Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 92594-92603 [2016-30666]

Agencies

• Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
• DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 244 (Tuesday, December 20, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 92594-92603]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-30666]


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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 51

[Docket ID OCC-2016-0017]
RIN 1557-AE07


Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is 
adopting a final rule addressing the conduct of receiverships for 
national banks that are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) (uninsured banks) and for which the FDIC would not 
be appointed as receiver. The final rule implements the provisions of 
the National Bank Act (NBA) that provide the legal framework for 
receiverships of such institutions. The final rule adopts the rule as 
proposed without change.

DATES: This final rule is effective on January 19, 2017.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mitchell Plave, Special Counsel, 
Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 649-5490, or for 
persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, TTY, (202) 649-5597, or 
Richard Cleva, Senior Counsel, Bank Activities and Structure Division, 
(202) 649-5500, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th 
Street SW., Washington, DC 20219.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

    On September 13, 2016, the OCC published a proposed rule to 
implement the provisions of the NBA that provide the legal framework 
for receiverships for uninsured banks,\1\ 12 U.S.C. 191--200,

[[Page 92595]]

with comments due by November 14, 2016.\2\ The OCC received 11 comments 
concerning the proposal. For the reasons discussed in section III of 
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the OCC is adopting the rule as 
proposed, without change.
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    \1\ All Federal savings associations (FSAs), including trust-
only FSAs, are required to be insured. For this reason, this final 
rule does not apply to FSAs, given that receiverships for FSAs would 
be conducted by the FDIC.
    \2\ Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, 81 FR 62835 
(September 13, 2016) (Proposed Rule).
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II. Background

    As of December 2, 2016, the OCC supervised 52 uninsured banks, all 
of which are national trust banks.\3\ Uninsured national trust banks 
have fundamentally different business models compared to commercial and 
consumer banks and savings associations and therefore face very 
different types of risks. National trust banks typically have few 
assets on the balance sheet, usually composed of cash on deposit with 
an insured depository institution, investment securities, premises and 
equipment, and intangible assets. These banks exercise fiduciary and 
custody powers, do not make loans, do not rely on deposit funding, and 
consequently have simple liquidity management programs. In view of 
these differences, the OCC typically requires these banks to hold 
capital in a specific minimum amount; as a result they hold capital in 
amounts that exceed substantially the ``well capitalized'' standard 
that applies when national banks calculate their capital pursuant to 
the OCC's rules in 12 CFR part 3.
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    \3\ The OCC may charter national banks whose operations are 
limited to those of a trust company and related activities (national 
trust bank). See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 27(a); 12 CFR 5.20(l).
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    The business model of national trust banks is to generate income in 
the form of fees by offering fiduciary and custodial services that 
generally fall into one or more of a few broad categories. Some 
national trust banks focus on institutional asset management, providing 
trust and custodial services for investment portfolios of pension 
plans, foundations and endowments, and other entities, often with an 
investment management component. A few other national trust banks serve 
primarily as a fiduciary and custodian to facilitate the establishment 
of Individual Retirement Accounts by customers of an affiliated mutual 
fund complex or broker-dealer firm. Some national trust banks provide 
custodial services, such as corporate trust accounts, under which the 
bank performs services for others in connection with their issuance, 
transfer, and registration of debt or equity securities. Other custody 
accounts may be a holding facility for customer securities, where the 
bank assists institutional customers with global settlement and 
safekeeping of the customer's securities.
    Many of the uninsured national trust banks are subsidiaries or 
affiliates of a full-service insured national bank or are affiliates of 
an insured state bank. Other uninsured national trust banks are not 
affiliated with an insured depository institution, but are affiliated 
with an investment management firm or other financial services firm. 
Still other uninsured national trust banks have no affiliation with a 
larger parent company.\4\
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    \4\ For additional discussion of the business model of uninsured 
national trust banks, see Proposed Rule, 81 FR at 62836-62837.
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    The OCC appoints and oversees receivers for uninsured banks under 
the provisions of the NBA \5\ and the substantial body of case law 
applying the statutory provisions and common law receivership 
principles to national bank receiverships.\6\ The FDIC is the required 
receiver only for an insured national (or state) bank.\7\ Based on the 
statutory history of the NBA and FIRREA, it is likely that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA) would not apply to an OCC receivership of 
an uninsured bank conducted by the OCC, and that such a receivership 
would be governed exclusively by the NBA, the common law of receivers, 
and cases applying the statutes and common law to national bank 
receiverships. While FIRREA and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) greatly expanded the 
FDIC's powers in resolving failed insured depository institutions, the 
OCC believes that those additional powers are not available to the OCC 
as receiver of uninsured banks under the NBA.
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    \5\ 12 U.S.C. 191-200.
    \6\ For a discussion of the statutory history relating to 
receiverships of national banks conducted by the OCC, under the NBA, 
and by the FDIC, pursuant to the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), see Proposed Rule, 81 
FR at 62836.
    \7\ Section 11(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the FDIA provides that the FDIC 
``shall'' be appointed receiver, and ``shall'' accept such 
appointment, whenever a receiver is appointed for the purpose of 
liquidation or winding up the affairs of an insured Federal 
depository institution by the appropriate Federal banking agency, 
notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law. 12 U.S.C. 
1821(c)(2)(A)(ii). The term ``Federal depository institution'' 
includes national banks. 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(4).
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    The OCC has not appointed a receiver for an uninsured bank since 
shortly after the Congress established the FDIC in response to the 
banking panics of 1930-1933. National trust banks face very different 
types of risks because of the fundamentally different business model of 
national trust banks compared to commercial and consumer banks and 
savings associations. These risks include operational, compliance, 
strategic, and reputational risks without the credit and liquidity 
risks that additionally affect the solvency of commercial and consumer 
banks. While any of these risks can result in the precipitous failure 
of a bank or savings association, from a historical perspective, trust 
banks have been more likely to decline into a weakened condition, 
allowing the OCC and the institution the time needed to find other 
solutions for rehabilitating the institution or to successfully resolve 
the institution without the need to appoint a receiver.
    The OCC believes it would nevertheless be beneficial to financial 
market participants and the broader community of regulators for the OCC 
to clarify the receivership framework for uninsured banks. Although the 
OCC conducted 2,762 receiverships pursuant to this framework in the 
years prior to the creation of the FDIC,\8\ and the associated legal 
issues are the subject of a robust body of published judicial 
precedents, the details have not been widely articulated in recent 
jurisprudence or legal commentary. This final rule may also facilitate 
synergies with the ongoing efforts of U.S. and international financial 
regulators since the financial crisis to enhance our readiness to 
respond effectively to the different critical financial distresses that 
could manifest themselves unexpectedly in the diverse types of 
financial firms presently operating in the market.
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    \8\ Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency for the 
Year Ended October 31, 1934 at 33 (discussing the status of active 
and closed receiverships under the jurisdiction of the Comptroller 
between 1865 and 1934).
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III. Public Comments on the Proposed Rule

    The OCC received 11 comments from the public in response to the 
OCC's notice of proposed rulemaking and the alternatives the OCC 
discussed therein. The commenters included individuals, a state trust 
company, and a think tank, as well as representatives of consumer 
groups, financial reform advocacy groups, state banking regulators, 
banking institutions, and bitcoin firms. These submissions offered 
issues and viewpoints about selected portions of the proposed rule's 
regulatory provisions for the OCC's consideration; these are discussed 
in connection with the discussion of the OCC's rationale for issuing 
the associated portions of the final rule, in Section III of this 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION.

[[Page 92596]]

    As part of the notice of proposed rulemaking, the OCC also asked 
for the public's input on a number of specific questions and received 
comments on two of these questions. One question was whether any unique 
considerations would be raised by applying the proposed rule's 
framework for receivership of uninsured national banks, which are all 
national trust banks at present, to other uninsured banks that would be 
organized to engage in the delivery of banking services in new and 
innovative ways, such as special purpose national banks engaged in 
financial technology (fintech) activities.\9\
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    \9\ See Proposed Rule, 81 FR at 62837 (discussing the OCC's 
initiative on responsible innovation in the Federal banking system, 
and the OCC's authority to charter special purpose banks that engage 
in selected core non-depository services within the business of 
banking).
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    On this receivership framework question, two commenters expressed 
concerns that the earlier-established legal regime for receiverships 
under the NBA and associated judicial precedent does not include select 
elements subsequently created for insured depository institutions under 
FIRREA and FDICIA, and thus might not be as effective outside the trust 
bank sphere in application to the receivership of special purpose 
national banks engaged in fintech activities. These commenters said the 
OCC should refrain from chartering these special purpose national banks 
until the law changes to address this difference. One commenter 
expressed concern that the rule's incorporation of the NBA's priority 
requirements for payment of receivership claims, which include no 
preference for consumer claims over other general creditors, might have 
the effect of distorting incentives among debt investors across special 
purpose national banks, and more broadly contribute to moral hazard.
    The OCC understands these comments to be urging, in effect, changes 
in the statutory receivership provisions underlying the rule. Absent 
Congressional action to do so, however, the current provisions of the 
NBA are the ones that would govern should it become necessary to 
appoint a receiver for an uninsured national bank. The OCC believes it 
is best to be clear, through a regulation implementing those NBA 
provisions, about the framework that would apply in order to avoid 
clouding the ongoing discussion about the chartering of special purpose 
national banks engaged in fintech activities with uncertainty about how 
uninsured institutions are resolved.
    More broadly, some commenters said the OCC should consider 
receivership and cost issues in deciding whether to charter special 
purpose national banks engaged in fintech activities, or the terms on 
which they could be chartered. Two commenters said the nature of a 
fintech firm's business diverges widely from banks, and that creditor 
loss rates in a receivership for an uninsured special purpose national 
bank engaged in fintech activities may exceed levels that are tolerable 
in the resolution of a chartered bank. These commenters said this was a 
contra-indication for chartering such banks, but one of the commenters 
further elaborated that the OCC can and should exercise particularly 
close supervision of these firms and thereby reduce the risk of 
receiverships ever taking place. Another commenter said that fintech 
firms do not have national trust banks' track record for remaining 
solvent and avoiding receivership, and the OCC should mitigate 
potential concerns about receivership costs by imposing capital support 
agreements and similar obligations in chartering special purpose 
national banks that engage in fintech activities.
    In contrast to these views about the uniqueness of special purpose 
national banks engaged in fintech activities, one commenter said that a 
fintech firm, such as a digital currency exchange, performs a function 
comparable to a national trust bank that obtains payments on behalf of 
customers and provides security for those funds, and therefore such 
institutions do not pose unique considerations for the receivership 
framework. Another commenter said the functions of special purpose 
national banks that engage in fintech activities could be even simpler 
than a national trust bank, such as a special purpose national bank 
that provides fintech payment services where each customer transaction 
is brief and segregated. For special purpose national banks engaged in 
fintech activities involving lending, this commenter stated the 
customer relationships are somewhat longer but still discrete, and that 
the OCC could adequately eliminate concerns about the impact of a 
receivership by ensuring the bank's plans for back-up servicing and 
orderly wind-up were robust.
    Some commenters discussed additional topics not touching on the 
receivership issues covered by the notice of proposed rulemaking, but 
more germane to the desired framework for creating, regulating, and 
supervising special purpose national banks that engage in fintech 
activities or uninsured national trust banks. These broader comments do 
not pertain to the OCC's adoption of the final rule for uninsured banks 
and many of them implicate issues that the OCC would need to evaluate 
on a case-by-case basis in connection with a decision on whether to 
charter a particular special purpose national bank that engages in 
fintech activities. The OCC has recently published and invited comment 
on a paper discussing these issues.\10\ We will consider the broader 
comments on fintech chartering submitted as part of this rulemaking 
together with those we receive in response to the paper.
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    \10\ See Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for 
Fintech Companies (Dec. 2016), available at https://www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf.
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    In the second question asked in the preamble to the Proposed Rule, 
the OCC asked for alternatives that would take into account the cost 
considerations that could arise for the OCC if the administrative 
expenses of an uninsured national bank receivership exceeded the assets 
in the receivership.\11\ In response to this question, one commenter 
urged the OCC not to impose assessment costs for special purpose 
national banks that engage in fintech activities on insured national 
banks, and another commenter further urged the OCC not to impose 
assessment costs for such banks on uninsured national trust banks. The 
OCC continues to consider what approach to assessments would be 
appropriate should it approve charters for special purpose national 
banks engaged in fintech activities. Any resulting modification to the 
OCC's assessment structure would be proposed for public comment in a 
separate rulemaking.
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    \11\ See Proposed Rule, 81 FR at 62838 (discussing the 
receiver's priority claim to liquidation proceeds for administrative 
expenses, the OCC's potential direct expenses for its receivership 
functions, and funding alternatives, such as building resources to 
defray these costs through the OCC's regulations governing the OCC's 
collection of assessments from uninsured national banks).
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IV. The Final Rule

Overview
    The final rule incorporates the framework set forth in the NBA for 
the Comptroller to appoint a receiver for an uninsured bank, generally 
under the same grounds for appointment of the FDIC as receiver for 
insured national banks. The uninsured bank may challenge the 
appointment in court, and the NBA affords jurisdiction to the 
appropriate United States district court for this purpose. The OCC will 
provide the public with notice of the appointment, as well as 
instructions for submitting claims against the uninsured bank in 
receivership. The Comptroller

[[Page 92597]]

may appoint any person as receiver, including the OCC or another 
government agency. The receiver carries out its duties under the 
direction of the Comptroller.
    The final rule also follows the statutory framework under the NBA 
with respect to claims, under which persons with claims against an 
uninsured bank in receivership will file their claims with the receiver 
for the failed uninsured bank, for review by the OCC. In the event the 
OCC denies the claim, the only remedy available to the claimant is to 
bring a judicial action against the uninsured bank's receivership 
estate and assert the claim de novo. A person is also free to initiate 
a claim by bringing an action against the receivership estate in court 
for adjudication and then submit the judgment to the OCC to participate 
in ratable dividends of liquidation proceeds along with other approved 
and adjudicated claims.\12\
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    \12\ See First Nat'l Bank of Bethel v. Nat'l Pahquioque Bank, 81 
U.S. 383, 401 (1871).
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    Approved or adjudicated claims are paid solely out of the assets of 
the uninsured national bank in receivership. This reflects the legal 
distinction between the OCC as regulatory agency and the OCC acting in 
a receivership capacity. In the former, the OCC oversees national 
banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and Federal agencies, supervising 
them under the charge of assuring the safety and soundness of, and 
compliance with laws and regulations, fair access to financial 
services, and fair treatment of customers by, the institutions and 
other persons subject to its jurisdiction. As receiver, the OCC 
appoints and oversees receivers for uninsured national banks, thereby 
facilitating the winding down of bank operations, assets, and accounts 
while minimizing disruptions to customers and creditors of the 
institution. Under the ``separate capacities'' doctrine, which has long 
been recognized in litigation involving the FDIC, it is well 
established that the agency, when acting in one capacity, is not liable 
for claims against the agency acting in its other capacity.\13\
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    \13\ For a discussion of the separate capacities doctrine and 
related case law, see Proposed Rule, 81 FR at 62838.
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    As provided in the final rule, the receiver liquidates the assets 
of the uninsured bank, with court approval, and pays the proceeds into 
an account as directed by the OCC. The categories of claims and the 
priority thereof for payment are set out in the final rule. The final 
rule also clarifies certain powers held by the receiver.
Section-by-Section Analysis
    Section 51.1 of the final rule identifies the purpose and scope of 
the final rule and clarifies that the rule applies to receiverships 
conducted by the OCC under the NBA for national banks that are not 
insured by the FDIC.\14\ The final rule does not extend to 
receiverships for uninsured Federal branches, although elements of the 
framework may be similar for uninsured Federal branch receiverships, 
which would also be resolved under provisions of the NBA.
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    \14\ A nationwide organization of state regulators requested 
clarity on how the NBA receivership framework for uninsured national 
banks and the OCC's proposed rule thereunder would interact with the 
processes established for debtors and creditors pursuant to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code. The OCC is not aware of any opinion of a U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court, or any other U.S. court, finding that an uninsured 
national bank is eligible to be a debtor subject to a petition under 
the Code.
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    Section 51.2 of the final rule is based on 12 U.S.C. 191 and 192 
and concerns appointment of a receiver. The final rule sets out the 
Comptroller's authority to appoint any person, including the OCC or 
another government agency, as receiver for an uninsured bank and 
provides that the receiver performs its duties subject to the approval 
and direction of the Comptroller.\15\ If the Comptroller were to 
appoint the OCC as receiver, the OCC would act in a receivership 
capacity with respect to the uninsured bank in receivership, rather 
than in the OCC's supervisory capacity.
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    \15\ But see 12 U.S.C. 1821(c)(6) (Comptroller may appoint the 
FDIC as conservator or receiver and the FDIC has discretion to 
accept such appointment); id. section 1821(c)(2)(C) (FDIC ``not 
subject to any other agency'' when acting as conservator or 
receiver''). Read together, these provisions likely mean that the 
provision in Sec.  51.2 concerning oversight of the receiver by the 
Comptroller would not apply to the FDIC acting as conservator or 
receiver for an uninsured institution, should the Comptroller 
appoint the FDIC and the FDIC accept such an appointment.
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    As discussed earlier, this dual capacity (OCC as supervisor versus 
OCC as receivership sponsor for an uninsured bank) recognizes that, 
while the NBA makes the receivership oversight and claims review 
functions of the Comptroller part of the OCC's responsibilities, the 
receivership oversight role is unique and distinct from the OCC's role 
as a Federal regulatory agency and supervisor of national banks and 
FSAs. This is comparable to the dual capacity of the FDIC's 
receivership function for insured depository institutions pursuant to 
the FDIA.
    Section 51.2 of the final rule also provides that the Comptroller 
may require the receiver to post a bond or other security and the 
receiver may hire staff and professional advisors, with the approval of 
the Comptroller, if needed to carry out the receivership. This section 
also identifies the grounds for appointment of a receiver for an 
uninsured bank and notes that uninsured banks may seek judicial review 
of the appointment pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 191.
    Section 51.3 of the final rule provides that the OCC will provide 
notice to the public of the appointment of a receiver for the uninsured 
bank. The final rule specifies that one component of this notice will 
include publication in a newspaper of general circulation selected by 
the OCC for three consecutive months, as required by 12 U.S.C. 193. As 
a component of the OCC's notice to the public about the receivership, 
the OCC will also provide instructions for creditors and other 
claimants seeking to submit claims with the receiver for the uninsured 
bank.
    As noted in the proposed rule, the OCC believes that the purpose of 
section 193 may be better served by publication through means in 
addition to the statutorily required publication in a newspaper. For 
example, the OCC could provide direct notice to customers and creditors 
of the uninsured bank to the extent the uninsured bank's records 
included current contact information. The OCC could also arrange to 
provide notice through electronic channels that customers would 
typically use to contact the uninsured bank, such as the uninsured 
bank's Web site. The OCC believes that an effective set of notice 
protocols would best be established on a case-by-case basis, in light 
of a specific uninsured bank's fiduciary and custodial activities, the 
types of customers served by the bank, coordination with other notice 
protocols under way for any related entity that is also undergoing 
resolution activity, and similar factors. The OCC requested comment on 
alternative means of communicating with customers of uninsured banks.
    One commenter, a trade association for banks, suggested that the 
OCC employ notice mechanisms that are consistent with the way in which 
the failed bank typically communicates with its clients and 
counterparties. The commenter suggested, for example, that a receiver 
for an institution with clients in other countries should communicate 
with those clients in the language typically used by the institution in 
its communications with those clients. The OCC agrees that this 
approach would be appropriate in such cases and reiterates that 
effective forms of notice, beyond the statutorily required notice in a 
newspaper, will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.

[[Page 92598]]

    Section 51.4 of the final rule addresses the submission of claims 
to the receiver for an uninsured bank. Under Sec.  51.4(a), a person 
with a claim against the receivership may submit a claim to the OCC, 
which will consider the claim and make a determination concerning its 
validity and approved amount. This process reflects the provisions in 
12 U.S.C. 193 and 194 regarding presentation of claims and payment of 
dividends on claims that are proved to the satisfaction of the 
Comptroller. Section 51.4 also provides that the Comptroller will 
establish a deadline for filing claims with the receiver, which could 
not be earlier than 30 days after the three-month publication of notice 
required by Sec.  51.3. This provision reflects NBA case law that 
permits the Comptroller to establish a date for filing claims against 
the receiver for a failed bank.\16\
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    \16\ See Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525, 531 (10th Cir. 1937).
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    Section 51.4(b) of the final rule clarifies that persons with 
claims against an uninsured bank in receivership may present their 
claims to a court of competent jurisdiction for adjudication in 
addition to, or as an alternative to, filing a claim with the OCC. If 
successful in court, such persons will be required to submit a copy of 
the final judgment to the OCC to participate in ratable dividends of 
liquidation proceeds along with claims against the bank in receivership 
submitted to, and approved by, the OCC. The final rule requires 
submission of a copy of the court's final judgment to the OCC. This 
provision is based on 12 U.S.C. 193 and 194.
    In this regard, the receivership regime established by the NBA 
differs somewhat from the approach set out in other resolution regimes, 
such as the bankruptcy provisions of the United States Code and the 
receivership provisions of the FDIA. Under those resolution regimes, 
creditors and claimants must generally submit their claims to the 
receivership estate for centralized administration and disposition, and 
claims that are not submitted by the claims deadline are barred from 
any participation in liquidation payments. The NBA provisions are 
different in that claimants are provided the opportunity to submit 
claims to the OCC for evaluation, but are not foreclosed from pursuing 
judicial resolution by filing litigation (or continuing a pre-existing 
lawsuit) in a court of competent jurisdiction against the uninsured 
bank in receivership.
    The claims filing deadline established by the Comptroller pursuant 
to Sec.  51.4(a) of the final rule is the date by which claimants 
seeking review under the OCC's claims process must make their 
submission. Nevertheless, a claimant that has not made a submission to 
the OCC by the deadline is not barred from initiating judicial claims 
against the uninsured bank in receivership solely by virtue of missing 
the claims deadline.\17\
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    \17\ See First Nat'l Bank of Bethel v. Nat'l Pahquioque Bank, 81 
U.S. 383, 401 (1871); Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525, 531 (10th Cir. 
1937). As noted earlier, it is incumbent on a claimant that pursues 
the judicial route and ultimately obtains judicial relief to submit 
the final judicial determination and award to the OCC, in order to 
participate in the OCC's periodic ratable dividends of liquidation 
proceeds of the receivership estate. Except with respect to a valid 
and enforceable security interest in specific property of the 
uninsured bank established as part of a final judicial 
determination, there are no assets or funds available to a 
successful judicial claimant other than the ratable dividend process 
set out in 12 U.S.C. 194 and described in Sec.  51.8 of the final 
rule.
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    The NBA's receivership provisions are like the receivership regime 
established by the FDIC under the FDIA, however, in that the avenue 
available to a party whose claim has been denied by the FDIC or OCC, 
when performing the agencies' receivership claims functions, is to file 
(or continue) a de novo judicial action asserting the facts and legal 
theory of the claim against the receivership of the bank. The NBA does 
not contemplate or support further action by the claimant in an 
administrative or judicial forum against the OCC seeking review of the 
claim determination.
    Section 51.4(c) of the final rule provides that if a person with a 
claim against an uninsured bank in receivership also has an obligation 
owed to the bank, the claim and obligation will be set off against each 
other and only the net balance remaining after set-off will be 
considered as a claim. To this end, Sec.  51.4(a) also includes 
language referring to claims for set-off. The right of set-off where 
parties have mutual obligations has long been recognized as an 
equitable principle.\18\ Well-settled case law has held that a 
receivership creditor's or other claimant's equitable right to a set-
off is not precluded by the ratable distribution requirement of the 
NBA, provided such set-off is otherwise legally valid.\19\ If, after 
set-off, an amount is owed to the creditor, the creditor may file a 
claim for the net amount remaining as any other general creditor. 
Conversely, if, after set-off, an amount is owed to the bank, the 
creditor does not have a claim and the net amount remaining is an asset 
of the uninsured bank, which the receiver may obtain in connection with 
marshalling the assets (as described further in Sec.  51.7(a) of the 
final rule).
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    \18\ See, e.g., Scammon v. Kimball, 92 U.S. 362 (1876); Blount 
v. Windley, 95 U.S. 173, 177 (1877); Carr v. Hamilton, 129 U.S. 252 
(1889).
    \19\ See Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 510 (1892); 
InterFirst Bank of Abilene, N.A. v. FDIC, 777 F.2d 1092, 1095-1096 
(5th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Mademoiselle of California, 379 F.2d 660, 
663 (9th Cir. 1967).
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    The OCC requested comment on whether there are additional 
characteristics of set-offs or other situations in which set-off may 
arise that should be included in the rule. One commenter, a trade 
association for banks, said that the administration of set-offs may be 
complex, given that the trust and fiduciary business is a fee-based 
industry. The commenter offered the example of instances in which fees 
have been accrued or are otherwise in the process of payment to one or 
more service providers at the time of receivership. The commenter 
suggested that the final rule acknowledge that a given resolution may 
involve bespoke, fact-specific set-off situations that would need to be 
carefully considered, while also serving the need for the receiver or a 
successor fiduciary to be in a position to continue providing fiduciary 
services during the receivership.
    The OCC believes that, on balance, it is not necessary to make this 
kind of an addition to the language of the final rule. Section 51.4 as 
a whole is designed to make the basic framework of claim submission 
transparent to creditors of the uninsured bank, and set-off is included 
as an element of this framework. As the commenter states, the OCC's 
determination of particular claims will require consideration of fact-
specific situations prior to reaching a disposition, and this extends 
to considerations of set-offs. The final rule is designed to 
accommodate with flexibility the consideration of such factors in the 
context in which each claim is postured.
    Section 51.5 of the final rule sets out the order of priorities for 
payment of administrative expenses of the receiver and claims against 
the uninsured bank in receivership. Under this section, the OCC will 
pay these expenses and claims in the following order: (1) 
administrative expenses of the receiver; (2) unsecured creditors, 
including secured creditors to the extent their claim exceeds their 
valid and enforceable security interest; (3) creditors of the uninsured 
bank, if any, whose claims are subordinated to general creditor claims; 
and (4) shareholders of the uninsured bank. The order is based on case 
law and, in the

[[Page 92599]]

case of the first priority for administrative expenses, on 12 U.S.C. 
196.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ See Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406, 410-411 
(1938); Merrill v. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.S. 131, 146 
(1899); Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 510 (1892); Bell v. 
Hanover Nat'l Bank, 57 F. 821, 822 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1893).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A creditor or other claimant with a security interest that was 
valid and enforceable as to its terms prior to the appointment of the 
receiver is entitled to exercise that security interest, outside the 
priority of distributions set out in the final rule.\21\ If the 
collateral value exceeds the amount of the claim as it was immediately 
prior to the receiver's appointment, the surplus remains an asset of 
the uninsured bank, and the receiver may obtain it in connection with 
marshalling the assets (as further described in Sec.  51.7(a) of the 
final rule).\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Ticonic Nat'l Bank v. Sprague, 303 U.S. 406, 410-411 
(1938); Bell v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 57 F. 821, 822 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1893).
    \22\ Bell v. Hanover Nat'l Bank, 57 F. 821, 822 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1893).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Liens arising from judicial determinations after the initiation of 
the receivership, as well as contractual liens that are triggered due 
to the appointment of a receiver or other post-appointment events, are 
not enforceable. This is because recognition of these liens would 
afford these claimants a priority that is not recognized under the 
established legal priorities described in Sec.  51.5 of the final rule. 
Similarly, a secured creditor is not entitled to a priority 
distribution of any portion of the claim that is not covered by the 
value of the collateral because the creditor is in the position of a 
general unsecured creditor for that portion of the claim and must 
participate in ratable liquidation distributions on par with other 
unsecured creditors.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Merrill v. Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U.S. 131, 146 
(1899).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Assets held by the uninsured bank at the time of the receiver's 
appointment in a fiduciary or custodial capacity, as identified on the 
bank's books and records, are not general assets of the bank. Section 
51.8(b) of the final rule reiterates this point. In the same vein, the 
claim of the customer for the return of the customer's fiduciary or 
custodial assets is separate from, and not subject to, the priority set 
out in Sec.  51.5. Fiduciary and custodial customers of the bank have 
direct claims on those assets pursuant to their fiduciary or custodial 
account contracts. However, the priority of a fiduciary or custodial 
customer's other claims against the bank, if any, would remain subject 
to the priority described in Sec.  51.5. For example, a fiduciary 
customer's claim for a refund of prepaid investment management fees 
that were attributable to periods after the receiver returned the 
fiduciary assets to the customer generally would be a general unsecured 
claim covered by Sec.  51.5(b). The claims process described in Sec.  
51.4(b) is available to a fiduciary customer, for both a direct claim 
for the return of fiduciary assets, as well as a receivership claim for 
amounts the customer believes it is owed by the bank.
    The OCC requested comment on whether there are other Federal 
statutes regarding specific types of claims that may be applicable to a 
receivership of an uninsured bank under the NBA and that would give 
certain claims a different priority, such as claims owed to the Federal 
government. One commenter, a coalition that advocates for reform in the 
financial services industry, agreed that customer assets held by a bank 
in a fiduciary capacity should not be considered assets of the bank, 
but questioned why other claims of the customer, such as a claim for a 
refund of prepaid investment management fees that were attributable to 
periods after the receiver returned the fiduciary assets to the 
customer, would be treated as a unsecured general creditor claim. The 
commenter suggested that such customer funds would have less protection 
in a receivership for an uninsured bank than they would under certain 
modern receivership and bankruptcy statutes that set forth claim 
priorities which include preference to customer claims over other 
general creditor claims.
    The OCC is required, by statute, to pay claims on a ratable basis. 
As discussed in connection with the description of Sec.  51.8 of the 
final rule, this requirement has been interpreted by the courts as 
requiring the OCC to make distributions on OCC-approved claims and 
judicial awards on an equal footing, determining the amount of each 
creditor's claim as it stands at the point of insolvency. As a result, 
the controlling ratable payment statute does not support a rule that 
makes distinctions in distribution priority between customer and 
general creditor claimants.
    Section 51.6 of the final rule provides that all administrative 
expenses of the receiver for an uninsured bank will be paid out of the 
assets of the receivership before payment of claims against the 
receivership. This reflects the requirements in 12 U.S.C. 196. The 
final rule also states that receivership expenses will include pre-
receivership and post-receivership obligations that the receiver 
determines are necessary and appropriate to facilitate the orderly 
liquidation or other resolution of the uninsured bank in receivership. 
To further illustrate the kinds of expenses that Sec.  196 affords a 
first priority claim on the uninsured bank's receivership assets, Sec.  
51.6 enumerates examples of such administrative expenses, such as wages 
and salaries of employees, expenses for professional services, 
contractual rent pursuant to an existing lease or rental agreement, and 
payments to third-party or affiliated service providers, when the 
receiver determines these expenses are of benefit to the receivership.
    Section 51.7 of the final rule contains provisions describing the 
powers and duties of the receiver and the disposition of fiduciary and 
custodial accounts. As described in Sec.  51.7, the receiver will take 
over the assets and operation of the uninsured bank, take action to 
realize on debts owed to the uninsured bank, sell the property of the 
bank, and liquidate the assets of the uninsured bank for payment of 
claims against the receivership. Section 51.7(a)(1)-(5) lists some of 
the major powers and duties for the receiver set out in 12 U.S.C. 192 
and clarified by the courts, including taking possession of the books 
and records of the bank, collecting on debts and claims owed to the 
bank, selling or compromising bad or doubtful debts (with court 
approval), and selling the bank's real and personal property (also with 
court approval).
    Section 51.7(b) of the final rule provides for the receiver to 
close the uninsured bank's fiduciary and custodial appointments, or 
transfer such accounts to a successor fiduciary or custodian under 12 
CFR 9.16 or other applicable Federal law. The uninsured banks currently 
in existence focus on fiduciary and custodial services, so this 
function of the receiver will be of primary importance. This provision 
recognizes that the receiver's power to wind up the affairs of the 
uninsured bank in receivership, acting with court approval to make 
disposition of bank assets, should properly encompass the power to 
transfer fiduciary or custodial appointments and any associated assets 
in appropriate circumstances.
    Transfer of fiduciary appointments may occur under the terms of the 
instrument creating the relationship, if it provides for transfer, or 
under a fiduciary transfer statute, if one is applicable. The OCC 
believes there are strong public policy interests in endeavoring to 
replace fiduciaries and custodians expeditiously, without an 
interruption in service to their customers, if transfer can be arranged 
to a qualified successor, maintaining the

[[Page 92600]]

same duties and standards of care with respect to the customers that 
previously pertained to their accounts at the uninsured bank in 
receivership. The alternative, given that the uninsured bank must be 
wound down and cannot provide services in the future, is to stop 
managing and reinvesting the customer's assets, stop responding to 
directions to transfer or receive assets in custody, close the 
accounts, and seek instructions from the account holders or the courts 
regarding return of associated assets. For institutional customers, 
this is likely to cause significant interruption of the intricate 
machinery of their financial operations. For individuals, it can 
potentially result in loss of asset value in adverse markets, or loss 
of income due to foregone reinvestments.
    Across the United States, there are disparate and often conflicting 
legal rules restricting or conditioning transfers of an appointment of 
a fiduciary for a beneficiary residing within the state. Depending on 
the geographic area across which the uninsured bank has established 
fiduciary relationships with its customers, and the standardization of 
its fiduciary account agreements or appointing instruments, it may be 
practicable for the receiver to transition an uninsured bank's 
fiduciary and custody accounts to a qualified successor through the 
mechanisms provided by applicable local law. On the other hand, if 
faced with dispersed customers, diverse account agreements or 
appointments of different vintage, or even the absence of an applicable 
law of transfer for customers in certain states, reliance on these 
methods may be so cumbersome as to effectively prevent accomplishment 
of the transfers in a timely way.
    In order to address these potential problems, the OCC, relying on 
the support of existing case law, is including language in the final 
rule to make it clear that the uninsured bank receiver's power under 12 
U.S.C. 192 to sell, with court approval, the real and personal property 
of the bank includes the power to transfer the bank's fiduciary 
accounts and related assets, subject to the approval of the court 
exercising jurisdiction over the receiver's efforts to transfer the 
bank's assets. The final rule is consistent with case law recognizing 
that a receiver for a national bank may properly arrange asset purchase 
and liability assumption transactions to move the business of a failed 
bank to a successor on an integrated basis, as part of the power to 
transfer assets, as well as analogous case law concerning the transfer 
of fiduciary and custodial assets by the FDIC, acting as receiver of 
failed insured depository institutions.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ See NCNB Texas National Bank v. Cowden, 895 F.2d 1488 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (holding that the FDIC, as receiver of insolvent bank, 
had authority to transfer fiduciary appointments to a bridge bank 
prior to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 51.7(c) of the final rule incorporates, in general terms, 
the powers, duties, and responsibilities of receivers for national 
banks under the NBA and under judicial precedents determining the 
authorities and responsibilities of receivers for national banks. 
Examples of these powers include: (1) the authority to repudiate 
certain contracts, including: (a) purely executory contracts, upon 
determining that the contracts would be unduly burdensome or 
unprofitable for the receivership estate,\25\ (b) contracts that 
involve fraud or misrepresentation,\26\ and (c) in limited cases, non-
executory contracts that are contrary to public policy; \27\ (2) the 
authority to recover fraudulent transfers; \28\ and (3) the authority 
to enforce collection of notes from debtors and collateral, regardless 
of the existence of side arrangements that would otherwise defeat the 
collectability of such notes.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ Bank One Texas v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 
943, 964-66 (N.D. Tex. 1995).
    \26\ A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts Sec.  228 at 320 (1952) 
(addressing contracts voidable for fraud, duress, or mistake).
    \27\ Cf. Fidelity Deposit Co. of Md. v. Conner, 973 F.2d 1236, 
1241 (5th Cir. 1992).
    \28\ See Peters v. Bain, 133 U.S. 670 (1890) (applying state 
substantive law to determine whether to void a transfer); Rogers v. 
Marchant, 91 F.2d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 1937).
    \29\ D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 458 
(1942). A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, Sec.  228 at 320 (1952) 
(addressing contracts voidable for fraud, duress or mistake).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 51.7(d) of the final rule requires the receiver to make 
periodic reports to the OCC concerning the status and proceedings of 
the receivership.
    Section 51.8 of the final rule contains provisions regarding the 
payment of dividends on claims against the uninsured bank and the 
distribution of any remaining proceeds to shareholders. This section 
provides that, after administrative expenses of the receivership have 
been paid, the OCC will make ratable dividends from available 
receivership funds based on the priority of claims in proposed Sec.  
51.5 for claims that have been proved to the OCC's satisfaction or 
adjudicated in a court of competent jurisdiction, as provided in 12 
U.S.C. 194. The OCC will make payment of dividends, if any, 
periodically, at the discretion of the OCC, as the receiver liquidates 
the assets of the uninsured bank.
    The final rule's inclusion of the ``ratable dividend'' requirement 
is designed to incorporate the associated standards about the proper 
application of this statutory directive, which the judiciary has 
articulated over the years. The ratable dividend requirement directs 
the OCC to make distributions on OCC-approved claims and judicial 
awards on an equal footing, determining the amount of each creditor's 
claim as it stands at the point of insolvency. As one example, a 
court's award of interest on an unpaid debt to the date of a judgment 
rendered in the plaintiff's favor after the receiver was appointed does 
not increase the amount of the plaintiff's claim for purposes of making 
ratable dividends. As another example, the ratable dividend requirement 
generally restricts claims against the bank receivership for debts that 
were not due and owing at the appointment of the receiver and arose for 
the first time as a consequence of the appointment or a post-
appointment event.
    The OCC requested comment on alternatives to the proposed rule's 
approach to paying dividends on claims, under which the OCC would 
exercise its discretion under section 194 to determine the timing of 
the distributions on established claims. Under one alternative 
presented in the proposed rule, the OCC would refrain from paying any 
dividends until all claims have been submitted and validated, with 
final allowed claim amounts established. As we noted in the proposal, 
this approach presents the possibility that proven claims may be 
delayed for a significant amount of time pending more protracted 
resolution of other claims. Under a second option presented in the 
proposed rule, the OCC would make ongoing dividends on proven claims, 
subject to the receiver's retaining a percentage of the funds on hand 
at the time of the distribution as a pool of dividends for catch-up 
distributions to a successful plaintiff later.
    The OCC did not receive comments on these alternative approaches 
for making ratable distributions on claims against a receivership. For 
this reason, and because the proposed rule's approach to payment of 
dividends provides the OCC with the discretion to tailor the dividend 
process to facts and circumstances of a particular receivership, the 
final rule adopts Sec.  51.8 as proposed.
    Section 51.8(a)(2) of the final rule recognizes the basic legal 
premise under the NBA receivership provisions and judicial 
interpretations thereof that any dividend payments to creditors and 
other claimants of an uninsured bank will be made solely from 
receivership

[[Page 92601]]

funds, if any, paid to the OCC by the receiver after payment of the 
expenses of the receiver. This provision is also consistent with the 
established dichotomy of the OCC's supervisory and receivership 
capacities in the NBA, as discussed earlier.
    Section 51.8(b) of the final rule similarly recognizes that assets 
held by an uninsured national bank at the time of the receiver's 
appointment in a fiduciary or custodial capacity, as designated on the 
bank's books and records, are not part of the bank's general assets and 
liabilities held in connection with its other business and will not be 
considered a source for payment for unrelated claims of creditors and 
other claimants. This provision is intended to make clear that the 
receiver will segregate identified fiduciary and custodial assets and 
either transfer those assets to other fiduciaries or custodians as 
described in connection with Sec.  51.7(b), or close the accounts and 
endeavor to make the associated assets available to the account holders 
or their representatives through other means.
    One commenter, a trade association for banks, agreed with the 
treatment of fiduciary assets in the proposed rule, but questioned 
whether Sec.  51.8(b) indicates with sufficient clarity that fiduciary 
assets will not be treated as assets of the bank in receivership. As 
stated in the final rule, fiduciary and custodial assets ``will not be 
considered as part of the bank's general assets. . .''. The OCC 
reiterates that, under this section, assets held by an uninsured bank 
in a fiduciary or custodial capacity, as designated on the bank's books 
and records, are not part of the bank's general assets and liabilities 
held in connection with its other business and will not be a source for 
payment for unrelated claims of creditors and other claimants.
    Section 51.8(d) of the final rule provides that, after all 
administrative expenses and claims have been paid in full, any 
remaining proceeds will be paid to shareholders in proportion to their 
stock ownership, also as provided in 12 U.S.C. 194.
    Section 51.9 of the final rule contains provisions for termination 
of receiverships in which there are assets remaining after all 
administrative expenses and all claims had been paid. This is the 
scenario addressed by 12 U.S.C. 197. In such a case, section 197 
requires the Comptroller to call a meeting of the shareholders of the 
bank at which the shareholders would decide whether to continue 
oversight by the Comptroller, or whether to end the receivership and 
appoint a liquidating agent to continue the liquidation of the 
remaining assets, under the direction of the board of directors and 
shareholders, as in a liquidation that had commenced under 12 U.S.C. 
181.
    There may be other circumstances under which termination would take 
place, such as when there are no receivership assets remaining after 
completion of receivership activities. Under this scenario, the 
receiver for an uninsured bank has liquidated all of the bank's assets, 
closed or transferred all fiduciary accounts to a successor fiduciary, 
paid all administrative expenses, and either paid creditor claims in 
full and distributed the remaining proceeds to shareholders, as 
provided in Sec.  51.8(c) of the final rule, or made ratable dividends 
of all remaining proceeds to creditors as provided in Sec.  51.8(a), 
but no additional assets remain in the estate. Under these 
circumstances, the provisions in 12 U.S.C. 197 for termination would 
not apply.

V. Regulatory Analysis

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    Under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et 
seq.), the OCC may not conduct or sponsor, and, notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, a person is not required to respond to, an 
information collection unless the information collection displays a 
valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The final 
rule contains no information collection requirements under the PRA.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq., 
generally requires that, in connection with a rulemaking, an agency 
prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility 
analysis that describes the impact of the rule on small entities. 
However, the regulatory flexibility analysis otherwise required under 
the RFA is not required if an agency certifies that the rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities (defined in regulations promulgated by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) to include commercial banks and savings 
institutions, and trust companies, with assets of $550 million or less 
and $38.5 million or less, respectively) and publishes its 
certification and a brief explanatory statement in the Federal Register 
together with the rule.
    The OCC currently supervises approximately 1,032 small entities. 
The scope of the final rule extends to uninsured banks. The maximum 
number of OCC-supervised small uninsured banks that could be subject to 
the receivership framework described in the final rule is approximately 
18.\30\ Accordingly, the OCC certifies that the final rule will not 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Consistent with the General Principles of Affiliation 13 
CFR 121.103(a), the OCC counts the assets of affiliated financial 
institutions when determining if we should classify an institution 
we supervise as a small entity. We used December 31, 2015, to 
determine size because a financial institution's assets are 
determined by averaging the assets reported on its four quarterly 
financial statements for the preceding year. See footnote 8 of the 
U.S. SBA's Table of Size Standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

OCC Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 Determination
    The OCC has analyzed the final rule under the factors in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1532). Under this 
analysis, the OCC considered whether the final rule includes a Federal 
mandate that may result in the expenditure by state, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year (adjusted annually for inflation). As 
detailed in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION, the OCC currently supervises 
52 uninsured banks, all of which are uninsured trust banks, and has not 
appointed a receiver for an uninsured bank since 1933. Unlike 
commercial and consumer banks and savings associations, which generally 
face credit and liquidity risks, national trust banks primarily face 
operational, reputational, and strategic risks. While any of these 
risks could result in the precipitous failure of a bank or savings 
association, from a historical perspective, trust banks have been more 
likely to decline into a weakened condition, allowing the OCC and the 
institution the time needed to find other solutions for rehabilitating 
the institution or to successfully resolve the institution without the 
need to appoint a receiver. As such, we believe the OCC is unlikely to 
place an uninsured trust bank into receivership. For this reason, and 
because the final rule does not impose any implementation requirements, 
the OCC concludes that the final rule will not result in an expenditure 
of $100 million or more by state, local, and tribal governments, or by 
the private sector, in any one year.

List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 51

    Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, National 
banks, Procedural rules, Receiverships.

[[Page 92602]]

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble and under the authority 
of 12 U.S.C. 16, 93a, 191-200, 481, 482, 1831c, and 1867 the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency adds part 51 to chapter I of title 12, 
Code of Federal Regulations to read as follows:

PART 51--RECEIVERSHIPS FOR UNINSURED NATIONAL BANKS

Sec.
51.1 Purpose and scope.
51.2 Appointment of receiver.
51.3 Notice of appointment of receiver.
51.4 Claims.
51.5 Order of priorities.
51.6 Administrative expenses of receiver.
51.7 Powers and duties of receiver; disposition of fiduciary and 
custodial accounts.
51.8 Payment of claims and dividends to shareholders.
51.9 Termination of receivership.

    Authority:  12 U.S.C. 16, 93a, 191-200, 481, 482, 1831c, and 
1867.


Sec.  51.1   Purpose and scope.

    (a) Purpose. This part sets out procedures for receiverships of 
national banks conducted by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) under the receivership provisions of the National Bank 
Act (NBA). These receivership provisions apply to national banks that 
are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
    (b) Scope. This part applies to the appointment of a receiver for 
uninsured national banks (uninsured banks) and the operation of a 
receivership after appointment of a receiver for an uninsured bank 
under 12 U.S.C. 191.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ This part does not apply to receiverships for uninsured 
Federal branches or uninsured Federal agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------


Sec.  51.2   Appointment of receiver.

    (a) In general. The Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) may 
appoint any person, including the OCC or another government agency, as 
receiver for an uninsured bank. The receiver performs its duties under 
the direction of the Comptroller and serves at the will of the 
Comptroller. The Comptroller may require the receiver to post a bond or 
other security. The receiver, with the approval of the Comptroller, may 
employ such staff and enter into contracts for professional services as 
are necessary to carry out the receivership.
    (b) Grounds for appointment. The Comptroller may appoint a receiver 
for an uninsured bank based on any of the grounds specified in 12 
U.S.C. 191(a).
    (c) Judicial review. If the Comptroller appoints a receiver for an 
uninsured bank, the bank may seek judicial review of the appointment as 
provided in 12 U.S.C. 191(b).


Sec.  51.3   Notice of appointment of receiver.

    Upon appointment of a receiver for an uninsured bank, the OCC will 
provide notice to the public of the receivership, including by 
publication in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive 
months. The notice of the receivership will provide instructions for 
creditors and other claimants seeking to submit claims with the 
receiver for the uninsured bank.


Sec.  51.4   Claims.

    (a) Submission of claims for consideration by the OCC. (1) Persons 
who have claims against the receivership for an uninsured bank may 
present such claims, along with supporting documentation, for 
consideration by the OCC. The OCC will determine the validity and 
approve the amounts of such claims.
    (2) The OCC will establish a date by which any person seeking to 
present a claim against the uninsured bank for consideration by the OCC 
must present their claim for determination. The deadline for filing 
such claims will not be less than 30 days after the end of the three-
month notice period in Sec.  51.3.
    (3) The OCC will allow any claim against the uninsured bank 
received on or before the deadline for presenting claims if such claim 
is established to the OCC's satisfaction by the information on the 
uninsured bank's books and records or otherwise submitted. The OCC may 
disallow any portion of any claim by a creditor or claim of a security, 
preference, set-off, or priority which is not established to the 
satisfaction of the OCC.
    (b) Submission of claims to a court. Persons with claims against an 
uninsured bank in receivership may present their claims to a court of 
competent jurisdiction for adjudication. Such persons must submit a 
copy of any final judgment received from the court to the OCC, to 
participate in ratable dividends along with other proved claims.
    (c) Right of set-off. If a person with a claim against an uninsured 
bank in receivership also has an obligation owed to the bank, the claim 
and obligation will be set off against each other and only the net 
balance remaining after set-off shall be considered as a claim, 
provided such set-off is otherwise legally valid.


Sec.  51.5   Order of priorities.

    The OCC will pay receivership expenses and proved claims against 
the uninsured bank in receivership in the following order of priority:
    (a) Administrative expenses of the receiver;
    (b) Unsecured creditors of the uninsured bank, including secured 
creditors to the extent their claim exceeds their valid and enforceable 
security interest;
    (c) Creditors of the uninsured bank, if any, whose claims are 
subordinated to general creditor claims; and
    (d) Shareholders of the uninsured bank.


Sec.  51.6   Administrative expenses of receiver.

    (a) Priority of administrative expenses. All administrative 
expenses of the receiver for an uninsured bank shall be paid out of the 
assets of the bank in receivership before payment of claims against the 
receivership.
    (b) Scope of administrative expenses. Administrative expenses of 
the receiver for an uninsured bank include those expenses incurred by 
the receiver in maintaining banking operations during the receivership, 
to preserve assets of the uninsured bank, while liquidating or 
otherwise resolving the affairs of the uninsured bank. Such expenses 
include pre-receivership and post-receivership obligations that the 
receiver determines are necessary and appropriate to facilitate the 
orderly liquidation or other resolution of the uninsured bank in 
receivership.
    (c) Types of administrative expenses. Administrative expenses for 
the receiver of an uninsured bank include:
    (1) Salaries, costs, and other expenses of the receiver and its 
staff, and costs of contracts entered into by the receiver for 
professional services relating to performing receivership duties; and
    (2) Expenses necessary for the operation of the uninsured bank, 
including wages and salaries of employees, expenses for professional 
services, contractual rent pursuant to an existing lease or rental 
agreement, and payments to third-party or affiliated service providers, 
that in the opinion of the receiver are of benefit to the receivership, 
until the date the receiver repudiates, terminates, cancels, or 
otherwise discontinues the applicable contract.


Sec.  51.7   Powers and duties of receiver; disposition of fiduciary 
and custodial accounts.

    (a) Marshalling of assets. In resolving the affairs of an uninsured 
bank in receivership, the receiver:
    (1) Takes possession of the books, records and other property and 
assets of the uninsured bank, including the value

[[Page 92603]]

of collateral pledged by the uninsured bank to the extent it exceeds 
valid and enforceable security interests of a claimant;
    (2) Collects all debts, dues and claims belonging to the uninsured 
bank, including claims remaining after set-off;
    (3) Sells or compromises all bad or doubtful debts, subject to 
approval by a court of competent jurisdiction;
    (4) Sells the real and personal property of the uninsured bank, 
subject to approval by a court of competent jurisdiction, on such terms 
as the court shall direct; and
    (5) Deposits all receivership funds collected from the liquidation 
of the uninsured bank in an account designated by the OCC.
    (b) Disposition of fiduciary and custodial accounts. The receiver 
for an uninsured bank closes the bank's fiduciary and custodial 
appointments and accounts or transfers some or all of such accounts to 
successor fiduciaries and custodians, in accordance with 12 CFR 9.16, 
and other applicable Federal law.
    (c) Other powers. The receiver for an uninsured bank may exercise 
other rights, privileges, and powers authorized for receivers of 
national banks under the NBA and the common law of receiverships as 
applied by the courts to receiverships of national banks conducted 
under the NBA.
    (d) Reports to OCC. The receiver for an uninsured bank shall make 
periodic reports to the OCC on the status and proceedings of the 
receivership.
    (e) Receiver subject to removal; modification of fees. (1) The 
Comptroller may remove and replace the receiver for an uninsured bank 
if, in the Comptroller's discretion, the receiver is not conducting the 
receivership in accordance with applicable Federal laws or regulations 
or fails to comply with decisions of the Comptroller with respect to 
the conduct of the receivership or claims against the receivership.
    (2) The Comptroller may reduce the fees of the receiver for an 
uninsured bank if, in the Comptroller's discretion, the Comptroller 
finds the performance of the receiver to be deficient, or the fees of 
the receiver to be excessive, unreasonable, or beyond the scope of the 
work assigned to the receiver.


Sec.  51.8   Payment of claims and dividends to shareholders.

    (a) Claims. (1) After the administrative expenses of the 
receivership have been paid, the OCC shall make ratable dividends from 
time to time of available receivership funds according to the priority 
described in Sec.  51.5, based on the claims that have been proved to 
the OCC's satisfaction or adjudicated in a court of competent 
jurisdiction.
    (2) Dividend payments to creditors and other claimants of an 
uninsured bank will be made solely from receivership funds, if any, 
paid to the OCC by the receiver after payment of the expenses of the 
receiver.
    (b) Fiduciary and custodial assets. Assets held by an uninsured 
bank in a fiduciary or custodial capacity, as designated on the bank's 
books and records, will not be considered as part of the bank's general 
assets and liabilities held in connection with its other business, and 
will not be considered a source for payment of unrelated claims of 
creditors and other claimants.
    (c) Timing of dividends. The payment of dividends, if any, under 
paragraph (a) of this section, on proved or adjudicated claims will be 
made periodically, at the discretion of the OCC, as the receiver 
liquidates the assets of the uninsured bank.
    (d) Distribution to shareholders. After all administrative expenses 
of the receiver and proved claims of creditors of the uninsured bank 
have been paid in full, to the extent there are receivership assets to 
make such payments, any remaining proceeds shall be paid to the 
shareholders, or their legal representatives, in proportion to their 
stock ownership.


Sec.  51.9   Termination of receivership.

    If there are assets remaining after full payment of the expenses of 
the receiver and all claims of creditors for an uninsured bank and all 
fiduciary accounts of the bank have been closed or transferred to a 
successor fiduciary and fiduciary powers surrendered, the Comptroller 
shall call a meeting of the shareholders of the uninsured bank, as 
provided in 12 U.S.C. 197, for the shareholders to decide the manner in 
which the liquidation will continue. The liquidation may continue by:
    (a) Continuing the receivership of the uninsured bank under the 
direction of the Comptroller; or
    (b) Ending the receivership and oversight by the Comptroller and 
replacing the receiver with a liquidating agent to proceed to liquidate 
the remaining assets of the uninsured bank for the benefit of the 
shareholders, as set out in 12 U.S.C. 197.

    Dated: December 15, 2016.
Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency.
[FR Doc. 2016-30666 Filed 12-19-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4810-33-P