Manual for Courts-Martial; Publication of Supplementary Materials, 78576-78589 [2016-26947]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 216 / Tuesday, November 8, 2016 / Notices
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[FR Doc. 2016–26928 Filed 11–7–16; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
These Supplementary Materials
are effective as of November 8, 2016.
DATES:
[Docket ID: DOD–2016–OS–0110]
Manual for Courts-Martial; Publication
of Supplementary Materials
Joint Service Committee on
Military Justice (JSC), Department of
Defense.
ACTION: Publication of Discussion and
Analysis (Supplementary Materials)
accompanying the Manual for CourtsMartial, United States (2012 ed.) (MCM).
AGENCY:
The JSC hereby publishes
Supplementary Materials accompanying
the MCM as amended by Executive
Orders 13643, 13669, 13696, 13730, and
13740. These changes have not been
coordinated within the Department of
Defense under DoD Directive 5500.1,
‘‘Preparation, Processing and
Coordinating Legislation, Executive
Orders, Proclamations, Views Letters
and Testimony,’’ June 15, 2007, and do
not constitute the official position of the
Department of Defense, the Military
Departments, or any other Government
agency. These Supplementary Materials
have been approved by the JSC and the
General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, and shall be applied in
conjunction with the rule with which
they are associated. The Discussions are
effective insofar as the Rules they
supplement are effective, but may not be
SUMMARY:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Major Harlye S. Carlton, USMC, (703)
963–9299 or harlye.carlton@usmc.mil.
The JSC Web site is located at: https://
jsc.defense.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Public Comments: The JSC solicited
public comments for these changes to
the MCM via the Federal Register on
October 23, 2012 (77 FR 64854–64887,
Docket ID: DoD–2012–OS–0129), held a
public meeting on December 11, 2012,
and published the JSC response to
public comments via the Federal
Register on March 5, 2013 (78 FR
14271–14272, Docket ID: DoD–2012–
OS–0129).
The amendments to the Discussion
and Analysis of the MCM are as follows:
Annex
Section 1. Appendix 12 of the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, is
amended as follows:
(a) Article 120 is amended to read as
follows:
‘‘120 Rape and sexual assault generally
Offense
Discharge
Confinement
Forfeiture
Rape ...........................................................................................
Sexual Assault ............................................................................
Aggravated Sexual Contact .......................................................
Abusive Sexual Contact .............................................................
Mandatory DD 5 .......................
Mandatory DD 5 .......................
DD, BCD .................................
DD, BCD .................................
Life 4 ........................................
30 yrs ......................................
20 yrs ......................................
7 yrs ........................................
Offense
Discharge
Confinement
Rape of a Child ..........................................................................
Sexual Assault of a Child ...........................................................
Sexual Abuse of a Child:
Cases Involving Sexual Contact .........................................
Other Cases ........................................................................
Mandatory DD 5 .......................
Mandatory DD 5 .......................
Life 4 ........................................
30 yrs ......................................
Total.
Total.
DD, BCD .................................
DD, BCD .................................
20 yrs ......................................
15 yrs ......................................
Total.
Total.’’
Total.
Total.
Total.
Total.’’
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(b) Article 120b is inserted to read as
follows:
‘‘120b Rape and sexual assault of a
child
(c) Article 120c is inserted to read as
follows:
‘‘120c
Other sexual misconduct
Offense
Discharge
Confinement
Indecent Viewing ........................................................................
Indecent Recording ....................................................................
Broadcasting or Distributing of an Indecent Recording .............
DD, BCD .................................
DD, BCD .................................
DD, BCD .................................
1 yr ..........................................
5 yrs ........................................
7 yrs ........................................
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Forfeiture
Total.
Total.
Total.
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Offense
Discharge
Confinement
Forcible Pandering .....................................................................
Indecent Exposure .....................................................................
DD, BCD .................................
DD, BCD .................................
12 yrs ......................................
1 yr ..........................................
‘‘125
offenses committed after 28 June 2012.
See Appendices 23, 27, and 28.]’’
(e) Article 125 is amended to read as
follows:
(d) The following Note is inserted
after Article 120c to read as follows:
‘‘[Note: The Article 120, 120b, and
120c maximum punishments apply to
Offense
Discharge
Forcible sodomy .........................................................................
Bestiality .....................................................................................
(f) Article 134 abusing public animal
is amended to read as follows:
‘‘134
Mandatory
.......................
DD, BCD .................................
Life 4
........................................
5 yrs ........................................
Total.
Total.’’
Forfeiture
Total.
Total.’’
Animal abuse
Offense
Discharge
Confinement
Abuse, neglect, or abandonment of an animal ..........................
Abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a public animal .................
Sexual act with an animal or cases where the accused caused
the serious injury or death of the animal.
BCD .........................................
BCD .........................................
DD, BCD .................................
1 yr ..........................................
2yrs ..........................................
5 yrs ........................................
(g) Article 134 Assault with intent to
commit voluntary manslaughter,
Forfeiture
Forcible sodomy; bestiality
Confinement
DD 5
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Forfeiture
Total.
Total.
Total.’’
robbery, sodomy, arson, or burglary is
amended to read as follows:
Offense
Discharge
Confinement
134 With intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, robbery,
forcible sodomy, arson, or burglary.
DD, BCD .................................
10 yrs ......................................
Discharge
Confinement
DD, BCD .................................
5 yrs ........................................
Forfeiture
Total.’’
(h) Article 134 Indecent conduct is
inserted to read as follows:
Offense
134
Indecent conduct ..............................................................
(i) The Notes are amended by adding
note 5 after note 4.
‘‘ 5. A dishonorable discharge can be
reduced to a bad-conduct discharge by
the convening authority in accordance
with a pretrial agreement.’’
Section 2. Appendix 12A of the
Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is inserted to read as follows:
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Article
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
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‘‘APPENDIX 12A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
This chart was compiled for
convenience purposes only and is not
the ultimate authority for specific lesser
included offenses. Lesser offenses are
those which are necessarily included in
the offense charged. See Article 79.
Depending on the factual circumstances
in each case, the offenses listed below
may be considered lesser included. The
Lesser included offense
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See
See
See
See
See
Part
Part
Part
Part
Part
IV,
IV,
IV,
IV,
IV,
Para.
Para.
Para.
Para.
Para.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Art. 86.
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Total.’’
elements of the proposed lesser
included offense should be compared
with the elements of the greater offense
to determine if the elements of the lesser
offense are derivative of the greater
offense and vice versa. The ‘‘elements
test’’ is the proper method for
determining lesser included offenses.
See Appendix 23.
Attempts to commit an offense may
constitute a lesser included offense and
are not listed. See Article 80.
Offense
Principals .....................................................................................
Accessory after the fact ..............................................................
Conviction of lesser included offenses .......................................
Attempts ......................................................................................
Conspiracy ..................................................................................
Solicitation.
Fraudulent enlistment, appointment, or separation.
Effecting unlawful enlistment, appointment, or separation.
Desertion .....................................................................................
Absence without leave.
Forfeiture
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Article
Offense
87 ..................
Missing movement.
—Design .....................................................................................
—Neglect ....................................................................................
Contempt toward officials.
Disrespect toward a superior commissioned officer ...................
Assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer.
—Striking superior commissioned officer in execution of office
88 ..................
89 ..................
90 ..................
Lesser included offense
—Drawing or lifting up a weapon or offering violence to superior commissioned officer in execution of office.
91 ..................
92 ..................
93 ..................
94 ..................
95 ..................
96 ..................
97 ..................
98 ..................
99 ..................
—Willfully disobeying lawful order of superior commissioned
officer.
Insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or petty officer.
—Striking or assaulting warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer in the execution of office.
—Disobeying a warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer ......
—Treating with contempt or being disrespectful in language or
deportment toward warrant, noncommissioned, or petty officer in the execution of office.
Failure to obey order or regulation.
Cruelty and maltreatment.
Mutiny and sedition.
—Mutiny by creating violence or disturbance ............................
—Mutiny by refusing to obey orders or perform duties ..............
—Sedition ....................................................................................
Resistance, flight, breach of arrest, and escape.
—Resisting apprehension ...........................................................
Releasing prisoner without proper authority.
—Suffering a prisoner to escape through design .......................
Unlawful detention.
Noncompliance with procedural rules.
Misbehavior before the enemy.
—Running away ..........................................................................
—Endangering safety of a command, unit, place, ship, or military property.
—Casting away arms or ammunition .........................................
—Cowardly conduct ....................................................................
100 ................
101 ................
102 ................
103 ................
104 ................
105 ................
106 ................
106a ..............
107 ................
108 ................
—Quitting place of duty to plunder or pillage .............................
Subordinate compelling surrender.
Improper use of a countersign.
Forcing a safeguard.
Captured or abandoned property.
Aiding the enemy.
Misconduct as a prisoner.
Spies.
Espionage.
False official statement.
Military property of the United States—sale, loss, damage, destruction, or wrongful disposition.
—Willfully damaging military property ........................................
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—Willfully suffering military property to be damaged .................
—Willfully destroying military property ........................................
—Willfully suffering military property to be destroyed ................
—Willfully losing military property ...............................................
—Willfully suffering military property to be lost ..........................
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Art. 87 (neglect); Art. 86.
Art. 86.
Art. 117.
Art. 90 (drawing or lifting up a weapon or offering violence to
superior commissioned officer); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery; assault with a dangerous
weapon; assault or assault consummated by a battery upon
commissioned officer not in the execution of office).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault with a dangerous weapon; assault upon a commissioned officer not in the execution of office).
Art. 92; Art. 89.
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon; assault upon warrant,
noncommissioned, or petty officer not in the execution of office).
Art. 92.
Art. 117.
Art. 90; Art. 116; Art. 128 (simple assault).
Art. 90 (willful disobedience of commissioned officer); Art. 91
(willful disobedience of warrant, noncommissioned, or petty
officer); Art. 92.
Art. 116; Art. 128 (assault).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 96 (neglect).
Art. 85 (desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty or important service); Art. 86 (absence without authority; going from
appointed place of duty).
Art. 92.
Art. 108.
Art. 85 (desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty or important service); Art. 86; Art. 99 (running away).
Art. 86 (going from appointed place of duty).
Art. 108 (damaging military property through neglect); Art. 109
(willfully damaging non-military property).
Art. 108 (through neglect suffering military property to be damaged).
Art. 108 (through neglect destroying military property; willfully
damaging military property; through neglect damaging military property); Art. 109 (willfully destroying non-military property; willfully damaging non-military property).
Art. 108 (through neglect suffering military property to be destroyed; willfully suffering military property to be damaged;
through neglect suffering military property to be damaged).
Art. 108 (through neglect losing military property).
Art. 108 (through neglect suffering military property to be lost).
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Article
109 ................
110 ................
111 ................
112 ................
112a ..............
113 ................
114 ................
115 ................
116 ................
117 ................
118 ................
Offense
Lesser included offense
—Willfully suffering military property to be sold .........................
—Willfully suffering military property to be wrongfully disposed
of.
Property other than military property of the United States—
waste, spoilage, or destruction.
Improper hazarding of vessel.
—Willfully and wrongfully hazarding a vessel ............................
—Willfully and wrongfully suffering a vessel to be hazarded .....
Drunken or reckless operation of vehicle, aircraft, or vessel.
—Reckless, wanton, or impaired operation or physical control
of a vessel.
—Drunken operation of a vehicle, vessel, or aircraft while
drunk or with a blood or breath alcohol concentration in violation of the described per se standard.
Drunk on Duty.
Wrongful use, possession, etc., of controlled substances.
—Wrongful use of controlled substance .....................................
—Wrongful manufacture of controlled substance ......................
—Wrongful introduction of controlled substance ........................
—Wrongful possession, manufacture, or introduction of a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
Misbehavior of sentinel or lookout.
—Drunk on post ..........................................................................
—Sleeping on post .....................................................................
—Leaving post ............................................................................
Art. 108 (through neglect suffering military property to be sold).
Art. 108 (through neglect suffering military property to be
wrongfully disposed of in the manner alleged).
Dueling.
Malingering.
Riot or breach of peace.
—Riot ..........................................................................................
Provoking speeches or gestures.
Murder.
—Premeditated murder and murder during certain offenses .....
—All murders under Article 118 .................................................
119 ................
119a ..............
120 1 ..............
—Murder as defined in Article 118(1), (2), and (4) ....................
Manslaughter.
—Voluntary manslaughter ..........................................................
—Involuntary manslaughter ........................................................
Death or injury of an unborn child.
—Killing an unborn child .............................................................
—Intentionally killing an unborn child .........................................
Rape and sexual assault generally.
—Rape.
—By unlawful force ..............................................................
—By force causing or likely to cause death or grievous
bodily harm to any person.
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—By threatening or placing that other person in fear that
any person would be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.
—By first rendering that other person unconscious ............
—By administering to that person a drug, intoxicant, or
other similar substance.
—Sexual Assault.
—By threatening or placing that other person in fear .........
—By causing bodily harm to that other person ...................
—By making a fraudulent representation that the sexual
act serves a professional purpose.
—Inducing a belief by any artifice, pretense, or concealment that the person is another person.
—Upon another person when the person knows or reasonably should know that the other person is asleep,
unconscious, or otherwise unaware that the sexual act
is occurring.
—When the other person is incapable of consenting .........
—Aggravated sexual contact.
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Art. 110 (negligently hazarding a vessel).
Art. 110 (negligently suffering a vessel to be hazarded).
Art. 110.
Art. 110; Art. 112.
Art. 112a (wrongful possession of controlled substance).
Art. 112a (wrongful possession of controlled substance).
Art. 112a (wrongful possession of controlled substance).
Art. 112a (wrongful possession, manufacture, or introduction of
controlled substance).
Art. 112; Art. 92 (dereliction of duty).
Art. 92 (dereliction of duty).
Art. 92 (dereliction of duty); Art. 86 (going from appointed
place of duty).
Art. 116 (breach of peace).
Art. 118 (intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm; act inherently
dangerous to another).
Art. 119 (involuntary manslaughter); Art. 128 (simple assault;
assault consummated by a battery; aggravated assault).
Art. 119 (voluntary manslaughter).
Art. 119 (involuntary manslaughter); Art. 128 (simple assault;
assault consummated by a battery; aggravated assault).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 119a (injuring an unborn child).
Art. 119a (killing an unborn child; injuring an unborn child).
Art. 120(b)(1)(B); Art. 120(c); Art. 120(d); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 120(a)(1); Art. 120(b)(1)(B); Art. 120(c); Art. 120(d); Art.
128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm; assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm).
Art. 120(b)(1)(B); Art. 120(c); Art. 120(d).
Art. 120(b)(2); Art. 120(c); Art. 120(d).
Art. 120(c); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by
a battery).
Art.
Art.
a
Art.
120(d).
120(d); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by
battery).
120(d).
Art. 120(d).
Art. 120(d).
Art. 120(d).
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Article
Offense
Lesser included offense
—By unlawful force ..............................................................
—By force causing or likely to cause death or grievous
bodily harm to any person.
—By threatening or placing that other person in fear that
any person would be subjected to death, grievous bodily harm, or kidnapping.
—By first rendering that person unconscious .....................
120a ..............
120b ..............
120c ..............
121 ................
—By administering to that person a drug, intoxicant, or
other similar substance.
—Abusive sexual contact ....................................................
Stalking.
Rape and sexual assault of a child.
—Rape of a child.
—Of a child who has not attained the age of 12 ................
—By force of a child who has attained the age of 12 ........
—By threatening or placing in fear a child who has attained the age of 12.
—By rendering unconscious a child who has attained the
age of 12.
—By administering a drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance to a child who has attained the age of 12.
—Sexual assault of a child.
—Sexual assault of a child who has not attained the age
of 12 involving contact between penis and vulva or anus
or mouth.
—Sexual assault of a child who has attained the age of
12 involving penetration of vulva or anus or mouth by
any part of the body or any object.
Other sexual misconduct.
Larceny and wrongful appropriation.
—Larceny ....................................................................................
—Larceny of military property .....................................................
122 ................
Robbery .......................................................................................
123 ................
123a ..............
Forgery.
Making, drawing, or uttering check, draft, or order without sufficient funds.
Maiming .......................................................................................
124 ................
125 ................
126 ................
127 ................
128 ................
Forcible sodomy; bestiality.
—Forcible sodomy ......................................................................
Arson.
—Aggravated arson ....................................................................
Extortion.
Assault.
—Assault consummated by a battery .........................................
—Assault upon a commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned,
or petty officer.
—Assault upon a sentinel or lookout in the execution of duty ...
—Assault consummated by a battery upon a child under 16
years.
—Assault with a dangerous weapon or other means of force
likely to produce death or grievous bodily harm.
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—Assault in which grievous bodily harm is intentionally inflicted.
129
130
131
132
133
134
134
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Burglary .......................................................................................
Housebreaking.
Perjury.
Frauds against the United States.
Conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.
Animal abuse.
Adultery.
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Art.
a
Art.
a
Art.
120(d); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by
battery).
120(d); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by
battery).
120(d).
Art.
a
Art.
a
Art.
120(d); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by
battery).
120(d); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by
battery).
128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 120b(c); Art. 120c.
Art. 120b(b); Art. 120b(c); Art. 128 (assault consummated by a
battery upon a child under 16 years).
Art. 120b(b); Art. 120b(c).
Art. 120b(b); Art. 120b(c); Art. 128 (assault consummated by a
battery upon a child under 16 years).
Art. 120b(b); Art. 120b(c); Art. 128 (assault consummated by a
battery upon a child under 16 years).
Art. 120b(c).
Art. 120b(c).
Art. 121 (wrongful appropriation).
Art. 121 (wrongful appropriation; larceny of property other than
military property).
Art. 121 (larceny; wrongful appropriation); Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery; assault with a dangerous weapon; assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily
harm)
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon; assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm)
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 126 (simple arson).
Art. 128 (simple assault).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
(when committed upon a child under the age of 16 years;
assault consummated by a battery upon a child under the
age of 16 years)).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon (when committed upon a
child under the age of 16 years; assault consummated by a
battery upon a child under the age of 16 years)).
Art. 130 (housebreaking).
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Article
Offense
134 ................
Assault—with intent to commit murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, forcible sodomy, arson, burglary, or
housebreaking.
—Assault with intent to murder ..................................................
Lesser included offense
—Assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter ...........
—Assault with intent to commit rape or forcible sodomy ...........
—Assault with intent to commit burglary ....................................
134 ................
134 ................
134 ................
134 ................
134 ................
134 ................
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—Assault with intent to commit robbery, arson, or housebreaking.
Bigamy.
Bribery and graft.
—Bribery .....................................................................................
Burning with intent to defraud.
Check, worthless, making and uttering—by dishonorably failing
to maintain funds.
Child endangerment.
—Child endangerment by design ...............................................
Child pornography.
—Possessing child pornography with intent to distribute ...........
—Distributing child pornography .................................................
—Producing child pornography ..................................................
Cohabitation, wrongful.
Correctional custody—offenses against.
Debt, dishonorably failing to pay.
Disloyal statements.
Disorderly conduct, drunkenness.
Drinking liquor with prisoner.
Drunk prisoner.
Drunkenness—incapacitation for performance of duties
through prior wrongful indulgence in intoxicating liquor or
any drug.
False or unauthorized pass offenses.
—Wrongful use or possession of false or unauthorized military
or official pass, permit, discharge certificate, or identification
card, with the intent to defraud or deceive.
False pretenses, obtaining services under.
False swearing.
Firearm, discharging—through negligence.
Firearm, discharging—willfully, under such circumstances as to
endanger human life.
Fleeing scene of accident.
Fraternization.
Gambling with a subordinate.
Homicide, negligent.
Impersonating a commissioned, warrant, noncommissioned, or
petty officer, or an agent or official.
Indecent conduct.
Indecent language ......................................................................
Jumping from vessel into the water.
Kidnapping.
Mail: Taking, opening, secreting, destroying, or stealing ...........
Mails: Depositing or causing to be deposited obscene matters
in.
Misprision of serious offense.
Obstructing justice.
Wrongful interference with an adverse administrative proceeding.
Pandering and prostitution.
Parole, violation of.
Perjury: Subornation of.
Public record: Altering, concealing, removing, mutilating, obliterating, or destroying.
Quarantine: Medical, breaking ....................................................
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Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon; assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm); Art. 134 (assault with intent to
commit voluntary manslaughter; willful or careless discharge
of a firearm).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon; assault intentionally inflicting grievous bodily harm); Art. 134 (willful or careless
discharge of a firearm).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon); Art. 134 (assault with intent to commit housebreaking).
Art. 128 (simple assault; assault consummated by a battery;
assault with a dangerous weapon).
Art. 134 (graft).
Art. 134 (child endangerment by culpable negligence).
Art. 134 (possessing child pornography).
Art. 134 (possessing child pornography; possessing child pornography with intent to distribute)
Art. 134 (possessing child pornography).
Art. 134 (same offenses, except without the intent to defraud
or deceive).
Art. 134 (firearm, discharging—through negligence).
Art. 117 (provoking speeches).
Art. 121.
Art. 134 (breaking restriction).
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Article
Offense
134 ................
134 ................
134 ................
Reckless endangerment.
Restriction, breaking.
Seizure: Destruction, removal, or disposal of property to prevent.
Self-injury without intent to avoid service.
Sentinel or lookout: Offenses against or by.
Soliciting another to commit an offense.
Stolen property: Knowingly receiving, buying, concealing.
Straggling.
Testify: Wrongful refusal.
Threat or hoax designed or intended to cause panic or public
fear.
—Threat ......................................................................................
Threat, communicating.
Unlawful entry.
Weapon: Concealed, carrying.
Wearing unauthorized insignia, decoration, badge, ribbon, device or lapel button’’.
134
134
134
134
134
134
134
................
................
................
................
................
................
................
134
134
134
134
................
................
................
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1 This
Lesser included offense
Art. 134 (communicating a threat); Art. 128 (assault).
chart only includes the 2012 version of Art. 120. See Appendix 27 and 28 for prior versions.
Section 3. The Discussion to Part I of
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is amended as follows:
(a) The Discussion immediately
following paragraph 4 is amended to
read as follows:
‘‘The Department of Defense, in
conjunction with the Department of
Homeland Security, has published
supplementary materials to accompany
the Manual for Courts-Martial. These
materials consist of a Discussion
(accompanying the Preamble, the Rules
for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of
Evidence, and the Punitive Articles), an
Analysis, and various appendices.
These supplementary materials do not
constitute the official views of the
Department of Defense, the Department
of Homeland Security, the Department
of Justice, the military departments, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, or any other authority of
the Government of the United States,
and they do not constitute rules. Cf.,
e.g., 5 U.S.C. 551(4). The supplementary
materials do not create rights or
responsibilities that are binding on any
person, party, or other entity (including
any authority of the Government of the
United States whether or not included
in the definition of ‘‘agency’’ in 5 U.S.C.
551(1)). Failure to comply with matter
set forth in the supplementary materials
does not, of itself, constitute error,
although these materials may refer to
requirements in the rules set forth in the
Executive Order or established by other
legal authorities (for example, binding
judicial precedents applicable to courtsmartial) that are based on sources of
authority independent of the
supplementary materials. See Appendix
21 in this Manual.
The 1995 amendment to paragraph 4
of the Preamble eliminated the practice
of identifying the Manual for Courts-
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Martial, United States, by a particular
year. Historically the Manual had been
published in its entirety sporadically
(e.g., 1917, 1921, 1928, 1949, 1951,
1969, and 1984) with amendments to it
published piecemeal. It was therefore
logical to identify the Manual by the
calendar year of publication, with
periodic amendments identified as
‘‘Changes’’ to the Manual. Beginning in
1995, however, a new edition of the
Manual was published in its entirety
and a new naming convention was
adopted. See Exec. Order No. 12960 of
May 12, 1995. Beginning in 1995, the
Manual was to be referred to as ‘‘Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States (19xx
edition).’’ In 2013, the Preamble was
amended to identify new Manuals based
on their publication date.
Amendments made to the Manual can
be researched in the relevant Executive
Order as referenced in Appendix 25.
Although the Executive Orders were
removed from Appendix 25 of the
Manual in 2012 to reduce printing
requirements, they can be accessed
online. See Appendix 25.
Section 4. The Discussion to Part II of
the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is amended as follows:
(a) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 307(c)(3) is amended
by deleting the first two Notes.
(b) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 307(c)(3) is amended
by inserting the words ‘‘For Article 134
offenses, also refer to paragraph 60c(6)
in Part IV.’’ after the words ‘‘How to
draft specifications.’’
(c) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 307(c)(3) is amended
by deleting the Note directly following
the words ‘‘(G) Description of offense.’’
(d) Part (G)(i) in the Discussion
immediately following R.C.M. 307(c)(3)
is amended to read as follows:
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‘‘(i) Elements. The elements of the
offense must be alleged, either expressly
or by necessary implication, except that
Article 134 specifications must
expressly allege the terminal element.
See paragraph 60.c.(6) in Part IV. If a
specific intent, knowledge, or state of
mind is an element of the offense, it
must be alleged.’’
(e) Part (G)(v) in the Discussion
immediately following R.C.M. 307(c)(3)
is inserted to read as follows:
‘‘(v) Lesser Included Offenses. The
elements of the contemplated lesser
included offense should be compared
with the elements of the greater offense
to determine if the elements of the lesser
offense are derivative of the greater
offense and vice versa. See discussion
following paragraph 3.b.(1)(c) in Part IV
and the related analysis in Appendix
23.’’
(f) The note immediately following
R.C.M. 307(c)(4) is deleted and
Discussion is inserted to read as follows:
‘‘The prohibition against
unreasonable multiplication of charges
addresses those features of military law
that increase the potential for
overreaching in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. It is based on
reasonableness, and has no foundation
in Constitutional rights. To determine if
charges are unreasonably multiplied,
see R.C.M. 906(b)(12). Because
prosecutors are free to charge in the
alternative, it may be reasonable to
charge two or more offenses that arise
from one transaction if sufficient doubt
exists as to the facts or the law. In no
case should both an offense and a lesser
included offense thereof be separately
charged. See also Part IV, paragraph 3,
and R.C.M. 601(e)(2) concerning referral
of several offenses.’’
(g) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 701(e) is amended by
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adding the following after ‘‘retribution
for such testimony’’:
‘‘Counsel must remain cognizant of
professional responsibility rules
regarding communicating with
represented persons.’’
(h) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 809(a) is amended to
read as follows:
‘‘Article 48 makes punishable
‘‘direct’’ contempt, as well as ‘‘indirect’’
or ‘‘constructive’’ contempt. ‘‘Direct’’
contempt is that which is committed in
the presence of the court-martial or its
immediate proximity. ‘‘Presence’’
includes those places outside the
courtroom itself, such as waiting areas,
deliberation rooms, and other places set
aside for the use of the court-martial
while it is in session. ‘‘Indirect’’ or
‘‘constructive’’ contempt is noncompliance with lawful writs,
processes, orders, rules, decrees, or
commands of the court-martial. A
‘‘direct’’ or ‘‘indirect’’ contempt may be
actually seen or heard by the courtmartial, in which case it may be
punished summarily. See subsection
(b)(1) of this Rule. A ‘‘direct’’ or
‘‘indirect’’ contempt may also be a
contempt not actually observed by the
court-martial, for example, when an
unseen person makes loud noises,
whether inside or outside the
courtroom, which impede the orderly
progress of the proceedings. In such a
case the procedures for punishing
contempt are more extensive. See
subsection (b)(2) of this Rule.
The words ‘‘any person,’’ as used in
Article 48, include all persons, whether
or not subject to military law, except the
military judge and foreign nationals
outside the territorial limits of the
United States who are not subject to the
code. The military judge may order the
offender removed whether or not
contempt proceedings are held. It may
be appropriate to warn a person whose
conduct is improper that persistence in
a course of behavior may result in
removal or punishment for contempt.
See R.C.M. 804, 806.
Each finding of contempt may be
separately punished.
A person subject to the code who
commits contempt may be tried by
court-martial or otherwise disciplined
under Article 134 for such misconduct
in addition to or instead of punishment
for contempt. See paragraph 108, Part
IV; see also Article 98. The 2011
amendment of Article 48 expanded the
contempt power of military courts to
enable them to enforce orders, such as
discovery orders or protective orders
regarding evidence, against military or
civilian attorneys. Persons not subject to
military jurisdiction under Article 2,
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having been duly subpoenaed, may be
prosecuted in Federal civilian court
under Article 47 for neglect or refusal to
appear or refusal to qualify as a witness
or to testify or to produce evidence.’’
(i) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 906(b)(5) is amended
to read as follows:
‘‘Each specification may state only
one offense. R.C.M. 307(c)(4). A
duplicitous specification is one which
alleges two or more separate offenses.
Lesser included offenses (see paragraph
3, Part IV) are not separate, nor is a
continuing offense involving separate
acts. The sole remedy for a duplicitous
specification is severance of the
specification into two or more
specifications, each of which alleges a
separate offense contained in the
duplicitous specification. However, if
the duplicitousness is combined with or
results in other defects, such as
misleading the accused, other remedies
may be appropriate. See subsection
(b)(3) of this rule. See also R.C.M.
907(b)(3).’’
(j) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 906(b)(12) is amended
to read as follows:
‘‘Unreasonable multiplication of
charges as applied to findings and
sentence is a limitation on the military’s
discretion to charge separate offenses
and does not have a foundation in the
Constitution. The concept is based on
reasonableness and the prohibition
against prosecutorial overreaching. In
contrast, multiplicity is grounded in the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. It prevents an accused
from being twice punished for one
offense if it is contrary to the intent of
Congress. See R.C.M. 907(b)(3).
Therefore, a motion for relief from
unreasonable multiplication of charges
as applied to findings and sentence
differs from a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of multiplicity.
The following non-exhaustive factors
should be considered when determining
whether two or more offenses are
unreasonably multiplied: whether the
specifications are aimed at distinctly
separate criminal acts; whether they
represent or exaggerate the accused’s
criminality; whether they unreasonably
increase his or her exposure to
punishment; and whether they suggest
prosecutorial abuse of discretion in
drafting of the specifications. Because
prosecutors are permitted to charge in
the alternative based on exigencies of
proof, a ruling on this motion ordinarily
should be deferred until after findings
are entered.’’
(k) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 907(b)(3) is amended
to read as follows:
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78583
‘‘Multiplicity is a legal concept,
arising from the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, which
provides that no person shall be put in
jeopardy twice for the same offense.
Absent legislative intent to the contrary,
an accused cannot be convicted and
punished for violations of two or more
statutes if those violations arise from a
single act. Where Congress intended to
impose multiple punishments for the
same act, imposition of such sentence
does not violate the Constitution.
Multiplicity differs from unreasonable
multiplication of charges. If two
offenses are not multiplicious, they
nonetheless may constitute an
unreasonable multiplication of charges
as applied to findings or sentence. See
R.C.M. 906(b)(12). Unreasonable
multiplication of charges is a limitation
on the military’s discretion to charge
separate offenses. It does not have a
foundation in the Constitution; it is
based on reasonableness and the
prohibition against prosecutorial
overreaching. The military judge is to
determine, in his or her discretion,
whether the charges constitute
unreasonable multiplication of charges
as applied to findings or sentencing. See
R.C.M. 906(b)(12).
To determine if two charges are
multiplicious, the practitioner should
first determine whether they are based
on separate acts. If so, the charges are
not multiplicious because separate acts
may be charged and punished
separately. If the charges are based upon
a single act, the practitioner should next
determine if Congress intended to
impose multiple convictions and
punishments for the same act. When
there is no overt expression of
congressional intent in the relevant
statutes, such intent may be inferred
based on the elements of the charged
statutes and their relationship to each
other or other principles of statutory
interpretation. If each statute contains
an element not contained in the other,
it may be inferred that Congress
intended they be charged and punished
separately. Likewise, if each statute
contains the same elements, it may be
inferred that Congress did not intend
they be charged and punished
separately. A lesser included offense
will always be multiplicious if charged
separately, but offenses do not have to
be lesser included to be multiplicious.
Ordinarily, a specification should not
be dismissed for multiplicity before
trial. The less serious of any
multiplicious specifications shall be
dismissed after findings have been
reached. Due consideration must be
given, however, to possible post-trial or
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appellate action with regard to the
remaining specification.’’
(l) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 910(a)(1) is amended
to read as follows:
‘‘See paragraph 3, Part IV, concerning
lesser included offenses. When the plea
is to a lesser included offense without
the use of exceptions and substitutions,
the defense counsel should provide a
written revised specification to be
included in the record as an appellate
exhibit.
A plea of guilty to a lesser included
offense does not bar the prosecution
from proceeding on the offense as
charged. See also subsection (g) of this
rule.
A plea of guilty does not prevent the
introduction of evidence, either in
support of the factual basis for the plea,
or, after findings are entered, in
aggravation. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(4).’’
(m) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 916(j)(2) is amended to
read as follows:
‘‘Examples of ignorance or mistake
which need only exist in fact include:
ignorance of the fact that the person
assaulted was an officer; belief that
property allegedly stolen belonged to
the accused; belief that a controlled
substance was really sugar.
Examples of ignorance or mistake
which must be reasonable as well as
actual include: belief that the accused
charged with unauthorized absence had
permission to go; belief that the accused
had a medical ‘‘profile’’ excusing
shaving as otherwise required by
regulation. Some offenses require
special standards of conduct (see, for
example, paragraph 68, Part IV,
Dishonorable failure to maintain
sufficient funds); the element of
reasonableness must be applied in
accordance with the standards imposed
by such offenses.
Examples of offenses in which the
accused’s intent or knowledge is
immaterial include: Any rape of a child,
or any sexual assault or sexual abuse of
a child when the child is under 12 years
old. However, such ignorance or
mistake may be relevant in extenuation
and mitigation.
See subsection (l)(1) of this rule
concerning ignorance or mistake of
law.’’
(n) The Discussion immediately
following R.C.M. 918(a)(1) is amended
to read as follows:
‘‘Exceptions and Substitutions. One or
more words or figures may be excepted
from a specification and, when
necessary, others substituted, if the
remaining language of the specification,
with or without substitutions, states an
offense by the accused which is
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punishable by the court-martial.
Changing the date or place of the offense
may, but does not necessarily, change
the nature or identity of an offense.
If A and B are joint accused and A is
convicted but B is acquitted of an
offense charged, A should be found
guilty by excepting the name of B from
the specification as well as any other
words indicating the offense was a joint
one.
Lesser Included Offenses. If the
evidence fails to prove the offense
charged but does prove an offense
necessarily included in the offense
charged, the fact finder may find the
accused not guilty of the offense
charged but guilty of the lesser included
offense. See paragraph 3 of Part IV
concerning lesser included offenses.
Offenses arising from the same act or
transaction. The accused may be found
guilty of two or more offenses arising
from the same act or transaction,
whether or not the offenses are
separately punishable. But see R.C.M.
906(b)(12); 907(b)(3)(B); 1003(c)(1)(C).’’
(o) The note immediately following
R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C) is deleted, and the
following is added immediately
following the last paragraph of the
Discussion:
‘‘Multiplicity is addressed in R.C.M.
907(b)(3)(B). Unreasonable
multiplication of charges is addressed in
R.C.M. 906(b)(12).’’
Section 5. The Discussion to Part IV
of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is amended as follows:
(a) The Discussion immediately
following paragraph 3.b.(1)(c) is
amended to read as follows:
‘‘The ‘‘elements test’’ is the proper
method for determining lesser included
offenses. See United States v. Jones, 68
M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2010); Schmuck v.
United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989);
Appendix 23 of this Manual, Art. 79.
Paragraph 3.b.(1) was amended to
comport with the elements test, which
requires that the elements of the lesser
offense must be a subset of the elements
of the charged offense. The elements test
does not require identical statutory
language, and use of normal principles
of statutory interpretation is permitted.
The elements test is necessary to
safeguard the due process requirement
of notice to a criminal defendant.’’
(b) The following Discussion is added
immediately after paragraph 3.b.(5):
‘‘Practitioners must consider lesser
included offenses on a case-by-case
basis. See United States v. Jones, 68 M.J.
465 (C.A.A.F. 2010); United States v.
Alston, 69 M.J. 214 (C.A.A.F. 2010);
discussion following paragraph
3.b.(1)(c) above. The lesser included
offenses listed in Appendix 12A were
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amended in 2016 to comport with the
elements test; however, practitioners
must analyze each lesser included
offense on a case-by-case basis. See
Appendix 23 of this Manual, Article
79.’’
(c) The following Discussion is added
immediately after paragraph 60.b:
‘‘The terminal element is merely the
expression of one of the clauses under
Article 134. See paragraph c below for
an explanation of the clauses and rules
for drafting specifications. More than
one clause may be alleged and proven;
however, proof of only one clause will
satisfy the terminal element. For clause
3 offenses, the military judge may
judicially notice whether an offense is
capital. See Mil. R. Evid. 202.’’
(d) The following Discussion is added
immediately after paragraph 60.c.(6)(a):
‘‘Clauses 1 and 2 are theories of
liability that must be expressly alleged
in a specification so that the accused
will be given notice as to which clause
or clauses to defend against. The words
‘‘to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces’’
encompass both paragraph c.(2)(a),
prejudice to good order and discipline,
and paragraph c.(2)(b), breach of custom
of the Service. A generic sample
specification is provided below:
‘‘In that llll, (personal
jurisdiction data), did (at/on board
location), on or about ll 20ll,
(commit elements of Article 134 clause
1 or 2 offense), and that said conduct
(was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces) (and)
(was of a nature to bring discredit upon
the armed forces).’’
If clauses 1 and 2 are alleged together
in the terminal element, the word ‘‘and’’
should be used to separate them. Any
clause not proven beyond a reasonable
doubt should be excepted from the
specification at findings. See R.C.M.
918(a)(1). See also Appendix 23 of this
Manual, Art. 79. Although using the
conjunctive ‘‘and’’ to connect the two
theories of liability is recommended, a
specification connecting the two
theories with the disjunctive ‘‘or’’ is
sufficient to provide the accused
reasonable notice of the charge against
him. See Appendix 23 of this Manual,
Art. 134.’’
(e) The following replaces the
paragraph below ‘‘Discussion’’
following paragraph 60.c.(6)(b):
‘‘The words ‘‘an offense not capital’’
are sufficient to provide notice to the
accused that a clause 3 offense has been
charged and are meant to include all
crimes and offenses not capital. A
generic sample specification for clause 3
offenses is provided below:
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‘‘In that llll, (personal
jurisdiction data), did (at/on board
location), on or about ll 20ll,
(commit: address each element), an
offense not capital, in violation of (name
or citation of statute).’’
In addition to alleging each element of
the federal statute, practitioners should
consider including, when appropriate
and necessary, words of criminality
(e.g., wrongfully, knowingly, or
willfully).’’
Section 6. Appendix 21 of the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, is
amended as follows:
(a) R.C.M. 306, the last paragraph
beginning with ‘‘2016 Amendment,’’ is
amended to read as follows:
‘‘2016 Amendment: R.C.M. 306(e)
implements Section 534(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113–291, 19
December 2014.’’
(b) R.C.M. 307(c)(3), after the
paragraph beginning with the words,
‘‘2012 Amendment,’’ and prior to the
line beginning with the words, ‘‘The
sources of the lettered subsection’’ add
the following:
‘‘2016 Amendment: The two notes
added in 2012 are removed. The notes
were originally added to address the
requirement to expressly state the
terminal element in specifications under
Article 134 and to address lesser
included offenses. See United States v.
Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012);
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225
(C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Jones,
68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2010). In 2016, the
Manual was amended to require the
terminal element be expressed in Article
134 specifications and to alter the
definition of lesser included offenses
under Article 79. See paragraphs 3 and
60.c.(6) in Part IV of this Manual.’’
(c) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(A), after the
paragraph beginning with the words
‘‘Sample specifications’’ delete the
paragraph beginning with the words the
‘‘2012 Amendment.’’
(d) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(G), after the
paragraph beginning with the words
‘‘Description of offense.’’ delete the
paragraph beginning with the words the
‘‘2012 Amendment,’’ and insert in its
place:
‘‘2016 Amendment: The note added
in 2012 is removed. The note was
originally added to address the
requirement to expressly state the
terminal element in Article 134
specifications. See United States v.
Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012);
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225
(C.A.A.F. 2011).’’
(e) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(G)(i), insert the
following language as a new paragraph
after the existing paragraph:
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‘‘2016 Amendment: This
subparagraph was amended and reflects
the removal of a note.’’
(f) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(G)(v), insert the
following language:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Subparagraph (v)
was added to address lesser included
offenses and refer practitioners to
Article 79 and new Appendix 12A. See
paragraph 3 in Part IV and Appendix
12A.’’
(g) R.C.M. 307(c)(4), after the
paragraph beginning with the words
‘‘2005 Amendment’’ delete the
paragraph beginning with the words the
‘‘2012 Amendment,’’ and insert in its
place:
‘‘2016 Amendment: The discussion
section was added to R.C.M. 307(c)(4) to
clarify the ambiguity between the two
distinct concepts of multiplicity and
unreasonable multiplication of charges.
For analysis related to multiplicity, see
R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B) in this Appendix.
For analysis related to unreasonable
multiplication of charges, see R.C.M.
906(b)(12) in this Appendix.
Nothing in the rule or the discussion
section should be construed to imply
that it would be overreaching for a
prosecutor to bring several charges
against an accused for what essentially
amounts to one transaction if there is a
valid legal reason to do so. For example,
prosecutors may charge two offenses for
exigencies of proof, which is a long
accepted practice in military law. See,
e.g., United States v. Morton, 69 M.J. 12
(C.A.A.F. 2010). The discussion section
emphasizes that a prosecutor is not
overreaching or abusing his or her
discretion merely because he or she
charges what is essentially one act
under several different charges or
specifications.
The language in the discussion
section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to United States v.
Campbell, 71 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F. 2012),
was removed because it is no longer
necessary, as the rules themselves have
been edited to remove any reference to
‘‘multiplicious for sentencing.’’ The
example was removed from the
discussion section because it overly
generalized the concept of unreasonable
multiplication of charges.’’
(h) R.C.M. 701(e), after the paragraph
beginning with the words, ‘‘1986
Amendment,’’ and immediately before
subparagraph (f), insert the following
language:
‘‘2016 Amendment: This rule
implements Article 46(b), enacted by
section 1704 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,
P.L. 113–66, 26 December 2013, as
amended by section 531(b) of the Carl
Levin and Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon
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National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113–291, 19
December 2014.’’
(i) R.C.M. 906(b)(12), delete the
paragraph beginning with the words the
‘‘2012 Amendment,’’ and insert in its
place:
‘‘2016 Amendment: This rule and
related discussion is the focal point for
addressing unreasonable multiplication
of charges. If a practitioner seeks to raise
a claim for multiplicity, that concept is
addressed in R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B) and
related discussion. This rule has been
amended. The Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces has recognized that
practitioners and the courts have
routinely confused the concepts of
multiplicity and unreasonable
multiplication of charges. See, e.g.,
United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19,
23 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (‘‘the terms
multiplicity, multiplicity for sentencing,
and unreasonable multiplication of
charges in military practice are
sometimes used interchangeably as well
as with uncertain definition’’); United
States v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 372 (C.M.A.
1983) (Cook, J. dissenting) (‘‘[t]hat
multiplicity for sentencing is a mess in
the military justice system is a
proposition with which I believe few
people familiar with our system would
take issue’’).
Multiplicity and unreasonable
multiplication of charges are two
distinct concepts. Unreasonable
multiplication of charges as applied to
findings and sentence is a limitation on
the prosecution’s discretion to charge
separate offenses. Unreasonable
multiplication of charges does not have
a foundation in the Constitution but is
instead based on the concept of
reasonableness and is a prohibition
against prosecutorial overreaching. In
contrast, multiplicity is based on the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and prevents an accused
from being twice punished for one
offense if it is contrary to the intent of
Congress. A charge may be found not to
be multiplicious but at the same time it
may be dismissed because of
unreasonable multiplication. See United
States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 337–38
(C.A.A.F. 2001).
Use of the term ‘‘multiplicity (or
multiplicious) for sentencing’’ is
inappropriate. If a charge is
multiplicious, meaning that it violates
the Constitutional prohibition against
Double Jeopardy, it necessarily results
in dismissal of the multiplied offenses,
therefore obviating any issue on
sentencing with respect to that charge.
Campbell, 71 M.J. at 23. A charge
should not be found multiplicious for
sentencing but not for findings. Thus,
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the more appropriate term for the
military judge’s discretionary review of
the charges at sentencing is
‘‘unreasonable multiplication of charges
as applied to sentence.’’ Id. at 24. The
rule was changed to remove
‘‘multiplicity for sentencing’’ from the
Manual, eliminating confusion and
misuse.
Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) were added
to the rule. They clarify the distinction
between unreasonable multiplication of
charges as applied to findings and to
sentence. Although these concepts have
existed for years (see Michael J. Breslin
& LeEllen Coacher, Multiplicity and
Unreasonable Multiplication of Charges:
A Guide to the Perplexed, 45 A.F. L.
Rev. 99 (1998) for a history of the
terms), they were not defined in
previous editions of the Manual. The
definitions were adopted from Quiroz,
Campbell, and recommendations from
Christopher S. Morgan, Multiplicity:
Reconciling the Manual for CourtsMartial, 63 A.F. L. Rev. 23 (2009). It is
possible that two offenses are not
unreasonably multiplied for findings
but are so for sentencing; these
additions explain how this can be so.
See, e.g., Campbell, 71 M.J. at 25
(military judge did not abuse his
discretion by finding that there was not
an unreasonable multiplication of
charges as applied to findings but that
there was an unreasonable
multiplication of charges as applied to
sentence).
The discussion sections were added
to address concerns that CAAF voiced
in dicta in Campbell. In previous
editions of the Manual, military judges
often used the discussion section in
R.C.M. 1003(c)(1) to determine when
relief was warranted for unreasonable
multiplication of charges as applied to
sentence. The Campbell court stated in
a footnote: ‘‘It is our view that after
Quiroz, the language in the Discussion
to R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C) regarding ‘a
single impulse or intent,’ is dated and
too restrictive. The better approach is to
allow the military judge, in his or her
discretion, to merge the offense for
sentencing purposes by considering the
Quiroz factors and any other relevant
factor. . . .’’ Campbell, 71 M.J. at 24
n.9. The Discussion was changed to
address the Quiroz factors and remove
any reference to the ‘‘single impulse or
intent’’ test, as suggested by CAAF. The
committee also decided to move the
Discussion section from R.C.M.
1003(b)(8)(C) to this rule because R.C.M.
1003 deals exclusively with sentencing
and a motion for appropriate relief due
to unreasonable multiplication of
charges can be raised as an issue for
findings or for sentence under this Rule.
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Therefore, it is more appropriate to
address the issue here.
For more information on multiplicity
and how it relates to unreasonable
multiplication of charges, see Michael J.
Breslin & LeEllen Coacher, Multiplicity
and Unreasonable Multiplication of
Charges: A Guide to the Perplexed, 45
A.F. L. Rev. 99 (1998); Christopher S.
Morgan, Multiplicity: Reconciling the
Manual for Courts-Martial, 63 A.F. L.
Rev. 23 (2009); Gary E. Felicetti,
Surviving the Multiplicty/LIO Family
Vortex, Army Law., Feb. 2011, at 46.
The language in the discussion
section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to the Campbell
decision was removed because it is no
longer necessary, as the rules
themselves have been edited to remove
any reference to ‘‘multiplicious for
sentencing’’ and additional discussion
sections were added to eliminate any
confusion with the terms.’’
(j) R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B), insert the
following language as a new paragraph
after the existing paragraph:
‘‘2016 Amendment: This rule and
related discussion is the focal point for
addressing claims of multiplicity. If a
practitioner seeks to raise a claim for
unreasonable multiplication of charges,
that concept is addressed in R.C.M.
906(b)(12) and related discussion. The
heading of this rule, which was added
in 2016, signifies that this rule deals
exclusively with multiplicity, and not
unreasonable multiplication of charges.
The discussion section of this rule was
amended because the committee
believed that a more thorough definition
of multiplicity was appropriate in light
of CAAF’s suggestion in United States v.
Campbell, 71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F.
2012), that the concepts of multiplicity
and unreasonable multiplication of
charges are often confounded.
The discussion of multiplicity is
derived from the Supreme Court’s
holding in Blockburger v. United States,
284 U.S. 299 (1932), and CMA’s holding
in United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370
(C.M.A. 1993). The Court in Blockburger
wrote: ‘‘[W]here the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the
test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof
of a fact which the other does not.’’
Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Military
courts departed from the Blockburger
analysis; however, the CMA’s decision
in Teters clearly re-aligned the military
courts with the federal courts, and
multiplicity is now determined in the
military courts by the Blockburger/
Teters analysis outlined in the
discussion section. Any reference to the
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‘‘single impulse’’ or ‘‘fairly embraced’’
tests is outdated and should be avoided.
Two offenses that arise from the same
transaction may not be multiplicious,
even if each does not require proof of an
element not required to prove the other,
if the intent of Congress was that an
accused could be convicted of and
punished for both offenses arising out of
the same act. The Blockburger/Teters
analysis applies only when Congress
did not intend that the offenses be
treated as separate. If Congress intended
to subject an accused to multiple
punishments for the same transaction,
and that intent is clear, the Blockburger/
Teters elements comparison is
unnecessary. See, e.g., Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368–69 (1983)
(‘‘[S]imply because two criminal
statutes may be construed to proscribe
the same conduct under the Blockburger
test does not mean that the Double
Jeopardy Clause precludes the
imposition, in a single trial, of
cumulative punishments pursuant to
those statutes. . . . Where . . . a
legislature specifically authorizes
cumulative punishment under two
statutes, regardless of whether those two
statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct
under Blockburger, a court’s task of
statutory construction is at an end and
the prosecutor may seek and the trial
court or jury may impose cumulative
punishment under such statutes in a
single trial.’’).
The language in the discussion
section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to the Campbell
decision was removed because it is no
longer necessary, as the Rules
themselves have been edited to remove
any reference to ‘‘multiplicious for
sentencing’’ and additional discussion
sections were added to eliminate any
confusion with the terms.’’
(k) R.C.M. 916(b), insert the following
language immediately following the
paragraph beginning with the words
‘‘2007 Amendment’’:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Changes to this
paragraph are based on section 541 of
the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011, which superseded the
previous paragraph 45, ‘‘Rape, sexual
assault and other sexual misconduct,’’
in its entirety and replaces paragraph 45
with ‘‘Rape and sexual assault
generally.’’ In addition, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ‘‘Rape
and sexual assault of a child,’’ and
paragraph 45c, ‘‘Other sexual
misconduct.’’
(l) R.C.M. 916(j), insert the following
language immediately following the
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paragraph beginning with the words
‘‘2007 Amendment’’:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Changes to this
paragraph are based on section 541 of
the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011, which superseded the
previous paragraph 45, ‘‘Rape, sexual
assault and other sexual misconduct,’’
in its entirety and replaces paragraph 45
with ‘‘Rape and sexual assault
generally.’’ In addition, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ‘‘Rape
and sexual assault of a child,’’ and
paragraph 45c, ‘‘Other sexual
misconduct.’’
Paragraph (j)(3) was deleted. The rule
reflects changes to Article 120. The
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
ruled that the statutory burden shift to
the accused in the 2007 version of
Article 120 was unconstitutional and
the subsequent burden shift to the
government to disprove consent beyond
a reasonable doubt once the accused
had raised the affirmative defense of
consent by a preponderance of the
evidence resulted in a legal
impossibility. United States v. Prather,
69 M.J. 338 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United
States v. Medina, 69 M.J. 462 (C.A.A.F.
2011).’’
(m) R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(D), insert the
following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with
the words ‘‘2007 Amendment’’:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Changes to this
paragraph are based on section 541 of
the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011, which superseded the
previous paragraph 45, ‘‘Rape, sexual
assault and other sexual misconduct,’’
in its entirety and replaces paragraph 45
with ‘‘Rape and sexual assault
generally.’’ In addition, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ‘‘Rape
and sexual assault of a child,’’ and
paragraph 45c, ‘‘Other sexual
misconduct.’’ ’’
(n) R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C), delete the
paragraph beginning with the words the
‘‘2012 Amendment’’ and insert in its
place:
‘‘2016 Amendment: This rule was
amended. The language in previous
editions of the Manual seemed to
suggest that an accused could not be
punished for offenses that were not
separate. This is true only if there is no
express statement from Congress
indicating that an accused can be
punished for two or more offenses that
are not separate. See R.C.M. 907(b)(3)
and related analysis. Subsections (i) and
(ii) were added to distinguish between
claims of multiplicity and unreasonable
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multiplication of charges. As the two
concepts are distinct, it is important to
address them in separate subsections.
See R.C.M. 906(b)(12) for claims of
unreasonable multiplication of charges
and R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B) for claims of
multiplicity.
Additionally, the committee decided
to move the discussion of the factors in
United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334
(C.A.A.F. 2001), from this rule to R.C.M.
906(b)(12) because the factors apply to
unreasonable multiplication of charges
as applied to findings as well as
sentence. Because this Rule refers only
to sentencing, it is more appropriate to
address the military judge’s
determination of unreasonable
multiplication in R.C.M. 906(b)(12),
because that Rule covers both findings
and sentence. See R.C.M. 906(b)(12) and
related analysis.
The language in the discussion
section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to the Campbell
decision was removed. Such language is
no longer necessary, as the Rules
themselves have been edited to remove
any reference to ‘‘multiplicious for
sentencing’’ and the discussion section
of R.C.M. 906(b)(12) addresses the
Quiroz factors.’’
(o) R.C.M. 1004(c)(7)(B), insert the
following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with
the words ‘‘1994 Amendment’’ and
immediately prior to the paragraph
beginning with the words ‘‘1986
Amendment’’:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Changes to this
paragraph reflect section 541 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011, which superseded the
previous paragraph 45, ‘‘Rape, sexual
assault and other sexual misconduct,’’
in its entirety and replaces paragraph 45
with ‘‘Rape and sexual assault
generally.’’ In addition, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ‘‘Rape
and sexual assault of a child,’’ and
paragraph 45c, ‘‘Other sexual
misconduct.’’ ’’
(p) R.C.M. 1004(c)(8), insert the
following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with
the words ‘‘1991 Amendment’’:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Changes to this
paragraph reflect section 541 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011, which superseded the
previous paragraph 45, ‘‘Rape, sexual
assault and other sexual misconduct,’’
in its entirety and replaces paragraph 45
with ‘‘Rape and sexual assault
generally.’’ In addition, the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
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Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ‘‘Rape
and sexual assault of a child,’’ and
paragraph 45c, ‘‘Other sexual
misconduct.’’ ’’
Section 7. Appendix 23 of the Manual
for Courts-Martial, United States, is
amended as follows:
(a) Paragraph 3.b.(4), Article 79,
Lesser included offenses, Specific lesser
included offenses, is amended by
deleting the paragraphs beginning with
the words ‘‘2012 Amendment’’ and
ending with ‘‘(C.A.A.F. 2008).’’ and
inserting in their place:
‘‘2016 Amendment: See analysis in
paragraph 3.b.(1) above. Lesser included
offenses (LIO) listings were removed
from each punitive article in paragraphs
1–113 (except paragraphs 1 and 3), Part
IV, and were moved to a new Appendix
12A. The LIO listings are determined
based on the elements of the greater
offense, but are not binding. Therefore,
practitioners should use Appendix 12A
only as a guide. To determine if an
offense is lesser included, the elements
test must be used. United States v.
Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 470 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
The offenses are not required to possess
identical statutory language; rather, the
court uses normal principles of statutory
construction to determine the meaning
of each element. See id. at 470–73;
United States v. Oatney, 45 M.J. 185
(C.A.A.F. 1996); Schmuck v. United
States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
Article 134 offenses generally will not
be lesser included offenses of
enumerated offenses in Articles 80–133.
See United States v. Girouard, 70 M.J.
5 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v.
McMurrin, 70 M.J. 15 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
Article 134 specifications must contain
the ‘‘terminal element.’’ See paragraphs
60.b and 60.c.(6)(a) in Part IV. See also
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225
(C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Ballan,
71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012); R.C.M.
307(c)(3).’’
(b) Paragraph 43.a, Article 118,
Murder, is amended by adding the
following language:
‘‘2012 Amendment: This statute was
modified pursuant to section 541 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011, to conform to renamed
sexual assault offenses in Article 120
and Article 120b. The changes took
effect on 28 June 2012.’’
(c) Paragraph 45, Article 120, Rape
and sexual assault generally, the first
paragraph of the analysis beginning
with the word ‘‘2012’’ and ending with
the number ‘‘28’’ is amended to read as
follows:
‘‘2012 Amendment: This paragraph
was substantially revised by section 541
of the National Defense Authorization
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Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112–81, 31
December 2011. Amendments contained
in this section took effect on 28 June
2012. Sec. 541(f), P.L. 112–81. On 28
June 2012, a modified paragraph 45,
‘‘Rape and sexual assault generally,’’
replaced the 2007 version of paragraph
45, ‘‘Rape, sexual assault, and other
sexual misconduct.’’ The analysis
related to prior versions of Article 120
is located as follows: For offenses
committed prior to 1 October 2007, see
Appendix 27; for offenses committed
during the period 1 October 2007
through 27 June 2012, see Appendix
28.’’
(d) Paragraph 45, Article 120, Rape
and sexual assault generally, is
amended by deleting subparagraphs b,
c, d, e, and f.
(e) Paragraph 45, Article 120b, Rape
and sexual assault of a child, is
amended by inserting ‘‘b’’ after ‘‘45’’.
(f) Paragraph 45b, Article 120b, Rape
and sexual assault of a child, is
amended by deleting subparagraphs b,
c, d, e, and f.
(g) Paragraph 45c, Article 120c, Other
sexual misconduct, is amended by
deleting subparagraphs b, c, d, e, and f.
(h) Paragraph 51, Article 125,
Sodomy, is amended by changing the
title to ‘‘Forcible Sodomy’’ and adding
the following language at the beginning:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Paragraph 51 was
amended pursuant to section 1707 of
the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113–66, 26
December 2013. Additionally, all
applicable references to sodomy
throughout the Manual were changed to
‘‘forcible sodomy’’ to reflect the
decriminalization of consensual sodomy
under the UCMJ.’’
(i) Paragraph 60.c.(6)(a) is amended to
read as follows:
‘‘2016 Amendment: In 2012 the
Manual was amended to address the
changes in practice resulting from the
holding in United States v. Fosler, 70
M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011). In 2016, the
President required that the terminal
element be expressly alleged in every
Article 134 specification.
The President ended the historical
practice of allowing the terminal
element to be inferred from Article 134
specifications, see, e.g. United States v.
Mayo, 12 M.J. 286 (C.M.A. 1982), and
required the terminal element be
expressly alleged to provide sufficient
notice to the accused and for uniformity
and consistency in practice. See Fosler,
70 M.J. at 227–28. In general, when
drafting specifications, the Government
must allege every element, either
expressly or by necessary implication.
See R.C.M. 307(c)(3). However, in
Article 134 specifications, the accused
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must be given notice as to which clause
or clauses he must defend against;
therefore, the terminal element may not
be inferred from a specification.
Although a single terminal element is
required, there are three theories of
liability that would satisfy the terminal
element: a disorder or neglect to the
prejudice of good order and discipline
(under clause 1); conduct of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces
(under clause 2); or a crime or offense
not capital (under clause 3). The three
clauses are ‘‘distinct and separate.’’
Fosler, 70 M.J. at 230. A single theory
may be alleged, or clauses 1 and 2 may
be combined. While it is not prohibited
to combine clauses 1, 2, and 3 in one
specification, such a combination is not
practical.
When charging both clauses 1 and 2,
practitioners are encouraged to use the
word ‘‘and’’ to separate the theories in
one specification, rather than using the
word ‘‘or’’ to separate the theories.
Practitioners may also allege two
separate specifications. At findings, the
Trial Counsel or Military Judge must
make certain that the record is clear as
to whether the trier of fact found that
clause 1, clause 2, or both clauses were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Using the word ‘‘and’’ to separate
clauses 1 and 2 in the terminal element
allows the trier of fact to except the
unproven clause from the specification.
This approach forces intellectual rigor
in analyzing each clause as distinct and
separate. Nothing in this analysis
should be read to suggest that a
specification connecting the two
theories with the disjunctive ‘‘or’’
necessarily fails to give the accused
reasonable notice of the charge against
him. See United States v. Rauscher, 71
M.J. 225, 226 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Russell v. United States,
369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962)).’’
(j) Paragraph 60.c.(6)(b) is amended by
deleting the paragraph beginning with
the words ‘‘2012 Amendment’’ and
ending ‘‘above.’’, and inserting in its
place:
‘‘2016 Amendment: New discussion
was added in 2012 to address United
States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F.
2011). In 2016, that discussion was
removed after paragraph 60 was
amended by Executive Order. See
analysis under subparagraph c.(6)(a)
above.’’
(k) Paragraph 62.c.(2) is amended to
read as follows:
‘‘(2) When determining whether
adulterous acts constitute the offense of
adultery under Article 134, commanders
should consider the listed factors. The
offense of adultery is intended to
prohibit extramarital sexual behavior
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that directly affects the discipline of the
armed forces, respect for the chain of
command, or maintenance of unit
cohesion. The intent of this provision is
to limit the crime of adultery to those
situations where the negative impact to
the unit is real rather than theorized.
This provision should not be interpreted
to criminalize sexual practices between
two adults with full and mutual consent
from each other, but rather, to punish
the collateral negative effects of
extramarital sexual activity when there
exists a genuine nexus between that
activity and the efficiency and
effectiveness of the armed forces. Cf.
United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198,
204–08 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (despite
constitutionally protected liberty
interest in private sexual behavior
between consenting adults, military may
regulate sexual conduct to the extent it
could affect military order and
discipline).
While each commander has discretion
to dispose of offenses by members of the
command, wholly private and
consensual sexual conduct between
adults is generally not punishable under
this paragraph. The right to engage in
such conduct, however, is tempered in
a military context by the mission of the
military, the need for cohesive teams,
and the need for obedience to orders.
Cases involving fraternization or other
unprofessional relationships may be
more appropriately charged under
Article 92 or Article 134—
Fraternization. Cases involving abuse of
authority by officers may be more
appropriately charged under Article
133.
Rule for Courts-Martial 306(b) advises
commanders to dispose of alleged
offenses at the lowest appropriate level.
As the R.C.M. 306(b) discussion states,
many factors must be taken into
consideration and balanced, including,
to the extent practicable, the nature of
the offense, any mitigating or
extenuating circumstances, any
recommendations made by subordinate
commanders, the interests of justice,
military exigencies, and the effect of the
decision on the military member and
the command. The goal should be a
disposition that is warranted,
appropriate, and fair. In the case of
officers, also consult the explanation to
paragraph 59 of Part IV in deciding how
to dispose of an allegation of adultery.’’
(l) Paragraph 90 is amended to read as
follows:
‘‘90. Article 134—(Indecent Conduct)
Introduction. This offense is new to
the Manual for Courts-Martial and was
promulgated pursuant to Executive
Order 13740 of 16 September 2016. It
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includes offenses previously proscribed
by ‘‘Indecent acts with another,’’ which
was deleted pursuant to Executive
Order 13447 of 1 October 2007, except
that the presence of another person is
not required. (m) Paragraph 97, Article
134 (Pandering and prostitution) is
amended by adding the following
language:
‘‘2016 Amendment: Paragraph 97 was
amended to broaden the definition of
prostitution and pandering to include
all sexual acts, not just sexual
intercourse. This amendment included
the removal of the language in
paragraph 97.c suggesting that engaging
in sodomy for money or compensation
could be charged under paragraph 51
(Article 125—Sodomy). Pursuant to
section 1707 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014,
P.L. 113–66, 26 December 2013,
consensual sodomy is no longer a crime
under the UCMJ and Article 125 is not
an appropriate charge for the consensual
exchange of money for sodomy. The
definition of prostitution for this offense
differs from the definition of
prostitution in Article 120c. Congress
provided a broader definition of
prostitution when criminalizing forcible
pandering.
Dated: November 3, 2016.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2016–26947 Filed 11–7–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
[Docket No.: ED–2016–ICCD–0125]
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Comment Request;
Implementation of Title I/II–A Program
Initiatives
Institute of Education Sciences
(IES), Department of Education (ED).
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, ED is
proposing a reinstatement of a
previously approved information
collection.
SUMMARY:
Interested persons are invited to
submit comments on or before January
9, 2017.
ADDRESSES: To access and review all the
documents related to the information
collection listed in this notice, please
use https://www.regulations.gov by
searching the Docket ID number ED–
2016–ICCD–0125. Comments submitted
in response to this notice should be
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES
DATES:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:27 Nov 07, 2016
Jkt 241001
submitted electronically through the
Federal eRulemaking Portal at https://
www.regulations.gov by selecting the
Docket ID number or via postal mail,
commercial delivery, or hand delivery.
Please note that comments submitted by
fax or email and those submitted after
the comment period will not be
accepted. Written requests for
information or comments submitted by
postal mail or delivery should be
addressed to the Director of the
Information Collection Clearance
Division, U.S. Department of Education,
400 Maryland Avenue SW., LBJ, Room
2E–343, Washington, DC 20202–4537.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
specific questions related to collection
activities, please contact Erica Johnson,
202–245–7676.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Department of Education (ED), in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(A)), provides the general
public and Federal agencies with an
opportunity to comment on proposed,
revised, and continuing collections of
information. This helps the Department
assess the impact of its information
collection requirements and minimize
the public’s reporting burden. It also
helps the public understand the
Department’s information collection
requirements and provide the requested
data in the desired format. ED is
soliciting comments on the proposed
information collection request (ICR) that
is described below. The Department of
Education is especially interested in
public comment addressing the
following issues: (1) Is this collection
necessary to the proper functions of the
Department; (2) will this information be
processed and used in a timely manner;
(3) is the estimate of burden accurate;
(4) how might the Department enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and (5) how
might the Department minimize the
burden of this collection on the
respondents, including through the use
of information technology. Please note
that written comments received in
response to this notice will be
considered public records.
Title of Collection: Implementation of
Title I/II–A Program Initiatives.
OMB Control Number: 1850–0902.
Type of Review: A reinstatement of a
previously approved information
collection.
Respondents/Affected Public: State,
Local, or Tribal Governments.
Total Estimated Number of Annual
Responses: 621.
Total Estimated Number of Annual
Burden Hours: 672.
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
78589
Abstract: The second round of data
collection for the Implementation of
Title I/II–A Program Initiatives study
will continue to examine the
implementation of policies promoted
through the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act (ESEA) at the state and
district levels, in four core areas: School
accountability and support for lowperforming schools, teacher and
principal evaluation, state content
standards, and assessments. The first
round of data collection for this study
was conducted in Spring and Summer
2014.
The purpose of this follow-up data
collection is to provide policy makers
with detailed information on the core
policies promoted by Title I and Title
II–A being implemented at the state and
district levels, and the resources and
supports they provide to schools and
teachers. The timing of the data
collection is critical to provide
information prior to the full
implementation of the Every Student
Succeeds Act (ESSA) in the 2017–18
school year. Although other research
studies cover similar topics on recent
federal education policy, the breadth of
research questions and the depth of
responses from all states and a
nationally representative sample of 570
school districts sets the Title I/II study
apart from other studies.
This study will rely on information
collected from existing sources, for
which there are no respondents or
burden, and on a set of revised state and
district surveys, based on the 2014 data
collection, in order to address the
study’s research questions. Extant data
sources include (a) the National
Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) and (b) EDFacts data.
The revised surveys of states and
school districts will begin in April 2017.
All respondents will have the
opportunity to complete an electronic
(e.g., web-based) survey (or paper
survey, if preferred). The survey
respondents are described briefly below:
State Surveys: The state survey will
be sent to the chief state school officer
in each of the 50 states and the District
of Columbia. The state surveys will be
administered using an electronic
instrument divided into modules
corresponding to the four core areas.
School District Surveys. The school
district survey will be sent to school
superintendents from the same
nationally representative sample of 570
school districts that participated in the
2014 survey. The district survey will be
web-based and modularized,
corresponding to the four core areas, to
allow for completion by one or multiple
respondents.
E:\FR\FM\08NON1.SGM
08NON1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 216 (Tuesday, November 8, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 78576-78589]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-26947]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
[Docket ID: DOD-2016-OS-0110]
Manual for Courts-Martial; Publication of Supplementary Materials
AGENCY: Joint Service Committee on Military Justice (JSC), Department
of Defense.
ACTION: Publication of Discussion and Analysis (Supplementary
Materials) accompanying the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
(2012 ed.) (MCM).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The JSC hereby publishes Supplementary Materials accompanying
the MCM as amended by Executive Orders 13643, 13669, 13696, 13730, and
13740. These changes have not been coordinated within the Department of
Defense under DoD Directive 5500.1, ``Preparation, Processing and
Coordinating Legislation, Executive Orders, Proclamations, Views
Letters and Testimony,'' June 15, 2007, and do not constitute the
official position of the Department of Defense, the Military
Departments, or any other Government agency. These Supplementary
Materials have been approved by the JSC and the General Counsel of the
Department of Defense, and shall be applied in conjunction with the
rule with which they are associated. The Discussions are effective
insofar as the Rules they supplement are effective, but may not be
applied earlier than the date of publication in the Federal Register.
DATES: These Supplementary Materials are effective as of November 8,
2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Major Harlye S. Carlton, USMC, (703)
963-9299 or harlye.carlton@usmc.mil. The JSC Web site is located at:
https://jsc.defense.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Public Comments: The JSC solicited public comments for these
changes to the MCM via the Federal Register on October 23, 2012 (77 FR
64854-64887, Docket ID: DoD-2012-OS-0129), held a public meeting on
December 11, 2012, and published the JSC response to public comments
via the Federal Register on March 5, 2013 (78 FR 14271-14272, Docket
ID: DoD-2012-OS-0129).
The amendments to the Discussion and Analysis of the MCM are as
follows:
Annex
Section 1. Appendix 12 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is amended as follows:
(a) Article 120 is amended to read as follows:
``120 Rape and sexual assault generally
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rape................................ Mandatory DD \5\....... Life \4\............... Total.
Sexual Assault...................... Mandatory DD \5\....... 30 yrs................. Total.
Aggravated Sexual Contact........... DD, BCD................ 20 yrs................. Total.
Abusive Sexual Contact.............. DD, BCD................ 7 yrs.................. Total.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Article 120b is inserted to read as follows:
``120b Rape and sexual assault of a child
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rape of a Child..................... Mandatory DD \5\....... Life \4\............... Total.
Sexual Assault of a Child........... Mandatory DD \5\....... 30 yrs................. Total.
Sexual Abuse of a Child:
Cases Involving Sexual Contact.. DD, BCD................ 20 yrs................. Total.
Other Cases..................... DD, BCD................ 15 yrs................. Total.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(c) Article 120c is inserted to read as follows:
``120c Other sexual misconduct
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indecent Viewing.................... DD, BCD................ 1 yr................... Total.
Indecent Recording.................. DD, BCD................ 5 yrs.................. Total.
Broadcasting or Distributing of an DD, BCD................ 7 yrs.................. Total.
Indecent Recording.
[[Page 78577]]
Forcible Pandering.................. DD, BCD................ 12 yrs................. Total.
Indecent Exposure................... DD, BCD................ 1 yr................... Total.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(d) The following Note is inserted after Article 120c to read as
follows:
``[Note: The Article 120, 120b, and 120c maximum punishments apply
to offenses committed after 28 June 2012. See Appendices 23, 27, and
28.]''
(e) Article 125 is amended to read as follows:
``125 Forcible sodomy; bestiality
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forcible sodomy..................... Mandatory DD \5\....... Life \4\............... Total.
Bestiality.......................... DD, BCD................ 5 yrs.................. Total.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(f) Article 134 abusing public animal is amended to read as
follows:
``134 Animal abuse
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Abuse, neglect, or abandonment of an BCD.................... 1 yr................... Total.
animal.
Abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a BCD.................... 2yrs................... Total.
public animal.
Sexual act with an animal or cases DD, BCD................ 5 yrs.................. Total.''
where the accused caused the
serious injury or death of the
animal.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(g) Article 134 Assault with intent to commit voluntary
manslaughter, robbery, sodomy, arson, or burglary is amended to read as
follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
134 With intent to commit voluntary DD, BCD................ 10 yrs................. Total.''
manslaughter, robbery, forcible
sodomy, arson, or burglary.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) Article 134 Indecent conduct is inserted to read as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense Discharge Confinement Forfeiture
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
134 Indecent conduct................ DD, BCD................ 5 yrs.................. Total.''
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) The Notes are amended by adding note \5\ after note \4.\
`` \5.\ A dishonorable discharge can be reduced to a bad-conduct
discharge by the convening authority in accordance with a pretrial
agreement.''
Section 2. Appendix 12A of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is inserted to read as follows:
``APPENDIX 12A
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
This chart was compiled for convenience purposes only and is not
the ultimate authority for specific lesser included offenses. Lesser
offenses are those which are necessarily included in the offense
charged. See Article 79. Depending on the factual circumstances in each
case, the offenses listed below may be considered lesser included. The
elements of the proposed lesser included offense should be compared
with the elements of the greater offense to determine if the elements
of the lesser offense are derivative of the greater offense and vice
versa. The ``elements test'' is the proper method for determining
lesser included offenses. See Appendix 23.
Attempts to commit an offense may constitute a lesser included
offense and are not listed. See Article 80.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Article Offense Lesser included offense
------------------------------------------------------------------------
77.................. Principals.............. See Part IV, Para. 1.
78.................. Accessory after the fact See Part IV, Para. 2.
79.................. Conviction of lesser See Part IV, Para. 3.
included offenses.
80.................. Attempts................ See Part IV, Para. 4.
81.................. Conspiracy.............. See Part IV, Para. 5.
82.................. Solicitation............
83.................. Fraudulent enlistment,
appointment, or
separation.
84.................. Effecting unlawful
enlistment,
appointment, or
separation.
85.................. Desertion............... Art. 86.
86.................. Absence without leave...
[[Page 78578]]
87.................. Missing movement........
--Design................ Art. 87 (neglect); Art.
86.
--Neglect............... Art. 86.
88.................. Contempt toward
officials.
89.................. Disrespect toward a Art. 117.
superior commissioned
officer.
90.................. Assaulting or willfully
disobeying superior
commissioned officer.
--Striking superior Art. 90 (drawing or
commissioned officer in lifting up a weapon or
execution of office. offering violence to
superior commissioned
officer); Art. 128
(simple assault;
assault consummated by
a battery; assault with
a dangerous weapon;
assault or assault
consummated by a
battery upon
commissioned officer
not in the execution of
office).
--Drawing or lifting up Art. 128 (simple
a weapon or offering assault; assault with a
violence to superior dangerous weapon;
commissioned officer in assault upon a
execution of office. commissioned officer
not in the execution of
office).
--Willfully disobeying Art. 92; Art. 89.
lawful order of
superior commissioned
officer.
91.................. Insubordinate conduct
toward warrant officer,
noncommissioned
officer, or petty
officer.
--Striking or assaulting Art. 128 (simple
warrant, assault; assault
noncommissioned, or consummated by a
petty officer in the battery; assault with a
execution of office. dangerous weapon;
assault upon warrant,
noncommissioned, or
petty officer not in
the execution of
office).
--Disobeying a warrant, Art. 92.
noncommissioned, or
petty officer.
--Treating with contempt Art. 117.
or being disrespectful
in language or
deportment toward
warrant,
noncommissioned, or
petty officer in the
execution of office.
92.................. Failure to obey order or
regulation.
93.................. Cruelty and maltreatment
94.................. Mutiny and sedition.....
--Mutiny by creating Art. 90; Art. 116; Art.
violence or disturbance. 128 (simple assault).
--Mutiny by refusing to Art. 90 (willful
obey orders or perform disobedience of
duties. commissioned officer);
Art. 91 (willful
disobedience of
warrant,
noncommissioned, or
petty officer); Art.
92.
--Sedition.............. Art. 116; Art. 128
(assault).
95.................. Resistance, flight,
breach of arrest, and
escape.
--Resisting apprehension Art. 128 (simple
assault; assault
consummated by a
battery).
96.................. Releasing prisoner
without proper
authority.
--Suffering a prisoner Art. 96 (neglect).
to escape through
design.
97.................. Unlawful detention......
98.................. Noncompliance with
procedural rules.
99.................. Misbehavior before the
enemy.
--Running away.......... Art. 85 (desertion with
intent to avoid
hazardous duty or
important service);
Art. 86 (absence
without authority;
going from appointed
place of duty).
--Endangering safety of Art. 92.
a command, unit, place,
ship, or military
property.
--Casting away arms or Art. 108.
ammunition.
--Cowardly conduct...... Art. 85 (desertion with
intent to avoid
hazardous duty or
important service);
Art. 86; Art. 99
(running away).
--Quitting place of duty Art. 86 (going from
to plunder or pillage. appointed place of
duty).
100................. Subordinate compelling
surrender.
101................. Improper use of a
countersign.
102................. Forcing a safeguard.....
103................. Captured or abandoned
property.
104................. Aiding the enemy........
105................. Misconduct as a prisoner
106................. Spies...................
106a................ Espionage...............
107................. False official statement
108................. Military property of the
United States--sale,
loss, damage,
destruction, or
wrongful disposition.
--Willfully damaging Art. 108 (damaging
military property. military property
through neglect); Art.
109 (willfully damaging
non-military property).
--Willfully suffering Art. 108 (through
military property to be neglect suffering
damaged. military property to be
damaged).
--Willfully destroying Art. 108 (through
military property. neglect destroying
military property;
willfully damaging
military property;
through neglect
damaging military
property); Art. 109
(willfully destroying
non-military property;
willfully damaging non-
military property).
--Willfully suffering Art. 108 (through
military property to be neglect suffering
destroyed. military property to be
destroyed; willfully
suffering military
property to be damaged;
through neglect
suffering military
property to be
damaged).
--Willfully losing Art. 108 (through
military property. neglect losing military
property).
--Willfully suffering Art. 108 (through
military property to be neglect suffering
lost. military property to be
lost).
[[Page 78579]]
--Willfully suffering Art. 108 (through
military property to be neglect suffering
sold. military property to be
sold).
--Willfully suffering Art. 108 (through
military property to be neglect suffering
wrongfully disposed of. military property to be
wrongfully disposed of
in the manner alleged).
109................. Property other than
military property of
the United States--
waste, spoilage, or
destruction.
110................. Improper hazarding of
vessel.
--Willfully and Art. 110 (negligently
wrongfully hazarding a hazarding a vessel).
vessel.
--Willfully and Art. 110 (negligently
wrongfully suffering a suffering a vessel to
vessel to be hazarded. be hazarded).
111................. Drunken or reckless
operation of vehicle,
aircraft, or vessel.
--Reckless, wanton, or Art. 110.
impaired operation or
physical control of a
vessel.
--Drunken operation of a Art. 110; Art. 112.
vehicle, vessel, or
aircraft while drunk or
with a blood or breath
alcohol concentration
in violation of the
described per se
standard.
112................. Drunk on Duty...........
112a................ Wrongful use,
possession, etc., of
controlled substances.
--Wrongful use of Art. 112a (wrongful
controlled substance. possession of
controlled substance).
--Wrongful manufacture Art. 112a (wrongful
of controlled substance. possession of
controlled substance).
--Wrongful introduction Art. 112a (wrongful
of controlled substance. possession of
controlled substance).
--Wrongful possession, Art. 112a (wrongful
manufacture, or possession,
introduction of a manufacture, or
controlled substance introduction of
with intent to controlled substance).
distribute.
113................. Misbehavior of sentinel
or lookout.
--Drunk on post......... Art. 112; Art. 92
(dereliction of duty).
--Sleeping on post...... Art. 92 (dereliction of
duty).
--Leaving post.......... Art. 92 (dereliction of
duty); Art. 86 (going
from appointed place of
duty).
114................. Dueling.................
115................. Malingering.............
116................. Riot or breach of peace.
--Riot.................. Art. 116 (breach of
peace).
117................. Provoking speeches or
gestures.
118................. Murder..................
--Premeditated murder Art. 118 (intent to kill
and murder during or inflict great bodily
certain offenses. harm; act inherently
dangerous to another).
--All murders under Art. 119 (involuntary
Article 118. manslaughter); Art. 128
(simple assault;
assault consummated by
a battery; aggravated
assault).
--Murder as defined in Art. 119 (voluntary
Article 118(1), (2), manslaughter).
and (4).
119................. Manslaughter............
--Voluntary manslaughter Art. 119 (involuntary
manslaughter); Art. 128
(simple assault;
assault consummated by
a battery; aggravated
assault).
--Involuntary Art. 128 (simple
manslaughter. assault; assault
consummated by a
battery).
119a................ Death or injury of an
unborn child.
--Killing an unborn Art. 119a (injuring an
child. unborn child).
--Intentionally killing Art. 119a (killing an
an unborn child. unborn child; injuring
an unborn child).
120 \1\............. Rape and sexual assault
generally.
--Rape..................
--By unlawful force.. Art. 120(b)(1)(B); Art.
120(c); Art. 120(d);
Art. 128 (simple
assault; assault
consummated by a
battery).
--By force causing or Art. 120(a)(1); Art.
likely to cause 120(b)(1)(B); Art.
death or grievous 120(c); Art. 120(d);
bodily harm to any Art. 128 (simple
person. assault; assault
consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon or
other means or force
likely to produce death
or grievous bodily
harm; assault
intentionally
inflicting grievous
bodily harm).
--By threatening or Art. 120(b)(1)(B); Art.
placing that other 120(c); Art. 120(d).
person in fear that
any person would be
subjected to death,
grievous bodily
harm, or kidnapping.
--By first rendering Art. 120(b)(2); Art.
that other person 120(c); Art. 120(d).
unconscious.
--By administering to Art. 120(c); Art. 128
that person a drug, (simple assault;
intoxicant, or other assault consummated by
similar substance. a battery).
--Sexual Assault.....
--By threatening or Art. 120(d).
placing that other
person in fear.
--By causing bodily Art. 120(d); Art. 128
harm to that other (simple assault;
person. assault consummated by
a battery).
--By making a Art. 120(d).
fraudulent
representation that
the sexual act
serves a
professional purpose.
--Inducing a belief Art. 120(d).
by any artifice,
pretense, or
concealment that the
person is another
person.
--Upon another person Art. 120(d).
when the person
knows or reasonably
should know that the
other person is
asleep, unconscious,
or otherwise unaware
that the sexual act
is occurring.
--When the other Art. 120(d).
person is incapable
of consenting.
--Aggravated sexual
contact.
[[Page 78580]]
--By unlawful force.. Art. 120(d); Art. 128
(simple assault;
assault consummated by
a battery).
--By force causing or Art. 120(d); Art. 128
likely to cause (simple assault;
death or grievous assault consummated by
bodily harm to any a battery).
person.
--By threatening or Art. 120(d).
placing that other
person in fear that
any person would be
subjected to death,
grievous bodily
harm, or kidnapping.
--By first rendering Art. 120(d); Art. 128
that person (simple assault;
unconscious. assault consummated by
a battery).
--By administering to Art. 120(d); Art. 128
that person a drug, (simple assault;
intoxicant, or other assault consummated by
similar substance. a battery).
--Abusive sexual Art. 128 (simple
contact. assault; assault
consummated by a
battery).
120a................ Stalking................
120b................ Rape and sexual assault
of a child.
--Rape of a child.......
--Of a child who has Art. 120b(c); Art. 120c.
not attained the age
of 12.
--By force of a child Art. 120b(b); Art.
who has attained the 120b(c); Art. 128
age of 12. (assault consummated by
a battery upon a child
under 16 years).
--By threatening or Art. 120b(b); Art.
placing in fear a 120b(c).
child who has
attained the age of
12.
--By rendering Art. 120b(b); Art.
unconscious a child 120b(c); Art. 128
who has attained the (assault consummated by
age of 12. a battery upon a child
under 16 years).
--By administering a Art. 120b(b); Art.
drug, intoxicant, or 120b(c); Art. 128
other similar (assault consummated by
substance to a child a battery upon a child
who has attained the under 16 years).
age of 12.
--Sexual assault of a
child.
--Sexual assault of a Art. 120b(c).
child who has not
attained the age of
12 involving contact
between penis and
vulva or anus or
mouth.
--Sexual assault of a Art. 120b(c).
child who has
attained the age of
12 involving
penetration of vulva
or anus or mouth by
any part of the body
or any object.
120c................ Other sexual misconduct.
121................. Larceny and wrongful
appropriation.
--Larceny............... Art. 121 (wrongful
appropriation).
--Larceny of military Art. 121 (wrongful
property. appropriation; larceny
of property other than
military property).
122................. Robbery................. Art. 121 (larceny;
wrongful
appropriation); Art.
128 (simple assault;
assault consummated by
a battery; assault with
a dangerous weapon;
assault intentionally
inflicting grievous
bodily harm)
123................. Forgery.................
123a................ Making, drawing, or
uttering check, draft,
or order without
sufficient funds.
124................. Maiming................. Art. 128 (simple
assault; assault
consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon;
assault intentionally
inflicting grievous
bodily harm)
125................. Forcible sodomy;
bestiality.
--Forcible sodomy....... Art. 128 (simple
assault; assault
consummated by a
battery).
126................. Arson...................
--Aggravated arson...... Art. 126 (simple arson).
127................. Extortion...............
128................. Assault.................
--Assault consummated by Art. 128 (simple
a battery. assault).
--Assault upon a Art. 128 (simple
commissioned, warrant, assault; assault
noncommissioned, or consummated by a
petty officer. battery).
--Assault upon a Art. 128 (simple
sentinel or lookout in assault; assault
the execution of duty. consummated by a
battery).
--Assault consummated by Art. 128 (simple
a battery upon a child assault; assault
under 16 years. consummated by a
battery).
--Assault with a Art. 128 (simple
dangerous weapon or assault; assault
other means of force consummated by a
likely to produce death battery; (when
or grievous bodily harm. committed upon a child
under the age of 16
years; assault
consummated by a
battery upon a child
under the age of 16
years)).
--Assault in which Art. 128 (simple
grievous bodily harm is assault; assault
intentionally inflicted. consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon (when
committed upon a child
under the age of 16
years; assault
consummated by a
battery upon a child
under the age of 16
years)).
129................. Burglary................ Art. 130
(housebreaking).
130................. Housebreaking...........
131................. Perjury.................
132................. Frauds against the
United States.
133................. Conduct unbecoming an
officer and a gentleman.
134................. Animal abuse............
134................. Adultery................
[[Page 78581]]
134................. Assault--with intent to
commit murder,
voluntary manslaughter,
rape, robbery, forcible
sodomy, arson,
burglary, or
housebreaking.
--Assault with intent to Art. 128 (simple
murder. assault; assault
consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon;
assault intentionally
inflicting grievous
bodily harm); Art. 134
(assault with intent to
commit voluntary
manslaughter; willful
or careless discharge
of a firearm).
--Assault with intent to Art. 128 (simple
commit voluntary assault; assault
manslaughter. consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon;
assault intentionally
inflicting grievous
bodily harm); Art. 134
(willful or careless
discharge of a
firearm).
--Assault with intent to Art. 128 (simple
commit rape or forcible assault; assault
sodomy. consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon).
--Assault with intent to Art. 128 (simple
commit burglary. assault; assault
consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon); Art.
134 (assault with
intent to commit
housebreaking).
--Assault with intent to Art. 128 (simple
commit robbery, arson, assault; assault
or housebreaking. consummated by a
battery; assault with a
dangerous weapon).
134................. Bigamy..................
134................. Bribery and graft.......
--Bribery............... Art. 134 (graft).
134................. Burning with intent to
defraud.
134................. Check, worthless, making
and uttering--by
dishonorably failing to
maintain funds.
134................. Child endangerment......
--Child endangerment by Art. 134 (child
design. endangerment by
culpable negligence).
134................. Child pornography.......
--Possessing child Art. 134 (possessing
pornography with intent child pornography).
to distribute.
--Distributing child Art. 134 (possessing
pornography. child pornography;
possessing child
pornography with intent
to distribute)
--Producing child Art. 134 (possessing
pornography. child pornography).
134................. Cohabitation, wrongful..
134................. Correctional custody--
offenses against.
134................. Debt, dishonorably
failing to pay.
134................. Disloyal statements.....
134................. Disorderly conduct,
drunkenness.
134................. Drinking liquor with
prisoner.
134................. Drunk prisoner..........
134................. Drunkenness--incapacitat
ion for performance of
duties through prior
wrongful indulgence in
intoxicating liquor or
any drug.
134................. False or unauthorized
pass offenses.
--Wrongful use or Art. 134 (same offenses,
possession of false or except without the
unauthorized military intent to defraud or
or official pass, deceive).
permit, discharge
certificate, or
identification card,
with the intent to
defraud or deceive.
134................. False pretenses,
obtaining services
under.
134................. False swearing..........
134................. Firearm, discharging--
through negligence.
134................. Firearm, discharging-- Art. 134 (firearm,
willfully, under such discharging--through
circumstances as to negligence).
endanger human life.
134................. Fleeing scene of
accident.
134................. Fraternization..........
134................. Gambling with a
subordinate.
134................. Homicide, negligent.....
134................. Impersonating a
commissioned, warrant,
noncommissioned, or
petty officer, or an
agent or official.
134................. Indecent conduct........
134................. Indecent language....... Art. 117 (provoking
speeches).
134................. Jumping from vessel into
the water.
134................. Kidnapping..............
134................. Mail: Taking, opening, Art. 121.
secreting, destroying,
or stealing.
134................. Mails: Depositing or
causing to be deposited
obscene matters in.
134................. Misprision of serious
offense.
134................. Obstructing justice.....
134................. Wrongful interference
with an adverse
administrative
proceeding.
134................. Pandering and
prostitution.
134................. Parole, violation of....
134................. Perjury: Subornation of.
134................. Public record: Altering,
concealing, removing,
mutilating,
obliterating, or
destroying.
134................. Quarantine: Medical, Art. 134 (breaking
breaking. restriction).
[[Page 78582]]
134................. Reckless endangerment...
134................. Restriction, breaking...
134................. Seizure: Destruction,
removal, or disposal of
property to prevent.
134................. Self-injury without
intent to avoid service.
134................. Sentinel or lookout:
Offenses against or by.
134................. Soliciting another to
commit an offense.
134................. Stolen property:
Knowingly receiving,
buying, concealing.
134................. Straggling..............
134................. Testify: Wrongful
refusal.
134................. Threat or hoax designed
or intended to cause
panic or public fear.
--Threat................ Art. 134 (communicating
a threat); Art. 128
(assault).
134................. Threat, communicating...
134................. Unlawful entry..........
134................. Weapon: Concealed,
carrying.
134................. Wearing unauthorized
insignia, decoration,
badge, ribbon, device
or lapel button''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This chart only includes the 2012 version of Art. 120. See Appendix
27 and 28 for prior versions.
Section 3. The Discussion to Part I of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, is amended as follows:
(a) The Discussion immediately following paragraph 4 is amended to
read as follows:
``The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of
Homeland Security, has published supplementary materials to accompany
the Manual for Courts-Martial. These materials consist of a Discussion
(accompanying the Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military
Rules of Evidence, and the Punitive Articles), an Analysis, and various
appendices. These supplementary materials do not constitute the
official views of the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of Justice, the military departments, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or any other
authority of the Government of the United States, and they do not
constitute rules. Cf., e.g., 5 U.S.C. 551(4). The supplementary
materials do not create rights or responsibilities that are binding on
any person, party, or other entity (including any authority of the
Government of the United States whether or not included in the
definition of ``agency'' in 5 U.S.C. 551(1)). Failure to comply with
matter set forth in the supplementary materials does not, of itself,
constitute error, although these materials may refer to requirements in
the rules set forth in the Executive Order or established by other
legal authorities (for example, binding judicial precedents applicable
to courts-martial) that are based on sources of authority independent
of the supplementary materials. See Appendix 21 in this Manual.
The 1995 amendment to paragraph 4 of the Preamble eliminated the
practice of identifying the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
by a particular year. Historically the Manual had been published in its
entirety sporadically (e.g., 1917, 1921, 1928, 1949, 1951, 1969, and
1984) with amendments to it published piecemeal. It was therefore
logical to identify the Manual by the calendar year of publication,
with periodic amendments identified as ``Changes'' to the Manual.
Beginning in 1995, however, a new edition of the Manual was published
in its entirety and a new naming convention was adopted. See Exec.
Order No. 12960 of May 12, 1995. Beginning in 1995, the Manual was to
be referred to as ``Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (19xx
edition).'' In 2013, the Preamble was amended to identify new Manuals
based on their publication date.
Amendments made to the Manual can be researched in the relevant
Executive Order as referenced in Appendix 25. Although the Executive
Orders were removed from Appendix 25 of the Manual in 2012 to reduce
printing requirements, they can be accessed online. See Appendix 25.
Section 4. The Discussion to Part II of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, is amended as follows:
(a) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 307(c)(3) is
amended by deleting the first two Notes.
(b) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 307(c)(3) is
amended by inserting the words ``For Article 134 offenses, also refer
to paragraph 60c(6) in Part IV.'' after the words ``How to draft
specifications.''
(c) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 307(c)(3) is
amended by deleting the Note directly following the words ``(G)
Description of offense.''
(d) Part (G)(i) in the Discussion immediately following R.C.M.
307(c)(3) is amended to read as follows:
``(i) Elements. The elements of the offense must be alleged, either
expressly or by necessary implication, except that Article 134
specifications must expressly allege the terminal element. See
paragraph 60.c.(6) in Part IV. If a specific intent, knowledge, or
state of mind is an element of the offense, it must be alleged.''
(e) Part (G)(v) in the Discussion immediately following R.C.M.
307(c)(3) is inserted to read as follows:
``(v) Lesser Included Offenses. The elements of the contemplated
lesser included offense should be compared with the elements of the
greater offense to determine if the elements of the lesser offense are
derivative of the greater offense and vice versa. See discussion
following paragraph 3.b.(1)(c) in Part IV and the related analysis in
Appendix 23.''
(f) The note immediately following R.C.M. 307(c)(4) is deleted and
Discussion is inserted to read as follows:
``The prohibition against unreasonable multiplication of charges
addresses those features of military law that increase the potential
for overreaching in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It is
based on reasonableness, and has no foundation in Constitutional
rights. To determine if charges are unreasonably multiplied, see R.C.M.
906(b)(12). Because prosecutors are free to charge in the alternative,
it may be reasonable to charge two or more offenses that arise from one
transaction if sufficient doubt exists as to the facts or the law. In
no case should both an offense and a lesser included offense thereof be
separately charged. See also Part IV, paragraph 3, and R.C.M. 601(e)(2)
concerning referral of several offenses.''
(g) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 701(e) is amended
by
[[Page 78583]]
adding the following after ``retribution for such testimony'':
``Counsel must remain cognizant of professional responsibility
rules regarding communicating with represented persons.''
(h) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 809(a) is amended
to read as follows:
``Article 48 makes punishable ``direct'' contempt, as well as
``indirect'' or ``constructive'' contempt. ``Direct'' contempt is that
which is committed in the presence of the court-martial or its
immediate proximity. ``Presence'' includes those places outside the
courtroom itself, such as waiting areas, deliberation rooms, and other
places set aside for the use of the court-martial while it is in
session. ``Indirect'' or ``constructive'' contempt is non-compliance
with lawful writs, processes, orders, rules, decrees, or commands of
the court-martial. A ``direct'' or ``indirect'' contempt may be
actually seen or heard by the court-martial, in which case it may be
punished summarily. See subsection (b)(1) of this Rule. A ``direct'' or
``indirect'' contempt may also be a contempt not actually observed by
the court-martial, for example, when an unseen person makes loud
noises, whether inside or outside the courtroom, which impede the
orderly progress of the proceedings. In such a case the procedures for
punishing contempt are more extensive. See subsection (b)(2) of this
Rule.
The words ``any person,'' as used in Article 48, include all
persons, whether or not subject to military law, except the military
judge and foreign nationals outside the territorial limits of the
United States who are not subject to the code. The military judge may
order the offender removed whether or not contempt proceedings are
held. It may be appropriate to warn a person whose conduct is improper
that persistence in a course of behavior may result in removal or
punishment for contempt. See R.C.M. 804, 806.
Each finding of contempt may be separately punished.
A person subject to the code who commits contempt may be tried by
court-martial or otherwise disciplined under Article 134 for such
misconduct in addition to or instead of punishment for contempt. See
paragraph 108, Part IV; see also Article 98. The 2011 amendment of
Article 48 expanded the contempt power of military courts to enable
them to enforce orders, such as discovery orders or protective orders
regarding evidence, against military or civilian attorneys. Persons not
subject to military jurisdiction under Article 2, having been duly
subpoenaed, may be prosecuted in Federal civilian court under Article
47 for neglect or refusal to appear or refusal to qualify as a witness
or to testify or to produce evidence.''
(i) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 906(b)(5) is
amended to read as follows:
``Each specification may state only one offense. R.C.M. 307(c)(4).
A duplicitous specification is one which alleges two or more separate
offenses. Lesser included offenses (see paragraph 3, Part IV) are not
separate, nor is a continuing offense involving separate acts. The sole
remedy for a duplicitous specification is severance of the
specification into two or more specifications, each of which alleges a
separate offense contained in the duplicitous specification. However,
if the duplicitousness is combined with or results in other defects,
such as misleading the accused, other remedies may be appropriate. See
subsection (b)(3) of this rule. See also R.C.M. 907(b)(3).''
(j) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 906(b)(12) is
amended to read as follows:
``Unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to findings and
sentence is a limitation on the military's discretion to charge
separate offenses and does not have a foundation in the Constitution.
The concept is based on reasonableness and the prohibition against
prosecutorial overreaching. In contrast, multiplicity is grounded in
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It prevents an
accused from being twice punished for one offense if it is contrary to
the intent of Congress. See R.C.M. 907(b)(3). Therefore, a motion for
relief from unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to
findings and sentence differs from a motion to dismiss on the grounds
of multiplicity.
The following non-exhaustive factors should be considered when
determining whether two or more offenses are unreasonably multiplied:
whether the specifications are aimed at distinctly separate criminal
acts; whether they represent or exaggerate the accused's criminality;
whether they unreasonably increase his or her exposure to punishment;
and whether they suggest prosecutorial abuse of discretion in drafting
of the specifications. Because prosecutors are permitted to charge in
the alternative based on exigencies of proof, a ruling on this motion
ordinarily should be deferred until after findings are entered.''
(k) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 907(b)(3) is
amended to read as follows:
``Multiplicity is a legal concept, arising from the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provides that no person shall be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Absent legislative intent
to the contrary, an accused cannot be convicted and punished for
violations of two or more statutes if those violations arise from a
single act. Where Congress intended to impose multiple punishments for
the same act, imposition of such sentence does not violate the
Constitution.
Multiplicity differs from unreasonable multiplication of charges.
If two offenses are not multiplicious, they nonetheless may constitute
an unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to findings or
sentence. See R.C.M. 906(b)(12). Unreasonable multiplication of charges
is a limitation on the military's discretion to charge separate
offenses. It does not have a foundation in the Constitution; it is
based on reasonableness and the prohibition against prosecutorial
overreaching. The military judge is to determine, in his or her
discretion, whether the charges constitute unreasonable multiplication
of charges as applied to findings or sentencing. See R.C.M. 906(b)(12).
To determine if two charges are multiplicious, the practitioner
should first determine whether they are based on separate acts. If so,
the charges are not multiplicious because separate acts may be charged
and punished separately. If the charges are based upon a single act,
the practitioner should next determine if Congress intended to impose
multiple convictions and punishments for the same act. When there is no
overt expression of congressional intent in the relevant statutes, such
intent may be inferred based on the elements of the charged statutes
and their relationship to each other or other principles of statutory
interpretation. If each statute contains an element not contained in
the other, it may be inferred that Congress intended they be charged
and punished separately. Likewise, if each statute contains the same
elements, it may be inferred that Congress did not intend they be
charged and punished separately. A lesser included offense will always
be multiplicious if charged separately, but offenses do not have to be
lesser included to be multiplicious.
Ordinarily, a specification should not be dismissed for
multiplicity before trial. The less serious of any multiplicious
specifications shall be dismissed after findings have been reached. Due
consideration must be given, however, to possible post-trial or
[[Page 78584]]
appellate action with regard to the remaining specification.''
(l) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 910(a)(1) is
amended to read as follows:
``See paragraph 3, Part IV, concerning lesser included offenses.
When the plea is to a lesser included offense without the use of
exceptions and substitutions, the defense counsel should provide a
written revised specification to be included in the record as an
appellate exhibit.
A plea of guilty to a lesser included offense does not bar the
prosecution from proceeding on the offense as charged. See also
subsection (g) of this rule.
A plea of guilty does not prevent the introduction of evidence,
either in support of the factual basis for the plea, or, after findings
are entered, in aggravation. See R.C.M. 1001(b)(4).''
(m) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 916(j)(2) is
amended to read as follows:
``Examples of ignorance or mistake which need only exist in fact
include: ignorance of the fact that the person assaulted was an
officer; belief that property allegedly stolen belonged to the accused;
belief that a controlled substance was really sugar.
Examples of ignorance or mistake which must be reasonable as well
as actual include: belief that the accused charged with unauthorized
absence had permission to go; belief that the accused had a medical
``profile'' excusing shaving as otherwise required by regulation. Some
offenses require special standards of conduct (see, for example,
paragraph 68, Part IV, Dishonorable failure to maintain sufficient
funds); the element of reasonableness must be applied in accordance
with the standards imposed by such offenses.
Examples of offenses in which the accused's intent or knowledge is
immaterial include: Any rape of a child, or any sexual assault or
sexual abuse of a child when the child is under 12 years old. However,
such ignorance or mistake may be relevant in extenuation and
mitigation.
See subsection (l)(1) of this rule concerning ignorance or mistake
of law.''
(n) The Discussion immediately following R.C.M. 918(a)(1) is
amended to read as follows:
``Exceptions and Substitutions. One or more words or figures may be
excepted from a specification and, when necessary, others substituted,
if the remaining language of the specification, with or without
substitutions, states an offense by the accused which is punishable by
the court-martial. Changing the date or place of the offense may, but
does not necessarily, change the nature or identity of an offense.
If A and B are joint accused and A is convicted but B is acquitted
of an offense charged, A should be found guilty by excepting the name
of B from the specification as well as any other words indicating the
offense was a joint one.
Lesser Included Offenses. If the evidence fails to prove the
offense charged but does prove an offense necessarily included in the
offense charged, the fact finder may find the accused not guilty of the
offense charged but guilty of the lesser included offense. See
paragraph 3 of Part IV concerning lesser included offenses.
Offenses arising from the same act or transaction. The accused may
be found guilty of two or more offenses arising from the same act or
transaction, whether or not the offenses are separately punishable. But
see R.C.M. 906(b)(12); 907(b)(3)(B); 1003(c)(1)(C).''
(o) The note immediately following R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C) is deleted,
and the following is added immediately following the last paragraph of
the Discussion:
``Multiplicity is addressed in R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B). Unreasonable
multiplication of charges is addressed in R.C.M. 906(b)(12).''
Section 5. The Discussion to Part IV of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States, is amended as follows:
(a) The Discussion immediately following paragraph 3.b.(1)(c) is
amended to read as follows:
``The ``elements test'' is the proper method for determining lesser
included offenses. See United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F.
2010); Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705 (1989); Appendix 23 of
this Manual, Art. 79. Paragraph 3.b.(1) was amended to comport with the
elements test, which requires that the elements of the lesser offense
must be a subset of the elements of the charged offense. The elements
test does not require identical statutory language, and use of normal
principles of statutory interpretation is permitted. The elements test
is necessary to safeguard the due process requirement of notice to a
criminal defendant.''
(b) The following Discussion is added immediately after paragraph
3.b.(5):
``Practitioners must consider lesser included offenses on a case-
by-case basis. See United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2010);
United States v. Alston, 69 M.J. 214 (C.A.A.F. 2010); discussion
following paragraph 3.b.(1)(c) above. The lesser included offenses
listed in Appendix 12A were amended in 2016 to comport with the
elements test; however, practitioners must analyze each lesser included
offense on a case-by-case basis. See Appendix 23 of this Manual,
Article 79.''
(c) The following Discussion is added immediately after paragraph
60.b:
``The terminal element is merely the expression of one of the
clauses under Article 134. See paragraph c below for an explanation of
the clauses and rules for drafting specifications. More than one clause
may be alleged and proven; however, proof of only one clause will
satisfy the terminal element. For clause 3 offenses, the military judge
may judicially notice whether an offense is capital. See Mil. R. Evid.
202.''
(d) The following Discussion is added immediately after paragraph
60.c.(6)(a):
``Clauses 1 and 2 are theories of liability that must be expressly
alleged in a specification so that the accused will be given notice as
to which clause or clauses to defend against. The words ``to the
prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces'' encompass
both paragraph c.(2)(a), prejudice to good order and discipline, and
paragraph c.(2)(b), breach of custom of the Service. A generic sample
specification is provided below:
``In that ____, (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board
location), on or about __ 20__, (commit elements of Article 134 clause
1 or 2 offense), and that said conduct (was to the prejudice of good
order and discipline in the armed forces) (and) (was of a nature to
bring discredit upon the armed forces).''
If clauses 1 and 2 are alleged together in the terminal element,
the word ``and'' should be used to separate them. Any clause not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt should be excepted from the specification at
findings. See R.C.M. 918(a)(1). See also Appendix 23 of this Manual,
Art. 79. Although using the conjunctive ``and'' to connect the two
theories of liability is recommended, a specification connecting the
two theories with the disjunctive ``or'' is sufficient to provide the
accused reasonable notice of the charge against him. See Appendix 23 of
this Manual, Art. 134.''
(e) The following replaces the paragraph below ``Discussion''
following paragraph 60.c.(6)(b):
``The words ``an offense not capital'' are sufficient to provide
notice to the accused that a clause 3 offense has been charged and are
meant to include all crimes and offenses not capital. A generic sample
specification for clause 3 offenses is provided below:
[[Page 78585]]
``In that ____, (personal jurisdiction data), did (at/on board
location), on or about __ 20__, (commit: address each element), an
offense not capital, in violation of (name or citation of statute).''
In addition to alleging each element of the federal statute,
practitioners should consider including, when appropriate and
necessary, words of criminality (e.g., wrongfully, knowingly, or
willfully).''
Section 6. Appendix 21 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is amended as follows:
(a) R.C.M. 306, the last paragraph beginning with ``2016
Amendment,'' is amended to read as follows:
``2016 Amendment: R.C.M. 306(e) implements Section 534(b) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-291,
19 December 2014.''
(b) R.C.M. 307(c)(3), after the paragraph beginning with the words,
``2012 Amendment,'' and prior to the line beginning with the words,
``The sources of the lettered subsection'' add the following:
``2016 Amendment: The two notes added in 2012 are removed. The
notes were originally added to address the requirement to expressly
state the terminal element in specifications under Article 134 and to
address lesser included offenses. See United States v. Ballan, 71 M.J.
28 (C.A.A.F. 2012); United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F.
2011); United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465 (C.A.A.F. 2010). In 2016,
the Manual was amended to require the terminal element be expressed in
Article 134 specifications and to alter the definition of lesser
included offenses under Article 79. See paragraphs 3 and 60.c.(6) in
Part IV of this Manual.''
(c) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(A), after the paragraph beginning with the
words ``Sample specifications'' delete the paragraph beginning with the
words the ``2012 Amendment.''
(d) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(G), after the paragraph beginning with the
words ``Description of offense.'' delete the paragraph beginning with
the words the ``2012 Amendment,'' and insert in its place:
``2016 Amendment: The note added in 2012 is removed. The note was
originally added to address the requirement to expressly state the
terminal element in Article 134 specifications. See United States v.
Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012); United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J.
225 (C.A.A.F. 2011).''
(e) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(G)(i), insert the following language as a new
paragraph after the existing paragraph:
``2016 Amendment: This subparagraph was amended and reflects the
removal of a note.''
(f) R.C.M. 307(c)(3)(G)(v), insert the following language:
``2016 Amendment: Subparagraph (v) was added to address lesser
included offenses and refer practitioners to Article 79 and new
Appendix 12A. See paragraph 3 in Part IV and Appendix 12A.''
(g) R.C.M. 307(c)(4), after the paragraph beginning with the words
``2005 Amendment'' delete the paragraph beginning with the words the
``2012 Amendment,'' and insert in its place:
``2016 Amendment: The discussion section was added to R.C.M.
307(c)(4) to clarify the ambiguity between the two distinct concepts of
multiplicity and unreasonable multiplication of charges. For analysis
related to multiplicity, see R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B) in this Appendix. For
analysis related to unreasonable multiplication of charges, see R.C.M.
906(b)(12) in this Appendix.
Nothing in the rule or the discussion section should be construed
to imply that it would be overreaching for a prosecutor to bring
several charges against an accused for what essentially amounts to one
transaction if there is a valid legal reason to do so. For example,
prosecutors may charge two offenses for exigencies of proof, which is a
long accepted practice in military law. See, e.g., United States v.
Morton, 69 M.J. 12 (C.A.A.F. 2010). The discussion section emphasizes
that a prosecutor is not overreaching or abusing his or her discretion
merely because he or she charges what is essentially one act under
several different charges or specifications.
The language in the discussion section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19 (C.A.A.F.
2012), was removed because it is no longer necessary, as the rules
themselves have been edited to remove any reference to ``multiplicious
for sentencing.'' The example was removed from the discussion section
because it overly generalized the concept of unreasonable
multiplication of charges.''
(h) R.C.M. 701(e), after the paragraph beginning with the words,
``1986 Amendment,'' and immediately before subparagraph (f), insert the
following language:
``2016 Amendment: This rule implements Article 46(b), enacted by
section 1704 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2014, P.L. 113-66, 26 December 2013, as amended by section 531(b) of
the Carl Levin and Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, P.L. 113-291, 19 December
2014.''
(i) R.C.M. 906(b)(12), delete the paragraph beginning with the
words the ``2012 Amendment,'' and insert in its place:
``2016 Amendment: This rule and related discussion is the focal
point for addressing unreasonable multiplication of charges. If a
practitioner seeks to raise a claim for multiplicity, that concept is
addressed in R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B) and related discussion. This rule has
been amended. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has recognized
that practitioners and the courts have routinely confused the concepts
of multiplicity and unreasonable multiplication of charges. See, e.g.,
United States v. Campbell, 71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (``the terms
multiplicity, multiplicity for sentencing, and unreasonable
multiplication of charges in military practice are sometimes used
interchangeably as well as with uncertain definition''); United States
v. Baker, 14 M.J. 361, 372 (C.M.A. 1983) (Cook, J. dissenting)
(``[t]hat multiplicity for sentencing is a mess in the military justice
system is a proposition with which I believe few people familiar with
our system would take issue'').
Multiplicity and unreasonable multiplication of charges are two
distinct concepts. Unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to
findings and sentence is a limitation on the prosecution's discretion
to charge separate offenses. Unreasonable multiplication of charges
does not have a foundation in the Constitution but is instead based on
the concept of reasonableness and is a prohibition against
prosecutorial overreaching. In contrast, multiplicity is based on the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and prevents an accused
from being twice punished for one offense if it is contrary to the
intent of Congress. A charge may be found not to be multiplicious but
at the same time it may be dismissed because of unreasonable
multiplication. See United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334, 337-38
(C.A.A.F. 2001).
Use of the term ``multiplicity (or multiplicious) for sentencing''
is inappropriate. If a charge is multiplicious, meaning that it
violates the Constitutional prohibition against Double Jeopardy, it
necessarily results in dismissal of the multiplied offenses, therefore
obviating any issue on sentencing with respect to that charge.
Campbell, 71 M.J. at 23. A charge should not be found multiplicious for
sentencing but not for findings. Thus,
[[Page 78586]]
the more appropriate term for the military judge's discretionary review
of the charges at sentencing is ``unreasonable multiplication of
charges as applied to sentence.'' Id. at 24. The rule was changed to
remove ``multiplicity for sentencing'' from the Manual, eliminating
confusion and misuse.
Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) were added to the rule. They clarify the
distinction between unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied
to findings and to sentence. Although these concepts have existed for
years (see Michael J. Breslin & LeEllen Coacher, Multiplicity and
Unreasonable Multiplication of Charges: A Guide to the Perplexed, 45
A.F. L. Rev. 99 (1998) for a history of the terms), they were not
defined in previous editions of the Manual. The definitions were
adopted from Quiroz, Campbell, and recommendations from Christopher S.
Morgan, Multiplicity: Reconciling the Manual for Courts-Martial, 63
A.F. L. Rev. 23 (2009). It is possible that two offenses are not
unreasonably multiplied for findings but are so for sentencing; these
additions explain how this can be so. See, e.g., Campbell, 71 M.J. at
25 (military judge did not abuse his discretion by finding that there
was not an unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to
findings but that there was an unreasonable multiplication of charges
as applied to sentence).
The discussion sections were added to address concerns that CAAF
voiced in dicta in Campbell. In previous editions of the Manual,
military judges often used the discussion section in R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)
to determine when relief was warranted for unreasonable multiplication
of charges as applied to sentence. The Campbell court stated in a
footnote: ``It is our view that after Quiroz, the language in the
Discussion to R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C) regarding `a single impulse or
intent,' is dated and too restrictive. The better approach is to allow
the military judge, in his or her discretion, to merge the offense for
sentencing purposes by considering the Quiroz factors and any other
relevant factor. . . .'' Campbell, 71 M.J. at 24 n.9. The Discussion
was changed to address the Quiroz factors and remove any reference to
the ``single impulse or intent'' test, as suggested by CAAF. The
committee also decided to move the Discussion section from R.C.M.
1003(b)(8)(C) to this rule because R.C.M. 1003 deals exclusively with
sentencing and a motion for appropriate relief due to unreasonable
multiplication of charges can be raised as an issue for findings or for
sentence under this Rule. Therefore, it is more appropriate to address
the issue here.
For more information on multiplicity and how it relates to
unreasonable multiplication of charges, see Michael J. Breslin &
LeEllen Coacher, Multiplicity and Unreasonable Multiplication of
Charges: A Guide to the Perplexed, 45 A.F. L. Rev. 99 (1998);
Christopher S. Morgan, Multiplicity: Reconciling the Manual for Courts-
Martial, 63 A.F. L. Rev. 23 (2009); Gary E. Felicetti, Surviving the
Multiplicty/LIO Family Vortex, Army Law., Feb. 2011, at 46.
The language in the discussion section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to the Campbell decision was removed because it is no
longer necessary, as the rules themselves have been edited to remove
any reference to ``multiplicious for sentencing'' and additional
discussion sections were added to eliminate any confusion with the
terms.''
(j) R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B), insert the following language as a new
paragraph after the existing paragraph:
``2016 Amendment: This rule and related discussion is the focal
point for addressing claims of multiplicity. If a practitioner seeks to
raise a claim for unreasonable multiplication of charges, that concept
is addressed in R.C.M. 906(b)(12) and related discussion. The heading
of this rule, which was added in 2016, signifies that this rule deals
exclusively with multiplicity, and not unreasonable multiplication of
charges. The discussion section of this rule was amended because the
committee believed that a more thorough definition of multiplicity was
appropriate in light of CAAF's suggestion in United States v. Campbell,
71 M.J. 19, 23 (C.A.A.F. 2012), that the concepts of multiplicity and
unreasonable multiplication of charges are often confounded.
The discussion of multiplicity is derived from the Supreme Court's
holding in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), and CMA's
holding in United States v. Teters, 37 M.J. 370 (C.M.A. 1993). The
Court in Blockburger wrote: ``[W]here the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.'' Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. Military courts departed from the
Blockburger analysis; however, the CMA's decision in Teters clearly re-
aligned the military courts with the federal courts, and multiplicity
is now determined in the military courts by the Blockburger/Teters
analysis outlined in the discussion section. Any reference to the
``single impulse'' or ``fairly embraced'' tests is outdated and should
be avoided.
Two offenses that arise from the same transaction may not be
multiplicious, even if each does not require proof of an element not
required to prove the other, if the intent of Congress was that an
accused could be convicted of and punished for both offenses arising
out of the same act. The Blockburger/Teters analysis applies only when
Congress did not intend that the offenses be treated as separate. If
Congress intended to subject an accused to multiple punishments for the
same transaction, and that intent is clear, the Blockburger/Teters
elements comparison is unnecessary. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459
U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) (``[S]imply because two criminal statutes may
be construed to proscribe the same conduct under the Blockburger test
does not mean that the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the imposition,
in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those
statutes. . . . Where . . . a legislature specifically authorizes
cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those
two statutes proscribe the `same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's
task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek
and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such
statutes in a single trial.'').
The language in the discussion section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to the Campbell decision was removed because it is no
longer necessary, as the Rules themselves have been edited to remove
any reference to ``multiplicious for sentencing'' and additional
discussion sections were added to eliminate any confusion with the
terms.''
(k) R.C.M. 916(b), insert the following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with the words ``2007 Amendment'':
``2016 Amendment: Changes to this paragraph are based on section
541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, which superseded the previous paragraph
45, ``Rape, sexual assault and other sexual misconduct,'' in its
entirety and replaces paragraph 45 with ``Rape and sexual assault
generally.'' In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ``Rape and sexual assault of a
child,'' and paragraph 45c, ``Other sexual misconduct.''
(l) R.C.M. 916(j), insert the following language immediately
following the
[[Page 78587]]
paragraph beginning with the words ``2007 Amendment'':
``2016 Amendment: Changes to this paragraph are based on section
541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, which superseded the previous paragraph
45, ``Rape, sexual assault and other sexual misconduct,'' in its
entirety and replaces paragraph 45 with ``Rape and sexual assault
generally.'' In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ``Rape and sexual assault of a
child,'' and paragraph 45c, ``Other sexual misconduct.''
Paragraph (j)(3) was deleted. The rule reflects changes to Article
120. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ruled that the statutory
burden shift to the accused in the 2007 version of Article 120 was
unconstitutional and the subsequent burden shift to the government to
disprove consent beyond a reasonable doubt once the accused had raised
the affirmative defense of consent by a preponderance of the evidence
resulted in a legal impossibility. United States v. Prather, 69 M.J.
338 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. Medina, 69 M.J. 462 (C.A.A.F.
2011).''
(m) R.C.M. 920(e)(5)(D), insert the following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with the words ``2007 Amendment'':
``2016 Amendment: Changes to this paragraph are based on section
541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012,
P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011, which superseded the previous paragraph
45, ``Rape, sexual assault and other sexual misconduct,'' in its
entirety and replaces paragraph 45 with ``Rape and sexual assault
generally.'' In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 added paragraph 45b, ``Rape and sexual assault of a
child,'' and paragraph 45c, ``Other sexual misconduct.'' ''
(n) R.C.M. 1003(c)(1)(C), delete the paragraph beginning with the
words the ``2012 Amendment'' and insert in its place:
``2016 Amendment: This rule was amended. The language in previous
editions of the Manual seemed to suggest that an accused could not be
punished for offenses that were not separate. This is true only if
there is no express statement from Congress indicating that an accused
can be punished for two or more offenses that are not separate. See
R.C.M. 907(b)(3) and related analysis. Subsections (i) and (ii) were
added to distinguish between claims of multiplicity and unreasonable
multiplication of charges. As the two concepts are distinct, it is
important to address them in separate subsections. See R.C.M.
906(b)(12) for claims of unreasonable multiplication of charges and
R.C.M. 907(b)(3)(B) for claims of multiplicity.
Additionally, the committee decided to move the discussion of the
factors in United States v. Quiroz, 55 M.J. 334 (C.A.A.F. 2001), from
this rule to R.C.M. 906(b)(12) because the factors apply to
unreasonable multiplication of charges as applied to findings as well
as sentence. Because this Rule refers only to sentencing, it is more
appropriate to address the military judge's determination of
unreasonable multiplication in R.C.M. 906(b)(12), because that Rule
covers both findings and sentence. See R.C.M. 906(b)(12) and related
analysis.
The language in the discussion section of the 2012 edition of the
Manual referring to the Campbell decision was removed. Such language is
no longer necessary, as the Rules themselves have been edited to remove
any reference to ``multiplicious for sentencing'' and the discussion
section of R.C.M. 906(b)(12) addresses the Quiroz factors.''
(o) R.C.M. 1004(c)(7)(B), insert the following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with the words ``1994 Amendment'' and
immediately prior to the paragraph beginning with the words ``1986
Amendment'':
``2016 Amendment: Changes to this paragraph reflect section 541 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-
81, 31 December 2011, which superseded the previous paragraph 45,
``Rape, sexual assault and other sexual misconduct,'' in its entirety
and replaces paragraph 45 with ``Rape and sexual assault generally.''
In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 added paragraph 45b, ``Rape and sexual assault of a child,'' and
paragraph 45c, ``Other sexual misconduct.'' ''
(p) R.C.M. 1004(c)(8), insert the following language immediately
following the paragraph beginning with the words ``1991 Amendment'':
``2016 Amendment: Changes to this paragraph reflect section 541 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-
81, 31 December 2011, which superseded the previous paragraph 45,
``Rape, sexual assault and other sexual misconduct,'' in its entirety
and replaces paragraph 45 with ``Rape and sexual assault generally.''
In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2012 added paragraph 45b, ``Rape and sexual assault of a child,'' and
paragraph 45c, ``Other sexual misconduct.'' ''
Section 7. Appendix 23 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United
States, is amended as follows:
(a) Paragraph 3.b.(4), Article 79, Lesser included offenses,
Specific lesser included offenses, is amended by deleting the
paragraphs beginning with the words ``2012 Amendment'' and ending with
``(C.A.A.F. 2008).'' and inserting in their place:
``2016 Amendment: See analysis in paragraph 3.b.(1) above. Lesser
included offenses (LIO) listings were removed from each punitive
article in paragraphs 1-113 (except paragraphs 1 and 3), Part IV, and
were moved to a new Appendix 12A. The LIO listings are determined based
on the elements of the greater offense, but are not binding. Therefore,
practitioners should use Appendix 12A only as a guide. To determine if
an offense is lesser included, the elements test must be used. United
States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 470 (C.A.A.F. 2010). The offenses are not
required to possess identical statutory language; rather, the court
uses normal principles of statutory construction to determine the
meaning of each element. See id. at 470-73; United States v. Oatney, 45
M.J. 185 (C.A.A.F. 1996); Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705
(1989).
Article 134 offenses generally will not be lesser included offenses
of enumerated offenses in Articles 80-133. See United States v.
Girouard, 70 M.J. 5 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United States v. McMurrin, 70 M.J.
15 (C.A.A.F. 2011). Article 134 specifications must contain the
``terminal element.'' See paragraphs 60.b and 60.c.(6)(a) in Part IV.
See also United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011); United
States v. Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012); R.C.M. 307(c)(3).''
(b) Paragraph 43.a, Article 118, Murder, is amended by adding the
following language:
``2012 Amendment: This statute was modified pursuant to section 541
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L.
112-81, 31 December 2011, to conform to renamed sexual assault offenses
in Article 120 and Article 120b. The changes took effect on 28 June
2012.''
(c) Paragraph 45, Article 120, Rape and sexual assault generally,
the first paragraph of the analysis beginning with the word ``2012''
and ending with the number ``28'' is amended to read as follows:
``2012 Amendment: This paragraph was substantially revised by
section 541 of the National Defense Authorization
[[Page 78588]]
Act for Fiscal Year 2012, P.L. 112-81, 31 December 2011. Amendments
contained in this section took effect on 28 June 2012. Sec. 541(f),
P.L. 112-81. On 28 June 2012, a modified paragraph 45, ``Rape and
sexual assault generally,'' replaced the 2007 version of paragraph 45,
``Rape, sexual assault, and other sexual misconduct.'' The analysis
related to prior versions of Article 120 is located as follows: For
offenses committed prior to 1 October 2007, see Appendix 27; for
offenses committed during the period 1 October 2007 through 27 June
2012, see Appendix 28.''
(d) Paragraph 45, Article 120, Rape and sexual assault generally,
is amended by deleting subparagraphs b, c, d, e, and f.
(e) Paragraph 45, Article 120b, Rape and sexual assault of a child,
is amended by inserting ``b'' after ``45''.
(f) Paragraph 45b, Article 120b, Rape and sexual assault of a
child, is amended by deleting subparagraphs b, c, d, e, and f.
(g) Paragraph 45c, Article 120c, Other sexual misconduct, is
amended by deleting subparagraphs b, c, d, e, and f.
(h) Paragraph 51, Article 125, Sodomy, is amended by changing the
title to ``Forcible Sodomy'' and adding the following language at the
beginning:
``2016 Amendment: Paragraph 51 was amended pursuant to section 1707
of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L.
113-66, 26 December 2013. Additionally, all applicable references to
sodomy throughout the Manual were changed to ``forcible sodomy'' to
reflect the decriminalization of consensual sodomy under the UCMJ.''
(i) Paragraph 60.c.(6)(a) is amended to read as follows:
``2016 Amendment: In 2012 the Manual was amended to address the
changes in practice resulting from the holding in United States v.
Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011). In 2016, the President required
that the terminal element be expressly alleged in every Article 134
specification.
The President ended the historical practice of allowing the
terminal element to be inferred from Article 134 specifications, see,
e.g. United States v. Mayo, 12 M.J. 286 (C.M.A. 1982), and required the
terminal element be expressly alleged to provide sufficient notice to
the accused and for uniformity and consistency in practice. See Fosler,
70 M.J. at 227-28. In general, when drafting specifications, the
Government must allege every element, either expressly or by necessary
implication. See R.C.M. 307(c)(3). However, in Article 134
specifications, the accused must be given notice as to which clause or
clauses he must defend against; therefore, the terminal element may not
be inferred from a specification.
Although a single terminal element is required, there are three
theories of liability that would satisfy the terminal element: a
disorder or neglect to the prejudice of good order and discipline
(under clause 1); conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed
forces (under clause 2); or a crime or offense not capital (under
clause 3). The three clauses are ``distinct and separate.'' Fosler, 70
M.J. at 230. A single theory may be alleged, or clauses 1 and 2 may be
combined. While it is not prohibited to combine clauses 1, 2, and 3 in
one specification, such a combination is not practical.
When charging both clauses 1 and 2, practitioners are encouraged to
use the word ``and'' to separate the theories in one specification,
rather than using the word ``or'' to separate the theories.
Practitioners may also allege two separate specifications. At findings,
the Trial Counsel or Military Judge must make certain that the record
is clear as to whether the trier of fact found that clause 1, clause 2,
or both clauses were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Using the word
``and'' to separate clauses 1 and 2 in the terminal element allows the
trier of fact to except the unproven clause from the specification.
This approach forces intellectual rigor in analyzing each clause as
distinct and separate. Nothing in this analysis should be read to
suggest that a specification connecting the two theories with the
disjunctive ``or'' necessarily fails to give the accused reasonable
notice of the charge against him. See United States v. Rauscher, 71
M.J. 225, 226 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Russell v. United
States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962)).''
(j) Paragraph 60.c.(6)(b) is amended by deleting the paragraph
beginning with the words ``2012 Amendment'' and ending ``above.'', and
inserting in its place:
``2016 Amendment: New discussion was added in 2012 to address
United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225 (C.A.A.F. 2011). In 2016, that
discussion was removed after paragraph 60 was amended by Executive
Order. See analysis under subparagraph c.(6)(a) above.''
(k) Paragraph 62.c.(2) is amended to read as follows:
``(2) When determining whether adulterous acts constitute the
offense of adultery under Article 134, commanders should consider the
listed factors. The offense of adultery is intended to prohibit
extramarital sexual behavior that directly affects the discipline of
the armed forces, respect for the chain of command, or maintenance of
unit cohesion. The intent of this provision is to limit the crime of
adultery to those situations where the negative impact to the unit is
real rather than theorized. This provision should not be interpreted to
criminalize sexual practices between two adults with full and mutual
consent from each other, but rather, to punish the collateral negative
effects of extramarital sexual activity when there exists a genuine
nexus between that activity and the efficiency and effectiveness of the
armed forces. Cf. United States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 204-08
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (despite constitutionally protected liberty interest in
private sexual behavior between consenting adults, military may
regulate sexual conduct to the extent it could affect military order
and discipline).
While each commander has discretion to dispose of offenses by
members of the command, wholly private and consensual sexual conduct
between adults is generally not punishable under this paragraph. The
right to engage in such conduct, however, is tempered in a military
context by the mission of the military, the need for cohesive teams,
and the need for obedience to orders. Cases involving fraternization or
other unprofessional relationships may be more appropriately charged
under Article 92 or Article 134--Fraternization. Cases involving abuse
of authority by officers may be more appropriately charged under
Article 133.
Rule for Courts-Martial 306(b) advises commanders to dispose of
alleged offenses at the lowest appropriate level. As the R.C.M. 306(b)
discussion states, many factors must be taken into consideration and
balanced, including, to the extent practicable, the nature of the
offense, any mitigating or extenuating circumstances, any
recommendations made by subordinate commanders, the interests of
justice, military exigencies, and the effect of the decision on the
military member and the command. The goal should be a disposition that
is warranted, appropriate, and fair. In the case of officers, also
consult the explanation to paragraph 59 of Part IV in deciding how to
dispose of an allegation of adultery.''
(l) Paragraph 90 is amended to read as follows:
``90. Article 134--(Indecent Conduct)
Introduction. This offense is new to the Manual for Courts-Martial
and was promulgated pursuant to Executive Order 13740 of 16 September
2016. It
[[Page 78589]]
includes offenses previously proscribed by ``Indecent acts with
another,'' which was deleted pursuant to Executive Order 13447 of 1
October 2007, except that the presence of another person is not
required. (m) Paragraph 97, Article 134 (Pandering and prostitution) is
amended by adding the following language:
``2016 Amendment: Paragraph 97 was amended to broaden the
definition of prostitution and pandering to include all sexual acts,
not just sexual intercourse. This amendment included the removal of the
language in paragraph 97.c suggesting that engaging in sodomy for money
or compensation could be charged under paragraph 51 (Article 125--
Sodomy). Pursuant to section 1707 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014, P.L. 113-66, 26 December 2013, consensual
sodomy is no longer a crime under the UCMJ and Article 125 is not an
appropriate charge for the consensual exchange of money for sodomy. The
definition of prostitution for this offense differs from the definition
of prostitution in Article 120c. Congress provided a broader definition
of prostitution when criminalizing forcible pandering.
Dated: November 3, 2016.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
[FR Doc. 2016-26947 Filed 11-7-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P