STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, 21568-21573 [2017-09369]
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 9, 2017 / Notices
In the FR
on April 25, 2017 (82 FR 19095), FR
Doc. 2017–08115, on page 19108, under
Exelon Generation Company, LLC,
Docket No. 50–353, Limerick Generating
Station, Unit 2, Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania, in the third column,
paragraph 4, line 11, ‘‘Amendment No.:
186’’ is corrected to read ‘‘Amendment
No.: 187.’’
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day
of April 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
V. Sreenivas,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch I,
Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2017–09367 Filed 5–8–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50–498 and 50–499; NRC–
2016–0092]
STP Nuclear Operating Company,
South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Environmental assessment and
finding of no significant impact;
issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing an
environmental assessment (EA)
prepared under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) and NRC’s regulations. This EA
summarizes the results of the NRC
staff’s environmental review, which
evaluates the potential environmental
impacts of granting exemptions from
NRC regulations in response to a request
from STP Nuclear Operating Company
(STPNOC, the licensee) for Facility
Operating License Nos. NPF–76 and
NPF–80, for South Texas Project (STP),
Units 1 and 2, respectively, located in
Matagorda County, Texas. The
regulatory exemptions, if granted, allow
STPNOC to change the licensing basis
loss-of-coolant accident analysis
identified in the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report to use a risk-informed
approach to address safety issues
discussed in Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–
191 and to close Generic Letter (GL)
2004–02.
DATES: May 9, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2016–0092 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
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SUMMARY:
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information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2016–0092. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For the
convenience of the reader, the ADAMS
accession numbers are provided in a
table in the ‘‘Availability of Documents’’
section of this document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room 01–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa
Regner, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001; telephone: 301–415–1906, email:
Lisa.Regner@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction and Background
The NRC is considering a request to
grant certain regulatory exemptions for
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–76
and NPF–80, issued to STPNOC for
operation of STP, Units 1 and 2, located
in Matagorda County, Texas, in
accordance with section 50.12,
‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
‘‘Application for amendment of license,
construction permit, or early site
permit.’’ The regulatory exemptions
would allow STPNOC to resolve
concerns associated with GSI–191,
‘‘Assessment of Debris Accumulation on
PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Sump
Performance,’’ and the associated GL
2004–02, ‘‘Potential Impact of Debris
Blockage on Emergency Recirculation
during Design Basis Accidents at
Pressurized-Water Reactors,’’ issued on
September 13, 2004.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, ‘‘Criteria
for and identification of licensing and
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regulatory actions requiring
environmental assessments,’’ the NRC
has prepared an EA summarizing the
findings of its NEPA review of the
proposed action. The NRC concluded
that the proposed action will have no
significant environmental impact.
The NRC published a draft EA on the
proposed action for public comment in
the Federal Register on May 4, 2016
(81 FR 26838) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML16032A387). No comments were
received.
Background
The NRC established GSI–191 to
determine whether the transport and
accumulation of debris from a loss-ofcoolant accident in the PWR
containment structure would impede
the operation of the emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) or containment
spray system (CSS). A loss-of-coolant
accident within the containment
structure is assumed to be caused by a
break in the primary coolant loop
piping. Water discharged from the pipe
break would collect on the containment
structure floor and within the
containment emergency sump. During
this type of accident, the ECCS and CSS
would initially draw cooling water from
the refueling water storage tank.
However, realigning the ECCS pumps to
the containment structure emergency
sump would provide long-term cooling
of the reactor core. Therefore, successful
long-term cooling depends on the ability
of the containment structure emergency
sump to provide adequate flow to the
residual heat removal recirculation
pumps for extended periods of time.
One of the concerns addressed by the
implementation of GSI–191 is that
debris, such as insulation installed on
piping and components, within the
containment structure could be
dislodged by a jet of water and steam
from a loss-of-coolant accident. Water,
along with debris, would accumulate at
the bottom of the containment structure
and flow towards the emergency sump
pumps. Insulation and other fibrous
material could block the emergency
sump screens and suction strainers,
which in turn could prevent the ability
of the containment emergency sump to
provide adequate flow to the residual
heat removal recirculation pumps (for
more information, see NUREG–0897,
‘‘Containment Emergency Sump
Performance’’).
The NRC issued GL 2004–02 to
address this safety concern by
requesting PWR licensees, pursuant to
10 CFR 50.54(f), to use an NRCapproved methodology to perform a
‘‘mechanistic evaluation of the potential
for the adverse effects of post-accident
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debris blockage and operation with
debris-laden fluids to impede or prevent
the recirculation functions of the ECCS
and CSS following all postulated
accidents for which the recirculation of
these systems is required’’ and submit
this information to the NRC for
evaluation.
Subsequent to the issuance of GL
2004–02, the NRC staff identified
another related concern with the
potential for debris to bypass the sump
strainers (even the new strainers) and
enter the reactor core. This safety issue
could result in the build-up of material
on fuel assemblies and at the core inlet,
inhibit heat transfer, and prevent
adequate cooling of the reactor core.
Since 2004, the NRC and industry have
conducted tests to gain more
information on this concern. In 2012,
the NRC staff developed three options
for resolution of GSI–191, which are
discussed in SECY–12–0093, ‘‘Closure
Options for Generic Safety Issue 191,
Assessment of Debris Accumulation on
Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump
Performance,’’ dated July 9, 2012.
The three options for demonstrating
compliance with 10 CFR 50.46,
‘‘Acceptance criteria for emergency core
cooling systems for light-water nuclear
power reactors,’’ and considering the
impact of debris on ECCS and CSS
recirculation, are summarized as
follows.
1. Option 1 allows the use of
approved models and test methods.
2. Option 2 allows the industry to
implement additional mitigating
measures until resolution is completed
and take additional time to resolve
issues through further industry testing
or use of a risk-informed approach. Use
of this option has two alternative
methods, including Option 2B, chosen
by STPNOC, which allows development
of a risk-informed approach to quantify
the risk associated with this generic
issue and submit a request to the NRC
for a license amendment.
3. Option 3 allows the industry to
separate the regulatory treatment of the
sump strainer and in-vessel effects. The
ECCS strainers will be evaluated using
currently approved models, while invessel effects will be addressed using a
risk-informed approach.
The STPNOC proposed to use Option
2 to demonstrate compliance with 10
CFR 50.46, and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix A, General Design Criterion
(GDC) 35, ‘‘Emergency core cooling,’’
GDC 38, ‘‘Containment heat removal,’’
and GDC 41, ‘‘Containment atmosphere
cleanup,’’ and to resolve GSI–191 for
STP. The licensee proposed to use both
a deterministic method, with plantspecific testing, and a risk-informed
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approach. Because, historically, the
NRC staff has not allowed licensees to
use a risk-informed approach to show
compliance with the requirements of 10
CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41,
STPNOC requested exemptions from 10
CFR 50.46(a)(1) and the aforementioned
GDCs, to allow the use of a riskinformed approach to resolve GSI–191.
If approved, the proposed action would
not authorize any modifications within
the containment structure, physical
changes to the ECCS, or other
modifications to the plant. Rather, the
proposed action would only allow the
use of an alternate methodology to show
compliance with the regulations that
require ECCS and CSS function during
certain loss-of-coolant accident events.
II. Environmental Assessment
Description of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is to amend
Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–76
and NPF–80 for STP, Units 1 and 2, and
to grant regulatory exemptions
requested by STPNOC. The regulatory
exemptions would allow STPNOC to
change the licensing basis loss-ofcoolant accident analysis identified in
the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report to use a risk-informed approach
to address safety issues discussed in
GSI–191 and to close GL 2004–02. If
approved, no physical modifications to
the nuclear plant or changes to reactor
operations involving the ECCS would be
required. The proposed action is in
response to the licensee’s application
dated June 19, 2013, and supplemented
by letters dated August 20, 2015, and
April 13, 2016.
Need for the Proposed Action
As the holder of Facility Operating
License Nos. NPF–76 and NPF–80,
STPNOC is expected to address the
safety issues discussed in GSI–191 and
to close GL 2004–02 with respect to
STP, Units 1 and 2. Consistent with
SECY–12–0093, STPNOC chose an
approach to use a risk-informed
methodology. Since the NRC staff’s
position has long held that only
deterministic or bounding calculations
be used to show compliance with 10
CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the
STPNOC has requested that the NRC
grant certain regulatory exemptions for
STP, Units 1 and 2.
Special Circumstances
The NRC staff determined that special
circumstances under 10 CFR 51.21 exist
to prepare an EA for the proposed action
because STP is the pilot plant to
propose a risk-informed approach to
resolve GSI–191 as recognized in Staff
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Requirement Memorandum SECY 12–
0093, ‘‘Closure Options for Generic
Safety Issue—191, Assessment of Debris
Accumulation on Pressurized-Water
Reactor Sump Performance,’’ dated
December 14, 2012. Because this is the
first NRC review of the use of a riskinformed, instead of a deterministic,
approach to determine that the ECCS
and CSS structures, systems, and
components will provide adequate
cooling for the reactor core and
containment during design-basis
accidents in accordance with 10 CFR
50.46 and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the NRC
staff considered the issuance of an EA
to be a prudent course of action that
would further the purposes of NEPA.
Plant Site and Environs
The STP is located on approximately
12,220 acres (4,945 hectares) in rural
and sparsely populated Matagorda
County, Texas, approximately 70 miles
(mi) [110 kilometers (km)] southsouthwest of Houston. Nearby
communities include Matagorda,
approximately 8 mi (13 km) south of the
site; the City of Palacios, 11 mi (18 km)
west of the site; and Bay City, 13 mi (21
km) north of the site.
The STP power plant consists of two
four-loop Westinghouse PWR units. The
reactor core of each unit heats water,
which is pumped to four steam
generators, where the heated water is
converted to steam. The steam is then
used to turn turbines, which are
connected to electrical generators that
produce electricity. A simplified
drawing of a PWR can be viewed at
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html.
The reactor, steam generators, and
other components are housed in a
concrete and steel containment
structure (building). The containment
structure is a reinforced concrete
cylinder with a concrete slab base and
hemispherical dome. A welded steel
liner is attached to the inside face of the
concrete shell to ensure a high degree of
leak tightness. In addition, the 4-foot
(1.2-meter)-thick concrete walls of the
containment structure serve as a
radiation shield. Additional information
on the plant structures and systems, as
well as the environmental impact
statement for license renewal, can be
found in NUREG–1437, Supplement 48,
‘‘Generic Environmental Impact
Statement for License Renewal of
Nuclear Plants: Supplement 48
Regarding South Texas Project, Units 1
and 2.’’
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed
Action
Radiological and non-radiological
impacts on the environment that may
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result from granting the regulatory
exemptions are summarized in the
following sections.
Radiological Impacts
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid
Effluents and Solid Waste
The STP uses waste treatment systems
to collect, process, recycle, and dispose
of gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes that
contain radioactive material in a safe
and controlled manner within NRC and
Environmental Protection Agency
radiation safety standards. Granting the
regulatory exemptions will not result in
any physical changes to the nuclear
plant or reactor operations that would
affect the types and quantities of
radioactive material generated during
plant operations; therefore, there will be
no changes to the plant radioactive
waste treatment systems. A detailed
description of the STP radioactive waste
handling and disposal activities is
contained in Chapter 2.1.2 of
Supplement 48 to NUREG–1437.
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Radioactive Gaseous Effluents
The objectives of the STP gaseous
waste management system (GWMS) are
to process and control the release of
radioactive gaseous effluents into the
environment to be within the
requirements of 10 CFR 20.1301, ‘‘Dose
limits for individual members of the
public,’’ and to be consistent with the as
low as is reasonably achievable
(ALARA) dose objectives set forth in
appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. The
GWMS is designed so that radiation
exposure to plant workers is within the
dose limits in 10 CFR 20.1201,
‘‘Occupational dose limits for adults.’’
Granting the regulatory exemptions
will not result in any physical changes
to the nuclear plant or reactor
operations; therefore, there will be no
changes to the GWMS. The existing
equipment and plant procedures that
control radioactive releases to the
environment will continue to be used to
maintain radioactive gaseous releases
within the dose limits of 10 CFR
20.1301 and the ALARA dose objectives
in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50.
Radioactive Liquid Effluents
The function of the STP liquid waste
processing system (LWPS) is to collect
and process radioactive liquid wastes to
reduce radioactivity and chemical
concentrations to levels acceptable for
discharge to the environment or to
recycle the liquids for use in plant
systems. The principal objectives of the
LWPS are to collect liquid wastes that
may contain radioactive material and to
maintain sufficient processing
capability so that liquid waste may be
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discharged to the environment below
the regulatory limits of 10 CFR 20.1301
and consistent with the ALARA dose
objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part
50. The waste is routed through a
monitor that measures the radioactivity
and can automatically terminate the
release in the event radioactivity
exceeds predetermined levels. The
liquid waste is discharged into the main
cooling reservoir. The entire main
cooling reservoir is within the STP site
boundary and the public is prohibited
from access to the area.
Granting the regulatory exemptions
will not result in any physical changes
to the nuclear plant or reactor
operations; therefore, there will be no
changes to the LWPS. The existing
equipment and plant procedures that
control radioactive releases to the
environment will continue to be used to
maintain radioactive liquid releases
within the dose limits of 10 CFR
20.1301 and the ALARA dose objectives
in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50.
Radioactive Solid Wastes
The function of the STP solid waste
processing system (SWPS) is to process,
package, and store the solid radioactive
wastes generated by nuclear plant
operations until they are shipped off site
to a vendor for further processing or for
permanent disposal at a licensed burial
facility, or both. The storage areas have
restricted access and shielding to reduce
radiation rates to plant workers. The
principal objectives of the SWPS are to
package and transport the waste in
compliance with NRC regulations in 10
CFR part 61, ‘‘Licensing Requirements
for Land Disposal of Radioactive
Waste,’’ and 10 CFR part 71, ‘‘Packaging
and Transportation of Radioactive
Material,’’ and the U.S. Department of
Transportation regulations in 49 CFR
parts 170 through 179; and to maintain
the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1201, 10
CFR 20.1301, and appendix I to 10 CFR
part 50.
Granting the regulatory exemptions
will not result in any physical changes
to the nuclear plant or reactor
operations; therefore, the waste can be
handled by the SWPS without
modification. The existing equipment
and plant procedures that control
radioactive solid waste handling will
continue to be used to maintain
exposures within the dose limits of 10
CFR 20.1201, 10 CFR 20.1301, and 10
CFR part 50, appendix I.
Occupational Radiation Doses
The proposed action of granting the
regulatory exemptions will not result in
any physical changes being made to the
nuclear plant or reactor operations;
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therefore, there will be no change to any
in-plant radiation sources. The
licensee’s radiation protection program
monitors radiation levels throughout the
nuclear plant to establish appropriate
work controls, training, temporary
shielding, and protective equipment
requirements so that worker doses will
remain within the dose limits of 10 CFR
part 20, subpart C, ‘‘Occupational Dose
Limits.’’ Granting the regulatory
exemptions will not change radiation
levels within the nuclear plant and,
therefore, will have no increased
radiological impact to the workers.
Offsite Radiation Dose
The primary sources of offsite dose to
members of the public from the STP are
radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents.
As discussed previously, there will be
no change to the operation of the STP
radioactive gaseous and liquid waste
management systems or the ability to
perform their intended functions. Also,
there will be no change to the STP
radiation monitoring system and
procedures used to control the release of
radioactive effluents in accordance with
radiation protection standards in 10
CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR 190,
‘‘Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Nuclear Power
Operations,’’ and the ALARA dose
objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part
50.
Based on the previous statements, the
offsite radiation dose to members of the
public would not change and would
continue to be within regulatory limits,
and, therefore, granting the regulatory
exemptions will not change offsite dose
levels and, consequently, the health
effects of the proposed action will not
be significant.
Design-Basis Accidents
Design-basis accidents at STP, Units 1
and 2, are evaluated by both the licensee
and the NRC to ensure that the units can
withstand the spectrum of postulated
accidents without undue hazard to the
public health and safety and the
protection of the environment.
Separate from its environmental
review in this EA, the NRC staff is
evaluating the licensee’s technical and
safety analyses provided in support of
the proposed action of granting the
exemption requests to ensure that,
following the proposed action, the
licensee will continue to meet the NRC
regulatory requirements for safe
operation. The results and conclusion of
the NRC staff’s safety review will be
documented in a publicly available
safety evaluation. If the NRC staff
concludes in this safety evaluation that
taking the proposed action will (1)
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provide reasonable assurance that the
health and safety of the public will not
be endangered by operation in the
proposed manner, (2) provide
reasonable assurance that such activities
will be conducted in compliance with
the Commission’s regulations, and (3)
not be inimical to the common defense
and security or to the health and safety
of the public, then the proposed action
will also not have a significant
environmental impact. The NRC will
not take the proposed action absent
such a safety conclusion.
Radiological Cumulative Impacts
The radiological dose limits for
protection of the public and plant
workers have been developed by the
NRC and the Environmental Protection
Agency to address the cumulative
impact of acute and long-term exposure
to radiation and radioactive material.
These dose limits are codified in 10 CFR
part 20, ‘‘Standards for Protection
Against Radiation,’’ and 40 CFR part
190.
Cumulative radiation doses are
required to be within the limits set forth
in the regulations cited in the previous
paragraph. Granting the exemptions will
not require any physical changes to the
plant or plant activities, there will not
be changes to in-plant radiation sources,
and offsite radiation dose to members of
the public will not change. Therefore,
the NRC staff concludes that there
would not be a significant cumulative
radiological impact from the proposed
action.
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Radiological Impacts Summary
Based on these radiological
evaluations, the proposed action of
granting the exemptions would not
result in any significant radiological
impacts. Therefore, if the NRC staff
concludes in its separate safety
evaluation that taking the proposed
action will (1) provide reasonable
assurance that the health and safety of
the public will not be endangered by
operation in the proposed manner, (2)
provide reasonable assurance that such
activities will be conducted in
compliance with the Commission’s
regulations, and (3) not be inimical to
the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public, then
the proposed action will not have a
significant radiological impact.
Non-Radiological Impacts
No physical modifications to the
nuclear plant or changes to reactor
operations involving the ECCS would be
required if the NRC were to grant the
regulatory exemptions. Also, no
physical changes would be made to
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other structures or land use within the
STP site. Non-radiological liquid
effluents or gaseous emissions would
not change and therefore environmental
conditions at the STP site also would
not change. In addition, granting the
regulatory exemptions would not result
in changes to the use of resources (e.g.,
visual, terrestrial, or aquatic) or cause
any new environmental impacts (e.g.,
noise). Further, granting the regulatory
exemptions does not change the
operation of the reactor, the heat load
dissipated to the environment, or the
amount of non-radiological waste.
Therefore, there would be no nonradiological environmental impacts to
any resource or any irreversible and
irretrievable commitments of resources.
Non-Radiological Cumulative Impacts
Since granting the regulatory
exemptions would not result in
environmental effects, there would be
no cumulative impact.
Environmental Impacts of the
Alternatives to the Proposed Action
As discussed earlier, licensees have
options in responding to GL 2004–02
and demonstrating compliance with 10
CFR 50.46 considering the impacts of
debris on the emergency core cooling
system. Consistent with these options
and as an alternative to the proposed
action, the licensee could choose to not
pursue exemptions (Options 1 and 3).
Depending on the results of its analysis,
the licensee would instead remove
fibrous insulation to reduce the debris
loading and the potential for clogging
the containment sumps, and would
replace insulation within the reactor
containment building. This alternative
would involve the physical removal and
disposal of significant amounts of
insulation from a radiation area within
the reactor containment building and
replacement with insulation less likely
to impact sump performance. This
would be considered the ‘‘no action
alternative’’ in that it would not require
exemptions (actions) from the NRC.
Removal of the existing insulation
from the containment building would
generate radiologically contaminated
waste. The STPNOC estimated that
4,620 cubic feet of insulation would be
removed and stored onsite until
disposal. The old insulation would
require special handling and packaging
so that it could be safely transported
from the STP site. The licensee’s
existing low-level radioactive and
hazardous waste handling and disposal
activities would likely be used to
process and store this waste material.
The old insulation would then be
transported to a low-level radioactive or
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hazardous waste disposal site. Energy
(fuel) would be expended to transport
the insulation and land would be
expended at the disposal site.
The removal of the old insulation and
installation of the new insulation would
expose workers to radiation. In its
application, STPNOC estimates that this
would result in an additional collective
radiation exposure of 158–176 personroentgen equivalent man (rem) over its
baseline collective radiation exposure.
The NRC staff reviewed NUREG–0713,
Volume 34, ‘‘Occupational Radiation
Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power
Reactors and Other Facilities 2012:
Forty-Fifth Annual Report,’’ and
determined that STPNOC’s average
baseline collective radiation exposure is
approximately 90 person-rem. This
additional 158–176 person-rem
collective exposure would be shared
across the entire work force involved
with removing and reinstalling
insulation.
In SECY–12–0093, the NRC staff
attempted to develop a total
occupational dose estimate for the work
involved in insulation removal and
replacement associated with GSI–191.
Due to uncertainties in the scope of
work required to remove and replace
insulation at a specific nuclear plant
and other site-specific factors such as
source term and hazardous materials,
the NRC staff was unable to estimate the
total occupational dose associated with
this work. However, dose estimates
were provided by the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI) in a letter to the NRC
dated March 30, 2012, based on
information collected on occupational
radiation exposures that have been, or
could be, incurred during insulation
removal and replacement. In the letter,
NEI noted similar difficulties to those
experienced by the NRC staff in
estimating the potential amount of
radiation exposure, but provided a ‘‘per
unit’’ estimate of between 80 to 525
person-rem. The NRC staff ultimately
concluded that the NEI estimates were
reasonable given the uncertainties in the
scope of work and other nuclear plant
site-specific factors such as source term
and hazardous materials. Therefore,
since STPNOC’s estimate of radiation
exposure for insulation removal and
replacement is within the NEI estimated
range, the NRC staff considers
STPNOC’s estimate of an increase of
158–176 person-rem over the baseline
exposure to be reasonable.
As stated in the ‘‘Occupational
Radiation Doses’’ section of this
document, STPNOC’s radiation
protection program monitors radiation
levels throughout the nuclear plant to
establish appropriate work controls,
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 9, 2017 / Notices
training, temporary shielding, and
protective equipment requirements so
that worker doses are expected to
remain within the dose limits of 10 CFR
20.1201.
In addition, as stated in the ‘‘Offsite
Radiation Dose’’ section of this
document, STPNOC also has a radiation
monitoring system and procedures in
place to control the release of
radioactive effluents in accordance with
radiation protection standards in 10
CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR part 190, and the
ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to
10 CFR part 50. Therefore, radiation
exposure to members of the public
would not be significant and would be
maintained within the NRC dose criteria
in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR part 190, and
the ALARA dose objectives of appendix
I to 10 CFR part 50.
Based on this information, impacts to
members of the public from removing
and replacing insulation within the
reactor containment building would not
be significant. However, impacts to
plant workers and the environment from
implementing this alternative would be
greater than implementing the proposed
action.
Alternative Use of Resources
The proposed action would not
involve the use of any different
resources (e.g., water, air, land, nuclear
fuel) not previously considered in
NUREG–1437, Supplement 48.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy,
on May 1, 2017, the NRC staff consulted
with the Texas State official, Mr. Robert
Free, regarding the final environmental
impact of the proposed action. The state
official had no comments on the final
EA and finding of no significant impact.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact
The NRC is considering STPNOC’s
requests to amend Facility Operating
License Nos. NPF–76 and NPF–80 for
STP, Units 1 and 2, and to grant
exemptions for STP, Units 1 and 2, from
certain requirements of 10 CFR
50.46(a)(1), and 10 CFR part 50,
appendix A, GDCs 35, 38, and 41.
This proposed action would not result
in changes to radioactive effluents or
emissions to nuclear plant workers and
members of the public or any changes
to radiological and non-radiological
impacts to the environment. On the
basis of the EA included in Section II of
this notice and incorporated by
reference in this finding, the NRC staff
finds that the proposed action will not
have a significant effect on the quality
of the human environment. The NRC
staff’s evaluation considered the
information provided in the licensee’s
application as supplement, and the NRC
staff’s review of related environmental
documents. Section IV below lists the
environmental documents related to the
proposed action and includes
information on the availability of the
documents. Accordingly, the NRC has
determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the
proposed action.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the
following table are available for public
inspection through the NRC’s
Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) or by
using one of the methods discussed in
Section I.A, ‘‘Obtaining Information,’’ of
this document.
Title
Date
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NUREG–0897, Containment Emergency Sump Performance: Technical Findings Related to Unresolved
Safety Issue A–43, Revision 1.
NRC Generic Letter 2004–02, Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-Water Reactors.
NEI letter to NRC, Nuclear Energy Institute, GSI–191 Dose Estimates ...........................................................
Commission SECY–12–0093, Closure Options for Generic Safety Issue–191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance.
Commission SRM–SECY–12–0093, Staff Requirements—SECY–12–0093—Closure Options for Generic
Safety Issue–191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance.
STPNOC letter to NRC, STP Pilot Submittal and Request for Exemption for a Risk-Informed Approach to
Resolve Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–191.
NRC letter to STPNOC, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2—Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Re: Request for Exemption for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolve Generic Safety Issue 191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised STP Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Corrections to Information Provided in Revised STP Pilot Submittal and Requests
for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety
Issue (GSI)–191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal of GSI–191 Chemical Effects Test Reports ...............................................
STPNOC letter to NRC, Supplement 1 to Revised STP Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and
License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Supplement 1 to Revised STP Pilot Submittal for a Risk-Informed Approach to Resolving Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–191 to Supersede and Replace the Revised Pilot Submittal.
NUREG–1437, Supplement 48, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear
Plants: Supplement 48 Regarding South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2: Final Report.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to STP–GSI–191 EMCB–RAI–1 ................................................................
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to NRC Request for Reference Document For STP Risk-Informed GSI–
191 Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to NRC Accident Dose Branch Request for Additional Information .........
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information re Use of RELAP5 in Analyses for
Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal of CASA Grande Code and Analyses for STP’s Risk-Informed GSI–191
Licensing Application.
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ADAMS
Accession No.
10/1985
ML112440046
9/13/2004
ML042360586
03/30/2012
07/09/2012
12/14/2012
ML12095A319
ML121320270
(package)
ML12349A378
01/31/2013
ML13043A013
04/01/2013
ML13066A519
06/19/2013
ML131750250
(package)
ML13295A222
10/03/2013
10/31/2013
11/21/2013
ML13323A673
(package)
ML13323A128
(package)
ML13338A165
11/2013
ML13322A890
12/23/2013
12/23/2013
ML14015A312
ML14015A311
03/17/2014
ML14086A383
(package)
ML14029A533
11/13/2013
01/09/2014
02/13/2014
ML14052A110
(package, portions redacted)
Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 88 / Tuesday, May 9, 2017 / Notices
Title
Date
21573
ADAMS
Accession No.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal of GSI–191 Chemical Effects Test Reports ...............................................
02/27/2014
NRC Letter to STPNOC, Request for Additional Information, Round 1 ............................................................
NUREG–0713, Volume 34, Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors and
Other Facilities 2012: Forty-Fifth Annual Report.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second Submittal of CASA Grande Source Code for STP’s Risk-Informed GSI–
191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSl–191 Licensing Application—Revised.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second Set of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April, 2014, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request for Additional Information, Round 2 .............................................................
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal of Updated CASA Grande Input for STP’s Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Description of Revised Risk-Informed Methodology and Responses to Round 2
Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Supplement 2 to STP Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License
Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Address Generic Safety Issue (GSI)–191 and Respond to
Generic Letter (GL) 2004–02.
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request for Additional Information, Round 3 (without Risk) ......................................
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request of Additional Information, Round 3 (Risk) ....................................................
STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSl–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Applicability of Application Supplement 1 Correspondence to Supplement 2 Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information
Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part A.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part B.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part C.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part D.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set of Responses to April 11, 2016, Requests for Additional Information Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application—Part E.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Supplement 3 to Revised Pilot Submittal and Requests for Exemptions and License Amendment for a Risk-Informed Approach to Address Generic Safety Issue (GSl)–191 and Respond to Generic Letter (GL) 2004–02.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Sensitivity Studies for
STPNOC Risk-Informed Pilot GSl–191 Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised Applicability Matrix for Response to Request for Additional Information
Questions APLA–1a and APLA–1b Regarding STP Risk-Informed GSl–191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response to Request for Additional Information on Revised Applicability Matrix for
Questions Regarding Risk-Informed GSI–191 Licensing Application.
04/15/2014
04/2014
ML14072A075
(package)
ML14087A075
ML14126A597
05/15/2014
ML14149A354
05/22/2014
07/15/2014
ML14149A439
(package)
ML14178A467
(package)
ML14202A045
03/03/2015
03/10/2015
ML14357A171
ML15072A092
03/25/2015
ML15091A440
08/20/2015
ML15246A125
(package)
04/11/2016
05/26/2016
05/11/2016
ML16082A507
ML16125A290
ML16154A117
06/09/2016
ML16176A148
06/16/2016
ML16196A241
07/18/2016
ML16209A226
07/21/2016
ML16229A189
07/21/2016
ML16230A232
07/28/2016
ML16221A393
09/12/2016
ML16272A162
10/20/2016
ML16302A015
11/9/2016
ML16321A407
12/7/2016
ML16365A006
01/19/2017
ML17025A123
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day
of May, 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert J. Pascarelli,
Chief, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division
of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2017–09369 Filed 5–8–17; 8:45 am]
mstockstill on DSK30JT082PROD with NOTICES
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
[Release No. 34–80584; File No. SR–
NYSEArca–2017–44]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE
Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed
Rule Change To List and Trade Shares
of the IQ Municipal Insured ETF; IQ
Municipal Short Duration ETF; and IQ
Municipal Intermediate ETF Under
NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.600
06/25/2014
(‘‘Act’’) 2 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,3
notice is hereby given that, on April 20,
2017, NYSE Arca, Inc. (‘‘Exchange’’ or
‘‘NYSE Arca’’) filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) the proposed rule
change as described in Items I and II
below, which Items have been prepared
by the self-regulatory organization. The
Commission is publishing this notice to
solicit comments on the proposed rule
change from interested persons.
May 3, 2017.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) 1 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
2 15
1 15
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CFR 240.19b–4.
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 88 (Tuesday, May 9, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21568-21573]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-09369]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-498 and 50-499; NRC-2016-0092]
STP Nuclear Operating Company, South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact;
issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
environmental assessment (EA) prepared under the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) and NRC's regulations. This EA summarizes the
results of the NRC staff's environmental review, which evaluates the
potential environmental impacts of granting exemptions from NRC
regulations in response to a request from STP Nuclear Operating Company
(STPNOC, the licensee) for Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and
NPF-80, for South Texas Project (STP), Units 1 and 2, respectively,
located in Matagorda County, Texas. The regulatory exemptions, if
granted, allow STPNOC to change the licensing basis loss-of-coolant
accident analysis identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report to use a risk-informed approach to address safety issues
discussed in Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191 and to close Generic Letter
(GL) 2004-02.
DATES: May 9, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0092 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0092. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For
the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided
in a table in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room 01-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa Regner, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-1906, email: Lisa.Regner@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction and Background
The NRC is considering a request to grant certain regulatory
exemptions for Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80,
issued to STPNOC for operation of STP, Units 1 and 2, located in
Matagorda County, Texas, in accordance with section 50.12, ``Specific
exemptions,'' of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
``Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early
site permit.'' The regulatory exemptions would allow STPNOC to resolve
concerns associated with GSI-191, ``Assessment of Debris Accumulation
on PWR [Pressurized-Water Reactor] Sump Performance,'' and the
associated GL 2004-02, ``Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on
Emergency Recirculation during Design Basis Accidents at Pressurized-
Water Reactors,'' issued on September 13, 2004.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.21, ``Criteria for and identification of
licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental assessments,''
the NRC has prepared an EA summarizing the findings of its NEPA review
of the proposed action. The NRC concluded that the proposed action will
have no significant environmental impact.
The NRC published a draft EA on the proposed action for public
comment in the Federal Register on May 4, 2016 (81 FR 26838) (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16032A387). No comments were received.
Background
The NRC established GSI-191 to determine whether the transport and
accumulation of debris from a loss-of-coolant accident in the PWR
containment structure would impede the operation of the emergency core
cooling system (ECCS) or containment spray system (CSS). A loss-of-
coolant accident within the containment structure is assumed to be
caused by a break in the primary coolant loop piping. Water discharged
from the pipe break would collect on the containment structure floor
and within the containment emergency sump. During this type of
accident, the ECCS and CSS would initially draw cooling water from the
refueling water storage tank. However, realigning the ECCS pumps to the
containment structure emergency sump would provide long-term cooling of
the reactor core. Therefore, successful long-term cooling depends on
the ability of the containment structure emergency sump to provide
adequate flow to the residual heat removal recirculation pumps for
extended periods of time.
One of the concerns addressed by the implementation of GSI-191 is
that debris, such as insulation installed on piping and components,
within the containment structure could be dislodged by a jet of water
and steam from a loss-of-coolant accident. Water, along with debris,
would accumulate at the bottom of the containment structure and flow
towards the emergency sump pumps. Insulation and other fibrous material
could block the emergency sump screens and suction strainers, which in
turn could prevent the ability of the containment emergency sump to
provide adequate flow to the residual heat removal recirculation pumps
(for more information, see NUREG-0897, ``Containment Emergency Sump
Performance'').
The NRC issued GL 2004-02 to address this safety concern by
requesting PWR licensees, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), to use an NRC-
approved methodology to perform a ``mechanistic evaluation of the
potential for the adverse effects of post-accident
[[Page 21569]]
debris blockage and operation with debris-laden fluids to impede or
prevent the recirculation functions of the ECCS and CSS following all
postulated accidents for which the recirculation of these systems is
required'' and submit this information to the NRC for evaluation.
Subsequent to the issuance of GL 2004-02, the NRC staff identified
another related concern with the potential for debris to bypass the
sump strainers (even the new strainers) and enter the reactor core.
This safety issue could result in the build-up of material on fuel
assemblies and at the core inlet, inhibit heat transfer, and prevent
adequate cooling of the reactor core. Since 2004, the NRC and industry
have conducted tests to gain more information on this concern. In 2012,
the NRC staff developed three options for resolution of GSI-191, which
are discussed in SECY-12-0093, ``Closure Options for Generic Safety
Issue 191, Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized-Water
Reactor Sump Performance,'' dated July 9, 2012.
The three options for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.46,
``Acceptance criteria for emergency core cooling systems for light-
water nuclear power reactors,'' and considering the impact of debris on
ECCS and CSS recirculation, are summarized as follows.
1. Option 1 allows the use of approved models and test methods.
2. Option 2 allows the industry to implement additional mitigating
measures until resolution is completed and take additional time to
resolve issues through further industry testing or use of a risk-
informed approach. Use of this option has two alternative methods,
including Option 2B, chosen by STPNOC, which allows development of a
risk-informed approach to quantify the risk associated with this
generic issue and submit a request to the NRC for a license amendment.
3. Option 3 allows the industry to separate the regulatory
treatment of the sump strainer and in-vessel effects. The ECCS
strainers will be evaluated using currently approved models, while in-
vessel effects will be addressed using a risk-informed approach.
The STPNOC proposed to use Option 2 to demonstrate compliance with
10 CFR 50.46, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, General Design Criterion
(GDC) 35, ``Emergency core cooling,'' GDC 38, ``Containment heat
removal,'' and GDC 41, ``Containment atmosphere cleanup,'' and to
resolve GSI-191 for STP. The licensee proposed to use both a
deterministic method, with plant-specific testing, and a risk-informed
approach. Because, historically, the NRC staff has not allowed
licensees to use a risk-informed approach to show compliance with the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, STPNOC requested
exemptions from 10 CFR 50.46(a)(1) and the aforementioned GDCs, to
allow the use of a risk-informed approach to resolve GSI-191. If
approved, the proposed action would not authorize any modifications
within the containment structure, physical changes to the ECCS, or
other modifications to the plant. Rather, the proposed action would
only allow the use of an alternate methodology to show compliance with
the regulations that require ECCS and CSS function during certain loss-
of-coolant accident events.
II. Environmental Assessment
Description of the Proposed Action
The proposed action is to amend Facility Operating License Nos.
NPF-76 and NPF-80 for STP, Units 1 and 2, and to grant regulatory
exemptions requested by STPNOC. The regulatory exemptions would allow
STPNOC to change the licensing basis loss-of-coolant accident analysis
identified in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to use a risk-
informed approach to address safety issues discussed in GSI-191 and to
close GL 2004-02. If approved, no physical modifications to the nuclear
plant or changes to reactor operations involving the ECCS would be
required. The proposed action is in response to the licensee's
application dated June 19, 2013, and supplemented by letters dated
August 20, 2015, and April 13, 2016.
Need for the Proposed Action
As the holder of Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80,
STPNOC is expected to address the safety issues discussed in GSI-191
and to close GL 2004-02 with respect to STP, Units 1 and 2. Consistent
with SECY-12-0093, STPNOC chose an approach to use a risk-informed
methodology. Since the NRC staff's position has long held that only
deterministic or bounding calculations be used to show compliance with
10 CFR 50.46, and GDCs 35, 38, and 41, the STPNOC has requested that
the NRC grant certain regulatory exemptions for STP, Units 1 and 2.
Special Circumstances
The NRC staff determined that special circumstances under 10 CFR
51.21 exist to prepare an EA for the proposed action because STP is the
pilot plant to propose a risk-informed approach to resolve GSI-191 as
recognized in Staff Requirement Memorandum SECY 12-0093, ``Closure
Options for Generic Safety Issue--191, Assessment of Debris
Accumulation on Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump Performance,'' dated
December 14, 2012. Because this is the first NRC review of the use of a
risk-informed, instead of a deterministic, approach to determine that
the ECCS and CSS structures, systems, and components will provide
adequate cooling for the reactor core and containment during design-
basis accidents in accordance with 10 CFR 50.46 and GDCs 35, 38, and
41, the NRC staff considered the issuance of an EA to be a prudent
course of action that would further the purposes of NEPA.
Plant Site and Environs
The STP is located on approximately 12,220 acres (4,945 hectares)
in rural and sparsely populated Matagorda County, Texas, approximately
70 miles (mi) [110 kilometers (km)] south-southwest of Houston. Nearby
communities include Matagorda, approximately 8 mi (13 km) south of the
site; the City of Palacios, 11 mi (18 km) west of the site; and Bay
City, 13 mi (21 km) north of the site.
The STP power plant consists of two four-loop Westinghouse PWR
units. The reactor core of each unit heats water, which is pumped to
four steam generators, where the heated water is converted to steam.
The steam is then used to turn turbines, which are connected to
electrical generators that produce electricity. A simplified drawing of
a PWR can be viewed at https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/pwrs.html.
The reactor, steam generators, and other components are housed in a
concrete and steel containment structure (building). The containment
structure is a reinforced concrete cylinder with a concrete slab base
and hemispherical dome. A welded steel liner is attached to the inside
face of the concrete shell to ensure a high degree of leak tightness.
In addition, the 4-foot (1.2-meter)-thick concrete walls of the
containment structure serve as a radiation shield. Additional
information on the plant structures and systems, as well as the
environmental impact statement for license renewal, can be found in
NUREG-1437, Supplement 48, ``Generic Environmental Impact Statement for
License Renewal of Nuclear Plants: Supplement 48 Regarding South Texas
Project, Units 1 and 2.''
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed Action
Radiological and non-radiological impacts on the environment that
may
[[Page 21570]]
result from granting the regulatory exemptions are summarized in the
following sections.
Radiological Impacts
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluents and Solid Waste
The STP uses waste treatment systems to collect, process, recycle,
and dispose of gaseous, liquid, and solid wastes that contain
radioactive material in a safe and controlled manner within NRC and
Environmental Protection Agency radiation safety standards. Granting
the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical changes to
the nuclear plant or reactor operations that would affect the types and
quantities of radioactive material generated during plant operations;
therefore, there will be no changes to the plant radioactive waste
treatment systems. A detailed description of the STP radioactive waste
handling and disposal activities is contained in Chapter 2.1.2 of
Supplement 48 to NUREG-1437.
Radioactive Gaseous Effluents
The objectives of the STP gaseous waste management system (GWMS)
are to process and control the release of radioactive gaseous effluents
into the environment to be within the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1301,
``Dose limits for individual members of the public,'' and to be
consistent with the as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) dose
objectives set forth in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. The GWMS is
designed so that radiation exposure to plant workers is within the dose
limits in 10 CFR 20.1201, ``Occupational dose limits for adults.''
Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical
changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, there
will be no changes to the GWMS. The existing equipment and plant
procedures that control radioactive releases to the environment will
continue to be used to maintain radioactive gaseous releases within the
dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1301 and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix
I to 10 CFR part 50.
Radioactive Liquid Effluents
The function of the STP liquid waste processing system (LWPS) is to
collect and process radioactive liquid wastes to reduce radioactivity
and chemical concentrations to levels acceptable for discharge to the
environment or to recycle the liquids for use in plant systems. The
principal objectives of the LWPS are to collect liquid wastes that may
contain radioactive material and to maintain sufficient processing
capability so that liquid waste may be discharged to the environment
below the regulatory limits of 10 CFR 20.1301 and consistent with the
ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50. The waste is
routed through a monitor that measures the radioactivity and can
automatically terminate the release in the event radioactivity exceeds
predetermined levels. The liquid waste is discharged into the main
cooling reservoir. The entire main cooling reservoir is within the STP
site boundary and the public is prohibited from access to the area.
Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical
changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, there
will be no changes to the LWPS. The existing equipment and plant
procedures that control radioactive releases to the environment will
continue to be used to maintain radioactive liquid releases within the
dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1301 and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix
I to 10 CFR part 50.
Radioactive Solid Wastes
The function of the STP solid waste processing system (SWPS) is to
process, package, and store the solid radioactive wastes generated by
nuclear plant operations until they are shipped off site to a vendor
for further processing or for permanent disposal at a licensed burial
facility, or both. The storage areas have restricted access and
shielding to reduce radiation rates to plant workers. The principal
objectives of the SWPS are to package and transport the waste in
compliance with NRC regulations in 10 CFR part 61, ``Licensing
Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste,'' and 10 CFR part
71, ``Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material,'' and the
U.S. Department of Transportation regulations in 49 CFR parts 170
through 179; and to maintain the dose limits of 10 CFR 20.1201, 10 CFR
20.1301, and appendix I to 10 CFR part 50.
Granting the regulatory exemptions will not result in any physical
changes to the nuclear plant or reactor operations; therefore, the
waste can be handled by the SWPS without modification. The existing
equipment and plant procedures that control radioactive solid waste
handling will continue to be used to maintain exposures within the dose
limits of 10 CFR 20.1201, 10 CFR 20.1301, and 10 CFR part 50, appendix
I.
Occupational Radiation Doses
The proposed action of granting the regulatory exemptions will not
result in any physical changes being made to the nuclear plant or
reactor operations; therefore, there will be no change to any in-plant
radiation sources. The licensee's radiation protection program monitors
radiation levels throughout the nuclear plant to establish appropriate
work controls, training, temporary shielding, and protective equipment
requirements so that worker doses will remain within the dose limits of
10 CFR part 20, subpart C, ``Occupational Dose Limits.'' Granting the
regulatory exemptions will not change radiation levels within the
nuclear plant and, therefore, will have no increased radiological
impact to the workers.
Offsite Radiation Dose
The primary sources of offsite dose to members of the public from
the STP are radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents. As discussed
previously, there will be no change to the operation of the STP
radioactive gaseous and liquid waste management systems or the ability
to perform their intended functions. Also, there will be no change to
the STP radiation monitoring system and procedures used to control the
release of radioactive effluents in accordance with radiation
protection standards in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR 190, ``Environmental
Radiation Protection Standards for Nuclear Power Operations,'' and the
ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR part 50.
Based on the previous statements, the offsite radiation dose to
members of the public would not change and would continue to be within
regulatory limits, and, therefore, granting the regulatory exemptions
will not change offsite dose levels and, consequently, the health
effects of the proposed action will not be significant.
Design-Basis Accidents
Design-basis accidents at STP, Units 1 and 2, are evaluated by both
the licensee and the NRC to ensure that the units can withstand the
spectrum of postulated accidents without undue hazard to the public
health and safety and the protection of the environment.
Separate from its environmental review in this EA, the NRC staff is
evaluating the licensee's technical and safety analyses provided in
support of the proposed action of granting the exemption requests to
ensure that, following the proposed action, the licensee will continue
to meet the NRC regulatory requirements for safe operation. The results
and conclusion of the NRC staff's safety review will be documented in a
publicly available safety evaluation. If the NRC staff concludes in
this safety evaluation that taking the proposed action will (1)
[[Page 21571]]
provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public
will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) provide
reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in
compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) not be inimical
to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the
public, then the proposed action will also not have a significant
environmental impact. The NRC will not take the proposed action absent
such a safety conclusion.
Radiological Cumulative Impacts
The radiological dose limits for protection of the public and plant
workers have been developed by the NRC and the Environmental Protection
Agency to address the cumulative impact of acute and long-term exposure
to radiation and radioactive material. These dose limits are codified
in 10 CFR part 20, ``Standards for Protection Against Radiation,'' and
40 CFR part 190.
Cumulative radiation doses are required to be within the limits set
forth in the regulations cited in the previous paragraph. Granting the
exemptions will not require any physical changes to the plant or plant
activities, there will not be changes to in-plant radiation sources,
and offsite radiation dose to members of the public will not change.
Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that there would not be a
significant cumulative radiological impact from the proposed action.
Radiological Impacts Summary
Based on these radiological evaluations, the proposed action of
granting the exemptions would not result in any significant
radiological impacts. Therefore, if the NRC staff concludes in its
separate safety evaluation that taking the proposed action will (1)
provide reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public
will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) provide
reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in
compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) not be inimical
to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the
public, then the proposed action will not have a significant
radiological impact.
Non-Radiological Impacts
No physical modifications to the nuclear plant or changes to
reactor operations involving the ECCS would be required if the NRC were
to grant the regulatory exemptions. Also, no physical changes would be
made to other structures or land use within the STP site. Non-
radiological liquid effluents or gaseous emissions would not change and
therefore environmental conditions at the STP site also would not
change. In addition, granting the regulatory exemptions would not
result in changes to the use of resources (e.g., visual, terrestrial,
or aquatic) or cause any new environmental impacts (e.g., noise).
Further, granting the regulatory exemptions does not change the
operation of the reactor, the heat load dissipated to the environment,
or the amount of non-radiological waste.
Therefore, there would be no non-radiological environmental impacts
to any resource or any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources.
Non-Radiological Cumulative Impacts
Since granting the regulatory exemptions would not result in
environmental effects, there would be no cumulative impact.
Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action
As discussed earlier, licensees have options in responding to GL
2004-02 and demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.46 considering the
impacts of debris on the emergency core cooling system. Consistent with
these options and as an alternative to the proposed action, the
licensee could choose to not pursue exemptions (Options 1 and 3).
Depending on the results of its analysis, the licensee would instead
remove fibrous insulation to reduce the debris loading and the
potential for clogging the containment sumps, and would replace
insulation within the reactor containment building. This alternative
would involve the physical removal and disposal of significant amounts
of insulation from a radiation area within the reactor containment
building and replacement with insulation less likely to impact sump
performance. This would be considered the ``no action alternative'' in
that it would not require exemptions (actions) from the NRC.
Removal of the existing insulation from the containment building
would generate radiologically contaminated waste. The STPNOC estimated
that 4,620 cubic feet of insulation would be removed and stored onsite
until disposal. The old insulation would require special handling and
packaging so that it could be safely transported from the STP site. The
licensee's existing low-level radioactive and hazardous waste handling
and disposal activities would likely be used to process and store this
waste material. The old insulation would then be transported to a low-
level radioactive or hazardous waste disposal site. Energy (fuel) would
be expended to transport the insulation and land would be expended at
the disposal site.
The removal of the old insulation and installation of the new
insulation would expose workers to radiation. In its application,
STPNOC estimates that this would result in an additional collective
radiation exposure of 158-176 person-roentgen equivalent man (rem) over
its baseline collective radiation exposure. The NRC staff reviewed
NUREG-0713, Volume 34, ``Occupational Radiation Exposure at Commercial
Nuclear Power Reactors and Other Facilities 2012: Forty-Fifth Annual
Report,'' and determined that STPNOC's average baseline collective
radiation exposure is approximately 90 person-rem. This additional 158-
176 person-rem collective exposure would be shared across the entire
work force involved with removing and reinstalling insulation.
In SECY-12-0093, the NRC staff attempted to develop a total
occupational dose estimate for the work involved in insulation removal
and replacement associated with GSI-191. Due to uncertainties in the
scope of work required to remove and replace insulation at a specific
nuclear plant and other site-specific factors such as source term and
hazardous materials, the NRC staff was unable to estimate the total
occupational dose associated with this work. However, dose estimates
were provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) in a letter to the
NRC dated March 30, 2012, based on information collected on
occupational radiation exposures that have been, or could be, incurred
during insulation removal and replacement. In the letter, NEI noted
similar difficulties to those experienced by the NRC staff in
estimating the potential amount of radiation exposure, but provided a
``per unit'' estimate of between 80 to 525 person-rem. The NRC staff
ultimately concluded that the NEI estimates were reasonable given the
uncertainties in the scope of work and other nuclear plant site-
specific factors such as source term and hazardous materials.
Therefore, since STPNOC's estimate of radiation exposure for insulation
removal and replacement is within the NEI estimated range, the NRC
staff considers STPNOC's estimate of an increase of 158-176 person-rem
over the baseline exposure to be reasonable.
As stated in the ``Occupational Radiation Doses'' section of this
document, STPNOC's radiation protection program monitors radiation
levels throughout the nuclear plant to establish appropriate work
controls,
[[Page 21572]]
training, temporary shielding, and protective equipment requirements so
that worker doses are expected to remain within the dose limits of 10
CFR 20.1201.
In addition, as stated in the ``Offsite Radiation Dose'' section of
this document, STPNOC also has a radiation monitoring system and
procedures in place to control the release of radioactive effluents in
accordance with radiation protection standards in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40
CFR part 190, and the ALARA dose objectives in appendix I to 10 CFR
part 50. Therefore, radiation exposure to members of the public would
not be significant and would be maintained within the NRC dose criteria
in 10 CFR 20.1301, 40 CFR part 190, and the ALARA dose objectives of
appendix I to 10 CFR part 50.
Based on this information, impacts to members of the public from
removing and replacing insulation within the reactor containment
building would not be significant. However, impacts to plant workers
and the environment from implementing this alternative would be greater
than implementing the proposed action.
Alternative Use of Resources
The proposed action would not involve the use of any different
resources (e.g., water, air, land, nuclear fuel) not previously
considered in NUREG-1437, Supplement 48.
Agencies and Persons Consulted
In accordance with its stated policy, on May 1, 2017, the NRC staff
consulted with the Texas State official, Mr. Robert Free, regarding the
final environmental impact of the proposed action. The state official
had no comments on the final EA and finding of no significant impact.
III. Finding of No Significant Impact
The NRC is considering STPNOC's requests to amend Facility
Operating License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80 for STP, Units 1 and 2, and to
grant exemptions for STP, Units 1 and 2, from certain requirements of
10 CFR 50.46(a)(1), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix A, GDCs 35, 38, and
41.
This proposed action would not result in changes to radioactive
effluents or emissions to nuclear plant workers and members of the
public or any changes to radiological and non-radiological impacts to
the environment. On the basis of the EA included in Section II of this
notice and incorporated by reference in this finding, the NRC staff
finds that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on
the quality of the human environment. The NRC staff's evaluation
considered the information provided in the licensee's application as
supplement, and the NRC staff's review of related environmental
documents. Section IV below lists the environmental documents related
to the proposed action and includes information on the availability of
the documents. Accordingly, the NRC has determined not to prepare an
environmental impact statement for the proposed action.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available for
public inspection through the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS) or by using one of the methods discussed in
Section I.A, ``Obtaining Information,'' of this document.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Title Date ADAMS Accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
NUREG-0897, Containment 10/1985 ML112440046
Emergency Sump Performance:
Technical Findings Related to
Unresolved Safety Issue A-43,
Revision 1.
NRC Generic Letter 2004-02, 9/13/2004 ML042360586
Potential Impact of Debris
Blockage on Emergency
Recirculation During Design
Basis Accidents at Pressurized-
Water Reactors.
NEI letter to NRC, Nuclear 03/30/2012 ML12095A319
Energy Institute, GSI-191 Dose
Estimates.
Commission SECY-12-0093, 07/09/2012 ML121320270
Closure Options for Generic (package)
Safety Issue-191, Assessment
of Debris Accumulation on
Pressurized-Water Reactor Sump
Performance.
Commission SRM-SECY-12-0093, 12/14/2012 ML12349A378
Staff Requirements--SECY-12-
0093--Closure Options for
Generic Safety Issue-191,
Assessment of Debris
Accumulation on Pressurized-
Water Reactor Sump Performance.
STPNOC letter to NRC, STP Pilot 01/31/2013 ML13043A013
Submittal and Request for
Exemption for a Risk-Informed
Approach to Resolve Generic
Safety Issue (GSI)-191.
NRC letter to STPNOC, South 04/01/2013 ML13066A519
Texas Project, Units 1 and 2--
Supplemental Information
Needed for Acceptance of
Requested Licensing Action Re:
Request for Exemption for a
Risk-Informed Approach to
Resolve Generic Safety Issue
191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised 06/19/2013 ML131750250
STP Pilot Submittal and (package)
Requests for Exemptions and
License Amendment for a Risk-
Informed Approach to Resolving
Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 10/03/2013 ML13295A222
Corrections to Information
Provided in Revised STP Pilot
Submittal and Requests for
Exemptions and License
Amendment for a Risk-Informed
Approach to Resolving Generic
Safety Issue (GSI)-191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 10/31/2013 ML13323A673
of GSI-191 Chemical Effects (package)
Test Reports.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 11/13/2013 ML13323A128
Supplement 1 to Revised STP (package)
Pilot Submittal and Requests
for Exemptions and License
Amendment for a Risk-Informed
Approach to Resolving Generic
Safety Issue (GSI)-191.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 11/21/2013 ML13338A165
Supplement 1 to Revised STP
Pilot Submittal for a Risk-
Informed Approach to Resolving
Generic Safety Issue (GSI)-191
to Supersede and Replace the
Revised Pilot Submittal.
NUREG-1437, Supplement 48, 11/2013 ML13322A890
Generic Environmental Impact
Statement for License Renewal
of Nuclear Plants: Supplement
48 Regarding South Texas
Project, Units 1 and 2: Final
Report.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 12/23/2013 ML14015A312
to STP-GSI-191 EMCB-RAI-1.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 12/23/2013 ML14015A311
to NRC Request for Reference
Document For STP Risk-Informed
GSI-191 Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 03/17/2014 ML14086A383
to NRC Accident Dose Branch (package)
Request for Additional
Information.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 01/09/2014 ML14029A533
to Request for Additional
Information re Use of RELAP5
in Analyses for Risk-Informed
GSI-191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 02/13/2014 ML14052A110 (package,
of CASA Grande Code and portions redacted)
Analyses for STP's Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application.
[[Page 21573]]
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 02/27/2014 ML14072A075
of GSI-191 Chemical Effects (package)
Test Reports.
NRC Letter to STPNOC, Request 04/15/2014 ML14087A075
for Additional Information,
Round 1.
NUREG-0713, Volume 34, 04/2014 ML14126A597
Occupational Radiation
Exposure at Commercial Nuclear
Power Reactors and Other
Facilities 2012: Forty-Fifth
Annual Report.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second 05/15/2014 ML14149A354
Submittal of CASA Grande
Source Code for STP's Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set 05/22/2014 ML14149A439
of Responses to April, 2014, (package)
Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSl-191 Licensing
Application--Revised.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second 06/25/2014 ML14178A467
Set of Responses to April, (package)
2014, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/15/2014 ML14202A045
of Responses to April, 2014,
Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application.
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request 03/03/2015 ML14357A171
for Additional Information,
Round 2.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Submittal 03/10/2015 ML15072A092
of Updated CASA Grande Input
for STP's Risk-Informed GSI-
191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 03/25/2015 ML15091A440
Description of Revised Risk-
Informed Methodology and
Responses to Round 2 Requests
for Additional Information
Regarding STP Risk-Informed
GSI-191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 08/20/2015 ML15246A125
Supplement 2 to STP Pilot (package)
Submittal and Requests for
Exemptions and License
Amendment for a Risk-Informed
Approach to Address Generic
Safety Issue (GSI)-191 and
Respond to Generic Letter (GL)
2004-02.
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request 04/11/2016 ML16082A507
for Additional Information,
Round 3 (without Risk).
NRC letter to STPNOC, Request 05/26/2016 ML16125A290
of Additional Information,
Round 3 (Risk).
STPNOC letter to NRC, First Set 05/11/2016 ML16154A117
of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSl-191 Licensing
Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 06/09/2016 ML16176A148
Applicability of Application
Supplement 1 Correspondence to
Supplement 2 Regarding STP
Risk-Informed GSI-191
Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Second 06/16/2016 ML16196A241
Set of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/18/2016 ML16209A226
of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application--Part A.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/21/2016 ML16229A189
of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application--Part B.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/21/2016 ML16230A232
of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application--Part C.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 07/28/2016 ML16221A393
of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application--Part D.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Third Set 09/12/2016 ML16272A162
of Responses to April 11,
2016, Requests for Additional
Information Regarding STP Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application--Part E.
STPNOC letter to NRC, 10/20/2016 ML16302A015
Supplement 3 to Revised Pilot
Submittal and Requests for
Exemptions and License
Amendment for a Risk-Informed
Approach to Address Generic
Safety Issue (GSl)-191 and
Respond to Generic Letter (GL)
2004-02.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 11/9/2016 ML16321A407
to Request for Additional
Information Regarding
Sensitivity Studies for STPNOC
Risk-Informed Pilot GSl-191
Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Revised 12/7/2016 ML16365A006
Applicability Matrix for
Response to Request for
Additional Information
Questions APLA-1a and APLA-1b
Regarding STP Risk-Informed
GSl-191 Licensing Application.
STPNOC letter to NRC, Response 01/19/2017 ML17025A123
to Request for Additional
Information on Revised
Applicability Matrix for
Questions Regarding Risk-
Informed GSI-191 Licensing
Application.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 2nd day of May, 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Robert J. Pascarelli,
Chief, Plant Licensing Branch IV, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2017-09369 Filed 5-8-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
