Mitigation and Investigation of Passenger Rail Human Factor Related Accidents and Operations in Terminals and Stations With Stub End Tracks, 87649-87653 [2016-29013]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 233 / Monday, December 5, 2016 / Notices
justice issues. The final range of issues
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scoping comments received. The
preliminary identification of reasonable
alternatives and environmental issues in
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Public Participation
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Dated: November 28, 2016.
M. Susan Smelley,
Director, Environmental Permitting and
Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2016–29082 Filed 12–2–16; 8:45 am]
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Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2016–03]
Mitigation and Investigation of
Passenger Rail Human Factor Related
Accidents and Operations in Terminals
and Stations With Stub End Tracks
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
AGENCY:
TVA is interested in an open process
and wants to hear from the community,
interested agencies and special interest
groups about the scope of resources and
issues they would like to be considered
in this EIS.
The public is invited to submit
comments on the scope of this EIS no
later than the date identified in the
DATES section of this notice. Federal,
state and local agencies such as the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Tennessee Department
of Environmental Conservation and the
Tennessee State Historic Preservation
Officer also are invited to provide
comments.
After consideration of comments
received during the scoping period,
TVA will develop and distribute a
document that will summarize public
and agency comments that were
received and identify the schedule for
completing the EIS process. Following
analysis of the issues, TVA will prepare
a draft EIS for public review and
comment. In making its final decision,
TVA will consider the analyses in this
EIS and substantive comments that it
receives. A final decision on proceeding
with construction and operation of a
bottom ash dewatering facility,
management and final disposal of CCR
and closure of the Bottom Ash
Impoundment and Main Ash
Impoundment will depend on a number
of factors. These include results of the
EIS, requirements of the CCR Rule,
engineering and risk evaluations and
financial considerations.
TVA anticipates holding a community
meeting near the plant after releasing
the Draft EIS. Meeting details will be
posted on TVA’s Web site. TVA expects
to release the Draft EIS in summer of
2017.
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Jkt 241001
FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2016–03 to stress to passenger
and commuter railroads the importance
of taking action to help mitigate human
factor accidents, assist in the
investigation of such accidents, and
enhance the safety of operations in
stations and terminals with stub end
tracks. This safety advisory contains
various recommendations to passenger
and commuter railroads related to
inward- and outward-facing cameras,
sleep apnea, and operating practices to
potentially mitigate the occurrence and
assist in the investigation of human
factor related accidents and to enhance
the safety of operations in terminals and
stations with stub end tracks.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Christian Holt, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Railroad Safety,
FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202)
493–0978.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. New Jersey Transit Incident
On September 29, 2016, at
approximately 8:38 a.m., New Jersey
Transit (NJT) Train 1614 travelling at 21
miles per hour (mph) impacted the
bumping block at the end of the track
No. 5 Depot, at Hoboken Terminal, in
Hoboken, New Jersey. The cab car
overrode the bumping block and struck
the wall of the terminal building, near
the ticket office in the corner of the
building. NJT Train 1614 was occupied
by three crew members and
approximately 331 passengers. The
accident resulted in the three
crewmembers and 108 passengers being
transported to four area hospitals. One
individual who was standing on the
pedestrian walkway between the tracks
and the station was fatally injured from
falling debris.
The National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) has taken the lead role in
conducting the investigation of this
accident under its legal authority. See
49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b).
As is customary, FRA is participating in
the NTSB’s investigation and also
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87649
investigating the accident under its own
authority. NTSB has not issued its
formal findings. Although the NTSB has
not concluded its investigation of this
accident, FRA believes railroads should
take more robust action to address
human factors that may cause accidents
and to enhance protection of railroad
employees and the public.
II. Other Railroad Accidents
Amtrak Accident at Philadelphia, PA
On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, National
Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) passenger train 188 (Train 188)
was traveling from Washington, DC, to
New York City. Aboard the train were
five crew members and approximately
238 passengers. Shortly after 9:20 p.m.,
the train derailed while traveling
through a curve in the track at Frankford
Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
As a result of the accident, eight persons
were killed and a significant number of
persons were seriously injured.
NTSB conducted an investigation of
this accident under its legal authority
and issued its findings on May 17,
2016.1 As Train 188 approached the
curve from the west, it traveled over a
straightaway with a maximum
authorized passenger train speed of 80
mph. The maximum authorized
passenger train speed for the curve was
50 mph. NTSB determined the train was
traveling approximately 106 mph within
the curve’s 50-mph speed restriction,
exceeding the maximum authorized
speed on the straightaway by 26 mph,
and 56 mph over railroad’s maximum
authorized speed for the curve.2 NTSB
concluded the locomotive engineer
operating the train made an emergency
application of Train 188’s air brake
system, and the train slowed to
approximately 102 mph before derailing
in the curve.3 NTSB concluded that the
probable cause of the engineer
accelerating to this speed was due to his
loss of situational awareness likely
because his attention was diverted to an
emergency situation with another train.4
On July 8, 2015, NTSB sent a letter to
FRA reiterating NTSB recommendations
1 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b); and
NTSB, Railroad Accident Report, RAR–16/02,
Derailment of Amtrak Passenger Train 188,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 12, 2015, https://
www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/
Reports/RAR1602.pdf.
2 RAR–16/02 at 1. FRA regulations provide, in
part, that it is unlawful to ‘‘[o]perate a train or
locomotive at a speed which exceeds the maximum
authorized limit by at least 10 miles per hour.’’ 49
CFR 240.305(a)(2).
3 RAR–16/02 at 4–5.
4 Id. at 44.
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R–10–01 & –02.5 The letter indicated
NTSB believes inward-facing
locomotive recorders could have
provided valuable information to help
determine the cause of the accident.
After this accident occurred, Amtrak
announced it would install inwardfacing cameras on all of its ACS–64
locomotives on the Northeast Corridor.
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Southern California Regional Rail
Authority (Metrolink) Chatsworth, CA
On September 12, 2008, in
Chatsworth, California, an accident
occurred involving a collision between
a Southern California Regional Rail
Authority (Metrolink) passenger train
and a Union Pacific Railroad Company
(UP) freight train.6 The accident
occurred after the locomotive engineer
operating the Metrolink passenger train
failed to stop his train for a stop signal.
As a result of the accident, 25 persons
on the Metrolink train were killed and
102 injured passengers were transported
to the hospital. The accident damage
was estimated to be in excess of $12
million. The NTSB found the probable
cause of that accident was the Metrolink
locomotive engineer’s distraction due to
the use of a personal cell phone to send
text messages resulting in a failure to
comply with the signal indication.7
Shortly after the Metrolink accident,
the Rail Safety Improvement Act of
2008 8 (RSIA) was enacted. RSIA
required, among other items, that
railroads install Positive Train Control
(PTC) systems. Also after the accident,
FRA issued its Emergency Order No. 26
(EO 26). 73 FR 58702 (Oct. 7, 2008). EO
26 prohibited railroad operating
employees (typically train crew
members such as locomotive engineers
and conductors) performing safetyrelated duties from using or turning on
electronic devices such as personal cell
phones. The requirements in EO 26
were codified in amended form at 49
CFR part 220, subpart C, in an FRA final
rule published on September 27, 2010,
5 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety
Recommendation History for Safety
Recommendation R–10–001: available online at:
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/
Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-10-001. NTSB’s
accident report also reiterated these
recommendations. See RAR–16/02 at 46–47. NTSB
also sent a letter regarding locomotive recorder
recommendations to Amtrak.
6 See National Transportation Safety Board,
Collision of Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific
Train LOF65–12 Chatsworth, California September
12, 2008, Accident Report NTSB/RAR–10/01 (Jan.
21, 2010); available online at: https://www.ntsb.gov/
investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/
RAR1001.pdf.
7 Id. at 66.
8 Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Public
Law 110–432, Division A, 122 Stat. 4848 (Oct. 16,
2008); available online at https://www.fra.dot.gov/
eLib/Details/ L03588.
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which took effect on March 28, 2011. 75
FR 59580. Among other requirements in
the final rule, railroad operating
employees are required to receive
training on the regulation’s
requirements governing the use of
electronic devices while on-duty and
are also required to be tested by railroad
supervisors to determine employees’
compliance with such requirements. 49
CFR 220.313–315.
The NTSB’s report on the Chatsworth
accident resulted in two new Safety
Recommendations, R–10–01 and R–10–
02.9 Safety Recommendation R–10–01
superseded Safety Recommendation R–
07–003, and recommended that FRA:
Require the installation, in all controlling
locomotive cabs and cab car operating
compartments, of crash- and fire-protected
inward- and outward-facing audio and image
recorders capable of providing recordings to
verify that train crew actions are in
accordance with rules and procedures that
are essential to safety as well as train
operating conditions. The devices should
have a minimum 12-hour continuous
recording capability with recordings that are
easily accessible for review, with appropriate
limitations on public release, for the
investigation of accidents or for use by
management in carrying out efficiency testing
and system wide performance monitoring
programs.
In addition, Safety Recommendation R–10–
02 recommended that FRA:
Require that railroads regularly review and
use in-cab audio and image recordings (with
appropriate limitations on public release), in
conjunction with other performance data, to
verify that train crew actions are in
accordance with rules and procedures that
are essential to safety.
Metro-North Railroad Derailment,
Bronx, NY
On December 1, 2013, at
approximately 7:20 a.m. EST,
southbound Metro-North Railroad
(Metro-North) passenger train 8808
derailed as it approached the Spuyten
Duyvil Station in New York City. All
passenger cars and the locomotive
derailed, and, as a result, four
passengers died and at least 61
passengers were injured. The train was
traveling at 82 mph when it derailed in
a section of curved track where the
maximum authorized speed was 30
mph. Following the accident, the
engineer reported that: (1) He felt dazed
just before the derailment; 10 and (2) his
wife had complained about his snoring.
The engineer then underwent a sleep
9 National Transportation Safety Board, Safety
Recommendations R–10–01 and R–10–02 (Feb. 23,
2010); available online at: https://www.ntsb.gov/
safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-10-001-002.pdf.
10 NTSB, Railroad Accident Brief RAB–14/12,
Metro-North Railroad Derailment, October 24, 2014,
p. 2.
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evaluation that identified excessive
daytime sleepiness and a sleep study
that diagnosed severe obstructive sleep
apnea (OSA). Based on its investigation
of the derailment, the NTSB concluded
that the engineer had multiple OSA risk
factors, such as obesity, male gender,
snoring, complaints of fatigue, and
excessive daytime sleepiness. Even
though the engineer had these OSA risk
factors, neither his personal health care
provider nor his Metro-North
occupational health evaluations had
screened the engineer for OSA.11 NTSB
determined that the probable cause of
the accident was the ‘‘engineer’s
noncompliance with the 30-mph speed
restriction because he had fallen asleep
due to undiagnosed severe obstructive
sleep apnea exacerbated by a recent
circadian rhythm shift required by his
work schedule.’’ 12
Railroad safety is of the utmost
importance to FRA, and, based on the
above accidents, FRA recommends
several measures discussed below, to
address human factor-caused accidents
III. Inward- and Outward-Facing
Cameras
On December 4, 2015, the President
signed into law the Fixing America’s
Surface Transportation Act, Public Law
114–94, 129 Stat. 1686 (Dec. 4, 2015)
(FAST Act). Section 11411 of the FAST
Act, codified in the Federal railroad
safety laws at 49 U.S.C. 20168 (the
Statute), requires FRA (as the Secretary
of Transportation’s delegate) to
promulgate regulations requiring each
railroad carrier that provides regularly
scheduled intercity rail passenger or
commuter rail passenger transportation
to install inward- and outward-facing
image recording devices in all
controlling locomotives of passenger
trains. 49 U.S.C. 20168(a). Although
FRA is in the process of developing a
regulatory proposal addressing this
statutory mandate, FRA encourages
railroads to accelerate the installation of
the cameras. The Statute contains
various design and operational
requirements related to these cameras
including:
• A minimum 12-hour continuous
recording capability (49 U.S.C.
20168(b)(1));
• Crash and fire protections for any
in-cab image recordings that are stored
only within a controlling locomotive
cab or cab car operating compartment
(49 U.S.C. 20168(b)(2));
• Recordings must be accessible for
review during an accident or incident
investigation (49 U.S.C. 20168(b)(3));
11 Id.
12 Id.
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• Railroads may use the recordings to:
Æ Verify that train crew actions
follow applicable safety laws and the
railroad carrier’s operating rules and
procedures (49 U.S.C. 20168(d)(1));
Æ Assist in an investigation into the
causation of a reportable accident or
incident (49 U.S.C. 20168(d)(2)); and
Æ Document a criminal act or
monitor unauthorized occupancy of the
controlling locomotive cab or car
operating compartment (49 U.S.C.
20168(d)(3)).
In addition to the design and
operational requirements in the FAST
Act, the Statute also contains various
other requirements regarding the use
and maintenance of inward- and
outward-facing cameras as well as
limitations and protections on how data
from the cameras can be used.
Importantly, the Statute prohibits
railroads from using image recordings to
retaliate against their employees. 49
U.S.C. 20168(i). In addition, to
discourage tampering with the cameras,
the Statute allows railroads to take
enforcement actions against employees
that tamper with or disable an inwardor outward-facing image recording
device. 49 U.S.C. 20168(f). Furthermore,
recording device data obtained from a
locomotive involved in a FRA
reportable accident or incident must be
preserved by the railroad for one year
after the accident or incident. 49 U.S.C.
20168(g).
Once FRA has acquired this data from
the railroad, FRA is prohibited from
publicly disclosing locomotive audio
and image recordings or transcripts of
oral communications between train,
operating, and communication center
employees related to the accident or
incident FRA is investigating. However,
FRA may publicly release a transcript of
a written depiction of visual
information that the agency deems is
relevant to the accident at the time other
factual reports on the accident are
released to the public. 49 U.S.C.
20168(h). This restriction is similar to
the prohibition on public disclosure of
locomotive recordings that NTSB takes
possession of during an investigation.
49 U.S.C. 1114(d).
FRA remains concerned with the
ability to fully investigate accidents that
appear to be human factor-caused where
there is insufficient information from
the controlling locomotive cab or cab
operating compartment to conclusively
determine what caused or contributed to
an accident. Locomotive cab recording
information could benefit investigations
and help identify necessary corrective
actions before similar train accidents
occur. Inward- and outward-facing
image recording devices would be
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valuable in revealing crew actions and
interactions before, during, and after an
accident. FRA also believes that inwardand outward-facing cameras will give
railroads the ability to monitor crew
behavior to ensure compliance with
existing Federal regulations and railroad
operating rules and deter
noncompliance. Existing Federal
regulations at 49 CFR part 217 require
railroads to conduct operational tests to
determine the extent of employees’
compliance with railroad operating
rules, and particularly those rules which
are most likely to cause the most
accidents or incidents.
IV. Railroad Employee Fatigue
Fatigue of railroad employees
continues to be a concern of FRA,
particularly for employees with sleep
disorders who operate passenger trains.
This Advisory contains suggested
measures that railroads and employees
should utilize to prevent work-related
errors and on-the-job accidents as a
result of sleep disorders.
Sleep disorders represent a serious
health problem and left untreated can
result in impaired work performance,
including possible loss of alertness and
situational awareness, which could in
turn present an imminent threat to
transportation safety.13 In general terms,
sleep disorders range from fairly
common disorders, such as insomnia
(the inability to initiate or maintain
sleep) to relatively rare sleep disorders
such as narcolepsy (inappropriate and
uncontrollable sleep episodes). Railroad
employees who typically work on-call
are especially vulnerable to circadian
rhythm disorders such as shift work
sleep disorder (SWSD).14 SWSD
symptoms include excessive sleepiness
when a worker needs to be awake,
insomnia when the worker needs to
obtain sleep, unrefreshing sleep, and
difficulty concentrating.15 One of the
more common sleep disorders is
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). And, the
lawyer representing the engineer of the
NJT train stated the engineer had
undiagnosed OSA.16
OSA is a respiratory disorder
characterized by a reduction or
cessation of breathing during sleep.
OSA is characterized by repeated
episodes of upper airway collapse in the
region of the upper throat (pharynx) that
results in intermittent periods of partial
13 See 81 FR 12642, 12643–12644 (Mar. 10, 2016);
Federal Railroad Administration Notice of Safety
Advisory 2004–04 (Oct. 1, 2004).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 See https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/
local/NJ-train-crash-undiagnosed-engineer-sleepdisorder-apnea-hoboken-401555955.html.
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airflow obstruction (hypopneas),
complete airflow obstruction (apneas),
and respiratory effort-related arousals
from sleep (RERAs) in which affected
individuals awaken partially and may
experience gasping and choking as they
struggle to breathe. Risk factors for
developing OSA include: Obesity, male
gender, advancing age, family history of
OSA, large neck size, and an
anatomically small oropharynx (throat).
Additionally, OSA is associated with
increased risk for other adverse health
conditions such as: Hypertension (high
blood pressure), diabetes, cardiac
dysrhythmias (irregular heartbeat),
myocardial infarction (heart attack),
stroke, and sudden cardiac death.
Individuals who have undiagnosed OSA
are often unaware they have
experienced periods of sleep interrupted
by breathing difficulties (apneas,
hypopneas, or RERAs) when they
awaken in the morning. As a result, the
condition is often unrecognized by
affected individuals and
underdiagnosed by medical
professionals.
For individuals with OSA, eight hours
of sleep can be less restful or refreshing
than four hours of ordinary,
uninterrupted sleep. Undiagnosed or
inadequately treated moderate to severe
OSA can cause unintended sleep
episodes and resulting deficits in
attention, concentration, situational
awareness, and memory, thus reducing
the capacity to safely respond to hazards
when performing safety sensitive duties.
Thus, OSA is a critical safety issue that
can affect operations in all modes of
travel in the transportation industry.
On March 10, 2016, FRA published an
advance notice of proposed rulemaking
(ANPRM) requesting data and
information concerning the prevalence
of moderate-to-severe OSA of
individuals occupying safety sensitive
positions in rail transportation and the
potential consequences for rail safety.
See 81 FR 12642 (Mar. 10, 2016). The
ANPRM also requested information on
the potential costs and benefits from
regulatory actions that would address
the safety risks associated with rail
transportation workers in safety
sensitive positions who have OSA. The
ANPRM was published jointly with the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration and requested similar
information regarding highway
transportation workers in safety
sensitive positions and highway safety.
This Advisory and accompanying
recommended actions is not in response
to the ANPRM; rather, it is an action
concurrent with the ANPRM. FRA is
currently reviewing the data and
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information submitted in response to
the ANPRM.
V. Passenger Terminals and Stations
With Stub End Tracks
The Hoboken accident involved NJT
Train 1614 that was traversing a stub
end track entering a passenger station at
21 mph–11 mph over the 10 mph posted
speed limit. FRA recommends
identifying locations that have stub end
tracks at passenger terminals and
stations that are equipped with
technology that can warn and enforce
passenger trains to stop short of a stub
end track and ensure they enforce
applicable speed limits. If such
locations are not equipped with
technology that can warn and enforce
passenger trains to stop short of a stub
end track and ensure they enforce
applicable speed limits, then FRA
encourages railroads to take other
operational actions to prevent trains
from overrunning stub end tracks
equipped with or without bumping
posts. One such operational action
would be to require communications
between the engineer and other
qualified employees that can take
appropriate action, such as applying the
emergency brakes, if necessary.
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VI. Recommended Actions
In light of the recent accident
discussed above, and in an effort to
ensure the safety of the Nation’s
railroads, their employees, and the
general public, FRA recommends that
intercity passenger and commuter
railroads do each of the following:
1. Instruct their employees during
training classes and safety briefings on
the importance of compliance with
maximum authorized train speed limits
and other speed restrictions when
entering passenger stations and
terminals;
2. Not less than once every six months
evaluate operational testing data as
required by 49 CFR 217.9. A railroad
should consider increasing the
frequency of operational testing where
its reviews show any non-compliance
with maximum authorized train speeds
in passenger stations or terminals.
Railroads should conduct a significant
number of operational tests on trains
required to operate into a station or
terminal with stub end tracks;
3. Adopt procedures requiring
communication between crew members
and the locomotive engineer before and
during operation into a station or
terminal and/or implement technology
to appropriately control and/or stop the
train short of the stub end track. These
actions could include:
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a. Making modifications to automatic
train control (ATC), cab signal, or other
signal systems capable of providing
warning and enforcement to ensure
trains comply with applicable speed
limits and stop short of stub end tracks;
b. If a railroad does not utilize an
ATC, cab signal, or other signal system
capable of providing warning and
enforcement at applicable passenger
terminals and stations with stub end
tracks platforms (or if a signal system
modification would interfere with the
implementation of PTC or is otherwise
not viable), making all passenger train
movements at the identified locations
while in communication with a second
qualified crew member. This will
provide constant communication with
the locomotive engineer and allow the
second crewmember to take immediate
appropriate action if the locomotive
engineer is not responding or is unable
to stop short of stub end tracks. This
could also include making a safety stop
at predetermined location and if the
locomotive engineer does not make an
appropriate safety stop the second
qualified crew member can take
appropriate action to stop the train;
4. Review Safety Advisory 2004–04
(69 FR 58995, Oct. 1, 2004); Effect of
Sleep Disorders on Safety of Railroad
Operations, in its entirety with all
operating crews. Recommended actions
from Safety Advisory 2004–04 are listed
below:
a. Establish training and educational
programs to inform employees of the
potential for performance impairment as
a result of fatigue, sleep loss, sleep
deprivation, inadequate sleep quality,
and working at odd hours, and
document when employees have
received the training. Incorporate
elements that encourage selfassessment, peer-to-peer
communication, and co-worker
identification accompanied by policies
consistent with these recommendations.
The Railroaders’ Guide to Healthy Sleep
Web site (https://
www.railroadersleep.org) has several
educational resources to assist
railroaders in improving their sleep
health including an anonymous tool for
self-screening for sleep disorders
including OSA. This Web site is set up
to disseminate educational information
to railroad employees and their families
about sleep disorders, the relevance of
healthy sleep to railroad safety, and
provide information about improving
the quality of the railroaders’ sleep. The
Web site was developed in conjunction
with the Division of Sleep Medicine at
Harvard Medical School, WGBH
Educational Foundation, and Volpe—
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The National Transportation Systems
Center;
b. Ensure that employees’ medical
examinations include assessment and
screening for possible sleep disorders
and other associated medical conditions
(including use of appropriate checklists
and records). Develop standardized
screening tools, or a good practices
guide, for the diagnosis, referral and
treatment of sleep disorders (especially
OSA) and other related medical
conditions to be used by company paid
or recommended physicians during
routine medical examinations; and
provide an appropriate list of certified
sleep disorder centers and related
specialists for referral when necessary;
c. Develop and implement rules that
request employees in safety-sensitive
positions to voluntarily report any sleep
disorder that could incapacitate, or
seriously impair, their performance;
d. Develop and implement policies
such that, when a railroad becomes
aware that an employee in a safetysensitive position has an incapacitating
or performance-impairing medical
condition related to sleep, the railroad
prohibits that employee from
performing any safety-sensitive duties
until that medical condition
appropriately responds to treatment;
and
e. Implement policies, procedures,
and any necessary agreements to—
i. Promote self-reporting of sleeprelated medical conditions by protecting
the medical confidentiality of that
information and protecting the
employment relationship, provided that
the employee complies with the
recommended course of treatment;
ii. Encourage employees with
diagnosed sleep disorders to participate
in recommended evaluation and
treatment; and
iii. Establish dispute resolution
mechanisms that rapidly resolve any
issues regarding the current fitness of
employees who have reported sleeprelated medical conditions and have
cooperated in evaluation and prescribed
treatment.
5. Accelerate the installation of
inward- and outward-facing cameras in
passenger trains in the cab of the
controlling locomotive or cab car
operating compartment per the FAST
Act. FRA notes that the FAST Act
includes provisions on standards for the
cameras, use of the cameras, and
preservation and protection of data from
the cameras.
FRA encourages all intercity
passenger and commuter railroads to
take actions consistent with the
preceding recommendations. FRA
acknowledges that action on some of the
E:\FR\FM\05DEN1.SGM
05DEN1
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 233 / Monday, December 5, 2016 / Notices
above recommendations may have
already taken place by segments of the
industry. If so, FRA recommends
railroads review their current programs
for relevancy and review the policies
and procedures with all their operating
employees.
FRA may modify this Safety Advisory
2016–03, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate
action necessary to ensure the highest
level of safety on the Nation’s railroads,
including pursing other corrective
measures under its rail safety authority.
Robert Lauby,
Administrator for Railroad Safety Chief Safety
Officer.
[FR Doc. 2016–29013 Filed 12–2–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Transit Administration
Fiscal Year 2016 Public Transportation
on Indian Reservations Program
Project Selections
Federal Transit Administration
(FTA), (DOT).
ACTION: Tribal Transit Program
Announcement of Project Selections.
AGENCY:
The Federal Transit
Administration (FTA) announces the
selection of 35 projects for funding with
Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 appropriations for
the Public Transportation on Indian
Reservations Program Tribal Transit
Program (TTP), as authorized by (49
U.S.C. 5311(c)(1)(a)(j)), as amended by
the Fixing America’s Surface
Transportation (FAST) Act, Public Law
114–94 (December 4, 2015). A total of $5
million is available under this program.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Successful applicants should contact
the appropriate FTA Regional office for
information regarding applying for the
funds or program-specific information.
A list of Regional offices, along with a
list of tribal liaisons can be found at
www.transit.dot.gov. Unsuccessful
´
applicants may contact Elan Flippin,
Office of Program Management at (202)
366–3800, email: Elan.Flippin@dot.gov,
to arrange a proposal debriefing within
30 days of this announcement. In the
event the contact information provided
by your tribe in the application has
changed, please contact your regional
tribal liaison with the current
information in order to expedite the
grant award process. A TDD is available
at 1–800–877–8339 (TDD/FIRS).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On March
14, 2016, FTA published a Notice of
Funding Opportunity (NOFO) through a
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:12 Dec 02, 2016
Jkt 241001
Federal Register Notice (81 FR 13444)
announcing the availability of Federal
funding for the TTP program. The FAST
Act authorizes $5 million annually for
federally recognized Indian Tribes or
Alaska Native villages, groups, or
communities as identified by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the U.S.
Department of the Interior for public
transportation. The TTP supports many
types of projects including: Operating
costs to enable tribes to start or continue
transit services; capital to enable tribal
investment in new or replacement
equipment; and funding for tribal transit
planning activities for public
transportation services in Indian
Country. TTP services link tribal
citizens to employment, food,
healthcare, school, social services,
recreation/leisure, and other key
community connections. FTA funds
may only be used for eligible purposes
defined under 49 U.S.C. 5311 and
described in the FTA Circular 9040.1G,
and consistent with the specific
eligibility and priorities established in
the March 2016 NOFO.
A total of 44 applications were
received from 39 tribes in 13 states
requesting $8.3 million, indicated that
there is significant demand for funds for
public transportation projects. Project
proposals were evaluated based on each
applicant’s responsiveness to the
program evaluation criteria outlined in
FTA’s March 2016 NOFO. The FTA also
took into consideration the current
status of previously funded applicants.
This included examining available prior
year competitive and formula balances;
and geographic balance and diversity,
including regional balance based on
tribal population. As a result, FTA is
funding a total of 35 projects for 34
tribes in 12 states. The projects selected
in Table 1 provide funding for transit
planning studies, capital and operating
requests for existing, start-up, expansion
and replacement projects. Funds must
be used only for the specific purposes
identified in Table 1. Allocations may
be less than what the applicant
requested and were capped at $329,843
to provide funding to all highly
recommended, recommended, and
planning proposals that received a
‘‘pass’’ rating; planning projects were
capped at $25,000. Tribes selected for
competitive funding should work with
their FTA regional office to finalize the
grant application in FTA’s Transit
Award Management System (TrAMs) for
the projects identified in the attached
table, so that funds are expeditiously
obligated. In cases where the allocation
amount is less than the proposer’s
requested amount, tribes should work
PO 00000
Frm 00124
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
87653
with the regional office to ensure the
funds are obligated for eligible aspects
of the projects, and for specific purpose
intended as reflected in Table 1. A
competitive project identification
number has been assigned to each
project for tracking purposes, and must
be used in the TrAMs application. For
more information about TrAMs, please
visit: https://www.transit.dot.gov/16260_
15769.html. The post award reporting
requirements include submission of the
Federal Financial Report (FFR),
Milestone Report in TrAMs, and
National Transit Database (NTD)
reporting, as appropriate (see FTA
Circular 9040.1G).
Tribes must continue to report to the
NTD to be eligible for formula
apportionment funds. To be considered
in the FY 2017 formula apportionments,
tribes should have submitted their
reports to the NTD no later than June 30,
2016; voluntary reporting to the NTD is
also encouraged. For tribes who have
not reported before, please contact the
NTD Operations Center in advance to
get a reporting account for the NTD online data collection system. The
Operation Center can be reached
Monday–Friday, 8:00 a.m.–7:00 p.m.
(ET), by email NTDHelp@dot.gov or by
phone 1–888–252–0936.
TTP grantees must comply with all
applicable Federal statutes, regulations,
executive orders, FTA circulars, and
other Federal requirements in carrying
out the project supported by the FTA
grant. To assist tribes with
understanding these requirements, FTA
has conducted Tribal Transit Technical
Assistance Workshops, and expects to
offer additional workshops in FY2017.
FTA has also expanded its technical
assistance to tribes receiving funds
under this program, with the Tribal
Transit Technical Assistance
Assessments initiative. Through these
assessments, FTA collaborates with
tribal transit leaders to review processes
and identify areas in need of
improvement and then assist with
solutions to address these needs. These
assessments include discussions of
compliance areas pursuant to the Master
Agreement, a site visit, promising
practices reviews, and technical
assistance from FTA and its contractors.
These workshops and assessments have
received exemplary feedback from
Tribal Transit Leaders, and provide FTA
with invaluable opportunities to learn
more about tribal transit leaders’
perspectives, and honor the sovereignty
of tribal nations. FTA will post
information about upcoming workshops
to its Web site and disseminate
information about the reviews through
its Regional offices. A list of Tribal
E:\FR\FM\05DEN1.SGM
05DEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 233 (Monday, December 5, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 87649-87653]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-29013]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
[Safety Advisory 2016-03]
Mitigation and Investigation of Passenger Rail Human Factor
Related Accidents and Operations in Terminals and Stations With Stub
End Tracks
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2016-03 to stress to passenger
and commuter railroads the importance of taking action to help mitigate
human factor accidents, assist in the investigation of such accidents,
and enhance the safety of operations in stations and terminals with
stub end tracks. This safety advisory contains various recommendations
to passenger and commuter railroads related to inward- and outward-
facing cameras, sleep apnea, and operating practices to potentially
mitigate the occurrence and assist in the investigation of human factor
related accidents and to enhance the safety of operations in terminals
and stations with stub end tracks.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Christian Holt, Operating Practices
Specialist, Office of Railroad Safety, FRA, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202) 493-0978.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. New Jersey Transit Incident
On September 29, 2016, at approximately 8:38 a.m., New Jersey
Transit (NJT) Train 1614 travelling at 21 miles per hour (mph) impacted
the bumping block at the end of the track No. 5 Depot, at Hoboken
Terminal, in Hoboken, New Jersey. The cab car overrode the bumping
block and struck the wall of the terminal building, near the ticket
office in the corner of the building. NJT Train 1614 was occupied by
three crew members and approximately 331 passengers. The accident
resulted in the three crewmembers and 108 passengers being transported
to four area hospitals. One individual who was standing on the
pedestrian walkway between the tracks and the station was fatally
injured from falling debris.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has taken the lead
role in conducting the investigation of this accident under its legal
authority. See 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b). As is
customary, FRA is participating in the NTSB's investigation and also
investigating the accident under its own authority. NTSB has not issued
its formal findings. Although the NTSB has not concluded its
investigation of this accident, FRA believes railroads should take more
robust action to address human factors that may cause accidents and to
enhance protection of railroad employees and the public.
II. Other Railroad Accidents
Amtrak Accident at Philadelphia, PA
On Tuesday, May 12, 2015, National Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) passenger train 188 (Train 188) was traveling from Washington,
DC, to New York City. Aboard the train were five crew members and
approximately 238 passengers. Shortly after 9:20 p.m., the train
derailed while traveling through a curve in the track at Frankford
Junction in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. As a result of the accident,
eight persons were killed and a significant number of persons were
seriously injured.
NTSB conducted an investigation of this accident under its legal
authority and issued its findings on May 17, 2016.\1\ As Train 188
approached the curve from the west, it traveled over a straightaway
with a maximum authorized passenger train speed of 80 mph. The maximum
authorized passenger train speed for the curve was 50 mph. NTSB
determined the train was traveling approximately 106 mph within the
curve's 50-mph speed restriction, exceeding the maximum authorized
speed on the straightaway by 26 mph, and 56 mph over railroad's maximum
authorized speed for the curve.\2\ NTSB concluded the locomotive
engineer operating the train made an emergency application of Train
188's air brake system, and the train slowed to approximately 102 mph
before derailing in the curve.\3\ NTSB concluded that the probable
cause of the engineer accelerating to this speed was due to his loss of
situational awareness likely because his attention was diverted to an
emergency situation with another train.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 49 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.; 49 CFR 831.2(b); and NTSB, Railroad
Accident Report, RAR-16/02, Derailment of Amtrak Passenger Train
188, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 12, 2015, https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1602.pdf.
\2\ RAR-16/02 at 1. FRA regulations provide, in part, that it is
unlawful to ``[o]perate a train or locomotive at a speed which
exceeds the maximum authorized limit by at least 10 miles per
hour.'' 49 CFR 240.305(a)(2).
\3\ RAR-16/02 at 4-5.
\4\ Id. at 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On July 8, 2015, NTSB sent a letter to FRA reiterating NTSB
recommendations
[[Page 87650]]
R-10-01 & -02.\5\ The letter indicated NTSB believes inward-facing
locomotive recorders could have provided valuable information to help
determine the cause of the accident. After this accident occurred,
Amtrak announced it would install inward-facing cameras on all of its
ACS-64 locomotives on the Northeast Corridor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendation
History for Safety Recommendation R-10-001: available online at:
https://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=R-10-001. NTSB's accident report also
reiterated these recommendations. See RAR-16/02 at 46-47. NTSB also
sent a letter regarding locomotive recorder recommendations to
Amtrak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Southern California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink) Chatsworth, CA
On September 12, 2008, in Chatsworth, California, an accident
occurred involving a collision between a Southern California Regional
Rail Authority (Metrolink) passenger train and a Union Pacific Railroad
Company (UP) freight train.\6\ The accident occurred after the
locomotive engineer operating the Metrolink passenger train failed to
stop his train for a stop signal. As a result of the accident, 25
persons on the Metrolink train were killed and 102 injured passengers
were transported to the hospital. The accident damage was estimated to
be in excess of $12 million. The NTSB found the probable cause of that
accident was the Metrolink locomotive engineer's distraction due to the
use of a personal cell phone to send text messages resulting in a
failure to comply with the signal indication.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See National Transportation Safety Board, Collision of
Metrolink Train 111 with Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 Chatsworth,
California September 12, 2008, Accident Report NTSB/RAR-10/01 (Jan.
21, 2010); available online at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAR1001.pdf.
\7\ Id. at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the Metrolink accident, the Rail Safety Improvement
Act of 2008 \8\ (RSIA) was enacted. RSIA required, among other items,
that railroads install Positive Train Control (PTC) systems. Also after
the accident, FRA issued its Emergency Order No. 26 (EO 26). 73 FR
58702 (Oct. 7, 2008). EO 26 prohibited railroad operating employees
(typically train crew members such as locomotive engineers and
conductors) performing safety-related duties from using or turning on
electronic devices such as personal cell phones. The requirements in EO
26 were codified in amended form at 49 CFR part 220, subpart C, in an
FRA final rule published on September 27, 2010, which took effect on
March 28, 2011. 75 FR 59580. Among other requirements in the final
rule, railroad operating employees are required to receive training on
the regulation's requirements governing the use of electronic devices
while on-duty and are also required to be tested by railroad
supervisors to determine employees' compliance with such requirements.
49 CFR 220.313-315.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Public Law 110-432,
Division A, 122 Stat. 4848 (Oct. 16, 2008); available online at
https://www.fra.dot.gov/eLib/Details/ L03588.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NTSB's report on the Chatsworth accident resulted in two new
Safety Recommendations, R-10-01 and R-10-02.\9\ Safety Recommendation
R-10-01 superseded Safety Recommendation R-07-003, and recommended that
FRA:
\9\ National Transportation Safety Board, Safety Recommendations
R-10-01 and R-10-02 (Feb. 23, 2010); available online at: https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/recletters/R-10-001-002.pdf.
Require the installation, in all controlling locomotive cabs and
cab car operating compartments, of crash- and fire-protected inward-
and outward-facing audio and image recorders capable of providing
recordings to verify that train crew actions are in accordance with
rules and procedures that are essential to safety as well as train
operating conditions. The devices should have a minimum 12-hour
continuous recording capability with recordings that are easily
accessible for review, with appropriate limitations on public
release, for the investigation of accidents or for use by management
in carrying out efficiency testing and system wide performance
monitoring programs.
In addition, Safety Recommendation R-10-02 recommended that FRA:
Require that railroads regularly review and use in-cab audio and
image recordings (with appropriate limitations on public release),
in conjunction with other performance data, to verify that train
crew actions are in accordance with rules and procedures that are
essential to safety.
Metro-North Railroad Derailment, Bronx, NY
On December 1, 2013, at approximately 7:20 a.m. EST, southbound
Metro-North Railroad (Metro-North) passenger train 8808 derailed as it
approached the Spuyten Duyvil Station in New York City. All passenger
cars and the locomotive derailed, and, as a result, four passengers
died and at least 61 passengers were injured. The train was traveling
at 82 mph when it derailed in a section of curved track where the
maximum authorized speed was 30 mph. Following the accident, the
engineer reported that: (1) He felt dazed just before the derailment;
\10\ and (2) his wife had complained about his snoring. The engineer
then underwent a sleep evaluation that identified excessive daytime
sleepiness and a sleep study that diagnosed severe obstructive sleep
apnea (OSA). Based on its investigation of the derailment, the NTSB
concluded that the engineer had multiple OSA risk factors, such as
obesity, male gender, snoring, complaints of fatigue, and excessive
daytime sleepiness. Even though the engineer had these OSA risk
factors, neither his personal health care provider nor his Metro-North
occupational health evaluations had screened the engineer for OSA.\11\
NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the
``engineer's noncompliance with the 30-mph speed restriction because he
had fallen asleep due to undiagnosed severe obstructive sleep apnea
exacerbated by a recent circadian rhythm shift required by his work
schedule.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ NTSB, Railroad Accident Brief RAB-14/12, Metro-North
Railroad Derailment, October 24, 2014, p. 2.
\11\ Id. at 3.
\12\ Id. at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Railroad safety is of the utmost importance to FRA, and, based on
the above accidents, FRA recommends several measures discussed below,
to address human factor-caused accidents
III. Inward- and Outward-Facing Cameras
On December 4, 2015, the President signed into law the Fixing
America's Surface Transportation Act, Public Law 114-94, 129 Stat. 1686
(Dec. 4, 2015) (FAST Act). Section 11411 of the FAST Act, codified in
the Federal railroad safety laws at 49 U.S.C. 20168 (the Statute),
requires FRA (as the Secretary of Transportation's delegate) to
promulgate regulations requiring each railroad carrier that provides
regularly scheduled intercity rail passenger or commuter rail passenger
transportation to install inward- and outward-facing image recording
devices in all controlling locomotives of passenger trains. 49 U.S.C.
20168(a). Although FRA is in the process of developing a regulatory
proposal addressing this statutory mandate, FRA encourages railroads to
accelerate the installation of the cameras. The Statute contains
various design and operational requirements related to these cameras
including:
A minimum 12-hour continuous recording capability (49
U.S.C. 20168(b)(1));
Crash and fire protections for any in-cab image recordings
that are stored only within a controlling locomotive cab or cab car
operating compartment (49 U.S.C. 20168(b)(2));
Recordings must be accessible for review during an
accident or incident investigation (49 U.S.C. 20168(b)(3));
[[Page 87651]]
Railroads may use the recordings to:
[cir] Verify that train crew actions follow applicable safety laws
and the railroad carrier's operating rules and procedures (49 U.S.C.
20168(d)(1));
[cir] Assist in an investigation into the causation of a reportable
accident or incident (49 U.S.C. 20168(d)(2)); and
[cir] Document a criminal act or monitor unauthorized occupancy of
the controlling locomotive cab or car operating compartment (49 U.S.C.
20168(d)(3)).
In addition to the design and operational requirements in the FAST
Act, the Statute also contains various other requirements regarding the
use and maintenance of inward- and outward-facing cameras as well as
limitations and protections on how data from the cameras can be used.
Importantly, the Statute prohibits railroads from using image
recordings to retaliate against their employees. 49 U.S.C. 20168(i). In
addition, to discourage tampering with the cameras, the Statute allows
railroads to take enforcement actions against employees that tamper
with or disable an inward- or outward-facing image recording device. 49
U.S.C. 20168(f). Furthermore, recording device data obtained from a
locomotive involved in a FRA reportable accident or incident must be
preserved by the railroad for one year after the accident or incident.
49 U.S.C. 20168(g).
Once FRA has acquired this data from the railroad, FRA is
prohibited from publicly disclosing locomotive audio and image
recordings or transcripts of oral communications between train,
operating, and communication center employees related to the accident
or incident FRA is investigating. However, FRA may publicly release a
transcript of a written depiction of visual information that the agency
deems is relevant to the accident at the time other factual reports on
the accident are released to the public. 49 U.S.C. 20168(h). This
restriction is similar to the prohibition on public disclosure of
locomotive recordings that NTSB takes possession of during an
investigation. 49 U.S.C. 1114(d).
FRA remains concerned with the ability to fully investigate
accidents that appear to be human factor-caused where there is
insufficient information from the controlling locomotive cab or cab
operating compartment to conclusively determine what caused or
contributed to an accident. Locomotive cab recording information could
benefit investigations and help identify necessary corrective actions
before similar train accidents occur. Inward- and outward-facing image
recording devices would be valuable in revealing crew actions and
interactions before, during, and after an accident. FRA also believes
that inward- and outward-facing cameras will give railroads the ability
to monitor crew behavior to ensure compliance with existing Federal
regulations and railroad operating rules and deter noncompliance.
Existing Federal regulations at 49 CFR part 217 require railroads to
conduct operational tests to determine the extent of employees'
compliance with railroad operating rules, and particularly those rules
which are most likely to cause the most accidents or incidents.
IV. Railroad Employee Fatigue
Fatigue of railroad employees continues to be a concern of FRA,
particularly for employees with sleep disorders who operate passenger
trains. This Advisory contains suggested measures that railroads and
employees should utilize to prevent work-related errors and on-the-job
accidents as a result of sleep disorders.
Sleep disorders represent a serious health problem and left
untreated can result in impaired work performance, including possible
loss of alertness and situational awareness, which could in turn
present an imminent threat to transportation safety.\13\ In general
terms, sleep disorders range from fairly common disorders, such as
insomnia (the inability to initiate or maintain sleep) to relatively
rare sleep disorders such as narcolepsy (inappropriate and
uncontrollable sleep episodes). Railroad employees who typically work
on-call are especially vulnerable to circadian rhythm disorders such as
shift work sleep disorder (SWSD).\14\ SWSD symptoms include excessive
sleepiness when a worker needs to be awake, insomnia when the worker
needs to obtain sleep, unrefreshing sleep, and difficulty
concentrating.\15\ One of the more common sleep disorders is
obstructive sleep apnea (OSA). And, the lawyer representing the
engineer of the NJT train stated the engineer had undiagnosed OSA.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See 81 FR 12642, 12643-12644 (Mar. 10, 2016); Federal
Railroad Administration Notice of Safety Advisory 2004-04 (Oct. 1,
2004).
\14\ Id.
\15\ Id.
\16\ See https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/NJ-train-crash-undiagnosed-engineer-sleep-disorder-apnea-hoboken-401555955.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
OSA is a respiratory disorder characterized by a reduction or
cessation of breathing during sleep. OSA is characterized by repeated
episodes of upper airway collapse in the region of the upper throat
(pharynx) that results in intermittent periods of partial airflow
obstruction (hypopneas), complete airflow obstruction (apneas), and
respiratory effort-related arousals from sleep (RERAs) in which
affected individuals awaken partially and may experience gasping and
choking as they struggle to breathe. Risk factors for developing OSA
include: Obesity, male gender, advancing age, family history of OSA,
large neck size, and an anatomically small oropharynx (throat).
Additionally, OSA is associated with increased risk for other adverse
health conditions such as: Hypertension (high blood pressure),
diabetes, cardiac dysrhythmias (irregular heartbeat), myocardial
infarction (heart attack), stroke, and sudden cardiac death.
Individuals who have undiagnosed OSA are often unaware they have
experienced periods of sleep interrupted by breathing difficulties
(apneas, hypopneas, or RERAs) when they awaken in the morning. As a
result, the condition is often unrecognized by affected individuals and
underdiagnosed by medical professionals.
For individuals with OSA, eight hours of sleep can be less restful
or refreshing than four hours of ordinary, uninterrupted sleep.
Undiagnosed or inadequately treated moderate to severe OSA can cause
unintended sleep episodes and resulting deficits in attention,
concentration, situational awareness, and memory, thus reducing the
capacity to safely respond to hazards when performing safety sensitive
duties. Thus, OSA is a critical safety issue that can affect operations
in all modes of travel in the transportation industry.
On March 10, 2016, FRA published an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM) requesting data and information concerning the
prevalence of moderate-to-severe OSA of individuals occupying safety
sensitive positions in rail transportation and the potential
consequences for rail safety. See 81 FR 12642 (Mar. 10, 2016). The
ANPRM also requested information on the potential costs and benefits
from regulatory actions that would address the safety risks associated
with rail transportation workers in safety sensitive positions who have
OSA. The ANPRM was published jointly with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration and requested similar information regarding
highway transportation workers in safety sensitive positions and
highway safety. This Advisory and accompanying recommended actions is
not in response to the ANPRM; rather, it is an action concurrent with
the ANPRM. FRA is currently reviewing the data and
[[Page 87652]]
information submitted in response to the ANPRM.
V. Passenger Terminals and Stations With Stub End Tracks
The Hoboken accident involved NJT Train 1614 that was traversing a
stub end track entering a passenger station at 21 mph-11 mph over the
10 mph posted speed limit. FRA recommends identifying locations that
have stub end tracks at passenger terminals and stations that are
equipped with technology that can warn and enforce passenger trains to
stop short of a stub end track and ensure they enforce applicable speed
limits. If such locations are not equipped with technology that can
warn and enforce passenger trains to stop short of a stub end track and
ensure they enforce applicable speed limits, then FRA encourages
railroads to take other operational actions to prevent trains from
overrunning stub end tracks equipped with or without bumping posts. One
such operational action would be to require communications between the
engineer and other qualified employees that can take appropriate
action, such as applying the emergency brakes, if necessary.
VI. Recommended Actions
In light of the recent accident discussed above, and in an effort
to ensure the safety of the Nation's railroads, their employees, and
the general public, FRA recommends that intercity passenger and
commuter railroads do each of the following:
1. Instruct their employees during training classes and safety
briefings on the importance of compliance with maximum authorized train
speed limits and other speed restrictions when entering passenger
stations and terminals;
2. Not less than once every six months evaluate operational testing
data as required by 49 CFR 217.9. A railroad should consider increasing
the frequency of operational testing where its reviews show any non-
compliance with maximum authorized train speeds in passenger stations
or terminals. Railroads should conduct a significant number of
operational tests on trains required to operate into a station or
terminal with stub end tracks;
3. Adopt procedures requiring communication between crew members
and the locomotive engineer before and during operation into a station
or terminal and/or implement technology to appropriately control and/or
stop the train short of the stub end track. These actions could
include:
a. Making modifications to automatic train control (ATC), cab
signal, or other signal systems capable of providing warning and
enforcement to ensure trains comply with applicable speed limits and
stop short of stub end tracks;
b. If a railroad does not utilize an ATC, cab signal, or other
signal system capable of providing warning and enforcement at
applicable passenger terminals and stations with stub end tracks
platforms (or if a signal system modification would interfere with the
implementation of PTC or is otherwise not viable), making all passenger
train movements at the identified locations while in communication with
a second qualified crew member. This will provide constant
communication with the locomotive engineer and allow the second
crewmember to take immediate appropriate action if the locomotive
engineer is not responding or is unable to stop short of stub end
tracks. This could also include making a safety stop at predetermined
location and if the locomotive engineer does not make an appropriate
safety stop the second qualified crew member can take appropriate
action to stop the train;
4. Review Safety Advisory 2004-04 (69 FR 58995, Oct. 1, 2004);
Effect of Sleep Disorders on Safety of Railroad Operations, in its
entirety with all operating crews. Recommended actions from Safety
Advisory 2004-04 are listed below:
a. Establish training and educational programs to inform employees
of the potential for performance impairment as a result of fatigue,
sleep loss, sleep deprivation, inadequate sleep quality, and working at
odd hours, and document when employees have received the training.
Incorporate elements that encourage self-assessment, peer-to-peer
communication, and co-worker identification accompanied by policies
consistent with these recommendations. The Railroaders' Guide to
Healthy Sleep Web site (https://www.railroadersleep.org) has several
educational resources to assist railroaders in improving their sleep
health including an anonymous tool for self-screening for sleep
disorders including OSA. This Web site is set up to disseminate
educational information to railroad employees and their families about
sleep disorders, the relevance of healthy sleep to railroad safety, and
provide information about improving the quality of the railroaders'
sleep. The Web site was developed in conjunction with the Division of
Sleep Medicine at Harvard Medical School, WGBH Educational Foundation,
and Volpe--The National Transportation Systems Center;
b. Ensure that employees' medical examinations include assessment
and screening for possible sleep disorders and other associated medical
conditions (including use of appropriate checklists and records).
Develop standardized screening tools, or a good practices guide, for
the diagnosis, referral and treatment of sleep disorders (especially
OSA) and other related medical conditions to be used by company paid or
recommended physicians during routine medical examinations; and provide
an appropriate list of certified sleep disorder centers and related
specialists for referral when necessary;
c. Develop and implement rules that request employees in safety-
sensitive positions to voluntarily report any sleep disorder that could
incapacitate, or seriously impair, their performance;
d. Develop and implement policies such that, when a railroad
becomes aware that an employee in a safety-sensitive position has an
incapacitating or performance-impairing medical condition related to
sleep, the railroad prohibits that employee from performing any safety-
sensitive duties until that medical condition appropriately responds to
treatment; and
e. Implement policies, procedures, and any necessary agreements
to--
i. Promote self-reporting of sleep-related medical conditions by
protecting the medical confidentiality of that information and
protecting the employment relationship, provided that the employee
complies with the recommended course of treatment;
ii. Encourage employees with diagnosed sleep disorders to
participate in recommended evaluation and treatment; and
iii. Establish dispute resolution mechanisms that rapidly resolve
any issues regarding the current fitness of employees who have reported
sleep-related medical conditions and have cooperated in evaluation and
prescribed treatment.
5. Accelerate the installation of inward- and outward-facing
cameras in passenger trains in the cab of the controlling locomotive or
cab car operating compartment per the FAST Act. FRA notes that the FAST
Act includes provisions on standards for the cameras, use of the
cameras, and preservation and protection of data from the cameras.
FRA encourages all intercity passenger and commuter railroads to
take actions consistent with the preceding recommendations. FRA
acknowledges that action on some of the
[[Page 87653]]
above recommendations may have already taken place by segments of the
industry. If so, FRA recommends railroads review their current programs
for relevancy and review the policies and procedures with all their
operating employees.
FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2016-03, issue additional
safety advisories, or take other appropriate action necessary to ensure
the highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads, including
pursing other corrective measures under its rail safety authority.
Robert Lauby,
Administrator for Railroad Safety Chief Safety Officer.
[FR Doc. 2016-29013 Filed 12-2-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P