and Group 3 were
manufactured and qualification tested
before this change in equipment and
process, whereas Group 2 and Electron’s
flight termination receivers were
assembled after the change. To verify
that the equipment and process change
did not invalidate previous qualification
and delta qualification testing, Vendor
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A applied the same heritage process
profile to the new equipment, retained
heritage printed circuit board samples
for periodic process control
comparisons, and implemented periodic
visual/x-ray inspections for consistency
validation. Heritage and new equipment
specifications were also assessed to
compare their performance
characteristics. White Sand Missile
Range has reviewed and accepted this
process change, for U.S. Government
launch vehicle programs conducting
launches from its launch range, based
on improved reliability and quality of
the process.
The FAA waives the requirements of
E417.7(f)(2) and (5) because the Electron
has implemented a failsafe flight safety
system design that would terminate
thrust to the vehicle should both flight
termination receivers fail or
communication was lost with the
ground station, and RL’s operating area
is remote enough that were it to
experience a catastrophic failure, it
would not jeopardize public health and
safety and safety of property. The
Electron test flight missions would
occur from the isolated Mahia Peninsula
in New Zealand. The area within 20 NM
of Mahia Peninsula has a very low
population density. The Electron flight
corridor is over the broad ocean area
with minimal impact on air and marine
traffic. Consequence analysis showed
that less than 1 in 100,000 casualties
would be expected if the worst
foreseeable vehicle response mode (i.e.,
where the vehicle guidance is assumed
to fail in a manner that leads to an
attempt to guide to erroneous, randomly
located points) occurred at the worst
flight time (relatively early in flight
before the vehicle proceeds downrange)
and the flight termination receiver failed
to activate. Thus, the casualty
expectation given the assumption of the
worst possible failure would on average
still produce significantly less casualties
than the FAA’s limit of 1 in 10,000,
which does not assume failure but
rather assigns realistic failure
probabilities. Also, the flight
termination receiver’s failsafe feature
will terminate thrust if there is a loss of
power or Radio Frequency carrier or
pilot tone signal, providing an
additional safety margin. For these
reasons, the FAA has determined that
waiving sections E417.7(f)(2) and (5) for
the Electron test flight missions from
Mahia, New Zealand will not jeopardize
public health and safety or safety of
property.
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ii. National Security and Foreign Policy
Implications
The FAA has identified no national
security or foreign policy implications
associated with granting this waiver.
iii. Public Interest
The waiver is consistent with the
public interest goals of Chapter 509 and
the National Space Transportation
Policy. Three of the public policy goals
of Chapter 509 are: (1) To promote
economic growth and entrepreneurial
activity through use of the space
environment; (2) to encourage the
United States private sector to provide
launch and reentry vehicles and
associated services; and (3) to facilitate
the strengthening and expansion of the
United States space transportation
infrastructure to support the full range
of United States space-related activities.
See 51 U.S.C. 50901(b)(1), (2), (4).
RL seeks to lower the cost and
increase the frequency of access to space
for small payloads, potentially
expanding the opportunity for space
services and research. These activities
will help to make the U.S. launch
industry more competitive
internationally. The National Space
Transportation Policy states that
strengthening U.S. competitiveness in
the international launch market and
improving the cost effectiveness of U.S.
space transportation services are in the
public interest:
Maintaining an assured capability to
meet United States Government needs,
while also taking the necessary steps to
strengthen U.S. competitiveness in the
international commercial launch
market, is important to ensuring that
U.S. space transportation capabilities
will be reliable, robust, safe, and
affordable in the future. Among other
steps, improving the cost effectiveness
of U.S. space transportation services
could help achieve this goal by allowing
the United States Government to invest
a greater share of its resources in other
needs such as facilities modernization,
technology advancement, scientific
discovery, and national security.
Further, a healthier, more competitive
U.S. space transportation industry
would facilitate new markets, encourage
new industries, create high technology
jobs, lead to greater economic growth
and security, and would further the
Nation’s leadership role in space.
More specifically, Rocket Lab will be
carrying onboard the Electron launch
vehicle on its inaugural launch a flight
test experiment for NASA Kennedy
Space Center which will improve public
risk mitigation capabilities from an
errant launch vehicle. This component
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Frm 00021
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
is designed and manufactured by NASA
KSC and is part of the independent
safety system which will be installed on
the launch vehicles. This safety system
will be capable of determining if the
flight of the launch vehicle will pose an
unacceptable increased risk to the
public based on mission rules designed
for its unique vehicle and flight
characteristics and programmed into the
safety system and terminate the flight of
such launch vehicle. This type of
capability is in public interest because
this safety system will allow for
improved protection of the public from
mishaps resulting from flight of errant
launch vehicles.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15,
2017.
Kenneth Wong,
Commercial Space Transportation, Licensing
and Evaluation Division Manager.
[FR Doc. 2017–13567 Filed 6–29–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Coast Guard
33 CFR Part 117
[Docket No. USCG–2016–0257]
RIN 1625–AA09
Drawbridge Operation Regulation;
Delaware River, Pennsauken
Township, NJ
Coast Guard, DHS.
Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Coast Guard proposes to
modify the operating regulation that
governs the DELAIR Memorial Railroad
Bridge across the Delaware River, mile
104.6, at Pennsauken Township, NJ.
This proposed regulation will allow the
bridge to be remotely operated from the
Conrail South Jersey dispatch center in
Mount Laurel, NJ, instead of being
operated by an on-site bridge tender.
This regulation will not change the
operating schedule of the bridge.
DATES: Comments and related material
must reach the Coast Guard on or before
August 18, 2017.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
identified by docket number USCG–
2016–0257 using Federal eRulemaking
Portal at https://www.regulations.gov.
See the ‘‘Public Participation and
Request for Comments’’ portion of the
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section
below for instructions on submitting
comments.
SUMMARY:
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 125 (Friday, June 30, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 29798-29800]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-13567]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 417
Waiver of Flight Termination Receiver Qualification by Similarity
Deficiencies
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of waiver.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This notice concerns three petitions for waiver submitted to
the FAA by Rocket Lab USA Inc. (RL) for the Flight Termination Receiver
(FTR) Qualification by Similarity (QBS): A petition to waive the
requirement that a component may be qualified based on similarity to a
component that has already been qualified for use only if the
environments encountered by the previously qualified component during
its qualification or flight history were equal or more severe than the
Rocket Lab qualification environments; a petition to waive the
Electromagnetic Interference and Compatibility (EMI/EMC) on the same
units; and a petition to waive the requirement that the same
manufacturer must produce the qualified and the unqualified component
in the same location using identical tools and manufacturing processes.
The FAA grants these three petitions.
DATES: Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15, 2017.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical questions concerning
this waiver, contact Michael Wiktowy, Licensing Program Lead,
Commercial Space Transportation--Licensing and Evaluation Division, 800
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone: (202) 267-
7287; email: Michael.Wiktowy@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
RL submitted a petition to the FAA's Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (AST) requesting relief from regulatory requirements for
a launch license for flight of Electron test flight missions from
Mahia, New Zealand. Specifically, RL requested relief from 14 CFR
E417.7(f)(2) and (5), Qualification Testing and Analysis by Similarity
for the Flight Termination Receiver. For Qualification, the Flight
Termination Receiver is required to meet Table E417.19-2, which states
with note (5): ``The same three sample components must undergo each
test designated with an X. For a test designated with a quantity of
less than three, each sample component tested must be one of the
original three sample components.'' For Qualification Testing and
Analysis by Similarity, Part 417 Appendix E section 417.7(f) provides
the requirements a launch operator must satisfy in order to qualify or
re-qualify a flight termination system component's design through
qualification by similarity to tests performed on identical or similar
hardware. Section E417.7(f)(2) states that to qualify component ``A''
based on similarity to
[[Page 29799]]
component ``B'', that has already been qualified for use, a launch
operator must demonstrate that the environment encountered by ``B''
must have been equal to or more severe than the qualification
environments required for ``A''. Specifically, RL used different
components for the random vibration qualification test and the EMI/EMC
qualification test instead of the original three qualification sample
components used for the other tests under E417.7(f)(2). Section
E417.7(f)(5) requires that the same manufacturer produce ``A'' and
``B'' in the same location using identical tools and manufacturing
processes. Specifically, RL's sample ``A'' and ``B'' were manufactured
at different locations with different manufacturing processes.
The FAA licenses the launch of a launch vehicle and reentry of a
reentry vehicle under authority granted to the Secretary of
Transportation in the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as amended
and re-codified by 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, chapter 509 (Chapter 509), and
delegated to the FAA Administrator and the Associate Administrator for
Commercial Space Transportation, who exercises licensing authority
under Chapter 509.
RL is a private commercial space flight company. RL seeks to lower
the cost and increase the frequency of access to space for small
payloads, potentially expanding the opportunity for space services and
research. RL's petition for waiver addresses all upcoming Electron test
flights that RL plans to launch from the Mahia Peninsula, New Zealand.
The Electron launch is the first planned test flight from the
privately-owned Rocket Lab Launch Complex at Mahia Peninsula in Hawkes
Bay, New Zealand. The launch location is capable of hosting launches to
the northeast, east, and south. The area within 20 NM surrounding the
launch site is extremely remote, and has a low population density. The
launch flight corridor will have minimal impact on air and marine
traffic.
Waiver Criteria
Chapter 509 allows the FAA to waive a license requirement if the
waiver (1) will not jeopardize public health and safety, safety of
property; (2) will not jeopardize national security and foreign policy
interests of the United States; and (3) will be in the public interest.
See 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3) (2011); 14 CFR 404.5(b) (2011).
Section E417.7(f)(2) and (5) Waiver Petition
Section E417.7(f)(2) requires a launch operator wishing to qualify
a component's design through qualification by similarity to tests
performed on identical or similar hardware to demonstrate that the
environments encountered by the component during its qualification or
flight history were equal to or more severe than the qualification
environments required for a component that has already been qualified
for use. Section E417.7(f)(5) requires a launch operator qualifying a
component's design as discussed above to demonstrate that the same
manufacturer produced both the qualified component and the component
the launch operator wishes to qualify in the same location using
identical tools and manufacturing processes. For reasons described
below, the FAA waives the requirements in section E417.7(f)(2) and (5)
to allow RL to use components in its flight termination system that
were qualified by similarity to more than one qualified component.
In deciding whether or not to issue a waiver, the FAA had to
analyze whether the waiver: (1) Would jeopardize public health and
safety or safety of property; (2) would jeopardize national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States; and (3) was in the
public interest. See 51 U.S.C. 50905(b)(3); 14 CFR 404.5(b).
i. Public Health and Safety and Safety of Property
Part 417 contains requirements for qualification and acceptance
testing of flight termination system components based on the approach
used at the federal launch ranges. At federal launch ranges, flight
termination system components are tested according to federal range-
approved test procedures and requirements. Verification methods include
test, analysis, and inspection. As an alternative to testing,
components of an FTS are sometimes qualified by similarity. A component
that has been qualified through testing for one launch vehicle may be
approved for use on a different launch vehicle if it can be shown that
the environments in which it must operate on the second vehicle are no
harsher than those of the first. Also, with limited additional testing,
the component may be qualified for a more severe environment. Although
RL did not complete each of the qualification by similarity
requirements for its flight termination receiver as required by the
regulations, the failsafe design of the Electron's flight termination
system combined with the remoteness of the operating area allow the FAA
to find that RL's activities will not jeopardize public health and
safety and safety of property.
RL procured the Electron launch vehicle's flight termination
receiver from Vendor A, who performed several qualification and delta
qualification tests. A delta qualification test extends the tested
environments to cover specific tests or levels that were not previously
covered. RL submitted a Qualification by Similarity Analysis Report to
the FAA, referencing three previous groups of similar flight
termination receiver qualification and delta qualification tests
performed by Vendor A. Group 1 was subjected to most of the
qualification testing required by 14 CFR Table E417.19-2, with three
exceptions: (a) Group 1 did not satisfy 14 CFR E417.7(f)(2) because the
random vibration qualification environment encountered by Group 1 was
not equal to or more severe than the random vibration qualification
environment required for the Electron flight termination receivers,
falling below for approximately 3.5% over the required 20 Hz to 2000 Hz
test band; (b) Group 1 was not subjected to EMI/EMC testing; and (c)
Group 1 did not meet the requirements of 14 CFR E417.7(f)(5) because it
was not produced in the same manufacturing location using identical
tools and manufacturing processes as the Rocket Lab Electron flight
termination receivers. Group 1's deficiencies were mitigated by two
subsequent delta qualification tests on 2 groups (referred to herein as
Group 2 and Group 3) of similar receivers. Group 2 satisfied Electron's
required random vibration qualification test levels for the entire
required test band, and Group 2 was manufactured in the same location
using identical tools and manufacturing processes as Electron flight
termination receivers. Group 3 successfully passed EMI/EMC
qualification testing.
Group 1 also did not meet the requirements of 14 CFR E417.7(f)(5)
because Group 1 was not produced in the same manufacturing location
using identical tools and manufacturing processes as Group 2 and
Electron flight termination receivers. Vendor A originally outsourced
one of the flight termination receiver's printed circuit boards to
another supplier. In late 2013, Vendor A upgraded its internal
equipment and process, and assembled the printed circuit boards in-
house. Group 1 and Group 3 were manufactured and qualification tested
before this change in equipment and process, whereas Group 2 and
Electron's flight termination receivers were assembled after the
change. To verify that the equipment and process change did not
invalidate previous qualification and delta qualification testing,
Vendor
[[Page 29800]]
A applied the same heritage process profile to the new equipment,
retained heritage printed circuit board samples for periodic process
control comparisons, and implemented periodic visual/x-ray inspections
for consistency validation. Heritage and new equipment specifications
were also assessed to compare their performance characteristics. White
Sand Missile Range has reviewed and accepted this process change, for
U.S. Government launch vehicle programs conducting launches from its
launch range, based on improved reliability and quality of the process.
The FAA waives the requirements of E417.7(f)(2) and (5) because the
Electron has implemented a failsafe flight safety system design that
would terminate thrust to the vehicle should both flight termination
receivers fail or communication was lost with the ground station, and
RL's operating area is remote enough that were it to experience a
catastrophic failure, it would not jeopardize public health and safety
and safety of property. The Electron test flight missions would occur
from the isolated Mahia Peninsula in New Zealand. The area within 20 NM
of Mahia Peninsula has a very low population density. The Electron
flight corridor is over the broad ocean area with minimal impact on air
and marine traffic. Consequence analysis showed that less than 1 in
100,000 casualties would be expected if the worst foreseeable vehicle
response mode (i.e., where the vehicle guidance is assumed to fail in a
manner that leads to an attempt to guide to erroneous, randomly located
points) occurred at the worst flight time (relatively early in flight
before the vehicle proceeds downrange) and the flight termination
receiver failed to activate. Thus, the casualty expectation given the
assumption of the worst possible failure would on average still produce
significantly less casualties than the FAA's limit of 1 in 10,000,
which does not assume failure but rather assigns realistic failure
probabilities. Also, the flight termination receiver's failsafe feature
will terminate thrust if there is a loss of power or Radio Frequency
carrier or pilot tone signal, providing an additional safety margin.
For these reasons, the FAA has determined that waiving sections
E417.7(f)(2) and (5) for the Electron test flight missions from Mahia,
New Zealand will not jeopardize public health and safety or safety of
property.
ii. National Security and Foreign Policy Implications
The FAA has identified no national security or foreign policy
implications associated with granting this waiver.
iii. Public Interest
The waiver is consistent with the public interest goals of Chapter
509 and the National Space Transportation Policy. Three of the public
policy goals of Chapter 509 are: (1) To promote economic growth and
entrepreneurial activity through use of the space environment; (2) to
encourage the United States private sector to provide launch and
reentry vehicles and associated services; and (3) to facilitate the
strengthening and expansion of the United States space transportation
infrastructure to support the full range of United States space-related
activities. See 51 U.S.C. 50901(b)(1), (2), (4).
RL seeks to lower the cost and increase the frequency of access to
space for small payloads, potentially expanding the opportunity for
space services and research. These activities will help to make the
U.S. launch industry more competitive internationally. The National
Space Transportation Policy states that strengthening U.S.
competitiveness in the international launch market and improving the
cost effectiveness of U.S. space transportation services are in the
public interest:
Maintaining an assured capability to meet United States Government
needs, while also taking the necessary steps to strengthen U.S.
competitiveness in the international commercial launch market, is
important to ensuring that U.S. space transportation capabilities will
be reliable, robust, safe, and affordable in the future. Among other
steps, improving the cost effectiveness of U.S. space transportation
services could help achieve this goal by allowing the United States
Government to invest a greater share of its resources in other needs
such as facilities modernization, technology advancement, scientific
discovery, and national security. Further, a healthier, more
competitive U.S. space transportation industry would facilitate new
markets, encourage new industries, create high technology jobs, lead to
greater economic growth and security, and would further the Nation's
leadership role in space.
More specifically, Rocket Lab will be carrying onboard the Electron
launch vehicle on its inaugural launch a flight test experiment for
NASA Kennedy Space Center which will improve public risk mitigation
capabilities from an errant launch vehicle. This component is designed
and manufactured by NASA KSC and is part of the independent safety
system which will be installed on the launch vehicles. This safety
system will be capable of determining if the flight of the launch
vehicle will pose an unacceptable increased risk to the public based on
mission rules designed for its unique vehicle and flight
characteristics and programmed into the safety system and terminate the
flight of such launch vehicle. This type of capability is in public
interest because this safety system will allow for improved protection
of the public from mishaps resulting from flight of errant launch
vehicles.
Issued in Washington, DC, on May 15, 2017.
Kenneth Wong,
Commercial Space Transportation, Licensing and Evaluation Division
Manager.
[FR Doc. 2017-13567 Filed 6-29-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P