Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets, 88006-88069 [2016-28280]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 234 (Tuesday, December 6, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 88006-88069]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-28280]



[[Page 88005]]

Vol. 81

Tuesday,

No. 234

December 6, 2016

Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration





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49 CFR Parts 236 and 238





Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative 
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 234 / Tuesday, December 6, 2016 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 88006]]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 236 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AC46


Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Standards for Alternative 
Compliance and High-Speed Trainsets

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to amend its regulations for passenger 
equipment safety standards, which currently provide for passenger rail 
service in a shared right-of-way under two separate tiers of safety 
standards: Tier I (speeds up to 125 miles per hour (mph)) and Tier II 
(speeds up to 150 mph). Consistent with the regulations' approach 
supporting interoperable passenger rail service by sharing the right-
of-way, this proposed rulemaking would add a new tier of safety 
standards (Tier III) to facilitate the safe implementation of 
interoperable high-speed passenger rail service at speeds up to 220 
mph. However, Tier III standards would require operations at speeds 
above 125 mph to be in an exclusive right-of-way without grade 
crossings. The proposal also would establish crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance requirements in the alternative to 
those currently specified for Tier I passenger trainsets. Adopting the 
proposed alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection 
requirements would remove regulatory barriers, allowing a more open 
U.S. rail market, incorporating recent technological designs. In 
addition, the proposal would increase from 150 mph to 160 mph the 
maximum speed FRA's existing regulations allow for passenger equipment 
that complies with FRA's Tier II standards.

DATES: Written comments must be received by February 6, 2017. Comments 
received after that date will be considered to the extent possible 
without incurring additional expense or delay.
    FRA anticipates it can resolve this rulemaking without a public, 
oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a public, 
oral hearing prior to January 5, 2017, FRA will schedule one and will 
publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to inform 
interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2013-0060, 
Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: The Federal eRulemaking Portal, 
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web site's online instructions for 
submitting comments.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, Washington, 
DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department 
of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the 
Ground level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name, docket 
name, and docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for 
this rulemaking (2130-AC46). Note that all comments received will be 
posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any 
personal information provided. Please see the Privacy Act heading in 
the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document for Privacy Act 
information related to any submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov at any time or 
visit the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140 on the Ground 
level of the West Building, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Devin Rouse, Mechanical Engineer, 
Passenger Rail Division, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal 
Railroad Administration, Office of Railroad Safety, Mail Stop 25, West 
Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone: 202-493-6185); or Michael Hunter, Trial Attorney, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Office 
of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, West Building 3rd Floor, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone: 202-493-0368).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Common Abbreviations

AAR Association of American Railroads
APTA American Public Transportation Association
ATD anthropomorphic test dummy
AW0 ready-to-run weight, empty
CEM crash energy management
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CG center of gravity
EN EuroNorm
ETF Engineering Task Force
FE finite element
FEA finite element analysis
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
g gravitational acceleration (32.2 feet/second/second)
HSR high-speed rail
in inch(es)
kip kilopound(s)
kN kilo-Newton(s)
kph kilometer(s) per hour
lbf pound(s)-force
lbs pounds
mph mile(s) per hour
ms millisecond(s)
MU multiple unit
NEC Northeast Corridor
OVI occupied volume integrity
PTC Positive Train Control
ROW right-of-way
RSAC Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
ITM inspection, testing, and maintenance
PTEP Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness
PESS Passenger Equipment Safety Standards
U.S.C. United States Code
UIC International Union of Railways

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
II. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    A. Statutory Background
    B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking 
Mandate
    C. Overview of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group and the 
Engineering Task Force
III. Technical Background and Overview
    A. General: Approaches to Crashworthiness and Occupant 
Protection
    B. Development of Technical Criteria and Procedures Report
    C. Adoption of Alternative Crashworthiness and Occupant 
Protection Performance Standards for Tier I Passenger Equipment and 
New Standards for Tier III Passenger Equipment
    1. Occupied Volume Integrity
    2. Truck Attachment Strength
    3. Interior Attachment Strength
    D. Development of Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment
    1. Brake Systems
    2. Cab Glazing
    3. Emergency Systems
    4. Cab Equipment
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272; 
Regulatory Flexibility Assessment
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications

[[Page 88007]]

    E. International Trade Impact Assessment
    F. Environmental Impact
    G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)
    H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)
    I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    J. Energy Impact
    K. Privacy Act
    L. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

I. Executive Summary

    This proposed rule is the product of consensus reached by FRA's 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), which accepted the task of 
reviewing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending specific actions that could be useful to advance the 
safety of passenger service, including the development of standards for 
the next generation of high-speed trainsets. The RSAC established the 
Passenger Safety Working Group (``PSWG'' or ``Working Group'') to 
handle this task and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to 
consider. In September 2009, the Working Group in turn established the 
Engineering Task Force (``ETF'' or ``Task Force'') for the purpose of 
producing a set of technical criteria and procedures to evaluate 
passenger rail equipment built based on alternative designs. This work 
led to the development of the report entitled ``Technical Criteria and 
Procedures for Evaluating the Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection 
Performance of Alternatively Designed Passenger Rail Equipment for Use 
in Tier I Service'' (Technical Criteria and Procedures Report or 
Report).\1\ The guidance in the Technical Criteria and Procedures 
Report has assisted railroads and rolling stock manufacturers who have 
petitioned FRA for waivers from compliance with FRA's Tier I passenger 
equipment crashworthiness standards, and has been useful to FRA in 
evaluating such petitions. In addition to developing the criteria in 
that Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to develop formal 
recommendations to the full RSAC for adopting these alternative 
crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations and to establish 
minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-speed 
trainsets, capable of operating at speeds of up to 220 mph, classified 
as Tier III passenger equipment. The ETF reached consensus on 
recommending the adoption of these alternative crashworthiness criteria 
in 49 CFR part 238 for Tier I passenger equipment. The ETF also reached 
consensus on criteria for Tier III passenger equipment, specifically 
trainset structure, side-window glazing, brake systems, interior 
fittings and surfaces, certain emergency systems and cab equipment, and 
cab glazing. The ETF further reached consensus on the definition of 
Tier III, including the proposed speed limitations on when Tier III 
equipment can operate on shared infrastructure and when the equipment 
must operate in an exclusive right-of-way. On June 14, 2013, the full 
RSAC voted to recommend the consensus items to the Administrator of 
FRA, as the basis for a formal rulemaking.
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    \1\ U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-ORD-11/
22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office of 
Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available at 
https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
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    This NPRM is based on these RSAC recommendations and, in 
particular, represents the first phase of rulemaking to establish Tier 
III passenger equipment safety standards as the work of the ETF 
continues.
    This NPRM proposes requirements in three main subject areas: (1) 
Tier III trainset safety standards; (2) alternative crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger 
equipment; and (3) the maximum authorized speed for Tier II passenger 
equipment. The following is a brief overview of the proposed rule 
organized by subject area and a summary of its economic impact.

Tier III Trainset Safety Standards

    This NRPM proposes to define Tier III passenger train operations 
and outline minimum safety standards for the use of such trainsets in 
the United States, focusing on core structural and critical system 
design criteria. FRA intends for the Tier III trainset requirements to 
facilitate safe implementation of interoperable high-speed rail 
service, enable the use of common infrastructure, and promote 
efficiencies. The Tier III operating environment would be unique: Tier 
III passenger trains would operate in a shared right-of-way at speeds 
up to 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings 
at speeds up to 220 mph. The requirements would provide for the sharing 
of rail infrastructure among various types of rail equipment, 
especially in more urban areas, while providing for dedicated passenger 
rail service at maximum speeds up to 220 mph. FRA's Passenger Equipment 
Safety Standards would therefore continue to allow high-speed passenger 
rail service to be interoperable with other types of rail service, the 
same way that Tier I and Tier II passenger train operations are 
currently interoperable.
    The proposed rule would establish requirements for Tier III 
trainset structure, window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings 
and surfaces, certain emergency systems (including window egress and 
rescue access requirements), and certain cab equipment. To support 
operational compatibility, the proposed Tier III trainset 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements are predominantly 
based on the proposed alternative crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements for Tier I passenger equipment and are intended 
to safely apply to operations at speeds up to 220 mph in a dedicated 
environment as approved by FRA. Specialized RSAC task groups developed 
the requirements for braking systems and cab glazing by focusing on the 
development of performance-based requirements that could be implemented 
in a technology-neutral manner, wherever possible.
    To develop their recommendations, the ETF and full RSAC considered 
the latest trainset designs and technology available globally, and 
adapted their recommendations for North American standards. The intent 
of the proposed requirements is to ensure that safety and reliability 
are paramount, while incorporating elements from the most advanced, 
service-proven technology. The proposed requirements would be 
supplemented by additional requirements FRA intends to propose in a 
subsequent rulemaking based on recommendations the ETF is developing, 
which remains active addressing the topics of inspection, testing, and 
maintenance (ITM), as well as safety planning for high-speed 
operations.

Alternative Crashworthiness Requirements for Tier I Passenger Trainsets

    As noted above, FRA proposes to codify a set of technical 
evaluation criteria the ETF developed as guidance to those seeking to 
use alternatively designed Tier I passenger trainsets to demonstrate 
the trainsets' crashworthiness and occupant protection performance is 
equal to the requirements in part 238. We intend for the proposed 
alternative technical criteria to allow industry greater flexibility to 
use contemporary design techniques and more fully apply emerging 
technology, including crash energy management (CEM) technology, without 
requiring a waiver of compliance for operating the equipment. The 
technical criteria are based on established international standards and 
significant research and

[[Page 88008]]

testing both the industry and DOT's John A. Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center (Volpe Center) conducted over the past 25 
years. Codifying the technical criteria would dovetail with alternative 
crashworthiness performance requirements FRA established in part 238 
for the front-end structures of cab cars and multiple-unit (MU) 
locomotives, thereby broadening application of such requirements to 
other main structures.

Tier II Maximum Authorized Speed

    On March 13, 2013, FRA issued a final rule (78 FR 16052) to amend 
the Federal Track Safety Standards to promote the safe interaction of 
rail vehicles and the tracks they operate on at speeds up to 220 mph. 
That final rule revised the track geometry and safety limits for 
various track classes, extended the limits for the highest track speeds 
from 200 to 220 mph (Class 9 track), and affirmed that the maximum 
authorized speed for Class 8 track is 160 mph. This proposed rule would 
make the maximum authorized operating speed for Tier II passenger 
equipment consistent with the limits for Class 8 track. Under the 
proposal, existing Tier II operations FRA has approved to operate at 
speeds up to 150 mph would be required to provide sufficient testing 
and vehicle/track interaction performance data required under 49 CFR 
213.329 and 238.111 and obtain FRA approval before any operations occur 
at the new maximum authorized speed of 160 mph.
    At this time, FRA is not proposing to amend the Tier II 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements, or other specific 
Tier II requirements, to make them more performance-based. The Tier II 
standards are more stringent than those for Tier I passenger equipment 
or proposed for Tier III passenger equipment principally because they 
were developed to support operations above 125 mph in a right-of-way 
shared with freight and other rail traffic. See 64 FR 25629. To 
compensate for the increased risk of a collision, a more crashworthy 
trainset design was needed. FRA's focus in this NPRM, as informed by 
the RSAC process, has been principally to address the industry's need 
for more performance-based Tier I crashworthiness and occupant 
protection standards and to develop new Tier III standards to support 
the next generation of high-speed rail in an environment where 
operations above 125 mph are in a dedicated right-of-way (so as to 
avoid the risk of collision with other rail traffic at speeds above 125 
mph). However, FRA makes clear that its approach to this NPRM does not 
mean FRA may not reexamine its Tier II requirements in the future.

Economic Analysis

    This rule proposes to expand and make more flexible FRA's Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards. The rule would introduce a new tier of 
safety standards, Tier III, passenger equipment must meet to operate at 
speeds up to 220 mph. Currently, FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards do not specifically address safety requirements for passenger 
rail equipment operations at speeds above 150 mph. Furthermore, the 
current regulatory framework generally sets Tier I safety compliance 
through equipment design requirements which limit application of recent 
technology. Therefore, this rule would facilitate using more 
performance-based requirements to demonstrate Tier I compliance in 
alternative ways. FRA believes this rule would have a net beneficial 
effect on the passenger rail industry and society as a whole.
    Specifically, the proposed rule would generate cost savings 
benefits by enabling high-speed rail operators to avoid new right-of-
way acquisition and infrastructure construction for dedicated rail 
lines in dense urban areas. Instead it would allow such trains to 
travel on existing, non-dedicated rail lines but at slower speeds than 
permissible for travel on dedicated rail lines. As there is no 
comprehensive set of equipment safety regulations for this type of 
operation in the United States, a high-speed rail operation of this 
nature (operating at speeds up to 220 mph) could be constructed in the 
absence of this rule only if the operation was governed by a rule of 
particular applicability, which would set forth the minimum safety 
standards and conditions that would apply to the operator's proposed 
operation. Most likely, FRA would grant this regulatory approval only 
if the proposed system was self-contained (i.e., no high-speed 
passenger trains intermixing with conventional passenger or freight 
trains, and no highway-rail grade crossings). Such a dedicated high-
speed rail system would not be as efficiently integrated with the rest 
of the general rail system. Not issuing the proposed regulation would 
also increase costs associated with the acquisition of new passenger 
trains and could delay new U.S. passenger rail infrastructure projects. 
The proposed rule would ensure additional existing alternative designs 
can operate in the U.S. railroad environment on a widespread basis 
compared to existing FRA regulations. This would help avert a potential 
patchwork in the U.S. passenger rail fleet that would perpetuate the 
current unattractiveness of the U.S. passenger equipment market to 
manufacturers. The proposed rule would allow U.S. trainsets to use 
technological advances for the improvement of safety and passenger rail 
operations which cannot be used under existing regulations. (For 
example it would be cost prohibitive to adapt Japanese high speed train 
technologies under current U.S. regulations.)
    There would also be safety benefits associated with improvement of 
the existing rail infrastructure to accommodate the operation of new 
high-speed rail equipment in these shared rights-of-way. Additionally, 
as the requirements herein are largely performance-based standards and 
not prescriptive requirements, the proposal would result in equipment 
benefits generated by passenger rail operators being able to adopt 
service-proven safety-equivalent technology and practices and apply 
future technological advancements.
    Over a 30-year period, FRA estimates quantifiable benefits would 
range from $8.7 to $16.8 billion.\2\ Of this total, $1.2 to $2.1 
billion would be for equipment benefits and $7.5 to $14.7 billion would 
be for infrastructure benefits. FRA estimates the present value of the 
total benefits to be $3.8 to $7.1 billion (when discounted at a 7-
percent rate) or $6.0 to $11.2 billion (when discounted at a 3-percent 
rate). The proposed rule would have a positive effect on society and 
the safety performance of the passenger railroad system. Some of the 
identified safety benefits are due to the ability to adopt safe 
equivalent technology and best practices to better the current safety 
environment, and to apply future technological advancements to improve 
rail safety.
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    \2\ Tier III benefits are uncertain because they are based on 
assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed rail 
operations and how those operations will be incorporated into the 
U.S. rail network. It is possible that all benefits relating to Tier 
III equipment, including infrastructure benefits, will be zero, 
which would occur if no high-speed rail projects come to fruition 
over the forecast horizon. Similarly, the estimated infrastructure 
benefits hinge on the assumption of not having to build dedicated 
HSR track for the whole system (i.e., they represent savings from 
being able to operate HSR using shared infrastructure). If the 
baseline is shared infrastructure, then these benefits will not be 
realized. Tier III benefits, including infrastructure benefits, are 
provided for expository purposes. Similarly, Tier I benefits from 
having performance standards are challenging to quantify, as is 
always the case for such benefits. However, given that they provide 
an option to design standards, operators would only comply with such 
standards voluntarily if they found it beneficial to do so.

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[[Page 88009]]

    Over the same period, FRA estimates industry would incur 
approximately $4.6 billion in quantifiable costs, with a present value 
of $2.0 billion (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or $3.2 million 
(when discounted at a 3-percent rate). All quantified costs \3\ would 
be for testing to demonstrate compliance with either the Tier I 
alternative or Tier III standards. FRA assumes that the proposed 
rulemaking would provide an option, not a mandate, for railroads to use 
a different type or design of passenger equipment in Tier I service and 
would not impose any burden on existing rolling stock or new equipment 
qualifying under existing regulations. Similarly, the proposed 
rulemaking would only provide a framework for railroads to operate 
equipment in new Tier III service--it would not impose any burden on 
existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing 
regulations.
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    \3\ This assessment allows railroads to plan for future 
improvements and maintenance activities, minimizing capital 
investment but ensuring plant and operations are balanced for the 
expected service. Potential train delay was not quantified in this 
assessment. The relationship between train delays and the number of 
trains per day is determined by several factors inherent to the 
infrastructure, operations, and equipment used in the line segment. 
At this stage, it is difficult, to estimate the exact effect of the 
proposed rule on train delay in the United States because the 
characteristics of the rail lines affected by the proposed rule are 
still unknown.
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Alternatives Considered

    One of the main purposes of the proposed regulation is to provide a 
set of minimum Federal safety requirements to determine whether 
passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary standards 
outside of the U.S. are safe for operation in the U.S. rail 
environment. Traditionally, U.S. railroad safety regulations evolved as 
a consequence of specific accidents scenarios, which have led to the 
identification of specific risks in the operating environment. While 
FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are adequately 
addressed for the operating environment, the proposed rule places 
special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than simply 
mitigating them.
    Importantly, the proposed rule does not intend to adopt or 
incorporate by reference a specific international design standard. But 
it is intended to open up the U.S. passenger rail market, to the 
greatest extent possible, to global manufacturers while ensuring 
passenger equipment is safe.
    The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the proposed safety 
requirements for Tier III trainsets are the European and Japanese 
industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety 
requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of 
regulatory requirements; market accessibility; benefits and costs; and 
operational efficiency and safety.
    FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of those options based on 
the key attributes of the alternatives and the effect of those 
attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory purpose. FRA compared 
the technical requirements of other established high-speed rail 
standards to illustrate the primary differences, not a direct 
comparison between comparable requirements/standards.
    Passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant protection 
design standards have been largely standardized by Euronorms.\4\ FRA 
concluded that there are no significant differences between trains 
built to the design standards contained in Euronorms and trains built 
to meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the 
proposed rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset prices would 
increase $310,250 (0.62 percent) per trainset to meet the proposed Tier 
III requirements in this rule.
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    \4\ Euronorms title derived: ``Standard'' means ``norme'' in 
French and ``norm'' in German. https://www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/default.aspx.
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    In Japan, railroad safety regulation is governed by the Railway 
Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, and is codified 
in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.\5\ These technical 
standards are primarily performance-based and railways have the 
obligation to conform their operations, equipment and infrastructure to 
these standards. In the case of its high-speed rail system, the 
Shinkansen, the railway transports only passengers and the rail line is 
entirely dedicated to high-speed rail with no conventional trains 
operating and has full grade separation. These are the significant 
differences underlying the design of Shinkansen trainsets operating in 
Japan when compared to passenger trainsets currently operating in the 
U.S. The key to the Japanese high-speed rail network's ongoing safety 
and reliability is the principle of crash avoidance. Modifying advanced 
Japanese high-speed trainsets to comply with the proposed Tier III 
requirements and be interoperable in the U.S. rail system would likely 
be cost prohibitive; FRA estimates $4.7 million per trainset.
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    \5\ https://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf.
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    European trains generally would not need carbody, truck, 
suspension, or brake modifications to comply with the proposed Tier III 
requirements. However, either the analysis used to demonstrate 
compliance of the train safety features or components would require 
modification or minor design modification(s) would likely be needed, or 
both. These differences are illustrated in the following:

     Summary of Potential Changes for Equipment Designed to European
           Standards To Comply With Proposed Rule in the U.S.
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            Analysis difference             Minor modifications required
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 Quasi static compression.........   End structure
                                             integrity of non-cab end.
 Dynamic collision scenario.......   Interior fixture
                                             attachment.
 Override protection..............   Seat
                                             crashworthiness.
 Fluid entry inhibition...........   Luggage racks.
 Roof and side structure integrity   Emergency window
                                             egress & rescue access
                                             windows.
 Glazing..........................   Emergency lighting.
                                             Alerters.
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    The regulatory impact analysis (RIA) that accompanies this proposed 
rule contains a preliminary analysis of regulatory alternatives FRA 
considered. Specifically, the preliminary analysis compares at a 
general level the costs and benefits of the proposed Tier III 
requirements to both European and Japanese standards for high-speed 
trains. The preliminary analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 
million European high-speed trainset

[[Page 88010]]

could be modified to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements 
with only minor structural modifications and as indicated above at 
little additional cost--about $310,000 per trainset. Modifications are 
expected to ensure such trainsets will safely operate in a U.S. 
setting. Due to the lack of historical safety information for 
operations at Tier III speeds in the U.S., FRA was unable to estimate 
the incremental safety benefit that would be provided by our proposed 
Tier III requirements as compared to the European standards. However, 
proposed requirements are supported by the recommendation of the RSAC 
and FRA is confident about the cost-beneficial nature of the proposal. 
Additionally, our analysis concludes that a hypothetical $50 million 
Japanese high-speed trainset would need significant structural 
modifications, including those to the carbody, trucks, and suspension, 
to comply with the proposed Tier III requirements, and would incur 
significant additional costs--about $4.7 million per trainset, as 
indicated above. Similarly, FRA is unable to provide an estimate of the 
expected incremental benefit of our proposed Tier III requirements, but 
we believe these additional costs are justified by the unique risks 
within the U.S. rail operating environment and the recommendations of 
the RSAC. U.S. high-speed trains may share track with other rail 
operations, including heavy and long freight trains, and operate on 
track with highway-rail grade crossings and the accompanying risks of 
colliding with trucks and other highway vehicles.
    FRA conducted a qualitative analysis comparing the proposed Tier I 
alternative requirements to two alternatives: Not taking any regulatory 
action or adopting existing international design standards. As 
discussed in the RIA, trainsets compliant with international design 
standards (such as European or Japanese) would require extensive 
modifications to meet existing Tier I requirements if FRA elected to 
take no regulatory action. However, under the proposed Tier I 
Alternative requirements, FRA believes the cost associated with 
compliance would be similar to those discussed for Tier III equipment.
    A second alternative would be to codify EN standards as a Federal 
regulation, instead of the proposed Tier I alternative requirements. 
This option opens the possibility for manufacturers to accrue savings 
from fewer modifications; however, such an option would require 
manufacturers to expend resources that favor a particular technology or 
approach to equipment design. Additionally, codifying EN standards in 
lieu of the proposed regulation may require equipment that is designed 
to some other standard to incur certain costs related to modifying the 
equipment to bring it into compliance. This means that regardless of 
the requirements codified, manufacturers will have to modify trainsets 
in order to meet these regulatory requirements. Importantly, trainsets 
meeting only a European standard (or Japanese or other international 
standard) would not be interoperable with existing U.S. passenger or 
freight equipment. Therefore, this equipment could only operate on an 
exclusive right-of-way, unable to take advantage of existing 
infrastructure.
    FRA requests public comment on the alternatives presented and 
discussed here and invites suggestions for other alternatives that 
should be considered. Please also see the RIA's ``Alternatives 
Considered'' section, in which FRA similarly requests public comment on 
these and other alternatives.
    FRA did consider the alternative of standalone HSR systems 
operating on an exclusive right-of-way (not physically connected to the 
general railroad system), utilizing passenger equipment that complies 
with European or other international standards but not necessarily with 
FRA's proposed requirements. For the reasons discussed below, FRA 
rejected this alternative. A major tenet of this rule is to safely 
facilitate the implementation of nationwide, interoperable HSR service. 
Standalone systems operating equipment that is not compliant with FRA's 
current or proposed passenger equipment safety standards would 
significantly limit the interoperability of HSR service. When 
developing the proposed requirements, FRA did not envision a network of 
standalone, non-interoperable HSR systems comprising the nationwide 
network.
    Additionally, it would be very costly for a standalone system to 
attempt to connect with major metropolitan areas because those 
standalone systems could not take advantage of a major regulatory 
benefit--operating over existing infrastructure. FRA determined that 86 
to 89 percent of the regulatory benefits are due to infrastructure cost 
avoidance for operations electing to use Tier I alternative and Tier 
III equipment. Interoperability will allow HSR operators to reach into 
major metropolitan areas where building a new, exclusive right-of-way 
may not be feasible due to land density, environmental, and other 
considerations.
    An advantage of the standalone alternative is that such an 
individual railroad system could optimize its operations to high levels 
of performance without necessarily having to adhere to requirements 
generally applicable to railroad systems in the U.S. However, for such 
a project to attain that level of performance, the project would have 
to optimize the design of the entire system, not only the passenger 
equipment. Basically, a standalone system would have to bring together 
all the other aspects of railroad safety (such as operating practices, 
signal and train control, and track) that must be applied to the 
individual, standalone system. Given that such an approach covers more 
than passenger equipment, and would likely necessitate particular 
right-of-way intrusion protection and other safety requirements not 
adequately addressed in FRA's current regulations, FRA continues to 
believe that addressing proposals for standalone HSR systems on a case-
by-case basis (RPA or waiver) is prudent because of the very small 
number of potential operations and the potential for significant 
differences in their design. Moreover, this form of regulatory approval 
is comprehensive, covering more than equipment safety concerns, to 
ensure proposed standalone systems properly address all rail safety 
concerns. Entities considering such operations voluntarily assume the 
higher costs of building new infrastructure, knowing they cannot take 
advantage of the cost savings from sharing existing infrastructure. 
Nonetheless, FRA requests public comment on whether the final rule 
should adopt other standards--including but not limited to the Japanese 
and European standards--that could be used in the alternative to the 
proposed requirements, potentially only in appropriate Tier I or Tier 
III operational environments. Comment on the specific alternative 
standard(s) it should consider, the operational environments in which 
it would be appropriate to allow use of such standard(s), and 
information on the benefits and costs of the alternative standard(s) 
compared to FRA's proposed approach is requested.

II. Statutory and Regulatory Background

A. Statutory Background

    In September 1994, the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) 
convened a meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail 
industry with the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one initiative of 
this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would

[[Page 88011]]

begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a 
five-year period. In November 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's 
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations 
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994 (the Act), Public Law 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 (November 
2, 1994). In the Act, Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult 
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for 
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations and to issue 
orders under it. See section 215 of the Act (codified at 49 U.S.C. 
20133).

B. Implementation of the 1994 Passenger Safety Rulemaking Mandate

    On May 4, 1998, under section 215 of the Act, FRA published the 
Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule (PTEP). See 63 FR 
24629. The PTEP contained minimum Federal safety standards for the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains, 
including freight railroads hosting the operations of passenger rail 
service. The rule also established specific requirements for passenger 
train emergency systems and contained specific requirements for 
participation in debrief and critique sessions following emergency 
situations and full-scale simulations.
    On May 12, 1999, FRA published the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards final rule (PESS). See 64 FR 25540. The PESS established 
comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment 
including requirements for carbody structure and emergency systems. FRA 
subsequently amended the PESS to address petitions seeking FRA's 
reconsideration of certain requirements contained in the rule. In 
response to the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and published 
three sets of amendments to the final rule. See 65 FR 41284, Jul. 3, 
2000; 67 FR 19970, Apr. 23, 2002; and 67 FR 42892, June 25, 2002.
    FRA has engaged in a number of rulemakings to amend and enhance its 
passenger safety requirements. On October 19, 2006, FRA published a 
final rule addressing various requirements on the inspection, testing, 
and operation of passenger equipment, and the attachment of safety 
appliances. See 71 FR 61835. On February 1, 2008, FRA published the 
Passenger Train Emergency Systems final rule promoting passenger 
occupant safety by addressing emergency communication, emergency 
egress, and rescue access requirements. See 73 FR 6370. FRA also 
established additional requirements for passenger train emergency 
systems on November 29, 2013, see 78 FR 71785, revised and clarified 
its PTEP regulations on March 31, 2014, see 79 FR 18128, and 
established new standards to improve the integrity of passenger train 
exterior side door safety systems on December 7, 2015, see 80 FR 76118.
    On January 8, 2010, FRA published a final rule enhancing 
requirements for the structural strength of the front end of cab cars 
and MU locomotives. See 75 FR 1180. FRA included energy-absorption 
requirements in the 2010 rulemaking to address traditional cab car and 
MU locomotive designs, with very strong underframes and relatively 
weaker superstructures, because it is vitally important to provide 
protection to crewmembers and passengers if the superstructure is 
impacted. In that rulemaking, FRA applied mature technology and design 
practice to extend requirements from linear-elastic to elastic-plastic 
and provided descriptions of allowable deformations without complete 
failure of the system. Although FRA believed at the time of the 
rulemaking that the alternative performance requirements would 
principally apply to shaped-nose equipment designs or CEM designs, or 
both, FRA also intended for them to apply to conventional flat-nosed 
equipment designs. In particular, the alternative performance 
requirements allow innovative designs that protect the occupied volume 
for its full height, even without traditional full-height collision and 
corner post structures, and the rule has been applied to such 
innovative end frame designs and traditional end frame designs.

C. Overview of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee

    FRA established the RSAC in March 1996 and it serves as a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations on rulemakings and other safety 
program issues. The RSAC includes representation from all of the 
agency's major stakeholders, including railroads, labor organizations, 
suppliers and manufacturers, and other interested parties.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ The member groups are: American Association of Private 
Railroad Car Owners (AAPRCO); American Association of State Highway 
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO); American Chemistry Council; 
American Petroleum Institute; American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA); American Short Line and Regional Railroad 
Association (ASLRRA); American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA); 
Association of American Railroads (AAR); Association of State Rail 
Safety Managers (ASRSM); Association of Tourist Railroads and 
Railway Museums; Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen 
(BLET); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED); 
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS); Chlorine Institute; Federal 
Transit Administration (FTA);* Fertilizer Institute; Institute of 
Makers of Explosives; International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers; International Association of Sheet Metal, Air, 
Rail and Transportation Workers (SMART), including the Sheet Metal 
Workers' International Association (SMWIA) and United Transportation 
Union (UTU); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW); 
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA);* League of 
Railway Industry Women;* National Association of Railroad Passengers 
(NARP); National Association of Railway Business Women;* National 
Conference of Firemen & Oilers; National Railroad Construction and 
Maintenance Association (NRCMA); National Railroad Passenger 
Corporation (Amtrak); National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB);* 
Railway Supply Institute (RSI); Safe Travel America (STA); 
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte (Mexico);* Transport 
Canada;* Transport Workers Union of America (TWU); Transportation 
Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).* *Indicates associate, 
non-voting membership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to the RSAC, and, after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, the RSAC establishes a working group that possesses 
the appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
consensus recommendations to FRA for action on the task. A working 
group may establish one or more task forces to develop facts and 
options on a particular aspect of a given task. The individual task 
force then provides that information to the working group for 
consideration.
    When a working group comes to unanimous consensus on 
recommendations for action, the package is presented to the full RSAC 
for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple majority of RSAC 
members, the proposal is formally recommended to the Administrator of 
FRA. FRA then determines what action to take on the recommendation. 
Because FRA staff members play an active role at the working group 
level discussing the issues and options and drafting the language of 
the consensus proposal, FRA often adopts the RSAC recommendation.
    FRA is not bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency 
exercises its independent judgment on whether a recommended rule 
achieves the agency's regulatory goal(s), is soundly supported, and is 
consistent with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in 
some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual 
regulatory proposal or final rule. FRA explains any such variations in 
the rulemaking. However, to the maximum extent

[[Page 88012]]

practicable, FRA utilizes RSAC to provide consensus recommendations 
with respect to both proposed and final agency action. If RSAC is 
unable to reach consensus on a recommendation for action, the task is 
withdrawn and FRA determines the best course of action.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group and the 
Engineering Task Force

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented the RSAC with the task of reviewing 
existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and recommending 
consideration of specific actions that could be useful in advancing the 
safety of passenger rail service. In turn, the RSAC accepted the task 
and established the PSWG to handle the task and develop recommendations 
for the full RSAC to consider. Members of this Working Group, in 
addition to FRA, include many of the same entities as the full RSAC.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ AAR, including BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), CSX 
Transportation, Inc. (CSXT), and Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(UP); AAPRCO; AASHTO; Amtrak; APTA, including Bombardier, Inc., 
Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Interfleet Technology, Inc. 
(Interfleet), Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), Maryland Transit 
Administration (MTA), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-
North), and Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad 
Corporation; ASLRRA; ATDA; BLET; BRS; IBEW; NARP; NRCMA; NTSB; RSI; 
SMART, including SMWIA and UTU; STA; TCIU/BRC; Transport Canada; 
TSA; and TWU.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On September 23, 2009, the Working Group established the ETF. The 
ETF was given the mission of developing technical criteria for the 
evaluation of passenger rail equipment built to alternative designs. 
Members of the ETF include representatives from various organizations 
that are part of the larger Working Group, in addition to FRA.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ AAR; AAPRCO; AASHTO, including California Department of 
Transportation, and Interfleet; APTA, including Alstom, Ansaldo 
Breda, Bombardier, Central Japan Railway Company (JRC), China South 
Locomotive and Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR), Denver Regional 
Transportation District (RTD), East Japan Railway Company, Faiveley 
Transport, GE Transportation, Japan International Transport 
Institute, Japan's Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism, Kawasaki, Keolis, KPS N.A., LIRR, LTK Engineering Services, 
Marsh, Metro-North, Nippon Sharyo, Parsons Brinckerhoff, PS 
Consulting, Safetran Systems, SEPTA, Sharma & Associates, Siemens, 
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (SCRRA), Stadler, STV, 
Talgo, Texas Central Railway, Veolia, Voith Turbo, and Wabtec; 
Amtrak; ASLRRA; BLET; European Railway Agency (ERA); NTSB; RSI, 
including Battelle Memorial Institute, and ENSCO; SMART, including 
SMWIA and UTU; TCIU/BRC; and Transport Canada.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ETF developed the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. 
After it developed the Report, the task of the ETF was expanded to (1) 
develop formal recommendations to the full RSAC to adopt the 
alternative crashworthiness criteria into FRA's regulations and (2) 
establish minimum safety requirements for the next generation of high-
speed trainsets able to operate at speeds up to 220 mph,\9\ classified 
as Tier III passenger equipment. While much of the ETF's initial work 
was used to develop the proposed crashworthiness elements of this NPRM, 
the ETF found it necessary to create smaller task groups to develop 
other and related technical criteria and recommendations for the safe 
operation of high-speed trainsets: The Brake Systems Task Group (BTG); 
Engineering, Structures, and Integrity (ESI) Task Group; Tier III Cab 
Glazing Task Group; and Vehicle-Track Interaction (VTI) Task Group. In 
addition, as explained below, the ETF established a task group to 
examine various requirements in 49 CFR part 229 and determine their 
applicability to Tier III trainsets. FRA intends to use the work of 
that part 229/Inspection, Testing and Maintenance Task Group--the 
``229/ITM Task Group''--in a future rulemaking so it is not 
specifically included in this proposal. With the exception of the Tier 
III Cab Glazing Task Group, the task groups consisted primarily of ETF 
members and participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ FRA elected 220 mph as the maximum operating speed for Tier 
III equipment to remain harmonious with FRA's track safety standards 
(49 CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013 (discussing the 
reasoning and research behind the 220 mph maximum track speed).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The BTG was established in June 2011, in response to a request from 
industry representatives to develop technology-neutral requirements 
applicable to brake systems and technology commonly found on today's 
high-speed trainsets worldwide. The BTG met as a group from November 
2011 to December 2012. Group members reviewed and compared current U.S. 
brake system requirements and international brake system requirements, 
including current U.S. inspection and maintenance requirements; 
analyzed common brake system features to determine basic brake system 
parameters; and identified performance-based requirements to permit 
operators to develop equipment-specific maintenance, inspection and 
service plans. The BTG divided into two sub-groups representing the 
Asian and European perspectives on high-speed trainset design. Each 
sub-group independently compared Asian and European best practices to 
current U.S. brake system regulations. As needed, each sub-group 
developed proposed amendments to current U.S. regulations to 
incorporate international best practices. The BTG presented its 
recommendations to the ETF on December 6, 2012, jointly to the PSWG and 
the ETF on May 30, 2013, and to the full RSAC on June 14, 2013.
    The ESI Task Group was established in June 2012 to provide 
additional technical and engineering guidance to standardize (to the 
extent possible and practical) how compliance with the provisions of 
the proposed requirements should be demonstrated. Since many of the 
proposed requirements in the NPRM rely heavily on computer analysis and 
simulations to demonstrate compliance, the ETF sought to separate the 
criteria (the performance requirements) from the methodology of 
demonstrating compliance with those requirements. The original Report 
included both technical criteria and procedures for actually 
demonstrating that the proposed alternatives to current requirements 
could provide an equivalent level of safety. The Task Force agreed that 
the procedures were not appropriate to include in the regulatory 
language, and recommended that the rule text contain only the criteria 
and conditions for which such criteria apply. It recommended that the 
detailed procedures for demonstrating compliance with the criteria be 
in an accompanying guidance document or industry standard. The ESI Task 
Group met from July 2012 to March 2013, and developed a draft guidance 
document of suggested methods for demonstrating compliance with 
proposed Tier I alternative and Tier III crashworthiness requirements. 
This group will reconvene to finalize this document and develop a more 
general compliance document to accompany ETF rulemakings.
    The Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group was created to resolve 
particular issues related to proposed cab glazing requirements for Tier 
III trainsets. The group consists of ETF members, and glazing experts 
and manufacturers from around the world. The group met four times 
between March and May 2013. It presented its recommendations for this 
NPRM to the PSWG on May 30, 2013, which FRA has adopted.
    The VTI Task Group evaluated whether high-speed trainsets operate 
safely under conditions the Federal Track Safety Standards in 49 CFR 
part 213 establish. The VTI Task Group focused on the conditions 
presented at lower-speed classes of track, and whether certain 
conditions presented a challenge to the highly-specialized suspension 
systems of high-speed trainsets. This group provided intermediate 
findings to the ETF. However, the ETF decided the

[[Page 88013]]

information was not sufficiently conclusive to warrant continued 
exploration of the topic at the time.
    As noted above, the ETF established an additional task group to 
examine various requirements in 49 CFR part 229 and determine their 
applicability to Tier III trainsets. This task group more narrowly 
addresses concerns and discussions originating from the BTG. This 
ongoing 229/ITM Task Group is developing appropriate language to apply 
pertinent elements from 49 CFR part 229 and ITM provisions from 49 CFR 
part 238 to both Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment, and 
recommending equivalent requirements for Tier III trainsets. The work 
of the 229/ITM Task Group is ongoing, and the ETF intends to 
incorporate the group's work into future rulemaking recommendations.
    Overall, in addition to the work of the various task groups, the 
full ETF met 18 times over four years in support of the development of 
this NPRM. Minutes of each of the meetings are part of the docket in 
this proceeding and are available for public inspection.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ These meetings were held on the following dates and in the 
following locations: September 23-24, 2009, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; November 3-4, 2009, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; 
January 7-8, 2010, Atlanta, Georgia; March 9-10, 2010, Orlando, FL; 
October 20-21, 2010, Cambridge, Massachusetts; January 11-12, 2011, 
Orlando, Florida; February 14-15, 2011, Washington, DC; March 30-31, 
2011, Washington, DC; June 16-17, 2011, Boston, Massachusetts; 
October 6-7, 2011, New Orleans, Louisiana; June 27-28, 2012, 
Manhattan Beach, California; September 25-26, 2012, Washington, DC; 
December 6, 2012, Arlington, Virginia; February 13-14, 2013, 
Washington, DC; May 30, 2013, Washington, DC; and September 11-12, 
2013, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To assist the ETF, FRA often drafted proposed regulatory text for 
discussion at the various task groups' meetings and task group 
participants offered suggested changes and additions to the proposed 
draft text. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center attended all of 
the ETF's meetings and made significant contributions to the technical 
discussions and development of the ETF's work product, especially the 
Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
    Through the many meetings and discussions, proposed regulatory 
language was developed and then presented, accepted, and approved at a 
joint meeting of the ETF and the Working Group on May 30, 2013. The 
consensus language was then presented before the full RSAC on June 14, 
2013, where it was approved by consensus vote, including the 
recommendations from the Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group (which were in 
a separate document). The Working Group's recommendations were thereby 
adopted by the full RSAC as its recommendations to FRA. The ETF did 
hold an additional meeting on September 11-12, 2013, which concerned 
these recommendations; the ETF addressed comments from ETF members to 
add clarification to, but not alter, the agreed-upon recommendations.
    This NPRM is a product of the RSAC's consensus recommendations and 
FRA believes the NPRM is consistent with RSAC's recommendations. Please 
note that the RSAC did not expressly consider FRA's proposal concerning 
the removal of the requirement for a rule of particular applicability 
to conduct operations at speeds above 150 mph, as specified in subpart 
I of part 236 of this chapter. See the discussion of proposed changes 
to Sec.  236.1007 of this chapter in the section-by-section analysis, 
below. FRA nonetheless believes this proposal, concerning the removal 
of this language from part 236, is consistent with the RSAC recommended 
approach to Tier III operations.

III. Technical Background and Overview

A. General: Approaches to Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection

    FRA, with help from the Volpe Center, conducted substantial 
research on rail equipment crashworthiness to establish a base of 
information to use to evaluate, amend, and develop regulations (with a 
specific focus on performance-based regulations) to respond to industry 
needs. Recognizing that railroads seek to deploy equipment designed to 
more performance-based and modern standards, FRA advanced its efforts 
to keep its crashworthiness regulations apace with current safety 
technology, particularly for passenger trains. In a passenger train 
collision or derailment, the principal crashworthiness risks that 
occupants face are the loss of safe space inside the train due to 
crushing of the train structure and, as the train decelerates, the risk 
of secondary impacts with interior surfaces. Therefore, the principal 
goals of the crashworthiness research FRA sponsored are twofold: First, 
to preserve a safe space in which occupants can ride out the collision 
or derailment; and, second, to minimize the physical forces occupants 
are subjected to when impacting surfaces inside a passenger train as 
the train decelerates.
    Crashworthiness regulations and specifications are intended to 
result in equipment features that increase survivability in accidents. 
The traditional approach to verify rail equipment crashworthiness in 
the U.S. (which is the approach used in FRA's existing regulations) is 
essentially car-oriented, prescribing such characteristics as the 
strength of the carbody and the strength of the attachment of the 
trucks. These features are intended to be effective for a wide range of 
accident conditions the equipment may be subjected to in service. The 
modern approach to rail equipment crashworthiness adds train-oriented 
specifications and typically includes minimum survivability 
requirements for prescribed collision scenarios. The modern approach to 
rail equipment crashworthiness does not replace the traditional 
approach. Rather, the modern approach expands the focus and manner in 
which rail equipment crashworthiness is evaluated, often using the 
traditional requirements as a performance baseline.
    Modern specifications generally describe the crashworthiness 
performance desired of equipment that utilizes CEM features. 
Significant research has been conducted on CEM strategies by both FRA/
Volpe and industry. CEM systems in passenger trains can improve 
crashworthiness by incorporating crush zones in unoccupied areas of the 
train cars. These zones are designed to collapse in a controlled 
fashion during a collision, dissipating collision energy by 
distributing crush through the unoccupied areas of the cars. This 
occupant protection strategy intends to preserve the occupied volumes 
in the train and limit the decelerations that occupants experience. In 
fact, Tier II passenger equipment must be designed with a CEM system to 
dissipate kinetic energy during a collision, see Sec.  238.403, and 
Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets were designed with a CEM system 
complying with this requirement. CEM-designed equipment has 
demonstrated that it preserves all occupied volume in a train-to-train 
collision scenario at more than twice the closing speed of conventional 
equipment in the same scenario where the CEM-designed equipment has the 
same level of occupied volume strength as conventional equipment.

B. Development of Technical Criteria and Procedures Report

    In 2009, FRA elected to develop, in consultation with RSAC, 
alternative criteria and procedures to assess the crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance of rail passenger equipment applicable 
to a wide range of equipment designs to be used in Tier I

[[Page 88014]]

service. The ETF was charged with producing a set of technical criteria 
and procedures for evaluating petitions for waivers from (or, as 
appropriate under Sec.  238.201(b), approval of alternative compliance 
with) one or more of the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; these 
technical criteria and procedures were published in 2011.\11\ The ETF 
developed the technical evaluation criteria and procedures so that they 
would provide a means of establishing whether equipment of an 
alternative design would result in at least equivalent performance to 
that of equipment designed in accordance with the structural standards 
in 49 CFR part 238.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA intended that entities (i.e., railroads, equipment 
manufacturers, and consultants) would apply these criteria and 
procedures to support requests for waiver of the applicable regulations 
to allow alternative evaluation of safety performance. To assist with 
this effort, RSAC's ETF had the following goals: Produce clear, 
realistic technical requirements, benefiting from the collective 
``best'' thinking in the passenger rail industry; define the analysis 
and testing required to demonstrate compliance with the technical 
requirements; provide clear pass/fail criteria for the analyses and 
tests; and work expeditiously so that sponsors of potential passenger 
service recognize available equipment options. Through RSAC's ETF, FRA 
began to work with the industry to develop new criteria to evaluate 
passenger equipment designed to standards differing from those 
historically used for procurements in the U.S. (e.g., AAR and APTA 
standards), while providing an equivalent level of crashworthiness. The 
initial work of the ETF culminated in development of the Technical 
Criteria and Procedures Report. The Report contains guidelines for 
assessing the crashworthiness and occupant protection performance of 
alternatively-designed equipment used in Tier I service, including 
trainsets designed for operation outside the U.S. that may not be 
compliant with FRA's current requirements. As described in the Report, 
the criteria are defined by the specific conditions evaluated and the 
critical results of the evaluation; the procedures are defined as the 
analysis and test techniques applied to demonstrate compliance with the 
criteria. The criteria and procedures developed take advantage of the 
latest technology in rail equipment crashworthiness.

C. Adoption of Alternative Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection 
Performance Standards for Tier I Passenger Equipment and New Standards 
for Tier III Passenger Equipment

    After initial publication of the Technical Criteria and Procedures 
Report, FRA concluded it would be beneficial to revise the Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards to formally adopt the alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance criteria, in part 
due to renewed demand for passenger equipment in the U.S. By codifying 
the criteria into the regulations, FRA could expand the options for 
regulatory compliance in a clearer and more direct manner. This would 
reduce the industry's burden and risk of relying solely on waiver 
petitions to provide flexibility for additional safety-equivalent 
options for passenger car designs and the use of modern CEM technology. 
Therefore, FRA presented the ETF with a regulatory plan to formally 
adopt Tier I alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection 
performance standards within part 238, based on the criteria previously 
developed by the ETF.
    At the same time, while the ETF developed the Technical Criteria 
and Procedures Report, the RSAC expanded the mission of the ETF to 
develop new safety standards for the next generation of interoperable 
high-speed rail passenger equipment capable of speeds up to 220 mph 
(Tier III). The technical criteria and procedures the ETF originally 
developed as alternatives for Tier I equipment also are the basis for 
the proposed crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements for 
Tier III equipment in this NPRM. Therefore, FRA discusses the 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements 
proposed in this NPRM together for both tiers of passenger train 
service and highlights the pertinent differences between the 
alternative criteria and procedures described in the Report for Tier I 
equipment and the crashworthiness and occupant protection proposals for 
Tier III equipment in the section-by-section analysis.
    It is important to note that the development of the Technical 
Criteria and Procedures Report was heavily influenced by international 
experience with high-speed rail.\12\ In particular, FRA drew from 
European standards, attempting to harmonize, to the extent possible, 
the technical criteria and procedures FRA developed (and is 
consequently proposing to require in this NPRM) with the technical 
requirements in the European standards. This was done in part to 
minimize the burden on foreign car builders entering the U.S. 
marketplace and to take advantage of sophisticated means of validating 
equipment designs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See U.S. Department of Transportation Report No. DOT-FRA-
ORD-11/22. Washington, DC: Federal Railroad Administration, Office 
of Railroad Policy Research and Development, October 2011, available 
at https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/details/L01292#p4_z50_gD_lRT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, FRA found that in some instances the technical 
requirements of the European standards did not fully address the safety 
concerns presented by the U.S. operating environment. FRA, in the 
section-by-section analysis, has highlighted those divergences. For 
example, in Sec.  238.705, Dynamic collision scenario, FRA discusses 
the need for an additional collision scenario with a large rigid mass 
(a rigid or non-deformable locomotive) as opposed to a deformable mass. 
The additional scenario provides further insight on how tested 
equipment performs in preserving the occupied volume during a collision 
with a rigid mass, which is a known collision scenario in the U.S. rail 
operating environment. Additionally, in Sec.  238.733, Interior fixture 
attachment, FRA proposes a greater level of interior fixture attachment 
strength than the European standard of 1g laterally. This 
enhancement is necessary for safety, is not an onerous requirement, and 
represents only a minimal increase in overall trainset cost if 
modifications are required.
    Overall, it is important to recognize that differences between the 
proposed requirements and international technical standards do not mean 
that in all cases structural modifications are necessary. Equipment 
designed to international standards can meet the requirements of this 
proposal. Therefore, the most immediate burden this proposal places on 
a foreign equipment manufacturer is to validate, and provide supporting 
documentation, that the equipment meets FRA's requirements, as 
proposed.
1. Occupied Volume Integrity
    To meet FRA's existing passenger train crashworthiness regulations, 
the underframe of a train car must not experience permanent deformation 
when subjected to a large compressive load at the coupler locations at 
either end of the car. Car deformation must remain elastic (no 
permanent deformation) when subjected to 800,000

[[Page 88015]]

pounds (lbs) of force applied along the line of draft (the theoretical 
line running from the coupler at one end of the car to the other). 
Beginning in 1939, AAR formally recommended this practice for new 
passenger equipment operated in trains of more than 600,000 lbs empty 
weight in response to numerous fatal accidents involving compromised 
occupied volumes. In 1945, this recommendation was adopted into AAR 
Standard S-034--Specifications for the Construction of New Passenger 
Equipment Cars. Federal law applied this standard to all MU locomotives 
built new after April 1, 1956 and operated in trains having a total 
empty weight of 600,000 lbs or more. See 49 CFR 229.141(a). In 1999, 
when FRA issued the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, FRA expanded 
this 800,000-pound static strength standard by Federal regulation to 
virtually all intercity passenger and commuter rail equipment (see 49 
CFR 238.203, 238.405).
    This line-of-draft strength approach has remained the cornerstone 
of occupied volume integrity (OVI) evaluation for nearly a century for 
several reasons. The pass/fail criterion of no permanent deformation 
anywhere in the vehicle is straightforward to implement and can be 
readily examined visually and confirmed using strain gages or other 
measuring devices. If the test is conducted properly and successfully, 
the vehicle remains in its original condition and can therefore enter 
service following the test. The intended nondestructive nature of the 
test makes it economical to perform because the first manufactured 
vehicle serves both as test article and proven, deliverable product.
    In addition, this proof-strength approach provides additional 
crashworthiness benefits and has increased in importance as additional 
crashworthiness features are incorporated in the structure of passenger 
rail vehicles. For instance, for an end frame to successfully prevent 
an intrusion from impacts above the floor, the structure supporting the 
end frame must itself be sufficiently strong. A strong end frame 
attached to an insufficiently robust supporting structure may prevent 
intrusion at the end of the vehicle but cause loss of occupied volume 
elsewhere in the vehicle as collision loads travel through the occupied 
volume. The proof-strength approach is effective in demonstrating the 
sufficiency of the underlying supporting structure and FRA is proposing 
to optimize it for application to CEM designs.
    Ultimately, preserving the occupied volume is accomplished 
primarily by ensuring the strength of the structure protecting it. If 
the occupied compartment is sufficiently strong, survivable space for 
the occupants is maintained. Secondary impacts are limited through a 
combination of structural crashworthiness and occupant protection 
measures. Allowing portions of the car to crush in a predetermined 
manner can limit the forces applied to the structure surrounding the 
occupied volume and control the decelerations that occupants 
experience. Conventional practice is to make individual cars uniformly 
strong and principally attempt to control the behavior of individual 
cars during a collision. The CEM approach is train-oriented, 
controlling the load into the occupied volume, and apportioning the 
structural crushing to unoccupied areas throughout the train.
    Within Europe, passenger trains are subject to two distinct 
standards for ensuring adequate OVI. European Standard (or Euronorm) EN 
12663, ``Railway Applications--Structural Requirements of Railway 
Vehicle Bodies--Part 1: Locomotives and Passenger Rolling Stock (and 
Alternate Method for Freight Wagons),'' contains several quasi-static 
load cases to be evaluated at different locations on train cars, 
including a line-of-draft load case. The load locations and the 
magnitude of the load to be applied at each location tend to differ 
from U.S. requirements. In addition to EN 12663, a second standard, EN 
15227, also applies to passenger rail equipment in Europe. EN 15227, 
``Railway Applications--Crashworthiness Requirements for Railway 
Vehicle Bodies,'' contains several dynamic impact scenarios that must 
be evaluated. EN 12663 and EN 15227 were developed to work in concert 
with one another, with EN 12663 used to ensure a baseline level of OVI 
and EN 15227 used to ensure a baseline level of performance in an 
idealized collision.
    FRA has employed a similar, two-step approach to OVI in this NPRM. 
Because a strong OVI serves as the foundation for other crashworthiness 
features, such as CEM components, a quasi-static OVI requirement is 
included. Whereas current domestic practice provides that the 
evaluation loads be applied along the line-of-draft, the proposed 
regulation instead places the evaluation loads at the locations on the 
occupied volume that constitute the ends of the collision load path. 
FRA intends for this change in placement of the loads to ensure that 
for designs featuring CEM elements, or another non-conventional 
longitudinal load path, the evaluation loads are applied in areas that 
will actually experience high compression loads during an accident. 
This helps ensure the rail vehicle possesses adequate OVI to restrict 
crushing to the intended CEM elements during a collision severe enough 
to activate the CEM system. The load magnitudes proposed in this NPRM 
were chosen to help ensure structural compatibility between existing 
Tier I rail equipment and any future vehicles designed to meet the 
proposed requirement.
    The second OVI requirement FRA is proposing in this NPRM involves a 
dynamic collision scenario evaluated using a standardized train consist 
(the ``initially-standing train'') being struck by the trainset 
undergoing evaluation (the ``initially-moving train''). Whereas the 
quasi-static OVI requirement is applied at the individual car-level, 
this scenario is applied at the trainset-level. The results of the 
scenario evaluation are used to evaluate CEM system performance, 
override resistance, and truck attachment integrity. Working together, 
the quasi-static OVI requirement and the dynamic collision scenario 
requirements help ensure the energy-absorbing features of a design 
function at a trainset-level and that each car possesses sufficient OVI 
to resist loss of occupied volume during operation of the energy-
absorption components.
2. Truck Attachment Strength
    The current FRA regulation for Tier I passenger equipment truck 
attachment, 49 CFR 238.219, Truck-to-car-body attachment, specifies 
static load requirements. In an effort to develop standards that are 
more performance-based, the ETF recommended dynamic load requirements 
for alternatively evaluating truck attachment strength. However, 
comparing the safety differences between the proposed dynamic 
requirements and existing static requirements is not straightforward. 
There are many different design approaches in service for attaching the 
truck to the carbody and meeting the current static load requirements. 
The different designs have exhibited varied performance in accidents: 
In some relatively severe accidents, compliant designs have remained 
attached; while in some less severe accidents, compliant designs have 
become detached. The ETF strove to assure the performance the 
alternative, dynamic truck attachment requirements provide would be at 
least as effective as that the attachment strength of an average or 
typical truck compliant with the current static

[[Page 88016]]

requirements provides. The alternative, dynamic truck attachment 
requirements the ETF developed and recommended provide for 
demonstration of compliance using results from the same computer 
simulation of the train-to-train collision scenario used to demonstrate 
sufficient OVI.
3. Interior Attachment Strength
    FRA's existing, acceleration-based performance requirements for 
interior attachments were established after years of industry practice 
designing interior fittings to withstand the forces due to 
accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically. As 
noted in the 1997 NPRM for the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
rulemaking (62 FR 49728), FRA and NTSB investigations of accidents 
involving passenger trains designed based on this practice revealed 
that luggage racks, seats, and other interior fixtures breaking loose 
were a frequent cause of injury to passengers and crewmembers. Due to 
injuries caused by broken seats and other loose fixtures, FRA concluded 
that the practice of designing interior fittings to withstand 
accelerations of 6g longitudinally, and 3g laterally and vertically, 
was not adequate. FRA therefore proposed to enhance interior attachment 
fitting strength. In the 1999 final rule (64 FR 25540), FRA then set 
the current attachment strength requirements of 8g longitudinally, and 
4g laterally and vertically. Subsequent accident investigations have 
revealed that interior fixtures that comply with the requirements for 
Tier I passenger equipment in Sec.  238.233 perform significantly 
better than interior fixtures in passenger cars that do not meet the 
current regulations, i.e., generally passenger cars already in service 
at the time the 1999 final rule took effect.
    The ETF discussed at length requirements for interior fittings and 
occupant protection during accidents. As these discussions developed, 
there was a desire to accommodate existing equipment designs built to 
European standards, i.e., EN 12663 and EN 15227, while maintaining a 
comparable level of safety to that within the U.S. rail operating 
environment. Many manufacturers of high-speed trainsets stressed during 
these discussions that this approach would allow the use of ``service-
proven'' designs and avoid the need for significant redesign that would 
affect critical suspension characteristics or lead to a completely new 
and unproven vehicle platform. In the interest of maintaining the 
industry's ability to adopt service-proven designs, the ETF examined 
existing practices throughout the world to help establish how current 
and proven design practice could be evaluated for application in the 
U.S.
    The ETF adopted an approach that incorporates specific requirements 
of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements for 
Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
December 2010 (GM/RT2100). GM/RT2100 is a safety standard that mandates 
requirements for the design and integrity of rail vehicle structures, 
including interior fixtures, for trains that operate in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.). GM/RT2100 (referencing EN 12663) requires interior 
fixtures to withstand carbody accelerations of 5g longitudinally, 1g 
laterally and 3g vertically. However, FRA has never found the 1g 
lateral acceleration requirement adequate for the U.S. rail operating 
environment. See FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final rule, 
published May 12, 1999, for a discussion on lateral attachment strength 
for interior fixtures (64 FR 25540).
    Thus, the proposed rule increases this minimum lateral acceleration 
requirement to 3g, as further discussed in the section-by-section 
analysis below. FRA notes that the structural vehicle requirements in 
EN 15227 limit the mean longitudinal deceleration to 5g within certain 
specified collision scenarios for vehicles designed to operate on 
international, national, and regional networks (6.4.1). ETF industry 
members recommended attachment strength requirements consistent with 
the collision behavior of vehicle structures built to the Euronorm 
standards and FRA agreed with their recommendation. The specific 
details on how to apply this alternative international approach are 
discussed in the section-by-section analysis below.

D. Development of Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment

    While the proposed crashworthiness and occupant protection 
performance requirements for Tier III passenger equipment derive from 
the work initially conducted by the ETF for alternatively evaluating 
Tier I passenger equipment, the ETF did focus specifically on a more 
comprehensive body of requirements for Tier III passenger equipment. 
These include requirements for brake systems, cab glazing, emergency 
systems, and cab equipment. An overview of specific proposals for Tier 
III passenger equipment in these areas is provided below.
1. Brake Systems
    Brake systems requirements for Tier III trainsets were developed 
from the recommendations of the RSAC's BTG. This group examined 
existing brake systems and technologies from around the world, and 
compared brake system requirements in the U.S. with systems on high-
speed trainsets operating internationally. The goal of this task group 
was to identify common features and determine basic regulatory 
parameters that considered all types of service-proven braking systems, 
regardless of the technology employed.
    To achieve this goal, the BTG created two sub-groups to examine 
trainset brake system design philosophies from both Asian and European 
industries that currently design trainsets to operate at the speeds 
envisioned for Tier III. The BTG focused on developing technology-
neutral, performance-based braking system requirements by selecting the 
best practices and designs of the international models, while still 
maintaining the safety intent of the original, pneumatic-based U.S. 
requirements. This need for a technology-neutral approach was the 
cornerstone for development of the Tier III brake system 
recommendations to the ETF, which suggested creating new requirements 
that would both permit the use of applicable international standards 
and be performance-driven to allow the development of future 
technologies.
    To accomplish this, the BTG suggested that FRA utilize the proposed 
Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment (``Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan''), and ITM plan, discussed below, to establish and 
approve technology-specific performance metrics that it could not 
otherwise define without a prescriptive regulation. This 
recommendation, ultimately adopted by FRA following the RSAC process, 
is a fundamental concept reflected in other elements of this proposed 
rule: to maintain the core safety intent of existing U.S. requirements 
in a manner that takes into account the inherent safety of service-
proven designs, as demonstrated on rail systems around the world.
2. Cab Glazing
    FRA's original requirements for window and windshield safety 
glazing on locomotives, passenger cars, and cabooses were established 
in 49 CFR part 223 on December 31, 1979 (44 FR 77352) to protect 
railroad employees and passengers from injury due to objects striking 
windows or windshields. Part 223 specifies a

[[Page 88017]]

process for certifying window glazing material, including testing 
requirements for glazing in both end-facing (FRA Type I) and side-
facing (FRA Type II) locations. With the introduction of Tier II 
requirements in 1999 (64 FR 25686) designed to provide protection at 
speeds up to 150 mph, FRA established additional requirements for both 
end-facing (FRA Type IH) and side-facing (FRA Type IIH) glazing 
locations in Tier II passenger equipment. FRA amended the large object 
impact requirements for end-facing glazing locations in 2002 (67 FR 
19992) with slight modifications, creating FRA Type IHP glazing. See 49 
CFR 238.421.
    During the development of the Tier III requirements, the ETF 
decided a new, large object impact test was necessary for end-facing 
glazing locations (e.g. windshields) to address optical clarity issues 
stemming from current requirements (for both Tier I and II) and the 
need for a test procedure that could be repeated reliably. To address 
the optical clarity issue, the ETF wanted a methodology to use to 
evaluate the performance of the end-facing glazing system at its angle 
of installation (similar to the approach for Type IHP glazing in 49 CFR 
238.421(b)(1)). Such a methodology would be more representative of the 
actual conditions in real-world applications. It would also help 
alleviate optical clarity issues resulting from thicker glazing as a 
function of higher operational speeds and perpendicular impact testing 
requirements in part 223. In addition, given the range of performance 
typically observed when testing most glazing materials, establishing a 
test procedure that could be reliably repeated on multiple test 
specimens was essential to ensure the quality of test results for these 
high-speed operations. FRA agrees with this approach.
    To address these issues the ETF, through its Tier III Cab Glazing 
Task Group, sought to refine the glazing requirements for high-speed 
operations by examining current international practice. In particular, 
it focused on established and proven experience with the application of 
European standard EN 15152, and its predecessors, including 
International Union of Railways (UIC) standard UIC 651. It considered 
these standards together with high-speed rail operating experience 
involving the prominent modes and causes for glazing failure. These 
standards and operating experience, together with the existing glazing 
requirements for Tier I and Tier II operations, served as the basis for 
the development of the proposed requirements for Tier III operations.
3. Emergency Systems
    This NPRM includes proposed requirements for passenger train 
emergency systems specific to Tier III trainsets and takes into account 
potential design considerations for Tier III trainset operating speeds. 
These proposed requirements focus particularly on emergency egress and 
rescue access through windows or alternative openings as part of an 
emergency window egress and rescue access plan. Sections 238.113 
(Emergency window exits) and 238.114 (Rescue access windows) were used 
as the baseline requirements for the total number of emergency egress 
and rescue access windows, as well as their acceptable means of removal 
and their dimensions.
    To address Tier III trainsets not designed to comply with the 
requirements in Sec.  238.113 or Sec.  238.114, the proposed rule would 
include a means for FRA to consider alternatives based on service-
proven approaches that provide an equivalent level of safety. The 
railroad would submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress 
and rescue access plan during the design review stage. This plan would 
allow consideration of: production challenges unique to high-speed 
trainsets, such as the need to pressurize compartments; proven 
international practice; and approaches other modes have taken (e.g., 
emergency egress window panels/door exits similar to over-wing exit 
doors on aircraft). Where an appropriate safety case can be made, the 
proposed rule would allow a railroad to elect to employ an alternative 
feature or approach if the railroad can demonstrate an equivalent or 
superior level of safety.
    This NPRM also addresses the attachment strength and performance of 
critical emergency systems. Specifically, it explains the requirements 
for minimum attachment strength of emergency lighting fixtures and any 
corresponding emergency power sources to be consistent with the 
approach we took for all other interior attachments in Tier III 
equipment. The NPRM would effectively provide a railroad with the 
option of complying with either the loading requirements currently 
applicable to Tier I equipment or alternative loading criteria based on 
an appropriate crash pulse that is justified by the intended vehicle 
design.
4. Cab Equipment
    This NPRM contains certain equipment requirements proposed for the 
cabs of Tier III trainsets. These proposed requirements were developed 
by the RSAC's BTG and address alerters (devices installed in the 
controlling cab of trainsets that promote continuous, active locomotive 
engineer attentiveness by monitoring select trainset engineer-induced 
control activities) and sanders (appurtenances on trainsets that 
provide a means for depositing sand on each rail in front of the first 
power operated wheel set in the direction of movement to increase 
wheel-track adhesion). The BTG adopted the same approach it used to 
develop the braking system proposal for these two cab features, seeking 
performance-based requirements that could be implemented in a 
technology-neutral manner wherever possible. FRA intends to propose 
additional requirements for cab equipment in a future rulemaking based 
on recommendations developed by the 229/ITM Task Group.

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis

Part 236--Rules, Standards, and Instructions Governing the 
Installation, Inspection, Maintenance, and Repair of Signal and Train 
Control Systems, Devices, and Appliances

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems
Section 236.1007 Additional Requirements for High-Speed Service
    FRA is proposing to remove paragraph (d) of this section as it is 
no longer relevant, and to redesignate paragraph (e) as paragraph (d) 
of this section. Paragraph (d) provides that, in addition to the 
requirements of paragraphs (a) through (c) of this section, a host 
railroad that conducts a freight or passenger operation at more than 
150 mph shall have an approved Positive Train Control (PTC) Safety Plan 
(PTCSP) accompanied by an ``HSR-125'' developed as part of an overall 
system safety plan approved by the Associate Administrator for Railroad 
Safety and Chief Safety Officer (Associate Administrator). Paragraph 
(d) also provides that such an operation would be governed by a rule of 
particular applicability. Paragraph (c) of this section contains 
particular requirements for freight and passenger operations at speeds 
more than 125 mph, and provides that a host railroad have an approved 
PTCSP accompanied by an HSR-125. Generally, an HSR-125 is a document 
establishing that the system will be operated at a level of safety 
comparable to that achieved over the 5-year period prior to the 
submission of the PTCSP by other train control systems that perform PTC 
functions required by subpart I to 49 CFR part 236, and which have been 
utilized on

[[Page 88018]]

high-speed rail systems with similar technical and operational 
characteristics in the U.S. or in foreign service, and that the system 
has been designed to detect incursions into the right-of-way, including 
incidents involving motor vehicles diverting from adjacent roads and 
bridges, where conditions warrant.
    The particular treatment in paragraph (d) of operations at speeds 
over 150 mph is a legacy of FRA regulations from the 1990s concerning 
high-speed rail. When FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 CFR part 213) 
were amended on June 22, 1998, to include standards for higher-speed 
operations, the rule envisioned regulating rail operations at speeds 
over 150 mph through a rule a particular applicability. See 63 FR 
33992. This same approach was codified in the Passenger Equipment 
Safety Standards when the rule was promulgated in 1999. See 64 FR 
25540. Subsequently, however, FRA amended the Track Safety Standards on 
March 13, 2013, to remove the prescriptive reference to a rule of 
particular applicability and make clear that operations at speeds above 
125 mph require FRA regulatory approval. See 78 FR 16052. In this NPRM, 
FRA is similarly proposing to remove the prescriptive reference to a 
rule of particular applicability in the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards and reaffirm that operations at speeds over 125 mph require 
FRA regulatory approval.
    Accordingly, FRA is proposing to modify 49 CFR 236.1007 to remove 
the prescriptive reference requiring a rule of particular applicability 
for operations at speeds over 150 mph. Paragraph (c) of this section 
would continue to require that operations at speeds over 125 mph 
require FRA regulatory approval. However, there is no further need to 
prescribe in all cases distinct regulatory treatment through a rule of 
particular applicability for operations at speeds above 150 mph. 
Operations in both speed ranges constitute high-speed rail operations 
and are regulated by FRA as such.
    FRA does not intend anything in this proposal to affect any order 
of particular applicability FRA has issued or may issue. In 1998, FRA 
issued an order of particular applicability governing certain rail 
operations on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). See 63 FR 39343, Jul. 22, 
1998. The order, as amended, specifies requirements for equipping 
trains to respond to the Advanced Civil Speed Enforcement System 
(ACSES) in NEC territory. See 71 FR 33034, Jun. 7, 2006. As delegated 
by the Secretary, FRA may issue such an order after an investigation 
requiring a railroad carrier to install, on any part of its line, a 
signal system that complies with requirements FRA has established as 
necessary for safety. See 49 U.S.C. chapter 205 (signal systems). Such 
an order of particular applicability has a far more limited scope than 
that envisioned at one time for a rule of particular applicability 
governing high-speed operations (i.e., a comprehensive rule addressing 
all aspects of a high-speed rail operation, not just signal systems). 
To be clear, the order of particular applicability governing certain 
rail operations on the NEC will not be affected by this rulemaking.

Part 238--Passenger Equipment Safety Standards

Subpart A--General
Section 238.5 Definitions
    FRA is proposing to add new definitions to this part and revise 
certain existing definitions to clarify the meaning of important terms 
and minimize potential for misinterpretation of the rule. FRA requests 
public comment regarding the terms defined in this section and whether 
we should also define other terms.
    FRA proposes to revise the definitions of ``glazing, end-facing'' 
and ``glazing, side-facing,'' and to make technical revisions to the 
definitions of ``Tier II'' and ``Train, Tier II passenger'' to reflect 
the proposed change in the maximum authorized speed of Tier II 
passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA also proposes to add 
new definitions for ``Associate Administrator,'' ``Cab,'' ``Tier III,'' 
``Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger,'' ``Trainset, Tier III,'' and 
``Trainset unit.'' Some of the proposed definitions we added involve 
new or fundamental concepts which require further discussion.
    FRA proposes to define ``Associate Administrator'' to mean the FRA 
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety and Chief Safety Officer, 
Associate Administrator for Railroad Safety, Associate Administrator 
for Safety, or the Associate Administrator's delegate. The title of 
Associate Administrator for purposes of this part has always referred 
to the same FRA official; only the full description of this official's 
title has changed since this part was originally promulgated. Because 
of the use of different titles in this part to refer to the same 
official, FRA proposes to add this definition to make clear that there 
is one official who is the Associate Administrator for purposes of this 
part. In the final rule, FRA may instead update and make consistent 
each reference to the Associate Administrator in each individual 
section of part 238 that refers to the Associate Administrator.
    FRA proposes to add the definition ``cab'' to mean, for purposes of 
subpart H of this part, a compartment or space in a trainset designed 
to be occupied by the engineer and contain an operating console from 
which the engineer exercises control over the trainset. Cab includes a 
locomotive cab. FRA is adding a more general definition of ``cab'' to 
ensure the requirements apply to high-speed trainsets, which do not 
utilize conventional locomotives. This new definition for ``cab'' is 
not intended to impose any new requirement on other types of equipment. 
This definition presumes there is a typical design of a high-speed 
trainset where the engineer and operating console are located in the 
leading end of the trainset. Regardless, FRA would expect the 
protections of Sec. Sec.  238.703 through 238.717 (Trainset structure) 
and Sec.  238.721 (Glazing) to apply, as appropriate, to that leading 
end whether it is to be occupied by operating crewmembers or 
passengers, or both. In this regard, and consistent with the definition 
of ``Occupied volume'' under Sec.  238.5, the protections mentioned 
above would apply, as appropriate, for the entire width of a trainset's 
leading end, irrespective of the occupant(s). In addition, this 
definition would apply to vehicles designed under appendix G to this 
part. FRA invites comment on this proposed definition, as well as 
comment on whether FRA should make more explicit in the rule text the 
protections that apply to the leading end of a trainset, whether 
intended to be occupied by crewmembers or passengers, or both.
    FRA proposes to revise the definition ``glazing, end-facing'' to 
mean any exterior glazing located where a line perpendicular to the 
plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal angle of 50 degrees or 
less with the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material 
is installed, except for: The coupled ends of MU locomotives or other 
equipment that is semi-permanently connected to each other in a train 
consist; and, end doors of passenger cars at locations other than the 
cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. Any glazing location which, due 
to curvature of the glazing material, can meet the criteria for either 
end-facing glazing or side-facing glazing would be considered end-
facing glazing. This definition makes clear that the glazing location 
means an ``exterior'' location and expressly identifies locations that 
FRA would not consider end-facing glazing locations. Additionally, the 
definition accounts for the aerodynamic shape of vehicle front-ends and 
expressly provides that any

[[Page 88019]]

window, based on its geometry, that could be either an end-facing 
glazing location or a side-facing glazing location is considered an 
end-facing glazing location that must comply with the end-facing 
glazing requirements. FRA intends for this proposed definition to be 
substantively the same as the revised definition for ``end facing 
glazing location'' in the final rule on Safety Glazing Standards (part 
223 of this chapter). See 81 FR 6775, Feb. 9, 2016. This revision is 
not intended to add any new requirement on glazing installed in 
passenger vehicles subject to the requirements of part 238. FRA intends 
this definition and other glazing requirements in the final rule to be 
consistent with the Safety Glazing Standards rulemaking.
    FRA proposes to revise the definition ``glazing, side-facing'' to 
mean any glazing located where a line perpendicular to the plane of the 
glazing material makes a horizontal angle of more than 50 degrees with 
the centerline of the vehicle in which the glazing material is 
installed. Side-facing glazing also means glazing located at the 
coupled ends of MU locomotives or other equipment that is semi-
permanently connected to each other in a train consist, and glazing 
located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car or MU 
locomotive. FRA intends for this proposed revision to be substantively 
the same as the revised definition for ``side facing glazing location'' 
in the final rule on Safety Glazing Standards, see id., and is 
necessary due to our proposed revision to the definition of ``glazing, 
end-facing'' in this part 238. Nonetheless, we do not intend for this 
revision to add any new requirement on glazing installed in passenger 
vehicles subject to the requirements of this part. As noted above, FRA 
intends this definition and other glazing requirements in the final 
rule to be consistent with the Safety Glazing Standards rulemaking.
    As discussed above, FRA proposes to revise the definition of ``Tier 
II'' to increase the maximum speed allowable for this tier of passenger 
equipment from 150 mph to 160 mph. FRA likewise proposes to revise the 
definition ``train, Tier II passenger.'' In addition, FRA proposes to 
add a definition for ``Tier III'' to add this equipment safety tier to 
this part with the definition ``trainset, Tier III'' to apply the 
proposed Tier III requirements to such equipment. Further, FRA intends 
for these definitions to make clear that the definitions of Tier I and 
Tier II do not include Tier III passenger equipment merely because the 
equipment operates in the Tier I and Tier II speed ranges. The 
operation of passenger equipment in both lower- and higher-speed ranges 
is integral to the definition of Tier III (please see above for a more 
detailed discussion of these safety tiers). This Tier III definition 
also makes clear that 125 mph is the maximum speed at which Tier III 
equipment can operate when sharing the right-of-way with non-Tier III 
equipment or when highway-rail grade crossings are present along the 
right-of-way. FRA elected this maximum speed to maintain operational 
compatibility with non-Tier III equipment based on the safety 
equivalency of the crashworthiness and occupant protection 
requirements. Further, this definition makes clear FRA is limiting Tier 
III operations to an absolute maximum speed of 220 mph, which is the 
maximum track speed permitted under FRA's Track Safety Standards (49 
CFR part 213). See 78 FR 16052, Mar. 13, 2013. FRA invites comments on 
the speed and operational restrictions discussed above and whether 
there are more appropriate alternatives to FRA's proposal.
    FRA proposes to add the definition ``trainset, Tier I alternative 
passenger'' to mean a trainset consisting of Tier I passenger equipment 
designed under the requirements of appendix G to this part. FRA 
proposes to add this definition to distinguish specific Tier I trainset 
designs that conform to alternative standards from Tier I equipment 
that meets the existing Tier I requirements in subpart C but provide an 
equivalent level of protection by conforming with the proposed 
requirements of appendix G to this part.
    FRA also proposes to add a new definition of ``trainset unit'' to 
mean that segment of a trainset located between connecting arrangements 
(articulations). This definition would clarify that the proposed 
requirements may apply to individual vehicles within a trainset 
consist, but not necessarily to the trainset as a whole.
Section 238.21 Special Approval Procedure
    FRA proposes to amend paragraph (c)(2) of this section to be 
consistent with the changes proposed to Sec.  238.201(b) for 
alternative compliance. The proposed applicable elements would be in 
new Sec.  238.201(b)(1) rather than in Sec.  238.201(b) due to the 
proposed reorganization of that section. FRA intends to conform 
paragraph (c)(2) of this section accordingly.
    Additionally, FRA is updating the reference to ``Associate 
Administrator for Safety'' to read simply ``Associate Administrator,'' 
consistent with the discussion provided above under Sec.  238.5.
Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements
Section 238.111 Pre-Revenue Service Acceptance Testing Plan
    FRA proposes to amend paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and (c) 
of this section to require railroads to obtain FRA approval before 
using Tier III passenger equipment that either has not been used in 
revenue service in the U.S. or has been used in revenue service in the 
U.S. and is scheduled for a major upgrade or introduction of new 
technology that affects a safety system on such equipment. The explicit 
inclusion of a Tier III notification and approval process is consistent 
with FRA's approach to the implementation of high-speed rail 
technology. It also provides a formal mechanism for FRA to ensure all 
required elements of this part are satisfactorily addressed and 
documented.
    FRA invites comment on FRA's proposed changes to this section. 
Specifically, we invite comment on any additional changes we should 
make concerning testing and approval requirements for Tier I, Tier II, 
or Tier III operations.
Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment
Section 238.201 Scope/Alternative Compliance
    In this section, FRA is proposing to redesignate existing paragraph 
(b) as paragraph (b)(1) and to add new paragraph (b)(2) due to the 
proposed addition of standards for alternative compliance in appendix G 
to this part.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) would continue to provide the existing 
option for railroads to petition FRA's Associate Administrator for 
approval to use Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative 
crashworthiness standards. This approval remains contingent upon the 
railroad's successful demonstration that such standards provide a level 
of safety at least equivalent to those in subpart C of this part. 
Although FRA is proposing to add a new appendix G to this part that 
provides specific alternative crashworthiness standards to those in 
subpart C, FRA does not intend to limit the flexibility this section 
currently provides for using other alternative designs.
    Proposed new paragraph (b)(2) would explain how Tier I passenger 
trainsets may comply with the alternative crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements in appendix G to this part instead of the 
requirements

[[Page 88020]]

of Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, 
and 238.219. Railroads would be required to submit test plans and 
supporting documentation for FRA review and give FRA at least 30 days' 
notice before commencing any testing, whether partially or in full, to 
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of proposed appendix G to 
this part. Railroads would also be required to submit a carbody 
crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance report based on the 
analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to demonstrate 
compliance. After receipt of this report, FRA would deem the submission 
acceptable, unless FRA stays action within 60 days by written notice. 
If FRA stays action, then the railroad would be required to correct any 
deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected the 
deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service. FRA may 
also impose conditions in writing necessary for safely operating the 
equipment for cause stated.
    FRA notes that the proposed approval process would differ from that 
for Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, which would require 
affirmative FRA approval. Tier I trainsets that FRA reviews under this 
paragraph would be deemed acceptable without further FRA action based 
on the appropriate submissions to FRA, unless FRA stays approval by 
written notice to the railroad. If FRA stays approval, FRA would then 
identify issues for clarification or resolution, as appropriate, which 
the railroad would be required to address and notify FRA it had 
corrected prior to placing the equipment into service.
    FRA invites comment on the proposed changes to this section.
Section 238.203 Static End Strength
    FRA proposes to revise this section to include a cross reference to 
Sec.  238.201(b)(2) to reflect the proposed alternative standards in 
appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. Please note that the 
existing alternative compliance provision in Sec.  238.201(b), which we 
propose to redesignate as Sec.  238.201(b)(1), does not apply to the 
requirements of this section, unlike the other structural requirements. 
Hence, FRA is not proposing to reference Sec.  238.201(b) generally in 
this section. However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing 
requirements of this section.
Section 238.205 Anti-Climbing Mechanism
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross 
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative 
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA 
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.207 Link Between Coupling Mechanism and Carbody
    FRA is proposing to revise paragraph (b) of this section to include 
a cross reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed 
alternative standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. 
However, FRA is not proposing to change the existing requirements of 
this section.
Section 238.209 Forward End Structure of Locomotives, Including Cab 
Cars and MU Locomotives
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross 
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative 
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA 
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.211 Collision Posts
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross 
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative 
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA 
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.213 Corner Posts
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross 
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative 
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA 
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Section 238.219 Truck-to-Car-Body Attachment
    FRA is proposing to revise this section to include a cross 
reference to Sec.  238.201(b) to reflect the proposed alternative 
standards in appendix G to this part for Tier I trainsets. However, FRA 
is not proposing to change the existing requirements of this section.
Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.401 Scope
    FRA proposes to revise this section to increase the maximum 
allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 
mph. This proposal is consistent with FRA's March 13, 2013, final rule 
amending and clarifying the Track Safety Standards, which affirmed that 
the maximum allowable speed on Class 8 track is 160 mph. See 78 FR 
16052. Further, this proposal would make the speed range for Tier II 
passenger equipment consistent with that for Class 8 track in the Track 
Safety Standards. As specified in Sec.  213.307 of this chapter, Class 
8 track encompasses the speed range above 125 mph up to 160 mph--the 
same speed range for Tier II passenger equipment standards. This change 
would only increase the maximum operating speed to 160 mph and would 
still require FRA approval to do so as this part and other FRA safety 
regulations require.
    For example, Amtrak's Acela Express currently operates at a maximum 
speed of 150 mph and has done so for well over a decade with FRA 
approval. While the proposed change would neither impose any new 
requirement on Acela Express, nor alter any aspect of FRA's regulatory 
approval of Acela Express, the rule would require FRA approval to 
increase the maximum operating speed to 160 mph.
    FRA's Tier II passenger equipment safety standards are based on 
safety requirements developed for the operation of Amtrak passenger 
trainsets at speeds up to 150 mph on the Northeast Corridor (NEC). See 
64 FR 25629. Amtrak sponsored a risk assessment of high-speed rail 
operations and FRA sponsored computer modeling to predict the 
performance of various equipment structural designs and configurations 
in collisions. The risk assessment found a significant risk of 
collisions at speeds below 20 mph and a risk of collisions at speeds 
exceeding 100 mph due to heavy and increasing conventional commuter 
rail traffic, freight rail traffic, highway-rail grade crossings, 
moveable bridges, and a history of low speed collisions in or near 
stations and rail yards. Based on the risk assessment and the results 
of the computer modeling, FRA determined that full reliance on 
collision avoidance measures rather than crashworthiness, though the 
hallmark of safe high-speed rail operations in several parts of the 
world, could not be implemented in corridors like the north end of the 
NEC. Traffic density patterns and right-of-way configurations would not 
permit implementation of the same collision avoidance measures that 
have proven successful in Europe and Japan. To compensate for the 
increased risk of a collision, a more crashworthy trainset design was 
needed. Accordingly, the structural requirements for Tier II passenger 
equipment are more stringent than those for Tier I passenger equipment 
or the design practice for North American passenger equipment or for 
high-speed rail equipment in other parts of the world.

[[Page 88021]]

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier 
II Passenger Equipment
Section 238.501 Scope
    FRA proposes to revise this section to increase the maximum 
allowable speed for Tier II passenger equipment from 150 mph to 160 
mph. Please see the discussion of Sec.  238.401.
Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment
    This proposed subpart would contain specific requirements Tier III 
passenger equipment must meet. Many of the requirements proposed herein 
consider Tier III passenger equipment in terms of an integrated 
trainset, particularly for purposes of crashworthiness and occupant 
protection requirements. This rule presumes that Tier III trainsets 
will consist of semi-permanently coupled, articulated, or otherwise 
``fixed'' configurations, that are not intended to operate normally as 
individual vehicles or in mixed consists (with equipment of another 
design or operational tier).
    The requirements proposed in this subpart are organized into 
subject areas based on their general applicability: trainset structure, 
window glazing, brake systems, interior fittings and surfaces, 
emergency systems, and cab equipment. These proposed requirements are 
intended to be applied in concert with proposed subparts I and J to 
establish a set of minimum safety requirements for Tier III passenger 
equipment that encourages a systemic approach to safety. FRA also 
intends that the requirements be applied in a manner that is 
performance-based and technology-neutral, where possible.
    FRA intends to supplement these specific requirements in future 
rulemaking(s). As noted above, the ETF remains active and continues to 
address safety requirements for Tier III operations. FRA will consider 
regulatory changes and additions that will help FRA safely and 
efficiently implement Tier III operations from design, to entry into 
revenue service, to ongoing inspection and maintenance.
    FRA notes that it intends for certain proposed sections of this 
subpart to be applied as an integrated set of alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements for 
Tier I passenger equipment as delineated in appendix G to this part. We 
consider this set of proposed requirements to provide an equivalent 
level of safety to its counterpart set of Tier I requirements in 
subpart C of this part. As explained in greater detail in the 
discussion of appendix G below, the proposed rule clarifies which 
specific Tier III crashworthiness and occupant protection performance 
requirement should be applied as an alternative set of Tier I 
counterpart requirements. Specifically, FRA makes clear that if 
alternative Tier I compliance is sought under appendix G, then all the 
requirements in appendix G must be met so the integrity of the 
alternative requirements is maintained.
Section 238.701 Scope
    This proposed subpart contains specific requirements for railroad 
passenger equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not 
exceeding 125 mph, and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade 
crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. FRA 
believes that in most cases new exclusive rights-of-way designed for 
Tier III operations will be constructed without highway grade 
crossings. However, some newly constructed exclusive rights-of-way may 
include highway grade crossings, but may have long stretches of track 
without a grade crossing. In these instances, imposing a 125 mph speed 
restriction on the entire exclusive right-of-way may have greater costs 
than benefits. Additional net benefits may be achievable, in certain 
circumstances, by applying the speed restriction only to track at or 
near each grade crossing instead of the entire exclusive right-of-way. 
In such cases, FRA would expect the railroad to address the safety 
considerations surrounding highway grade crossings in the exclusive 
right-of-way in its Tier III Safe Operation Plan, which is subject to 
FRA review and approval. However, FRA invites comment on alternative 
approaches, such as whether the rule should include provisions that 
explicitly apply the speed restriction only to track located at or near 
each grade crossing within an exclusive right-of-way.
    FRA is proposing to allow passenger seating in the leading unit of 
a Tier III trainset if safety issues associated with passengers 
occupying the leading unit are addressed and mitigated through a 
comprehensive Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Demonstration of compliance 
with the requirements of this subpart would be subject to FRA review 
and approval under Sec.  238.111.
Trainset Structure
Section 238.703 Quasi-Static Compression Load Requirements
    As discussed above, FRA proposes a two-step approach to OVI in this 
NPRM. Accordingly, in paragraph (a) of this section, FRA proposes that 
for it to consider a Tier III trainset to have sufficient OVI, 
compliance with the requirements of both paragraph (b) of this section 
and Sec.  238.705 must be demonstrated. The purpose of applying both 
requirements is to ensure the integrity of the occupied volume during a 
collision or other accident. Integrity of the occupied volume is a 
fundamental requirement of crashworthiness--the primary goal of which 
is preservation of space to protect occupants during an accident. 
Additionally, a strong OVI serves as the foundation for other 
crashworthiness features such as CEM components.
    Although the language of this section references only Tier III 
trainsets, the requirements of this section may also be applied to Tier 
I trainsets through the application of appendix G, instead of complying 
with the existing requirements of 49 CFR 238.203, ``Static end 
strength.'' Tier I passenger equipment designed to alternative 
crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an appropriate level of 
crashworthiness by complying with the quasi-static compression load 
requirements proposed in Sec.  238.703(b). In general, Sec.  238.203 
requires all passenger equipment to support an 800,000-pound 
compressive load along its line-of-draft without experiencing permanent 
deformation. This magnitude of load applied to the line-of-draft has 
been the longstanding practice in the U.S. This evaluation is readily 
performed on passenger equipment conventionally designed for service in 
the U.S. For vehicles designed less conventionally or alternatively 
(e.g., articulated trainsets, full or partial low-floor trainsets, and 
trainsets utilizing CEM), the structure of the occupied volume may be 
designed so that collision loads are not transmitted along the line-of-
draft. While a rail vehicle may be designed to carry normal, 
longitudinal service loads along its line-of-draft, the more severe 
collision loads may be introduced into the structure differently. Below 
is a discussion of the quasi-static compression load requirements 
proposed in paragraph (b) that would apply to each vehicle of a Tier 
III trainset, and, if elected, as an alternative for Tier I trainsets, 
through application of appendix G.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) introduces three means of compliance, 
each consisting of a prescribed load magnitude and a corresponding 
pass/fail criterion (or pass/fail criteria), and states that each 
vehicle under evaluation must comply with one of three compression load 
pass/fail criteria enumerated in paragraphs (b)(1)(i)-(iii). FRA notes 
that this paragraph (b)(1)

[[Page 88022]]

applies to evaluation of individual vehicles of a trainset, not a 
trainset as a whole. Additionally, FRA is not proposing to require 
using all three alternatives to evaluate a vehicle; FRA would require 
only demonstration that the vehicle design complies with one 
compression load pass/fail criterion. By including three sets of load 
magnitudes and pass/fail criteria, FRA intends to accommodate quasi-
static compression load evaluation for a variety of passenger trainset 
vehicle designs and ensure that each alternative provides an equivalent 
level of safety.
    For each of the three quasi-static compression load requirements 
that may be applied, the evaluation loads are introduced not at the 
line-of-draft, but at the ends of the collision load path through the 
occupied volume. Introducing the loads along the collision load path 
permits evaluation of the quasi-static compression resistance of a 
given design in a manner more representative of the type of loading the 
occupied volume would experience in a collision. The details of the 
location(s) of the load points at the ends of the collision load path 
would be determined on a design-by-design basis.
    The proposed quasi-static compression load requirements also permit 
use of a combination of elastic testing and elastic/plastic computer 
simulation to demonstrate a trainset's ability to comply with one of 
the three requirements. While an analysis of a properly-executed, 
finite-element (FE) computer simulation can demonstrate a design's 
compliance, some structural testing of the actual occupied volume 
undergoing evaluation is needed to validate the results the computer 
simulation produced. The process of validation essentially provides a 
computer simulation with a foundation in reality.
    A detailed FE model of the carbody undergoing evaluation is 
necessary to properly capture the structural response of the occupied 
volume to the evaluation compression loads. FRA expects this model will 
include all the structural members and connections that comprise the 
occupied volume. If the carbody structure is symmetric from side to 
side, a symmetry boundary condition may be used to facilitate efficient 
model evaluation. Certain details of the carbody structure that do not 
directly affect the OVI, such as couplers and designated CEM 
components, may be omitted from the OVI model.
    FRA also expects the material properties (e.g., stress-strain 
characteristics) that are used in the model would be derived from 
either manufacturer-certified minimum properties or from tests 
conducted on the actual construction materials. Material properties may 
be assumed to be independent of the rate of deformation for the 
purposes of OVI evaluation. Failure modeling of connections (e.g., 
welds, rivets, bolts, etc.) would not be required if the analysis does 
not indicate critical stresses or strains near those connections.
    Appropriate boundary conditions must be chosen to provide 
reasonable restraint to the model. FRA expects that vertical support to 
the model would be provided at the locations in the actual vehicle 
where it would carry vertical loads. Typically, those locations include 
the attachments of the secondary suspension components to the 
underframe and, if the car is so equipped, the articulation. 
Longitudinal restraint in the model may be accomplished by a rigid wall 
that is in contact with the reaction-end of the vehicle structure. 
Lateral restraint may either be introduced through a symmetry boundary 
condition or by applying a reasonable coefficient of friction between 
the longitudinal restraint wall and the body structure.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) provides that the first load magnitude 
and corresponding pass/fail criterion is an 800,000-pound compression 
load applied to the collision load path without causing any permanent 
deformation to the occupied volume. The load magnitude (800,000 pounds) 
is the same as the evaluation load generally required in existing Sec.  
238.203 for Tier I passenger equipment but would be introduced into the 
occupied volume along the collision load path (whether or not that is 
the line-of-draft). The pass/fail criterion of no permanent deformation 
would be the same as the pass/fail criterion in existing Sec.  238.203.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) provides that the second load 
magnitude and corresponding pass/fail test is a 1,000,000-pound 
compression load applied to the collision load path without exceeding 
either of two pass/fail criteria. Under this proposal, both pass/fail 
criteria must be met for a design to successfully meet this quasi-
static compression load requirement, which would increase the 
evaluation load by 25 percent over the conventional 800,000-pound load. 
As a consequence of applying a more severe load, FRA would relax the 
pass/fail criteria to permit small areas of plastic strain to develop 
within the structure. Thus, the first pass/fail criterion in proposed 
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(A) states that local plastic strains that may 
develop anywhere within a model may not exceed 5 percent. This pass/
fail criterion would be applied to the entire structure of the vehicle 
undergoing evaluation. The second pass/fail criterion in proposed 
paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B) states that local shortening (deformation) of 
the vehicle may not exceed 1 percent over any 15-foot length of the 
occupied volume. This criterion is intended to prevent localized loss 
of occupied volume that may occur when the 5-percent plastic strain 
criterion is not exceeded.
    Paragraph (b)(1)(iii) provides that the third load magnitude and 
corresponding pass/fail criterion is a 1,200,000 pound compression load 
applied to the collision load path without exceeding the crippling 
strength of the vehicle. This paragraph would define crippling as the 
maximum point on the load-versus-displacement characteristic. The load 
magnitude required by this quasi-static compression load requirement 
would be 50 percent higher than the 800,000-pound load required by 
existing Sec.  238.203, which also requires that the carbody must 
remain elastic to successfully meet the requirement. Because the 
evaluation load would be increased by 50 percent, the corresponding 
pass-fail criterion would require that the vehicle being evaluated have 
an ultimate load carrying capacity (i.e., crippling resistance) equal 
to or greater than 1.2 million pounds. To determine the adequacy of the 
proposed ultimate load, in June 2011, FRA performed a series of quasi-
static compression tests on passenger railcars compliant with Sec.  
238.203 and verified that these cars had an ultimate load capacity of 
approximately 1.2 million pounds. This testing series established that 
1.2 million pounds is a reasonable minimum standard for the crippling 
strength of passenger equipment compliant with Sec.  238.203. The 
results of that testing and corresponding FE modeling are summarized in 
an FRA ``Research Results'' report,\13\ two technical papers,\14\ and 
an FRA final report.\15\
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    \13\ USDOT/FRA, ``Occupant Volume Integrity Evaluation in 
Passenger Railcars.'' Research Results--Office of Railroad Policy 
and Development, RR 12-01, February 2012.
    \14\ Carolan, M., Muhlanger, M., Perlman, B., and Tyrell, D., 
``Occupied Volume Integrity Testing: Elastic Test Results and 
Analyses,'' American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. 
RTDF2011-67010, September, 2011; Carolan, M., Perlman, B., and 
Tyrell, D., ``Crippling Test of a Budd Pioneer Passenger Car,'' 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2012-74087, 
April 2012.
    \15\ Carolan, M., Perlman, B., and Tyrell, D., ``Alternative 
Occupied Volume Integrity (OVI) Tests and Analyses,'' U.S. 
Department of Transportation, DOT/FRA/ORD-13/46, October 2013.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 88023]]

    Demonstration of compliance with any of the quasi-static 
requirements may be achieved through testing to the specified load or a 
combination of elastic testing and plastic analysis. Paragraph (b)(2) 
would establish that, at a minimum, an end compression load of no less 
than 337,000 pound-force (lbf) must be applied to the carbody structure 
to validate the plastic analysis. In addition, these requirements would 
establish the minimum level of model validation to be performed using 
the results of a test of the same design. Nonetheless, FRA does not 
intend for these proposed minimum requirements to replace sound 
engineering judgment that higher force values may be appropriate to 
obtain valid test results when designing and performing the compression 
testing and FE modeling.
    Because paragraphs (b)(1)(ii) and (iii) would permit permanent 
deformation to occur in the occupied volume of a vehicle during its 
evaluation, it is likely a combination of elastic (i.e., non-
destructive) testing and elastic-plastic finite element analysis (FEA) 
would be used to demonstrate a vehicle design's ability to meet either 
of those two quasi-static compression load requirements. While 
paragraph (b)(1)(i) would not permit permanent deformation to occur in 
a design undergoing evaluation, FRA does not intend for the proposed 
rule to prevent a combination of elastic testing to a load less than 
800,000 lbs and FEA up to the target load of 800,000 lbs from being 
used to demonstrate that a design's OVI complies with this first 
requirement.
    As previously discussed, proposed paragraph (b)(2) states that, no 
matter which of the three requirements that is chosen for evaluation of 
a design's OVI is applied, a compression test also must be performed 
and the applied longitudinal compression load must be at least 337,000 
lbf (1500kN). This test is required to ensure the FE computer model 
that is used to demonstrate alternative compliance can successfully 
model the response of the carbody to the same loading condition as part 
of a program of model validation. This value is equal to 1500 kN, which 
is the compression load placed on the coupler support structures 
required by European standard EN 12663 for Category P-II passenger 
equipment. The ETF recommended this minimum value for the validation 
test's elastic load and FRA adopted this minimum recognizing that 
sufficient strains must be developed within the tested structure to 
provide quality measurements necessary for validating a model.
    Finally, proposed paragraph (b)(3) states that compliance with 
paragraph (b) of this section must be documented and submitted to FRA 
for review and approval. In particular, we propose several options for 
compliance with paragraph (b)(1), and FRA review and approval is 
necessary to evaluate the approach taken to ensure compliance.
Section 238.705 Dynamic Collision Scenario
    In this section, FRA is proposing to introduce a dynamic collision 
scenario analysis as the second part of the OVI evaluation of a Tier 
III passenger trainset. PTC technology cannot protect against all 
possible collision scenarios, such as collisions with trespassing 
highway equipment at grade crossings or with other rolling stock 
(freight or passenger equipment) during manual operations at 20 mph or 
below. Accordingly, compliance with this requirement is necessary to 
preserve the occupied volume, protecting all occupants on the trainset.
    As mentioned in the discussion of proposed Sec.  238.703 above, 
each vehicle in the trainset would need to demonstrate it meets both 
the OVI requirements in proposed paragraph (b) of that section and the 
dynamic collision scenario requirements in proposed paragraph (b) of 
this section. Further, as mentioned in the discussion of proposed Sec.  
238.703, and as outlined in proposed appendix G, a Tier I passenger 
trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may comply 
with this section instead of the requirements currently applicable to 
Tier I passenger trainsets in Sec.  238.203.
    In combination with the quasi-static compression load requirements 
discussed in proposed Sec.  238.703, the purpose of this proposed 
dynamic collision scenario requirement is to ensure that survivable 
space for the passengers and crew is preserved in up to moderately 
severe accident conditions (i.e., conditions comparable to a head-on 
collision at a speed of 20 to 25 mph, depending on the type of 
equipment, into a stationary train). This requirement would also 
provide a baseline level of protection for scenarios that may be more 
severe, but less predictable with respect to loading conditions and 
historical accident data. Although the dynamic collision scenario would 
be conducted at the trainset level, the requirements described in this 
section would be evaluated at the level of the trainset's individual 
vehicles so no vehicle in the trainset may exceed the parameters 
outlined in proposed paragraph (b) as a result of the dynamic collision 
scenario.
    Proposed paragraph (a) outlines the required conditions under which 
a dynamic collision scenario would be performed. Generally, the 
collision scenario requires a dynamic impact to be simulated between 
two trains: An initially-moving train and an initially-standing train. 
The initially-moving train is the trainset undergoing evaluation, 
either Tier III equipment or, as provided in appendix G, Tier I 
equipment designed to alternative crashworthiness standards. The 
initially-standing train is a locomotive-led consist of five 
conventionally-designed passenger cars. The conventionally-designed 
passenger cars have a prescribed weight and force-versus-displacement 
characteristic.\16\ The pass/fail criteria for the scenario determine 
whether there is sufficient preservation of occupied volume for 
passengers and crew in the trainset undergoing evaluation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ Appropriate weights and force-versus-displacement 
characteristics for the conventionally-designed passenger cars can 
be found in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA expects the collision scenario would be executed for an impact 
duration sufficient to capture the most severe portion of the collision 
event. The actual amount of impact time required to simulate the 
collision sufficiently would vary based upon the characteristics of the 
trainset undergoing evaluation. Typically, the collision scenario would 
be executed until all of the equipment, including the initially-
standing and initially-moving consists, is moving in the same direction 
at approximately the same velocity. If all of the equipment is moving 
together at approximately the same speed, no further car-to-car impacts 
would occur, and the simulation would have been executed for a 
sufficient duration to capture the most severe decelerations.
    There are various types of analyses that may be used to evaluate 
the collision scenario requirements. These analyses include fully-
detailed FE models, lumped-parameter analyses, or a hybrid approach 
where a combination of detailed FE modeling and lumped-parameter 
techniques are used within the same simulation. An FEA of the scenario 
is generally a highly-detailed simulation of the actual trainset 
geometry. The parts making up the trainset are meshed into a large 
number of elements, with each element having its own mass, stiffness, 
and connection properties to the adjacent elements. A lumped parameter 
analysis represents each car or section of a car within a trainset 
using a small number of masses and a small number of non-linear 
springs. At its extreme, each car consists

[[Page 88024]]

of a single mass and a single spring characteristic. A hybrid approach 
may utilize an FE mesh to represent some structures (e.g., CEM 
structures that undergo large deformations) and lumped-parameter 
representations of other structures (e.g., cars far from the impacting 
interface that experience little deformation). Any of the three types 
of analyses is capable of developing the information needed to verify a 
trainset's ability to meet the requirements of the collision scenario. 
Additionally, because the centerlines of the initially-moving and 
initially-standing trains are aligned with one another during this 
scenario, a half-symmetric model may be used to represent the colliding 
vehicles, as appropriate.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1) requires the initially-moving train to be 
made up of the equipment undergoing evaluation at its empty, ready-to-
run (AW0) weight.\17\ As highlighted above, this equipment can be 
either Tier III equipment or, under appendix G, Tier I equipment 
designed to alternative crashworthiness standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ ``AW0'' is a loading designation that is defined by the 
manufacturer. Specifically, AW0 refers to the ``actual weight'' of 
an empty vehicle. The phrase ``empty, ready-to-run weight'' is 
typically how this designation is defined in a technical document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed paragraph (a)(2) states that if the length of consists to 
be used in service can vary, then the longest and shortest consist 
lengths must both be evaluated under this section. This requirement is 
intended to ensure the trainset's OVI is satisfactory when operated in 
both the shortest and longest train consists that will be utilized in 
service. The trainset undergoing evaluation must successfully meet the 
collision scenario requirements for both its shortest and longest 
configurations; it is not required to demonstrate other configurations 
meet the requirements.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(3) states that if the trainset is intended 
for use in push-pull service, then both the locomotive-led and cab-car-
led configurations shall be evaluated separately. This requirement is 
intended to ensure sufficient OVI for all occupied spaces in the 
trainset regardless of whether it is led by a cab car or a conventional 
locomotive.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(4) describes the configuration of the 
initially-standing train of conventional passenger equipment. As 
provided in paragraph (a)(4)(i), this train is to be led by a rigid 
locomotive weighing 260,000 pounds and also made up of five identical 
coaches, each having a weight of 95,000 pounds. Paragraph (a)(4)(ii) 
provides that the locomotive and each passenger coach crush in response 
to applied force as specified in Table 1 to this section. Table 1 
provides the non-linear, force-versus-crush relationship for the 
passenger cars and locomotive comprising the initially-standing train. 
These relationships are meant to be representative of typical crush 
responses for passenger equipment; likewise, the weights given for the 
conventional locomotive and conventional passenger cars are meant to be 
representative of typical weights for passenger equipment. The weights 
for the passenger cars and locomotives, the force-versus-crush 
behavior, and the geometry for the standing locomotive are all provided 
in the Technical Criteria and Procedures Report. Further detail on the 
geometry of the locomotive can be found in that Report. In addition, 
paragraph (a)(4)(iii) provides that the locomotive would be modeled 
using the data inputs listed in appendix H to this part, so that the 
locomotive's geometric design is as depicted in Figure 1 to appendix H.
    Proposed paragraphs (a)(5) through (10) are meant to ensure that 
the collision scenario is evaluated under the same conditions by each 
entity performing this type of evaluation. Proposed paragraph (a)(5) 
explains that the scenario must be evaluated on tangent, level track.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(6) describes the initial velocities to be 
assigned to the initially-moving consist. If the initially-moving 
consist is led by a cab car or an MU locomotive, then it must have an 
initial velocity of 20 mph. If the initially-moving consist is led by a 
conventional locomotive, it must have an initial velocity of 25 mph. 
These speeds were chosen based upon estimates of the upper limit of the 
ability of conventionally-designed Tier I equipment to maintain its 
occupied volume in a similar collision scenario.
    FRA intends for the requirements in proposed paragraphs (a)(7) 
through (9) to simplify the modeling of the collision scenario and to 
help ensure the scenario is evaluated consistently by different 
entities. Paragraph (a)(7) provides that the coupler knuckles on the 
impacting equipment shall be closed. Paragraph (a)(8) states that the 
moving and standing consists are not braked. Paragraph (a)(9) states 
that the initially-standing train is free to move only in the 
longitudinal direction.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(10) would require that the model used to 
demonstrate compliance with the dynamic collision requirements be 
validated, and that model validation be documented and submitted to FRA 
for review and approval. Regardless of the type of analysis employed to 
demonstrate a trainset's ability to meet the collision scenario 
requirements, the analytical model must undergo some level of 
validation for the results to be considered acceptable. The validation 
to be performed on the model used in the collision scenario would be in 
addition to any validation required for a model used to demonstrate the 
quasi-static OVI of the trainset undergoing evaluation. While full-
scale destructive testing of a trainset undergoing evaluation is not 
expected, FRA expects that any designated energy-absorbing components 
will be tested at the component-level. The results of these component 
tests would be used to validate a model of the same type to be used to 
demonstrate the trainset's ability to meet the dynamic collision 
scenario. FRA also expects that any components that experience large 
deflection or permanent deformation during the modeling of the 
collision must be validated with some type of physical test.
    Proposed paragraph (b) would contain the crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance requirements the individual vehicles in 
the initially-moving trainset involved in the dynamic collision 
scenario must meet as described in paragraph (a)--i.e., the trainset 
undergoing evaluation. Proposed paragraph (b)(1) outlines two 
conditions for demonstrating that the initially-moving trainset 
possesses sufficient crashworthiness to resist a significant loss of 
occupied volume during the collision scenario. Only one of the two 
performance conditions would have to be shown to be met to successfully 
demonstrate compliance: No more than 10 inches of longitudinal, 
permanent deformation of the occupied volume as a result of the impact, 
as proposed in paragraph (b)(1)(i); or global vehicle shortening not 
exceeding 1 percent over any 15-foot length of the occupied volume, as 
proposed in paragraph (b)(1)(ii). These two performance conditions are 
meant to permit different analysis techniques (e.g., lumped-parameter 
or FEA) to be applied to evaluate the collision scenario.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2) provides that if the option to use GM/
RT2100 is exercised to demonstrate compliance with any of the 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then 
the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of 
each vehicle during the dynamic collision scenario shall not exceed 5g 
in any 100-millisecond (ms) time period. A plot of the 100-ms average 
longitudinal deceleration versus time, in which the

[[Page 88025]]

curve never exceeds 5g, would suffice to demonstrate 
compliance with paragraph (b)(2).
    Proposed paragraph (b)(3) sets out the criteria that must be met to 
demonstrate the crashworthiness of the engineer's cab as a result of 
the dynamic collision impact. Paragraph (b)(3)(i) states that a 
survival space where there is no intrusion must be maintained around 
each seat in the cab. Survival space is defined as extending a minimum 
of 12 inches from each edge of the seat. Walls or other items 
originally within this defined space, not including the operating 
console, shall not further intrude more than 1.5 inches towards the 
seat under evaluation.
    In addition, as a result of the impact, under paragraph (b)(3)(ii), 
there shall be a clear exit path from the cab for the occupants, and, 
under paragraph (b)(3)(iii), the vertical height of the compartment 
shall not be reduced by more than 20 percent. FRA intends for proposed 
paragraph (b)(3)(iii) to prevent loss of occupied volume that occurs 
either through lifting of the floor or downward buckling of the 
ceiling.
    Further, proposed paragraph (b)(3)(iv) provides that the operating 
console shall not have moved closer to the engineer's seat by more than 
2 inches as a result of the impact. Because portions of the operating 
console in a given cab may originally be within the 12-inch survival 
space defined in paragraph (b)(3)(i) before the impact, it is important 
that the console not move more than 2 inches closer to the engineer's 
seat and impede the engineer from exiting the cab following the impact. 
The allowable encroachment for the operating console is one-third 
larger than the 1.5 inches allowed for walls or other items originally 
within the 12-inch survival space. This larger allowance assumes the 
initial configuration is designed so there is sufficient space for the 
engineer to readily get into and out of his or her seat, as well as 
space to comfortably situate himself or herself for normal operation of 
the train. Consequently, console movement of 2 inches or less can be 
allowed without inhibiting or preventing egress. If the engineer's seat 
is part of a set of adjacent seats, the requirements of this paragraph 
(b)(iv) would apply to both seats. This seating arrangement is in the 
cabs of Amtrak's Acela Express trainsets.
Section 238.707 Override Protection
    This proposed section would contain the requirements for analyzing 
the ability of a Tier III passenger trainset to resist vertical 
climbing or override at its collision interface locations during a 
dynamic collision scenario. This proposed section would examine the 
vertical displacement behavior of colliding equipment under an ideal 
impact scenario where an initially-moving Tier III trainset and an 
initially-standing conventional train are aligned. This section would 
also prescribe an impact scenario where the interface of the colliding 
equipment is translated both laterally and vertically by 3 inches to 
ensure that override is resisted during an impact when the two trains 
are not perfectly aligned. Evaluating the colliding equipment's ability 
to resist override in an offset impact condition helps to demonstrate 
that the override features are robust.
    FRA clarifies that Tier III passenger trainsets would have to 
comply with both paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section. FRA also 
clarifies that under proposed appendix G, a Tier I passenger trainset 
designed to alternative crashworthiness standards may demonstrate an 
appropriate level of override protection by complying with the 
requirements this section proposes instead of complying with the 
requirements applicable to Tier I passenger trainsets in Sec.  238.205, 
Anti-climbing mechanism, and Sec.  238.207, Link between coupling 
mechanism and car body. In general, the requirements proposed in this 
section were developed as an alternative to demonstrating anti-climbing 
capabilities in current Sec.  238.205 and the capability of the link 
between the coupling mechanism and carbody to resist the loads in 
current Sec.  238.207. While compliance with both Sec. Sec.  238.205 
and 238.207 requires meeting a set of quasi-static, vertical load 
cases, the requirements proposed in this section were developed as a 
dynamic performance standard.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1) contains two sets of initial conditions 
for analyzing the ability of the evaluated trainset to resist vertical 
climbing or override during a dynamic collision scenario, and states 
these conditions must be applied using the dynamic collision scenario 
in proposed Sec.  238.705(a). Criteria for evaluating the dynamic 
collision scenario for each set of initial conditions are provided in 
proposed paragraph (a)(2). Because the same model may be used both to 
demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Sec.  238.705 and the 
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the model must 
be validated with test data in such a way as to provide confidence in 
the validity of the results of the collision analyses. In this regard, 
if the components that experience large deflection or permanent 
deformation in the analysis described in Sec.  238.705 also experience 
large deflection or permanent deformation in the analysis described in 
paragraph (a)(2) of this section, then the same test results may be 
used to validate the model. If the performance of the components that 
undergo large deformation in the analysis described in paragraph (a)(2) 
of this section is not validated with test data as part of the 
validation of the model used in Sec.  238.705, then additional 
validation testing must be performed to validate the model being used 
to demonstrate performance under paragraph (a)(2).
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be 
used in the collision simulation to demonstrate anti-climbing 
performance. This paragraph provides that all vehicles in both the 
initially-moving and the initially-standing train consists must be 
positioned at their nominal running heights with the centerlines of the 
initially-moving and initially-standing trains aligned. Because the 
centerlines of the colliding vehicles would be aligned with one 
another, a longitudinally half-symmetric model may be used to simulate 
this collision scenario, as appropriate. FRA intends for this initial 
condition to represent an ideal collision situation where the colliding 
vehicles are initially aligned with one another.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1)(ii) describes the second condition to be 
used in the collision simulation as a 3-inch lateral and 3-inch 
vertical offset of the interface of the colliding equipment. The 
lateral and vertical offsets must be applied simultaneously in the same 
simulation. Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner will 
demonstrate that the anti-climb features are of a robust design, 
capable of preventing climbing when the colliding vehicles are not 
perfectly aligned. Because this simulation requires a lateral offset 
between the initially-standing and initially-moving consists, a 
symmetric boundary condition may not be employed (i.e., the full width 
of each consist must be modeled).
    Proposed paragraph (a)(2) explains the pass/fail criteria that must 
be successfully met to demonstrate a trainset possesses adequate anti-
climb features for its colliding interface. The criteria must be met 
for each set of initial conditions in paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (ii) for 
demonstrating appropriate resistance to override between colliding 
equipment. Paragraph (a)(2)(i) would provide that the relative 
difference in elevation of the underframes between the colliding 
equipment in the initially-moving and initially-standing train consists 
may not change by more than 4 inches at any point during the

[[Page 88026]]

simulation. Because the initially-standing consist is permitted only 
longitudinal motion under Sec.  238.705(a)(9), no vehicle in the 
initially-standing consist will experience any vertical motion. Thus, 
the change in elevation of the initially-moving trainset's underframe 
would be measured relative to the underframe of the initially-standing 
consist. To evaluate this scenario properly, the collision simulation 
must be run until all vehicles in the initially-moving and the 
initially-standing consists are moving in the same direction at 
approximately the same velocity.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(2)(ii) contains the second pass/fail 
criterion to be met to demonstrate resistance to override between 
colliding equipment. No tread of any wheel of the first vehicle of the 
initially-moving consist may rise above the top of the rail by more 
than 4 inches. This condition must be evaluated throughout the duration 
of the collision simulation, not only at the end of the collision. To 
evaluate this scenario properly, the collision simulation must be 
executed until all vehicles in the initially-moving and the initially-
standing train consists are moving in the same direction at 
approximately the same velocity.
    Proposed paragraph (b) contains the evaluation methodology for 
demonstrating the appropriate level of override protection for 
connected equipment in a Tier III trainset. This paragraph would 
examine the vertical displacement behavior of coupled equipment under 
an ideal impact scenario where the vehicles within the initially-moving 
train are aligned. It also would prescribe an impact scenario where the 
first coupled interface of the initially-moving train is translated 
both laterally and vertically by 2 inches. Evaluating the connected 
equipment's ability to resist override in an offset impact condition is 
necessary to demonstrate the override features are robust and can 
resist override during an impact where the coupled vehicles are not 
perfectly aligned.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) explains the conditions for analyzing the 
ability of connected equipment to resist vertical climbing or override 
at the coupled interfaces during a dynamic collision scenario, using 
the scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a). Like paragraph (a) of this 
section, each set of conditions in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) must 
be evaluated independently. Criteria for evaluating the dynamic 
collision scenario for each set of conditions are in paragraph (b)(2). 
As noted in the discussion of paragraph (a), because the same model may 
be used to demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Sec.  
238.705 and the requirements of this section, the model must be 
validated with test data in a way that provides confidence in the 
validity of the results of the collision analyses. The discussion of 
model validation in paragraph (a) applies equally to model validation 
for purposes of paragraph (b).
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(i) describes the first condition to be 
used for collision simulation to demonstrate override protection for 
connected equipment. This paragraph provides that all vehicles in both 
the initially-moving and the initially-standing train consists must be 
positioned at their nominal running heights, with the centerlines of 
the initially-moving and initially-standing trains aligned. Because the 
centerlines of the colliding vehicles would be aligned with one 
another, a longitudinally half-symmetric model may be used to simulate 
this collision scenario, as appropriate. This initial condition is 
meant to represent an ideal collision situation where the colliding 
vehicles are initially aligned with one another.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) would explain that the second 
condition to be used in the collision simulation is a 2-inch lateral 
and 2-inch vertical offset of the first connected interface between 
vehicles in the initially-moving train. The lateral and vertical 
offsets must be applied simultaneously in the same simulation. 
Evaluating the equipment offset in this manner would demonstrate that 
the anti-climb features are of a robust design that would prevent 
climbing when the vehicles in the initially-moving trainset are not 
perfectly aligned. Because this simulation requires a lateral offset 
between the vehicles of the initially-moving consist, a symmetric 
boundary condition may not be used (i.e., the full width of each 
consist must be modeled).
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2) sets out the pass/fail criteria that must 
be successfully met to demonstrate a Tier III trainset possesses 
adequate anti-climb features to protect the vehicles connected in the 
trainset from overriding each other. The criteria must be met for each 
set of initial conditions provided in paragraphs (b)(1)(i) and (ii) to 
demonstrate appropriate resistance to override between connected 
equipment. Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(i) would provide that the relative 
difference in elevation of the underframes between the connected 
equipment in the initially-moving train may not change by more than 4 
inches at any point during the simulation. To evaluate this scenario 
properly, the simulation must be run until all vehicles in the 
initially-moving and the initially-standing consists are moving in the 
same direction at approximately the same velocity.
    The 4-inch vertical difference in paragraph (b)(2)(i) is a pass/
fail criterion and must be measured relative to the initial heights of 
the connected equipment. A change in underframe height in excess of 4 
inches would indicate one of the two connected vehicles has begun to 
climb and override the other.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2)(ii) contains the second pass/fail 
criterion to be met to demonstrate resistance to override between 
connected equipment. No tread of any wheel of the initially-moving 
train may rise above the top of the rail by more than 4 inches. This 
condition may not be exceeded at any point during the simulation. To 
evaluate this scenario properly, the simulation must be executed until 
all vehicles in the initially-moving and the initially-standing 
consists are moving in the same direction at approximately the same 
velocity.
Section 238.709 Fluid Entry Inhibition
    This section proposes requirements for fluid entry inhibition for 
the skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset. The 
proposed requirements are largely the same as those in Sec.  238.209(a) 
for Tier I locomotives, including MU locomotives and cab cars. Section 
238.209(a) requires that the front end of a Tier I locomotive be 
covered by a skin equivalent to a half-inch-thick, 25-kilopound-per-
square-inch (ksi) steel plate to prevent the entry of fluids into the 
locomotive cab in the event of a collision. While that specific 
requirement is easily applied to conventional designs, many of which 
may still make use of steel sheets for the outer skin, it is more 
difficult to apply to the complex, aerodynamic shapes of modern 
passenger trainset front ends, which often are comprised of various 
structures, including crash energy management elements. Because the 
consideration of aerodynamics and crash energy management is 
significant, this section proposes to account for the use of more 
modern designs and materials to construct a passenger trainset front 
end so it can be evaluated effectively.
    FRA notes that, while this section focuses on the prevention of 
fluid entry, it also establishes a minimum level of penetration 
resistance that may be applied more generally. Because this section is 
based on Sec.  238.209(a), which identifies two important carbody

[[Page 88027]]

characteristics for the protection of cab occupants in conventional 
equipment designs, material thickness and strength, this section offers 
protection for more hazards than the entry of fluid alone.
    Specifically, proposed paragraph (a)(1) provides that the skin 
covering the front-end structure of a Tier III trainset must maintain a 
resistance to penetration into the cab equivalent to that of the half-
inch-thick sheet of 25-ksi steel plate, as required by Sec.  
238.209(a)(1)(i) for Tier I locomotives. This may be achieved using an 
outer skin of an equivalent strength; a combination of materials 
between the engineer and the outside environment; or a composite 
material of a lesser thickness, if an equivalent level of penetration 
resistance is maintained. To demonstrate compliance, the sum of the 
thicknesses and material strength of all elements (e.g., skin and 
structural elements) may be considered, when measured from the 
structural leading edge of the trainset up to, and including, the 
interior structural wall of the cab at its weakest location, when 
projected onto a vertical plane, just forward of the engineer's normal 
operating position.
    By permitting additional methods to achieve equivalent penetration 
resistance, FRA recognizes that even though most modern designs may 
make use of lighter weight materials for aerodynamic skins (e.g., 
aluminum, fiberglass), it does not imply that the protection provided 
is any less substantial. In fact, the combination of skin, structure, 
and crash energy management features in front of the engineer may 
actually provide more protection than the half-inch-thick, 25-ksi steel 
plate. It is important to note, however, that FRA intends for the 
performance requirement in this paragraph to be evaluated laterally 
across the entire width of the cab, including all carbody structures 
just forward of the engineer's normal operating position. This would 
demonstrate protection equivalent to that provided by the referenced 
steel plate exists across the entire width of the cab when projected in 
front of the engineer. Non-structural elements or features, such as the 
operating console and insulation materials, would not be taken into 
account in demonstrating compliance.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(2) is derived from the existing requirement 
for fluid entry inhibition for Tier I locomotives in Sec.  
238.209(a)(1)(ii). It would also be applied so it is consistent with 
the design of modern passenger trainset front end structures. This 
recognizes that various techniques may be employed to provide fluid 
entry inhibition characteristics, particularly through the use of 
flexible and impermeable materials.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(3) would complement the requirements of 
paragraph (a)(1) by prescribing that the required front-end protective 
skin (or its equivalent) be affixed to the main structural members 
(e.g., collision and corner posts) to ensure the integrity of the 
overall front-end structure. In this regard, FRA makes clear that the 
requirement for front-end protective skin (or its equivalent) is 
independent of the requirements proposed for the other structural 
features at the front end of the trainset--and indeed provides an 
additional layer of protection. Proposed paragraph (a)(3) is also 
derived from the existing requirement for Tier I locomotives in Sec.  
238.209(a)(1)(iii).
    Since this section expressly provides flexibility to demonstrate 
compliance, it inherently allows various means of compliance that could 
be considered acceptable. Consequently, proposed paragraph (b) would 
require that, at a minimum, detailed structural drawings be submitted 
for FRA review, with pertinent calculations to demonstrate compliance 
with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this section. FRA believes it 
is necessary to provide such detail on how the requirements of 
paragraph (a) are to be met given the expected use of front-end 
protection in Tier III trainsets equivalent to the steel plate 
specified in paragraph (a), and in Tier I trainsets designed to 
alternative crashworthiness standards, as provided in proposed appendix 
G.
    FRA is not aware of any international standard regarding fluid 
entry inhibition. These proposed requirements are necessary to protect 
the occupied volume because of the front end structure of Tier I and 
Tier III equipment as this location is vulnerable in a highway grade 
crossing collision if a fuel tank that is part of or being transported 
by the highway vehicle ruptures. See 64 FR 25540. However, equipment 
designed to international standards may be able to meet this 
requirement as designed, without modification, due to the large 
structure that is usually present on the leading ends of the equipment. 
FRA invites comment on this proposed section and specifically on 
whether application of the proposed requirements is clear.
Section 238.711 End Structure Integrity of Cab End
    In this section, FRA proposes requirements to ensure the structure 
of cab ends for Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to 
alternative crashworthiness standards, under proposed appendix G) 
provides a minimum level of protection for the engineer and other cab 
occupants, equivalent to the collision post and corner post 
requirements for Tier I equipment in subpart C of this part. Accident 
history shows the occupied volume can be penetrated by large, blunt 
objects that contact the end structure, particularly in grade crossing 
collisions, threatening the safety of the crew and other occupants. For 
such collision scenarios, the end structure can be designed to act as 
an integrated structure, absorbing energy as it deforms to provide 
increased occupied volume protection.
    Specifically, FRA is proposing to cross-reference the requirements 
of appendix F to this part, Alternative Dynamic Performance 
Requirements for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives. 
FRA added appendix F to this part in the final rule on Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards; Front End Strength of Cab Cars and 
Multiple-Unit Locomotives. See 75 FR 1180, Jan. 8, 2010. In particular, 
these dynamic performance requirements facilitate testing of end frame 
designs without readily identifiable collision or corner post 
structures. They provide an option to demonstrate the dynamic 
performance of front end structures when impacting a rigid object, 
instead of the static load testing requirements prescribed in 
Sec. Sec.  238.211 and 238.213 for collision posts and corner posts, 
respectively. These dynamic performance requirements do not prescribe 
the strength of the main structural members (i.e., collision posts and 
corner posts), but rather prescribe energy absorption requirements for 
the end structure in grade crossing collision scenarios. Instead of 
focusing on whether an individual collision post or corner post 
structure is capable of resisting the applied loads, the focus is more 
appropriately placed on the ability of the end frame structure as an 
integrated whole to withstand collisions. The collision scenarios can 
be evaluated through the use of FEA, or testing, or both. The 
requirements are performance-based and each must be evaluated using a 
prescribed collision scenario of a rigid object impacting the end 
structure.
Section 238.713 End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End
    In this section, FRA proposes requirements to ensure the structure 
of the non-cab ends of Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets 
designed to alternative crashworthiness standards under proposed 
appendix G to this part) provides a minimum level of protection

[[Page 88028]]

for occupants equivalent to that required for Tier I equipment in 
subpart C of this part. These proposed requirements help ensure the 
integrity of the components that make up any non-cab end of a passenger 
trainset unit. The proposed requirements are substantially similar to 
the Tier I collision and corner post requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.211 
and 238.213, respectively. The proposal would also specifically permit 
trainsets with particular safety features, such as pushback couplers, 
the flexibility to demonstrate required safety performance instead of 
separate collision post structures.
    Proposed paragraph (a) explains that the requirements of paragraphs 
(b) and (c) of this section apply to a Tier III trainset other than at 
cab ends.
    Proposed paragraph (b) contains the requirements for collision post 
structures at any non-cab end of a trainset unit. The proposed 
requirements are the same as the requirements for collision post 
structures in Sec.  238.211(a)(1), which generally apply to the ends of 
Tier I passenger equipment other than at the cab end of a locomotive. 
While the heading of this proposed paragraph is ``Collision post 
requirements,'' FRA intends for these proposed requirements to apply to 
the structures otherwise located at approximately the one-third points 
laterally at any non-cab end of the trainset unit, whether or not the 
structures are identified as collision posts.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) explains that at least one set of 
specified requirements must be met. Paragraph (b)(1)(i) is the first 
set of requirements addressing collision post structural protection. 
This paragraph provides that there would be two full-height collision 
posts, located at approximately the one-third points laterally across 
the width of the end of the trainset unit. Each collision post would be 
required to have an ultimate longitudinal shear strength of at least 
300,000 pounds, with the load applied at the top of the underframe 
member to which it is attached. This paragraph further states that if 
reinforcement is used to provide the required shear strength, the 
reinforcement shall have full value, meaning a width equal to the width 
of the collision post, for a distance of 18 inches up from the 
underframe connection and then taper to a location approximately 30 
inches above the underframe connection.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1)(ii) provides an alternative to meeting 
the requirements of paragraph (b)(1)(i). This paragraph states that an 
equivalent end structure may be used instead of the specific collision 
post structures described in paragraph (b)(1)(i). The equivalent end 
structure would be required to withstand the sum of the forces that 
would otherwise be applied to each individual post.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2) provides conditions under which collision 
posts are not required in the non-cab end structure of a Tier III 
trainset unit. This paragraph explains an exception to the requirements 
of paragraph (b)(1) for the non-cab end of any unit with push-back 
couplers and interlocking anti-climbing mechanisms, and for the non-cab 
ends of a semi-permanently coupled consist. To apply this exception, a 
non-cab end of a trainset unit must demonstrate that its inter-car 
connection can prevent disengagement and telescoping to the same extent 
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post 
requirements of subpart C of this part. The exception in proposed 
paragraph (b)(2) to the specific collision post requirements for 
trainset units with certain design features is similar to an exception 
to the collision post requirements in the existing Tier I requirements 
in Sec.  238.211(d). Proposed paragraph (b)(2) further specifies that 
the criteria in proposed Sec.  238.707(b) must be applied to evaluate 
whether a Tier III trainset unit's inter-car connection can prevent 
such disengagement and telescoping. Section 238.707 contains the 
proposed requirements for demonstrating override resistance for 
connected equipment during a dynamic collision simulation. FRA intends 
for application of Sec.  238.707(b) to provide clarity and guidance on 
the type of analysis FRA expects would be used to demonstrate a 
particular trainset unit fulfills the conditions of the exception when 
there are no collision posts at the non-cab end.
    Proposed paragraph (c) contains the requirements for corner post 
structures on the non-cab end of a Tier III passenger car. Notably, 
unlike requirements for collision posts at non-cab ends, requirements 
for corner posts would not apply to non-cab ends of all units in a Tier 
III passenger trainset--only Tier III passenger trainset units that are 
passenger cars. Collision post requirements are necessary for each end 
of any trainset unit, even if only occupied by crewmembers at one end, 
to help prevent the uncontrolled crushing or climbing of trainset units 
that could tend to misalign the trainset or cause telescoping that 
could endanger the crew and passengers. Corner posts do not protect 
against the misalignment of trainset units in the same way, and would 
not be required by this rule if the end of the trainset unit is not 
designed to be occupied by crewmembers or passengers. Specifically, for 
a passenger car that has a cab equipped with one or more control stands 
or consoles designed for an engineer to operate the trainset, the 
requirements of Sec.  238.711 would apply to the cab end. Otherwise, 
the requirements of this paragraph would apply to the non-cab end of a 
passenger car, including any end of a passenger car without a cab.
    Although the proposed heading of this paragraph is ``Corner post 
requirements,'' FRA makes clear these proposed requirements apply to 
the corner structures at the non-cab ends of passenger cars, whether or 
not the structures are identified as corner posts. The majority of the 
corner structure requirements provided in this section are analogous to 
the Tier I corner post requirements in Sec.  238.213.
    The proposed requirements in paragraph (c)(1) apply to each non-cab 
end of a passenger car and would require that there be two side 
structures, placed forward of the occupied volume, capable of resisting 
the forces specified in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) through (iii). These 
structures do not necessarily need to be located on the absolute 
corners of the carbody if they are located in a manner that protects 
the occupied volume. FRA is not aware of any international standards or 
requirements for corner posts that are equivalent to the proposed 
requirements. The proposed requirements are intended to address 
accident conditions like those of the commuter train derailment and 
collision in Bridgeport, CT, on May 17, 2013. In that accident, a 
commuter train derailed toward an adjacent track such that the non-cab 
end of a passenger car protruded into the right-of-way of an oncoming 
train. There was structural damage to the protruding corner, but the 
corner post resisted loss of the occupied volume to avoid fatal 
injuries.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(i) provides the first load case and pass/
fail requirement to be applied to the corner structures at non-cab 
ends. This paragraph states that each corner structure must resist a 
150,000-pound horizontal force at the height of the floor without 
failure. Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(ii) provides the second load case 
and pass/fail requirement. This paragraph states that each corner 
structure must resist a 20,000-pound horizontal force at the height of 
the roof without failure. Proposed paragraph (c)(1)(iii) provides the 
third load case and pass/fail requirement. This paragraph states that 
each corner structure must resist a 30,000-pound

[[Page 88029]]

horizontal force applied at a point 18 inches above the top of the 
floor without permanent deformation.
    Proposed paragraph (c)(2) states that the orientation of the 
applied horizontal forces shall range from longitudinal inward to 
transverse inward, consistent with the Tier I requirements in Sec.  
238.213.
    Proposed paragraphs (c)(3) and (4) do not have explicit 
counterparts in the Tier I requirements in Sec.  238.213. FRA intends 
for each paragraph to address the way to apply the evaluation loads to 
the structure at non-cab ends. Paragraph (c)(3) states that for each 
evaluation load, the load shall be applied to an area of the structure 
sufficient enough to prevent local crippling or punching through the 
material at the point of load application. Paragraph (c)(4) states that 
the load area shall be chosen to be appropriate for the particular car 
design and shall not exceed 10 inches by 10 inches. These two 
paragraphs, addressing the areas of the corner structure over which the 
load must be applied, are intended to guide the planning of the tests 
and analyses undertaken to demonstrate compliance with the corner 
structure requirements. FRA recognizes that a highly localized load 
application can result in localized deformation and, as a consequence, 
result in an evaluation test or analysis that is not descriptive of the 
entire corner structure's behavior. At the same time, too large a load 
application area would not result in a proper evaluation of the corner 
structure at the discrete locations integral to demonstrating the 
strength of the structure. While FRA provides this guidance, the 
entities (e.g., manufacturers, testing facilities, consultants) 
performing the evaluation would use their engineering judgment to 
determine the selection of the loading mechanism (i.e., physical load 
application device in the case of a test, or boundary conditions in the 
case of a computer simulation) and load application area for evaluation 
purposes consistent with the proposed requirements.
    In addition, FRA notes that because two of the three load cases 
described in paragraph (c)(1) permit permanent deformation to occur 
during the evaluation (provided the ultimate strength of the post is 
not reached), FRA envisions that FEA or another appropriate simulation 
tool would be used to perform the evaluation. FRA also expects any 
analysis model used to demonstrate compliance with this paragraph and 
the other structural requirements in this part, would be properly 
validated using test data to demonstrate the model's ability to 
properly reflect the relevant behaviors.
Section 238.715 Roof and Side Structure Integrity
    FRA is proposing that the roof and side structure integrity 
requirements for Tier III trainsets (and Tier I trainsets designed to 
alternative crashworthiness standards under proposed appendix G to this 
part) equal those requirements in Sec.  238.215, ``Rollover strength,'' 
and Sec.  238.217, ``Side structure.''
    Section 238.215 currently requires a carbody to be designed so that 
the weight of the car can be supported by either the roof of the car, 
or by specified sidewall structural members, without resulting in 
stresses exceeding one-half of the stress necessary to cause either 
yielding or buckling. FRA expects that compliance with this requirement 
would be demonstrated through FEA modeling of the structural carbody. 
Moreover, FRA expects that the FEA model would have been subjected to a 
program of model validation to demonstrate the model's ability to 
accurately represent the structure. Further discussion of Sec.  238.215 
is in the original Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final rule. See 
64 FR 25607, 25608.
    Section 238.217 currently includes design requirements for the 
sidewall stiffness of Tier I passenger equipment. This section codifies 
longstanding design practice in the U.S. Compliance with this section 
may be demonstrated through hand calculations. FRA does not expect 
compliance to require physical testing or computer simulation, although 
these methods of evaluation may be used. Further discussion of Sec.  
238.217 is in the original Passenger Equipment Safety Standards final 
rule. 64 FR 25608, 25609.
Section 238.717 Truck-to-Carbody Attachment
    In this section, FRA proposes requirements to demonstrate the 
integrity of truck-to-carbody attachments on a Tier III trainset (or a 
Tier I trainset designed to alternative crashworthiness standards under 
proposed appendix G to this part) during a dynamic impact. The 
requirements in either paragraph (a) or (b) may be applied; a given 
design must demonstrate it complies with only one set of requirements. 
FRA provided the two sets of requirements to permit different types of 
analyses to be used to demonstrate the trainset units possess adequate 
truck attachment strength. If a trainset features more than one type of 
truck or more than one type of truck-to-carbody attachment, 
satisfactory truck-to-carbody attachment strength must be demonstrated 
for each design.
    Paragraph (a) proposes demonstrating truck-to-carbody attachment 
integrity by showing compliance with the requirements in Sec.  238.219. 
Discussion of Sec.  238.219 is in the original Passenger Equipment 
Safety Standards final rule, 64 FR 25609, 25610, May 12, 1999, and in 
amendments to the final rule, 67 FR 19977, 19978, Apr. 23, 2002.
    Proposed paragraph (b) contains the second option for demonstrating 
truck-to-carbody attachment integrity. In this paragraph, the truck-to-
carbody attachment evaluation loads would be applied at the CG of the 
truck and each load case would be evaluated separately. Additionally, 
the loads would be applied quasi-statically for each load case. For 
each of the quasi-static load cases, the applied load may not cause any 
permanent deformation in the truck attachments or carbody.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(1) describes the first of three quasi-static 
loads that must be evaluated. The load is stated as a 3g vertical load 
acting downward on the mass of the truck (i.e., pulling the truck 
toward the ground). Because a 3g vertical load acting upward on the 
mass of the truck would force the truck into contact with the underside 
of the carbody, only the 3g downward vertical load case must be 
evaluated to demonstrate sufficient attachment strength between the 
truck and carbody.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(2) describes the second of the three quasi-
static loads to be evaluated. The load is stated as a 1g lateral load 
acting on the mass of the truck. Because the lateral load must be 
evaluated at the CG of the truck, this load would generate a moment (or 
torque) in the truck-to-carbody attachments. Additionally, the vertical 
reaction that develops as a result of the lateral load must also be 
considered and evaluated simultaneously with the lateral load itself. 
FRA expects that if the truck-to-carbody attachments are not symmetric 
from side to side, the lateral load case would be evaluated for a 
lateral load acting independently in both the positive lateral and 
negative lateral (e.g., inward and outward) directions.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(3) describes the final three quasi-static 
loads to be evaluated. The load is stated as a 5g longitudinal load 
acting on the mass of the truck. Because the longitudinal load must be 
evaluated at the CG of the truck, this load would also generate a 
moment (or torque) in the truck-to-carbody attachments. The vertical 
reaction that develops as a result of the longitudinal load must also 
be considered and

[[Page 88030]]

evaluated simultaneously with the longitudinal load.
    Demonstrating the truck can remain attached under a 5g quasi-static 
longitudinal load is contingent on complying with the proposed 
requirements in paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii), derived from the dynamic 
collision scenario results described in Sec.  238.705(a) in which a 
moving train impacts a standing train under specified conditions. 
During the collision scenario Sec.  238.705(a) describes, the average 
longitudinal deceleration at the CG of the vehicle containing the truck 
under evaluation (and its attachments) may not exceed 5g (paragraph 
(b)(3)(i)), and the peak longitudinal deceleration of the truck may not 
exceed 10g (paragraph (b)(3)(ii)). The longitudinal deceleration of the 
truck must be measured during the collision scenario at the CG of the 
truck.
    Because the initially-moving and initially-standing train consists 
are aligned with one another in the collision scenario described in 
proposed Sec.  238.705(a), a half-symmetric model may be used, as 
appropriate, to demonstrate compliance with proposed paragraph (b)(3) 
of this section. To use a half-symmetric model properly to demonstrate 
truck attachment integrity, the truck and its attachments must also be 
symmetric from side to side (e.g., using the same attachment 
mechanism(s) in the same position(s) relative to a vertical-
longitudinal plane at the center of the vehicle).
    Proposed paragraph (c) provides an alternative to demonstrating 
compliance with paragraph (b)(3). Paragraph (c) would require 
demonstrating the truck remains attached after a dynamic impact under 
the nominal conditions in the dynamic collision scenario described in 
Sec.  238.705(a). Because the requirements of paragraph (b)(3) may only 
be applied to a truck and carbody meeting the deceleration requirements 
in paragraphs (b)(3)(i) and (ii), respectively, paragraph (c) may be 
used to demonstrate truck-to-carbody attachment when the requirements 
in paragraph (b)(3) are exceeded.
    Proposed paragraph (d) states that for the purposes of this 
section, the mass of the truck includes the axles, wheels, bearings, 
truck-mounted brake system, suspension system components, and any other 
component attached to the truck by design. This description of what the 
mass of the truck includes is the same as that in Sec.  238.219. FRA 
expects the mass of the truck, including the components attached, would 
be documented.
    Finally, proposed paragraph (e) emphasizes that truck-to-carbody 
attachment integrity must be demonstrated using a validated model. If 
the model employed has not been validated by means like those required 
to comply with Sec.  238.705, then additional testing must be performed 
to validate the model being used to demonstrate performance with this 
requirement.
Glazing
Section 238.721 Glazing
    This section would define the requirements for exterior glazing 
(i.e., side- and end-facing exterior windows and windshields) to be 
installed on Tier III trainsets. The requirements of this section 
outline performance standards for both the cab and non-cab areas of the 
trainsets. The performance metrics for the non-cab areas adopt the 
requirements of part 223 of this chapter to maintain compatibility with 
existing Tier I trainsets. FRA developed the requirements for the cab 
areas from the recommendations the Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group 
provided.
    The approach FRA used to develop glazing requirements for cab 
areas, much like its approach to Tier III in general, represents a 
balance between maintaining compatibility with existing Tier I 
equipment and the adoption of service-proven techniques to protect 
against potential risks encountered with high-speed operation. In this 
respect, it is important to note that, while glazing exposed to the 
direction of train motion would be more vulnerable due to the speed of 
the trainset, the right-of-way must also be secured and protected 
appropriately against potential hazards to the glazing in areas where 
Tier III trainsets will operate above Tier I speeds. Such hazards 
include the launching of objects at the train. For example, substantial 
fencing in conjunction with intrusion detection systems are common 
protections provided for high-speed systems where an overpass spans the 
right-of-way (ROW). These additional infrastructure improvements 
represent a significant increase in ROW protection, which are not 
typically present on most U.S. rail corridors, but would be expected 
for Tier III high-speed corridors. Indeed, under FRA's Track Safety 
Standards, a ``right-of-way plan'' for Class 8 and 9 track, which 
corresponds to the speed range for Tier III high-speed corridors, must 
be submitted to FRA for approval and address the prevention of 
vandalism, launching of objects from overhead bridges or structures 
into the path of trains, and intrusion of vehicles from adjacent ROWs. 
See 49 CFR 213.361.
    Risks posed to exterior glazing may differ greatly depending on the 
location and orientation of the installed glazing. For this reason, cab 
glazing is further segregated into two distinct categories: One for 
end-facing locations (e.g., windshields), and one for cab side windows 
and glazing (if equipped). Since the two locations may present 
different risks, the definition of ``end-facing'' is important to 
establish how cab glazing compliance is evaluated. This subject was 
discussed on a number of occasions during the task group meetings as 
both the part 223 definitions and international standards were 
considered. However, the task group concluded the language in part 223 
was generally sufficient, although FRA proposes revisions to this 
section and the definitions for ``glazing, end-facing'' and ``glazing, 
side-facing'' in Sec.  238.5. FRA agrees with the task group and 
intends for the proposed revisions to the glazing definitions to 
clarify that the end-facing glazing requirements do not apply to 
certain locations in a semi-permanently connected train consist that, 
while on the end of a vehicle, are exposed to lesser risk.
    Proposed paragraph (b) describes the requirements for end-facing 
cab glazing and represents the most substantial change from the 
traditional FRA Type I performance requirements in part 223. End-facing 
cab glazing on Tier III trainsets would be designated as Type IHS. 
Since the challenge to glazing in this location is directly related to 
the speed of the trainset, considerable discussion was devoted to this 
topic within the task group. Although different approaches were 
discussed, the efforts of the group eventually focused on finding a 
reliable and repeatable large object impact test procedure, and 
appropriate performance metrics, to replace the traditional ``cinder 
block test.''
    Since the windshield of any vehicle must meet several performance 
criteria to provide adequate protection, durability, and visual 
clarity, quality assurance and control are imperative. In this respect, 
the task group widely accepted that the current Type I large object 
impact test presents too many variables and challenges to reliably and 
accurately assess the performance of glazing used at very high-speeds. 
To resolve this issue, the group considered existing international 
standards and test procedures. In particular, the group focused on the 
development of criteria, test conditions, procedures, and projectile 
design based on relevant portions of EN 15152 and UIC 651.
    After considerable discussion, the task group reached consensus to 
adopt

[[Page 88031]]

modified criteria based on the relevant elements of EN 15152 and UIC 
651 for the Tier III end-facing large object impact test. This is 
outlined in proposed paragraph (b)(2), which would establish the 
projectile design, test conditions (e.g., speed, impact angle, sample 
size, temperature, etc.), the number of representative samples to be 
tested, and qualification criteria. Additional considerations for the 
use of representative sample sizes, instead of actual dimensions, are 
proposed in paragraph (b)(3), and proposed paragraph (b)(4) addresses 
demonstration of resistance to spalling. Specifically, under the 
conditions proposed, each sample must show no penetration, no marks on 
the witness plate, and no failure of the mounting apparatus, which 
would be representative of the method by which the glazing would be 
installed. Further, under proposed paragraph (b)(4), materials used 
specifically to protect the cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall 
shields) would not be required to meet the flammability and smoke 
emission performance requirements of appendix B to this part. The task 
group raised concerns about the availability of spall shields that meet 
the performance requirements of appendix B to this part, while 
balancing the protection from spalling to cab occupants that spall 
shields offer. FRA makes clear, however, that spall shields, like other 
materials in a cab, would continue to be subject to other requirements 
for fire safety, i.e., the requirements of Sec.  238.103(c) through 
(e), which include fire safety analysis requirements.
    In addition, proposed paragraph (b) also identifies supplemental 
considerations for the effects of temperature and curvature, each 
adopted from EN 15152. These considerations are not expressly detailed 
in part 223, yet they were widely accepted as necessary to ascertain 
reliable and accurate glazing performance evaluations. The effects of 
curvature could not be ignored because most high-speed trainsets now 
incorporate sophisticated front-end glazing designs to balance 
visibility with aerodynamics. FRA notes that, although the task group 
considered a small object impact test, it decided such a requirement 
was not necessary at this time. The task group considered its value for 
high-speed trainsets related more to the durability and maintenance of 
the glazing, whereas the large object impact and ballistic test 
requirements would provide the more critical performance metrics 
related to safety. FRA agrees with the approach taken by the task 
group.
    FRA notes that the cab side glazing, addressed in proposed 
paragraph (c), presents a different set of challenges and its role in 
protecting cab occupants is highly dependent on window size and 
location, which can vary greatly between trainset designs. While 
initial task group discussions considered adopting traditional Type I 
requirements for the side glazing, it determined it was not necessary 
and potentially impractical. Imposing the same requirements established 
for end-facing glazing would require a substantial increase in size and 
weight (and the inherent framing and mounting considerations) and may 
limit the level of available protection by potentially restricting the 
use of innovative, lightweight transparent materials, which may be well 
suited for this side-facing location.
    Since side-facing cab glazing is not directly exposed to hazards in 
the direction of travel, the speed-dependent requirements of the 
proposed Type IHS test requirements may be inappropriate. The glazing 
task group agreed that the two most important performance metrics for 
safety in this location are ballistic resistance and mounting strength. 
Therefore, the group recommended maintaining the same level of 
ballistic protection as currently provided in part 223 for end-facing 
glazing as the primary performance metric for side-facing cab glazing. 
The task group also agreed to continue the current side-facing large 
object impact test in part 223 to ensure the glazing mounting 
arrangement would be structurally sufficient. FRA agrees with this 
approach.
    Ballistic protection for cab glazing was discussed in detail during 
task group meetings. In particular, labor representatives asserted that 
ballistic protection from a larger diameter projectile, differing from 
the size required for Type I glazing by part 223, would enhance the 
overall safety of the cab occupants. Much discussion was focused on 
this point, but a review of the available information on the impact 
characteristics of reasonable ballistic scenarios (projectile size and 
terminal velocity), and a review of the statistics related to glazing 
failure due to ballistic impact, proved inconclusive. This is one area 
where the task group could not agree on a consistent approach. 
Therefore, the task group referred the decision on ballistic 
requirements for cab glazing to FRA during the development of the task 
group's final recommendations.
    FRA does not have sufficient evidence to suggest a particular risk 
or hazard exists that would apply to all potential Tier III systems to 
warrant a change from current ballistic requirements in part 223. 
However, this does not imply that the conditions of a particular 
operation may not warrant additional consideration and protection. To 
be consistent with the aforementioned approach to Tier III safety, 
elements which may be subject to variables present within a specific 
operation must be addressed in a manner appropriate to that operation. 
Since the level of service, operating environment, and operational 
conditions may vary greatly between Tier III railroads, a single 
prescriptive requirement that varies from current requirements cannot 
be justified.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(5) describes the approach taken for Tier III 
ballistic protection. Specifically, Tier III operations must identify 
risks and hazards specific to their property as part of their Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan, and provide ballistic penetration resistance 
sufficient to protect cab occupants from these risks and hazards. This 
protection shall, at a minimum, meet the requirements of part 223, 
appendix A.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(6) describes options for testing of glazing 
for Tier III trainsets. Compliance with the requirements may be 
demonstrated by independent third-party testing or by the glazing 
manufacturer itself. If the glazing manufacturer is chosen to certify 
the glazing, the manufacturer must invite FRA to witness the test(s) 
and provide 30 days' notice to FRA before conducting the test(s).
    Paragraph (b)(7) proposes re-certification requirements that would 
apply when changes to the glazing manufacturing process or mounting 
arrangement occur which may influence the mechanical properties of the 
glazing system, and the ability of the glazing to comply with the 
penetration resistance requirements of this section. This proposed 
requirement is necessary to ensure that the integrity of the glazing is 
not compromised by changes occurring after the original certification.
    Paragraph (b)(8) proposes that documentation describing any glazing 
certification or re-certification be made available to FRA upon 
request.
    Proposed paragraph (b)(9) describes the marking requirements for 
Tier III end-facing cab glazing material. Markings must be clearly 
visible after the glazing is installed and contain the words ``FRA TYPE 
IHS'' (indicating that the glazing is compliant with the requirements 
in this paragraph (b)), the

[[Page 88032]]

name of the manufacturer, and the type of brand identification of the 
material.
    As noted above, proposed paragraph (c) contains the requirements 
for side-facing exterior cab glazing. Such glazing must comply with the 
existing large-object impact requirements for Type II glazing described 
in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter. FRA also proposes that side-
facing cab glazing must achieve the same ballistics penetration 
resistance required of end-facing glazing in paragraph (b)(5) above. 
For all other areas of the trainset, the non-cab side-facing glazing 
requirements of paragraph (d) apply. FRA invites comment on the manner 
and extent to which glazing subject to the requirements of paragraphs 
(c) or (d) should be specifically marked and identified for Tier III 
service similar to that proposed for end-facing cab-glazing in 
paragraph (b)(9). FRA may impose specific marking and identification 
requirements in the final rule.
    The performance aspects of non-cab side-facing glazing were 
established by consensus agreement of the ETF before creation of the 
Tier III Cab Glazing Task Group. Overall, the requirements for non-cab 
glazing maintain the current requirements for Type II glazing in 
appendix A of part 223 as indicated in paragraph (d)(1). As mentioned 
earlier, FRA intends for this approach to maintain compatibility with 
current Tier I requirements to establish commonality for operation with 
all other equipment types at speeds not exceeding 125 mph, whereas 
additional systemic safety measures and ROW protections would be 
required for higher-speed operations.
    In regards to emergency egress and rescue access, the ETF 
recognized that multiple approaches would need to be considered to 
support the adoption of service-proven technology. More specifically, 
the methods employed in the manufacturing of high-speed trainsets are 
often governed by considerations of aerodynamic effects and noise 
reduction. In some designs, this can have particular influence on the 
way side-facing glazing is installed and mounted on trainsets. 
Therefore, the ETF recommended a more performance-oriented requirement 
rather than a prescriptive one, which is reflected here and in the 
proposed requirements for emergency window egress and rescue access in 
proposed Sec.  238.741 discussed below. Proposed paragraph (d)(2) would 
specifically recognize the design of windows intended to be breakable 
as an alternative for removing glazing. This would include using a tool 
or other method to expeditiously and safely remove the glazing if at 
least the same level of glazing safety is maintained as the current 
requirements of part 223. This must be demonstrated by quantitative 
analysis, full scale demonstration, or other means and be addressed as 
part of the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan. As noted, 
requirements for emergency window egress and rescue access would also 
need to be met, consistent with proposed Sec.  238.741.
    Proposed paragraph (e) contains requirements for glazing 
securement. Paragraph (e)(1) would require designing each exterior 
window glazing system (the window glazing and its mounting apparatus) 
to withstand the forces caused by variances in pressure when two trains 
pass at their maximum authorized speed at their closest distance to 
each other. This requirement is identical to that currently provided 
for Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment in Sec. Sec.  238.221(b)(2) 
and 238.421(d)(1), respectively, and would help provide assurance that 
a trainset's exterior window glazing remains in place when passing 
other objects in close proximity. Proposed paragraph (e)(2) would also 
require that exterior window glazing be secured so as to withstand the 
impact forces described in this section. This proposed requirement is 
virtually identical to that currently provided for Tier I and Tier II 
passenger equipment in Sec. Sec.  238.221(b)(1) and 238.421(d)(2), 
respectively. The requirements proposed in paragraph (e) are common for 
all exterior glazing installed on a Tier III trainset, and may be 
demonstrated through testing or analysis.
Brake System
Section 238.731 Brake System
    In this section, FRA is proposing to introduce requirements for 
brake systems for Tier III passenger trainsets. Development of these 
requirements was identified as one of the goals for this first Tier III 
rulemaking to facilitate planned equipment acquisitions. These 
requirements represent a balance between maintaining compatibility with 
existing Tier I equipment and the adoption of service-proven techniques 
to protect against potential risks encountered with high-speed 
operations. A concerted effort was made to develop technology-neutral 
requirements.
    To develop the proposal for these brake system requirements, the 
ETF created the BTG. The BTG's charter, established at the group's 
initial meeting, was to develop performance-based regulations which 
would accommodate existing high-speed trainset technology without 
regard to its design. To achieve this goal, many of the provisions in 
this proposed section refer to provisions in the railroad's Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan or ITM plan. This is necessary to address the 
various ways brake system technology is actually implemented in high-
speed passenger trainsets worldwide.
    Proposed paragraph (a) describes the requirement for each railroad 
to identify (through analysis and testing) the maximum safe operating 
speed for its Tier III trainsets that results in no thermal damage to 
equipment or infrastructure during normal operations. This is based on 
the requirements for Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment in 
Sec. Sec.  238.231(j)(4) and 238.431(e)(4), respectively, that a train 
not operate at a speed resulting in thermal damage to wheels or rotor 
surface temperatures exceeding the manufacturer's recommendation when 
the friction brake alone is applied to brake the train. Nonetheless, 
this proposed section acknowledges that, at present, high-speed 
trainset braking technology relies predominantly on electric (i.e., 
dynamic or regenerative) braking and that friction braking, by whatever 
means, is used only at lower speeds. In addition, this proposed section 
presumes there are extensive on-board diagnostics capable of 
identifying dynamic brake defects (as specified in Sec.  238.731(n)) 
present. Moreover, this proposed section extends the scope of existing 
regulations by considering the potential for a Tier III braking 
technology that relies on interaction or contact with the rail or 
guideway.
    Proposed paragraph (b) would require the railroad's Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan to identify the worst-case adhesion conditions under 
which the brake system must stop the passenger trainset from its 
maximum operating speed within the prevailing signal spacing. This 
proposed requirement is derived from its Tier II equivalent at Sec.  
238.431(a), which states that a passenger train's brake system shall be 
capable of stopping the train from its maximum operating speed within 
the signal spacing existing on the track over which the train is 
operating under worst-case adhesion conditions. The distinction for 
Tier III is that the ``worst case'' conditions would be defined by a 
railroad in its Tier III Safe Operation Plan. This would help ensure 
that a railroad relies on a formally-devised definition of worst-case 
adhesion in its procurement of individual equipment. In recognizing 
that these elements may vary between operations and geographical 
locations, allowing a railroad to define these conditions

[[Page 88033]]

would provide it the flexibility to tailor its braking system to the 
actual operating environment.
    Proposed paragraph (c) would require Tier III trainsets to be 
equipped with an emergency brake application feature that is available 
at any time and produces an irretrievable stop. This proposed paragraph 
is consistent with the requirements of Sec.  232.103(i) of this chapter 
for brake systems generally and the requirements of Sec.  238.231(c) 
and Sec.  238.431(c) for Tier I and II passenger equipment brake 
systems, respectively. The emergency brake application would also be 
initiated by an unintentional parting of the train, or by the train 
crew at locations specified in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan. Because the locations where a trainset can be safely stopped are 
operation-specific, the railroad would identify them in its Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan.
    Proposed paragraph (d) would establish requirements for a passenger 
brake alarm. The BTG invested considerable effort addressing this 
concept. Generally, the passenger brake alarm enables passengers to 
alert the engineer of a need to stop the train. However, stopping the 
train at a random location due to a passenger-initiated brake command 
can be a highly undesirable event and the BTG believed the engineer 
should determine the safest location where the train should stop under 
emergency conditions. Thus, the BTG recommended a set of conditions 
when the passenger brake alarm is acknowledged and acted upon, which 
FRA agrees it should adopt for Tier III passenger equipment. Generally, 
these provisions have been developed in consideration of operating 
practices associated with present-day high-speed operations in Asia and 
Europe and relevant requirements currently in part 238.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(1) would specify that each trainset unit 
have two locations equipped with the means to initiate a passenger 
brake alarm unless a unit is 45 feet or less in length. In that case, 
one equipped location would be sufficient.
    This proposal also derives from the requirements for Tier II 
passenger equipment in Sec.  238.431(c). Passenger brake alarm 
locations would be identified in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan. This paragraph would also require that the words ``Passenger 
Brake Alarm'' be legibly stenciled or marked on each device or on an 
adjacent badge plate, as required for Tier I passenger equipment in 
Sec.  238.305(c)(5) (as ``Emergency Brake Valve'') and indirectly 
required for Tier II passenger equipment under subpart F of part 238.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(2) would require the passenger brake alarm 
to be designed to minimize the opportunity for accidental activation. 
The brake alarm may be protected from accidental activation by a cover 
or screen provided the alarm remains readily accessible to passengers.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(3) would require that activation of the 
passenger brake alarm result in an emergency brake application if the 
trainset has not cleared the boarding platform. This proposal 
recognizes in particular that the alarm may be activated due to an 
urgent safety issue associated with passengers or crewmembers boarding 
or alighting from the trainset while at the platform, and that the 
trainset would be traveling at a slower speed as it begins to 
accelerate away from the platform.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(4) would specify the sequence of events when 
the passenger brake alarm is activated after the trainset has cleared 
the boarding platform. In this event, the engineer must acknowledge the 
alarm within a prescribed time period to retain control of the 
trainset. The railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan must specify the 
time period the engineer has to act, and the Plan must also describe 
the method used to confirm that the trainset has cleared the boarding 
platform.
    Proposed paragraph (d)(5) would describe the brake system operation 
when the engineer does not acknowledge a passenger brake alarm with the 
specified time period. In this event, a full service brake application 
shall occur automatically unless the engineer intervenes by 
acknowledging the brake alarm and actively manipulating appropriate 
trainset controls, as described in proposed paragraph (d)(6), to give 
the engineer ultimate control over whether to stop the trainset.
    Proposed paragraph (e) addresses degraded brake system performance 
of Tier III trainsets with blended braking systems and is based on 
requirements for Tier I and Tier II passenger equipment in Sec. Sec.  
238.231(j) and 238.431(e), respectively. A blended brake system 
consists of a combination of friction and dynamic braking. Proposed 
paragraph (e)(1) specifies that the allowable stopping distance defined 
in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan shall not be exceeded in 
the event of a power loss or failure of the dynamic or regenerative 
brake. The Tier III Safe Operation Plan must contain provisions for 
reducing the maximum allowable train speed, based on feedback from the 
on-board monitoring and diagnostic system, specified in proposed Sec.  
238.731(n), so the train can be safely stopped using friction braking 
alone within the allowable stopping distance.
    Proposed paragraph (e)(2) would require the railroad's Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan to define the operating conditions when the 
available friction braking effort alone can safely stop the Tier III 
trainset. As a whole, proposed paragraph (e) would require that 
restrictions be in place (as defined in the Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan) that prescribe how trainsets without functional electric braking 
are to be operated to ensure thermal-related damage does not occur, 
particularly to brake equipment.
    Proposed paragraph (e)(3) would require each Tier III trainset to 
be equipped with diagnostic hardware and software that provides a 
continuous indication of the brake system status to the engineer in the 
controlling cab. See also the proposed requirement in Sec.  238.731(n) 
for an onboard monitoring and diagnostic system.
    Proposed paragraph (e)(4) would require the railroad to determine, 
through analysis and testing, the maximum speed its Tier III trainsets 
can operate at using the friction brake system alone without causing 
thermal-related damage to the equipment or infrastructure. This 
provision is related to proposed paragraphs (e)(1) through (3) of this 
section because the parameters associated with continued trainset 
operation under conditions of degraded brake system performance must be 
developed for the particular trainset technology and operating 
characteristics, and accommodated in trainset operating procedures, 
including any software and hardware associated with trainset speed 
control.
    Proposed paragraph (f) addresses main reservoirs for Tier III 
trainset brake systems and is generally based on safety requirements 
originally developed for steam locomotives, as found in Sec.  230.72(b) 
of this chapter. Paragraph (f)(1) would require that main reservoirs be 
designed and tested using a recognized industry standard specified in 
the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan, such as the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code 
for Unfired Pressure Vessel Section VIII, Division I (ASME Code), 
referenced in Sec.  229.51(a)(2). The actual standard used to qualify 
main reservoirs for Tier III trainsets must be documented in the 
railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan. This paragraph would specify 
the working pressure and rated temperature for main reservoirs unless 
otherwise defined by the designated standard

[[Page 88034]]

identified in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Reservoirs 
would be certified consistent with requirements based on size and 
volume.
    Proposed paragraphs (f)(2) and (3) of this section contain 
requirements for welded steel main reservoirs that are also based on 
requirements originally developed for steam locomotives in Sec.  
230.72(b) through (d) of this chapter. Proposed paragraph (f)(3) would 
prohibit welded repairs of Tier III trainset main reservoirs.
    Proposed paragraph (g)(1) addresses requirements specifically for 
aluminum main reservoirs and refers to the existing requirements in 
Sec.  229.51(a) of this chapter applicable to locomotives.
    Proposed paragraph (g)(2) is a new provision and contains a 
prohibition on welded repairs to aluminum main reservoirs.
    Proposed paragraph (h) prescribes requirements for steel and 
aluminum main reservoir proof tests, which would be performed prior to 
their installation on a Tier III trainset. These tests may be pneumatic 
or hydrostatic. The test pressure would be defined in paragraphs (f) or 
(g) of this section, depending on whether the reservoir is steel or 
aluminum, unless otherwise established by the railroad's ITM Plan. 
Records of main reservoir tests must be made and retained for the life 
of the equipment. In addition, the railroad's ITM Plan shall define 
periodic inspection requirements for main reservoirs on Tier III 
trainsets.
    Proposed paragraph (i) addresses the requirements for the locations 
of gauges and devices used by the engineer to aid in the control or 
braking of a Tier III trainset. Such devices must be placed so that the 
engineer can conveniently read them from the engineer's normal position 
during trainset operation. This paragraph is based on the existing 
requirement in Sec.  229.53 of this chapter.
    Proposed paragraph (j) contains requirements for Tier III trainset 
brake application and release. Paragraph (j)(1) proposes that brake pad 
and shoe clearance must be present when the brakes are released. 
Paragraph (j)(2) would require establishing the minimum brake cylinder 
pressure necessary to adjust from minimum service to full service brake 
application for proper train operation. This pressure would be approved 
during the trainset design review and documented in the railroad's Tier 
III Safe Operation Plan.
    Proposed paragraph (k) would require that the railroad specify the 
ITM requirements for the foundation brake gear in the railroad's ITM 
plan. The purpose for these requirements derives from Sec.  229.57 of 
this chapter. However, due to the variety of possible Tier III braking 
systems, the prescriptive requirements of Sec.  229.57 may not be 
appropriate for a given foundation brake system. Defining the 
requirements in the railroad's ITM plan, which is subject to FRA review 
and approval, would ensure that appropriate ITM practices are in the 
foundation brake system on Tier III trainsets.
    Proposed paragraph (l) would define limits on brake pipe leakage 
and also require that the method for inspecting brake pipe leakage be 
prescribed in the railroad's ITM plan. Leakage rates would be 
established under either paragraph (l)(1) or paragraph (l)(2) of this 
section, whichever is more restrictive. Specifically, paragraph (l)(1) 
would permit leakage limits based on an Air Consumption Analysis in the 
railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan. Paragraph (l)(2) would set 
prescriptive requirements for brake pipe leakage adopted from Sec.  
229.59(b) and (c) of this chapter.
    Proposed paragraph (m) describes the requirements for wheel slide 
protection and alarm. Extensive discussion on this topic occurred 
during BTG deliberations. For safety reasons, wheel slide must be 
avoided to prevent overrunning a switch or incursion of the trainset 
into an area beyond the confines of its operating authority. 
Nonetheless, the BTG considered wheel slip to be a maintenance concern 
and did not recommend that FRA address it in this proposed rulemaking. 
Wheel slip differs from wheel slide because it is caused when the 
tractive effort on the wheel exceeds the adhesive forces keeping the 
wheel in normal rotational contact with the rail, whereas wheel slide 
is caused when the braking effort on the rail exceeds the adhesive 
forces keeping the wheel in normal rotational contact with the rail. 
FRA agrees with the task group and has modeled this paragraph after the 
wheel slide protection and alarm requirements for Tier II passenger 
equipment in Sec.  238.431(h).
    Proposed paragraphs (m)(1) through (3) of this section define the 
minimum functional requirements for wheel slide protection and alarm. 
Paragraph (m)(1) would require that an adhesion control system be 
available to adjust the braking force on each wheel to avoid wheel 
slide. Paragraph (m)(2) would require that this system be able to alert 
the engineer, either through visible or audible means, or both, of the 
presence of a wheel slide condition on any axle in the trainset. 
Proposed paragraph (m)(3) would address when the wheel slide protection 
system fails to function within pre-established, allowable parameters 
as defined in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan. To prepare 
for such an event, the Tier III Safe Operation Plan shall specify 
operating restrictions (e.g., speed limits) on trainsets whose slide 
protection devices are not functioning as intended.
    Proposed paragraph (n) would require each Tier III trainset to be 
equipped with a brake system health monitoring and diagnostic system to 
automatically assesses the functionality of the brake system for the 
entire trainset, both before departure of the trainset and while it is 
en route. The railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan shall document 
the details of the monitoring and diagnostic system and the means for 
communicating trainset brake system functionality.
    Proposed paragraph (o) would require Tier III equipment to be 
equipped with a way to secure equipment, when unattended, from 
unintentional movement. This means of securement must be independent of 
the pneumatic brake. Since the securement technique may be technology-
specific to the trainset, FRA expects the Tier III Safe Operation Plan 
would identify the procedures and means necessary for securing 
unattended equipment and the grade conditions when such securement must 
occur. The Tier III Safe Operation Plan shall also provide evidence 
demonstrating the effectiveness of the securement method(s). As defined 
in Sec.  238.231(h)(4), ``unattended equipment'' means equipment left 
standing and unmanned in such a manner that a qualified person cannot 
readily control the brake system of the equipment. FRA notes in 
particular that, because certain brake system requirements are imposed 
by Federal statute, 49 U.S.C. ch. 203, the railroad must also ensure 
those statutory requirements are addressed.
    Proposed paragraph (p) would require the design of a Tier III 
trainset to accommodate coupling to a rescue vehicle (which could be a 
conventional locomotive) or a rescue trainset. The design must also 
allow the rescue vehicle or trainset to control the brake system on the 
disabled Tier III trainset. This proposed paragraph is based on a 
similar requirement for Tier II passenger equipment in Sec.  
238.431(f).
Interior Fittings and Surfaces
Section 238.733 Interior Fixture Attachment
    This proposed section would address requirements for interior 
fixture attachment strength for Tier III trainsets, principally to help 
prevent and mitigate hazards associated with secondary collisions 
(i.e., a collision occurring

[[Page 88035]]

inside the trainset as a consequence of a (primary) collision involving 
external contact with the trainset). It would provide two means of 
demonstrating compliance.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1) would provide the first means: Interior 
fixtures must comply with the existing requirements in 49 CFR 238.233, 
Interior fittings and surfaces, and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1 
(previously designated as SS-C&S-006), ``Standard for Attachment 
Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,'' 
Authorized September 2005. FRA proposes to incorporate by reference 
this APTA standard into this paragraph and in paragraph (i) of appendix 
G to this part. APTA PR-CS-S-006-98 addresses fittings used in commuter 
and intercity railcar and locomotive cab interiors. It specifies the 
minimum strength and attachment strength for interior sub-systems, 
including overhead luggage racks, stanchions and handholds, windscreen 
and partitions, food service equipment, and miscellaneous interior 
fittings. This standard also contains recommendations for design 
requirements and design practices for such interior sub-systems. APTA 
PR-CS-S-006-98 is reasonably available to all interested parties online 
at www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for 
review.
    These proposed requirements are based on the applied accelerations 
of 8g longitudinally, 4g laterally, and 4g vertically, acting on the 
mass of the fitting (8g/4g/4g). As described in the Technical 
Background and Overview section of this NPRM, the 1999 Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards final rule (64 FR 25540) established these 
acceleration-based performance requirements after years of industry 
practice designing interior fittings to withstand the forces due to 
accelerations of 6g longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 3g vertically 
(6g/3g/3g), which FRA found to be inadequate to protect against 
occupant injury. Subsequent accident investigations have revealed that 
interior fixtures that comply with these requirements, codified for 
Tier I passenger equipment in Sec.  238.233, perform significantly 
better than interior fixtures in passenger cars that were exempted from 
those requirements and thus do not meet the regulations, i.e., 
generally passenger cars already in service when the 1999 final rule 
took effect.
    However, FRA recognizes some Tier III passenger equipment may not 
experience accelerations of 8g/4g/4g during the dynamic collision 
scenario proposed in Sec.  238.705, or at higher-speed collisions 
resulting in collapse of the occupied volume. Members of the rail 
industry contend the 8g/4g/4g requirements are unnecessary for some 
equipment designed to alternative standards and would add to vehicle 
weight. FRA acknowledges that equipment that does not experience large 
decelerations during collisions may not need to be designed to these 
FRA requirements, which are also reflected in industry safety 
standards. Accordingly, FRA developed an alternative attachment 
strength option consistent with international design standards.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(2) describes the alternative option for 
demonstrating adequate attachment strength of interior fixtures in Tier 
III trainsets. The proposed option requires that interior fixture 
attachment strength comply with the requirements in Section 6.1.4, 
``Security of furniture, equipment and features,'' of GM/RT2100, which 
FRA proposes to incorporate by reference in this paragraph and Sec.  
238.741(b)(2), below. Section 6.1.4 contains requirements for 
securement of furniture, on-board equipment, and other trainset 
features to help mitigate against injuries to passengers and crew from 
secondary impacts within the occupied volume. GM/RT2100 is available to 
all interested parties online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy 
available for review.
    Certain restrictions govern the option to apply the GM/RT2100 
standard. GM/RT2100 is a safety standard that applies to trains 
operating in the U.K. The standard mandates requirements for the design 
and integrity of rail vehicle structures, including interior fixtures. 
The standard requires rail vehicle body structures to comply with the 
requirements in EN 12663 and EN 15227. The interior fixture attachment 
strength requirements in GM/RT2100 are consistent with the carbody 
deceleration limits in EN 12663 and EN 15227.
    The structural carbody requirements of particular relevance in EN 
12663 specify minimum proof loads for equipment attachment during 
normal operation of the vehicle. The mass of the fixture is multiplied 
by specified accelerations. For passenger coach cars, the accelerations 
in the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical directions are 5g, 1g, and +3/-1g, as stated in Section 6.5.2, 
Tables 13, 14, and 15 respectively.
    The structural carbody requirements of particular relevance in EN 
15227 are associated with a dynamic collision scenario (Section 5, 
Table 2), in which the mean longitudinal vehicle decelerations in the 
survival spaces for power cars and coach cars are limited to 5g for a 
36 kph (22.4 mph) collision with a like train (Section 6.4.1).
    If the option to use GM/RT2100 is exercised to demonstrate adequate 
attachment strength of the interior fixtures in Tier III trainsets, 
then data must be provided to demonstrate that the average longitudinal 
deceleration of the CG of each vehicle during the dynamic collision 
scenario does not exceed 5g in any 100-ms time period. Suitable 
evidence would include a plot of the 100-ms running average 
deceleration versus time for the duration of the collision scenario. 
The average deceleration over a 100-ms time period is necessary to 
account for large decelerations higher than the mean deceleration for 
sustained periods (i.e., any period lasting more than 100 ms), which 
could result in interior fitting attachment failure. Without suitable 
evidence, there is no assurance the less stringent 5g attachment 
strength requirement is adequate for the particular trainset under 
evaluation. If the adequacy of the attachment strength is not 
demonstrated, then the GM/RT2100 option cannot be used and the 
crashworthiness of interior fittings must comply with the current Tier 
I requirements in Sec.  238.233 and APTA standard PR-CS-S-006-98.
    In addition, if the option to comply with GM/RT2100 is exercised, 
then this proposed paragraph would require that interior 
crashworthiness be evaluated based on a minimum lateral acceleration of 
3g--not the 1g permitted in GM/RT2100. FRA has never found the 1g 
lateral acceleration requirement adequate for the U.S. rail operating 
environment. Thus, the proposed rule would increase the minimum lateral 
acceleration requirement to 3g. Further, the use of the GM/RT2100 
standard must be carried out consistent with any conditions identified 
in the railroad's FRA-approved Tier III Safe Operation Plan. The Tier 
III Safe Operation Plan must demonstrate that interior fixtures provide 
an equivalent level of safety during accidents at any speed as 
equipment that complies with the requirements in Sec.  238.233 and APTA 
PR-CS-S-006-98. The Tier III Safe Operation Plan must address the 
collision consequences associated with interior fixtures designed to 
withstand acceleration forces of 5g longitudinally, 3g laterally, and 
3g vertically (5g/3g/3g) as opposed to 8g/4g/4g. FRA is concerned that 
interior fixtures designed to withstand average decelerations of less 
than 5g may not have a sufficient factor of safety to remain attached 
during collisions

[[Page 88036]]

occurring at speeds above the collision design scenario speeds. 
Accordingly, some evidence must be provided to ensure that the interior 
fixtures do not detach during collisions at speeds above the collision 
design scenario speeds, or the likelihood of higher speed collisions 
has been significantly reduced to provide the same degree of risk for 
equipment whose interior fixture attachments have been designed to 
withstand 8g/4g/4g loading.
Section 238.735 Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Cab Crew)
    Proposed paragraph (a) contains the requirements for passenger 
seating crashworthiness in Tier III trainsets. As in Sec.  238.733 
above, FRA proposes two ways to demonstrate adequate attachment 
strength.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(1) provides the first means: Passenger 
seating must meet the requirements of Sec.  238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-
016-99, Rev. 2 (previously designated as SS-C&S-016, Rev. 2), 
``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized 
October 2010. FRA proposes to incorporate this APTA standard by 
reference into this paragraph and paragraph (j) of appendix G to this 
part. APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 addresses design guidelines, recommendations, 
and requirements for passenger seats installed in passenger equipment 
that is part of the general railroad system of transportation. APTA PR-
CS-S-016-99 is available to all interested parties online at 
www.apta.com. Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for 
review. However, the rule would not require compliance with section 6.0 
of this APTA standard, ``Seat durability testing.'' Seat durability 
testing is beyond the scope of this proposal because the testing 
focuses on the optimal life of the seats--not their crashworthiness 
performance.
    Proposed paragraph (a)(2) describes the second way to demonstrate 
compliance. This proposed option explains that passenger seating may 
comply with the requirements in Section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, 
personnel, or train crew,'' of GM/RT2100, which FRA proposes to 
incorporate by reference into this paragraph. Section 6.2 contains 
design specifications and tolerances for passenger and crew seating. 
GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties online at 
www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, FRA will 
maintain a copy available for review.
    The option proposed in paragraph (a)(2) offers alternative test 
conditions and performance requirements for evaluating seat 
crashworthiness. The applicable dynamic seat test procedures are 
defined in appendix E to GM/RT2100. GM/RT2100 utilizes Hybrid III 50th-
percentile male anthropomorphic test devices (ATDs), and the procedures 
to prepare the ATDs are defined in appendix G to GM/RT2100. The 
applicable injury criteria and survival space requirements are defined 
in appendix H to GM/RT2100. Further, the test conditions and 
performance requirements in GM/RT2100 are aligned with the structural 
design requirements in EN 12663 and EN 15227, whereas the seat test 
conditions and performance requirements in APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, 
are aligned with the structural design requirements in subpart C of 
part 238.
    Nonetheless, please note that if paragraph (a)(2) is used for 
demonstrating compliance with the seat crashworthiness requirements, 
then this proposed paragraph would require that interior 
crashworthiness be evaluated based on a minimum lateral acceleration of 
3g--not 1g as permitted in GM/RT2100. As noted above, FRA found the 1g 
lateral acceleration requirement inadequate. Thus, the proposed rule 
would increase the minimum lateral acceleration requirement to 3g. 
Moreover, the use of the GM/RT2100 standard must be carried out 
consistent with any conditions identified in the railroad's FRA-
approved Tier III Safe Operation Plan. The Tier III Safe Operation Plan 
must demonstrate that interior fixtures provide an equivalent level of 
safety during accidents at any speed as equipment that complies with 
the requirements in Sec.  238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98. For further 
discussion of these requirements, see the discussion in Sec.  238.733, 
above.
    Proposed paragraph (b) describes the requirements for the 
crashworthiness of seats provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier 
III trainset. Unlike passenger seating, cab seats must comply with the 
requirements in Sec.  238.233(e), (f) and (g), and the performance, 
design, and test criteria of AAR-RP-5104, ``Locomotive Cab Seats,'' 
April 2008, which FRA proposes to incorporate by reference in this 
paragraph and paragraph (k)(2) of appendix G to this part. (This AAR 
publication is found in Section M of AAR's ``Manual of Standards and 
Recommended Practices.'') FRA is not proposing an optional alternative 
compliance demonstration. AAR-RP-5104 covers the performance and design 
requirements and performance tests for the construction of locomotive 
cab seats on road locomotives. AAR-RP-5104 is available to all 
interested parties online at www.arrpublications.com for a fee. 
Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review.
Section 238.737 Luggage Racks
    Proposed paragraph (a) contains requirements to constrain the 
longitudinal and lateral motion of articles stowed in luggage racks. 
FRA intends for these proposed requirements to maintain luggage 
accessibility while minimizing the risk of hazardous projectiles. The 
proposed transverse dividers are intended to limit the longitudinal 
motion of luggage not only in collisions but also during normal 
operations. In this regard, the proposed downward slope (from the aisle 
to the adjacent side-wall) of luggage racks is principally intended to 
restrain the lateral motion of luggage during normal operations. By 
inhibiting the distance stowed articles may move, the velocity of such 
items due to longitudinal and lateral train accelerations is minimized, 
which also minimizes their associated kinetic energy when striking 
another object.
    Proposed paragraph (b) describes two ways to comply with the 
structural requirements for luggage racks. The first, in paragraph 
(b)(1), is to comply with Sec.  238.233 as provided for other interior 
fixtures. The second, in paragraph (b)(2), is to comply with Section 
6.8, ``Luggage stowage'' of GM/RT2100, which FRA proposes to 
incorporate by reference in this paragraph. Section 6.8 contains the 
requirements for luggage stowage, either on the floor or in overhead 
racks. As noted above, GM/RT2100 is available to all interested parties 
online at www.rgsonline.co.uk/Railway_Group_Standards. Additionally, 
FRA will maintain a copy available for review. This proposed option 
offers alternative performance requirements for evaluating luggage 
racks. The luggage attachment strength requirements in GM/RT2100 are 
aligned with the structural design requirements in EN 12663 and 
EN15227, whereas the luggage rack attachment strength requirements in 
Sec.  238.233 are aligned with the structural design requirements of 
subpart C of this part. A discussion of these requirements is in Sec.  
238.733 and in the Technical Background and Overview section of this 
NPRM above.
Emergency Systems
Section 238.741 Emergency Window Egress and Rescue Access
    Section 238.741 proposes requirements for emergency egress and 
rescue access through windows or alternative openings in passenger cars 
as

[[Page 88037]]

part of an emergency window egress and rescue access plan for Tier III 
trainsets. The ETF recognized that any regulation would need to allow 
multiple approaches to facilitate the adoption of service-proven, high-
speed trainset technology. Specifically, the methods used to 
manufacture high-speed trainsets are often governed by consideration of 
the effects of aerodynamics and noise; and together with the potential 
need to pressurize occupied compartments, these can have a particular 
effect on the way window glazing is installed and mounted in some 
trainset designs. Therefore, the ETF decided to recommend performance-
oriented requirements to allow necessary flexibility where an 
appropriate safety case can be made.
    FRA agrees with the ETF's recommendation. Proposed paragraph (a) 
would allow a railroad to submit an emergency window egress and rescue 
access plan during the design review stage for FRA approval if the 
trainset design is not compatible with the emergency system 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.113 and 238.114. A railroad may elect to 
employ an alternative feature or approach that demonstrates an 
equivalent or superior level of safety. Such an approach might involve 
use of an emergency egress window panel/door exit similar to the over-
wing exits on aircraft and sharing characteristics of a removable panel 
for vestibule and other interior doors intended for passage through a 
passenger car, as required by Sec.  238.112(f), rather than an 
emergency window exit per se.
    In addition, proposed paragraph (b) specifically addresses the 
performance of emergency window exits in Tier III trainsets in terms of 
ease of operability (e.g., removal). Specifically, paragraph (b) 
recognizes that alternative removal methods may need to be employed for 
these types of trainsets. Thus, it would allow alternative methods to 
remove window glazing, such as use of a conspicuously identified tool, 
or other mechanism, to expeditiously and safely remove the glazing. The 
emergency window egress and rescue access plan must document that any 
alternative method employed is as safe as that provided by the 
emergency window exit ease of operability requirements in Sec.  
238.113(b). In addition, the railroad must include a provision in its 
Tier III ITM plan to inspect for the presence of the identified tool or 
other mechanism at least each day the trainset is in service.
    FRA notes that requirements for the ease of operating rescue access 
windows are provided in Sec.  238.114(b). As applied to Tier III 
trainsets, this paragraph would require that each rescue access window 
(or its alternative) be capable of removal without unreasonable delay 
by an emergency responder using either a provided external mechanism, 
or tools or implements commonly available to the responder in a 
passenger train emergency. FRA believes these existing requirements are 
broad enough to apply to Tier III trainsets and alternative rescue 
access windows if utilized under an approved emergency window egress 
and rescue access plan.
    Proposed paragraph (c) addresses window opening dimension 
requirements for both emergency egress and rescue access windows in 
Tier III trainsets. If the dimensions of window openings do not comply 
with the minimum requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.113 or 238.114, then 
the emergency window egress and rescue access plan must demonstrate use 
of window openings of different dimensions provides at least an 
equivalent level of safety. This proposed paragraph acknowledges the 
size of windows may vary greatly between designs and not necessarily 
reflect the types of windows found on traditional Tier I passenger 
cars. Proposed paragraph (d) specifically addresses the use of 
emergency egress panels or additional door exits in the alternative to 
emergency window exits or rescue access windows. The railroad would be 
required to submit a plan demonstrating the means of emergency egress 
or rescue access employed provides an equivalent, or superior, 
evacuation time for the same number of occupants, as a layout of 
comparable size and configuration consistent with Sec. Sec.  238.113 or 
238.114, or both, as appropriate. The plan would also address the 
location, design, and signage and instructions for the alternative 
emergency evacuation openings. As discussed in paragraph (a), FRA 
recognizes that railroads may need to employ alternative features or 
approaches for evacuating passenger car occupants in Tier III 
trainsets, and one such approach might involve use of an emergency 
egress window panel/door exit rather than an emergency window exit per 
se.
    FRA makes clear that its approval of any alternative emergency 
evacuation arrangement would take into account that emergency window 
exits themselves provide a supplementary means of emergency egress in 
life-threatening situations, should doors be rendered inaccessible or 
inoperable. Accordingly, while door exits serve as the preferred means 
of egress in an emergency situation, the railroad would be required to 
demonstrate that use of additional door exits, instead of emergency 
window exits or rescue access windows, would not diminish safety. 
Specifically, the railroad would be required to demonstrate that the 
risk of carbody distortion and other such risks that could render the 
door exits inoperable or inaccessible would be addressed so that at 
least an equivalent level of safety is provided.
Section 238.743 Emergency Lighting
    With one exception, the proposed emergency lighting requirements 
for Tier III trainsets would be the same as the existing emergency 
lighting requirements of Sec.  238.115 for passenger trainsets, as 
stated in proposed paragraph (a). The exception would be for emergency 
lighting back-up power systems, permitting alternative crash loadings 
instead of the requirements in Sec.  238.115(b)(4)(ii). This proposed 
exception is detailed in paragraph (b), under which a railroad may seek 
to use the loading requirements defined in Section 6.1.4, ``Security of 
furniture, equipment and features,'' of GM/RT2100. In particular, these 
loading requirements are the same as those proposed for alternatively 
demonstrating adequate attachment strength of interior fixtures in Tier 
III trainsets discussed in Sec.  238.733, above. Accordingly, both the 
interior lighting fixtures and their emergency back-up power systems 
would be subject to the same, proposed alternative loading 
requirements. As in proposed Sec.  238.733, use of the alternative 
loading requirements would be carried out consistent with any 
conditions identified in the railroad's FRA-approved Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan.
Cab Equipment
Section 238.751 Alerters
    In this section, FRA proposes to introduce requirements for 
alerters for Tier III passenger trainsets. The current requirements for 
alerters on Tier I passenger equipment can be found at Sec.  238.237, 
and those for Tier II passenger equipment can be found principally at 
Sec.  238.447 as well as at Sec.  238.445. The regulatory text in this 
proposed section for alerters and in proposed Sec.  238.753 for sanders 
was developed by the BTG, which was formed by the ETF to address Tier 
III braking requirements. The BTG mandate was to develop performance-
based requirements that would accommodate existing, high-speed trainset 
technology without regard to its design. Many of the proposed 
requirements for alerters and sanders make reference to the need for 
accommodating provisions in the railroad's Tier III Safe Operation 
Plan.

[[Page 88038]]

This is necessary to accommodate the diversity of high-speed trainsets 
and the various ways in which the specified requirements may actually 
be implemented. FRA notes that the proposed requirements for alerters 
and sanders represent only a portion of the cab equipment provisions 
that would be applicable to Tier III passenger equipment. FRA would 
specifically address other Tier III cab features in future rulemaking.
    Proposed paragraph (a) would require installation of an alerter in 
the operating cab of each Tier III trainset, unless the trainset is 
operating in a territory where alternate technology is available to 
provide the same functions. This provision is proposed to accommodate 
alternate designs and technologies that would address this safety 
feature.
    Proposed paragraphs (b) through (d) describe the high-level 
functionality that an alerter, if present, must provide. Upon 
activation of the alerter, engineer acknowledgment must occur within a 
prescribed period of time as defined in the railroad's Tier III Safe 
Operation Plan in order for the engineer to remain in control of the 
trainset. Failure to acknowledge the alerter within the prescribed time 
period would result in the automatic initiation of a retrievable, full 
service brake application; the full service brake application would be 
recoverable only by intervention of the engineer, who must acknowledge 
the alerter and actively issue a command for brake application. These 
proposed requirements are consistent with those for Tier I and Tier II 
passenger equipment, yet would provide a greater level of specificity.
    As noted, this section would allow use of an alternate technology 
to provide the same function(s) as an alerter. If such alternate 
technology is used, in whole or in part to provide the required 
functionality, proposed paragraph (e) would require the railroad to 
conduct a hazard analysis to be included in the railroad's Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan. The analysis must demonstrate that the use of any 
alternate technology to perform the function(s) of an alerter provides 
at least an equivalent level of safety to the function(s) the alerter 
would be required to perform.
Section 238.753 Sanders
    In this section, FRA is proposing the introduction of requirements 
for sanders for Tier III passenger trainsets. Deliberations of the BTG 
included discussion of whether sanders would be present on Tier III 
trainset equipment. The BTG decided that since the use of sanders is 
not prohibited in any way, proposed regulations should be developed to 
accommodate this possibility.
    The current requirements for sanders are in Sec.  229.131 of this 
chapter. Sanders represent only a portion of the regulations residing 
in 49 CFR part 229, Locomotive Safety Standards, which may be 
applicable to Tier III passenger equipment. As noted above, the 229/ITM 
Task Group is undertaking the effort to develop Tier III equivalents of 
applicable provisions in 49 CFR parts 229 and 238, including 
inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for Tier I and Tier 
II passenger equipment, which may be addressed in future FRA 
rulemaking(s).
    Proposed paragraph (a) addresses the fact that sanders are not 
required for Tier III trainsets, but acknowledges that the railroad's 
Tier III Safe Operation Plan may include such requirements. If sanders 
are present, they must be operational.
    Proposed paragraph (b) makes use of existing provisions in 49 CFR 
part 229, specifically Sec.  229.131(a), (b), and (d) of this chapter, 
which address where to apply sand, actions to take when sanders become 
inoperative en route, and how to identify equipment with defective 
sanders. Nonetheless, the proposed text would make clear that the 
requirements of Sec.  229.9, Movement of non-complying locomotives, and 
Sec.  229.23, Periodic inspection: General, do not apply. Instead, the 
requirements of Sec.  238.17, Movement of passenger equipment with 
other than power brake defects, would apply to Tier III trainsets with 
defective sanders. Likewise, instead of the requirements of Sec.  
229.23, requirements for the periodic inspection of a Tier III trainset 
with defective sanders would be defined in the railroad's ITM Plan. In 
this regard, proposed paragraph (c) would require the railroad's ITM 
plan to specify the overall inspection, testing and maintenance 
requirements for Tier III trainsets equipped with sanders.
Subpart I--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for Tier 
III Passenger Equipment
    Proposed subpart I would contain ITM requirements for Tier III 
passenger equipment. Recommendations for ITM requirements specific to 
the brake system were developed by the BTG and would be codified in 
Sec. Sec.  238.803, and 238.805. Recommendations for more comprehensive 
ITM requirements for Tier III passenger equipment are being developed 
by the 229/ITM Task Group for future rulemaking. While these 
recommendations are still being developed, FRA envisions that the 
requirements of this subpart would be based largely on the existing 
requirements for Tier II trainsets in subpart F of this part. This 
proposed subpart I therefore serves as a placeholder for additional 
requirements that may be proposed.
Section 238.801 Scope
    This section would establish the general applicability of the ITM 
requirements specified in this part for an operation that falls within 
the definition of Tier III.
Section 238.803 Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements; 
Brake System
    FRA is generally proposing to apply subpart F of this part 238 as 
the ITM requirements for brake systems of Tier III trainsets, as 
identified in proposed paragraph (a). FRA nonetheless emphasizes in 
proposed paragraph (b)(1) that the railroad's ITM plan would be 
required to contain a description of an appropriate brake test 
equivalent to that of a Class I brake test described in Sec.  238.313. 
In addition, FRA proposes exceptions to the application of Sec.  
238.15, which would otherwise govern the movement of a Tier III 
trainset with a power brake defect, as provided in paragraph (b)(2). 
The BTG found these exceptions necessary for Tier III trainsets to 
accommodate the advanced technology available on such equipment. FRA 
agrees, and they would apply in three specific circumstances.
    First, paragraph (b)(2)(i) proposes an exception to the requirement 
in Sec.  238.15 that, in the event of an en route failure that causes 
power brakes to be cut out or renders them inoperative, would allow for 
the determination of the percentage of operative brakes in a Tier III 
trainset to be made by a technological method described in the 
railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan instead of the walking 
inspection required by Sec.  238.15(c)(4)(iv). FRA expects that such a 
method would rely on diagnostic equipment on board the trainset, 
because visual inspection of the brake system may be difficult due to 
the expected aerodynamic features of the body of the trainset.
    Second, to accommodate the variety of braking strategies employed 
in the design of Tier III trainsets, in paragraph (b)(2)(ii), FRA 
proposes that the formula for computing the percentage of operative 
brakes necessary for continued trainset operation in the event of 
partial brake system failure en route be provided in the railroad's 
Tier III Safe Operation Plan.
    Finally, proposed paragraph (b)(2)(iii) would address 
implementation of operating restrictions for Tier III

[[Page 88039]]

trainsets, depending on whether they are in a shared right-of-way or 
not. When a Tier III trainset is operating in a right-of-way shared 
with Tier I passenger equipment or freight equipment, operating 
restrictions would be determined by the percentage of operative power 
brakes in the trainset based on the requirements of Sec.  238.15. When 
a Tier III trainset is operating in a right-of-way exclusively for Tier 
III passenger equipment, operating restrictions would be defined in the 
railroad's Tier III Safe Operation Plan.
Section 238.805 Periodic Tests; Brake System
    In this section FRA is proposing to specify periodic testing 
requirements for brake systems of Tier III trainsets. The proposed 
requirements in this section were derived from corresponding 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  229.25 and 229.29 of this chapter deemed 
relevant to Tier III trainsets by the BTG and represent minimum 
requirements with which FRA agrees. To render them appropriate for Tier 
III technology, FRA's proposal avoids prescriptive standards and allows 
for particular details of the testing requirements (frequency, scope, 
etc.) to be determined by the railroad's FRA-approved ITM plan.
Subpart J--Specific Requirements for the Safe Operation Plan for Tier 
III Passenger Equipment
    FRA proposes to add and reserve this subpart, which would contain 
the requirements for the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment. The actual requirements will be introduced in a subsequent 
rulemaking. While certain requirements of this proposed rule do make 
reference to the Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment, 
FRA has elected not to include any general requirements for this plan 
in this NPRM. The ETF had not discussed such requirements in depth when 
FRA prepared this NPRM and FRA seeks the ETF's input on such 
requirements before addressing them in a future rulemaking. In the 
interim, FRA would work with any proposed Tier III operation to ensure 
that the specific requirements referencing a Safe Operation Plan for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment are properly addressed and documented.
Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the 
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in 
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs
    To clarify the application of the floor fire test to Tier III 
passenger equipment, FRA proposes to add text to Note 16 of the table 
of ``Test Procedures and Performance Criteria for the Flammability and 
Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in Passenger Cars and 
Locomotive Cabs'' in paragraph (c) of appendix B to this part. FRA 
intends for this addition to address how the floor fire test method 
requirements of ASTM E-119-00a would apply to the undercarriage design 
common to most high-speed trainsets. Unlike most conventional passenger 
equipment, most modern high-speed trainsets employ a material cowling 
that fully encloses the underframe of the vehicle, including any 
underfloor equipment, to improve aerodynamics and reduce noise. This 
material may be considered part of the floor assembly for the purposes 
of this test when the evaluation is considering a fire source that is 
under and external to this material. To apply the requirement in this 
manner, the railroad must also conduct a fire hazard analysis that 
includes the considerations in Note 17 of this table, to protect 
against a fire source within the space between the undercarriage and 
the cowling.
Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements 
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives.
    FRA is amending appendix F to part 238 to apply this appendix to 
Tier III passenger equipment. As noted in the discussion of Sec.  
238.711, FRA proposes that the cab ends of Tier III trainsets comply 
with the requirements of appendix F to this part to demonstrate the 
integrity of the end structure. FRA added appendix F to this part to 
provide dynamic performance alternatives to the collision post and 
corner post requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.211 and 238.213 for Tier I 
passenger equipment. See 75 FR 1180. Because appendix F would continue 
to contain alternative requirements for Tier I passenger equipment, and 
also apply as the mandatory requirements for Tier III passenger 
equipment, FRA may make additional conforming changes to this appendix 
at the final rule stage if necessary to clarify the application of this 
appendix to both Tier I and Tier IIII passenger equipment. FRA also 
notes that appendix F would apply to Tier I alternative passenger 
trainsets under proposed appendix G to demonstrate the integrity of the 
end structure at the cab ends of these trainsets. While appendix G 
would itself contain alternative requirements, all the requirements of 
appendix G are intended to apply as a whole. Accordingly, FRA may make 
additional conforming changes to this appendix F at the final rule 
stage necessary to clarify application of this appendix F to Tier I 
alternative passenger trainsets.
Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the 
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of a Tier I 
Passenger Trainset
    FRA is proposing to add appendix G to part 238 to provide 
alternative crashworthiness and occupant protection performance 
requirements for Tier I passenger trainsets instead of the conventional 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 238.207, 238.209(a), 
238.211, 238.213, and 238.219 in subpart C of this part. The technical 
contents of proposed appendix G remain materially unchanged from those 
developed for the original Technical Criteria and Procedures Report.
    FRA intends for these alternative requirements to be applied to a 
Tier I trainset as a whole. Accordingly, compliance must be 
demonstrated either through application of the conventional 
requirements in subpart C, or through application of the requirements 
in this appendix G, not a combination of both. They also apply in 
addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.209(b), 238.215, 
238.217, and 238.233, APTA standards for occupant protection, and an 
AAR recommended practice for locomotive cab seats, as specified in this 
appendix. While the appendix may refer to specific units of rail 
equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in this appendix 
would apply only to a Tier I trainset as a whole, as noted above.
    In general, where alternatives to the conventional Tier I 
requirements are given in this appendix G, those requirements are also 
identified in the Tier III requirements in subpart H--Specific 
Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment. See the discussion in 
the section-by-section analysis for subpart H.
    Use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance for Tier I passenger trainsets is 
subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.  238.201.
    Proposed paragraphs (a) through (d) provide alternatives to the 
Tier I requirements for occupied volume integrity, override protection, 
and fluid entry inhibition and associated penetration resistance. The 
referenced alternatives are identified in the proposed Tier III 
requirements in subpart H. The alternatives are intended to be applied 
to the individual units, such as the individual cars, making up

[[Page 88040]]

a Tier I alternative passenger trainset, as specified.
    Proposed paragraph (e) is intended to be applied to each cab end of 
a Tier I alternative passenger trainset. This paragraph states that 
each cab end must comply with the requirements given in appendix F to 
this part. Further, this paragraph explains that while appendix F uses 
specific language to refer to ``corner posts'' and ``collision posts,'' 
alternative designs may not necessarily contain these discrete 
structures. Accordingly, this paragraph provides that the requirements 
of appendix F apply at the specified locations, regardless of whether 
the structure at the specified locations is a post. Overall, this 
paragraph is intended to require an equivalent level of performance 
from an alternative Tier I design to that of a conventionally-designed, 
Tier I compliant vehicle, without overly constraining the design of the 
cab end structure.
    Proposed paragraph (f) provides alternatives to the end structure 
integrity requirements for each non-cab end of each unit of a Tier I 
trainset. The referenced alternatives are identified in the proposed 
Tier III requirements in subpart H.
    As proposed in paragraph (g), a Tier I alternative passenger 
trainset is subject to the conventional requirements for roof and side 
structure integrity in Sec. Sec.  238.215 and 238.217. These 
requirements are sufficiently broad to apply to Tier I passenger 
trainsets of alternative designs. Accordingly, no regulatory 
alternatives are needed.
    Proposed paragraph (h) provides alternatives to the truck 
attachment requirements for each unit of a Tier I alternative trainset. 
The referenced alternatives are identified in the proposed Tier III 
requirements in subpart H.
    Proposed paragraphs (i), (j), and (k) provide that a Tier I 
alternative passenger trainset must comply with the conventional Tier I 
regulations and industry safety standards for interior fixture 
attachment, passenger seat crashworthiness, and crew seat 
crashworthiness, respectively.
    Notably, in paragraph (i), FRA is proposing to incorporate by 
reference APTA standard PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for the 
Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,'' 
Authorized June 2006, for interior fixtures. The standard is intended 
to address forces applied to the carbody and truck structures during 
collisions, derailments, and other accident conditions. APTA PR-CS-S-
034-99 is available to all interested parties online at www.apta.com. 
Additionally, FRA will maintain a copy available for review.
    Further, in paragraph (j), FRA proposes to incorporate by reference 
APTA standard PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in 
Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 2010, with the exception of 
Section 6 of the standard, which is related to the durability testing 
of seats. FRA considers the durability testing of seats to be beyond 
the scope of this proposed regulation for the same reasons discussed 
above, under Sec.  238.735.
Appendix H to Part 238--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input 
Data and Geometrical Depiction
    FRA proposes to add this appendix to formally provide input data 
and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a computer model of the 
rigid (conventional) locomotive design proposed in Sec.  238.705(a)(4) 
to use to evaluate the OVI of a Tier III trainset (and a Tier I 
alternative passenger trainset under proposed appendix G) in a dynamic 
collision scenario. Proposed Sec.  238.705(a) outlines the required 
conditions under which a dynamic collision scenario would be performed 
involving an initially-moving train impacting an initially-standing 
train having the rigid (conventional) locomotive leading its consist. 
As proposed in Sec.  238.705(a)(4), the initially-standing train would 
be made up of a rigid locomotive and five identical passenger coaches 
having the following characteristics: The locomotive weighs 260,000 
pounds and each coach weighs 95,000 pounds; the locomotive and each 
coach crush in response to applied force as specified in Table 1 to 
Sec.  238.705; and the locomotive has a geometric design as depicted in 
Figure 1 to this appendix H.
    This appendix is intended to establish a consistent definition for 
locomotive geometry to be used to conduct dynamic computer simulations. 
The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the geometry for 
approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive design. Because 
this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a locomotive mass 
corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is provided for modeling 
purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight specified for the 
locomotive in Sec.  238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to this appendix provides 
two views of the locomotive's geometric depiction. FRA invites comment 
on whether the proposed approach is the best means to provide the data 
inputs necessary for the regulated community.

V. Regulatory Impact and Notices

A. Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures

    This proposed rule has been evaluated in accordance with existing 
policies and procedures, and determined to be significant under 
Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, and DOT policies and 
procedures. 44 FR 11034 (Feb. 26, 1979). The proposed rule is 
``economically significant'' rule as defined by Section 3(f)(1) of 
Executive Order 12866 because it is likely to have an effect of $100 
million or more in a single year. FRA has prepared and placed in the 
docket a Regulatory Impact Analysis addressing the economic impacts of 
this proposed rule. The RIA presents estimates of the quantifiable 
costs likely to occur over the next 30 years of the rule as proposed, 
as well as estimates of quantifiable benefits that would be generated 
by the rule as proposed. Informed by its analysis, FRA believes that 
this proposed rule would result in positive net benefits. The proposed 
rule would help address several limitations in the CFR pertaining to 
passenger equipment.
    FRA is amending its passenger equipment (passenger locomotives 
(power units), coaches and train sets) safety regulations. This 
proposed rule would add a new equipment tier (Tier III) to facilitate 
the safe implementation of HSR up to 220 mph on dedicated rail lines. 
The proposal would also establish alternative crashworthiness 
performance standards to qualify passenger rail equipment for Tier I 
operations (Tier I alternative). In addition, FRA proposes to increase 
the maximum allowable speed for Tier II operations from 150 mph to 160 
mph. The ETF developed the technical requirements and RSAC approved 
them. This proposal attempts to address several limitations in the CFR 
pertaining to passenger equipment. Existing passenger equipment safety 
standards in 49 CFR part 238 do not address safety requirements for 
passenger rail equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Furthermore, the 
current regulatory framework establishes Tier I safety compliance by 
providing equipment design requirements. Existing regulations for Tier 
I equipment limit the application of contemporary design techniques and 
recent technology that can improve safety. Additionally, the NPRM would 
increase the allowable speed for Tier II equipment making it consistent 
with recent changes in 49 CFR parts 213 and 238 relative to

[[Page 88041]]

Vehicle/Track Interaction (VTI) Safety Standards.
    FRA believes that approximately $4.6 billion in quantifiable costs 
would be borne by the industry over a future 30-year period, with a 
present value of $2 billion (when discounted at a 7-percent rate) or 
$3.2 billion (when discounted at a 3-percent rate). The identified 
quantified costs are related to testing to demonstrate compliance with 
either the proposed Tier I alternative or Tier III standards, 
inspection, testing and maintenance of brakes, and to expected trainset 
modifications. The proposed Tier I standards would provide only an 
option for railroads to use a different type or design of passenger 
equipment in Tier I service and would not impose any cost on existing 
rolling stock or new equipment qualifying under existing regulations. 
The proposed Tier III standards would provide an option to FRA's 
existing regulatory approach for permitting railroads to operate 
equipment in new Tier III service, which is by issuing rules of 
particular applicability. The proposed Tier III requirements would not 
impose any cost on existing rolling stock or new equipment qualifying 
under existing regulations (existing passenger rolling stock is Tier I 
and II; there is no Tier III in the U.S. as of yet).

                                             Regulatory Cost Summary
                           [Quantified estimates using a future 30-year time horizon]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Section                        Description           Undiscounted         3%              7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Equipment Related
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.2.1..............................  Trainset Tests (Tier I)....      $2,976,600      $1,993,277      $1,310,701
3.2.1..............................  Trainset Tests (Tier III)..       2,928,000       2,008,213       1,334,302
3.2.2..............................  Trainset Maintenance (Tier       36,000,000      23,520,529      14,890,849
                                      I).
3.1.4..............................  Costs Related to ITM Brake       17,150,722      10,147,114       5,548,586
                                      Requirements for Tier III.
3.2.3..............................  Trainset Modifications.....      88,111,000      66,100,340      48,147,529
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                        Equipment Total.........     147,166,322     103,769,473      71,231,967
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Infrastructure Related
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3.2.3..............................  Infrastructure Upgrade          400,000,000     253,653,516     154,394,117
                                      (Tier I).
3.2.3..............................  Infrastructure Upgrade        3,960,000,000   2,737,015,815   1,700,773,286
                                      (Tier III).
3.2.4..............................  Track Maintenance (Tier I).      14,577,720       8,082,124       4,044,953
3.2.4..............................  Track Maintenance (Tier         101,750,000      54,984,200      25,785,984
                                      III).
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                        Infrastructure Total....   4,476,327,720   3,053,735,655   1,884,998,340
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                        Total (Equipment and       4,623,494,042   3,157,505,130   1,956,230,309
                                         Infrastructure) \18\.
                                                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                        Annualized..............     154,116,468     161,093,573    157,645,5645
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would have a positive effect on society and the 
safety performance of the passenger railroad system. Some of the 
identified safety benefits are due to the ability to adopt safe 
equivalent technology and best practices to better the current safety 
environment, and to apply future technological advancements for the 
improvement of rail safety. Infrastructure-related benefits dwarf other 
quantified benefits (i.e., safety, equipment design and engineering, 
and manufacturing benefits). Infrastructure benefits would be generated 
by the ability of railroad operators to take advantage of a blended 
operating environment, avoiding costly new construction and maintenance 
of dedicated track and right-of-way acquisition. This benefit is 
especially attractive to railroad operators that provide service in 
areas with high population density because right of way acquisition and 
new railroad construction is significantly more expensive and complex. 
This alternative would increase the probability that new services are 
introduced and reduce the need for new construction in densely 
populated areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ For the purposes of demonstrating a range of costs, the 
lower end of the range for total Equipment and Infrastructure is 
estimated to be approximately $4.6 billion. Discounted cost 
estimates are approximately $3.1 billion at the 3-percent level and 
$1.9 billion at the 7-percent level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The U.S. market would benefit from the regulatory proposal because 
the new safety standards would allow more manufacturers to supply 
rolling stock and would allow operators to take advantage of a wider 
variety of trainsets. Furthermore, the proposal would allow Tier I 
alternative and Tier III operations to use service-proven platforms 
with the latest technology available. These benefits would be achieved 
by ensuring that foreign technology meets FRA's safety requirements and 
that all equipment suppliers comply with the same safety standards. 
This RIA estimated a range in total benefits that is between $8.7 
billion and $16.8 billion over the next 30 years. Of the total, $1.2 
billion to $2.1 billion can be allocated to equipment benefits while 
the remainder is infrastructure related ($7.5 billion to $14.7 
billion). Table 2 provides more detailed benefit estimates and their 
discounted values at the 3- and 7-percent levels.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ Tier III benefits are uncertain because they are based on 
assumptions regarding the future growth of high-speed rail 
operations and how those operations will be incorporated into the 
U.S. rail network. It is possible in the extreme, benefits for Tier 
III equipment, including infrastructure benefits, will be zero, 
which would occur if no high-speed rail projects come to fruition 
over the forecast horizon. Similarly, the estimated infrastructure 
benefits hinge on the assumption of not having to build dedicated 
HSR track for the whole system (i.e., they represent savings from 
being able to operate HSR using shared infrastructure). If the 
baseline is shared infrastructure, then these benefits will not be 
realized. Tier III benefits, including infrastructure benefits, are 
provided for expository purposes. Similarly, Tier I benefits from 
having performance standards are challenging to quantify, as is 
always the case for such benefits. However, given that they provide 
an option to design standards, operators would only comply with such 
standards, voluntarily making investments, if they found it 
beneficial to do so.

[[Page 88042]]



                                        Regulatory Benefit Range Summary
                            [Quantified estimates use a future 30-year time horizon]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Section                   Description           Undiscounted            3%                 7%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                   High Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.4.........................  Trainset Components           $575,000,000       $370,129,150       $229,818,248
                                 (Tier I alternative).
4.1.4.........................  Trainset Component \20\      1,023,760,569        791,314,162        591,529,134
                                 (Tier III).
4.1.5.........................  Trainset Engineering            47,250,000         30,414,961         18,885,064
                                 \21\ (Tier I
                                 alternative).
4.1.5.........................  Trainset Engineering           221,130,000        170,728,740        127,624,437
                                 (Tier III).
4.1.7.........................  Safety (Tier I                  52,597,299         33,483,989         20,553,470
                                 alternative).
4.1.8.........................  Manufacturing Certainty        114,912,792         86,204,443         62,789,786
                                 (Tier I alternative
                                 and Tier III).
4.1.9.........................  Trainset Maintenance            38,304,264         28,734,814         20,929,929
                                 (Tier I alternative
                                 and III).
                                Equipment Subtotal           2,072,704,774      1,511,010,260      1,072,130,069
4.1.6.........................  Infrastructure Subtotal     14,680,000,000      9,735,682,060      5,991,665,872
                                Total                       16,752,704,774     11,246,692,320      7,063,795,941
                                Annualized                     854,710,589        573,797,912        569,245,910
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Low Range
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4.1.4.........................  Trainset Components            115,000,000         74,025,830         45,963,650
                                 (Tier I alternative).
4.1.4.........................  Trainset Component             761,257,859        585,392,942        433,067,170
                                 (Tier III).
4.1.5.........................  Trainset Engineering             9,450,000          6,082,992          3,777,013
                                 (Tier I alternative).
4.1.5.........................  Trainset Engineering           164,243,990        126,300,532         93,435,725
                                 (Tier III).
4.1.7.........................  Safety (Tier I                  52,597,299         33,483,989         20,553,470
                                 alternative).
4.1.8.........................  Manufacturing Certainty         55,830,211         42,551,847         31,246,952
                                 (Tier I alternative
                                 and Tier III).
4.1.9.........................  Trainset Maintenance            17,389,930          9,336,581          4,475,199
                                 (Tier I alternative
                                 and III).
                                Equipment Subtotal           1,175,769,289        877,174,713        632,519,178
4.1.6.........................  Infrastructure Subtotal      7,480,000,000      5,169,918,763      3,212,571,763
                                Total                        8,655,769,289      6,047,093,477      3,845,090,941
                                Annualized                     288,525,643        308,518,230        309,862,050
151...........................  Net Benefits--High.....     12,129,210,732      8,089,187,192      5,107,565,634
                                   Net Benefits--Low...      4,063,300,247      2,912,179,307      1,905,057,812
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As shown on Table 2, undiscounted net regulatory benefits would be 
substantial and would be between $4.1 billion and $12.1 billion. 
Discounted net benefits would be between $2.9 billion (low range) and 
$8.1 billion (high range) at the 3-percent level. And net benefits 
would be between $1.9 billion (low range) and $5.1 billion (high range) 
at the 7-percent level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \20\ Trainset components are the parts of the trainsets, e.g. 
bogies for the coaches, traction motor for the power unit, etc.
    \21\ Trainset Engineering is the design and implementation of 
how the trainsets will be put together and constructed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Alternatives Considered
    One of the main purposes of the proposed regulation is to provide a 
set of minimum Federal safety requirements to determine whether 
passenger equipment platforms designed to contemporary standards 
outside of the U.S. are safe for operation in the U.S. rail 
environment. Traditionally, U.S. railroad safety regulations evolved as 
a consequence of specific accidents scenarios, which have led to the 
identification of specific risks in the operating environment. While 
FRA seeks to continue ensuring the safety risks are adequately 
addressed for the operating environment, the proposed rule places 
special emphasis on measures to avoid those risks rather than simply 
mitigating them.
    Importantly, the proposed rule does not intend to adopt or 
incorporate by reference a specific international design standard. 
Doing so may preclude certain equipment manufacturers from competing in 
the U.S. market and FRA intends that, to the greatest extent possible, 
the U.S. passenger rail market be open to global manufacturers.
    The alternatives FRA considered in establishing the proposed safety 
requirements for Tier III trainsets, are the European and Japanese 
industry standards. These options provide a continuum of safety 
requirements for a range of aspects such as: Varying levels of 
regulatory requirements; market accessibility; benefits and costs; and 
operational efficiency and safety.
    FRA prepared a high-level cost comparison of those options based on 
the key attributes of the alternatives and the effect of those 
attributes on societal welfare and the regulatory purpose. However, it 
is important to note this is not a direct comparison between comparable 
requirements/standards. FRA is comparing the technical requirements of 
other established high-speed rail standards to illustrate the primary 
differences. FRA expects service-proven equipment produced to these 
international standards can comply with the proposed regulation with no 
significant changes to the underlying design platform.
European Platform
    Passenger rail equipment crashworthiness and occupant protection 
design standards have been largely standardized by Euronorms (EN) 12663 
and 15227. These European ``norms'' \22\ or standards were developed 
and established by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN). 
These ``norms'' are not only intended to serve as safety standards, but 
also to ensure efficiency and performance of products and services and 
improve the function of markets by removing barriers to trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ ``Standard'' means ``norme'' in French and ``norm'' in 
German. https://www.cen.eu/work/ENdev/whatisEN/Pages/default.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA estimated the costs required to modify European trainsets to 
meet the proposed Tier III requirements in this rule. FRA concludes 
that there are no significant differences between trains built to the 
design standards contained in ENs 12663 and 15227 and trains built to 
meet the crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in the 
proposed rule. FRA estimates that on average trainset prices would 
increase $310,250 or 0.62 percent, per trainset. These modifications 
would be justified

[[Page 88043]]

because they represent a nominal increase in cost while maintaining a 
level of occupant protection appropriate for the U.S. passenger rail 
operating environment.
Japanese Platform
    Japan introduced the Shinkansen high-speed passenger rail system 
about 50 years ago. Railroad safety regulation is governed by the 
Railway Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) 
and is codified in the Technical Regulatory Standards on Railways.\23\ 
These technical standards are primarily performance based and railways 
have the obligation to conform its operations, equipment and 
infrastructure to these standards. In the case of the Shinkansen, the 
railway is passenger-only and the rail line is entirely dedicated to 
high-speed rail passenger service. This is the substantial difference 
in the design of Shinkansen trainsets operating in Japan and passenger 
rail trainsets currently operating in the U.S. The key to the Japanese 
high-speed rail network's ongoing safety and reliability is the 
``principle of crash avoidance.'' Unlike the typical operating 
environment in the U.S., no conventional train service runs on the 
Japanese system and it has full grade separation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ https://www.mlit.go.jp/english/2006/h_railway_bureau/Laws_concerning/14.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although FRA believes that the proposed Tier III requirements would 
allow Japanese trainsets to be modified for use in the U.S. market and 
be interoperable, it is also expected that those required modifications 
would be costly. Indeed, modifying advanced Japanese high-speed 
trainsets would likely be cost prohibitive to be interoperable on the 
U.S. system; FRA estimates $4.7 million per train set.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272

    FRA developed the proposed rule in accordance with Executive Order 
13272 (``Proper Consideration of Small Entities in Agency Rulemaking'') 
and DOT's procedures and policies to promote compliance with the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) to ensure potential 
impacts of rules on small entities are properly considered.
    The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires an agency to review 
regulations to assess their impact on small entities. An agency must 
conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis unless it determines and 
certifies that a rule is not expected to have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
    Existing Passenger Equipment Safety Standards in this part 238 do 
not specifically address safety requirements for passenger rail 
equipment at speeds above 150 mph. Furthermore, the current regulatory 
framework generally sets Tier I safety compliance through equipment 
design requirements, which limit the application of recent technology. 
The proposed regulation would change the existing passenger rail 
equipment safety regulatory framework by introducing a high-speed rail 
equipment category (Tier III) and establishing alternative compliance 
requirements for conventional train equipment (Tier I) that are more 
performance-based. Additionally, the NPRM would increase the maximum 
allowable speed for Tier II equipment to make it consistent with the 
corresponding speed range in FRA's Track Safety Standards for the track 
over which the equipment operates. This Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis is presented to comply with Executive Order 13272 and with the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act as part of the formal rulemaking process 
required by law.
    FRA has initiated the proposed rulemaking using recommendations by 
FRA's RSAC. The proposed regulation would amend part 238 of chapter II, 
subtitle B of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to reflect new or 
modified safety requirements for Tier I and Tier III equipment, and to 
increase the authorized speed limit for Tier II equipment.
1. Description of Regulated Entities and Impacts
    The ``universe'' of the entities under consideration includes only 
those small entities that can reasonably be expected to be directly 
affected by the provisions of this rule as proposed. For the proposed 
rule, there is only one type of small entity that would be affected: 
Small passenger railroads.
    ``Small entity'' is defined in 5 U.S.C. 601(3) as having the same 
meaning as ``small business concern'' under section 3 of the Small 
Business Act. This includes any small business concern that is 
independently owned and operated, and is not dominant in its field of 
operation. 5 U.S.C. 601(5) defines ``small entities'' as governments of 
cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or 
special districts with populations less than 50,000.
    The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) stipulates ``size 
standards'' for small entities. It provides that industry sectors 
relevant for the proposed rulemaking must not exceed the limits listed 
below (and still classify as a ``small entity''): \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ U.S. Small Business Administration, ``Table of Small 
Business Standards Matched to North American Industry Classification 
System Codes,'' effective November 5, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     1,000 employees for railroad rolling stock manufacturing.
     1,500 employees for line haul operating railroads.
     500 employees for motor and generator manufacturing.
     500 employees for switching and terminal establishments.
    Federal agencies may adopt their own size standards for small 
entities in consultation with SBA, and in conjunction with public 
comment. Under the authority provided to it by SBA, FRA published a 
final policy, which formally establishes small entities as railroads 
that meet the line haulage revenue requirements of a Class III 
railroad.\25\ Currently, the revenue requirements are $20 million or 
less in annual operating revenue, adjusted annually for inflation. The 
$20 million limit (adjusted annually for inflation) is based on the 
Surface Transportation Board's threshold of a Class III railroad, which 
is adjusted by applying the railroad revenue deflator adjustment.\26\ 
FRA is proposing to use this definition for this NPRM. Any comments 
received pertinent to its use will be addressed in the final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ See 68 FR 24891, May 9, 2003.
    \26\ For further information on the calculation of the specific 
dollar limit, please see 49 CFR part 1201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Railroads
    For purposes of this analysis, there are only two intercity 
passenger railroads, Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad. Neither is 
considered a small entity. Amtrak is a Class I railroad and the Alaska 
Railroad is a Class II railroad. The Alaska Railroad is owned by the 
State of Alaska, which has a population well in excess of 50,000. There 
are currently 28 commuter or other short-haul passenger railroad 
operations in the U.S., most of which are part of larger transportation 
organizations that receive Federal funds and serve major metropolitan 
areas with populations greater than 50,000. However, two of these 
passenger railroads do not fall in this category and are considered 
small entities: The Hawkeye Express and the Saratoga & North Creek 
Railway. The Hawkeye Express provides service to Iowa City, Iowa, and 
is owned by a Class III railroad, a small entity. The Saratoga & North 
Creek Railway started operations in 2011, serving several stations 
between North Creek and Saratoga Springs, New York, and meets

[[Page 88044]]

the criteria to be considered a small entity.
    It is important to note that the two railroads being considered in 
this analysis use passenger rolling stock that is different from the 
equipment covered by the proposed rulemaking. Furthermore, the Hawkeye 
Express and the Saratoga & North Creek Railway would be able to find 
their current trainset types in the market if they decided to acquire 
new rolling stock over the next 30 years.
    This proposal does not increase costs for these small passenger 
railroads. FRA expects the cost to acquire passenger rail equipment 
would drop as a result of the proposed rulemaking. These two railroads 
would have more variety in trainset models available for passenger 
operations and options in companies supplying equipment in the U.S. 
market. Additionally, small railroads would enjoy lower prices as the 
U.S. passenger rail market is enlarged by the proposed rulemaking, 
enhancing economies of scale and increasing predictability for 
equipment orders.
Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
    The passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment manufacturing 
sector in the United States has a fairly small number of firms with no 
more than 15 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and a few hundred 
component and subcomponent suppliers.\27\ However, for this flexibility 
analysis, FRA is taking a broader approach by assessing the effect of 
the regulation as proposed on the railroad rolling stock manufacturing 
sector as defined by the North American Classification System (NAICS), 
which includes the passenger rail and urban rapid transit equipment 
manufacturing industry, but goes beyond by also covering freight and 
maintenance-of-way vehicles. This approach includes firms that 
currently do not manufacture passenger rail equipment, but can 
potentially enter the market. Based on data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau, employment on these industries is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ Lowe, M., Tokuoka, S., Dubay, K., and Gereffi, G., ``U.S. 
Manufacture of Rail Vehicles for Intercity Passenger Rail and Urban 
Transit: A Value Chain Analysis,'' Center on Globalization, 
Governance & Competitiveness, June 24, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     NAICS code 336510, Railroad rolling stock manufacturing, 
159 firms in the industry, and 137 firms with less than 500 employees.
     NAICS code 335312, Motor and generator manufacturing, 428 
firms in the industry, and 384 firms with less than 500 employees.
    The main impact affecting these industries from the rule as 
proposed would be the qualification costs for Tier I alternative and 
Tier III trainsets. As noted in the Regulatory Impact Analysis, 
companies supplying trainsets covered by the rulemaking would be 
required to submit test and analysis results to demonstrate compliance 
with the safety requirements. However, in the case of rolling stock 
manufacturing, this cost would only be incurred by the OEM when 
submitting a qualification package, which would include details 
regarding the performance of the trainset model in the required tests 
and analyses. Therefore, small and very small firms supplying OEMs are 
not expected to be required to submit that information. Small firms 
could be expected to benefit from existing requirements for minimum 
domestic content as more trainsets are purchased by U.S. railroad 
operators. Small business would have the opportunity to supply OEMs 
with domestic inputs and to partner with larger firms to allow small 
domestic producers to meet the needs of the market being created by the 
regulatory proposal. This means that FRA expects the proposed 
rulemaking to have only a positive impact on these small entities as 
more of them are provided with the opportunity to enter the passenger 
railroad equipment manufacturing industry.
Significant Economic Impact Criteria
    Previously, FRA sampled small railroads and found that revenue 
averaged approximately $4.7 million (not discounted) in 2006. One 
percent of average annual revenue per small railroad would be $47,000. 
FRA realizes that some railroads will have revenue than lower $4.7 
million. However, FRA estimates that small railroads would not have any 
additional expenses over the next ten years to comply with the 
requirements as proposed in this NPRM. Based on this, FRA concludes 
that the expected burden of this rule as proposed would not have a 
significant impact on the competitive position of small entities, or on 
the small entity segment of the railroad industry as a whole.
Substantial Number Criteria
    This final rule would likely burden all small railroads that are 
not exempt from its scope or application (See 49 CFR 238.3). Thus, as 
noted above this proposed rule would impact a substantial number of 
small railroads.
2. Certification
    Pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), FRA 
certifies that this proposed rule would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. FRA invites all 
interested parties to submit data and information regarding the 
potential economic impact that would result from adoption of the 
proposals in this NPRM. FRA will consider all comments received in the 
public comment process when making a final determination for 
certification of the final rule.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The information collection requirements in this proposed rule are 
being submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review 
and approval in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). The sections that contain the new, revised, and 
current information collection requirements and the estimated time to 
fulfill each requirement are as follows:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                      Respondent         Total annual      Average time per      Total annual
           CFR section                 universe            responses           response          burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
229.47--Emergency Brake Valve--   30 railroads......  30 markings.......  1 minute..........  1
 Marking Brake Pipe Valve as      30 railroads......  5 markings........  1 minute..........  .08
 such.
 --DMU, MU, Control Cab
 Locomotives--Marking Emergency
 Brake Valve as such.
238.7--Waivers..................  30 railroads......  5 waivers.........  2 hours...........  10
238.15--Movement of passenger     30 railroads......  1,000 tags........  3 minutes.........  50
 equipment with power brake       30 railroads......  288 tags..........  3 minutes.........  14
 defect.                          30 railroads......  144 notices.......  3 minutes.........  7
 --Movement of passenger
 equipment--defective en route.
Conditional requirement--Notice.

[[Page 88045]]

 
238.17--Limitations on movement   30 railroads......  200 tags..........  3 minutes.........  10
 of passenger equipment--defects  30 railroads......  76 tags...........  3 minutes.........  4
 found at calendar day insp. &    30 railroads......  38 radio            30 seconds........  .32
 on movement of passenger                              notifications.
 equipment--develops defects en
 route.
 --Special requisites--movement--
 passenger equip.--saf. appl.
 defect.
 --Crew member notifications....
238.21--Petitions for special     30 railroads......  1 petition........  16 hours..........  16
 approval of alternative          30 railroads......  1 petition........  120 hours.........  120
 standards.                       30 railroads......  10 petitions......  40 hours..........  400
 --Petitions for special          Public/RR Industry  4 comments........  1 hour............  4
 approval of alternative
 compliance.
 --Petitions for special
 approval of pre-revenue service
 acceptance testing plan.
 --Comments on petitions........
238.103--Fire Safety............  2 new railroads...  2 analyses........  150 hours.........  300
 --Procuring New Pass.            30 railroads......  1 analysis........  40 hours..........  40
 Equipment--Fire Safety Analysis. 30 railroads/.....  3 analyses........  20 hours..........  60
 --Existing Equipment--Final      APTA..............
 Fire Safety Analysis.
 --Transferring existing
 equipment--.
Revised Fire Safety Analysis....
238.107--Inspection/testing/      30 railroads......  30 reviews........  60 hours..........  1,800
 maintenance plans--Review by
 railroads.
238.109--Employee/Contractor Tr.  7,500 employees/..  2,500 empl./......  1.33 hours........  3,458
 --Training employees--Mech.      100 trainers......  100 trainers......  3 minutes.........  125
 Insp.                            30 railroads......  2,500 record......
 --Recordkeeping--Employee/.....
Contractor Current
 Qualifications.
238.111--Pre-revenue service      9 equipment         2 plans...........  16 hours..........  32
 acceptance testing plan:          manufacturers.     2 plans...........  192 hours.........  384
 Passenger equipment that has     9 equipment         2 plans...........  60 hours..........  120
 previously been used in service   manufacturers.     1 report..........  60 hours..........  60
 in the U.S..                     9 equipment         1 plan............  20 hours..........  20
 --Passenger equipment that has    manufacturers.
 not been previously used in      30 railroads......
 revenue service in the U.S..     30 railroads......
 --Subsequent Equipment Orders..
 --Tier II & Tier III Passenger
 Equipment: Report of Test
 Results to FRA (revised
 requirement).
 --Plan submitted to FRA for
 Tier II or Tier III equipment
 before being placed in service
 (revised requirement).
238.201--New Requirements.......  30 railroads......  1 plan............  40 hours..........  40
Alternative Compliance: Tier I    30 railroads......  1 notice..........  30 minutes........  1
 Passenger equipment--Test plans
 + supporting documentation
 demonstrating compliance.
 --Notice of Tests sent to FRA
 30 days prior to commencement
 of operations.
238.213--Corner Posts--Plan to    30 railroads......  10 plans..........  40 hours..........  400
 meet section's corner post
 requirements for cab car or MU
 locomotives.
238.229--Safety Appliances......  30 railroads......  30 lists..........  1 hour............  30
 --Welded safety appliances       30 railroads......  30 lists..........  1 hour............  30
 considered defective: lists.     30 railroads......  4 tags............  3 minutes.........  .20
 --Lists Identifying Equip. w/    30 railroads......  2 notices.........  1 minute..........  .0333
 Welded Saf. App.                 30 railroads......  30 plans..........  16 hours..........  480
 --Defective Welded Saf.          30 railroads......  60 workers........  4 hours...........  240
 Appliance--Tags.                 30 railroads......  1 record..........  2.25 hours........  2
 --Notification to Crewmembers    30 railroads......  15 petitions......  4 hours...........  60
 about Non- Compliant Equipment.  30 railroads......  3,060 records.....  12 minutes........  612
 --Inspection plans.............
 --Inspection Personnel--
 Training.
 --Remedial action: Defect/crack
 in weld--record.
 --Petitions for special
 approval of alternative
 compliance--impractical
 equipment design.
 --Records of inspection/repair
 of welded safety appliance
 brackets/supports/Training.

[[Page 88046]]

 
238.230--Safety Appliances--New   30 railroads......  100 records.......  6 minutes.........  10
 Equipment--Inspection Record of  30 railroads......  15 document.......  4 hours...........  60
 Welded Equipment by Qualified
 Employee.
 --Welded safety appliances:
 Documentation for equipment
 impractically designed to
 mechanically fasten safety
 appliance support.
238.231--Brake System--           30 railroads......  2,500 forms.......  21 minutes........  875
 Inspection and repair of hand/   30 railroads......  30 procedures.....  2 hours...........  60
 parking brake: Records.
 --Procedures Verifying Hold of
 Hand/Parking Brakes.
238.237--Automated monitoring...  30 railroads......  3 documents.......  2 hours...........  6
 --Documentation for alerter/     30 railroads......  25 tags...........  3 minutes.........  1
 deadman control timing.
 --Defective alerter/deadman
 control: Tagging.
238.303--Exterior calendar day    30 railroads......  30 notices........  1 minute..........  1
 mechanical inspection of         30 railroads......  50 tags...........  3 minutes.........  3
 passenger equipment: Notice of   30 railroads......  50 tags...........  3 minutes.........  3
 previous inspection.             30 railroads......  4 documents.......  2 hours...........  8
 --Dynamic brakes not in          30 railroads......  100 notices.......  3 minutes.........  5
 operating mode: Tag.             30 railroads......  100 records.......  2 minutes.........  3
 --Conventional locomotives       30 railroads......  1,959,620.........  10 minutes + 1      359,264
 equipped with inoperative                            records...........   minute.
 dynamic brakes: Tagging.
 --MU passenger equipment found
 with inoperative/ineffective
 air compressors at exterior
 calendar day inspection:
 Documents.
 --Written notice to train crew
 about inoperative/ineffective
 air compressors.
 --Records of inoperative air
 compressors.
 --Record of exterior calendar
 day mechanical inspection.
238.305--Interior calendar day    30 railroads......  540 tags..........  1 minute..........  9
 mechanical inspection of         30 railroads......  1,959,620 records.  5 minutes + 1       359,264
 passenger cars--Tagging of                                                minute.
 defective end/side doors.
 --Records of interior calendar
 day inspection.
238.307--Periodic mechanical      30 railroads......  2 notices/          5 hours...........  10
 inspection of passenger cars     30 railroads......   notifications.     2 minutes.........  7
 and unpowered vehicles--         30 railroads......  200 notices.......  200 hours/........  3,857,443
 Alternative inspection           30 railroads......  19,284 records....  2 minutes.........  500
 intervals: Notifications.                            5 documents.......  100 hours.........
 --Notice of seats/seat
 attachments broken or loose.
 --Records of each periodic
 mechanical inspection.
 --Detailed documentation of
 reliability assessments as
 basis for alternative
 inspection interval.
238.311--Single car test........  30 railroads......  50 tags...........  3 minutes.........  3 hours
 --Tagging to indicate need for
 single car test.
238.313--Class I Brake Test.....  30 railroads......  15,600 records....  30 minutes........  7,800
 --Record for additional
 inspection for passenger
 equipment that does not comply
 with Sec.   238.231(b)(1).
238.315--Class IA brake test....  30 railroads......  18,250 notices....  5 seconds.........  25
 --Notice to train crew that      30 railroads......  365,000 test......  15 seconds........  1,521
 test has been performed (verbal
 notice).
 --Communicating Signal Tested
 and Operating.
238.317--Class II brake test....  30 railroads......  365,000 test......  15 seconds........  1,521
 --Communicating Signal Tested
 and Operating.
238.321--Out-of-service credit--  30 railroads......  1,250 notes.......  2 minutes.........  42
 Passenger Car: Out-of-use
 notation.
238.445--Automated Monitoring...  1 railroad........  10,000 alerts.....  10 seconds........  28
 --Performance monitoring:        1 railroad........  21,900 notices....  20 seconds........  122
 alerters/alarms.
 --Monitoring system: Self-test
 feature: Notifications.
238.503--Inspection, testing,     1 railroad........  1 plan............  1,200 hours.......  1,200
 and maintenance requirements--
 Plans.

[[Page 88047]]

 
238.505--Program approval         Rail Industry.....  3 comments........  3 hours...........  9
 procedures--Submission of
 program/plans and Comments on
 programs.
238.703--Quasi-static Load        2 railroads.......  1 analysis........  40 hours..........  40
 Requirements--Document/analysis
 Tier III Trainsets showing
 compliance with this section
 (new requirement).
238.705--Dynamic Collision        2 railroads.......  1 analysis........  40 hours..........  40
 Scenario--Demonstration of
 Occupied Volume Integrity Tier
 III Trainsets--Model Validation
 document (new requirement).
238.707--Override Protection--    2 railroads.......  1 analysis........  40 hours..........  40
 Anti-climbing Performance Tests/
 .
Analyses Tier III Trainsets--
 (new requirement).
238.709--Fluid Entry Inhibition-- 2 railroads.......  1 analysis........  20 hours..........  20
 Information to demonstrate
 compliance with this section
 Tier III Trainsets--(new
 requirement).
238.721--New Requirements--Safe   2 railroads.......  1 analysis........  480 hours.........  480
 Operation Plans Tier III         5 Glass             1 analysis........  60 hours..........  60
 Trainsets--Addressing Glazing     Manufacturers.     1 written notice..  30 minutes........  1
 Safety and Other Subpart G       5 Glass             1 recert..........  1 second..........  0
 Issues:--End-Facing Document/     Manufacturers.     120 markings......  2 minutes.........  6
 Analysis for Exterior Windows    5 Glass             1 analysis........  10 hours..........  10
 of Tier III Trainsets.            Manufacturers.     240 markings......  2 minutes.........  8
 --30-Day Advance Notice to FRA   5 Glass             1 analysis........  20 hours..........  20
 by glazing manufacturer           Manufacturers.     1, 200 markings...  2 minutes.........  40
 inviting agency representatives  5 Glass             1 alternative       5 hours...........  5
 to witness all tests Tier III     Manufacturers.      standard.
 Passenger Equipment.             5 Glass
 --Glazing Material                Manufacturers.
 Recertification.                 5 Glass
 --Marking of End-facing           Manufacturers.
 exterior windows Tier III        5 Glass
 Trainsets.                        Manufacturers.
 --Cab Glazing; Side Facing       2 railroads.......
 Exterior Window in Tier III
 Cab--document showing
 compliance Type II glaze.
 --Marking of Side-facing
 exterior windows Tier III
 Trainsets.
 --Non-Cab Glazing; Side Facing
 Exterior Window Tier III--
 compliance document Type II
 glaze.
 --Marking of Side-facing
 exterior windows Tier III
 Trainsets Non-cab cars.
 --Alternative standard to FRA
 for side-facing exterior window
 intended to be breakable and
 serve as an emergency window
 exit in accordance with
 railroad's Tier III Safe
 Operation Plan.
238.731--New Requirements--Brake  2 railroads.......  1 analysis/testing  480 hours.........  480
 Systems--RR Analysis and         2 railroads.......  40 stencils/        20 minutes........  13
 testing Tier III trainsets       2 railroads.......   markings.          480 hours.........  480
 maximum safe operating speed.                        1 ITM plan........
 --Tier III trainsets passenger
 brake alarm--legible stenciling/
 marking of devices with words
 ``Passenger Brake Alarm''.
 --Inspection, testing and
 maintenance plan (ITM)--
 Periodic inspection for main
 reservoirs.
238.741--New Requirement -        2 railroads.......  1 plan............  60 hours..........  60
 Emergency window egress and
 rescue plan to FRA for
 passenger cars in Tier III
 trainsets not in compliance
 with sections 238.113 or
 238.114.
238.743--New Requirements--       2 railroads.......  1 analysis/testing  60 hours..........  60
 Emergency Lighting--Tier III
 trainsets--Testing/Analysis.
238.751--New Requirements--       2 railroads.......  1 analysis/testing  200 hours.........  200
 Alerters--Tier III trainsets--
 Testing/Analysis.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    All estimates include the time for reviewing instructions, 
searching existing data sources, gathering or maintaining the needed 
data, and reviewing the information. Under 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), FRA 
solicits comments concerning: (1) Whether these information collection 
requirements are necessary for the proper performance of the functions 
of FRA, including whether the information has practical utility; (2) 
the accuracy of FRA's estimates of the burden of the information 
collection requirements; (3) the quality, utility, and clarity of the

[[Page 88048]]

information to be collected; and (4) whether the burden of collection 
of information on those who are to respond, including through the use 
of automated collection techniques or other forms of information 
technology, may be minimized. For information or a copy of the 
paperwork package submitted to OMB, contact Mr. Robert Brogan, 
Information Clearance Officer, Federal Railroad Administration, at 202-
493-6292, or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Records Management Officer, Federal 
Railroad Administration, at 202-493-6139.
    Organizations and individuals desiring to submit comments on the 
collection of information requirements should direct them to Mr. Robert 
Brogan or Ms. Kimberly Toone, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue SE, 3rd Floor, Washington, DC 20590. Comments may also be 
submitted via email to Mr. Brogan at Robert.Brogan@dot.gov, or to Ms. 
Toone at Kim.Toone@dot.gov.
    OMB is required to make a decision concerning the collection of 
information requirements contained in this proposed rule between 30 and 
60 days after publication of this document in the Federal Register. 
Therefore, a comment to OMB is best assured of having its full effect 
if OMB receives it within 30 days of publication. The final rule will 
respond to any OMB or public comments on the information collection 
requirements contained in this proposal.
    FRA is not authorized to impose a penalty on persons for violating 
information collection requirements which do not display a current OMB 
control number, if required. FRA intends to obtain current OMB control 
numbers for any new information collection requirements resulting from 
this rulemaking action prior to the effective date of the final rule. 
The OMB control number, when assigned, will be announced by separate 
notice in the Federal Register.

D. Federalism Implications

    Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism'' (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), 
requires FRA to develop an accountable process to ensure ``meaningful 
and timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that have federalism implications.'' ``Policies 
that have federalism implications'' are defined in the Executive Order 
to include regulations that have ``substantial direct effects on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government.'' Under Executive Order 13132, the agency 
may not issue a regulation with federalism implications that imposes 
substantial direct compliance costs and that is not required by 
statute, unless the Federal government provides the funds necessary to 
pay the direct compliance costs incurred by State and local 
governments, or the agency consults with State and local government 
officials early in the process of developing the regulation. Where a 
regulation has federalism implications and preempts State law, the 
agency seeks to consult with State and local officials in the process 
of developing the regulation.
    This proposed rule has been analyzed under the principles and 
criteria contained in Executive Order 13132. This proposed rule will 
not have a substantial effect on the States or their political 
subdivisions, and it will not affect the relationships between the 
Federal government and the States or their political subdivisions, or 
the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels 
of government. In addition, FRA has determined that this regulatory 
action will not impose substantial direct compliance costs on the 
States or their political subdivisions. Therefore, the consultation and 
funding requirements of Executive Order 13132 do not apply.
    However, the final rule arising from this rulemaking could have 
preemptive effect by operation of law under certain provisions of the 
Federal railroad safety statutes, specifically the former Federal 
Railroad Safety Act of 1970, repealed and recodified at 49 U.S.C. 
20106, and the former Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act (LIA) at 45 
U.S.C. 22-34, repealed and re-codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701-20703. 
Section 20106 provides that States may not adopt or continue in effect 
any law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety or security 
that covers the subject matter of a regulation prescribed or order 
issued by the Secretary of Transportation (with respect to railroad 
safety matters) or the Secretary of Homeland Security (with respect to 
railroad security matters), except when the State law, regulation, or 
order qualifies under the ``essentially local safety or security 
hazard'' exception to section 20106. Moreover, the former LIA has been 
interpreted by the Supreme Court as preempting the field concerning 
locomotive safety. See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 
(1926).

E. International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-39, 19 U.S.C. 2501 
et seq.) prohibits Federal agencies from engaging in any standards or 
related activities that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. Legitimate domestic objectives, such as 
safety, are not considered unnecessary obstacles. The statute also 
requires consideration of international standards and, where 
appropriate, that they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    FRA has assessed the potential effect of this rulemaking on foreign 
commerce and believes that its proposed requirements are consistent 
with the Trade Agreements Act. The proposed requirements are safety 
standards, which, as noted, are not considered unnecessary obstacles to 
trade. Moreover, FRA has sought, to the extent practicable, to state 
the proposed requirements in terms of the performance desired, rather 
than in more narrow terms restricted to a particular design or system.

F. Environmental Impact

    FRA has evaluated this NPRM in accordance with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA; 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), other 
environmental statutes, related regulatory requirements, and its 
``Procedures for Considering Environmental Impacts'' (FRA's Procedures) 
(64 FR 28545, May 26, 1999). FRA has determined that this NPRM is 
categorically excluded from detailed environmental review pursuant to 
section 4(c)(20) of FRA's Procedures, which concerns the promulgation 
of railroad safety rules and policy statements that do not result in 
significantly increased emissions of air or water pollutants or noise 
or increased traffic congestion in any mode of transportation. See 64 
FR 28547, May 26, 1999. Categorical exclusions (CEs) are actions 
identified in an agency's NEPA implementing procedures that do not 
normally have a significant impact on the environment and therefore do 
not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental 
impact statement (EIS). See 40 CFR 1508.4.
    In analyzing the applicability of a CE, the agency must also 
consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would 
warrant a more detailed environmental review through the preparation of 
an EA or EIS. Id. In accordance with section 4(c) and (e) of FRA's 
Procedures, the agency has further concluded that no extraordinary 
circumstances exist with respect to this proposed regulation that might 
trigger the need for a more detailed environmental review. The purpose 
of

[[Page 88049]]

this rulemaking is to propose amendments to FRA's Passenger Equipment 
Safety Standards. This proposed rulemaking would add safety standards 
to facilitate the safe implementation of high-speed rail at speeds up 
to 220 mph (Tier III). The proposal also would establish 
crashworthiness and occupant protection performance requirements in the 
alternative to those currently specified for passenger trainsets 
operated at speeds up to 125 mph (Tier I). In addition, the proposal 
would increase from 150 mph to 160 mph the maximum speed allowable for 
the tier of railroad passenger equipment currently operated at the 
Nation's highest train speeds (Tier II). FRA does not anticipate any 
environmental impacts from the proposed requirements and finds that 
there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with 
this NPRM.

G. Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)

    Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, and DOT 
Order 5610.2(a) (91 FR 27534, May 10, 2012) require DOT agencies to 
achieve environmental justice as part of their mission by identifying 
and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse 
human health or environmental effects, including interrelated social 
and economic effects, of their programs, policies, and activities on 
minority populations and low-income populations. The DOT Order 
instructs DOT agencies to address compliance with Executive Order 12898 
and requirements within the DOT Order in rulemaking activities, as 
appropriate. FRA has evaluated this proposed rule under Executive Order 
12898 and the DOT Order and has determined that it would not cause 
disproportionately high and adverse human health and environmental 
effects on minority populations or low-income populations.

H. Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)

    FRA has evaluated this proposed rule in accordance with the 
principles and criteria contained in Executive Order 13175, 
Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, dated 
November 6, 2000. The proposed rule would not have a substantial direct 
effect on one or more Indian tribes, would not impose substantial 
direct compliance costs on Indian tribal governments, and would not 
preempt tribal laws. Therefore, the funding and consultation 
requirements of Executive Order 13175 do not apply, and a tribal 
summary impact statement is not required.

I. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    Under section 201 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. 
L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 1531), each Federal agency ``shall, unless otherwise 
prohibited by law, assess the effects of Federal regulatory actions on 
State, local, and tribal governments, and the private sector (other 
than to the extent that such regulations incorporate requirements 
specifically set forth in law).'' Section 202 of the Act (2 U.S.C. 
1532) further requires that ``before promulgating any general notice of 
proposed rulemaking that is likely to result in the promulgation of any 
rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in expenditure 
by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for 
inflation) in any 1 year, and before promulgating any final rule for 
which a general notice of proposed rulemaking was published, the agency 
shall prepare a written statement'' detailing the effect on State, 
local, and tribal governments and the private sector. This proposed 
rule will not result in the expenditure, in the aggregate, of 
$100,000,000 or more (as adjusted annually for inflation) in any one 
year, and thus preparation of such a statement is not required.

J. Energy Impact

    Executive Order 13211 requires Federal agencies to prepare a 
Statement of Energy Effects for any ``significant energy action.'' See 
66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001. Under the Executive Order, a ``significant 
energy action'' is defined as any action by an agency (normally 
published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is expected to 
lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including 
notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices 
of proposed rulemaking: (1)(i) That is a significant regulatory action 
under Executive Order 12866 or any successor order, and (ii) is likely 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy; or (2) that is designated by the Administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs as a significant energy 
action.
    FRA has evaluated this proposed rule in accordance with Executive 
Order 13211. FRA has determined that this proposed rule is not likely 
to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or 
use of energy. Consequently, FRA has determined that this regulatory 
action is not a ``significant energy action'' within the meaning of the 
Executive Order.

K. Privacy Act

    In accordance with 5 U.S.C. 553(c), DOT solicits comments from the 
public to better inform its rulemaking process. DOT posts these 
comments, without edit, including any personal information the 
commenter provides, to www.regulations.gov, as described in the system 
of records notice (DOT/ALL-14 FDMS), which can be reviewed at 
www.dot.gov/privacy.

L. Analysis Under 1 CFR Part 51

    As required by 1 CFR 51.5, FRA has summarized the standards it is 
proposing to incorporate by reference and shown the reasonable 
availability of those standards in the section-by-section analysis of 
this rulemaking document.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 236

    Railroad safety.

49 CFR Part 238

    Incorporation by reference, Passenger equipment, Railroad safety, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

The Proposed Rule

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, FRA proposes to amend 
parts 236 and 238 of chapter II, subtitle B of title 49, Code of 
Federal Regulations as follows:

PART 236--[AMENDED]

0
1. The authority citation for part 236 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 20102-20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20157, 
20301-20303, 20306, 20701-20703, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, 
note; and 49 CFR 1.89.

Subpart I--Positive Train Control Systems


Sec.  236.1007   [Amended]

0
2. In Sec.  236.1007, remove paragraph (d), and redesignate paragraph 
(e) as paragraph (d).

PART 238--[AMENDED]

Subpart A--General

0
3. The authority citation for part 238 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 20103, 20107, 20133, 20141, 20302-20303, 
20306, 20701-20702, 21301-21302, 21304; 28 U.S.C. 2461, note; and 49 
CFR 1.89.

0
4. Section 238.5 is amended by revising the definitions of ``glazing, 
end-

[[Page 88050]]

facing'', ``glazing, side-facing'', ``Tier II'', and ``Train, Tier II 
passenger'', and adding in alphabetical order definitions of 
``Associate Administrator'', ``Cab'', ``Tier III'', ``Trainset, Tier I 
alternative passenger'', ``Trainset, Tier III'', and ``Trainset unit'' 
to read as follows:


Sec.  238.5  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Associate Administrator means Associate Administrator for Railroad 
Safety and Chief Safety Officer, Associate Administrator for Railroad 
Safety, Associate Administrator for Safety.
* * * * *
    Cab means, for the purposes of subpart H of this part, a 
compartment or space in a trainset designed to be occupied by the 
engineer and contain an operating console from which the engineer 
exercises control over the trainset. This term includes a locomotive 
cab.
* * * * *
    Glazing, end-facing means any exterior glazing located where a line 
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal 
angle of 50 degrees or less with the centerline of the vehicle in which 
the glazing material is installed, except for: The coupled ends of 
multiple-unit (MU) locomotives or other equipment semi-permanently 
connected to each other in a train consist; and end doors of passenger 
cars at locations other than the cab end of a cab car or MU locomotive. 
Any location which, due to curvature of the glazing material, can meet 
the criteria for either an end-facing glazing location or a side-facing 
glazing location shall be considered an end-facing glazing location.
* * * * *
    Glazing, side-facing means any glazing located where a line 
perpendicular to the plane of the glazing material makes a horizontal 
angle of more than 50 degrees with the centerline of the vehicle in 
which the glazing material is installed. Side-facing glazing also means 
glazing located at the coupled ends of MU locomotives or other 
equipment semi-permanently connected to each other in a train consist 
and glazing located at end doors other than at the cab end of a cab car 
or MU locomotive.
* * * * *
    Tier II means operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not 
exceeding 160 mph.
    Tier III means operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not 
exceeding 125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade 
crossings at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.
* * * * *
    Train, Tier II passenger means a short-distance or long-distance 
intercity passenger train providing service at speeds exceeding 125 mph 
but not exceeding 160 mph.
* * * * *
    Trainset, Tier I alternative passenger means a trainset consisting 
of Tier I passenger equipment designed under the requirements of 
appendix G to this part.
    Trainset, Tier III means an intercity passenger train that provides 
service in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 125 mph and in 
an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds exceeding 
125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.
    Trainset unit means a trainset segment located between connecting 
arrangements (articulations).
* * * * *
0
5. In Sec.  238.21 revise paragraphs (c)(2) and (d)(2) to read as 
follows:


Sec.  238.21  Special approval procedure.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (2) The elements prescribed in Sec. Sec.  238.201(b)(1), 
238.229(j)(2), and 238.230(d); and
* * * * *
    (d) * * *
    (2) Each petition for special approval of the pre-revenue service 
acceptance testing plan shall be submitted to the Associate 
Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE., Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590.

Subpart B--Safety Planning and General Requirements

0
6. In Sec.  238.111 revise paragraphs (b)(2), (4), (5), and (7), and 
(c) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.111  Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan.

* * * * *
    (b) * * *
    (2) Submit a copy of the plan to FRA at least 30 days before 
testing the equipment and include with that submission notification of 
the times and places of the pre-revenue service tests to permit FRA 
observation of such tests. For Tier II and Tier III passenger 
equipment, the railroad shall obtain FRA approval of the plan under the 
procedures specified in Sec.  238.21.
* * * * *
    (4) Document in writing the results of the tests. For Tier II and 
Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall report the results of 
the tests to the Associate Administrator at least 90 days prior to its 
intended operation of the equipment in revenue service.
    (5) Correct any safety deficiencies identified in the design of the 
equipment or in the ITM procedures uncovered during testing. If safety 
deficiencies cannot be corrected by design changes, the railroad shall 
impose operational limitations on the revenue service operation of the 
equipment designed to ensure the equipment can operate safely. For Tier 
II and Tier III passenger equipment, the railroad shall comply with any 
operational limitations the Associate Administrator imposes on the 
revenue service operation of the equipment for cause stated following 
FRA review of the results of the test program. This section does not 
restrict a railroad from petitioning FRA for a waiver of a safety 
regulation under the procedures specified in part 211 of this chapter.
* * * * *
    (7) For Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment, obtain approval 
from the Associate Administrator before placing the equipment in 
revenue service. The Associate Administrator will grant such approval 
if the railroad demonstrates compliance with the applicable 
requirements of this part.
    (c) If a railroad plans a major upgrade or introduction of new 
technology to Tier II or Tier III passenger equipment that has been 
used in revenue service in the United States and that affects a safety 
system on such equipment, the railroad shall follow the procedures in 
paragraph (b) of this section before placing the equipment in revenue 
service with the major upgrade or introduction of new technology.
* * * * *

Subpart C--Specific Requirements for Tier I Passenger Equipment

0
7. In Sec.  238.201, redesignate paragraph (b) as (b)(1), revise the 
first sentence of newly redesignated (b)(1), and add paragraph (b)(2) 
to read as follows:


Sec.  238.201  Scope/alternative compliance.

* * * * *
    (b)(1) Passenger equipment of special design shall be deemed to 
comply with this subpart, other than Sec.  238.203, for the service 
environment the petitioner proposes to operate the equipment in if the 
Associate Administrator determines under paragraph (c) of this section 
that the equipment provides at least an equivalent level of safety in 
such environment for the protection of its occupants from serious 
injury in the case of a derailment or collision. * * *

[[Page 88051]]

    (2)(i) Tier I passenger trainsets may comply with the alternative 
crashworthiness and occupant protection requirements in appendix G to 
this part instead of the requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.203, 238.205, 
238.207, 238.209(a), 238.211, 238.213, and 238.219.
    (ii) To assess compliance with the alternative requirements, the 
railroad shall submit the following documents to the Associate 
Administrator, for review:
    (A) Test plans, and supporting documentation for all tests intended 
to demonstrate compliance with the alternative requirements and to 
validate any computer modeling and analysis used, including notice of 
such tests, 30 days before commencing the tests; and
    (B) A carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection compliance 
report based on the analysis, calculations, and test data necessary to 
demonstrate compliance.
    (iii) The carbody crashworthiness and occupant protection 
compliance report shall be deemed acceptable unless the Associate 
Administrator stays action by written notice to the railroad within 60 
days after receipt of those submissions.
    (A) If the Associate Administrator stays action, the railroad shall 
correct any deficiencies FRA identified and notify FRA it has corrected 
the deficiencies before placing the subject equipment into service.
    (B) FRA may also impose written conditions necessary for safely 
operating the equipment, for cause stated.
* * * * *
0
8. Revise Sec.  238.203(a)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.203  Static end strength.

    (a)(1) Except as further specified in this paragraph, paragraph (d) 
of this section, and Sec.  238.201(b)(2), on or after November 8, 1999, 
all passenger equipment shall resist a minimum static end load of 
800,000 pounds applied on the line of draft without permanent 
deformation of the body structure.
* * * * *
0
9. Revise the first sentence of Sec.  238.205(a) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.205  Anti-climbing mechanism.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, and Sec.  
238.201(b), all passenger equipment placed in service for the first 
time on or after September 8, 2000, and prior to March 9, 2010, shall 
have at both the forward and rear ends an anti-climbing mechanism 
capable of resisting an upward or downward vertical force of 100,000 
pounds without failure. * * *
* * * * *
0
10. Revise Sec.  238.207 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.207   Link between coupling mechanism and carbody.

    Except as specified in Sec.  238.201(b), all passenger equipment 
placed in service for the first time on or after September 8, 2000, 
shall have a coupler carrier at each end designed to resist a vertical 
downward thrust from the coupler shank of 100,000 pounds for any normal 
horizontal position of the coupler, without permanent deformation. 
Passenger equipment connected by articulated joints that complies with 
the requirements of Sec.  238.205(a) also complies with the 
requirements of this section.
0
11. Amend Sec.  238.209 by adding paragraph (a) introductory text to 
read as follows:


Sec.  238.209   Forward end structure of locomotives, including cab 
cars and MU locomotives.

    (a) Except as specified in Sec.  238.201(b)--
* * * * *
0
12. Revise Sec.  238.211(a) introductory text to read as follows:


Sec.  238.211   Collision posts.

    (a) Except as further specified in this paragraph, paragraphs (b) 
through (d) of this section, Sec.  238.201(b), and Sec.  238.209(b)--
* * * * *
0
13. Revise Sec.  238.213(a)(1) to read as follows:


Sec.  238.213   Corner posts.

    (a)(1) Except as further specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of 
this section, Sec.  238.201(b), and Sec.  238.209(b), each passenger 
car shall have at each end of the car, placed ahead of the occupied 
volume, two full-height corner posts, each capable of resisting 
together with its supporting car body structure:
* * * * *
0
14. Revise the first sentence of Sec.  238.219 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.219   Truck-to-car-body attachment.

    Except as provided in Sec.  238.201(b), passenger equipment shall 
have a truck-to-carbody attachment with an ultimate strength sufficient 
to resist without failure the following individually applied loads: 2g 
vertically on the mass of the truck; and 250,000 pounds in any 
horizontal direction on the truck, along with the resulting vertical 
reaction to this load. * * *

Subpart E--Specific Requirements for Tier II Passenger Equipment

0
15. Revise the first sentence of Sec.  238.401 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.401   Scope.

    This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger 
equipment operating at speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 
mph. * * *

Subpart F--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for 
Tier II Passenger Equipment

0
16. Revise Sec.  238.501 to read as follows:


Sec.  238.501   Scope.

    This subpart contains inspection, testing, and maintenance 
requirements for railroad passenger equipment that operates at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 160 mph.
0
17. Add subpart H to part 238 to read as follows:

Subpart H--Specific Requirements for Tier III Passenger Equipment

Sec.
238.701 Scope.

Trainset Structure

238.703 Quasi-static compression load requirements.
238.705 Dynamic collision scenario.
238.707 Override protection.
238.709 Fluid entry inhibition.
238.711 End structure integrity of cab end.
238.713 End structure integrity of non-cab end.
238.715 Roof and side structure integrity.
238.717 Truck-to-carbody attachment.

Glazing

238.721 Glazing.

Brake System

238.731 Brake system.

Interior Fittings and Surfaces

238.733 Interior fixture attachment.
238.735 Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew).
238.737 Luggage racks.

Emergency Systems

238.741 Emergency window egress and rescue access.
238.743 Emergency lighting.

Cab Equipment

238.751 Alerters.
238.753 Sanders.

Figure 1 to Subpart H of Part 238--Cylindrical Projectile for Use in 
Sec.  238.721 End-Facing Cab-Glazing Testing


Sec.  238.701   Scope.

    This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger 
equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 
125 mph

[[Page 88052]]

and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at speeds 
exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph. Passenger seating is 
permitted in the leading unit of a Tier III trainset, if safety issues 
associated with passengers occupying the leading unit are addressed and 
mitigated through a comprehensive Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment. Demonstration of compliance with the requirements 
of this subpart is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.  
238.111.

Trainset Structure


Sec.  238.703   Quasi-static compression load requirements.

    (a) General. To demonstrate resistance to loss of occupied volume, 
Tier III trainsets shall comply with both the quasi-static compression 
load requirements in paragraph (b) of this section and the dynamic 
collision requirements in Sec.  238.705.
    (b) Quasi-static compression load requirements. (1) Each individual 
vehicle in a Tier III trainset shall resist a minimum quasi-static end 
load applied on the collision load path of:
    (i) 800,000 pounds without permanent deformation of the occupied 
volume; or
    (ii) 1,000,000 pounds without exceeding either of the following two 
conditions:
    (A) Local plastic strains no greater than 5 percent; and
    (B) Vehicle shortening no greater than 1 percent over any 15-foot 
length of the occupied volume; or
    (iii) 1,200,000 pounds without crippling the body structure. 
Crippling of the body structure is defined as reaching the maximum 
point on the load-versus-displacement characteristic.
    (2) To demonstrate compliance with this section, each type of 
vehicle shall be subjected to an end compression load (buff) test with 
an end load magnitude no less than 337,000 lbf (1500 kN).
    (3) Compliance with the requirements of paragraph (b) of this 
section shall be documented and submitted to FRA for review and 
approval.


Sec.  238.705   Dynamic collision scenario.

    (a) General. In addition to the requirements of Sec.  238.703, 
occupied volume integrity (OVI) shall also be demonstrated for each 
individual vehicle in a Tier III trainset through an evaluation of a 
dynamic collision scenario in which a moving train impacts a standing 
train under the following conditions:
    (1) The initially-moving train is made up of the equipment 
undergoing evaluation at its AW0 ready-to-run weight;
    (2) If trains of varying consist lengths are intended for use in 
service, then the shortest and longest consist lengths shall be 
evaluated;
    (3) If the initially-moving train is intended for use in push-pull 
service, then, as applicable, both the configurations as led by a 
locomotive and as led by a cab car shall be evaluated separately;
    (4) The initially-standing train is led by a rigid (conventional) 
locomotive and also made up of five identical passenger coaches having 
the following characteristics:
    (i) The locomotive weighs 260,000 pounds and each coach weighs 
95,000 pounds;
    (ii) The locomotive and each passenger coach crush in response to 
applied force as specified in Table 1 to this section; and
    (iii) The locomotive shall be modeled using the data inputs listed 
in appendix H to this part so that it has a geometric design as 
depicted in Figure 1 to appendix H to this part;
    (5) The scenario shall be evaluated on tangent, level track;
    (6) The initially-moving train shall have an initial velocity of 20 
mph if the consist is led by a cab car or MU locomotive, or an initial 
velocity of 25 mph if the consist is led by a conventional locomotive;
    (7) The coupler knuckles on the colliding equipment shall be closed 
and centered;
    (8) The initially-moving and initially-standing train consists are 
not braked;
    (9) The initially-standing train has only one degree-of-freedom 
(longitudinal displacement); and
    (10) The model used to demonstrate compliance with the dynamic 
collision requirements must be validated. Model validation shall be 
documented and submitted to FRA for review and approval.
    (b) Dynamic collision requirements. As a result of the impact 
described in paragraph (a) of this section--
    (1) One of the following two conditions must be met for the 
occupied volume of the initially-moving train:
    (i) There shall be no more than 10 inches of longitudinal permanent 
deformation; or
    (ii) Global vehicle shortening shall not exceed 1 percent over any 
15-foot length of occupied volume.
    (2) If Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
December 2010, is used to demonstrate compliance with any of the 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.733, 238.735, 238.737, or 238.743, then 
the average longitudinal deceleration of the center of gravity (CG) of 
each vehicle in the initially-moving train during the dynamic collision 
scenario shall not exceed 5g during any 100-millisecond (ms) time 
period.
    (3) Compliance with each of the following conditions shall also be 
demonstrated for the cab of the initially-moving train after the 
impact:
    (i) For each seat provided for an employee in the cab, and any 
floor-mounted seat in the cab, a survival space shall be maintained 
where there is no intrusion for a minimum of 12 inches from each edge 
of the seat. Walls or other items originally within this defined space, 
not including the operating console, shall not further intrude more 
than 1.5 inches towards the seat under evaluation;
    (ii) There shall be a clear exit path for the occupants of the cab;
    (iii) The vertical height of the cab (floor to ceiling) shall not 
be reduced by more than 20 percent; and
    (iv) The operating console shall not have moved closer to the 
engineer's seat by more than 2 inches; if the engineer's seat is part 
of a set of adjacent seats, the requirements of this paragraph apply to 
both seats.

    Table 1--Force-Versus-Crush Relationships for Passenger Coach and
                         Conventional Locomotive
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Crush      Force
                      Vehicle                         (in)       (lbf)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passenger Coach...................................       0             0
                                                         3        80,000
                                                         6     2,500,000
Conventional Locomotive...........................       0             0
                                                         2.5     100,000
                                                         5     2,500,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec.  238.707   Override protection.

    (a) Colliding equipment. (1) Using the dynamic collision scenario 
described in Sec.  238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall be 
evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions:
    (i) All vehicles in the initially-moving and initially-standing 
train consists are positioned at their nominal running heights; and
    (ii) The lead vehicle of the initially-moving train shall be 
perturbed laterally and vertically by 3 inches at the colliding 
interface.
    (2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph 
(a)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall 
be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:

[[Page 88053]]

    (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of 
the colliding equipment in the initially-moving and initially-standing 
train consists shall not change by more than 4 inches; and
    (ii) The tread of any wheel of the first vehicle of the initially-
moving train shall not rise above the top of the rail by more than 4 
inches
    (b) Connected equipment override. (1) Using the dynamic collision 
scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a), anti-climbing performance shall 
be evaluated for each of the following sets of initial conditions:
    (i) All vehicles in the initially-moving and initially-standing 
train consists are positioned at their nominal running heights; and
    (ii) One vehicle is perturbed laterally and vertically by 2 inches, 
relative to the adjacent vehicle, at the first vehicle-to-vehicle 
interface in the initially-moving train.
    (2) For each set of initial conditions specified in paragraph 
(b)(1) of this section, compliance with the following conditions shall 
be demonstrated after a dynamic impact:
    (i) The relative difference in elevation between the underframes of 
the connected equipment in the initially-moving train shall not change 
by more than 4 inches; and
    (ii) The tread of any wheel of the initially-moving train shall not 
rise above the top of rail by more than 4 inches.


Sec.  238.709   Fluid entry inhibition.

    (a) The skin covering the forward-facing end of a Tier III trainset 
shall be--
    (1) Equivalent to a \1/2\-inch steel plate with yield strength of 
25,000 pounds per square inch. Material of higher yield strength may be 
used to decrease the required thickness of the material provided at 
least an equivalent level of strength is maintained. The sum of the 
thicknesses of elements (e.g., skin and structural elements) from the 
structural leading edge of the trainset to a point, when projected onto 
a vertical plane, just forward of the engineer's normal operating 
position, may also be used to satisfy this requirement;
    (2) Designed to inhibit the entry of fluids into the cab; and
    (3) Affixed to the collision posts or other main structural members 
of the forward end structure so as to add to the strength of the end 
structure.
    (b) Information used to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements of this section shall at a minimum include a list and 
drawings of the structural elements considered in satisfying the 
requirement of this section, and calculations showing that the 
thickness-strength requirement is satisfied.


Sec.  238.711   End structure integrity of cab end.

    The cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the 
requirements of appendix F to this part to demonstrate the integrity of 
the end structure. For those units of Tier III trainsets without 
identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix F 
apply to the end structure at each location specified, regardless of 
whether the structure is a post.


Sec.  238.713   End structure integrity of non-cab end.

    (a) General. Tier III trainsets shall comply with the requirements 
in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section to demonstrate the integrity 
of the end structure for other than the cab ends.
    (b) Collision post requirements. (1) Each unit of a Tier III 
trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the unit either:
    (i) Two full-height collision posts, located at approximately the 
one-third points laterally. Each collision post shall have an ultimate 
longitudinal shear strength of not less than 300,000 pounds at a point 
even with the top of the underframe member to which it is attached. If 
reinforcement is used to provide the shear value, the reinforcement 
shall have full value for a distance of 18 inches up from the 
underframe connection and then taper to a point approximately 30 inches 
above the underframe connection; or
    (ii) An equivalent end structure that can withstand the sum of 
forces that each collision post in paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this section 
is required to withstand. For analysis purposes, the required forces 
may be assumed to be evenly distributed at the locations where the 
equivalent structure attaches to the underframe.
    (2) Collision posts are not required for the non-cab ends of any 
unit with push-back couplers and interlocking anti-climbing mechanisms 
in a Tier III trainset, or the non-cab ends of a semi-permanently 
coupled consist of trainset units, if the inter-car connection is 
capable of preventing disengagement and telescoping to the same extent 
as equipment satisfying the anti-climbing and collision post 
requirements in subpart C of this part. For demonstrating that the 
inter-car connection is capable of preventing such disengagement (and 
telescoping), the criteria in Sec.  238.707(b) apply.
    (c) Corner post requirements. (1) Each passenger car in a Tier III 
trainset shall have at each non-cab end of the car, placed ahead of the 
occupied volume, two side structures capable of resisting a:
    (i) 150,000-pound horizontal force applied at floor height without 
failure;
    (ii) 20,000-pound horizontal force applied at roof height without 
failure; and
    (iii) 30,000-pound horizontal force applied at a point 18 inches 
above the top of the floor without permanent deformation.
    (2) For purposes of this paragraph, the orientation of the applied 
horizontal forces shall range from longitudinal inward to transverse 
inward.
    (3) For each evaluation load, the load shall be applied to an area 
of the structure sufficient to not locally cripple or punch through the 
material.
    (4) The load area shall be chosen to be appropriate for the 
particular car design and shall not exceed 10 inches by 10 inches.


Sec.  238.715   Roof and side structure integrity.

    To demonstrate roof and side structure integrity, Tier III 
trainsets shall comply with the requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.215 and 
238.217.


Sec.  238.717   Truck-to-carbody attachment.

    To demonstrate the integrity of truck-to-carbody attachments, each 
unit in a Tier III trainset shall:
    (a) Comply with the requirements of Sec.  238.219; or
    (b) Have a truck-to-carbody attachment with strength sufficient to 
resist, without yielding, the following individually applied, quasi-
static loads on the mass of the truck at its CG:
    (1) 3g vertically downward;
    (2) 1g laterally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to 
this load; and
    (3) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, 5g 
longitudinally, along with the resulting vertical reaction to this 
load, provided that for the conditions in the dynamic collision 
scenario described in Sec.  238.705(a):
    (i) The average longitudinal deceleration at the CG of the 
equipment during the impact does not exceed 5g; and
    (ii) The peak longitudinal deceleration of the truck during the 
impact does not exceed 10g.
    (c) As an alternative to demonstrating compliance with paragraph 
(b)(3) of this section, the truck shall be shown to remain attached 
after a dynamic impact under the conditions in the collision scenario 
described in Sec.  238.705(a).
    (d) For purposes of paragraph (b) of this section, the mass of the 
truck includes axles, wheels, bearings, truck-

[[Page 88054]]

mounted brake system, suspension system components, and any other 
component attached to the truck by design.
    (e) Truck attachment shall be demonstrated using a validated model.

Glazing


Sec.  238.721   Glazing.

    (a) General. Glazing safety issues associated with operating in a 
Tier III environment shall be identified and addressed through a 
comprehensive analysis in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier 
III Passenger Equipment that considers right-of-way access control, 
intrusion detection, and safety devices to contain thrown or dropped 
objects.
    (b) Cab glazing; end-facing. (1) Each end-facing exterior window in 
a cab of a Tier III trainset shall comply with the requirements for 
Type I glazing in appendix A to part 223 of this chapter, except as 
provided in paragraphs (b)(2) through (4) of this section.
    (2) Instead of the large object impact test specified in appendix A 
to part 223, each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall demonstrate 
compliance with the following requirements of this paragraph:
    (i) The glazing article shall be impacted with a cylindrical 
projectile that complies with the following design specifications as 
depicted in Figure 1 to this subpart:
    (A) The projectile shall be constructed of aluminum alloy such as 
ISO 6362-2:1990, grade 2017A, or its demonstrated equivalent;
    (B) The projectile end cap shall be made of steel;
    (C) The projectile assembly shall weigh 2.2 lbs (-0, +0.044 lbs) or 
1 kilogram (kg) (-0, +0.020 kg) and shall have a hemispherical tip. 
Material may be removed from the interior of the aluminum portion to 
adjust the projectile mass according to the prescribed tolerance. The 
hemispherical tip shall have a milled surface with 0.04 inch (1 mm) 
grooves; and
    (D) The projectile shall have an overall diameter of 3.7 inches (94 
mm) with a nominal internal diameter of 2.76 inches (70 mm).
    (ii) The test of the glazing article shall be deemed satisfactory 
if the test projectile does not penetrate the windscreen, the 
windscreen remains in its frame, and the witness plate is not marked by 
spall.
    (iii) A new projectile shall be used for each test.
    (iv) The glazing article to be tested shall be that which has the 
smallest area for each design type. For the test, the glazing article 
shall be fixed in a frame of the same construction as that mounted on 
the vehicle.
    (v) A minimum of four tests shall be conducted and all must be 
deemed satisfactory. Two tests shall be conducted with the complete 
glazing article at 32 [deg]F; 9 [deg]F (0 [deg]C  5 [deg]C) and two tests shall be conducted with the complete 
glazing article at 68 [deg]F  9 [deg]F (20 [deg]C  5 [deg]C). For the tests to be valid they shall demonstrate that 
the core temperature of the complete glazing article during each test 
is within the required temperature range.
    (vi) The test glazing article shall be mounted at the same angle 
relative to the projectile path as it will be to the direction of 
travel when mounted on the vehicle.
    (vii) The projectile's impact velocity shall equal the maximum 
operating speed of the Tier III trainset plus 100 mph (160 km/h). The 
projectile velocity shall be measured within 13 feet (4 m) of the point 
of impact.
    (viii) The point of impact shall be at the geometrical center of 
the glazing article.
    (3) Representative samples for large object impact testing of large 
Tier III end-facing cab glazing articles may be used instead of the 
actual design size provided that the following conditions are met:
    (i) Testing of glazing articles having dimensions greater than 39.4 
by 27.6 inches (1,000 mm by 700 mm), excluding framing, may be 
performed using a flat sample having the same composition as the 
glazing article for which compliance is to be demonstrated. The glazing 
manufacturer shall provide documentation containing its technical 
justification that testing a flat sample is sufficient to verify 
compliance of the glazing article with the requirements of this 
paragraph.
    (ii) Flat sample testing is permitted only when no surface of the 
full size glazing article contains curvature with a radius less than 98 
inches (2,500 mm), and when a complete, finished glazing article is 
laid (convex side uppermost) on a flat horizontal surface, the 
distance, (measured perpendicularly to the flat surface) between the 
flat surface and the inside face of the glazing article is not greater 
than 8 inches (200 mm).
    (4) End-facing glazing shall demonstrate sufficient resistance to 
spalling, as verified by the large impact projectile test under the 
following conditions:
    (i) An annealed aluminum witness plate of maximum thickness 0.006 
inches (0.15 mm) and of dimension 19.7 by 19.7 inches (500 mm by 500 
mm) is placed vertically behind the sample under test, at a horizontal 
distance of 500 mm from the point of impact in the direction of travel 
of the projectile or the distance between the point of impact of the 
projectile and the location of the engineer's eyes in the engineer's 
normal operating position, whichever is less. The center of the witness 
plate is aligned with the point of impact.
    (ii) Spalling performance shall be deemed satisfactory if the 
aluminum witness plate is not marked.
    (iii) For the purposes of this part, materials used specifically to 
protect the cab occupants from spall (i.e., spall shields) shall not be 
required to meet the flammability and smoke emission performance 
requirements of appendix B to this part.
    (5) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall provide 
ballistic penetration resistance sufficient to protect cab occupants 
from risks and hazards identified by the railroad as part of its Safe 
Operation Plan for Tier III Equipment. This protection shall, at a 
minimum, meet the requirements of part 223, appendix A.
    (6) Tests performed on glazing materials for demonstration of 
compliance with this section shall be certified by either:
    (i) An independent third-party (laboratory, facility, underwriter); 
or
    (ii) The glazing manufacturer, by providing FRA the opportunity to 
witness all tests by written notice at least 30 days prior to testing.
    (7) Any glazing material certified to meet the requirements of this 
section shall be re-certified by the same means (as originally 
certified) if any changes are made to the glazing that may affect its 
mechanical properties or its mounting arrangement on the vehicle.
    (8) All certification/re-certification documentation shall be made 
available to FRA upon request.
    (9) Each end-facing exterior window in a cab shall be permanently 
marked, before installation, in such a manner that the marking is 
clearly visible after the material has been installed. The marking 
shall include:
    (i) The words ``FRA TYPE IHS'' to indicate that the material has 
successfully passed the testing requirements specified in this 
paragraph (b);
    (ii) The name of the manufacturer; and
    (iii) The type or brand identification of the material.
    (c) Cab glazing; side-facing. Each side-facing exterior window in a 
cab of a Tier III trainset shall--
    (1) Comply with the requirements for Type II glazing contained in 
appendix A

[[Page 88055]]

to part 223 of this chapter, for large-object impact; and
    (2) Maintain the minimum ballistics penetration resistance as 
required for end-facing glazing in paragraph (b)(5) of this section.
    (d) Non-cab glazing; side-facing.
    (1) Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, each 
side-facing exterior window in other than a cab shall comply with the 
requirements for Type II glazing contained in appendix A to part 223 of 
this chapter.
    (2) Instead of the requirements specified in paragraph (d)(1) of 
this section, a side-facing exterior window intended to be breakable 
and serve as an emergency window exit under the railroad's Tier III 
Safe Operation Plan may comply with an alternative standard that 
provides an equivalent level of safety and is approved for use by FRA.
    (e) Glazing securement. Each exterior window shall remain in place 
when subjected to:
    (1) The forces due to air pressure differences caused when two 
trains pass at the minimum separation for two adjacent tracks, while 
traveling in opposite directions, each train traveling at the maximum 
authorized speed; and
    (2) The impact forces that the exterior window is required to 
resist as specified in this section.

Brake System


Sec.  238.731   Brake system.

    (a) General. Each railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and 
testing the maximum safe operating speed for its Tier III trainsets 
that results in no thermal damage to equipment or infrastructure during 
normal operation of the brake system.
    (b) Minimum performance requirement for brake system. Each Tier III 
trainset's brake system shall be capable of stopping the trainset from 
its maximum operating speed within the signal spacing existing on the 
track over which the trainset is operating under the worst-case 
adhesion conditions defined in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment.
    (c) Emergency brake system. A Tier III trainset shall be provided 
with an emergency brake application feature that produces an 
irretrievable stop. An emergency brake application shall be available 
at any time, and shall be initiated by either of the following:
    (1) An unintentional parting of the trainset; or
    (2) The train crew at locations specified in the railroad's Safe 
Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment.
    (d) Passenger brake alarm. (1) A means to initiate a passenger 
brake alarm shall be provided at two locations in each unit of a Tier 
III trainset that is over 45 feet in length. When a unit of the 
trainset is 45 feet or less in length, a means to initiate a passenger 
brake alarm need only be provided at one location in the unit. These 
locations shall be identified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment. The words ``Passenger Brake Alarm'' shall 
be legibly stenciled or marked on each device or on an adjacent badge 
plate.
    (2) All passenger brake alarms shall be installed so as to prevent 
accidental activation.
    (3) During departure from the boarding platform, activation of the 
passenger brake alarm shall result in an emergency brake application.
    (4) A passenger brake alarm activation that occurs after the 
trainset has safely cleared the boarding platform shall be acknowledged 
by the engineer within the time period specified in the railroad's Safe 
Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment for train operation to 
remain under the full control of the engineer. The method used to 
confirm that the trainset has safely cleared the boarding platform 
shall be defined in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment.
    (5) If the engineer does not acknowledge the passenger brake alarm 
as specified in paragraph (d)(4) of this section, at a minimum, a 
retrievable full service brake application shall be automatically 
initiated until the trainset has stopped unless the engineer intervenes 
as described in paragraph (d)(6) of this section.
    (6) To retrieve the full service brake application described in 
paragraph (d)(5) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the 
passenger brake alarm and activate appropriate controls to issue a 
command for brake application as specified in the railroad's Safe 
Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment.
    (e) Degraded performance of blended brake system. The following 
requirements of this paragraph (e) apply to operation of Tier III 
trainsets with blended braking systems to address degraded brake system 
performance:
    (1) Loss of power or failure of the dynamic or regenerative brake 
shall not result in exceeding the allowable stopping distance defined 
in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment;
    (2) The available friction braking shall be adequate to stop the 
trainset safely under the operating conditions defined in the 
railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment;
    (3) The operational status of the trainset brake system shall be 
displayed for the engineer in the operating cab; and
    (4) The railroad shall demonstrate through analysis and testing the 
maximum speed for safely operating its Tier III trainsets using only 
the friction brake portion of the blended brake with no thermal damage 
to equipment or infrastructure.
    (f) Main reservoir system. (1) The main reservoirs in a Tier III 
trainset shall be designed and tested to meet the requirements of a 
recognized standard specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment, such as the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for Unfired 
Pressure Vessel Section VIII, Division I (ASME Code). The working 
pressure shall be 150 psig (10.3 bar) and the corresponding rated 
temperature shall be 150[emsp14][deg]F (65 [deg]C) unless otherwise 
defined in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment. Reservoirs shall be certified based on their size and volume 
requirements.
    (2) Each welded steel main reservoir shall be drilled in accordance 
with the requirements of a recognized standard specified in the 
railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment, such 
as paragraph UG-25(e) of Section VIII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure 
Vessel Code. With the drain opening located at the low point of the 
reservoir, one row of holes shall be drilled lengthwise on the 
reservoir on a line intersecting the drain opening and sloped to the 
drain opening.
    (3) A breach of a welded steel main reservoir at any of the drilled 
holes described in paragraph (f)(2) of this section shall be cause for 
the reservoir to be condemned and withdrawn from service. Any type of 
welded repair to a steel main reservoir is prohibited.
    (g) Aluminum main reservoirs. (1) Aluminum main reservoirs used in 
a Tier III trainset shall conform to the requirements of Sec.  229.51 
of this chapter.
    (2) Any type of welded repair to an aluminum main reservoir is 
prohibited.
    (h) Main reservoir tests. Prior to initial installation, each main 
reservoir shall be subjected to a pneumatic or hydrostatic pressure 
test based on the maximum working pressure defined in paragraph (f) or 
(g) of this section, as appropriate, unless otherwise established by 
the railroad's inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) plan. Records 
of the test date, location, and pressure shall be maintained by the 
railroad for the life of the equipment. Periodic inspection

[[Page 88056]]

requirements for main reservoirs shall be defined in the railroad's ITM 
plan.
    (i) Brake gauges. All mechanical gauges and all devices providing 
electronic indication of air pressure that are used by the engineer to 
aid in the control or braking of a Tier III trainset shall be located 
so they may be conveniently read from the engineer's normal position 
during operation of the trainset.
    (j) Brake application/release. (1) Brake actuators shall be 
designed to provide brake pad and shoe clearance when the brakes are 
released.
    (2) The minimum brake cylinder pressure shall be established to 
provide adequate adjustment from minimum service to full service for 
proper train operation. The brake cylinder pressure shall be approved 
as part of the design review process described in the railroad's Safe 
Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment.
    (k) Foundation brake gear. The railroad shall specify requirements 
in its ITM plan for the inspection, testing, and maintenance of the 
foundation brake gear.
    (l) Leakage. (1) If a Tier III trainset is equipped with a brake 
pipe, the leakage rates shall not exceed the limits defined in either 
paragraph (l)(2) of this section, or those defined in the Air 
Consumption Analysis included in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment, whichever is more restrictive. The method 
of inspection for main reservoir pipe leakage shall be prescribed in 
the railroad's ITM plan.
    (2) Brake pipe leakage may not exceed 5 p.s.i. per minute; and with 
a full service application at maximum brake pipe pressure and with 
communication to the brake cylinders closed, the brakes shall remain 
applied for at least 5 minutes.
    (m) Slide protection and alarm. (1) A Tier III trainset shall be 
equipped with an adhesion control system designed to automatically 
adjust the braking force on each wheel to prevent sliding during 
braking.
    (2) A wheel-slide alarm that is visual or audible, or both, shall 
alert the engineer in the operating cab to wheel-slide conditions on 
any axle of the trainset.
    (3) If this system fails to prevent wheel slide within preset 
parameters specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment, then operating restrictions for a trainset with 
slide protection devices that are not functioning as intended shall be 
specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment.
    (n) Monitoring and diagnostics. Each Tier III trainset shall be 
equipped with a monitoring and diagnostic system that is designed to 
automatically assess the functionality of the brake system for the 
entire trainset. Details of the system operation and the method of 
communication of brake system functionality prior to the departure of 
the trainset and while en route shall be described in detail in the 
railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger Equipment.
    (o) Train securement. Independent of the pneumatic brakes, Tier III 
equipment shall be equipped with a means of securing the equipment 
against unintentional movement when unattended (as defined in Sec.  
238.231(h)(4)). The railroad shall specify in its Safe Operation Plan 
for Tier III Passenger Equipment the procedures used to secure the 
equipment and shall also demonstrate that those procedures effectively 
secure the equipment on all grade conditions identified by the 
railroad.
    (p) Rescue operation; brake system. A Tier III trainset's brake 
system shall be designed to allow a rescue vehicle or trainset to 
control its brakes when the trainset is disabled.

Interior Fittings and Surfaces


Sec.  238.733   Interior fixture attachment.

    (a) Tier III trainsets shall comply with the interior fixture 
attachment requirements referenced in either of the following 
paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-006-98.
    (2) Section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and 
features,'' of GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Interior fixture attachment strength is based on a minimum of 
5g longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical acceleration resistance; 
and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out in accordance with any 
conditions identified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier 
III Passenger Equipment, as approved by FRA.
    (b) The standards required in this section are incorporated by 
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad 
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 
DC and is available from the sources indicated below. It is also 
available for inspection at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
    (1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW., 
Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com.
    (i) APTA PR-CS-S-006-98 Rev. 1, ``Standard for Attachment Strength 
of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad Equipment,'' Authorized 
September 2005.
    (ii) [Reserved.]
    (2) Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, 
London, England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk.
    (i) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
December 2010.
    (ii) [Reserved.]


Sec.  238.735   Seat crashworthiness (passenger and cab crew).

    (a) Passenger seating in Tier III trainsets shall comply with the 
requirements referenced in either of the following paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.233 and APTA PR-CS-S-016-99 excluding Section 6.0, 
``Seat durability testing;'' or
    (2) Section 6.2, ``Seats for passengers, personnel, or train 
crew,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of 238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Seat attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g 
longitudinal, 3g lateral, and 3g vertical acceleration resistance; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment, as approved by FRA.
    (b) Each seat provided for an employee in the cab of a Tier III 
trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, shall comply with the 
requirements in both of the following paragraphs:
    (1) Sections 238.233 (e), (f), and (g), including the loading 
requirements of 8g longitudinally, 4g laterally, and 4g vertically; and
    (2) The performance, design, and test criteria of AAR-RP-5104.
    (c) The standards required in this section are incorporated by 
reference into this section with the approval of the Director of the 
Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved 
material is available for inspection at Federal Railroad 
Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 
DC and

[[Page 88057]]

are available from the sources indicated below. They are also available 
for inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
    (1) American Public Transportation Association, 1666 K Street NW., 
Washington, DC 20006, www.aptastandards.com.
    (i) APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for Passenger Seats in 
Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized October 2010.
    (ii) [Reserved.]
    (2) Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, 
London, England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk.
    (i) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
December 2010.
    (ii) [Reserved.]
    (3) AAR-RP-5104, ``Locomotive Cab Seats,'' April 2008.
    (i) Association of American Railroads, 425 3rd Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20024, aarpublications.com.
    (ii) [Reserved.]


Sec.  238.737   Luggage racks.

    (a) Overhead storage racks shall provide longitudinal and lateral 
restraint for stowed articles. These racks shall incorporate transverse 
dividers at a maximum spacing of 10 ft. (3 m) to restrain the 
longitudinal movement of luggage. To restrain the lateral movement of 
luggage, these racks shall also slope downward in the outboard 
direction at a minimum ratio of 1:8 with respect to a horizontal plane.
    (b) Luggage racks shall comply with the requirements in either of 
the following paragraphs:
    (1) Section 238.233; or
    (2) Section 6.8, ``Luggage stowage,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/
RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of 238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g longitudinal, 
3g lateral, and 3g vertical acceleration resistance; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment, as approved by FRA. In particular, the railroad shall 
determine the maximum allowable weight of the luggage stowed for 
purposes of evaluating luggage rack attachment strength.
    (c) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, Issue Four, ``Requirements 
for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety and Standards Board Ltd., 
December 2010 is incorporated by reference into this section with the 
approval of the Director of the Federal Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) 
and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material is available for inspection at 
Federal Railroad Administration, Docket Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue 
SE., Washington, DC and is available from Communications, RSSB, Block 2 
Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, England EC1V 1NY, 
www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for inspection at NARA. For 
information on the availability of this material at NARA, call 202-741-
6030 or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html

Emergency Systems


Sec.  238.741   Emergency window egress and rescue access.

    (a) Emergency window egress and rescue access plan. If a passenger 
car in a Tier III trainset is not designed to comply with the 
requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.113 or 238.114, the railroad shall 
submit to FRA for approval an emergency window egress and rescue access 
plan during the design review stage. The plan must include, but is not 
limited to, the elements in this section.
    (b) Ease of operability. If an emergency window exit in a passenger 
car requires the use of a tool, other implement (e.g., hammer), or a 
mechanism to permit removal of the window panel from the inside of the 
car during an emergency situation, then the plan must demonstrate the 
use of the device provides a level of safety equivalent to that 
provided by Sec.  238.113(b). In particular, the plan must address the 
location, design, and signage and instructions for the device. The 
railroad shall also include a provision in its Tier III ITM plan to 
inspect for the presence of the device at least each day the car is in 
service.
    (c) Dimensions. If the dimensions of a window opening in a 
passenger car do not comply with the requirements in Sec. Sec.  238.113 
or 238.114, then the plan must demonstrate that at least an equivalent 
level of safety is provided.
    (d) Alternative emergency evacuation openings. If a passenger car 
employs the use of emergency egress panels or additional door exits 
instead of emergency window exits or rescue access windows, then the 
plan must demonstrate that such alternative emergency evacuation 
openings provide a level of safety at least equivalent to that required 
by Sec.  238.113 or Sec.  238.114, or both. The plan must address the 
location, design, and signage and instructions for the alternative 
emergency evacuation openings.


Sec.  238.743   Emergency lighting.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, Tier III 
trainsets shall comply with the emergency lighting requirements 
specified in Sec.  238.115.
    (b) Emergency lighting back-up power systems shall, at a minimum, 
be capable of operating after experiencing the individually applied 
accelerations defined in either of the following paragraphs:
    (1) Sec.  238.115(b)(4)(ii); or
    (2) Section 6.1.4, ``Security of furniture, equipment and 
features,'' of Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, provided that--
    (i) The conditions of Sec.  238.705(b)(2) are met;
    (ii) Attachment strength is based on a minimum of 5g longitudinal, 
3g lateral, and 3g vertical acceleration resistance; and
    (iii) Use of the standard is carried out under any conditions 
identified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment, as approved by FRA.(c) Railway Group Standard GM/RT2100, 
Issue Four, ``Requirements for Rail Vehicle Structures,'' Rail Safety 
and Standards Board Ltd., December 2010 is incorporated by reference 
into this section with the approval of the Director of the Federal 
Register under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. All approved material 
is available for inspection at Federal Railroad Administration, Docket 
Clerk, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC and is available from 
Communications, RSSB, Block 2 Angel Square, 1 Torrens Street, London, 
England EC1V 1NY, www.rgsonline.co.uk. It is also available for 
inspection at NARA. For information on the availability of this 
material at NARA, call 202-741-6030 or go to https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

Cab Equipment


Sec.  238.751   Alerters.

    (a) An alerter shall be provided in the operating cab of each Tier 
III trainset, unless in accordance with paragraph (e) of this section 
the trainset operates in a territory where an alternate technology 
providing equivalent safety, such as redundant automatic train control 
or redundant automatic train stop system, is installed.
    (b) Upon initiation of the alerter, the engineer must acknowledge 
the alerter within the time period and according to the parameters 
specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier

[[Page 88058]]

III Passenger Equipment in order for train operation to remain under 
the full control of the engineer.
    (c) If the engineer does not acknowledge the alerter as specified 
in paragraph (b) of this section, at a minimum a retrievable full 
service brake application shall occur until the train has stopped, 
unless the crew intervenes as described in paragraph (d) of this 
section.
    (d) To retrieve the full service brake application described in 
paragraph (c) of this section, the engineer must acknowledge the 
alerter and activate appropriate controls to issue a command for brake 
application as specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier 
III Passenger Equipment.
    (e) If an alternate technology to the alerter is used, the railroad 
shall conduct a hazard analysis that confirms the ability of the 
technology to provide an equivalent level of safety. This analysis 
shall be included in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment.


Sec.  238.753  Sanders.

    (a) A Tier III trainset shall be equipped with operative sanders, 
if required by the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III 
Passenger Equipment.
    (b) Sanders required under this section shall comply with Sec.  
229.131(a), (b), and (d) of this chapter, except that instead of the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  229.9 and 229.23 of this chapter:
    (1) The requirements of Sec.  238.17 shall apply to the tagging and 
movement of a Tier III trainset with defective sanders; and
    (2) The requirements of the railroad's ITM plan shall apply to the 
next periodic inspection of such a trainset.
    (c) In addition to the requirements in paragraph (b) of this 
section, the railroad's ITM plan shall specify the ITM requirements for 
Tier III trainsets equipped with sanders.
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0
18. Add subpart I to part 238 to read as follows:

Subpart I--Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment

Sec.
238.801 Scope.
238.803 Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements; brake 
system.
238.805 Periodic tests; brake system.


Sec.  238.801  Scope.

    This subpart contains specific requirements for railroad passenger 
equipment operating in a shared right-of-way at speeds not exceeding 
125 mph and in an exclusive right-of-way without grade crossings at 
speeds exceeding 125 mph but not exceeding 220 mph.


Sec.  238.803  Inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements; brake 
system.

    (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, Tier III 
trainsets shall be subject to the ITM requirements of subpart F of this 
part.
    (b)(1) The equivalent of a Class I brake test contained in Sec.  
238.313 shall be developed for use where required by this part, and 
shall be defined in the railroad's ITM plan.
    (2) Movement of a trainset with a power brake defect as defined in 
Sec.  238.15 shall be conducted in accordance with Sec.  238.15, with 
the following exceptions:
    (i) The confirmation of the percentage of operative power brakes 
required by Sec.  238.15(c)(4)(iv) may be by a technological method 
specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment;
    (ii) The computation of the percentage of operative power brakes 
required by Sec.  238.15(c)(1) shall be determined by a formula 
specified in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan for Tier III Passenger 
Equipment; and
    (iii) Operating restrictions determined by the percentage of 
operative power brakes in a trainset shall be based upon the 
requirements of Sec.  238.15 when the trainset operates in a shared 
right-of-way; operating restrictions shall be based upon a percentage 
of operative brakes as defined in the railroad's Safe Operation Plan 
for Tier III Passenger Equipment when the trainset operates in a right-
of-way exclusively for Tier III passenger equipment.


Sec.  238.805   Periodic tests; brake system.

    (a) Each Tier III trainset shall be subject to the tests and 
inspections prescribed in the railroad's ITM plan, as approved by FRA. 
All testing required under this section shall be performed at the 
intervals specified in the ITM plan. The railroad's ITM plan shall 
include, but not be limited to, the following requirements:
    (1) The filtering devices or dirt collectors located in the main 
reservoir supply line to the air brake system shall be cleaned, 
repaired, and replaced under the ITM plan.
    (2) All brake control equipment and truck brake equipment shall be 
cleaned, repaired, and tested under the ITM plan.
    (3) The date and place of cleaning, repairing, or testing shall be 
recorded in the railroad's data management system, and the person 
performing the work and that person's supervisor shall sign the form 
electronically. A record of the components of the air brake system that 
are cleaned, repaired, or tested shall be kept in the railroad's 
electronic files.
    (b) Each periodic inspection shall include, but not be limited to, 
the following requirements:
    (1) All mechanical gauges used by the engineer to aid in the 
control or braking of the trainset shall be tested by comparison with a 
dead-weight tester or a test gauge designed for this purpose. A gauge 
or device shall not be in error more than five percent, or three 
p.s.i., whichever is less.
    (2) All electrical devices and visible insulation shall be 
inspected.
    (3) All cable connections between cars and jumpers that are 
designed to carry 600 volts or more shall be thoroughly cleaned, 
inspected, and tested for continuity. A microprocessor-based self-
monitoring event recorder, if installed, is exempt from periodic 
inspection.
0
19. Add and reserve subpart J to part 238.

Subpart J--Specific Requirements for the Safe Operation Plan for 
Tier III Passenger Equipment [Reserved]

0
20. Amend paragraph (c) of Appendix B to part 238 by adding a sentence 
to the end of note 16 of the table of ``Test Procedures and Performance 
Criteria for the Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of 
Materials Used in Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs'' to read as 
follows:

Appendix B to Part 238--Test Methods and Performance Criteria for the 
Flammability and Smoke Emission Characteristics of Materials Used in 
Passenger Cars and Locomotive Cabs

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    \16\ * * * For purposes of this Note, the floor assembly of a 
vehicle in a Tier III trainset may be tested together with undercar 
design features that separate the vehicle from the fire source, 
i.e., skirts and bottom covers, to protect against a fire source 
under and external to the vehicle. To assess the safety associated 
with testing the floor assembly in this manner, and to protect 
against a fire source under the floor assembly but internal to the 
vehicle, safety must also be demonstrated by conducting a fire 
hazard analysis that includes the considerations in Note 17.
* * * * *
0
21. Revise the introductory text of appendix F to part 238 by adding a 
third paragraph to read as follows:

Appendix F to Part 238--Alternative Dynamic Performance Requirements 
for Front End Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

* * * * *
    Although the requirements of this appendix are stated in terms 
applicable to Tier I passenger equipment, they are also applicable 
to Tier III passenger trainsets under Sec.  238.711. Specifically, 
the cab ends of Tier III trainsets shall comply with the 
requirements of this appendix to demonstrate the integrity of the 
end structure.
* * * * *
0
22. Add appendix G to part 238 to read as follows:

Appendix G to Part 238--Alternative Requirements for Evaluating the 
Crashworthiness and Occupant Protection Performance of a Tier I 
Passenger Trainset

General

    This appendix applies to Tier I alternative passenger trainsets, 
as described below. While the appendix may refer to specific units 
of rail equipment in a trainset, the alternative requirements in 
this appendix apply only to a trainset as a whole.
    This appendix specifies alternatives to the crashworthiness and 
occupant protection performance requirements for Tier I passenger 
equipment in Sec. Sec.  238.203, Static end strength; 238.205, Anti-
climbing mechanism; 238.207, Link between coupling mechanism and car 
body; 238.209(a), Forward end structure of locomotives, including 
cab cars and MU locomotives; 238.211, Collision posts; 238.213, 
Corner posts; and 238.219, Truck-to-carbody attachment. To maintain 
their integrity, these requirements apply as a whole. They also 
apply in addition to the requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.209(b); 
238.215, Rollover strength; 238.217, Side structure; and 238.233, 
Interior fittings and surfaces; and with APTA standards for occupant 
protection and an AAR recommended practice for locomotive cab seats, 
as specified in this appendix.
    For ease of comparison with the Tier I requirements in subpart C 
of this part, this appendix is arranged in order by the Tier I 
section referenced.
    Use of this appendix to demonstrate alternative crashworthiness 
and occupant protection performance for Tier I passenger equipment 
is subject to FRA review and approval under Sec.  238.201.

[[Page 88060]]

Occupied Volume Integrity

    (a) Instead of the requirements of Sec.  238.203, the units of a 
Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their occupied 
volume integrity (OVI) by complying with both the quasi-static 
compression load and dynamic collision requirements in Sec. Sec.  
238.703(b) and 238.705, respectively.

Override Protection

    (b) Colliding equipment. Instead of the requirements of Sec.  
238.205, the units of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may 
demonstrate their ability to resist vertical climbing and override 
at each colliding interface during a train-to-train collision by 
complying with the dynamic collision requirements in Sec.  
238.707(a).
    (c) Connected equipment. Instead of the requirements of 
Sec. Sec.  238.205 and 238.207, when connected, the units of a Tier 
I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their ability to 
resist vertical climbing and override by complying with the dynamic 
collision requirements in Sec.  238.707(b).

Fluid Entry Inhibition

    (d) Instead of the requirements of Sec.  238.209(a), each cab 
end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate its 
ability to inhibit fluid entry and provide other penetration 
resistance by complying with the requirements in Sec.  238.709.

End Structure Integrity of Cab End

    (e) Each cab end of a Tier I alternative passenger trainset is 
subject to the requirements of appendix F to this part to 
demonstrate cab end structure integrity. For those cab ends without 
identifiable corner or collision posts, the requirements of appendix 
F apply to the end structure at the specified locations, regardless 
of whether the structure at the specified locations is a post.

End Structure Integrity of Non-Cab End

    (f) Instead of the applicable requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.211 
and 238.213, the units of a Tier I alternative trainset may 
demonstrate end structure integrity for other than a cab end by 
complying with the requirements in Sec.  238.713(b) and (c).

Roof and Side Structure Integrity

    (g) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the 
requirements of Sec. Sec.  238.215 and 238.217 to demonstrate roof 
and side structure integrity.

Truck Attachment

    (h) Instead of the requirements of Sec.  238.219, the units of a 
Tier I alternative passenger trainset may demonstrate their truck-
to-carbody attachment integrity by complying with the requirements 
in Sec.  238.717 (b) through (e).

Interior Fixture Attachment

    (i) A Tier I alternative passenger trainset is subject to the 
interior fixture requirements in Sec.  238.233. Interior fixtures 
must also comply with APTA PR-CS-S-006-98, Rev. 1, ``Standard for 
Attachment Strength of Interior Fittings for Passenger Railroad 
Equipment,'' Authorized September 2005, and those portions of APTA 
PR-CS-S-034-99, Rev. 2, ``Standard for the Design and Construction 
of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock,'' Authorized June 2006, 
relating to interior fixtures.

Seat Crashworthiness (Passenger and Crew)

    (j) Passenger seating. Passenger seating in a Tier I alternative 
passenger trainset is subject to the requirements for seats in Sec.  
238.233 and must also comply with APTA PR-CS-S-016-99, Rev. 2, 
``Standard for Passenger Seats in Passenger Rail Cars,'' Authorized 
October 2010, with the exception of Section 6.0, Seat Durability 
Testing.
    (k) Crew seating. Each seat provided for an employee regularly 
assigned to occupy the cab of a Tier I alternative passenger 
trainset, and any floor-mounted seat in the cab, must comply with 
the following:
    (1) Section 238.233(e), (f), and (g), including the loading 
requirements of 8g longitudinally, 4g laterally, and 4g vertically; 
and
    (2) The performance, design, and test criteria of AAR-RP-5104, 
``Locomotive Cab Seats,'' April 2008.
0
23. Add appendix H to part 238 to read as follows:

Appendix H--Rigid Locomotive Design Computer Model Input Data and 
Geometrical Depiction

    As specified in Sec.  238.705(a)(4), this appendix provides 
input data and a geometrical depiction necessary to create a 
computer model of the rigid (conventional) locomotive design for use 
in evaluating the OVI of a Tier III trainset in a dynamic collision 
scenario. (This appendix may also be applied to a Tier I alternative 
passenger trainset to evaluate its OVI, in accordance with appendix 
G).
    The input data, in the form of an input file, contains the 
geometry for approximately the first 12 feet of the rigid locomotive 
design. Because this input file is for a half-symmetric model, a 
locomotive mass corresponding to 130,000 pounds of weight is 
provided for modeling purposes--half the 260,000 pounds of weight 
specified for the locomotive in Sec.  238.705(a)(4). Figure 1 to 
this appendix provides two views of the locomotive's geometric 
depiction.

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Sarah Feinberg,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2016-28280 Filed 12-5-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-C