Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-015 LeadTrac System of Records, 85106-85107 [2016-28289]
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85106
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 227 / Friday, November 25, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process.
(b) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’s ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(c) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to
the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Dated: November 17, 2016.
Jonathan R. Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2016–28288 Filed 11–23–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–14–P
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS–2016–0087]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement–015 LeadTrac
System of Records
Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of Homeland
Security is issuing a final rule to amend
its regulations to exempt portions of a
newly established system of records
titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)/U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE)–015
LeadTrac System of Records’’ from
certain provisions of the Privacy Act.
Specifically, the Department exempts
portions of the ‘‘DHS/ICE–015 LeadTrac
System of Records’’ from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative
enforcement requirements.
DATES: This final rule is effective
November 25, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
general questions, please contact:
Amber Smith, Privacy Officer, (202–
732–3300), U.S. Immigration and
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Jkt 241001
Background
DHS/ICE published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register, 81 FR 153, August 9, 2016,
proposing to exempt portions of the
system of records from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative
enforcement requirements. The system
of records is the DHS/ICE–015 LeadTrac
System of Records. The DHS/ICE–015
LeadTrac System of Records Notice was
published concurrently in the Federal
Register, 81 FR 153, August 9, 2016, and
comments were invited on both the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
and System of Records Notice (SORN).
Public Comments
DHS received no comments on the
NPRM and no comments on the SORN.
Because DHS received no public
comments, the Department will
implement the rulemaking as proposed.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
SUMMARY:
Customs Enforcement, 500 12th Street
SW., Mail Stop 5004, Washington, DC
20536, email: ICEPrivacy@ice.dhs.gov.
For privacy issues, please contact:
Jonathan R. Cantor (202–1717), Acting
Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS proposes to amend
chapter I of title 6, Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for part 5
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat.
2135; (6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.); 5 U.S.C. 301.
Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
2. Add paragraph 75 to appendix C to
part 5 to read as follows:
■
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
*
*
*
*
*
75. The DHS/ICE–015 LeadTrac System of
Records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by ICE investigative
and homeland security personnel. The DHS/
ICE–015 LeadTrac System of Records is a
repository of information held by ICE for
analytical and investigative purposes. The
system is used to conduct research
supporting the production of law
enforcement activities; provide lead
information for investigative inquiry and
follow-up; assist in the conduct of ICE
criminal and administrative investigations;
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
assist in the disruption of terrorist or other
criminal activity; and discover previously
unknown connections among existing ICE
investigations. The DHS/ICE–015 LeadTrac
System of Records contains aggregated data
from ICE and DHS law enforcement and
homeland security IT systems, as well as data
uploaded by ICE personnel for analysis from
various public, private, and commercial
sources during the course of an investigation
or analytical project. The Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2), has exempted this system from the
following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5),
(e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
552a(k)(2), has exempted this system from
the following provisions of the Privacy Act:
5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). When a record
received from another system has been
exempted in that source system under 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2) or (k)(2), DHS will claim the
same exemptions for those records that are
claimed for the original primary systems of
records from which they originated and
claims any additional exemptions set forth
here.
Exemptions from these particular
subsections are justified, on a case-by-case
basis to be determined at the time a request
is made, for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because release
of the accounting of disclosures could alert
the subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of that investigation
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would therefore
present a serious impediment to law
enforcement efforts and/or efforts to preserve
national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension, which would undermine the
entire investigative process. Disclosure of
corrections or notations of dispute may
impede investigations by requiring DHS to
inform each witness or individual contacted
during the investigation of each correction or
notation pertaining to information provided
them during the investigation.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records)
because access to the records contained in
this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or
potential criminal, civil, or regulatory
violation to the existence of that investigation
and reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the
records could permit the individual who is
the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension. Amendment of the records
could interfere with ongoing investigations
and law enforcement activities and would
impose an unreasonable administrative
burden by requiring investigations to be
continually reinvestigated. In addition,
E:\FR\FM\25NOR1.SGM
25NOR1
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 227 / Friday, November 25, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
ehiers on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with RULES
permitting access and amendment to such
information could disclose classified and
other security-sensitive information that
could be detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and
Necessity of Information) because in the
course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of
information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear, or the
information may not be strictly relevant or
necessary to a specific investigation. In the
interests of effective law enforcement, it is
appropriate to retain all information that may
aid in establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of
Information from Individuals) because
requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the
subject to the nature or existence of the
investigation, thereby interfering with that
investigation and related law enforcement
activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such detailed
information could impede law enforcement
by compromising the existence of a
confidential investigation or reveal the
identity of witnesses or confidential
informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H),
and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f)
(Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access
provisions of subsection (d) for the reasons
noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or
procedures with respect to such access.
Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in
the system of records or otherwise
establishing procedures pursuant to which
individuals may access and view records
pertaining to themselves in the system would
undermine investigative efforts and reveal
the identities of witnesses, potential
witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of
Information) because with the collection of
information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely, and
complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their
investigative training and exercise of good
judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’s ability to obtain, serve,
and issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law
enforcement mechanisms that may be filed
under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and
evidence.
(i) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies)
to the extent that the system is exempt from
other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
Dated: November 17, 2016.
Jonathan Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2016–28289 Filed 11–23–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–28–P
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:00 Nov 23, 2016
Jkt 241001
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Agricultural Marketing Service
7 CFR Part 932
[Doc. No. AMS–SC–16–0031; SC16–932–1
FIR]
Olives Grown in California;
Suspension and Revision of Incoming
Size-Grade Requirements
Agricultural Marketing Service,
USDA.
ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as
final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of
Agriculture (USDA) is adopting, as a
final rule, without change, an interim
rule that suspended the incoming sizegrade authority under the California
olive marketing order, which regulates
the handling of olives in California. The
rule, which was recommended by the
California Olive Committee
(Committee), also made conforming
changes to the corresponding size-grade
requirements in the order’s rules and
regulations and two Committee forms.
The Committee locally administers the
order and is comprised of producers and
handlers of olives operating within the
area of production. The interim rule
suspended the incoming size-grade
authority of the marketing order and
revised the corresponding size-grade
requirements in the order’s rules and
regulations. The change is expected to
benefit handlers because the current
size-grading requirements hinder
handler operations and flexibility,
increase costs, and diminish their
competitiveness.
SUMMARY:
DATES:
Effective November 28, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Peter Sommers, Marketing Specialist, or
Jeffrey Smutny, Regional Director,
California Marketing Field Office,
Marketing Order and Agreement
Division, Specialty Crops Program,
AMS, USDA; Telephone: (559) 487–
5901, Fax: (559) 487–5906, or Email:
PeterR.Sommers@ams.usda.gov or
Jeffrey.Smutny@ams.usda.gov.
Small businesses may obtain
information on complying with this and
other marketing order and agreement
regulations by viewing a guide at the
following Web site: https://
www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/
moa/small-businesses; or by contacting
Richard Lower, Marketing Order and
Agreement Division, Specialty Crops
Program, AMS, USDA, 1400
Independence Avenue SW., STOP 0237,
Washington, DC 20250–0237;
Telephone: (202) 720–2491, Fax: (202)
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
85107
720–8938, or Email: Richard.Lower@
ams.usda.gov.
This rule
is issued under Marketing Agreement
and Marketing Order No. 932, both as
amended (7 CFR part 905), regulating
the handling of olives grown in
California, hereinafter referred to as the
‘‘order.’’ The order is effective under the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act
of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. 601–674),
hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Act.’’
The Department of Agriculture
(USDA) is issuing this rule in
conformance with Executive Orders
12866, 13563, and 13175.
Prior to this change, the size
requirements were based on count
ranges, mid-points and average counts
per pound, while new technology sizes
olives using mass and volume. Thus, the
size-grading requirements and the more
advanced sizing technology available
now are incompatible and hinder
handler operations and flexibility,
increase costs, and diminish handler
competitiveness. Suspending the
incoming size-grading requirements will
provide an opportunity for the industry
to develop new requirements applicable
both to currently-available technology
and future needs.
In an interim rule published in the
Federal Register on July 18, 2016, and
effective on July 19, 2016, (81 FR 46567,
Doc. No. AMS–SC–16–0031, SC16–932–
1 IR), paragraphs (a)(1)(ii) through (a)(5)
in § 932.51 were suspended indefinitely.
In addition, the rule revised language in
§ 932.151, bringing that section into
conformity with the intent of the rule,
and necessitated minor conforming
changes to two Committee forms, the
Weight & Grade Report (COC–3c) and
Report of Limited and Undersize and
Cull Olives Inspection and Disposition
(COC–5).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Pursuant to requirements set forth in
the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5
U.S.C. 601–612), the Agricultural
Marketing Service (AMS) has
considered the economic impact of this
action on small entities. Accordingly,
AMS has prepared this final regulatory
flexibility analysis.
The purpose of the RFA is to fit
regulatory actions to the scale of
business subject to such actions in order
that small businesses will not be unduly
or disproportionately burdened.
Marketing orders issued pursuant to the
Act, and the rules issued thereunder, are
unique in that they are brought about
through group action of essentially
small entities acting on their own
behalf.
E:\FR\FM\25NOR1.SGM
25NOR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 227 (Friday, November 25, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 85106-85107]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-28289]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS-2016-0087]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of
Homeland Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-015 LeadTrac
System of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security is issuing a final rule to
amend its regulations to exempt portions of a newly established system
of records titled, ``Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)-015 LeadTrac System of
Records'' from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. Specifically, the
Department exempts portions of the ``DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of
Records'' from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act because of
criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement requirements.
DATES: This final rule is effective November 25, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions, please contact:
Amber Smith, Privacy Officer, (202-732-3300), U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, 500 12th Street SW., Mail Stop 5004, Washington,
DC 20536, email: ICEPrivacy@ice.dhs.gov. For privacy issues, please
contact: Jonathan R. Cantor (202-1717), Acting Chief Privacy Officer,
Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
DHS/ICE published a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register, 81 FR 153, August 9, 2016, proposing to exempt portions of
the system of records from one or more provisions of the Privacy Act
because of criminal, civil, and administrative enforcement
requirements. The system of records is the DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System
of Records. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of Records Notice was
published concurrently in the Federal Register, 81 FR 153, August 9,
2016, and comments were invited on both the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) and System of Records Notice (SORN).
Public Comments
DHS received no comments on the NPRM and no comments on the SORN.
Because DHS received no public comments, the Department will
implement the rulemaking as proposed.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS proposes to amend
chapter I of title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
0
1. The authority citation for part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.); 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
0
2. Add paragraph 75 to appendix C to part 5 to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
75. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of Records consists of
electronic and paper records and will be used by ICE investigative
and homeland security personnel. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of
Records is a repository of information held by ICE for analytical
and investigative purposes. The system is used to conduct research
supporting the production of law enforcement activities; provide
lead information for investigative inquiry and follow-up; assist in
the conduct of ICE criminal and administrative investigations;
assist in the disruption of terrorist or other criminal activity;
and discover previously unknown connections among existing ICE
investigations. The DHS/ICE-015 LeadTrac System of Records contains
aggregated data from ICE and DHS law enforcement and homeland
security IT systems, as well as data uploaded by ICE personnel for
analysis from various public, private, and commercial sources during
the course of an investigation or analytical project. The Secretary
of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted
this system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I), (e)(5), (e)(8); (f); and (g). Additionally,
the Secretary of Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2),
has exempted this system from the following provisions of the
Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (c)(4); (d); (e)(1), (e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), (e)(4)(I); and (f). When a record received from another
system has been exempted in that source system under 5 U.S.C.
552a(j)(2) or (k)(2), DHS will claim the same exemptions for those
records that are claimed for the original primary systems of records
from which they originated and claims any additional exemptions set
forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made,
for the following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
as well as the recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts
and/or efforts to preserve national security. Disclosure of the
accounting would also permit the individual who is the subject of a
record to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or
evidence, and to avoid detection or apprehension, which would
undermine the entire investigative process. Disclosure of
corrections or notations of dispute may impede investigations by
requiring DHS to inform each witness or individual contacted during
the investigation of each correction or notation pertaining to
information provided them during the investigation.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to
the records contained in this system of records could inform the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal,
civil, or regulatory violation to the existence of that
investigation and reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS
or another agency. Access to the records could permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede the investigation, to
tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid detection or
apprehension. Amendment of the records could interfere with ongoing
investigations and law enforcement activities and would impose an
unreasonable administrative burden by requiring investigations to be
continually reinvestigated. In addition,
[[Page 85107]]
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
classified and other security-sensitive information that could be
detrimental to homeland security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of
Information) because in the course of investigations into potential
violations of federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not
be strictly relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In
the interests of effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in establishing patterns of
unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from
the subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the
nature or existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because
providing such detailed information could impede law enforcement by
compromising the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal
the identity of witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules), because portions of this
system are exempt from the individual access provisions of
subsection (d) for the reasons noted above, and therefore DHS is not
required to establish requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to such access. Providing notice to individuals with respect
to existence of records pertaining to them in the system of records
or otherwise establishing procedures pursuant to which individuals
may access and view records pertaining to themselves in the system
would undermine investigative efforts and reveal the identities of
witnesses, potential witnesses, and confidential informants.
(g) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because
with the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it
is impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5)
would preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training
and exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(h) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of
investigative techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(i) From subsection (g)(1) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that
the system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy
Act.
Dated: November 17, 2016.
Jonathan Cantor,
Acting Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2016-28289 Filed 11-23-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-28-P
