Uninterruptible Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and Spent Fuel Pools, 11159-11162 [2017-03284]
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11159
Proposed Rules
Federal Register
Vol. 82, No. 33
Tuesday, February 21, 2017
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains notices to the public of the proposed
issuance of rules and regulations. The
purpose of these notices is to give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the
rule making prior to the adoption of the final
rules.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Office of Procurement and Property
Management
7 CFR Part 3201
RIN 0599–AA24
Designation of Product Categories for
Federal Procurement
Office of Procurement and
Property Management, USDA.
ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of
comment period.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) is extending by 30
days the deadline to submit comments
on the proposed rule to designate 12
product categories for federal
procurement, which was published on
January 13, 2017 (82 FR 4206) under the
authority of section 9002 of the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of
2002 (the 2002 Farm Bill), as amended
by the Food, Conservation, and Energy
Act of 2008 (the 2008 Farm Bill), and
further amended by the Agricultural Act
of 2014 (the 2014 Farm Bill), 7 U.S.C.
8102. The 60-day comment period in
the proposed rule is scheduled to end
on March 14, 2017. The extended
comment period will now close on
April 13, 2017. In this proposed rule,
USDA is proposing to amend the
Guidelines for Designating Biobased
Products for Federal Procurement
(Guidelines) to add 12 sections that will
designate the product categories within
which biobased products would be
afforded procurement preference by
Federal agencies and their contractors.
DATES: Comments on the proposed rule
published January 13, 2017 (82 FR 4206)
must be received on or before April 13,
2017.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments
by any of the following methods. All
submissions received must include the
agency name and Regulatory
Information Number (RIN). The RIN for
this rulemaking is 0599–AA24. Also,
please identify submittals as pertaining
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SUMMARY:
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to the ‘‘Proposed Designation of Product
Categories.’’
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Email: biopreferred_support@
amecfw.com. Include RIN number
0599–AA24 and ‘‘Proposed Designation
of Product Categories’’ on the subject
line. Please include your name and
address in your message.
• Mail/commercial/hand delivery:
Mail or deliver your comments to: Marie
Wheat, USDA, Office of Procurement
and Property Management, Room 361,
Reporters Building, 300 7th St. SW.,
Washington, DC 20024.
• Persons with disabilities who
require alternative means for
communication for regulatory
information (Braille, large print,
audiotape, etc.) should contact the
USDA TARGET Center at (202) 720–
2600 (voice) and (202) 690–0942 (TTY).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Marie Wheat, USDA, Office of
Procurement and Property Management,
Room 361, Reporters Building, 300 7th
St. SW., Washington, DC 20024; email:
biopreferred_support@amecfw.com;
phone (202) 239–4502. Information
regarding the Federal preferred
procurement program (one initiative of
the BioPreferred Program) is available
on the Internet at https://
www.biopreferred.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comment Period
USDA is extending the public
comment period for an additional 30
days. The public comment period will
end on April 13, 2017, instead on March
14, 2017.
List of Subjects in 7 CFR Part 3201
Biobased products, Procurement.
Dated: February 3, 2017.
Malcom Shorter,
Acting Assistant Secretary for
Administration, U.S. Department of
Agriculture.
[FR Doc. 2017–03288 Filed 2–17–17; 8:45 am]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM–50–113; NRC–2015–0230]
Uninterruptible Monitoring of Coolant
and Fuel in Reactors and Spent Fuel
Pools
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is denying a petition
for rulemaking (PRM), dated September
10, 2015, submitted by Dr. Alexander
DeVolpi (the petitioner). The petition
was docketed by the NRC on September
21, 2015, and was assigned Docket No.
PRM–50–113. The petitioner requested
that the NRC amend its regulations to
require ‘‘installation of ex-vessel
instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in
reactors and spent-fuel pools.’’ The NRC
is denying the petition because the
Commission finds that the issues raised
by the petitioner have been addressed
by actions taken by the NRC in response
to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear
accident.
SUMMARY:
The docket for the petition for
rulemaking, PRM–50–113, is closed on
February 21, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2015–0230, when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this petition. You
may obtain publicly-available
information related to this petition by
any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2015–0230. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
DATES:
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Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 33 / Tuesday, February 21, 2017 / Proposed Rules
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For the
convenience of the reader, instructions
about obtaining materials referenced in
this document are provided in Section
IV, ‘‘Availability of Documents,’’ of this
document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jennifer C. Tobin, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301–
415–2328; email: Jennifer.Tobin@
nrc.gov; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Reasons for Denial
III. Conclusion
IV. Availability of Documents
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I. The Petition
Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
‘‘Petition for rulemaking,’’ provides an
opportunity for any interested person to
petition the Commission to issue,
amend, or rescind any regulation. The
NRC received a petition dated
September 10, 2015, from Dr. Alexander
DeVolpi and assigned it Docket No.
PRM–50–113. The NRC published a
notice of docketing in the Federal
Register (FR) on December 1, 2015 (80
FR 75009). The NRC did not request
public comment on PRM–50–113
because it had sufficient information to
review the issues raised by the
petitioner.
The petitioner requested that the NRC
amend 10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Domestic
licensing of production and utilization
facilities,’’ to require ‘‘installation of exvessel instrumentation for
uninterruptible monitoring of coolant
and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel
pools.’’
II. Reasons for Denial
The NRC is denying the petition
because the issues raised by the
petitioner have been addressed through
actions taken in response to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.
The NRC determined that there is no
sufficient technical or regulatory basis
to amend the NRC’s regulations as
requested by the petitioner.
The petitioner proposed that
Recommendation 5.1A in the 2014
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National Academy of Sciences (NAS)
report entitled ‘‘Lessons Learned from
the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for
Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear
Plants’’ should be mandated (as an NRC
regulation) to require installation of exvessel instrumentation for
uninterruptible monitoring of coolant
and fuel in reactors and spent fuel
pools. The petitioner stated that NAS
gave a high priority to this
recommendation and the petitioner
indicated that he has developed
instrumentation that is capable of
uninterruptible monitoring of critical
thermodynamic parameters. The
petitioner included diagrams and
explanations of his patented
instrumentation and supportive
technical papers and requested that the
NRC require use of such
instrumentation to prevent or mitigate
accidents. In particular, the petitioner
contends that the accident at Three Mile
Island, Unit 2 might have been
prevented if real-time uninterruptible
ex-vessel reactor water-level monitoring
had been in place. Further, the
petitioner states that one or two of the
Fukushima Dai-ichi meltdowns might
have been delayed or averted if
uninterruptible ex-vessel real-time
reactor water-level monitoring had been
in place and operating on self-contained
low-current battery supplies.
The NRC staff responded to the NAS
report and its recommendations in
SECY–15–0059, ‘‘Seventh 6-Month
Status Update on Response to Lessons
Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011,
¯
Great Tohoku Earthquake and
Subsequent Tsunami,’’ dated April 9,
2015. The NRC staff’s discussion of
Recommendation 5.1A in enclosure 6 of
SECY–15–0059 addresses the
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation
for uninterruptible monitoring of
coolant and fuel in reactors and spent
fuel pools. The NRC staff found that this
recommendation was addressed by
existing requirements and other ongoing
activities. The issues that the
petitioner’s proposal would address are
being or have already been addressed by
NRC actions taken in response to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident, as
summarized in this document.
Instrumentation used to support
strategies in the mitigation of beyonddesign-basis events is addressed in
Order EA–12–049, ‘‘Issuance of Order to
Modify Licenses with Regard to
Requirements for Mitigation Strategies
for Beyond-Design-Basis External
Events.’’ This Order ensures that plant
operators have the information
concerning key parameters needed to
support implementation of mitigation
strategies to maintain or restore core
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cooling, spent fuel pool cooling, and
containment prior to the onset of core or
spent fuel damage. Either installed
instrumentation remains powered
during an extended loss of alternating
current power via safety-related
batteries and other power supplies that
provide coping capabilities for an
indefinite period of time, or portable
instruments are used that are
independent from installed plant power
systems. If mitigation strategies are not
successful and severe accident
conditions develop, the enhancements
made in response to Order EA–12–049
will provide for monitoring of key
parameters on the condition of the
reactor, containment, and spent fuel
pool throughout the accident’s
progression until instrumentation
becomes unavailable or unreliable.
These enhancements should also enable
licensees to more easily transition to the
use of computational aids when direct
diagnosis of key plant conditions cannot
be determined reliably from
instrumentation. Further, spent fuel
pool instrumentation is also required by
Order EA–12–051, ‘‘Order Modifying
Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent
Fuel Pool Instrumentation,’’ to remotely
report three distinct water levels:
Normal level; low level but still enough
to shield workers above the pools from
radiation; and a level near the top of the
spent fuel rods, at which more water
should be added without delay.
Following the issuance of the Orders,
the NRC staff presented its evaluation of
enhanced instrumentation for beyonddesign-basis conditions in enclosure 5
to SECY–15–0137, ‘‘Proposed Plans for
Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and
3 Recommendations.’’ The staff
recommended that the Commission not
pursue additional regulatory
requirements for enhanced reactor and
containment instrumentation. The NRC
staff concluded that additional studies
are unlikely to support additional
regulatory requirements related to
enhanced reactor and containment
instrumentation for beyond-design-basis
conditions, when evaluated against the
criteria for operating reactors in
§ 50.109, ‘‘Backfitting,’’ or the issue
finality provisions of 10 CFR part 52,
‘‘Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals
for Nuclear Power Plants.’’
In the staff requirements
memorandum associated with SECY–
15–0137, the Commission directed the
NRC staff to provide the final results of
its evaluation following interactions
with external stakeholders and the
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards (ACRS). Accordingly, the
NRC staff provided updated information
regarding enhanced reactor and
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containment instrumentation for
beyond-design-basis conditions in
enclosure 2 to SECY–16–0041, ‘‘Closure
of Fukushima Tier 3 Recommendations
Related to Containment Vents,
Hydrogen Control, and
Instrumentation.’’ The updated
information addressed the observations
provided by the ACRS in letters dated
November 16, 2015, and March 15,
2016, and insights provided by external
stakeholders. For example, information
was added to the final assessment that
describes the technical support
guidance (TSG) for the severe accident
management guidelines (SAMGs) and
related assessments of plant parameters
as well as the status of safety functions
that would be performed by plant
personnel during a severe accident. The
SAMGs are entered when plant
conditions indicate that cooling of the
spent fuel pool or core cannot be
maintained and the fuel in the spent
fuel pool or reactor is on a trajectory
towards damage. The SAMGs then
invoke the TSGs that are based on an
engineering evaluation of the scenario.
This would include an assessment of
the available parameter indications,
their functional consistency, and their
trends as the plant transitions to severe
accident conditions, which may be more
severe than the conditions assumed in
instrument design and environmental
qualifications. The severe accident
response strategies are then based on
fundamental principles that do not rely
on precise indications of parameter
values, but rather on an integrated
technical assessment of the evolving
event scenario and the conditions that
preceded the onset of fuel damage in the
spent fuel pool or core.
The additional NRC staff evaluations
further support the conclusion that
regulatory actions to require
enhancements to reactor and
containment instrumentation to support
the response to severe accidents would
not provide a substantial safety
enhancement, and therefore, additional
regulatory actions would not be
warranted when evaluated against the
§ 50.109 criteria. The ACRS agreed in its
March 15, 2016, letter that no further
regulatory action is warranted in
support of the closure of the
recommendation on enhanced
instrumentation.
In addition to the discussions in
SECY–15–0137 and SECY–16–0041, the
NRC staff notes that, depending on an
accident’s progression, licensees will
use available indicators and technical
assessments of the evolving scenario to
implement adequate measures to protect
public health and safety in accordance
with the NRC’s emergency preparedness
requirements. If an accident progresses
to fuel damage, specific additional
actions may be required, including
initiating predetermined protective
actions for the public.
Moreover, the NRC is proposing to
amend its regulations to establish
regulatory requirements for nuclear
power reactor applicants and licensees
to mitigate beyond-design-basis events
to reflect requirements imposed on
current licensees by Order and the
lessons learned from the Fukushima
Dai-ichi accident. This proposed rule,
‘‘Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events,’’ which was published in the
Federal Register on November 13, 2015
(80 FR 70610; corrected November 30,
2015 at 80 FR 74717), would, among
other things, add a new regulation
(proposed 10 CFR 50.155) to make
Orders EA–12–049 and EA–12–051
generically applicable, establish
regulatory requirements for an
integrated response capability, and
include requirements for enhanced
onsite emergency response capabilities.
Therefore, in accordance with the
NRC staff’s evaluation in SECY–15–
0137, the Commission’s direction on
SECY–15–0137, updated information
provided in SECY–16–0041, and
existing emergency preparedness
requirements, and the proposed
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis
Events rulemaking, the NRC has
determined that additional
instrumentation requirements to address
severe accident conditions proposed in
PRM–50–113 are not necessary.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons cited in Section II of
this document, the NRC has concluded
that the issues raised by the petitioner
have been addressed by NRC actions
taken in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident and there is no
sufficient technical or regulatory basis
to amend the NRC’s regulations as
requested by the petitioner. Therefore,
the NRC is denying PRM–50–113.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the
following table are available to
interested persons through one or more
of the methods listed in the ADDRESSES
section of this document.
ADAMS accession No./Web link/Federal
Register citation
Document
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ACRS Letter, ‘‘Plans for Resolving the NRC Near-Term Task Force Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3
Recommendations,’’ November 16, 2015.
ACRS Letter, ‘‘Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 Recommendations Related to Vents, Hydrogen Control,
and Enhanced Instrumentation,’’ March 15, 2016.
Federal Register notice, ‘‘Uninterruptible Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and Spent Fuel
Pools,’’ December 1, 2015.
Federal Register notice, ‘‘Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,’’ November 13, 2015 ...............
Letter from Nuclear Energy Institute to NRC, ‘‘Submittal of Industry Initiative to Maintain Severe Accident Management Guidelines,’’ October 26, 2015.
National Academy of Sciences, ‘‘Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants,’’ 2014.
NRC Generic Letter 1982–033, ‘‘Supplement 1 to NUREG–0737—Requirements for Emergency Response Capability,’’ December 17, 1982.
NUREG–0933, ‘‘Resolution of Generic Safety Issues,’’ December 2011 ...............................................
Order EA–12–049, ‘‘Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses With Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,’’ March 12, 2012.
Order EA–12–051, ‘‘Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,’’ March 12, 2012.
PRM–50–113, ‘‘Uninterruptible Monitoring of Critical Thermodynamic Parameters (Coolant and Fuel
in Reactors and Spent-Fuel Pools),’’ September 10, 2015.
SECY–15–0059, ‘‘Seventh 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons Learned from Japan’s
March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami,’’ April 9, 2015.
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ML15320A074.
ML16075A330.
80 FR 75009.
80 FR 70610 (corrected by 80 FR 74717;
November 30, 2015).
ML15335A442.
https://www.nap.edu/read/18294/chapter/1.
ML031080548.
https://nureg.nrc.gov/sr0933.
ML12054A735.
ML12056A044.
ML15264A857.
ML15069A444, ML15069A568 (enc. 3),
ML15069A600 (enc. 6).
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ADAMS accession No./Web link/Federal
Register citation
Document
SECY–15–0065, ‘‘Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150–
AJ49),’’ April 30, 2015.
SECY–15–0137, ‘‘Proposed Plans for Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,’’
October 29, 2015.
SECY–16–0041, ‘‘Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 Recommendations Related to Containment Vents,
Hydrogen Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,’’ March 31, 2016.
SRM–SECY–15–0065, ‘‘Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN
3150–AJ49),’’ August 27, 2015.
SRM–SECY–15–0137, ‘‘Proposed Plans for Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,’’ February 8, 2016.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day
of February 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2017–03284 Filed 2–17–17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2016–9571; Directorate
Identifier 2016–NM–139–AD]
Examining the AD Docket
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all
Airbus Model A321 series airplanes.
This proposed AD was prompted by a
full scale fatigue test campaign on these
airplanes in the context of the extended
service goal. This proposed AD would
require inspections of the affected frame
locations, and repair if necessary. We
are proposing this AD to address the
unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by April 7, 2017.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments,
using the procedures found in 14 CFR
11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail
address above between 9 a.m. and 5
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SUMMARY:
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14:44 Feb 17, 2017
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
For service information identified in
this NPRM, contact Airbus,
Airworthiness Office—EIAS, 1 Rond
Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac
Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36
96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email
account.airworth-eas@airbus.com;
Internet https://www.airbus.com. You
may view this referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue
SW., Renton, WA. For information on
the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425–227–1221.
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You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
9571; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this proposed AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sanjay Ralhan, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057–3356; telephone 425–227–1405;
fax 425–227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments about
this proposed AD. Send your comments
to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2016–9571; Directorate Identifier
2016–NM–139–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
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ML15254A006, ML15254A034 (enc. 5).
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ML16039A175.
aspects of this proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact we receive
about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Union, has issued EASA Airworthiness
Directive 2016–0146, dated July 20,
2016 (referred to after this as the
Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness
Information, or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct
an unsafe condition for all Airbus
Model A321 series airplanes. The MCAI
states:
Following the results of a new full scale
fatigue test campaign on the A321 airframe
in the context of the A321 extended service
goal, it was identified that cracks could
develop on the fastener holes of frame (FR)
35.1, FR 35.2, and FR 35.3 between stringers
(STR) 29 and STR 32 and at the FR 35.2 to
Slidebox junction (Triform fitting), both left
hand (LH) and right hand (RH) sides.
This condition, if not detected and
corrected, could reduce the structural
integrity of the fuselage. Prompted by these
findings, Airbus developed an inspection
programme, published in Service Bulletin
(SB) A320–53–1308, SB A320–53–1309, SB
A320–53–1310, SB A320–53–1311, SB A320–
53–1312 and SB A320–53–1313, each
containing instructions for a different
location. For the reasons described above,
this [EASA] AD requires repetitive special
detailed (rototest) inspections (SDI) of the
affected frame locations and, depending on
findings, accomplishment of a repair.
This [EASA] AD is considered an interim
action, pending the development of a
permanent solution.
You may examine the MCAI in the
AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
9571.
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 33 (Tuesday, February 21, 2017)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 11159-11162]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2017-03284]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 50
[Docket No. PRM-50-113; NRC-2015-0230]
Uninterruptible Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and
Spent Fuel Pools
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Petition for rulemaking; denial.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is denying a
petition for rulemaking (PRM), dated September 10, 2015, submitted by
Dr. Alexander DeVolpi (the petitioner). The petition was docketed by
the NRC on September 21, 2015, and was assigned Docket No. PRM-50-113.
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend its regulations to require
``installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel pools.'' The
NRC is denying the petition because the Commission finds that the
issues raised by the petitioner have been addressed by actions taken by
the NRC in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident.
DATES: The docket for the petition for rulemaking, PRM-50-113, is
closed on February 21, 2017.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0230, when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this petition. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this petition by
any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0230. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS
[[Page 11160]]
Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or
by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. For the convenience of the reader,
instructions about obtaining materials referenced in this document are
provided in Section IV, ``Availability of Documents,'' of this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jennifer C. Tobin, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301-415-2328; email:
Jennifer.Tobin@nrc.gov; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555-0001.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. The Petition
II. Reasons for Denial
III. Conclusion
IV. Availability of Documents
I. The Petition
Section 2.802 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR), ``Petition for rulemaking,'' provides an opportunity for any
interested person to petition the Commission to issue, amend, or
rescind any regulation. The NRC received a petition dated September 10,
2015, from Dr. Alexander DeVolpi and assigned it Docket No. PRM-50-113.
The NRC published a notice of docketing in the Federal Register (FR) on
December 1, 2015 (80 FR 75009). The NRC did not request public comment
on PRM-50-113 because it had sufficient information to review the
issues raised by the petitioner.
The petitioner requested that the NRC amend 10 CFR part 50,
``Domestic licensing of production and utilization facilities,'' to
require ``installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent-fuel pools.''
II. Reasons for Denial
The NRC is denying the petition because the issues raised by the
petitioner have been addressed through actions taken in response to the
Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident. The NRC determined that there is
no sufficient technical or regulatory basis to amend the NRC's
regulations as requested by the petitioner.
The petitioner proposed that Recommendation 5.1A in the 2014
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report entitled ``Lessons Learned
from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S.
Nuclear Plants'' should be mandated (as an NRC regulation) to require
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent fuel pools. The
petitioner stated that NAS gave a high priority to this recommendation
and the petitioner indicated that he has developed instrumentation that
is capable of uninterruptible monitoring of critical thermodynamic
parameters. The petitioner included diagrams and explanations of his
patented instrumentation and supportive technical papers and requested
that the NRC require use of such instrumentation to prevent or mitigate
accidents. In particular, the petitioner contends that the accident at
Three Mile Island, Unit 2 might have been prevented if real-time
uninterruptible ex-vessel reactor water-level monitoring had been in
place. Further, the petitioner states that one or two of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi meltdowns might have been delayed or averted if
uninterruptible ex-vessel real-time reactor water-level monitoring had
been in place and operating on self-contained low-current battery
supplies.
The NRC staff responded to the NAS report and its recommendations
in SECY-15-0059, ``Seventh 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons
Learned from Japan's March 11, 2011, Great T[omacr]hoku Earthquake and
Subsequent Tsunami,'' dated April 9, 2015. The NRC staff's discussion
of Recommendation 5.1A in enclosure 6 of SECY-15-0059 addresses the
installation of ex-vessel instrumentation for uninterruptible
monitoring of coolant and fuel in reactors and spent fuel pools. The
NRC staff found that this recommendation was addressed by existing
requirements and other ongoing activities. The issues that the
petitioner's proposal would address are being or have already been
addressed by NRC actions taken in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi
nuclear accident, as summarized in this document.
Instrumentation used to support strategies in the mitigation of
beyond-design-basis events is addressed in Order EA-12-049, ``Issuance
of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation
Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events.'' This Order
ensures that plant operators have the information concerning key
parameters needed to support implementation of mitigation strategies to
maintain or restore core cooling, spent fuel pool cooling, and
containment prior to the onset of core or spent fuel damage. Either
installed instrumentation remains powered during an extended loss of
alternating current power via safety-related batteries and other power
supplies that provide coping capabilities for an indefinite period of
time, or portable instruments are used that are independent from
installed plant power systems. If mitigation strategies are not
successful and severe accident conditions develop, the enhancements
made in response to Order EA-12-049 will provide for monitoring of key
parameters on the condition of the reactor, containment, and spent fuel
pool throughout the accident's progression until instrumentation
becomes unavailable or unreliable. These enhancements should also
enable licensees to more easily transition to the use of computational
aids when direct diagnosis of key plant conditions cannot be determined
reliably from instrumentation. Further, spent fuel pool instrumentation
is also required by Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation,'' to remotely
report three distinct water levels: Normal level; low level but still
enough to shield workers above the pools from radiation; and a level
near the top of the spent fuel rods, at which more water should be
added without delay.
Following the issuance of the Orders, the NRC staff presented its
evaluation of enhanced instrumentation for beyond-design-basis
conditions in enclosure 5 to SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for
Resolving Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations.'' The staff
recommended that the Commission not pursue additional regulatory
requirements for enhanced reactor and containment instrumentation. The
NRC staff concluded that additional studies are unlikely to support
additional regulatory requirements related to enhanced reactor and
containment instrumentation for beyond-design-basis conditions, when
evaluated against the criteria for operating reactors in Sec. 50.109,
``Backfitting,'' or the issue finality provisions of 10 CFR part 52,
``Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.''
In the staff requirements memorandum associated with SECY-15-0137,
the Commission directed the NRC staff to provide the final results of
its evaluation following interactions with external stakeholders and
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Accordingly, the
NRC staff provided updated information regarding enhanced reactor and
[[Page 11161]]
containment instrumentation for beyond-design-basis conditions in
enclosure 2 to SECY-16-0041, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3
Recommendations Related to Containment Vents, Hydrogen Control, and
Instrumentation.'' The updated information addressed the observations
provided by the ACRS in letters dated November 16, 2015, and March 15,
2016, and insights provided by external stakeholders. For example,
information was added to the final assessment that describes the
technical support guidance (TSG) for the severe accident management
guidelines (SAMGs) and related assessments of plant parameters as well
as the status of safety functions that would be performed by plant
personnel during a severe accident. The SAMGs are entered when plant
conditions indicate that cooling of the spent fuel pool or core cannot
be maintained and the fuel in the spent fuel pool or reactor is on a
trajectory towards damage. The SAMGs then invoke the TSGs that are
based on an engineering evaluation of the scenario. This would include
an assessment of the available parameter indications, their functional
consistency, and their trends as the plant transitions to severe
accident conditions, which may be more severe than the conditions
assumed in instrument design and environmental qualifications. The
severe accident response strategies are then based on fundamental
principles that do not rely on precise indications of parameter values,
but rather on an integrated technical assessment of the evolving event
scenario and the conditions that preceded the onset of fuel damage in
the spent fuel pool or core.
The additional NRC staff evaluations further support the conclusion
that regulatory actions to require enhancements to reactor and
containment instrumentation to support the response to severe accidents
would not provide a substantial safety enhancement, and therefore,
additional regulatory actions would not be warranted when evaluated
against the Sec. 50.109 criteria. The ACRS agreed in its March 15,
2016, letter that no further regulatory action is warranted in support
of the closure of the recommendation on enhanced instrumentation.
In addition to the discussions in SECY-15-0137 and SECY-16-0041,
the NRC staff notes that, depending on an accident's progression,
licensees will use available indicators and technical assessments of
the evolving scenario to implement adequate measures to protect public
health and safety in accordance with the NRC's emergency preparedness
requirements. If an accident progresses to fuel damage, specific
additional actions may be required, including initiating predetermined
protective actions for the public.
Moreover, the NRC is proposing to amend its regulations to
establish regulatory requirements for nuclear power reactor applicants
and licensees to mitigate beyond-design-basis events to reflect
requirements imposed on current licensees by Order and the lessons
learned from the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. This proposed rule,
``Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events,'' which was published in
the Federal Register on November 13, 2015 (80 FR 70610; corrected
November 30, 2015 at 80 FR 74717), would, among other things, add a new
regulation (proposed 10 CFR 50.155) to make Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-
051 generically applicable, establish regulatory requirements for an
integrated response capability, and include requirements for enhanced
onsite emergency response capabilities.
Therefore, in accordance with the NRC staff's evaluation in SECY-
15-0137, the Commission's direction on SECY-15-0137, updated
information provided in SECY-16-0041, and existing emergency
preparedness requirements, and the proposed Mitigation of Beyond-
Design-Basis Events rulemaking, the NRC has determined that additional
instrumentation requirements to address severe accident conditions
proposed in PRM-50-113 are not necessary.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons cited in Section II of this document, the NRC has
concluded that the issues raised by the petitioner have been addressed
by NRC actions taken in response to the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear
accident and there is no sufficient technical or regulatory basis to
amend the NRC's regulations as requested by the petitioner. Therefore,
the NRC is denying PRM-50-113.
IV. Availability of Documents
The documents identified in the following table are available to
interested persons through one or more of the methods listed in the
ADDRESSES section of this document.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Document ADAMS accession No./Web link/ Federal Register citation
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACRS Letter, ``Plans for Resolving the NRC Near- ML15320A074.
Term Task Force Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3
Recommendations,'' November 16, 2015.
ACRS Letter, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 ML16075A330.
Recommendations Related to Vents, Hydrogen
Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,'' March
15, 2016.
Federal Register notice, ``Uninterruptible 80 FR 75009.
Monitoring of Coolant and Fuel in Reactors and
Spent Fuel Pools,'' December 1, 2015.
Federal Register notice, ``Mitigation of Beyond- 80 FR 70610 (corrected by 80 FR 74717; November 30, 2015).
Design-Basis Events,'' November 13, 2015.
Letter from Nuclear Energy Institute to NRC, ML15335A442.
``Submittal of Industry Initiative to Maintain
Severe Accident Management Guidelines,'' October
26, 2015.
National Academy of Sciences, ``Lessons Learned https://www.nap.edu/read/18294/chapter/1.
from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving
Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants,'' 2014.
NRC Generic Letter 1982-033, ``Supplement 1 to ML031080548.
NUREG-0737--Requirements for Emergency Response
Capability,'' December 17, 1982.
NUREG-0933, ``Resolution of Generic Safety https://nureg.nrc.gov/sr0933.
Issues,'' December 2011.
Order EA-12-049, ``Issuance of Order to Modify ML12054A735.
Licenses With Regard to Requirements for
Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis
External Events,'' March 12, 2012.
Order EA-12-051, ``Order Modifying Licenses with ML12056A044.
Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool
Instrumentation,'' March 12, 2012.
PRM-50-113, ``Uninterruptible Monitoring of ML15264A857.
Critical Thermodynamic Parameters (Coolant and
Fuel in Reactors and Spent-Fuel Pools),''
September 10, 2015.
SECY-15-0059, ``Seventh 6-Month Status Update on ML15069A444, ML15069A568 (enc. 3), ML15069A600 (enc. 6).
Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's March
11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent
Tsunami,'' April 9, 2015.
[[Page 11162]]
SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: Mitigation of ML15049A201.
Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49),''
April 30, 2015.
SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for Resolving Open ML15254A006, ML15254A034 (enc. 5).
Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,'' October
29, 2015.
SECY-16-0041, ``Closure of Fukushima Tier 3 ML16049A079.
Recommendations Related to Containment Vents,
Hydrogen Control, and Enhanced Instrumentation,''
March 31, 2016.
SRM-SECY-15-0065, ``Proposed Rulemaking: ML15239A767.
Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN
3150-AJ49),'' August 27, 2015.
SRM-SECY-15-0137, ``Proposed Plans for Resolving ML16039A175.
Open Fukushima Tier 2 and 3 Recommendations,''
February 8, 2016.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day of February 2017.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. 2017-03284 Filed 2-17-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P