Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) Model 412EP Helicopter in the 412 EPI Configuration; Search and Rescue (SAR) With Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Installation, 24458-24462 [2017-11073]
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 102 / Tuesday, May 30, 2017 / Rules and Regulations
horizontal storage of high burnup spent
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[FR Doc. 2017–11064 Filed 5–26–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 29
[Docket No. FAA–2017–0466; Special
Conditions No. 29–041–SC]
Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc. (Bell) Model 412EP
Helicopter in the 412 EPI
Configuration; Search and Rescue
(SAR) With Automatic Flight Control
System (AFCS) Installation
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for the Bell Model 412EP (412EPI
configuration) helicopter. This
helicopter as modified by Bell will have
a novel or unusual design feature
associated with a SAR AFCS. The
applicable airworthiness standards do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for this design feature.
These special conditions contain the
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SUMMARY:
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Jkt 241001
additional safety standards the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: These special conditions are
effective June 29, 2017. We must receive
your comments by July 31, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by docket number [FAA–2017–0466]
using any of the following methods:
• Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
• Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver
comments to the ‘‘Mail’’ address
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
• Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
Privacy: The FAA will post all
comments it receives, without change,
to https://regulations.gov, including any
personal information the commenter
provides. Using the search function of
the docket Web site, anyone can find
and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA
docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or
signing the comment for an association,
business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s
complete Privacy Act Statement can be
found in the Federal Register published
on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478),
as well as at https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
Docket: You can read the background
documents or comments received at
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for accessing the
docket or go to the Docket Operations in
Room @12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
George Harrum, Flight Analyst, FAA,
Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and
Policy Group, (ASW–111), 10101
Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas
76177; telephone (817) 222–4087; email
George.Harrum@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Reason for No Prior Notice and
Comment Before Adoption
The substance of these special
conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period previously
and has been derived without
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substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. Therefore, the FAA
has determined that prior public notice
and comment are unnecessary,
impracticable, and contrary to the
public interest, and finds good cause
exists for adopting these special
conditions upon issuance. The FAA is
requesting comments to allow interested
persons to submit views that may not
have been submitted in response to the
prior opportunities for comment.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take
part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data.
We will consider all comments we
receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so
without incurring additional expense or
delay. We may change these special
conditions based on the comments we
receive.
Background and Discussion
On March 20, 2015, Bell applied for
a supplemental type certificate (STC) for
installation of an optional SAR AFCS in
certain Model 412EP helicopters. The
Model 412EP helicopter, approved
under Type Certificate No. H4SW, is a
14 CFR part 29 transport category
helicopter certificated in both Category
A and Category B and for operation
under instrument flight rules under the
requirements of Appendix B to Part 29.
Bell designated certain serial-numbered
Model 412EP helicopters for a specific
configuration commercially identified
as ‘‘412EPI.’’ The 412 EPI configuration
includes the following changes from the
412EP: Installation of the Pratt &
Whitney Canada Model PT6T–9 Twin
Power Section Turboshaft Engine with
Electronic Engine Control, and cockpit
instruments and avionics replacement
with the Bell BasiX-Pro® Integrated
Avionics System. This rotorcraft has a
maximum take-off weight of 12,200
pounds. It carries up to 13 passengers
with maximum external load of almost
6,614 lbs. and a range up to 609 miles.
The use of dedicated AFCS upper
modes, in which a fully coupled
autopilot provides operational SAR
profiles, is needed for SAR operations
conducted over water in offshore areas
clear of obstructions. The SAR modes
enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully
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coupled maneuvers, to include
predefined search patterns during cruise
flight, and to transition from cruise
flight to a stabilized hover and
departure (transition from hover to
cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also
includes an auxiliary crew control that
allows another crewmember (such as a
hoist operator) to have limited authority
to control the helicopter’s longitudinal
and lateral position during hover
operations.
Flight operations conducted over
water at night may have an extremely
limited visual horizon with little visual
reference to the surface even when
conducted under Visual Meteorological
Conditions. Consequently, the
certification requirements for SAR
modes must meet the criteria in
Appendix B to Part 29. While Appendix
B to Part 29 prescribes airworthiness
criteria for instrument flight, it does not
consider operations below instrument
flight minimum speed (VMINI), whereas
the SAR modes allow for coupled
operations at low speed, all-azimuth
flight to zero airspeed (hover).
The regulations as currently
promulgated did not envision
instrument flight below the Appendix B
envelope, including hover using AFCS
modes. This necessitates the
development of a special condition to
address the gap in 14 CFR part 29
regulations and the lack of adequate
airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR
mode certification to include flight
characteristics, performance, and
installed equipment and systems. Also,
the requirements of the Bell 412EP
Special Conditions No. 29–ASW–5 are
not adequate to address the safety
objectives for this SAR AFCS design
feature. Special Conditions No. 29–
ASW–5 only requires provisions for
mitigating hazards to required
equipment from high intensity radio
frequency transmission sources.
The 412EPI configuration SAR
operations necessitate safety critical
navigation and control functions. These
functions allow the rotorcraft to operate
under instrument flight rules (IFR) then
transition to stabilized visual flight rules
hover below required minimum obstacle
distances. To safely accomplish this
specialized operation, the equipment
must possess minimum functional
reliability and availability under
potentially adverse environmental
conditions. The 412EPI configuration
SAR equipment operates as an
integrated system to accomplish the
functions mentioned above.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR
21.101, Bell must show that the 412EP
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model helicopter in the 412EPI
configuration, as changed, continues to
meet either the applicable provisions of
the regulations incorporated by
reference in type certificate (TC) No.
H4SW or the applicable regulations in
effect on the date of application for the
change, depending on the significance
of the change as defined by 14 CFR
21.101. The regulations incorporated by
reference in the TC are commonly
referred to as the ‘‘original type
certification basis.’’ The regulations
incorporated by reference in H4SW are
as follows:
(a) 14 CFR part 29, dated February 1,
1965, including Amendments 29–1
through 29–51.
(b) 14 CFR 29.141, 29.143, 29.251,
29.301, 29.303, 29.305, 29.307(a),
29.561(c), 29.601(a), 29.603, 29.605,
29.609(a), 29.625, 29.777,
29.831(b)(c)(d), 29.907, 29.993,
29.1023(a), 29.1049, 29.1093.
29.1203(a)(b)(d), 29.1301, 29.1327,
29.1381, 29.1385, 29.1389, 29.1391,
29.1393, 29.1395, 29.1431, 29.1435,
29.1523(a)(b), 29.1541, 29.1543(b),
29.1547, 29.1551, 29.1553, at Amdt. 29–
0.
(c) 14 CFR 29.955(a)(1) at Amdt. 29–
2.
(d) 14 CFR 29.773(a), 29.901,
29.1191(a)(c)(d)(e)(f), at Amdt. 29–3.
(e) 14 CFR 29.1397 at Amdt. 29–7.
(f) 14 CFR 29.1387 at Amdt 29–9.
(g) 14 CFR part 29.1401 at Amdt. 29–
11.
(h) 14 CFR 29.63, 29.939, 29.1165,
29.1322 at Amdt. 29–12.
(i) 14 CFR 29.1145 at Amdt. 29–13.
(j) 14 CFR 29.1335 at Amdt. 29–14.
(k) 14 CFR 29.29, 29.33(a)(1),
29.1353(a)(b), 29.1501, 29.1527,
29.1581(a)(b)(d) at Amdt. 29–15.
(l) 14 CFR 29.1413(a), at Amdt. 29–16.
(m) 14 CFR 29.1091(a)(b), 29.1545 at
Amdt. 29–17.
(n) 14 CFR 29.571, 29.1529, 14 CFR
part 29 Appendix A at Amdt. 29–20.
(o) 14 CFR 29.1321, 14 CFR part 29
Appendix B I and IX (a)(b) at Amdt. 29–
21.
(p) 14 CFR 29.853(a)(2)(c) at Amdt.
29–23.
(q) 14 CFR 29.21, 29.45(a)(b)(c)(e)(f),
29.151, 29.672(a), 29.771(a)(b)(c),
29.1303, 29.1325, 29.1331, 29.1333,
29.1355, 29.1357(a)(c)(d)(e)(g), 29.1517,
29.1555(a)(b)(c)(d), 29.1559, 29.1583,
29.1585 at Amdt. 29–24.
(r) 14 CFR 29.1011(d), 29.1041,
29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047,
29.1141(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(2),
29.1337(a)(b)(1)(2)(c)(d)(e), 29.1557(c)(2)
at Amdt. 29–26.
(s) 14 CFR 29.337(a), 29.613(d), at
Amdt. 29–30.
(t) 14 CFR 29.783(e),
29.903(a)(b)(c)(3)(d)(e) at Amdt. 29–31
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(u) 14CFR 29.1143(a)(b)(c)(e)(f),
29.1549 at Amdt. 29–34.
(v) 14 CFR 29.49(a)(b)(c), 29.51, 29.53,
29.55, 29.60, 29.61, 29.64, 29.65(a),
29.75, 29.79, 29.83(a)(b), 29.87(a), at
Amdt. 29–39.
(w) 14 CFR 29.1305(a)(3)(4)(6–19)(21–
23)(25)(26)(b)(c),
29.1309(a)(b)(2)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h), 14 CFR
part 29 Appendix B VIII
(a)(b)(3)(4)(5)(6)(c), at Amdt. 29–40.
(x) 14 CFR
29.1521(a)(b)(1)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(ii)(c)(4)(d)
(e)(f)(g)(h)(i)(j) at Amdt. 29–41.
(y) 14 CFR 29.1329(f),
29.1351(a)(b)(3)(4)(6)(d), 29.1359 at
Amdt. 29–42.
(z) 14 CFR 29.865(c)(6) at Amdt. 29–
43.
(aa) 14 CFR 29.59, 29.62, 29.67, 29.77,
29.81, 29.85, 29.1323(a)(b)(c)(d)(e) at
Amdt. 29–44.
(bb) 14 CFR 29.1317(a)(b)(c), 14 CFR
part 29 Appendix E at Amdt. 29–49.
(cc) 14 CFR 29.1587 at Amdt. 29–51.
(dd) Equivalent Level of Safety
Findings:
(1) 14 CFR 29.1305(a)(11–16) and
29.1549(a)(b)(c)(e) for the Power
Situation Indicator (documented in
ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC–RD/P–1)
dated January 16, 2013.
(2) 14 CFR 29.1545(b)(2) for Airspeed
Indicator (documented in ELOS Memo
No. ST0025RC–RD/F–2) dated
September 27, 2012.
(3) 14 CFR 29.1333(a) and 14 CFR part
29 Appendix B VIII(b)(5)(i) and (ii) for
Electronically Integrated Flight
Instrument Systems (documented in
ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC–RD/S–2)
dated January 25, 2013.
(4) 14 CFR 29.1555(c)(1) for the
Useable Fuel Capacity Marking
(documented in ELOS Memo No.
ST0025RC–RD/P–2) dated December 18,
2012.
(ee) If BHT Kit 412–706–140,
Increased Gross Weight, is installed
then compliance has also been shown to
14 CFR 29.25(a)(1)(3)(4) Amend 29–51,
14 CFR part 29 Appendix B III,
IV(a)(b)(1)(3)(c)(1)(d)(1)(e)(f), V, VI, VII
at Amend 29–21 and 14 CFR 36.1(c) at
Amend 36–14.
Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations
(i.e., 14 CFR part 29) do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the Bell Model 412EP helicopter in
the 412EPI configuration because of a
novel or unusual design feature, special
conditions are prescribed under § 21.16.
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and
they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.101.
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Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the TC for that model
be amended later to include any other
model that incorporates the same novel
or unusual design feature, or should any
other model already included on the
same TC be modified to incorporate the
same novel or unusual design feature,
the special conditions would also apply
to the other model.
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Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Bell Model 412EP helicopter in
the 412EPI configuration will
incorporate the following novel or
unusual design features.
The SAR system is composed of a
navigation computer with SAR modes,
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR
functions, hoist operator control, a
hover speed reference system, and two
radio altimeters. The AFCS coupled
SAR functions include:
(a) Hover hold at selected height
above the surface.
(b) Ground speed hold.
(c) Transition down and hover to a
waypoint under guidance from the
navigation computer.
(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and
hover near a target over which the
helicopter has flown.
(e) Transition up, climb, and capture
a cruise height.
(f) Capture and track SAR search
patterns generated by the navigation
computer.
(g) Monitor the preselected hover
height with automatic increase in
collective if the aircraft height drops
below the safe minimum height.
These SAR modes are intended to be
used over large bodies of water in areas
clear of obstructions. Further, use of the
modes that transition down from cruise
to hover will include operation at
airspeeds below VMINI.
The SAR system only entails
navigation, flight control, and coupled
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The
system does not include additional
equipment that may be required for over
water flight or external loads to meet
other operational requirements.
Applicability
These special conditions apply to the
Bell Model 412EP helicopter in the
412EPI configuration. Should Bell apply
at a later date for a change to the type
certificate to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions
would apply to that model as well
under the provisions of § 21.101(d).
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
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of helicopter. It is not a rule of general
applicability and affects only the
applicant who applied to the FAA for
approval of these features on the
helicopter.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701–
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the type
certification basis for Bell Helicopter
Textron Inc. (Bell) Model 412EP
helicopters in the 412EPI configuration
when modified by Bell by installing an
optional Search and Rescue (SAR)
Automatic Flight Control System
(AFCS).
In addition to the 14 CFR part 29
certification requirements for Category
A and helicopter instrument flight
(Appendix B), the following additional
requirements must be met for
certification of the SAR AFCS:
(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled
SAR flight modes must provide:
(1) Safe and controlled flight in the
three axes at all airspeeds (lateral
position and speed, longitudinal
position and speed, and height and
vertical speed) from the previous VMINI
to a hover (within the maximum
demonstrated wind envelope).
(2) Automatic transition to the
helicopter instrument flight (Appendix
B) envelope as part of the normal SAR
mode sequencing.
(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around
mode that safely interrupts any other
coupled mode and automatically
transitions the helicopter to the
instrument flight (Appendix B)
envelope.
(4) A means to prevent unintended
flight below a safe minimum height.
Pilot-commanded descent below the
safe minimum height is acceptable
provided the alerting requirements in
paragraph (b)(8)(i) of these Special
Conditions alert the pilot of this descent
below safe minimum height.
(b) SAR Mode System Architecture.
To support the integrity of the SAR
modes, the following system
architecture is required:
(1) Ground mapping radar function
that presents real-time information to
the pilots.
(2) A system for limiting the engine
power demanded by the AFCS when
any of the automatic piloting modes are
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engaged, so full authority digital engine
control power limitations, such as
torque and temperature, are not
exceeded.
(3) A system providing the aircraft
height above the surface and final pilotselected height at a location on the
instrument panel in a position
acceptable to the FAA that will make it
plainly visible to and usable by any
pilot at their station.
(4) A system providing the aircraft
heading and the ability to automatically
hold a pilot-selected heading set by
either setting the reference to the
current heading or adjusting the
reference left or right. If the reference
setting can change faster than the
aircraft ability to follow, a display of
reference heading is required at a
location on the instrument panel in a
position acceptable to the FAA that will
make it plainly visible to and usable by
any pilot at their station.
(5) A system providing the aircraft
longitudinal and lateral hover velocities
and the pilot-selected longitudinal and
lateral velocities when used by the
AFCS in the flight envelope where
airspeed indications become unreliable.
This information must be presented at a
location on the instrument panel in a
position acceptable to the FAA that is
plainly visible to and usable by any
pilot at their station.
(6) A system providing wind speed
and wind direction when automatic
piloting modes are engaged or
transitioning from one mode to another.
(7) A means to monitor for flight
guidance deviations and failures with
alerting that enables the flight crew take
appropriate corrective action.
(8) An alerting system that provides
visual or aural alerts, or both, to the
flight crew under any of the following
conditions:
(i) When the stored or pilot-selected
safe minimum height is reached.
(ii) When a SAR mode system
malfunction occurs.
(iii) When the AFCS changes modes
automatically from one SAR mode to
another. For normal transitions from
one SAR mode to another, a single
visual or aural alert may suffice. For a
SAR mode malfunction or a mode
having a time-critical component, the
flight crew alerting system must activate
early enough to allow the flight crew to
take timely and appropriate action. The
alerting system means must be designed
to alert the flight crew in order to
minimize crew errors that could create
an additional hazard.
(9) The SAR system hoist operator
control is considered a flight control
with limited authority and must comply
with the following:
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(i) The hoist operator control must be
designed and located to provide for
convenient operation and to prevent
confusion and inadvertent operation.
(ii) The helicopter must be safely
controllable by the hoist operator
control throughout the range of that
control.
(iii) The hoist operator control may
not interfere with the safe operation of
the helicopter.
(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls
must be able to smoothly override the
control authority of the hoist operator
control, without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength, and without
the danger of exceeding any other
limitation because of the override.
(10) The reliability of the AFCS must
be related to the effects of its failure.
The occurrence of any failure condition
that would prevent continued safe flight
and landing must be extremely
improbable. For any failure condition of
the AFCS which is shown to not be
extremely improbable:
(i) The helicopter must be safely
controllable and capable of continued
safe flight without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength. Additional
unrelated probable failures affecting the
control system must be evaluated.
(ii) The AFCS must be designed so
that it cannot create a hazardous
deviation in the flight path or produce
hazardous loads on the helicopter
during normal operation or in the event
of a malfunction or failure, assuming
corrective action begins within an
appropriate period of time. Where
multiple systems are installed,
subsequent malfunction conditions
must be evaluated in sequence unless
their occurrence is shown to be
improbable.
(11) A functional hazard assessment
and a system safety assessment must
address the failure conditions associated
with SAR operations:
(i) For SAR catastrophic failure
conditions, changes may be required to
the following:
(A) System architecture.
(B) Software and complex electronic
hardware design assurance levels.
(C) High Intensity Radiated Field
(HIRF) test levels.
(D) Instructions for continued
airworthiness.
(ii) The assessments must consider all
the systems required for SAR
operations, including the AFCS, all
associated AFCS sensors (for example,
radio altimeter), and primary flight
displays. Electrical and electronic
systems with SAR catastrophic failure
conditions for both visual flight rules
and IFR must comply with the 14 CFR
29.1317(a)(4) HIRF requirements.
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(c) SAR Mode Performance
Requirements.
(1) The SAR modes must be
demonstrated for the requested flight
envelope, including the following
minimum sea-state and wind
conditions:
(i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5
meters (8.2 feet), considering both short
and long swells.
(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17
knots for all other azimuths.
(2) The selected hover height and
hover velocity must be captured
(including the transition from one
captured mode to another captured
mode) accurately and smoothly and not
exhibit any significant overshoot or
oscillation.
(3) The minimum use height (MUH)
for the SAR modes must be no less than
the maximum loss of height following
any single failure or any combination of
failures not shown to be extremely
improbable, plus an additional margin
of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is the
minimum height at which any SAR
AFCS mode may be engaged.
(4) The SAR mode system must be
usable up to the maximum certified
gross weight of the aircraft or to the
lower of the following weights:
(i) Maximum emergency flotation
weight.
(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground
Effect (OGE) weight.
(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
(d) Flight Characteristics.
(1) For SAR mode coupled flight
below VMINI, at the maximum
demonstrated winds, the helicopter
must be able to maintain any required
flight condition and make a smooth
transition from any flight condition to
any other flight condition without
requiring exceptional piloting skill,
alertness, or strength, and without
exceeding the limit load factor. This
requirement also includes aircraft
control through the hoist operator’s
control.
(2) For coupled flight below the
previously established VMINI, the
following stability requirements replace
the stability requirements of paragraph
IV, V, and VI of Appendix B to Part 29:
(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The
requirements of Appendix B to part 29,
paragraph IV are not applicable.
(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability:
The requirements of Appendix B to part
29, paragraph V are not applicable.
(iii) Dynamic Stability, paragraph VI:
(A) Any oscillation must be damped
and any aperiodic response must not
double in amplitude in less than 10
seconds. This requirement must also be
met with degraded upper mode(s) of the
AFCS.
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(B) After any upset, such as a wind
gust, the AFCS must return the aircraft
to the last commanded flight condition
within 10 seconds or less.
(3) With any of the upper modes of
the AFCS engaged, the pilot must be
able to manually recover the aircraft and
transition to the normal (Appendix B)
IFR flight profile envelope without
exceptional skill, alertness, or strength.
(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI)
Performance Information.
(1) The following performance
information must be provided in the
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement
(RFMS):
(i) OEI performance information and
emergency procedures, providing the
maximum weight that will provide a
minimum clearance of 15 feet above the
surface, following failure of the critical
engine in a hover. The maximum weight
must be presented as a function of the
hover height for the temperature and
pressure altitude range requested for
certification. The effects of wind must
be reflected in the hover performance
information.
(ii) Hover OGE performance with the
critical engine inoperative for OEI
continuous and time-limited power
ratings for those weights, altitudes, and
temperatures for which certification is
requested.
(2) These OEI performance
requirements do not replace
performance requirements that may be
needed to comply with the
airworthiness or operational standards
(14 CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for
external loads or human external cargo.
(f) RFMS.
(1) The RFMS must contain, at a
minimum:
(i) Limitations necessary for safe
operation of the SAR system, including:
(A) Minimum crew requirements.
(B) Maximum SAR weight.
(C) Engagement criteria for each of the
SAR modes to include MUH, as
determined in paragraph (c)(3) of these
Special Conditions.
(ii) Normal and emergency procedures
for operation of the SAR system
(including operation of the hoist
operator control) with AFCS failure
modes, AFCS degraded modes, and
engine failures.
(iii) Performance information:
(A) OEI performance and height-loss.
(B) Hover OGE performance
information, utilizing OEI continuous
and time-limited power ratings.
(C) The maximum wind envelope
demonstrated in flight test.
(D) Information and/or advisory
information concerning operations in a
heavy salt spray environment, including
any airframe or power effects as a result
of salt encrustation.
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 102 / Tuesday, May 30, 2017 / Rules and Regulations
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with RULES
(g) Flight Demonstration.
(1) Before approval of the SAR
system, an acceptable flight
demonstration of all coupled SAR
modes is required.
(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe
operations during coupled maneuvers.
The demonstration of fail-safe
operations must include a pilot
workload assessment associated with
manually flying the aircraft to an
altitude greater than 200 feet above the
surface and an airspeed of at least the
best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
(3) For any failure condition of the
SAR system shown to not be extremely
improbable, the pilot must be able to
make a smooth transition from one
flight mode to another without
exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or
strength.
(4) Failure conditions that are shown
to not be extremely improbable must be
demonstrated by analysis, ground
testing, or flight testing. For failures
demonstrated in flight, the following
normal pilot recovery times are
acceptable:
(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/
Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover modes:
Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot
recognition plus 3 seconds.
(5) All AFCS malfunctions must
include evaluation at the low-speed and
high-power flight conditions typical of
SAR operations. Additionally, AFCS
hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory
malfunctions, particularly in yaw,
require evaluation. AFCS malfunction
testing must include a single or a
combination of failures (such as,
erroneous data from and loss of the
radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and
altitude sensors) that are shown to not
be extremely improbable.
(6) The flight demonstration must
include the following environmental
conditions:
(i) Swell into wind.
(ii) Swell and wind from different
directions.
(iii) Cross swell.
(iv) Swell of different lengths (short
and long swell).
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on May 19,
2017.
Lance T. Gant
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017–11073 Filed 5–26–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:28 May 26, 2017
Jkt 241001
[Docket No. FAA–2017–0501; Directorate
Identifier 2017–NM–053–AD; Amendment
39–18908; AD 2017–11–09]
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA,
call 425–227–1221. It is also available
on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2017–
0501.
RIN 2120–AA64
Examining the AD Docket
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
Airworthiness Directives; Learjet, Inc.,
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
We are superseding
Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017–08–
07 for certain Learjet, Inc., Model 60
airplanes. AD 2017–08–07 required a
one-time inspection of the fuselage skin
for corrosion, and related investigative
and corrective actions if necessary. This
new AD retains the actions of AD 2017–
08–07 and removes certain airplanes
from the applicability. This AD was
prompted by a determination that only
certain airplanes are affected by the
unsafe condition. We are issuing this
AD to address the unsafe condition on
these products.
DATES: This AD is effective May 30,
2017.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in this AD
as of May 22, 2017 (82 FR 18084, April
17, 2017).
We must receive comments on this
AD by July 14, 2017.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments,
using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail
address above between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this final rule, contact Learjet, Inc., One
Learjet Way, Wichita, KS 67209–2942;
telephone: 316–946–2000; fax: 316–
946–2220; email: ac.ict@
aero.bombardier.com; Internet: https://
www.bombardier.com. You may view
this referenced service information at
the FAA, Transport Airplane
SUMMARY:
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2017–
0501; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for
the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–
5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.
Comments will be available in the AD
docket shortly after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul
Chapman, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe Branch, ACE–118W, FAA,
Wichita Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), 1801 Airport Road, Room 100,
Dwight D. Eisenhower Airport, Wichita,
KS 67209; phone: 316–946–4152; fax:
316–946–4107; email: Wichita-COS@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
On April 7, 2017, we issued AD 2017–
08–07, Amendment 39–18856 (82 FR
18084, April 17, 2017) (‘‘AD 2017–08–
07’’), for Learjet, Inc., Model 60
airplanes, serial numbers 60–002
through 60–430 inclusive. AD 2017–08–
07 required a one-time inspection of the
fuselage skin for corrosion, and related
investigative and corrective actions if
necessary. AD 2017–08–07 resulted
from an evaluation by the design
approval holder (DAH) indicating that
the upper fuselage skin under the aft
oxygen line fairing is subject to multisite damage (MSD). We issued AD
2017–08–07 to detect and correct
corrosion of the fuselage skin, which
could result in reduced structural
integrity of the airplane.
Actions Since AD 2017–08–07 Was
Issued
Since we issued AD 2017–08–07, we
determined that only certain airplanes
identified in the applicability of AD
2017–08–07 are affected by the unsafe
condition. For Learjet, Inc., Model 60
airplanes, serial numbers 60–002
through 60–430 inclusive, the unsafe
condition affects only airplanes with a
dorsal-mounted oxygen bottle and
E:\FR\FM\30MYR1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 102 (Tuesday, May 30, 2017)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 24458-24462]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-11073]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 29
[Docket No. FAA-2017-0466; Special Conditions No. 29-041-SC]
Special Conditions: Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell) Model
412EP Helicopter in the 412 EPI Configuration; Search and Rescue (SAR)
With Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) Installation
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Bell Model 412EP
(412EPI configuration) helicopter. This helicopter as modified by Bell
will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with a SAR AFCS.
The applicable airworthiness standards do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for this design feature. These special
conditions contain the additional safety standards the Administrator
considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that
established by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: These special conditions are effective June 29, 2017. We must
receive your comments by July 31, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number [FAA-2017-0466]
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room
W12-140, West Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery of Courier: Deliver comments to the ``Mail''
address between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to https://regulations.gov, including any personal information
the commenter provides. Using the search function of the docket Web
site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all comments
received into any FAA docket, including the name of the individual
sending the comment (or signing the comment for an association,
business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement can
be found in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477-19478), as well as at https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov.
Docket: You can read the background documents or comments received
at https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to the Docket Operations in Room @12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: George Harrum, Flight Analyst, FAA,
Rotorcraft Directorate, Regulations and Policy Group, (ASW-111), 10101
Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, Texas 76177; telephone (817) 222-4087;
email George.Harrum@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption
The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period previously and has been derived without
substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a significant change from the
substance contained herein. Therefore, the FAA has determined that
prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, impracticable, and
contrary to the public interest, and finds good cause exists for
adopting these special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting
comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have
been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do
so without incurring additional expense or delay. We may change these
special conditions based on the comments we receive.
Background and Discussion
On March 20, 2015, Bell applied for a supplemental type certificate
(STC) for installation of an optional SAR AFCS in certain Model 412EP
helicopters. The Model 412EP helicopter, approved under Type
Certificate No. H4SW, is a 14 CFR part 29 transport category helicopter
certificated in both Category A and Category B and for operation under
instrument flight rules under the requirements of Appendix B to Part
29. Bell designated certain serial-numbered Model 412EP helicopters for
a specific configuration commercially identified as ``412EPI.'' The 412
EPI configuration includes the following changes from the 412EP:
Installation of the Pratt & Whitney Canada Model PT6T-9 Twin Power
Section Turboshaft Engine with Electronic Engine Control, and cockpit
instruments and avionics replacement with the Bell BasiX-Pro[supreg]
Integrated Avionics System. This rotorcraft has a maximum take-off
weight of 12,200 pounds. It carries up to 13 passengers with maximum
external load of almost 6,614 lbs. and a range up to 609 miles.
The use of dedicated AFCS upper modes, in which a fully coupled
autopilot provides operational SAR profiles, is needed for SAR
operations conducted over water in offshore areas clear of
obstructions. The SAR modes enable the helicopter pilot to fly fully
[[Page 24459]]
coupled maneuvers, to include predefined search patterns during cruise
flight, and to transition from cruise flight to a stabilized hover and
departure (transition from hover to cruise flight). The SAR AFCS also
includes an auxiliary crew control that allows another crewmember (such
as a hoist operator) to have limited authority to control the
helicopter's longitudinal and lateral position during hover operations.
Flight operations conducted over water at night may have an
extremely limited visual horizon with little visual reference to the
surface even when conducted under Visual Meteorological Conditions.
Consequently, the certification requirements for SAR modes must meet
the criteria in Appendix B to Part 29. While Appendix B to Part 29
prescribes airworthiness criteria for instrument flight, it does not
consider operations below instrument flight minimum speed
(VMINI), whereas the SAR modes allow for coupled operations
at low speed, all-azimuth flight to zero airspeed (hover).
The regulations as currently promulgated did not envision
instrument flight below the Appendix B envelope, including hover using
AFCS modes. This necessitates the development of a special condition to
address the gap in 14 CFR part 29 regulations and the lack of adequate
airworthiness standards for AFCS SAR mode certification to include
flight characteristics, performance, and installed equipment and
systems. Also, the requirements of the Bell 412EP Special Conditions
No. 29-ASW-5 are not adequate to address the safety objectives for this
SAR AFCS design feature. Special Conditions No. 29-ASW-5 only requires
provisions for mitigating hazards to required equipment from high
intensity radio frequency transmission sources.
The 412EPI configuration SAR operations necessitate safety critical
navigation and control functions. These functions allow the rotorcraft
to operate under instrument flight rules (IFR) then transition to
stabilized visual flight rules hover below required minimum obstacle
distances. To safely accomplish this specialized operation, the
equipment must possess minimum functional reliability and availability
under potentially adverse environmental conditions. The 412EPI
configuration SAR equipment operates as an integrated system to
accomplish the functions mentioned above.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, Bell must show that the
412EP model helicopter in the 412EPI configuration, as changed,
continues to meet either the applicable provisions of the regulations
incorporated by reference in type certificate (TC) No. H4SW or the
applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the
change, depending on the significance of the change as defined by 14
CFR 21.101. The regulations incorporated by reference in the TC are
commonly referred to as the ``original type certification basis.'' The
regulations incorporated by reference in H4SW are as follows:
(a) 14 CFR part 29, dated February 1, 1965, including Amendments
29-1 through 29-51.
(b) 14 CFR 29.141, 29.143, 29.251, 29.301, 29.303, 29.305,
29.307(a), 29.561(c), 29.601(a), 29.603, 29.605, 29.609(a), 29.625,
29.777, 29.831(b)(c)(d), 29.907, 29.993, 29.1023(a), 29.1049, 29.1093.
29.1203(a)(b)(d), 29.1301, 29.1327, 29.1381, 29.1385, 29.1389, 29.1391,
29.1393, 29.1395, 29.1431, 29.1435, 29.1523(a)(b), 29.1541, 29.1543(b),
29.1547, 29.1551, 29.1553, at Amdt. 29-0.
(c) 14 CFR 29.955(a)(1) at Amdt. 29-2.
(d) 14 CFR 29.773(a), 29.901, 29.1191(a)(c)(d)(e)(f), at Amdt. 29-
3.
(e) 14 CFR 29.1397 at Amdt. 29-7.
(f) 14 CFR 29.1387 at Amdt 29-9.
(g) 14 CFR part 29.1401 at Amdt. 29-11.
(h) 14 CFR 29.63, 29.939, 29.1165, 29.1322 at Amdt. 29-12.
(i) 14 CFR 29.1145 at Amdt. 29-13.
(j) 14 CFR 29.1335 at Amdt. 29-14.
(k) 14 CFR 29.29, 29.33(a)(1), 29.1353(a)(b), 29.1501, 29.1527,
29.1581(a)(b)(d) at Amdt. 29-15.
(l) 14 CFR 29.1413(a), at Amdt. 29-16.
(m) 14 CFR 29.1091(a)(b), 29.1545 at Amdt. 29-17.
(n) 14 CFR 29.571, 29.1529, 14 CFR part 29 Appendix A at Amdt. 29-
20.
(o) 14 CFR 29.1321, 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B I and IX (a)(b) at
Amdt. 29-21.
(p) 14 CFR 29.853(a)(2)(c) at Amdt. 29-23.
(q) 14 CFR 29.21, 29.45(a)(b)(c)(e)(f), 29.151, 29.672(a),
29.771(a)(b)(c), 29.1303, 29.1325, 29.1331, 29.1333, 29.1355,
29.1357(a)(c)(d)(e)(g), 29.1517, 29.1555(a)(b)(c)(d), 29.1559, 29.1583,
29.1585 at Amdt. 29-24.
(r) 14 CFR 29.1011(d), 29.1041, 29.1043, 29.1045, 29.1047,
29.1141(a)(b)(c)(d)(f)(2), 29.1337(a)(b)(1)(2)(c)(d)(e), 29.1557(c)(2)
at Amdt. 29-26.
(s) 14 CFR 29.337(a), 29.613(d), at Amdt. 29-30.
(t) 14 CFR 29.783(e), 29.903(a)(b)(c)(3)(d)(e) at Amdt. 29-31
(u) 14CFR 29.1143(a)(b)(c)(e)(f), 29.1549 at Amdt. 29-34.
(v) 14 CFR 29.49(a)(b)(c), 29.51, 29.53, 29.55, 29.60, 29.61,
29.64, 29.65(a), 29.75, 29.79, 29.83(a)(b), 29.87(a), at Amdt. 29-39.
(w) 14 CFR 29.1305(a)(3)(4)(6-19)(21-23)(25)(26)(b)(c),
29.1309(a)(b)(2)(c)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h), 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B VIII
(a)(b)(3)(4)(5)(6)(c), at Amdt. 29-40.
(x) 14 CFR
29.1521(a)(b)(1)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(ii)(c)(4)(d)(e)(f)(g)(h)(i)(j) at Amdt.
29-41.
(y) 14 CFR 29.1329(f), 29.1351(a)(b)(3)(4)(6)(d), 29.1359 at Amdt.
29-42.
(z) 14 CFR 29.865(c)(6) at Amdt. 29-43.
(aa) 14 CFR 29.59, 29.62, 29.67, 29.77, 29.81, 29.85,
29.1323(a)(b)(c)(d)(e) at Amdt. 29-44.
(bb) 14 CFR 29.1317(a)(b)(c), 14 CFR part 29 Appendix E at Amdt.
29-49.
(cc) 14 CFR 29.1587 at Amdt. 29-51.
(dd) Equivalent Level of Safety Findings:
(1) 14 CFR 29.1305(a)(11-16) and 29.1549(a)(b)(c)(e) for the Power
Situation Indicator (documented in ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/P-1) dated
January 16, 2013.
(2) 14 CFR 29.1545(b)(2) for Airspeed Indicator (documented in ELOS
Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/F-2) dated September 27, 2012.
(3) 14 CFR 29.1333(a) and 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B VIII(b)(5)(i)
and (ii) for Electronically Integrated Flight Instrument Systems
(documented in ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/S-2) dated January 25, 2013.
(4) 14 CFR 29.1555(c)(1) for the Useable Fuel Capacity Marking
(documented in ELOS Memo No. ST0025RC-RD/P-2) dated December 18, 2012.
(ee) If BHT Kit 412-706-140, Increased Gross Weight, is installed
then compliance has also been shown to 14 CFR 29.25(a)(1)(3)(4) Amend
29-51, 14 CFR part 29 Appendix B III, IV(a)(b)(1)(3)(c)(1)(d)(1)(e)(f),
V, VI, VII at Amend 29-21 and 14 CFR 36.1(c) at Amend 36-14.
Regulatory Basis for Special Conditions
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 29) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Bell Model 412EP helicopter in the
412EPI configuration because of a novel or unusual design feature,
special conditions are prescribed under Sec. 21.16.
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, under
Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under
Sec. 21.101.
[[Page 24460]]
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the TC for that model be amended later to
include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, or should any other model already included on the same
TC be modified to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature,
the special conditions would also apply to the other model.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Bell Model 412EP helicopter in the 412EPI configuration will
incorporate the following novel or unusual design features.
The SAR system is composed of a navigation computer with SAR modes,
an AFCS that provides coupled SAR functions, hoist operator control, a
hover speed reference system, and two radio altimeters. The AFCS
coupled SAR functions include:
(a) Hover hold at selected height above the surface.
(b) Ground speed hold.
(c) Transition down and hover to a waypoint under guidance from the
navigation computer.
(d) SAR pattern, transition down, and hover near a target over
which the helicopter has flown.
(e) Transition up, climb, and capture a cruise height.
(f) Capture and track SAR search patterns generated by the
navigation computer.
(g) Monitor the preselected hover height with automatic increase in
collective if the aircraft height drops below the safe minimum height.
These SAR modes are intended to be used over large bodies of water
in areas clear of obstructions. Further, use of the modes that
transition down from cruise to hover will include operation at
airspeeds below VMINI.
The SAR system only entails navigation, flight control, and coupled
AFCS operation of the helicopter. The system does not include
additional equipment that may be required for over water flight or
external loads to meet other operational requirements.
Applicability
These special conditions apply to the Bell Model 412EP helicopter
in the 412EPI configuration. Should Bell apply at a later date for a
change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating
the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would
apply to that model as well under the provisions of Sec. 21.101(d).
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of helicopter. It is not a rule of general applicability
and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of
these features on the helicopter.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 29
Aircraft, Aviation safety.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701-44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (Bell)
Model 412EP helicopters in the 412EPI configuration when modified by
Bell by installing an optional Search and Rescue (SAR) Automatic Flight
Control System (AFCS).
In addition to the 14 CFR part 29 certification requirements for
Category A and helicopter instrument flight (Appendix B), the following
additional requirements must be met for certification of the SAR AFCS:
(a) SAR Flight Modes. The coupled SAR flight modes must provide:
(1) Safe and controlled flight in the three axes at all airspeeds
(lateral position and speed, longitudinal position and speed, and
height and vertical speed) from the previous VMINI to a
hover (within the maximum demonstrated wind envelope).
(2) Automatic transition to the helicopter instrument flight
(Appendix B) envelope as part of the normal SAR mode sequencing.
(3) A pilot-selectable Go-Around mode that safely interrupts any
other coupled mode and automatically transitions the helicopter to the
instrument flight (Appendix B) envelope.
(4) A means to prevent unintended flight below a safe minimum
height. Pilot-commanded descent below the safe minimum height is
acceptable provided the alerting requirements in paragraph (b)(8)(i) of
these Special Conditions alert the pilot of this descent below safe
minimum height.
(b) SAR Mode System Architecture. To support the integrity of the
SAR modes, the following system architecture is required:
(1) Ground mapping radar function that presents real-time
information to the pilots.
(2) A system for limiting the engine power demanded by the AFCS
when any of the automatic piloting modes are engaged, so full authority
digital engine control power limitations, such as torque and
temperature, are not exceeded.
(3) A system providing the aircraft height above the surface and
final pilot-selected height at a location on the instrument panel in a
position acceptable to the FAA that will make it plainly visible to and
usable by any pilot at their station.
(4) A system providing the aircraft heading and the ability to
automatically hold a pilot-selected heading set by either setting the
reference to the current heading or adjusting the reference left or
right. If the reference setting can change faster than the aircraft
ability to follow, a display of reference heading is required at a
location on the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA
that will make it plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their
station.
(5) A system providing the aircraft longitudinal and lateral hover
velocities and the pilot-selected longitudinal and lateral velocities
when used by the AFCS in the flight envelope where airspeed indications
become unreliable. This information must be presented at a location on
the instrument panel in a position acceptable to the FAA that is
plainly visible to and usable by any pilot at their station.
(6) A system providing wind speed and wind direction when automatic
piloting modes are engaged or transitioning from one mode to another.
(7) A means to monitor for flight guidance deviations and failures
with alerting that enables the flight crew take appropriate corrective
action.
(8) An alerting system that provides visual or aural alerts, or
both, to the flight crew under any of the following conditions:
(i) When the stored or pilot-selected safe minimum height is
reached.
(ii) When a SAR mode system malfunction occurs.
(iii) When the AFCS changes modes automatically from one SAR mode
to another. For normal transitions from one SAR mode to another, a
single visual or aural alert may suffice. For a SAR mode malfunction or
a mode having a time-critical component, the flight crew alerting
system must activate early enough to allow the flight crew to take
timely and appropriate action. The alerting system means must be
designed to alert the flight crew in order to minimize crew errors that
could create an additional hazard.
(9) The SAR system hoist operator control is considered a flight
control with limited authority and must comply with the following:
[[Page 24461]]
(i) The hoist operator control must be designed and located to
provide for convenient operation and to prevent confusion and
inadvertent operation.
(ii) The helicopter must be safely controllable by the hoist
operator control throughout the range of that control.
(iii) The hoist operator control may not interfere with the safe
operation of the helicopter.
(iv) Pilot and copilot flight controls must be able to smoothly
override the control authority of the hoist operator control, without
exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without the
danger of exceeding any other limitation because of the override.
(10) The reliability of the AFCS must be related to the effects of
its failure. The occurrence of any failure condition that would prevent
continued safe flight and landing must be extremely improbable. For any
failure condition of the AFCS which is shown to not be extremely
improbable:
(i) The helicopter must be safely controllable and capable of
continued safe flight without exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or
strength. Additional unrelated probable failures affecting the control
system must be evaluated.
(ii) The AFCS must be designed so that it cannot create a hazardous
deviation in the flight path or produce hazardous loads on the
helicopter during normal operation or in the event of a malfunction or
failure, assuming corrective action begins within an appropriate period
of time. Where multiple systems are installed, subsequent malfunction
conditions must be evaluated in sequence unless their occurrence is
shown to be improbable.
(11) A functional hazard assessment and a system safety assessment
must address the failure conditions associated with SAR operations:
(i) For SAR catastrophic failure conditions, changes may be
required to the following:
(A) System architecture.
(B) Software and complex electronic hardware design assurance
levels.
(C) High Intensity Radiated Field (HIRF) test levels.
(D) Instructions for continued airworthiness.
(ii) The assessments must consider all the systems required for SAR
operations, including the AFCS, all associated AFCS sensors (for
example, radio altimeter), and primary flight displays. Electrical and
electronic systems with SAR catastrophic failure conditions for both
visual flight rules and IFR must comply with the 14 CFR 29.1317(a)(4)
HIRF requirements.
(c) SAR Mode Performance Requirements.
(1) The SAR modes must be demonstrated for the requested flight
envelope, including the following minimum sea-state and wind
conditions:
(i) Sea State: Wave height of 2.5 meters (8.2 feet), considering
both short and long swells.
(ii) Wind: 25 knots headwind; 17 knots for all other azimuths.
(2) The selected hover height and hover velocity must be captured
(including the transition from one captured mode to another captured
mode) accurately and smoothly and not exhibit any significant overshoot
or oscillation.
(3) The minimum use height (MUH) for the SAR modes must be no less
than the maximum loss of height following any single failure or any
combination of failures not shown to be extremely improbable, plus an
additional margin of 15 feet above the surface. MUH is the minimum
height at which any SAR AFCS mode may be engaged.
(4) The SAR mode system must be usable up to the maximum certified
gross weight of the aircraft or to the lower of the following weights:
(i) Maximum emergency flotation weight.
(ii) Maximum hover Out-of-Ground Effect (OGE) weight.
(iii) Maximum demonstrated weight.
(d) Flight Characteristics.
(1) For SAR mode coupled flight below VMINI, at the
maximum demonstrated winds, the helicopter must be able to maintain any
required flight condition and make a smooth transition from any flight
condition to any other flight condition without requiring exceptional
piloting skill, alertness, or strength, and without exceeding the limit
load factor. This requirement also includes aircraft control through
the hoist operator's control.
(2) For coupled flight below the previously established
VMINI, the following stability requirements replace the
stability requirements of paragraph IV, V, and VI of Appendix B to Part
29:
(i) Static Longitudinal Stability: The requirements of Appendix B
to part 29, paragraph IV are not applicable.
(ii) Static Lateral-Directional Stability: The requirements of
Appendix B to part 29, paragraph V are not applicable.
(iii) Dynamic Stability, paragraph VI:
(A) Any oscillation must be damped and any aperiodic response must
not double in amplitude in less than 10 seconds. This requirement must
also be met with degraded upper mode(s) of the AFCS.
(B) After any upset, such as a wind gust, the AFCS must return the
aircraft to the last commanded flight condition within 10 seconds or
less.
(3) With any of the upper modes of the AFCS engaged, the pilot must
be able to manually recover the aircraft and transition to the normal
(Appendix B) IFR flight profile envelope without exceptional skill,
alertness, or strength.
(e) One-Engine Inoperative (OEI) Performance Information.
(1) The following performance information must be provided in the
Rotorcraft Flight Manual Supplement (RFMS):
(i) OEI performance information and emergency procedures, providing
the maximum weight that will provide a minimum clearance of 15 feet
above the surface, following failure of the critical engine in a hover.
The maximum weight must be presented as a function of the hover height
for the temperature and pressure altitude range requested for
certification. The effects of wind must be reflected in the hover
performance information.
(ii) Hover OGE performance with the critical engine inoperative for
OEI continuous and time-limited power ratings for those weights,
altitudes, and temperatures for which certification is requested.
(2) These OEI performance requirements do not replace performance
requirements that may be needed to comply with the airworthiness or
operational standards (14 CFR 29.865 or 14 CFR part 133) for external
loads or human external cargo.
(f) RFMS.
(1) The RFMS must contain, at a minimum:
(i) Limitations necessary for safe operation of the SAR system,
including:
(A) Minimum crew requirements.
(B) Maximum SAR weight.
(C) Engagement criteria for each of the SAR modes to include MUH,
as determined in paragraph (c)(3) of these Special Conditions.
(ii) Normal and emergency procedures for operation of the SAR
system (including operation of the hoist operator control) with AFCS
failure modes, AFCS degraded modes, and engine failures.
(iii) Performance information:
(A) OEI performance and height-loss.
(B) Hover OGE performance information, utilizing OEI continuous and
time-limited power ratings.
(C) The maximum wind envelope demonstrated in flight test.
(D) Information and/or advisory information concerning operations
in a heavy salt spray environment, including any airframe or power
effects as a result of salt encrustation.
[[Page 24462]]
(g) Flight Demonstration.
(1) Before approval of the SAR system, an acceptable flight
demonstration of all coupled SAR modes is required.
(2) The AFCS must provide fail-safe operations during coupled
maneuvers. The demonstration of fail-safe operations must include a
pilot workload assessment associated with manually flying the aircraft
to an altitude greater than 200 feet above the surface and an airspeed
of at least the best rate of climb airspeed (Vy).
(3) For any failure condition of the SAR system shown to not be
extremely improbable, the pilot must be able to make a smooth
transition from one flight mode to another without exceptional piloting
skill, alertness, or strength.
(4) Failure conditions that are shown to not be extremely
improbable must be demonstrated by analysis, ground testing, or flight
testing. For failures demonstrated in flight, the following normal
pilot recovery times are acceptable:
(i) Transition modes (Cruise-to-Hover/Hover-to-Cruise) and Hover
modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 1 second.
(ii) Cruise modes: Normal pilot recognition plus 3 seconds.
(5) All AFCS malfunctions must include evaluation at the low-speed
and high-power flight conditions typical of SAR operations.
Additionally, AFCS hard-over, slow-over, and oscillatory malfunctions,
particularly in yaw, require evaluation. AFCS malfunction testing must
include a single or a combination of failures (such as, erroneous data
from and loss of the radio altimeter, attitude, heading, and altitude
sensors) that are shown to not be extremely improbable.
(6) The flight demonstration must include the following
environmental conditions:
(i) Swell into wind.
(ii) Swell and wind from different directions.
(iii) Cross swell.
(iv) Swell of different lengths (short and long swell).
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on May 19, 2017.
Lance T. Gant
Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2017-11073 Filed 5-26-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P