Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps, 71202-71241 [2016-23983]

Agencies

• Commodity Futures Trading Commission

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 199 (Friday, October 14, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 71202-71241]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-23983]



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Vol. 81

Friday,

No. 199

October 14, 2016

Part II





Commodity Futures Trading Commission





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17 CFR Part 50





Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 81 , No. 199 / Friday, October 14, 2016 / 
Rules and Regulations

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Part 50

RIN 3038-AE20


Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC) 
is adopting an amendment to the Commission's regulations to expand the 
existing clearing requirement for interest rate swaps pursuant to the 
pertinent section of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The amended 
regulation requires that interest rate swaps denominated in certain 
currencies and having certain termination dates, as described herein, 
be submitted for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization (DCO) 
that is registered under the CEA (registered DCO) or a DCO that has 
been exempted from registration under the CEA (exempt DCO).

DATES: The amended rule is effective December 13, 2016. Specific 
compliance dates are discussed in the Supplementary Information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah E. Josephson, Deputy Director, 
Division of Clearing and Risk (DCR), at 202-418-5684 or 
sjosephson@cftc.gov; Peter A. Kals, Special Counsel, DCR, at 202-418-
5466 or pkals@cftc.gov; Melissa A. D'Arcy, Special Counsel, DCR, at 
202-418-5086 or mdarcy@cftc.gov; Meghan A. Tente, Special Counsel, DCR, 
at 202-418-5785 or mtente@cftc.gov; Michael A. Penick, Economist, 
Office of the Chief Economist (OCE), at 202-418-5279 or 
mpenick@cftc.gov; or Lihong McPhail, Research Economist, OCE, at 202-
418-5722 or lmcphail@cftc.gov, in each case at the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW., 
Washington, DC 20581.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Background
    A. Clearing Requirement Proposal
    B. Regulatory Background
    C. Clearing Requirements in Other Jurisdictions
    D. Submissions From DCOs
    E. Commission Processes for Review and Surveillance of DCOs
II. Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    A. Overview of Comments Received
    B. Determination Analysis
    C. Generally Applicable Comments
III. Expanded and Amended Regulation 50.4(a)
IV. Implementation Schedule
    A. No Compliance Date Phase-In by Type of Market Participant
    B. Compliance Date Tied to a Non-U.S. Jurisdiction Clearing 
Requirement
    C. Clarifications to the Implementation Schedule
    D. Scope of Entities Subject to the Implementation Schedule
    E. Projected Compliance Dates
V. Cost Benefit Considerations
    A. Statutory and Regulatory Background
    B. Overview of Swap Clearing
    C. Consideration of the Costs and Benefits of the Commission's 
Action
    D. Costs and Benefits of the Commission's Action as Compared to 
Alternatives
    E. Section 15(a) Factors
VI. Related Matters
    A. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    B. Paperwork Reduction Act

I. Background

A. Clearing Requirement Proposal

    On June 16, 2016, the Commission published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM) to establish an expanded interest rate swap clearing 
requirement under section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA and Commission 
regulation 50.4(a).\1\ The Commission proposed requiring clearing of 
certain interest rate swaps offered for clearing at Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, Inc. (CME), Eurex Clearing AG (Eurex), LCH.Clearnet Ltd. 
(LCH), and/or Singapore Exchange Derivatives Clearing Ltd. (SGX), each 
a Commission-registered DCO.\2\ The interest rate swaps proposed in the 
NPRM were: Fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in 
Australian dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD), Hong Kong dollar (HKD), 
Mexican peso (MXN), Norwegian krone (NOK), Polish zloty (PLN), 
Singapore dollar (SGD), Swedish krona (SEK), and Swiss franc (CHF) 
(collectively, the nine additional currencies); basis swaps denominated 
in AUD; forward rate agreements (FRAs) denominated in AUD, NOK, PLN, 
and SEK; overnight index swaps (OIS) denominated in AUD and CAD; and 
OIS having termination dates of up to three years that are denominated 
in U.S. dollar (USD), euro (EUR), or sterling (GBP).\3\
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    \1\ Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA for Interest Rate Swaps, 81 FR 39506 (June 16, 2016).
    \2\ Two DCOs that the Commission has exempted from registration, 
ASX Clear (Futures) Pty Ltd. (Australia) (ASX) and OTC Clearing Hong 
Kong Ltd., clear some of the swaps covered by this determination 
(AUD- and HKD-denominated interest rate swaps, respectively). 
Pursuant to Commission orders, these two DCOs are permitted to clear 
for U.S. proprietary accounts but not for U.S. customers. However, 
as discussed further below, should either of these two exempt DCOs 
decide that they wish to offer clearing to U.S. customers, they 
would be eligible to apply for registration as full DCOs. Because 
these DCOs have not submitted filings under Commission regulation 
39.5(b), this final rule addresses only those registered DCOs that 
have submitted swaps for consideration under that regulation.
    \3\ See Table 1 for information regarding which registered DCOs 
clear which interest rate swaps. Each DCO submitted information 
about the interest rate swaps subject to this rulemaking to the 
Commission pursuant to regulation 39.5(b), which is discussed 
further below.
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    For the reasons discussed below, this final rulemaking expands the 
existing interest rate swap clearing requirement by requiring the 
clearing of all of the swaps covered by the NPRM, except for AUD-
denominated FRAs.

B. Regulatory Background

    The Commission's first clearing requirement determination issued in 
2012 applied to four classes of interest rate swaps and two classes of 
credit default swaps.\4\ The Commission is adopting this clearing 
requirement determination to require the clearing of certain, 
additional interest rate swaps pursuant to section 2(h) of the CEA. 
Under section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA, it is unlawful for any person to 
engage in a swap unless that person submits such swap for clearing to a 
DCO that is registered under the CEA or a DCO that is exempt from 
registration under the CEA if the swap is required to be cleared. The 
Commission may initiate a clearing requirement determination pursuant 
to a swap submission from a registered DCO.\5\ Section 2(h)(2)(B)(i) of

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the CEA requires a DCO to submit to the Commission each swap, or any 
group, category, type, or class of swaps that it plans to accept for 
clearing and provide notice to its members of the submission. 
Commission regulation 39.5(b) implements the procedural elements of 
section 2(h)(2)(B)-(C) by establishing the specific process for the 
submission of swaps by a DCO to the Commission for a clearing 
requirement determination.\6\
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    \4\ Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the 
CEA, 77 FR 74284 (Dec. 13, 2012) [hereinafter the First Clearing 
Requirement Determination]. The four classes of interest rate swaps 
defined under Commission regulation 50.4(a) include fixed-to-
floating, basis, FRA, and OIS. In 2012, the Commission required 
that, for the fixed-to-floating, basis, and FRA classes, the top 
four currencies as measured by total notional amount be subject to 
required clearing. Those top four currencies were EUR, USD, GBP, and 
Japanese yen (JPY). All four currencies were specified in the fixed-
to-floating, basis, and FRA classes under regulation 50.4(a). For 
OIS swaps, all the currencies except JPY were specified under the 
rule.
    \5\ Section 2(h)(2) of the CEA provides the Commission with 
authority to issue a determination that a swap is required to be 
cleared pursuant to two separate review processes. Section 
2(h)(2)(A) of the CEA provides for a Commission-initiated review 
process whereby the Commission, on an ongoing basis, must review 
swaps (or a group, category, type or class of swaps) to make a 
determination as to whether a swap (or group, category, type or 
class of swaps) should be required to be cleared. The other process 
provided under section 2(h)(2)(B) of the CEA entails the 
Commission's review of swaps that are submitted by DCOs. 
Specifically, section 2(h)(2)(B)(i) of the CEA requires that each 
DCO submit to the Commission each swap (or group, category, type or 
class of swaps) that it plans to accept for clearing. The swaps 
subject to this rulemaking were submitted by DCOs pursuant to 
section 2(h)(2)(B)(i) of the CEA and Commission regulation 39.5(b).
    \6\ Section 2(h)(2)(B)-(C) of the CEA describes the process by 
which the Commission is required to review swap submissions from 
DCOs to determine whether the swaps should be subject to the 
clearing requirement. On June 23, 2016, the Commission published on 
its Web site for public comment 34 submissions from DCOs submitted 
pursuant to section 2(h)(2)(B) of the CEA and CFTC regulation 
39.5(b) over the past few years. The public comment period closed on 
July 25, 2016, and five letters were submitted by that date. See 
CFTC Press Release, CFTC Requests Public Comment on Swap Clearing 
Requirement Submissions (June 23, 2016), available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7396-16. Any future proposals 
for a new clearing requirement determination related to the swaps 
covered by those 34 submissions would be subject to a separate 
notice and comment rulemaking process. Market participants may offer 
additional comments or feedback on market developments related to 
those 34 submissions by contacting any of the DCR staff named above.
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    Accordingly, the Commission is issuing this final rulemaking to 
adopt an amendment to Sec.  50.4(a) such that the following products 
are subject to the clearing requirement as set forth in regulation 
50.4: (1) Fixed-to-floating swaps denominated in the nine additional 
currencies; (2) basis swaps denominated in AUD; (3) FRAs denominated in 
NOK, PLN, and SEK; (4) OIS denominated in AUD and CAD; and (5) OIS 
denominated in USD, EUR, and GBP that have termination dates of up to 
three years.

C. Clearing Requirements in Other Jurisdictions

    The following is an updated summary of actions taken by other 
jurisdictions towards implementing clearing mandates for interest rate 
swaps. The Commission believes that it is important to harmonize its 
swap clearing requirement with clearing mandates promulgated in other 
jurisdictions. For example, if a non-U.S. jurisdiction issued a 
clearing requirement and a swap dealer (SD) located in the U.S. were 
not subject to that non-U.S. clearing requirement, then a swap market 
participant located in the non-U.S. jurisdiction might be able to avoid 
the non-U.S. clearing requirement by entering into a swap with the SD 
located in the U.S.
    As the Commission reviewed the regulation 39.5(b) submissions from 
DCOs, it considered whether those products offered for clearing at DCOs 
were subject, or were likely to be subject, to a clearing requirement 
in another jurisdiction. For those products that were the subject of a 
clearing requirement rule or proposal outside of the U.S., the 
Commission reviewed the specifications of the products and the 
processes used by non-U.S. regulators to impose a clearing mandate. In 
addition, the Commission reviewed data produced and made available to 
the public in connection with any rule proposals or final rules 
implementing a clearing requirement in non-U.S. jurisdictions. Finally, 
the Commission considered comments submitted in response to clearing 
mandate rule proposals in non-U.S. jurisdictions and any subsequent 
changes that regulators made to final rules implementing a clearing 
mandate. In this manner, the Commission was informed by its review of 
non-U.S. jurisdictions' clearing mandates and considered those mandates 
in preparing this determination.
    Consequently, the scope of the swaps included in this final 
rulemaking reflects the Commission's desire to harmonize with our 
counterparts abroad and is informed by the work of those regulators, as 
described below. In addition, the product specifications of the swaps 
included in this clearing requirement determination are intended to be 
consistent with those referenced in clearing mandates published by the 
Commission's counterparts abroad.\7\
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    \7\ In the future, it may be appropriate to propose a clearing 
requirement under the CEA covering swaps that are not yet the 
subject of a proposed or final clearing mandate issued by a non-U.S. 
jurisdiction. See generally comment letter from the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA), at 5, (discussing 
the goal of harmonizing clearing mandates, commending the 
Commission's independent analysis in the NPRM, and noting that ``the 
CFTC does not have any control over the clearing mandates of its 
counterparts in non-U.S. jurisdictions and therefore should continue 
to conduct full and robust independent analysis prior to 
implementing any clearing mandates.'').
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i. Australia
    The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has 
published regulations that require certain Australian and non-
Australian entities \8\ to clear AUD-, USD-, GBP-, EUR-, and JPY-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps, basis swaps, and 
FRAs, as well as AUD-, USD-, GBP-, and EUR-denominated OIS. The 
regulations' swap classes are co-extensive with those described in 
existing Commission regulation 50.4(a), except for the addition of AUD-
denominated swaps. The first compliance date for an Australian market 
participant to comply with the Australian clearing mandate for AUD-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps and basis swaps was 
April 4, 2016.\9\ The first compliance date for the Australian clearing 
mandate for AUD-denominated OIS will be October 3, 2016 and for AUD-
denominated FRAs April 2, 2018.\10\
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    \8\ As defined under ASIC's final clearing rules, clearing 
entities subject to the Australian clearing mandate include 
Australian authorized deposit-taking institutions (ADIs) and 
Australian financial services licensee (AFS Licensees) that hold a 
total gross notional outstanding position of AUD 100 billion or more 
under specific circumstances, as measured at particular points in 
time. To account for non-Australian entities, ASIC's final rules 
also define foreign clearing entities, opt-in clearing entities, and 
cross-reference to Australia's Corporations Regulations 2001 
definition of foreign internationally active dealers. ASIC 
Derivative Transaction Rules (Clearing) 2015, available at: https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2015L01960.
    \9\ ASIC Derivative Transaction Rules (Clearing) 2015, at 
section 1.2.7.
    \10\ Id., at section 1.2.3.
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    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include AUD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps, basis swaps, and OIS swaps that are consistent with the AUD-
denominated swaps that are, or will be, required to be cleared by 
ASIC.\11\
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    \11\ For the reasons discussed below, the Commission is not 
finalizing its proposed requirement to clear AUD-denominated FRAs at 
this time.
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ii. Canada
    In 2015, Canada's provincial securities regulators \12\ published a 
draft rule that would require certain derivatives to be cleared.\13\ On 
February 24, 2016, the Canadian provincial securities regulators 
published a revised draft rule that applies to certain

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Canadian market participants \14\ and proposes subjecting the following 
classes of interest rate swaps to a clearing mandate: CAD-, USD-, EUR-, 
and GBP-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps; USD-, EUR-, 
and GBP-denominated basis swaps; USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated FRAs; 
and CAD-, USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated OIS.\15\ Subject to 
ministerial approvals, the Canadian provincial securities regulators' 
revised rule will take effect on May 9, 2017.\16\ Consequently, it is 
the Commission's understanding that May 9, 2017 is the first compliance 
date upon which a Canadian market participant will be required to 
comply with the clearing mandate.\17\
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    \12\ Canada's provincial securities regulators are collectively 
referred to as the Canadian Securities Administrators, including 
representatives from: The Alberta Securities Commission; the British 
Columbia Securities Commission; the Manitoba Securities Commission; 
the Financial and Consumer Services Commission of New Brunswick; the 
Office of the Superintendent of Securities Service Newfoundland and 
Labrador; the Office of the Superintendent of Securities of the 
Northwest Territories; the Nova Scotia Securities Commission; the 
Nunavut Securities Offices; the Ontario Securities Commission; the 
Office of the Superintendent of Securities of Prince Edward Island; 
the Autorit[eacute] des march[eacute]s financiers; the Financial and 
Consumer Affairs Authority of Saskatchewan; and the Office of the 
Yukon Superintendent of Securities. See also, CSA Members, available 
at: https://www.csa-acvm.ca/aboutcsa.aspx?id=80.
    \13\ Draft National Instrument 94-101 respecting Mandatory 
Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives. Summary available at: 
https://www.albertasecurities.com/Regulatory%20Instruments/5022685-v5-Proposed_NI_94-101_package.pdf.
    \14\ The draft rule proposed by Canada's provincial securities 
regulators would require central counterparty clearing for 
transactions entered into between a local counterparty and: (i) A 
clearing member of a regulated clearing agency that clears a 
mandatory clearable derivative; (ii) an affiliated entity of the 
clearing member described in (i); or (iii) a local counterparty that 
has, together with its local affiliates, an aggregate gross notional 
amount of more than CAD 500 million outstanding (excluding 
intragroup transactions). See, Draft Regulation 94-101 respecting 
Mandatory Central Counterparty Clearing of Derivatives (2nd 
Publication). Summary available at: https://www.lautorite.qc.ca/files/pdf/reglementation/instruments-derives/reglements/94-101/2016-02-24/2016fev24-94-101-avis-cons-en.pdf.
    \15\ Id. The Canadian regulators' draft regulation does not 
propose to include CAD-denominated basis swaps or FRAs. Therefore, 
the Commission is adding only CAD-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps and OIS to the CFTC's clearing requirement under 
this determination.
    \16\ The Commission staff has consulted with Canadian provincial 
authorities to confirm the timetable for implementation of the 
clearing obligation.
    \17\ Id.
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    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include CAD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps and OIS swaps that are consistent with the CAD-denominated swaps 
that will be required to be cleared by the Canadian provincial 
securities regulators.
iii. European Union
    On August 6, 2015, the European Commission adopted an initial 
interest rate swap clearing obligation for certain financial 
counterparties and non-financial counterparties \18\ that the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) developed pursuant to the 
European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).\19\ The initial 
European interest rate swap class is co-extensive with the clearing 
requirements under regulation 50.4(a), except that with respect to OIS, 
the European class covers OIS with a termination date range of up to 
three years instead of two. Similarly, the initial European class 
covers interest rate swaps denominated in USD, EUR, GBP, and JPY, but 
not any of the nine additional currencies.\20\ Compliance with the 
European clearing obligation is required for transactions between 
clearing member counterparties at this time, and will be phased in 
between 2016 and 2018 for additional transactions by type of 
counterparty.\21\ The first compliance date for a European market 
participant to comply with the clearing obligation for EUR-, USD-, and 
GBP-denominated OIS with termination dates ranging from seven days to 
three years was on June 21, 2016.\22\ The EUR-, USD-, and GBP-
denominated OIS with termination dates ranging from two years to three 
years that are included in this rulemaking are covered by the European 
Commission's initial clearing obligation.
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    \18\ The European Commission's clearing requirement applies to 
all financial counterparties (e.g., banks, insurers, asset managers, 
etc.) and certain non-financial counterparties, which are European 
Union entities that do not fall within the definition of a financial 
counterparty, but exceed the clearing thresholds (non-financial 
counterparties above the applicable clearing threshold by asset 
class). The non-financial counterparty clearing threshold for 
interest rate swaps is EUR 3 billion in gross notional value. See 
European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 149/2013, 
available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:052:0011:0024:EN:PDF.
    \19\ European Commission press release announcing the European 
Clearing Obligation, available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5459_en.htm. See also Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012.
    \20\ European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2015/
2205, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R2205&from=EN.
    \21\ Id. Under the European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
No. 2015/2205, Category 1 counterparties are clearing members of at 
least one of the central counterparties authorized or recognized to 
clear at least one class of mandated derivatives, as of December 21, 
2015; Category 2 counterparties are entities that meet the EUR 8 
billion threshold of month-end average outstanding gross notional 
amounts of derivatives for a three month period, limited to 
financial counterparties or alternative investment funds that are 
non-financial counterparties; Category 3 counterparties are 
financial counterparties and alternative investment funds that are 
non-financial counterparties, that are not Category 1 or Category 2 
counterparties; and Category 4 counterparties are non-financial 
counterparties that do not belong in Category 1, 2, or 3.
    \22\ European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2015/
2205, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32015R2205&from=EN.
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    On June 10, 2016, the European Commission adopted an expansion of 
the European Union clearing obligation for certain financial 
counterparties and non-financial counterparties \23\ to cover NOK-, 
PLN-, and SEK-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps and 
FRAs.\24\ The first compliance date for a European market participant 
to comply with the NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps and FRA clearing obligation will be on February 9, 
2017.\25\ The European Commission's expanded clearing obligation will 
apply only to transactions between clearing member counterparties on 
February 9, 2017; the clearing obligation will be phased in for 
additional transactions by type of counterparty from 2017 to 2019.\26\
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    \23\ See European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2016/
1178, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R1178&from=EN. This regulation contains a 
description of the categories of financial counterparties and non-
financial counterparties subject to the European Union's clearing 
obligation. This description is substantively the same as the one 
applicable to the European Union's first clearing obligation related 
to interest rates swaps denominated in USD, EUR, GBP, and JPY, 
including OIS with a termination date of up to three years.
    \24\ European Commission press release announcing new rules on 
central clearing for interest rate derivatives contracts denominated 
in specific European currencies, available at: https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEX-16-2171_en.htm#9. See also European 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1178, available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R1178&from=EN. The Commission notes that Poland and 
Sweden are members of the European Union, but Norway is not. 
Accordingly, the Commission staff has consulted separately with 
staff from Norway's financial regulators regarding this clearing 
requirement determination.
    \25\ European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 2016/
1178, available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R1178&from=EN.
    \26\ Id. Under the European Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 
No. 2016/1178, Category 1 counterparties are clearing members of at 
least one of the central counterparties authorized or recognized to 
clear at least one class of mandated derivatives, as of August 9, 
2016; Category 2 counterparties are entities that meet the EUR 8 
billion threshold of month-end average outstanding gross notional 
amounts of derivatives for a three month period, limited to 
financial counterparties or alternative investment funds that are 
non-financial counterparties; Category 3 counterparties are 
financial counterparties and alternative investment funds that are 
non-financial counterparties, that are not Category 1 or Category 2 
counterparties; and Category 4 counterparties are non-financial 
counterparties that do not belong in Category 1, 2, or 3.
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    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include (1) EUR-, USD-, and GBP-denominated OIS with 
termination dates ranging from two years to three years; (2) NOK-, PLN-
, and SEK-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps; and (3) 
NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs that are, or will soon be, 
required to be cleared by the European Commission.

[[Page 71205]]

iv. Hong Kong
    On February 5, 2016, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority jointly published 
conclusions to a consultation paper proposing mandatory clearing for 
certain interest rate swaps.\27\ The Legislative Council adopted final 
rules to implement a clearing mandate for transactions between certain 
local and foreign-incorporated entities \28\ covering fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps and basis swaps denominated in USD, GBP, EUR, JPY, 
and HKD, as well as OIS denominated in USD, GBP, and EUR.\29\ The 
clearing mandate rules became effective on September 1, 2016. Although 
mandatory clearing for the designated products has not yet commenced, 
the first calculation period for determining which counterparties have 
an obligation to clear has begun.\30\ During the calculation period, 
certain market participants have to count their transactions toward the 
clearing threshold to determine whether they will be subject to Hong 
Kong's clearing mandate.\31\ The first compliance date for a Hong Kong 
market participant to comply with the Hong Kong authorities' clearing 
mandate will be on July 1, 2017.\32\
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    \27\ Consultation Conclusions and Further Consultation on 
Introducing Mandatory Clearing and Expanding Mandatory Reporting, 
available at: https://www.sfc.hk/edistributionWeb/gateway/EN/consultation/conclusion?refNo=15CP4.
    \28\ The Securities and Futures (OTC Derivative Transactions--
Clearing and Record Keeping Obligations and Designation of Central 
Counterparties) Rules impose a clearing obligation on transactions 
between prescribed persons, including local and foreign (i) licensed 
corporations, (ii) authorized financial institutions, and (iii) 
approved money brokers, that have reached the clearing threshold of 
USD 20 billion during the applicable three month calculation period. 
In addition, any transactions between such a prescribed person and a 
financial services provider must also be cleared. Financial services 
providers are designated by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 
Commission, with the consent of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
    \29\ Id. See also Securities and Futures (OTC Derivative 
Transactions--Clearing and Record Keeping Obligations and 
Designation of Central Counterparties) Rules, The Government of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Gazette, available at: 
https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20162005/es22016200528.pdf.
    \30\ Securities and Futures (OTC Derivative Transactions--
Clearing and Record Keeping Obligations and Designation of Central 
Counterparties) Rules, The Government of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region Gazette, available at: https://www.gld.gov.hk/egazette/pdf/20162005/es22016200528.pdf.
    \31\ Id.
    \32\ Id.
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    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include HKD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps that will be required to be cleared by the Hong Kong Securities 
and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.
v. Mexico
    In 2015, Banco de M[eacute]xico, the Mexican central bank, 
published a clearing mandate to require that certain Mexican financial 
institutions \33\ clear MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps having a termination date range of approximately two months to 30 
years and that reference the Mexican ``Interbank Equilibrium Interest 
Rate'' (TIIE).\34\ The first compliance date for a Mexican market 
participant to comply with the Banco de M[eacute]xico's clearing 
mandate was on April 1, 2016.\35\
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    \33\ Banco de M[eacute]xico's Rules for Derivatives Transactions 
(Circular 4/2012) limit the clearing mandate to transactions between 
local banks, brokerage firms, and institutional investors. The Banco 
de M[eacute]xico's Rules also contemplate an exemption for small 
entities with notional amounts outstanding below the specified 
threshold of 10 billion unidades de inversi[oacute]n.
    \34\ Rules for Derivatives Transactions (Circular 4/2012), Banco 
de M[eacute]xico, available at: https://www.banxico.org.mx/disposiciones/circulares/%7BD7250B17-13A4-B0B7-F4E5-04AF29F37014%7D.pdf.
    \35\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps that are required to be cleared by the Banco de M[eacute]xico.
vi. Singapore
    In 2015, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) published 
proposed regulations that would require financial institutions \36\ to 
clear SGD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps referencing 
the Swap Offer Rate (SOR) and USD-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps referencing LIBOR.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ Under MAS' proposal, the clearing mandate applies to 
transactions between banks that exceed the SGD 20 billion gross 
notional outstanding derivatives contract threshold for each of the 
previous four calendar quarters.
    \37\ Summary published by MAS available at: https://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2015/MAS-Consults-on-Proposed-Regulations-for-Mandatory-Clearing-of-OTC-Derivatives.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include SGD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps that are likely to be the subject of final regulatory action by 
MAS establishing a clearing requirement, which will commence in 2017.
vii. Switzerland
    In 2015, the Swiss parliament adopted legislation providing a 
framework for a swap clearing requirement. A clearing requirement for 
certain financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties \38\ 
is expected to be phased in from 2016.\39\ It is not yet known exactly 
which products such a clearing requirement would cover, but based on 
the criteria required to be considered by the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority (Finma), Finma may determine that the CHF-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps referencing LIBOR 
should be included.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \38\ According to guidance from the Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority, derivatives transactions executed by and 
among financial counterparties and non-financial counterparties that 
meet the threshold requirements will be subject to the clearing 
requirement. Financial counterparties meet the threshold if their 
rolling averages for gross positions in outstanding derivatives 
transactions (over 30 working days) are at or above CHF 8 billion. 
Non-financial counterparties meet the threshold if their rolling 
averages for gross positions in outstanding derivatives transactions 
(over 30 working days) are at or above amounts specific to each 
product (e.g., CHF 3.3 billion in interest rate derivatives 
transactions).
    \39\ Financial Stability Board, OTC Derivatives Market Reforms, 
Eleventh Progress Report on Implementation, Appendix C 
(Implementation timetable: Central clearing of standardised 
transactions) (Aug. 26, 2016), available at: www.fsb.org/2016/08/otc-derivatives-market-reforms-eleventh-progress-report-on-implementation/.
    \40\ See Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), 
Guidance 01/2016 Financial Market Infrastructure Act: FINMA's next 
steps (July 6, 2016), available at: https://www.finma.ch/en/~/media/
finma/dokumente/dokumentencenter/myfinma/4dokumentation/finma-
aufsichtsmitteilungen/20160707-finma-aufsichtsmitteilung-01-
2016.pdf?la=en.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As a result of this clearing requirement determination, the classes 
of swaps required to be cleared under Commission regulation 50.4(a) are 
expanded to include CHF-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps that may be subject to a clearing requirement in 2017.

D. Submissions From DCOs

    CME and LCH provided the Commission with regulation 39.5(b) 
submissions relating to: Fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps 
denominated in the nine additional currencies; AUD-denominated basis 
swaps; and USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated OIS with termination dates 
of up to 30 years. CME and LCH provided Sec.  39.5(b) submissions 
pertaining to the FRAs and OIS listed in Table 1, below. CME and

[[Page 71206]]

SGX provided submissions relating to MXN- and SGD-denominated fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps, respectively. Eurex provided a submission 
relating to CHF-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps and 
OIS denominated in USD, EUR, and GBP with terms up to 30 years plus 10 
business days.\41\ LCH will begin offering MXN-denominated fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps in early October 2016.\42\ Based on 
representations made by CME to the Commission, the Commission believes 
that CME will begin offering AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS before the 
end of 2016.\43\
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    \41\ The 39.5(b) submissions are available on the Commission's 
Web site at: https://www.cftc.gov/IndustryOversight/IndustryFilings/index.htm. Submission materials that a submitting DCO marked for 
confidential treatment are not available for public review, pursuant 
to Commission regulations 39.5(b)(5) and 145.9(d).
    \42\ LCH has filed a regulation 39.5(b) submission with the 
Commission as of September 23, 2016 for this swap.
    \43\ Prior to offering these swaps for clearing, CME will need 
to file Sec. Sec.  40.6 and 39.5(b) submissions with the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 1 summarizes the relevant interest rate swaps submitted by 
CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Based on its regulation 39.5(b) submission, LCH will offer 
clearing of MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps in 
early October 2016.
    \45\ CME plans to offer clearing of AUD-denominated OIS interest 
rate swaps before the end of 2016.
    \46\ CME plans to offer clearing of CAD-denominated OIS interest 
rate swaps before the end of 2016.

                                       Table 1--Summary of Interest Rate Swap Submissions Under Regulation 39.5(b)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   Maximum stated
             Currency                  Floating rate index        termination date           CME              Eurex              LCH             SGX
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                          Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD..............................  BBSW......................  30 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  *No.
CAD..............................  CDOR......................  30 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
CHF..............................  LIBOR.....................  30 years.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  No.
HKD..............................  HIBOR.....................  10 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
MXN..............................  TIIE-BANXICO..............  21 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes \44\........  No.
NOK..............................  NIBOR.....................  10 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
PLN..............................  WIBOR.....................  10 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
SGD..............................  SOR-VWAP..................  10 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  Yes.
SEK..............................  STIBOR....................  30 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       Basis Swaps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD..............................  BBSW......................  30 years.............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Overnight Index Swaps
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
USD..............................  FedFunds..................  30 years.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  No.
EUR..............................  EONIA.....................  30 years.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  No.
GBP..............................  SONIA.....................  30 years.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  Yes.............  No.
AUD..............................  AONIA-OIS.................  5.5 years............  No \45\.........  No..............  Yes.............  No.
CAD..............................  CORRA-OIS.................  2 years..............  No \46\.........  No..............  Yes.............  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 Forward Rate Agreements
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD..............................  BBSW......................  3 years..............  Yes.............  No..............  No..............  No.
NOK..............................  NIBOR.....................  2 years..............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
PLN..............................  WIBOR.....................  2 years..............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
SEK..............................  STIBOR....................  3 years..............  Yes.............  No..............  Yes.............  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes that these interest rate swaps are all single 
currency swaps without optionality, as defined by the applicable DCO.
    The submissions from CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX provided the 
information required by regulation 39.5(b)(3)(i)-(viii), which, along 
with other information, has assisted the Commission in making a 
quantitative and qualitative assessment that these swaps should be 
subject to a clearing requirement determination.\47\ In making this 
clearing requirement determination, the Commission considered the 
ability of CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX to clear a given swap, as well as 
data supplied cumulatively from each DCO for these swaps.\48\ The 
Commission also reviewed the existing rule frameworks and risk 
management policies of each DCO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ In their submissions, CME and LCH stated that they had 
provided notice of the submissions to members as required by 
regulation 39.5(b)(3)(viii). SGX stated that its Sec.  39.5(b) 
submission was published on its Web site. Eurex stated that it would 
forward its Sec.  39.5(b) submission to its members so that they 
could comment.
    \48\ CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX are eligible to clear interest 
rate swaps under regulation 39.5(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Additionally, the Commission considered industry data \49\ as well 
as other publicly available data sources, specifically data published 
by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), and information that 
has been made publicly available pursuant to part 43 of the 
Commission's regulations (part 43 Data).\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ The Commission considered FIA SEF Tracker data and ISDA 
SwapsInfo data.
    \50\ The Commission notes that it also has access to data 
pursuant to part 45 of the Commission's regulations (part 45 Data), 
which is used in the cost benefit considerations in section V. 
However, for the purposes of this determination, the Commission 
decided to use the part 43 Data in its determination analysis in 
section II.B to enable commenters to review the same data that the 
Commission reviewed in making the determination. In the future, the 
Commission may analyze part 45 Data and provide the public with 
aggregated and anonymized summaries of such data when considering 
whether other swaps should be subject to the clearing requirement. 
The Commission also may refer to other non-public data sources, as 
available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rulemaking also reflects consultation with the staff of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. prudential regulators, and 
international regulatory authorities. This consultation occurred prior 
to the approval of the NPRM, as well as prior to the approval of this 
final rulemaking by the Commission. The Commission

[[Page 71207]]

has benefitted from this close communication with its fellow 
authorities throughout this rulemaking process.
    Finally, the Commission considered the ten public comments received 
in response to the NPRM.

E. Commission Processes for Review and Surveillance of DCOs

i. Part 39 Regulations Set Forth Standards for Compliance
    Section 5b(c)(2) of the CEA sets forth 18 core principles with 
which DCOs must comply to be registered and to maintain registration. 
The core principles address numerous issues, including financial 
resources, participant and product eligibility, risk management, 
settlement procedures, default management, system safeguards, 
reporting, recordkeeping, public information, and legal risk.
    Each of the DCOs that submitted the interest rate swaps subject to 
this rulemaking is registered with the Commission. The DCOs' regulation 
39.5(b) submissions discussed herein identify swaps that the DCOs are 
currently clearing and are eligible to clear under regulation 39.5(a). 
Consequently, the Commission has been reviewing and monitoring 
compliance by the DCOs with the core principles for clearing the 
submitted swaps.
    The primary objective of the Commission's supervisory program is to 
ensure compliance with applicable provisions of the CEA and 
implementing regulations, and, in particular, the core principles 
applicable to DCOs. A primary concern of the program is to monitor and 
mitigate potential risks that can arise in derivatives clearing 
activities for the DCO, its members, and entities using the DCO's 
services. Accordingly, the Commission's supervisory program takes a 
risk-based approach, and pays particular attention to the risks posed 
by stressed market conditions, and major market events, as well as 
market participants' reactions to such conditions and events.
    In addition to the core principles set forth in section 5b(c)(2) of 
the CEA, section 5c(c) governs the procedures for review and approval 
of new products, new rules, and rule amendments submitted to the 
Commission by DCOs. Part 39 of the Commission's regulations implements 
sections 5b and 5c(c) of the CEA by establishing specific requirements 
for compliance with the core principles, as well as procedures for 
registration, for implementing DCO rules, and for clearing new 
products. Part 40 of the Commission's regulations sets forth additional 
provisions applicable to a DCO's submission of rule amendments and new 
products to the Commission.
    The Commission has means to enforce compliance, including the 
Commission's ability to sue the DCO in federal court for civil monetary 
penalties,\51\ issue a cease and desist order,\52\ or suspend or revoke 
the registration of the DCO.\53\ In addition, any deficiencies or other 
compliance issues observed during ongoing monitoring or an examination 
are frequently communicated to the DCO and various measures are used by 
the Commission to ensure that the DCO appropriately addresses such 
issues, including escalating communications within the DCO management 
and requiring the DCO to demonstrate, in writing, timely correction of 
such issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ See section 6c of the CEA.
    \52\ See section 6b of the CEA.
    \53\ See section 5e of the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Initial Registration Application Review and Periodic In-Depth 
Reviews
    Section 5b of the CEA requires a DCO to register with the 
Commission. In order to do so, an organization must submit an 
application demonstrating that it complies with the core principles. 
During the review period, the Commission generally conducts an on-site 
review of the prospective DCO's facilities, asks a series of questions, 
and reviews all documentation received. The Commission may ask the 
applicant to make changes to its rules to comply with the CEA and the 
Commission's regulations.
    After registration, the Commission conducts examinations of DCOs to 
determine whether each DCO is in compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations. Each examination begins with a planning phase where staff 
reviews information the Commission has to determine whether the 
information raises specific issues and to develop an examination plan. 
The examination team participates in a series of meetings with the DCO 
at its facility. Commission staff also communicates with relevant DCO 
staff, including senior management, and reviews documentation. Data 
produced by the DCO is independently tested. Finally, when relevant, 
walk-through testing is conducted for key DCO processes.
    Commission staff also reviews DCOs that are systemically important 
(SIDCOs) at least once a year. Of the DCOs discussed in this 
rulemaking, only CME has been determined to be a SIDCO.
iii. Commission Daily Risk Surveillance
    Commission risk surveillance staff monitors the risks posed to and 
by DCOs, clearing members, and market participants, including market 
risk, liquidity risk, credit risk, and concentration risk. The analysis 
includes review of daily, large trader reporting data obtained from 
market participants, clearing members, and DCOs, which is available at 
the trader, clearing member, and DCO levels. Relevant margin and 
financial resources information also is included within the analysis.
    Commission staff regularly conducts back testing to review margin 
coverage at the product level and follows up with the relevant DCO 
regarding any exceptional results. Independent stress testing of 
portfolios is conducted on a daily, weekly, and ad hoc basis. The 
independent stress tests may lead to individual trader reviews and/or 
futures commission merchant (FCM) risk reviews to gain a deeper 
understanding of a trading strategy, risk philosophy, risk controls and 
mitigants, and financial resources at the trader and/or FCM level. The 
traders and FCMs that have a higher risk profile are then reviewed 
during the Commission's on-site review of a DCO's risk management 
procedures.
    Given the importance of DCOs within the financial system and the 
heightened scrutiny as more transactions are moved into central 
clearing, the goal of the Commission risk surveillance staff is: (1) To 
identify positions in cleared products subject to the Commission's 
jurisdiction that pose significant financial risk; and (2) to confirm 
that these risks are being appropriately managed. Commission risk 
surveillance staff undertakes these tasks at the trader level, the 
clearing member level, and the DCO level. That is, staff identifies 
both traders that pose risks to clearing members and clearing members 
that pose risks to the DCO. Staff then evaluates the financial 
resources and risk management practices of traders, clearing members, 
and DCOs in relation to those risks. Commission risk surveillance staff 
routinely monitors conditions in assigned markets throughout the day. 
Because of the work done in identifying accounts of interest, analysts 
are able to focus their efforts on those traders whose positions 
warrant heightened scrutiny under current market conditions.
    To gain insight into how markets operate during stressed market 
conditions, an essential technique in

[[Page 71208]]

evaluating risk is the use of stress testing. Stress testing is the 
practice of determining the potential loss (or gain) to a position or 
portfolio based on a hypothetical price change or a hypothetical change 
in a price input such as option volatility. Commission risk 
surveillance staff conducts a wide array of stress tests. Some stress 
tests are based on the greatest price move over a specified period of 
time such as the last five years or the greatest historical price 
change. Another stress testing technique is the use of ``event based'' 
stress testing that replicates the price changes on a particular date 
in history, such as September 11, 2001, or the date that Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy in 2008. Other specific events might 
include Hurricane Katrina, the U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System's implementation of the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility as a liquidity backstop, or, most recently, the United Kingdom 
(U.K.)'s vote to exit from the European Union. Price changes can be 
measured as a dollar amount or a percentage change. This flexibility 
can be helpful when price levels have changed by a large amount over 
time. For example, the actual price changes in equity indices in 
October 1987 are not particularly large at today's market levels but 
the percentage changes are meaningful.
    The general standard in designing stress tests is to use ``extreme 
but plausible'' market moves. After identifying accounts at risk and 
estimating the size of the risk, the third step is to compare that risk 
to the assets available to cover it. Because stress testing, by 
definition, involves extreme moves, hypothetical results will exceed 
initial margin requirements on a product basis, i.e., the price moves 
will be in the 1% tail. Many large traders, however, carry portfolios 
of positions with offsetting characteristics. In addition, many traders 
and clearing members deposit excess initial margin in their accounts. 
Therefore, even under stressed conditions, in many instances the total 
initial margin available may exceed potential losses or the shortfall 
may be relatively small.
    Each DCO maintains a financial resources package that protects the 
DCO against clearing member defaults. If a clearing member defaults on 
its obligations, the first layer of protection against a DCO default is 
the defaulting clearing member's initial margin, as well as the 
defaulting clearing member's guaranty fund contribution. The second 
layer of protection against a DCO default, after the defaulting 
clearing member's initial margin and guaranty fund contribution, is the 
DCO's capital contribution. The third layer of protection against a DCO 
default is the DCO's mutualized resources, which often include guaranty 
fund contributions of non-defaulting clearing members and assessments 
of non-defaulting clearing members. These layers of protection comprise 
the DCO's financial resources package.
    Commission risk surveillance staff compares the level of risk posed 
by clearing members to a DCO's financial resources package on an 
ongoing basis. Pursuant to Commission regulation 39.11(a), a DCO must 
have sufficient financial resources to cover a default by the clearing 
member posing the largest risk to the DCO. Pursuant to Commission 
regulation 39.33(a), a SIDCO \54\ must have sufficient financial 
resources to cover defaults by the clearing members posing the two 
largest risks to the DCO. Commission risk surveillance staff 
periodically compares stress test results with DCOs to assess their 
financial capacity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ DCOs that elect to be covered under subpart C of part 39 of 
the Commission's regulations also are subject to this requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission risk surveillance staff frequently discusses the risks 
of particular accounts or positions with relevant DCOs. For example, as 
a follow-up to a trader review, Commission risk surveillance staff 
might compare its stress test results with those of the DCO. As also 
noted above, in the case of FCMs, there have been instances where, as a 
result of Commission risk surveillance staff comments or inquiries, 
DCOs have taken action to revise their stress tests and/or financial 
resources package to align with Commission risk surveillance staff's 
recommendations.

II. Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

A. Overview of Comments Received

    The Commission received 10 comment letters during the 30-day public 
comment period following publication of the NPRM.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Comment letters received in response to the NPRM may be 
found on the Commission's Web site at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1711. The following organizations 
submitted comment letters: Asset Management Group of the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA AMG); ASX Clear 
(Futures) Pty Limited (ASX); Better Markets Inc. (Better Markets); 
Citadel LLC (Citadel); CME Group Inc. (CME Group); International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA); Japanese Bankers 
Association (JBA); LCH Group Limited (LCH Group); the Managed Funds 
Association (MFA); and Scotiabank Inverlat, S.A. (Scotiabank).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Majority of Commenters Express Support for Proposal
    Seven commenters (Better Markets, Citadel, CME Group, ISDA, LCH 
Group, MFA, and SIFMA AMG) voiced support for the proposed expansion of 
the clearing requirement and agreed with the Commission's analysis that 
the expanded clearing requirement would enhance financial stability by 
reducing systemic risk, improving market integrity, or increasing 
transparency in the swap market. Two commenters, Scotiabank and ASX, 
provided clarifying comments with respect to product specifications, 
but did not express explicit support for the proposal overall. One 
commenter, JBA, requested that the Commission reconsider its proposal 
to expand the interest rate swaps clearing requirement in light of the 
increasing number of clearing brokers withdrawing from the swaps 
clearing business due to rising costs.
ii. Substantive Issues Related to Product Specifications
    One commenter, Scotiabank, discussed the specifications of the MXN-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps included in the 
Commission's proposed expanded fixed-to-floating interest rate swap 
class.\56\ Another commenter, ASX, addressed the Commission's proposed 
inclusion of AUD-denominated FRAs in the expanded FRA class.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \56\ See discussion of Scotiabank's comment letter in section 
III.
    \57\ See discussion of ASX's comment letter in sections II and 
III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Implementation and Harmonization
    Most commenters responded to the NPRM's request for comment 
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of a simultaneous effective 
date versus a series of compliance dates that would coordinate 
implementation with clearing requirements issued by non-U.S. 
jurisdictions.\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ See discussion of implementation issues and related comment 
letters in section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Six commenters, CME Group, Citadel, ISDA, LCH Group, MFA, and SIFMA 
AMG all supported the Commission's goal of harmonizing its clearing 
requirement with those of non-U.S. jurisdictions. Citadel commented 
that such harmonization would lead to the benefit of eliminating 
regulatory arbitrage. LCH Group stated that such harmonization would 
promote certainty for market participants. SIFMA AMG commented that 
such harmonization would improve the functioning of swaps markets and 
reduce operational

[[Page 71209]]

complexity. ISDA commented that harmonization is crucial to effective 
and efficient implementation of all of the reforms of the derivatives 
markets sought by the G20. MFA commented that the Commission's approach 
to harmonizing its clearing requirement with those of other 
jurisdictions would increase transparency and market integrity. MFA 
also suggested that if the Commission proceeds with the expanded 
clearing requirement, then other jurisdictions will follow.
iv. Data Considered by the Commission
    One commenter, Citadel, complimented the Commission for assessing 
the extent of outstanding notional exposures of the swaps covered by 
the NPRM using multiple sources of data.\59\ Another commenter, ISDA, 
suggested that the Commission review data indicating the impact of the 
proposed expanded clearing requirement on market participants in 
particular jurisdictions.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \59\ See section III.B.iii.a.
    \60\ See discussion of ISDA's comment letter in section II.C.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Clarification
    Two commenters, JBA and Scotiabank, requested clarification as to 
whether the expanded clearing requirement would only apply to new swaps 
entered into after the applicable compliance date and whether 
previously executed swaps would be required to be ``backloaded'' to 
clearing.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ See discussion of JBA's and Scotiabank's comment letters in 
section III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vi. Access to DCOs and Clearing Members
    One commenter, JBA, raised concerns about market participants 
needing to establish a clearing relationship with a new DCO in order to 
comply with the expanded clearing requirement.\62\ Another commenter, 
CME Group, raised concerns about the ability of relatively small market 
participants to establish an account with a clearing member.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ See discussion of JBA's comment letter in sections 
II.B.iii.d and V.C.
    \63\ See discussion of CME Group's comment letter in section 
II.C.i and section V.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

vii. Trade Execution Requirement
    Three comment letters discussed the possibility of a trade 
execution requirement applying to some or all of the interest rate 
swaps subject to this rulemaking.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See discussion of Citadel's, ISDA's, and SIFMA AMG's 
comment letters in section II.C.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Determination Analysis

i. Background Information on Interest Rate Swaps
    Interest rate swaps generally are agreements wherein counterparties 
agree to exchange payments based on a series of cash flows over a 
specified period of time, typically calculated using two different 
rates, multiplied by a notional amount. As of June 2015, according to 
an estimate by BIS, there was approximately $435 trillion in 
outstanding notional of interest rate swaps, which represents 
approximately 79% of the total outstanding notional of all 
derivatives.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ Semi-Annual OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-June 2015, 
published December 2015 available at: https://www.bis.org/statistics/d5_1.pdf. The BIS data provides the broadest market-wide 
estimates of interest rate swap activity available to the 
Commission. The Commission receives swaps market information 
pursuant to parts 43 and 45 of the Commission's regulations. See 
also Swap Data Recordkeeping and Reporting Requirements, 77 FR 2136 
(Jan. 13, 2012); Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction 
Data, 77 FR 1182 (Jan. 9, 2012). However, this data only includes 
swaps subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, i.e., those swaps 
subject to the CEA. The BIS data represents the broader swaps 
market, some of which is not reportable to the Commission under the 
CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 2(h)(2)(A)(i) of the CEA provides that the Commission shall 
review each swap, or any group, category, type, or class of swaps to 
make a determination as to whether the swap or group, category, type, 
or class of swaps should be required to be cleared. This final 
rulemaking adds to the four classes of interest rate swaps that the 
Commission defined in the First Clearing Requirement Determination:
    1. Fixed-to-floating swaps: Swaps in which the payment or payments 
owed for one leg of the swap is calculated using a fixed rate and the 
payment or payments owed for the other leg are calculated using a 
floating rate.
    2. Basis swaps: Swaps for which the payments for both legs are 
calculated using floating rates.
    3. Forward rate agreements: Swaps in which payments are exchanged 
on a pre-determined date for a single specified period and one leg of 
the swap is calculated using a fixed rate and the other leg is 
calculated using a floating rate that is set on a pre-determined date.
    4. Overnight index swaps: Swaps for which one leg of the swap is 
calculated using a fixed rate and the other leg is calculated using a 
floating rate based on a daily overnight rate.
    Interest rate swaps within the classes described above are 
currently required to be cleared pursuant to regulation 50.4(a) if they 
meet certain specifications: (i) Currency in which notional and payment 
amounts of a swap are specified; (ii) floating rate index referenced in 
the swap; and (iii) stated termination date of the swap. The Commission 
also included the following three ``negative'' specifications: \66\ (i) 
No optionality; (ii) no dual currencies; and (iii) no conditional 
notional amounts.\67\ This clearing requirement determination analyzes 
the additional interest rate swaps submitted by CME, Eurex, LCH, and 
SGX according to these classifications and specifications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ The negative specifications are product specifications that 
are explicitly excluded from the clearing requirement. All 
specifications are listed in regulation 50.4(a).
    \67\ The First Clearing Requirement Determination described the 
term ``conditional notional amount'' as ``notional amounts that can 
change over the term of a swap based on a condition established by 
the parties upon execution such that the notional amount of the swap 
is not a known number or schedule of numbers, but may change based 
on the occurrence of some future event. This term does not include 
what are commonly referred to as `amortizing' or `roller coaster' 
notional amounts for which the notional amount changes over the term 
of the swap based on a schedule of notional amounts known at the 
time the swap is executed. Furthermore, it would not include a swap 
containing early termination events or other terms that could result 
in an early termination of the swap if a DCO clears the swap with 
those terms.'' See 77 FR at 74302 n. 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Consistency With Core Principles for Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations
    Section 2(h)(2)(D)(i) of the CEA requires the Commission to 
determine whether a clearing requirement determination would be 
consistent with the core principles for registered DCOs set forth in 
section 5b(c)(2) of the CEA and implemented in part 39 of the 
Commission's regulations.\68\ CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX, each a 
registered DCO, already clear the swaps identified in the regulation 
39.5(b) submissions described above.\69\ Accordingly, CME, Eurex, LCH, 
and SGX already are required to comply with the DCO core principles 
with respect to the interest rate swaps subject to this final 
rulemaking. Moreover, each of these DCOs has been, and is, subject to 
the

[[Page 71210]]

Commission's review and surveillance procedures, as discussed above, 
with respect to these swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ The core principles address numerous issues, including 
financial resources, participant and product eligibility, risk 
management, settlement procedures, default management, system 
safeguards, reporting, recordkeeping, public information, and legal 
risk. See sections 5b(c)(2)(A)-(R) of the CEA and 17 CFR part 39, 
subparts B and C.
    \69\ Currently, CME is the only registered DCO offering MXN-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps for clearing. As 
noted above, LCH has filed a Sec.  39.5(b) submission regarding this 
swap and will begin offering MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps for clearing beginning in early October 2016. 
Similarly, LCH is the only registered DCO clearing AUD- and CAD-
denominated OIS at this time. CME has confirmed that it intends to 
file Sec.  39.5(b) submissions regarding these swaps before the end 
of 2016, and it is not likely to need to change its risk management 
framework to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the purposes of reviewing whether the regulation 39.5(b) 
submissions are consistent with the DCO core principles, the Commission 
has relied on both the information received in the regulation 39.5(b) 
submissions and, as discussed above, its ongoing review and risk 
surveillance programs.
    The Commission concludes that CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX are capable 
of maintaining compliance with the DCO core principles following the 
adoption of this clearing requirement determination. The Commission has 
not found any evidence to conclude that subjecting any of the interest 
rates swaps identified herein to a clearing requirement would adversely 
affect compliance by CME, Eurex, LCH, or SGX with the DCO core 
principles. In response to the NPRM, LCH Group commented on this topic, 
stating that it does not believe that the clearing requirement would 
adversely impact its ability to comply with the DCO core principles. 
Accordingly, the Commission believes that each of the regulation 
39.5(b) submissions discussed herein is consistent with section 
5b(c)(2) of the CEA.
iii. Consideration of the Five Statutory Factors for Clearing 
Requirement Determinations
    Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(I)-(V) of the CEA identifies five factors 
that the Commission must ``take into account'' in making a clearing 
requirement determination.\70\ In regulation 39.5(b), the Commission 
developed a process for reviewing DCO swap submissions to determine 
whether such swaps should be subject to a clearing requirement 
determination. The following is the Commission's consideration of the 
five factors as they relate to: (1) Fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps denominated in the nine additional currencies; (2) AUD-
denominated basis swaps; (3) NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs; and 
(4) USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated OIS with termination dates of up to 
three years; and AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS, as submitted by CME, 
Eurex, LCH, and/or SGX pursuant to regulation 39.5(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ The factors are:
    (1) The existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, 
trading liquidity, and adequate pricing data;
    (2) The availability of rule framework, capacity, operational 
expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear 
the contract on terms that are consistent with the material terms 
and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded;
    (3) The effect on the mitigation of systemic risk, taking into 
account the size of the market for such contract and the resources 
of the DCO available to clear the contract;
    (4) The effect on competition, including appropriate fees and 
charges applied to clearing; and
    (5) The existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of 
the insolvency of the relevant DCO or one or more of its clearing 
members with regard to the treatment of customer and swap 
counterparty positions, funds, and property.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As it reviewed the five statutory factors for this clearing 
requirement, the Commission considered the effect a new clearing 
mandate will have on a DCO's ability to withstand stressed market 
conditions. The post-financial crisis reforms that have increased the 
use of central clearing also have increased the importance of ensuring 
that central counterparties are resilient, particularly in times of 
market stress. The Commission has been working with other domestic and 
international regulators to make sure that adequate measures are taken 
to address the potential financial stability risks posed by central 
counterparties.\71\ The Commission is focused on the financial 
stability of DCOs and is committed to monitoring all potential risks 
they face, including those related to increased clearing due to a new 
clearing requirement determination. Accordingly, how DCOs manage risk 
during times of market stress, as well as whether DCOs could manage the 
incremental risk in stressed market conditions that may result from the 
Commission requiring that these swaps be cleared, are critical factors 
that the Commission considered in issuing this final rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ The Commission's Market Risk Advisory Committee hosted a 
meeting on June 27, 2016, to discuss central counterparty 
coordination in default management, global systemically important 
bank resolution, and central counterparty resolution, webcast 
available at: https://www.cftc.gov/Exit/index.htm?https:/youtu.be/fxQDh5lnh9c. See CFTC Press Release PR7386-16, announcing the 
meeting agenda (June 16, 2016), available at: https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7391-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Factor (I)--Outstanding Notional Exposures, Trading Liquidity, and 
Adequate Pricing Data
    The first of the five factors requires the Commission to consider 
``the existence of significant outstanding notional exposures, trading 
liquidity, and adequate pricing data'' related to ``a submission made 
[by a DCO].'' \72\ As explained in the proposal for the First Clearing 
Requirement Determination, there is no single source of data for 
notional exposures and trading liquidity for individual products within 
the global interest rate swap market.\73\ Despite significant progress 
with regard to trade reporting over the years since the 2008 financial 
crisis, this remains true. Nonetheless, the Commission has considered 
multiple sources of data \74\ on the interest rate swap market that 
provide the information the Commission needs to evaluate the first 
factor, including: (1) Publicly available real time data disseminated 
by DTCC Data Repository (U.S.) LLC (DDR), a provisionally-registered 
swap data repository (SDR),\75\ pursuant to part 43 Data; (2) data from 
CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX collected in their capacities as DCOs; (3) 
data from the BIS; (4) data from ISDA; and (5) data from the Futures 
Industry Association (FIA).\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ See section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA.
    \73\ See 77 FR 47170, 47193 and n. 100 (Aug. 7, 2012) (citing 
Bank of England, ``Thoughts on Determining Central Clearing 
Eligibility of OTC Derivatives,'' Financial Stability Paper No. 14, 
March 2012, at 11, available at:https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Documents/fpc/fspapers/fs_paper14.pdf.) As 
discussed above, the Commission receives data regarding swaps 
subject to its jurisdiction pursuant to parts 43 and 45 of the 
Commission's regulations. The Commission also receives regular 
reporting from registered DCOs, as well as its registered entities.
    \74\ The Commission reviews part 43 Data, as well as data from 
CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX, on an ongoing basis. Although the part 43 
Data that is included in section II.B.iii is dated as of the second 
quarter 2015, Commission staff has not observed significant changes 
in the level of trading activity that would cause the Commission to 
change its finding that there is regular trading activity in these 
markets, as well as a measurable amount of data, such that there are 
significant outstanding notional exposures and trading liquidity in 
the swaps subject to this determination. In addition, although the 
data from DCOs presented in section II.B.iii is dated as of the 
second quarter 2015, Commission staff has not observed significant 
changes in the notional amounts outstanding or the aggregate 
notional values of swaps being cleared that would cause the 
Commission to change its finding that there are significant 
outstanding notional exposures and trading liquidity in the swaps 
subject to this final rulemaking. No commenters raised concerns 
about this data or offered additional data.
    \75\ CME SDR and BSDR LLC, each a provisionally-registered SDR, 
accept data regarding interest rate swaps, but have not collected 
sufficient data relevant to the time periods considered by this 
determination. ICE Trade Vault, LLC, another provisionally-
registered SDR, did not accept interest rate swap data during the 
time periods relevant to this final rulemaking.
    \76\ In the First Clearing Requirement Determination, the 
Commission also considered (i) market data published weekly by 
TriOptima that covered swap trade information submitted voluntarily 
by 14 large derivatives dealers and (ii) trade-by-trade data 
provided voluntarily by the 14 dealers to the OTC Derivatives 
Supervisors Group (ODSG). See 77 FR at 74307. The Commission is not 
using these sources for the determination adopted today because 
TriOptima no longer collects its data, and the ODSG data was a one-
time exercise conducted between June and August 2010.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 71211]]

Outstanding Notional Exposures and Trading Liquidity: Fixed-to-Floating 
Interest Rate Swaps Denominated in the Nine Additional Currencies
    In assessing the extent of outstanding notional exposures and 
trading liquidity for a particular swap, the Commission reviews various 
data series to ascertain whether there is an active market for the 
swap, including whether the swap is traded on a regular basis as 
reflected by trade count and whether there is a measurable amount of 
notional exposures, such that a DCO can adequately risk manage the 
swap. In particular, the Commission reviewed the aggregate notional 
exposure and the trade count data from a number of sources for each 
swap subject to this determination. While there is no defined standard 
for an active market,\77\ the Commission believes the data indicates 
that there are sufficient outstanding notional exposures and trading 
liquidity for fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in the 
nine additional currencies to support a clearing requirement 
determination. The Part 43 Data presented in Table 2 generally 
demonstrates that there is significant activity in new fixed-to-
floating interest rate swap trades denominated in each of the nine 
additional currencies. Table 2 presents aggregate notional values and 
trade counts of fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in 
these currencies that were executed during the three-month period from 
April 1 to June 30, 2015.\78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ A line of economic research papers analyzing the impact of 
central clearing on liquidity in over-the-counter derivatives have 
used three or more alternative methods of calculating liquidity 
based on academic research. These transaction-based methods for 
measuring liquidity are informative for assessing and understanding 
what constitutes an active market. See Loon, Y. C. and Zhong, Z. K., 
The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk, liquidity, and 
trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 112 (1), 91-115 (2014) at 98, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176561. See also 
Loon, Y. C. and Zhong, Z. K., Does Dodd-Frank affect OTC transaction 
costs and liquidity? Evidence from real-time CDS trade reports. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 119 (3), 645-672 (2016) at 647, 
available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443654.
    \78\ The data on notional amounts the Commission receives for 
interest rate swaps pursuant to part 43 is subject to caps, which 
vary based on currency, reference rate, swap class (e.g., FRA vs. 
OIS), and maturity of the underlying swap. As a result, the data in 
Table 2 will underestimate the amount of notional outstanding for 
the reported trades, as around 25% of the trades contained capped 
notional amounts. See 17 CFR 43.4(h). According to the adopting 
release accompanying part 43, the Commission caps notional amounts 
to ensure the anonymity of the parties to a large swap and maintain 
the confidentiality of business transactions and market positions. 
See Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction Data, 77 FR 1182, 
1213 (Jan. 9, 2012). The rules were amended in May 2013 as they 
relate to caps. See Procedures to Establish Appropriate Minimum 
Block Sizes for Large Notional Off-Facility Swaps and Block Trades, 
78 FR 32866 (May 31, 2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes the market for any swap is global. Even if the 
bulk of the activity in a particular swap occurs between counterparties 
located in a single jurisdiction, Table 2 demonstrates that there is 
significant participation by U.S. persons in each of the swaps covered 
by this determination.\79\ Because Table 2 is based on Part 43 Data, it 
should include only data related to those swaps for which at least one 
counterparty is a U.S. person.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See also further discussion of this topic in response to a 
comment from ISDA at section II.C.ii.
    \80\ Under the Commission's general policy, neither part 43 
reporting nor the clearing requirement apply to a swap where neither 
counterparty is a U.S. person (although these requirements generally 
would apply, with the possibility of substituted compliance, to 
certain swaps involving foreign branches of U.S. SDs or major swap 
participants (MSPs), or non-U.S. persons that are guaranteed by or 
affiliate conduits of U.S. persons). See Interpretive Guidance and 
Policy Statement Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 
78 FR 45292, 45369-70 (July 26, 2013). Therefore, part 43 reporting 
applies whenever at least one counterparty to a swap is a U.S. 
person.
    \81\ This table reflects data that was publically disseminated 
by DDR and reported to it by the reporting counterparty, a swap 
execution facility (SEF), or designated contract market (DCM) 
pursuant to part 43. As such, the Commission did not independently 
verify the accuracy of the swap data. The transactions disseminated 
to the public were rounded pursuant to regulation 43.4(g). As a 
result, this table may underestimate the amount of notional 
outstanding for the reported trades. This table does not include 
cancelled and corrected swaps that counterparties reported under 
part 43. The Commission converted the notional amounts to USD 
according to the exchange rates of June 30, 2015. Three other SDRs 
provisionally-registered with the Commission, CME SDR, BSDR LLC, and 
ICE Trade Vault LLC also accept information pursuant to part 43. 
During the second quarter of 2015, none of those SDRs collected 
sufficient information regarding the interest rate swaps subject to 
this rulemaking.

  Table 2--Part 43 Data Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps Aggregate
   Notional Amounts and Trade Counts Reported Second Quarter 2015 \81\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                       (USD)           Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MXN...............................      $403,621,757,132          15,492
CAD...............................       318,497,173,863           4,125
AUD...............................       322,042,446,624           4,898
SEK...............................        82,092,397,444           1,779
PLN...............................        47,267,162,195           1,463
NOK...............................        23,974,272,144             659
SGD...............................        45,618,398,397             995
CHF...............................        48,986,953,725             899
HKD...............................        21,704,787,338             469
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 3.1 demonstrates the outstanding notional amounts of fixed-
to-floating interest rate swaps, denominated in each of the nine 
additional currencies except for MXN, cleared at LCH as of July 17, 
2015.\82\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \82\ As mentioned above, LCH will commence clearing fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps denominated in MXN in October 2016.

  Table 3.1--LCH Data Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps Outstanding
                Notional Amounts As of July 17, 2015 \83\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Outstanding notional
                     Currency                               (USD)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAD...............................................    $3,479,830,407,148
AUD...............................................     3,311,898,621,627
CHF...............................................     1,110,123,528,868
SEK...............................................       942,508,451,280
SGD...............................................       735,450,982,935
PLN...............................................       500,992,688,256
NOK...............................................       402,746,575,455
HKD...............................................       385,067,416,327
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 3.2 describes the aggregate notional values and trade counts 
of fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in these 
currencies that were cleared at LCH during the three-month period from 
April 1 to June 30, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ Data includes zero coupon swaps and variable notional swaps 
and excludes basis swaps, FRAs, and OIS. LCH converted values to 
USD. All data from LCH cited in this rulemaking is ``single-sided,'' 
which means that the outstanding notional amounts correspond to the 
notional amounts of swaps submitted for clearing. Single-sided 
reporting from LCH, as well as data reported by CME and SGX, refers 
to the same concept insofar as all modes of reporting reflect the 
total notional amounts outstanding at the DCO based on the swaps 
submitted for clearing. When two counterparties submit a swap to the 
clearinghouse for clearing through novation, the clearinghouse 
becomes the new counterparty to each of the original counterparties. 
This novation process results in double-counting, and single-sided 
reporting reflects the actual number of trades submitted to a 
clearinghouse for clearing. See note 85 for an explanation of CME's 
single-sided data. LCH publishes outstanding notional amounts of the 
swaps it has cleared. See LCH's Web site, available at: https://www.swapclear.com/what/clearing-volumes.html.

   Table 3.2--LCH Data Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps Aggregate
   Notional Amounts Cleared and Trade Counts \84\ Second Quarter 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                    \85\ (USD)         Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD...............................      $747,580,867,222          11,675
CAD...............................       591,935,914,049           8,097
SEK...............................       192,434,187,521           5,827
SGD...............................       188,573,379,738           4,872
CHF...............................       175,203,370,522           3,659
PLN...............................        99,184,390,887           4,249
NOK...............................        72,569,065,080           2,855
HKD...............................        65,655,762,520           1,868
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 71212]]

    Table 4.1 demonstratesthe outstanding notional amounts of fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps, denominated in each of the nine 
additional currencies, cleared at CME as of July 17, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \84\ Like the outstanding notional data, this data includes zero 
coupon swaps and variable notional swaps.
    \85\ The aggregate notional amounts cleared at LCH will appear 
to be greater than that reflected in the part 43 Data because the 
part 43 Data captures only swap data subject to the CEA, while LCH, 
an entity organized in the United Kingdom, clears swaps for entities 
that may not be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The fact 
that LCH's notional amounts are higher supports this clearing 
requirement determination because it suggests that there may be 
greater liquidity in these swaps outside the U.S., of which DCOs 
could take advantage in order successfully to risk manage and price 
these swaps.

  Table 4.1--CME Data Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps Outstanding
             Notional Amounts \86\ as of July 17, 2015 \87\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Outstanding notional
                     Currency                               (USD)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAD...............................................      $295,213,937,641
MXN...............................................       283,989,842,748
AUD...............................................       192,208,979,188
SEK...............................................        30,834,434,233
NOK...............................................        25,396,100,018
CHF...............................................        18,322,872,584
PLN...............................................         4,157,627,521
HKD...............................................         1,937,495,645
SGD...............................................         1,014,201,616
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 4.2 describes the aggregate notional values and trade counts 
of fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in these 
currencies that were cleared at CME during the three-month period from 
April 1 to June 30, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ CME uses the term ``open interest'' to refer to outstanding 
notional amounts. Both terms--``open interest'' and ``outstanding 
notional amounts''--refer to the same concept. CME converted the 
values to USD. As noted above, like the LCH data cited in this 
rulemaking, all data from CME is ``single-sided,'' which means that 
the outstanding notional amounts correspond to the notional amounts 
of swaps submitted for clearing.
    \87\ Data excludes basis swaps, FRAs, and OIS. CME publishes 
open interest amounts of the swaps it has cleared. See CME's Web 
site, available at: https://www.cmegroup.com/trading/interest-rates/cleared-otc/#data.

   Table 4.2--CME Data Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps Aggregate
      Notional Amounts Cleared and Trade Counts Second Quarter 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                       (USD)           Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MXN...............................      $193,941,151,671           7,749
AUD...............................        51,591,005,387           1,194
CAD...............................        91,523,261,511           2,995
SEK...............................         9,712,957,726             998
NOK...............................         5,298,232,932             422
CHF...............................         2,665,840,791             173
PLN...............................         1,097,490,552             577
SGD...............................           355,136,534              32
HKD...............................           211,815,688              16
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of July 17, 2015, the outstanding notional amount of SGD-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps cleared at SGX was 
$58.5 billion.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \88\ SGX converted this value from SGD to USD. This figure is 
``single-sided,'' which means that the outstanding notional amount 
corresponds to the notional amounts of swaps submitted for clearing. 
SGX publishes outstanding notional amounts on its Web site, 
available at: https://www.sgx.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As another data source, the Commission looked to BIS data. BIS' 
2013 triennial central bank survey for interest rate swaps describes 
the daily average notional values of interest rate swaps, including 
fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps, on a worldwide basis, 
denominated in each of the nine additional currencies.

 Table 5--Excerpt From BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey 2013 \89\ Over-
     the-Counter Single Currency Interest Rate Derivatives Turnover
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Daily average
                                                      notional of swaps
                     Currency                       (including fixed-to-
                                                    floating), worldwide
                                                         (USD) \90\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD...............................................       $62,854,000,000
CAD...............................................        26,794,000,000
SEK...............................................        14,618,000,000
MXN...............................................         9,285,000,000
CHF...............................................         5,335,000,000
SGD...............................................         3,349,000,000
NOK...............................................         2,560,000,000
PLN...............................................         2,138,000,000
HKD...............................................         1,992,000,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    More recently, BIS has published statistics showing significant 
outstanding notional amounts for CAD-, CHF-, and SEK-denominated 
interest rate swaps: Approximately $10.3 trillion CAD-denominated, 
approximately $3.2 trillion CHF-denominated, and approximately $2.4 
trillion SEK-denominated.\91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, Interest Rate 
Derivatives Market Turnover in 2013, Tables 1 and 2.1-2.6 (December 
2013), available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf13irt.pdf.
    \90\ Data as of April 2013. BIS converted the figures to USD.
    \91\ Interest rate derivatives by instrument, counterparty, and 
currency. Notional amounts outstanding, expressed in USD, at end 
June 2015, available at: https://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d7?p=20151&c=. This report does not provide data specific to 
interest rate swaps denominated in all nine additional currencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On a daily basis, using data collected from DDR, ISDA's 
``SwapsInfo'' report publishes the notional value and trade counts of 
fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in four of the nine 
additional currencies.\92\ For example, Table 6 shows the aggregate 
notional values and trade counts of such swaps entered into on 
September 15, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ SwapsInfo provides data from two SDRs--DDR and BSDR LLC--
that is ``required to be disclosed under U.S. regulatory 
guidelines.'' SwapsInfo does not provide information specific to 
interest rate swaps denominated in all nine additional currencies. 
The SwapsInfo referenced in Table 6 only includes information from 
DDR. See SwapsInfo Web site, available at: https://www.swapsinfo.org/charts/derivatives/price-transaction.

 Table 6--Excerpt From ISDA SwapsInfo Interest Rate Derivatives--Price/
         Transaction Data Fixed-to-Floating Interest Rate Swaps
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Approximate         Aggregate
                                     aggregate notional     trade count
             Currency                amount executed on     executed on
                                     September 15, 2015    September 15,
                                         (USD) \93\            2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD...............................        $2,143,376,093              51
CAD...............................         1,515,366,916              30
MXN...............................           283,339,847             142
PLN...............................           141,249,743              19
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also reviewed data published by the FIA, in its 
``SEF Tracker'' report,\94\ consisting of weekly aggregate notional 
values of interest rate swaps, including FRAs, denominated in various 
currencies, including five of the nine additional currencies, which 
have been transacted on 12 SEFs that are now registered with the 
Commission.\95\ Table 7 shows the aggregate notional values of interest 
rate swaps denominated in AUD, CAD, MXN, PLN, and SEK executed on SEFs 
during the week of May 25, 2015, as well as such swaps denominated in 
CHF, HKD, and NOK.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \93\ The Commission converted the values to USD as of Sept. 18, 
2015. ISDA SwapsInfo does not provide data for CHF-, HKD-, NOK-, 
SEK-, or SGD-denominated interest rate swaps.
    \94\ SEF Tracker is published periodically on FIA's Web site, 
available at: https://fia.org/sef-tracker.
    \95\ The SEFs include: BGC Derivatives Markets, L.P.; Bloomberg 
SEF LLC; DW SEF LLC; GFI Swaps Exchange LLC; Javelin SEF, LLC; ICAP 
SEF (US) LLC; ICAP Global Derivatives Limited; LatAm SEF, LLC; 
Tradition SEF, Inc.; trueEx LLC; tpSEF Inc.; and TW SEF LLC. The 
Commission recognizes that under section 2(h)(8) of the CEA and 
Commission regulations 37.10 and 38.12, the Commission could in the 
future act to adopt a trade execution requirement for some or all of 
the interest rate swaps subject to the clearing requirement adopted 
in this rulemaking. The adoption of a clearing requirement 
determination is a prerequisite for any subsequent trade execution 
requirement. See also note 76.
    \96\ The published report does not contain information for CHF-, 
HKD-, and NOK-denominated interest rate swaps. FIA provided figures 
for those swaps to the Commission. According to FIA, no SGD-
denominated interest rate swaps were transacted on SEFs during the 
week of May 25, 2015. During the week of July 26, 2015, the 
aggregate notional amount of SGD-denominated interest rate swaps 
executed on SEFs was $7,305,402.

[[Page 71213]]



     Table 7--FIA Data Weekly Notional Volume of Interest Rate Swaps
                    (including FRAs) by Currency \97\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                      Aggregate weekly
                                                      notional executed
                     Currency                       on SEFs week  of May
                                                     25, 2015 (USD) \98\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD...............................................       $36,194,670,000
MXN...............................................        19,526,810,000
CAD...............................................        12,527,450,000
CHF...............................................         6,686,971,251
SEK...............................................         5,958,000,000
PLN...............................................         1,420,000,000
NOK...............................................         1,403,918,860
HKD...............................................            51,589,605
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In summary, the data indicates varying levels of activity, measured 
by outstanding notional amounts and trade counts, in fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps denominated in the nine additional currencies. The 
Commission acknowledges that the data comes from various, limited 
periods of time that do not explicitly include periods of market 
stress. However, the Commission concludes that the data demonstrates 
sufficient regular trading activity and outstanding notional exposures 
in the fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in the nine 
additional currencies to provide the liquidity necessary for DCOs to 
successfully risk manage these products and to support the adoption of 
a clearing requirement. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that 
there is sufficient regular trading activity and outstanding notional 
exposures for all fixed-to-floating swaps subject to this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \97\ May 2015 edition of FIA SEF Tracker, available at: https://fia.org/articles/fia-releases-sef-tracker-report-may.
    \98\ FIA converted the values to USD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Outstanding Notional Exposures and Trading Liquidity: AUD-
Denominated Basis Swaps
    The First Clearing Requirement Determination required the clearing 
of certain USD-, EUR-, GBP-, and JPY-denominated basis swaps. As part 
of this clearing requirement determination, the Commission is expanding 
the basis swap class to include AUD-denominated basis swaps, as 
proposed.
    According to part 43 Data, 366 new AUD-denominated basis swaps were 
executed during the three-month period from April 1 to June 30, 2015. 
The aggregate notional amount of these swaps was $32,559,762,900.\99\ 
Also, during this period, there was no volume of AUD-denominated basis 
swaps cleared at CME, but the outstanding notional amount in such swaps 
cleared at CME as of June 30, 2015 was $69,662,645,400. During the 
second quarter of 2015, 786 new AUD-denominated basis swaps were 
cleared at LCH. The aggregate notional amount of these swaps was 
$74,012,261,949. As of July 17, 2015, the outstanding notional amount 
of AUD-denominated basis swaps cleared at CME and LCH was 
$183,995,548,759 and $443,819,944,145, respectively.\100\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ This figure comes from data that was publically 
disseminated by DDR and reported to it by the reporting 
counterparty, a SEF, or a DCM pursuant to part 43. As such, the 
Commission did not independently verify the accuracy of the swap 
data. The transactions disseminated to the public were rounded 
pursuant to regulation 43.4(g). As a result, this figure may 
underestimate the amount of notional outstanding for the reported 
trades. This figure does not include cancelled and corrected swaps 
that counterparties reported under part 43. The Commission converted 
the aggregate notional amount to USD according to the exchange rates 
of June 30, 2015.
    \100\ CME and LCH converted these figures to USD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the data considered above comes from limited periods of time 
that do not explicitly include periods of market stress, the Commission 
concludes that the data demonstrates sufficient regular trading 
activity and outstanding notional exposures in AUD-denominated basis 
swaps to provide the liquidity necessary for DCOs to successfully risk 
manage these products and to support the adoption of a clearing 
requirement, as proposed. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that 
there is sufficient regular trading activity and outstanding notional 
exposures for AUD-denominated basis swaps subject to this rulemaking.
3. Outstanding Notional Exposures and Trading Liquidity: NOK-, PLN-, 
and SEK-Denominated FRAs
    The First Clearing Requirement Determination required the clearing 
of certain USD-, EUR-, GBP-, and JPY-denominated FRAs. As part of the 
clearing requirement determination issued today, the Commission has 
decided to amend the FRA class to include only the NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-
denominated FRAs proposed.
    At this time, the Commission has decided not to include AUD-
denominated FRAs as part of its expanded clearing requirement. This 
decision is based on several factors. First, the Australian authorities 
have postponed required clearing of AUD-denominated FRAs until July 
2018.\101\ Second, ASX commented that it would not be prudent for the 
Commission to finalize a clearing requirement for this product in light 
of the delay in the Australian clearing requirement for this product. 
Finally, ASX stated that it has observed a general trend in the 
Australian domestic market away from FRAs and towards single-period 
swaps instead.\102\ While there is currently a date certain on which 
Australian authorities will require clearing in AUD-denominated FRAs, 
the Commission is electing not to finalize its proposal with regard to 
AUD-denominated FRAs, will continue to monitor the market for AUD-
denominated FRAs, and may take further action with regard to this 
product as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \101\ See ASIC Derivative Transaction Rules (Clearing) 2015, at 
9, available at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/F2015L01960.
    \102\ See also Aaron Woolner, ``Australian clearing volumes 
steady despite new mandate,'' Risk.net, Apr. 27, 2016, https://www.risk.net/asia-risk/news/2456034/australian-clearing-volumes-steady-despite-new-mandate (explaining that Australian dollar FRAs 
present clearinghouses with an operational challenge insofar as AUD-
denominated FRAs settle and fix on the same day, which creates 
problems for clearinghouses because their end-of-day process will 
not complete until the start of the next Asia-Pacific trading day) 
(article on file with the Commission and available upon request).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 8 presents aggregate notional amounts and trade counts of 
NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs executed during the second quarter 
of 2015, collected by DDR.

 Table 8--Part 43 Data FRAs Aggregate Notional Amounts and Trade Counts
                   Reported Second Quarter 2015 \103\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                       (USD)           Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEK...............................      $183,646,587,508             514
NOK...............................       105,087,098,253             397
PLN...............................        14,455,487,594             103
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 9.1 presents the outstanding notional amounts of NOK-, PLN-, 
and SEK-denominated FRAs cleared at LCH as of July 17, 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ This table reflects data that was publically disseminated 
by DDR and reported to it by the reporting counterparty, a SEF, or 
DCM pursuant to part 43. As such, the Commission did not 
independently verify the accuracy of the swap data. The transactions 
disseminated to the public were rounded pursuant to regulation 
43.4(g). As a result, this table may underestimate the amount of 
notional outstanding for the reported trades. This table does not 
include cancelled and corrected swaps that counterparties reported 
under part 43. The Commission converted the notional amounts to USD 
according to the exchange rates of June 30, 2015.

[[Page 71214]]



  Table 9.1--LCH Data FRAs Outstanding Notional Amounts As of July 17,
                                  2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Outstanding notional
                     Currency                               (USD)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEK...............................................      $706,370,365,302
NOK...............................................       544,670,239,925
PLN...............................................       274,120,726,256
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 9.2 presents the aggregate notional values and trade counts 
of NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs cleared at LCH during the 
second quarter of 2015.

  Table 9.2--LCH Data FRAs Aggregate Notional Amounts Cleared and Trade
                       Counts Second Quarter 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                       (USD)           Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEK...............................      $369,900,226,814           1,600
NOK...............................       348,764,102,890           1,874
PLN...............................       232,246,791,831           1,029
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 10.1 presents the outstanding notional amounts of NOK-, PLN-, 
and SEK-denominated FRAs cleared at CME as of July 17, 2015.

  Table 10.1--CME Data FRAs Outstanding Notional Amounts As of July 17,
                                  2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                    Outstanding notional
                     Currency                               (USD)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEK...............................................        $1,448,168,085
PLN...............................................           360,386,524
NOK...............................................           122,512,986
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 10.2 presents the aggregate notional amounts and trade counts 
of NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs cleared at CME during the 
second quarter of 2015.

 Table 10.2--CME Data FRAs Aggregate Notional Amounts Cleared and Trade
                    Counts Second Quarter 2015 \104\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                       (USD)           Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SEK...............................        $1,504,300,488               6
NOK...............................                     0               0
PLN...............................                     0               0
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes that the part 43 Data provided in Table 8 
comes from a limited period of time that does not explicitly include 
periods of market stress. The Commission also notes the absence of any 
clearing activity at CME in NOK- or PLN-denominated FRAs during the 
second quarter of 2015. However, the Commission concludes that the part 
43 Data provided in Table 8, together with the LCH data provided in 
Tables 9.1 and 9.2, demonstrate sufficient regular trading activity and 
outstanding notional exposures in NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs 
to provide the liquidity necessary for DCOs to successfully risk manage 
these products and to support the adoption of a clearing requirement. 
Moreover, the Commission notes that like the other products subject to 
this determination, these FRAs are subject to a clearing requirement 
issued by another jurisdiction, in this case the European Union.\105\ 
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there is sufficient regular 
trading activity and outstanding notional exposures for all FRAs 
subject to this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ Although there was no clearing activity in NOK- or PLN-
denominated FRAs during the second quarter of 2015, CME continues to 
offer clearing of these products.
    \105\ In analyzing the volume and liquidity of NOK-, PLN-, and 
SEK-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps and FRAs, ESMA 
concluded that there was greater volume and liquidity in products 
denominated in these three currencies than in fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps and FRAs denominated in three other currencies 
(Czech koruna (CZK), Danish kroner (DKK), and Hungarian forint 
(HUF)). Therefore, ESMA included the NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated 
products in its clearing obligation but not the CZK-, DKK-, and HUF-
denominated products. In other words, ESMA ultimately determined 
that three currencies should be subject to the EU clearing 
obligation and three currencies should not be, a decision with which 
the European Commission concurred. See ESMA Final Report--Draft 
technical standards on the clearing obligation--interest rate OTC 
derivatives in additional currencies (ESMA/2015/1629, Nov. 10, 
2015), available at: https://www.esma_europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/esma-2015-1629_-_final_report_clearing_obligation_irs_other_currencies.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Outstanding Notional Exposures and Trading Liquidity: OIS With 
Termination Dates of Up to Three Years; and AUD- and CAD-Denominated 
OIS
    The First Clearing Requirement Determination required the clearing 
of certain USD-, EUR- and GBP-denominated OIS with a stated termination 
date range of seven days to two years. As part of this clearing 
requirement determination, the Commission is amending the maximum 
termination date to three years for USD-, EUR- and GBP-denominated OIS 
that have been required to be cleared pursuant to the First Clearing 
Requirement Determination. This will make the Commission's OIS clearing 
requirement consistent with that in effect in the European Union.\106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \106\ See discussion of the pending European Union Clearing 
Obligation in section I.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 11 presents aggregate notional values and trade counts of 
USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated OIS with terms of two to three years 
executed during the second quarter of 2015, collected by DDR.

Table 11--Part 43 Data 2-3 Year OIS Aggregate Notional Amounts and Trade
                Counts Reported \107\ Second Quarter 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Aggregate notional
             Currency                       (USD)           Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUR...............................        $7,582,189,400              47
USD...............................         4,611,000,000              32
GBP...............................         1,377,942,400              15
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Tables 12 and 13 present the outstanding notional amounts 
outstanding, the aggregate notional values cleared and trade counts, of 
USD-, EUR-, and GBP-denominated OIS with terms of two to three years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \107\ This table reflects data that was publically disseminated 
by DDR and reported to it by the reporting counterparty, SEF, or DCM 
pursuant to part 43. As such, the Commission did not independently 
verify the accuracy of the swaps. The transactions disseminated to 
the public were rounded pursuant to regulation 43.4(g). As a result, 
this table may underestimate the amount of notional outstanding for 
the reported trades. This table does not include cancelled and 
corrected swaps that counterparties reported under part 43. The 
Commission converted the notional amounts to USD according to the 
exchange rates of June 30, 2015.

   Table 12--LCH Data 2-3 Year OIS Outstanding Notional Amounts, Aggregate Notional Amounts Cleared, and Trade
                                                  Counts \108\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Outstanding notional   Aggregate notional
                   Currency                      as of July 17, 2015     cleared second      Trade count second
                                                        (USD)          quarter 2015 (USD)       quarter 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUR...........................................      $456,729,830,424      $369,018,669,593                 1,252

[[Page 71215]]

 
GBP...........................................        91,417,244,109        64,071,802,837                   187
USD...........................................        90,058,657,103        46,523,581,500                   120
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


   Table 13--CME Data 2-3 Year OIS Outstanding Notional Amounts, Aggregate Notional Amounts Cleared, and Trade
                                                  Counts \109\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                Outstanding notional   Aggregate notional
                   Currency                      as of July 17, 2015     cleared second      Trade count second
                                                        (USD)          quarter 2015 (USD)       quarter 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EUR...........................................       $53,456,578,566        $6,888,346,279                    12
USD...........................................       151,923,747,195         9,334,544,737                     6
GBP...........................................        27,764,067,455           857,520,000                     4
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As part of this clearing requirement determination, the Commission 
also is adding AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS to the OIS class included 
in regulation 50.4(a). This will make the Commission's OIS clearing 
requirement consistent with the requirements that will begin to take 
effect in Australia in October 2016 and in Canada in 2017.\110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \108\ LCH converted the EUR and GBP values to USD.
    \109\ CME converted the EUR and GBP values to USD.
    \110\ See discussion of the Australian and Canadian swap 
clearing requirements in section I.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Table 14 presents aggregate notional amounts and trade counts of 
AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS executed during the second quarter of 2015 
collected by DDR.

 Table 14--Part 43 Data AUD- and CAD-OIS Aggregate Notional Amounts and
             Trade Counts Reported \111\ Second Quarter 2015
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Aggregate notional
          Currency                    (USD)              Trade count
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD.........................      $307,048,016,016                   537
CAD.........................        51,645,589,883                   107
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Tables 15.1 and 15.2 present the outstanding notional amounts 
outstanding, as well as aggregate notional values cleared and trade 
counts, of AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS cleared at LCH.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \111\ This table reflects data that was publically disseminated 
by DDR and reported to it by the reporting counterparty, SEF, or DCM 
pursuant to part 43. As such, the Commission did not independently 
verify the accuracy of the swaps. The transactions disseminated to 
the public were rounded pursuant to regulation 43.4(g). As a result, 
this table may underestimate the amount of notional outstanding for 
the reported trades. This table does not include cancelled and 
corrected swaps that counterparties reported under part 43. The 
Commission converted the notional amounts to USD according to the 
exchange rates of June 30, 2015.
    \112\ As discussed above, CME intends to begin offering to clear 
AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS before the end of 2016.
    \113\ LCH converted the AUD values to USD.
    \114\ LCH began clearing AUD-denominated OIS on January 4, 2016.

  Table 15.1--LCH Data AUD-Denominated OIS Outstanding Notional Amount, Aggregate Notional Amount Cleared, and
                                                Trade Count \113\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Outstanding notional    Aggregate notional
                  Currency                     as of January 15,    cleared January 4-15,  Trade count January 4-
                                                2016 \114\ (USD)          2016 (USD)              15, 2016
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD........................................       $25,739,497,700        $26,199,691,300                     25
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


  Table 15.2--LCH Data CAD-Denominated OIS Outstanding Notional Amount, Aggregate Notional Amount Cleared, and
                                                Trade Count \115\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                              Outstanding notional    Aggregate notional
                  Currency                    as of July 17, 2015       cleared second       Trade count second
                                                     (USD)            quarter 2015 (USD)        quarter 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAD........................................      $506,221,411,997       $216,524,096,571                    260
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 71216]]

    The fact that Australian and Canadian regulators have included AUD- 
and CAD-denominated OIS, respectively, in their clearing requirements 
demonstrates that they believe that these swaps represent an important 
part of the derivatives portfolios of Australian and Canadian banks. 
The part 43 Data cited in Table 14 demonstrates that there is also 
meaningful participation by U.S. swap market participants in these 
swaps. For example, U.S. SDs and their affiliated entities play an 
important role in the global swaps market, including in Australia and 
Canada. The Commission therefore believes that it is prudent for its 
clearing requirement to be consistent with those issued by other 
jurisdictions, even with respect to swaps that are relatively less 
frequently traded than other swaps.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \115\ LCH converted the CAD values to USD.
    \116\ See section II.C.ii for a more lengthy discussion and 
analysis of BIS data with regard to U.S.-based market participants' 
activity in global interest rate swap markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While the Commission recognizes that the data considered above 
comes from limited periods of time that do not explicitly include 
periods of market stress, the Commission concludes that the data 
demonstrates sufficient regular trading activity and outstanding 
notional exposures in USD-, GBP-, and EUR-denominated OIS with a 
termination date range of two to three years, as well as AUD- and CAD-
denominated OIS, to provide the necessary liquidity for DCOs to 
successfully risk manage these products and to support the adoption of 
a clearing requirement. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that 
there is sufficient regular trading activity and outstanding notional 
exposures for all OIS subject to this rulemaking.
5. Pricing Data: Fixed-to-Floating Swaps Denominated in the Nine 
Additional Currencies; AUD-Denominated Basis Swaps; NOK-, PLN-, and 
SEK-Denominated FRAs; USD-, GBP, and EUR-OIS With Termination Dates of 
up to Three Years; and AUD- and CAD-OIS
    The Commission regularly reviews pricing data on the interest rate 
swaps subject to this rulemaking and has found that these swaps are 
capable of being priced off of deep and liquid markets. Commission 
staff receives and reviews margin model information from CME, Eurex, 
LCH, and SGX that addresses how such DCOs would follow particular 
procedures to ensure that market liquidity exists in order to exit a 
position in a stressed market, including the products subject to this 
determination. In particular, Commission staff analyzes the level of 
liquidity in the specific product markets and assesses the time 
required to determine a price. Based on this information, the 
Commission staff has no reason to believe that there is, or will be, 
difficulty pricing the products subject to this determination in a 
stressed environment.
    Because of the stability of access to pricing data from these 
markets, the pricing data for non-exotic interest rate swaps that are 
currently being cleared is generally viewed as reliable. In addition, 
CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX provided information that supports the 
Commission's conclusion that there is adequate pricing data to warrant 
a clearing requirement for the swaps subject to this rulemaking. LCH 
and CME believe there is adequate pricing data for risk and default 
management. CME stated that its interest rate swap valuations are fully 
transparent and rely on pricing inputs obtained from wire service 
feeds. In its Sec.  39.5(b) submission, SGX asserted that the valuation 
rate sources it uses, and the manner in which it determines mark-to-
market prices, are in alignment with industry practices. CME, Eurex, 
LCH, and SGX obtain daily prices from third-party data providers, 
clearing members, and/or major banks.
    As discussed above, the Commission reviews margin models and 
related pricing data submitted by CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX. One source 
of information that they use to determine adequate pricing data is a 
regular survey of swap traders that asks the traders to estimate what 
it would cost to liquidate positions of different sizes in different 
currencies. The information obtained during these market participant 
surveys is incorporated into each of CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX's 
internal margin models so that each is confident that it will be able 
to withstand stressed market conditions. Establishing accurate pricing 
data is one component of each of CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX's ability to 
risk manage their interest rate swaps offered for clearing. The 
Commission believes that the methods used by these DCOs provide 
information on pricing that is accurate and demonstrates the ability to 
price the products subject to this determination successfully. 
Accordingly, the Commission concludes that there is adequate pricing 
data to support an extension of the clearing requirement to the swaps 
subject to this rulemaking.
6. Comments Received Regarding Factor (I)
    In response to the NPRM, three commenters, Better Markets, Citadel, 
and CME Group agreed with the Commission's analysis of the first factor 
under section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii). That is, these commenters agreed that 
there is sufficient outstanding notional exposures in all of the swaps 
covered by the NPRM for DCOs successfully to risk manage such swaps and 
that this supports a clearing requirement determination. In its comment 
letter, Citadel complimented the Commission for assessing the extent of 
outstanding notional exposures using multiple sources of data. Citadel 
noted further that the various sources of data the Commission 
referenced in discussing the extent of outstanding notional exposures 
demonstrate the variety of sources a DCO may rely on to access price 
data for risk and default management purposes. In addition, Better 
Markets, Citadel, and MFA commented that there is sufficient trading 
activity and liquidity in the swaps subject to this rulemaking to 
support a clearing requirement. MFA highlighted the fact that, as noted 
in the NPRM, a significant percentage of the market already clears the 
swaps voluntarily at Commission-registered DCOs. Citadel commented that 
the clearing requirement would enhance liquidity in cleared instruments 
to the benefit of investors. Similarly, SIFMA AMG commented that 
clearing improves market liquidity.
    With respect to pricing data, in their comment letters, CME Group 
and LCH Group agreed with the Commission that there is sufficient 
pricing data available for the swaps subject to this rulemaking such 
that CME Group and LCH Group can adequately manage the risks that would 
arise from the default of a clearing member. The Commission received no 
other comments related to the level of outstanding notional exposures 
and trading liquidity or adequacy of pricing data for the swaps subject 
to this rulemaking.
    For the reasons described above and in light of the comments 
received, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion stated in the NPRM 
that there are sufficient outstanding notional exposures and trading 
liquidity, as well as adequate pricing data, to expand the clearing 
requirement to include the swaps subject to this rulemaking, which are 
referenced in revised regulation 50.4(a).
b. Factor (II)--Availability of Rule Framework, Capacity, Operational 
Expertise and Resources, and Credit Support Infrastructure
    Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(II) of the CEA requires the Commission to 
take into account the availability of rule

[[Page 71217]]

framework, capacity, operational expertise and resources, and credit 
support infrastructure to clear the swaps subject to this rulemaking on 
terms that are consistent with the material terms and trading 
conventions on which they are now traded. The Commission believes that 
CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX have developed rule frameworks, capacity, 
operational expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure 
to clear the interest rate swaps that they currently clear, including 
those products subject to this determination, on terms that are 
consistent with the material terms and trading conventions on which 
those swaps are being traded.
1. Background
    The Commission subjects CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX to ongoing review 
and risk surveillance programs to ensure compliance with the core 
principles for the submitted swaps.\117\ As discussed above, as part of 
a registered DCO's initial registration review and periodic in-depth 
reviews thereafter, the Commission reviews the DCO's rule framework, 
capacity, and operational expertise and resources to clear the 
submitted swaps. The Commission may request that the DCO or DCO 
applicant change its rules to comply with the CEA and Commission 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ Section 5c(c) of the CEA governs the procedures for review 
and approval of new products, new rules, and rule amendments 
submitted to the Commission by DCOs. Parts 39 and 40 of the 
Commission's regulations implement section 5c(c) by: (i) 
Establishing specific requirements for compliance with the core 
principles as well as procedures for registration, implementing DCO 
rules, and clearing new products; and (ii) establishing provisions 
for a DCO's submission of rule amendments and new products to the 
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After registration, the Commission conducts examinations of DCOs to 
determine whether the DCO is in compliance with the CEA and Commission 
regulations. Moreover, Commission risk surveillance staff monitors the 
risks posed to and by the DCO, in ways that include regularly 
conducting back testing to review margin coverage at the product level 
and following up with the DCO and its clearing members regarding any 
exceptional results.
    CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX have procedures pursuant to which they 
regularly review their clearing of the interest rate swaps subject to 
this rulemaking in order to confirm, or make adjustments to, margins 
and other risk management tools. When reviewing CME, Eurex, LCH, and 
SGX's risk management tools, the Commission considers whether the DCO 
is able to manage risk during stressed market conditions to be one of 
the most significant considerations.
    CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX have developed detailed risk management 
practices, including a description of the risk factors considered when 
establishing margin levels such as historical volatility, intraday 
volatility, seasonal volatility, liquidity, open interest, market 
concentration, and potential moves to default, among other risks.\118\ 
The Commission reviews and oversees CME's, Eurex's, LCH's, and SGX's 
risk management practices and development of margin models. Margin 
models are further refined by stress testing and daily back testing. 
When assessing whether CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX can clear swaps safely 
during stressed market conditions, stress testing and back testing are 
key tools the Commission considers as well.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \118\ Each of CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX has published a document 
outlining its compliance with the Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures (PFMIs) published by the Committee on Payments and 
Market Infrastructures (CPMI formerly CPSS) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). See CME Clearing: 
Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures Disclosure, 
available at: https://www.cmegroup.com/clearing/risk-management/files/cme-clearing-principles-for-financial-market-infrastructures-disclosure.pdf. See Assessment of Eurex Clearing AG's compliance 
against the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market 
infrastructures (PFMI) and disclosure framework associated to the 
PFMIs, available at: https://www.eurexclearing.com/blob/148684/58e6fe89e3f54ebe169e530ac2235b43/data/cpss-iosco-pfmi_assessment_2014_en.pdf. See LCH's CPMI-IOSCO Self Assessment 
2014, available at: https://www.lchclearnet.com/documents/731485/762558/CPMI_IOSCO_Assessment_of_LCH+ClearnetLtd+2014.pdf/45876bd6-3818-4b76-a463-2952a613c326. See SGX PFMI Disclosure Documents, 
available at: https://www.sgx.com/wps/portal/sgxweb/home/clearing/derivatives/pfmi_disclosure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX design stress tests to simulate ``extreme 
but plausible'' market conditions based on historical analysis of 
product movements and/or based on hypothetical forward-looking 
scenarios that are created with the assistance of market experts and 
participants. Commission staff monitors and oversees the use and 
development of these stress tests. CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX conduct 
stress tests daily. In addition, CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX conduct 
reverse stress testing to ensure that their default funds are sized 
appropriately. Reverse stress testing uses plausible market movements 
that could deplete guaranty funds and cause large losses for top 
clearing members.\119\ These four DCOs analyze the results of stress 
tests and reverse stress tests to determine if any changes to their 
financial resources or margin models are necessary. Commission risk 
surveillance staff also monitors markets in real-time, performs stress 
tests against the DCOs' margin models as an additional level of 
oversight, and may recommend changes to a margin model.
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    \119\ For example, CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX may use scenarios 
for stress testing and reverse stress testing that capture, among 
other things, historical price volatilities, shifts in price 
determinants and yield curves, multiple defaults over various time 
horizons, and simultaneous pressures in funding and asset markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX conduct back testing on a daily basis to 
ensure that the margin models capture market movements for member 
portfolios. Back testing serves two purposes: It tests margin models to 
determine whether they are performing as intended and it checks whether 
the margin models produce margin coverage levels that meet the DCO's 
established standards. CME conducts daily back testing for each major 
asset class, and SGX performs daily back testing on a contract level to 
examine margin models in more detail. LCH may call additional margin 
from clearing members if back testing demonstrates margin erosion. The 
back testing process helps CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX determine whether 
their clearing members satisfy the required margin coverage levels and 
liquidation time frame.
    Before offering a new product for clearing, such as the interest 
rate swaps subject to this rulemaking, CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX take 
stress tests and back testing results into account to determine whether 
the clearinghouse has sufficient financial resources to offer new 
clearing services. In addition, the Commission reviews margin models 
and default resources to ensure that the DCOs can risk manage their 
portfolio of products offered for clearing. The Commission believes 
that this combination of stress testing and back testing in 
anticipation of offering new products for clearing provides CME, Eurex, 
LCH, and SGX with greater certainty that new product offerings will be 
risk-managed appropriately. The process of stress testing and back 
testing also gives the DCOs practice incorporating the new product into 
their models.
    In addition to the Commission's surveillance and oversight, CME, 
Eurex, LCH, and SGX continue to monitor and test their margin models 
over time so that they can operate effectively in stressed and non-
stressed market environments. CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX review and 
validate their margin models regularly and in the case of CME and SGX, 
no less than annually. To risk manage their margin coverage levels for 
interest rate swaps denominated in

[[Page 71218]]

various currencies, CME and LCH also regularly survey traders to 
estimate what it would cost to liquidate positions of different sizes 
in different currencies and then incorporate those costs into the 
amount of initial margin that a clearing member is required to post, 
and tailor their margin models to account for several attributes 
specific to various currencies.
    Finally, aside from margin coverage requirements, CME, Eurex, LCH, 
and SGX can monitor and manage credit risk exposure by asset class, 
clearing member, account, or even by individual customers. They manage 
credit risk by establishing position and concentration limits based on 
product type or counterparty. The Commission recognizes that these 
limits reduce potential market risks so that DCOs are better able to 
withstand stressed market conditions. CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX monitor 
exposure concentrations and may require additional margin deposits for 
clearing members with weak credit scores, with large or concentrated 
positions, with positions that are illiquid or exhibit correlation with 
the member itself, and/or where the member has particularly large 
exposures under stress scenarios. The ability to call for any 
additional margin, on top of collecting initial and variation margin, 
to meet the current DCO exposure is another tool that CME, Eurex, LCH, 
and SGX may use to protect against stressed market conditions.
    In support of its ability to clear the products subject to this 
rulemaking, CME's Sec.  39.5(b) submissions cite to its rulebook to 
demonstrate the availability of rule framework, capacity, operational 
expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear 
interest rate swap contracts on terms that are consistent with the 
material terms and trading conventions on which the contracts are then 
traded. LCH's submissions state that LCH has the capability and 
expertise not only to manage the risks inherent in the current book of 
interest rate swaps cleared, but also to manage the increased volume 
that a clearing requirement for additional currently clearable products 
could generate. SGX's submission states that SGD-denominated fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps are cleared under an established rule 
framework and operational infrastructure that has been accepted by 
SGX's clearing members. SGX asserted further that it has the 
appropriate risk management, operations, and technology capabilities in 
place to ensure that it is able to liquidate positions in these swaps 
in an orderly manner should a default occur. Similarly, Eurex's 
submission states that it clears interest rate swaps pursuant to its 
well-developed rule framework and support infrastructure.
    Importantly, the Commission notes that CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX 
each developed their interest rate swap clearing offerings in 
conjunction with market participants and in response to the specific 
needs of the marketplace. In this manner, CME's, Eurex's, LCH's, and 
SGX's clearing services are designed to be consistent with the material 
terms and trading conventions of a bilateral, uncleared market.
    When assessing whether CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX can clear the swaps 
subject to this rulemaking safely during times of market stress, the 
Commission reviewed the public disclosures published by CME, Eurex, 
LCH, and SGX. In addition, the Commission reviewed the risk management 
practices used by these DCOs, and the Commission has determined that 
the application of such practices to the products subject to this 
clearing requirement determination should ensure that the products can 
be cleared safely during times of market stress. Accordingly, the 
Commission concludes that at each of the four DCOs discussed above, 
there is an available rule framework, capacity, operations expertise 
and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear the swaps 
subject to this rulemaking on terms that are consistent with the 
material terms and trading conventions on which they are now traded.
2. Comments Received Regarding Factor (II)
    In response to the NPRM, Citadel agreed with the Commission's 
conclusion that the existing DCO rule frameworks and infrastructure are 
satisfactory for clearing the swaps subject to the determination. 
Citadel commented that the already significant amount of voluntary 
clearing of these swaps demonstrates the suitability of the DCOs' 
frameworks and infrastructures. LCH Group commented that its rule 
framework, capacity, operational expertise, resources, and credit 
support structure are adequate to clear the swaps covered by the 
rulemaking, including during times of market stress. Similarly, CME 
Group commented that it is capable of offering uninterrupted clearing 
services of these swaps, even during times of market stress. Finally, 
Better Markets commented that the second factor under section 
2(h)(2)(D)(ii) is satisfied because registered DCOs are already 
clearing the swaps subject to the NPRM in compliance with the DCO core 
principles. Better Markets also urged the Commission strictly to 
surveil DCOs' risk management procedures.
    The Commission received no other comments related to the existence 
of satisfactory DCO rule frameworks and infrastructure to support this 
expanded clearing requirement determination.
    For the reasons described above and in light of the comments 
received, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion stated in the NPRM 
that there are available rule frameworks, capacity, operations 
expertise and resources, as well as credit support infrastructures 
consistent with material terms and current trading conventions, to 
expand the clearing requirement to include the swaps subject to this 
rulemaking, which are referenced in revised regulation 50.4(a).
c. Factor (III)--Effect on the Mitigation of Systemic Risk
    Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(III) of the CEA requires the Commission to 
take into account the effect of the clearing requirement on the 
mitigation of systemic risk, taking into account the size of the market 
for such contract and the resources of the DCO available to clear the 
contract. The Commission believes that the market for the swaps covered 
by this determination is significant and that mitigating counterparty 
risk through clearing likely will reduce systemic risk in that market 
generally. Data collected by SDRs demonstrates that Commission-
registered SDs are counterparties to an overwhelming majority of swaps 
reported to the Commission. Because only SDs with a significant volume 
of swaps activity are required to register with the Commission,\120\ by 
expanding the swap clearing requirement, a greater percentage of an 
SD's swap activity will be centrally cleared and risk managed. For 
example, central clearing reduces the interconnectedness of the swap 
positions of SDs, and other swap market participants, because the DCO, 
an independent third party that takes no market risk, guarantees the 
collateralization of swap counterparties' exposures. Mitigating 
counterparty credit risk for SDs with systemically important swap 
positions through clearing likely would reduce systemic risk in the 
swap market and the financial system as a whole.\121\
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    \120\ See definition of SD, codified in Commission regulation 
1.3(ggg).
    \121\ In its regulation 39.5(b) submission, SGX asserts that 
central clearing reduces counterparty credit risk because the 
central counterparty interposes itself between the initial buyer and 
seller and because clearing creates efficiencies through the 
consolidation of collateral management.

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[[Page 71219]]

    In addition to managing counterparty credit risk, centrally 
clearing the swaps covered by this rulemaking through a DCO will reduce 
systemic risk through the following means: Providing counterparties 
with daily mark-to-market valuations and exchange of variation margin 
pursuant to a risk management framework; requiring posting of initial 
margin to cover potential future exposures in the event of a default; 
offering multilateral netting to substantially reduce the number and 
notional amount of outstanding bilateral positions; reducing swap 
counterparties' operational burden by consolidating collateral 
management and cash flows; eliminating the need for novations or tear-
ups because clearing members may offset opposing positions; and 
increasing transparency.
    The Commission recognizes that the new margin requirements for 
uncleared swaps for SDs and MSPs require some market participants to 
post and collect margin for those swaps not subject to the Commission's 
clearing requirement.\122\ Neither the Commission's nor the prudential 
regulators' uncleared margin requirement was finalized at the time the 
Commission issued the First Clearing Requirement Determination. As a 
result, the Commission considered the clearing requirement in light of 
existing market practice. Going forward, the requirement to margin 
uncleared swaps in certain instances will mitigate the accumulation of 
risk between counterparties in a manner similar to that of central 
clearing.
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    \122\ Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for SDs and MSPs, 
81 FR 636 (Jan. 6, 2016) (codified in subpart E of part 23 of the 
Commission's regulations) (establishing initial and variation margin 
requirements for certain SDs and MSPs for which there is no 
prudential regulator); and Margin and Capital Requirements for 
Covered Swap Entities, 80 FR 74840 (Nov. 30, 2015) (establishing 
minimum margin and capital requirements for certain registered SDs, 
MSPs, security-based swap dealers, and major security-based swap 
participants regulated by one of the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm Credit 
Administration or the Federal Housing Finance Agency). See also 
section V for further discussion of this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, the Commission believes that central clearing, including 
required clearing such as that described herein, offers greater risk 
mitigation than bilateral margining for swaps that are sufficiently 
standardized and meet the Commission's other requirements for 
suitability. First, absent any applicable exception or exemption,\123\ 
the clearing requirement applies to all transactions in swaps 
identified in regulation 50.4, whereas, generally speaking, the new 
uncleared margin requirements apply only to swaps executed between SDs 
and MSPs, and between an SD or MSP and its counterparty that is a 
``financial end-user.'' \124\ Second, this clearing requirement 
requires all swap counterparties to post initial margin with a DCO, 
whereas under the uncleared swap margin regulations, for certain swaps, 
specifically those between an SD or MSP and a financial end-user, 
initial margin is required to be posted and collected only if the 
financial end-user (together with its affiliates) has over $8 billion 
in gross notional exposures for uncleared swaps.\125\ Third, swaps 
transacted through a DCO are secured by the DCO's guaranty fund and 
other available financial resources, which are intended to cover 
extraordinary losses that would not be covered by initial margin 
(``tail risk''), whereas swaps subject to the uncleared margin 
requirements are not secured by a guaranty fund or other financial 
resources available to the DCO but covered by unencumbered assets of 
the counterparty.
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    \123\ The exception and exemptions to the clearing requirement 
are codified in subpart C to part 50 of the Commission's 
regulations.
    \124\ See Commission regulation 23.151 (defining financial end 
user). See also Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap 
Entities, 80 FR at 74900 (defining financial end user for rules that 
are applicable to SDs and MSPs that have a prudential regulator).
    \125\ Commission regulation 23.152.
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1. DCO Mitigation of Risk and Concentration of Risk
    In their Sec.  39.5(b) submissions, CME, Eurex, and LCH stated that 
subjecting interest rate swaps to central clearing helps mitigate 
systemic risk. According to LCH, if all clearable swaps were required 
to be cleared at a small number of central counterparties rather than 
being held bilaterally by a much larger group of swap counterparties, 
the robust risk management frameworks of clearinghouses, such as that 
operated by LCH, would serve to reduce operational and systemic risk in 
the interest rate swap market. CME stated that the 2008 financial 
crisis demonstrated the potential for systemic risk arising from the 
interconnectedness of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market 
participants and asserted that centralized clearing will reduce 
systemic risk.
    While a clearing requirement removes a large portion of the 
interconnectedness of current OTC markets that leads to systemic risk, 
the Commission notes that central clearing, by its very nature, 
concentrates risk in a handful of entities. Similarly, SGX, in its 
Sec.  39.5(b) submission, noted that the risk reducing and other 
benefits of central clearing must be weighed against the concentration 
of risk in a few clearinghouses. However, the Commission observes that 
central clearing was developed and designed to handle such 
concentration of risk. Moreover, as discussed at length above, the 
Commission's review and risk surveillance programs monitor and attempt 
to mitigate potential risks that can arise in derivatives clearing 
activities for the DCO, its members, and other entities using the DCO's 
services.
    Part of a DCO's risk management framework includes procedures for 
responding in stressed circumstances, such as a clearing member's 
default on its obligations. As discussed below, each of CME, Eurex, 
LCH, and SGX has a procedure for closing out and/or transferring a 
defaulting clearing member's positions and collateral.\126\ 
Transferring customer positions to solvent clearing members in the 
event of a default is critical to reducing systemic risk. DCOs are 
designed to withstand defaulting positions and to prevent a defaulting 
clearing member's loss from spreading further and triggering additional 
defaults. If the introduction of this expanded clearing requirement for 
interest rate swaps increases the number of clearing members and market 
participants in the swap market, then DCOs may find it easier to 
transfer positions from defaulting clearing members to other clearing 
members because there may be a larger pool of potential clearing 
members to receive the positions. If this were to occur, then this 
expanded interest rate swap clearing requirement would help to reduce 
systemic risk by increasing the number of clearing members and market 
participants in these swaps, which would be expected to provide DCOs 
with additional recipients for defaulting clearing members' positions 
in the event of a default.
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    \126\ For further discussion of treatment of customer and swap 
counterparty positions, funds and property in the event of a the 
insolvency of a DCO or one or more of its clearing members, please 
see Factor (V)--Legal certainty in the event of insolvency. See 
section II.B.iii.
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    Each DCO has experience risk managing interest rate swaps, and the 
Commission has determined that each of CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX has the 
necessary resources available to clear the swaps that are the subject 
of its submission. Accordingly, the Commission concludes that it has 
considered the effect of the expanded clearing requirement on the 
mitigation of systemic risk and found that mitigating counterparty risk 
through required central clearing likely will

[[Page 71220]]

generally reduce systemic risk in the swaps markets for the products 
subject to this determination.
2. Comments Received Regarding Factor (III)
    Several comment letters agreed with the Commission's conclusion 
that the clearing requirement would reduce systemic risk. Citadel 
commented that it believes that clearing reduces systemic risk by 
promoting open, efficient, and transparent markets and by reducing 
interconnectedness. In its comment letter, Citadel agreed with the 
Commission that central clearing does more to mitigate systemic risk 
than bilateral margining requirements. Citadel noted that unlike 
bilateral margining requirements, clearing eliminates the complex web 
of interconnected bilateral counterparty credit exposures. Citadel also 
commented that it believes that market participants benefit from the 
risk and default management frameworks that clearinghouses provide, 
including margin collection, end-of-day pricing, multilateral netting 
and compression, and a guaranty fund.
    SIFMA AMG commented that clearing promotes market integrity. Better 
Markets commented that increased clearing may reduce systemic risk 
because of a potential increase in the number of DCO-clearing members. 
LCH Group commented that its risk management framework is calibrated to 
the particular characteristics of the swaps covered by the NPRM. LCH 
Group commented further that it is capable of handling any increased 
risk that could result from the clearing requirement, including during 
stressed market conditions.
    The Commission received no other comments related to the effect of 
the expanded clearing requirement on the mitigation of systemic risk.
    For the reasons described above and in light of the comments 
received, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion, stated in the NPRM 
that CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX would be able to manage the risks posed 
by clearing the additional swaps that will be required to be cleared by 
virtue of the expanded clearing requirement. In addition, the 
Commission believes that the required central clearing of the interest 
rate swaps subject to this rulemaking will serve to mitigate 
counterparty credit risk, and might increase the number of clearing 
members and market participants in these swaps, thereby potentially 
reducing systemic risk. Thus, the Commission has decided to expand the 
clearing requirement so that it includes the swaps subject to this 
rulemaking, which are referenced in revised regulation 50.4(a).
d. Factor (IV)--Effect on Competition
    Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(IV) of the CEA requires the Commission to 
take into account the effect on competition, including appropriate fees 
and charges applied to clearing. As discussed above, of particular 
concern to the Commission is whether this determination would harm 
competition by creating, enhancing, or entrenching market power in an 
affected product or service market, or facilitating the exercise of 
market power. Market power is viewed as the ability to raise prices, 
including clearing fees and charges, reduce output, diminish 
innovation, or otherwise harm customers as a result of diminished 
competitive constraints or incentives.
1. Competition Analysis
    In the NPRM, the Commission identified one putative service market 
as potentially affected by this clearing requirement determination: A 
DCO service market encompassing those clearinghouses that currently 
clear, or could reasonably be expected to clear, the types of interest 
rate swaps subject to this rulemaking, i.e., CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX. 
Without defining the precise contours of this market, the Commission 
recognizes that, depending on the interplay of several factors, this 
clearing requirement determination potentially could impact competition 
within the affected market.\127\ Several factors may influence whether 
any impact on competition is, overall, positive or negative. Of 
particular importance are: (1) Whether the demand for these clearing 
services and swaps is sufficiently elastic that a small but significant 
increase above competitive levels would prove unprofitable because 
users of the interest rate swaps and DCO clearing services would 
substitute other clearing services co-existing in the same market(s); 
and (2) the potential for new entry into this market. The availability 
of substitute clearing services to compete with those encompassed by 
this determination, and the likelihood of timely, sufficient new entry 
in the event that prices do increase above competitive levels, each 
operate independently to constrain anticompetitive behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \127\ See section II.C.ii for a further discussion of the market 
for interest rate swaps.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Any competitive import from this determination likely would stem 
from the fact that it removes the alternative of not clearing for 
interest rate swaps subject to this rulemaking. On the other hand, this 
clearing requirement determination does not change who may or may not 
compete to provide clearing services for the interest rate swaps 
subject to this rulemaking (as well as those not required to be 
cleared).
    Removing the alternative of not clearing is not determinative of 
negative competitive impact. Other factors--including the availability 
of other substitutes within the market or potential for new entry into 
the market--may constrain market power. The Commission does not foresee 
that this determination constructs barriers that would deter or impede 
new entry into a clearing services market.\128\ Indeed, there is some 
basis to expect that the determination could foster an environment 
conducive to new entry. For example, this clearing requirement 
determination, and the prospect that more may follow, is likely to 
reinforce, if not encourage, growth in demand for clearing services. 
Demand growth, in turn, can enhance the sales opportunity, a condition 
hospitable to new entry.\129\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \128\ That said, the Commission recognizes that to the extent 
the clearing services market for the interest rate swaps subject to 
this rulemaking, after removing the alternative of not clearing such 
swaps, would be (1) limited to a concentrated few participants with 
highly aligned incentives, and (2) insulated from new competitive 
entry through barriers--e.g., high sunk capital cost requirements; 
high switching costs to transition from embedded incumbents; and 
access restrictions--this clearing requirement determination could 
have a negative competitive impact by increasing market 
concentration. However, no commenters agreed with this specific 
argument as articulated in the NPRM.
    \129\ See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) section 9.2 (entry likely if it 
would be profitable which is in part a function of ``the output 
level the entrant is likely to obtain''). In addition, the 
Commission notes that there are clearing organizations that clear 
the swaps subject to this rulemaking that are not Commission-
registered DCOs: (1) OTC Clearing Hong Kong, which the Commission 
has exempted from DCO registration and clears HKD-denominated 
interest rate swaps; (2) ASX, which the Commission also has exempted 
from DCO registration and clears AUD-denominated interest rate 
swaps; and (3) Asigna (Mexico), which clears MXN-denominated 
interest rate swaps. The Commission observes that each of these 
clearing organizations would be eligible to apply for registration 
as a DCO if the organization were interested in offering client 
clearing to U.S. customers. Exemptions from registration are 
conditioned on clearing only for U.S. proprietary accounts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission notes further, that while Eurex and SGX each clear 
only one of the interest rate swaps subject to this rulemaking, they 
are generally eligible to clear interest rate swaps under Commission 
regulation under Sec.  39.5(a) and may decide to add to their interest 
rate swap offerings in light of this rulemaking.

[[Page 71221]]

2. Comments Received Regarding Factor (IV)
    Better Markets, Citadel, and MFA commented that the clearing 
requirement would have a positive effect on competition. According to 
both Citadel and Better Markets, central clearing of swaps generally 
increases the range of execution counterparties, increases liquidity 
and price competition, narrows bid-ask spreads, and improves access to 
best execution. Similarly, MFA commented that the clearing requirement 
would increase competition among potential trading counterparties and 
liquidity providers by reducing counterparty credit and operational 
risk and by allowing market participants to trade with a wider range of 
execution counterparties. Better Markets also commented that the 
clearing requirement could promote competition because it could remove 
barriers to entry to the market and suggested that the clearing 
requirement could enhance the ability of relatively small SDs and other 
relatively small swap participants to compete with larger dealers and 
participants.
    Citadel commented that by eliminating bilateral counterparty credit 
exposure and trading documentation, clearing can lead to market 
structure innovations such as trading solutions that allow investors to 
trade directly with one another instead of through intermediaries.
    Citadel also commented that clearing lowers execution costs in 
addition to increasing liquidity. Citadel cited academic research 
published in 2016 indicating that the Commission's existing IRS 
clearing requirement, together with trading reforms, have enabled swap 
market participants to save as much as $20 million to $40 million per 
day, with between $7 million and $13 million of the savings by market 
participants being attributed to market participants that do not act as 
dealers in the swaps market.\130\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \130\ See Citadel letter for further discussion of academic 
papers and possible cost savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Two commenters, JBA and Citadel, voiced contrasting views 
concerning the effects of only one DCO offering a swap subject to a 
clearing requirement. JBA stated that when only one DCO offers a swap 
for clearing, costs might increase for market participants to join that 
DCO or enter into new client clearing arrangements with clearing 
members of that DCO. JBA also commented that there may be lower 
liquidity for swaps newly offered at a particular DCO.
    By contrast, Citadel commented that the possibility of only one DCO 
offering to clear a particular swap would not have adverse effects 
because swap market participants generally prefer to clear swaps at one 
DCO instead of at multiple DCOs in order to reduce costs by maximizing 
netting, compression, and margin offsets. Citadel also commented that 
fees charged by FCMs, rather than fees charged by DCOs, are the major 
source of clearing costs.\131\ Moreover, according to Citadel, the fees 
charged by FCMs depend primarily on the portfolio the customer wishes 
to clear rather than on the number of DCOs offering to clear a 
particular swap. Finally, Citadel commented that the clearing 
requirement could lead a DCO or FCM to expand its clearing offerings 
because of the increased clearing volumes that may result from the 
clearing requirement. As more DCOs and/or FCMs enter the market or 
expand clearing offerings, price competition would increase and costs 
for customers would be expected to decrease.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \131\ FCMs provide their customers with access to DCOs in their 
capacity as DCO clearing members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With regard to JBA's comment, in light of the fact that there are 
only three swaps covered by the determination that are currently 
offered for clearing by solely one DCO (MXN-denominated fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps, currently offered for clearing only at 
CME; and AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS, currently offered for clearing 
only at LCH), and LCH and CME have indicated that they intend to begin 
offering to clear each of these swaps, respectively, before the end of 
2016, the Commission believes that JBA's competitive concerns about 
only one DCO offering a particular swap will be largely addressed.
    While not explicitly addressing the fourth factor under section 
2(h)(2)(D)(ii) of the CEA, ISDA expressed concern about how the 
clearing requirement for AUD- and HKD-denominated interest rate swaps 
might affect competition due to the fact that the Commission exempted 
ASX and OTC Clearing Hong Kong from DCO registration, meaning that they 
may clear these swaps for U.S. proprietary accounts but not for U.S. 
customer accounts.\132\ As stated in note 127 above, the Commission 
notes that these entities could apply to the Commission for DCO 
registration in order to clear for U.S. customer accounts should they 
decide to pursue that line of business at any time in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \132\ Commission regulation 1.3(y) defines proprietary account, 
and Commission regulation 1.3(gggg) defines customer account.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Citadel's comments suggest that extinguishing bilateral 
counterparty credit exposure and eliminating complex bilateral trading 
documentation for swaps subject to a clearing requirement enables 
market participants to access a wider range of execution counterparties 
and encourages the entry of new liquidity providers.\133\ In Citadel's 
view, competition among FCMs is more relevant to ensuring that the 
overall fees and charges applied to clearing are set at a reasonable 
level. In addition, the imposition of a clearing requirement may itself 
create the commercial rationale for another DCO or FCM to launch or 
expand its clearing offering. Under this view, price competition tends 
to increase, execution costs for investors and customers tend to 
decrease, and overall market liquidity would therefore improve for the 
swaps subject to the clearing requirement.\134\
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    \133\ Commission regulation 39.12(b)(6) requires a DCO to 
establish rules providing that upon acceptance of a swap for 
clearing, the original swap is extinguished and replaced by an equal 
and opposite swap between the DCO and each clearing member acting as 
principal for a house trade or acting as agent for a customer trade. 
This process extinguishes counterparty credit risk between the 
original executing counterparties.
    \134\ See section V for additional discussion on the 
implications of clearing fees. In the aggregate clearing fees may go 
up, but clearing fees as measured by per unit cost may go down after 
the implementation of a new clearing requirement determination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons described above and in light of the comments 
received, the Commission concludes that it has considered the effect of 
the expanded clearing requirement on competition and found that it 
potentially could impact competition within the affected market, but 
anticompetitive behavior is likely to be constrained and demand for 
clearing services is expected to grow. Accordingly, the Commission 
reaffirms its conclusion stated in the NPRM that its consideration of 
competitiveness is sufficient to expand the clearing requirement to 
include the swaps subject to this rulemaking, which are referenced in 
revised regulation 50.4(a).
e. Factor (V)--Legal Certainty in the Event of Insolvency
    Section 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(V) of the CEA requires the Commission to 
take into account the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the 
event of the insolvency of the relevant DCO or one or more of its 
clearing members with regard to the treatment of customer and swap 
counterparty positions, funds, and property. The Commission is issuing 
this clearing requirement based on its view that, as stated in the 
NPRM, there is reasonable legal certainty with regard to the treatment 
of customer and swap counterparty positions, funds, and property in 
connection with cleared

[[Page 71222]]

swaps, namely the fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps, basis swap, 
OIS, and FRAs subject to this determination, in the event of the 
insolvency of the relevant DCO or one or more of the DCO's clearing 
members.\135\
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    \135\ In this case, the relevant DCOs are CME, LCH, and SGX. The 
Commission is not discussing Eurex in terms of this factor because 
Eurex's DCO registration order does not currently permit Eurex to 
clear for customers. See Eurex DCO registration order, available at: 
https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@otherif/documents/ifdocs/orgdcoeurexclrorder212016.pdf.
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1. Applicable Legal Regime--U.S.
    The Commission concludes that, in the case of a clearing member 
insolvency at CME, where the clearing member is the subject of a 
proceeding under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, subchapter IV of Chapter 7 
of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. 761-767) and parts 22 and 190 of 
the Commission's regulations would govern the treatment of customer 
positions.\136\ Pursuant to section 4d(f) of the CEA, a clearing member 
accepting funds from a customer to margin a cleared swap must be a 
registered FCM. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 761-767 and part 190 of the 
Commission's regulations, the customer's interest rate swap positions, 
carried by the insolvent FCM, would be deemed ``commodity contracts.'' 
\137\ As a result, neither a clearing member's bankruptcy nor any order 
of a bankruptcy court could prevent CME from closing out/liquidating 
such positions. However, customers of clearing members would have 
priority over all other claimants with respect to customer funds that 
had been held by the defaulting clearing member to margin swaps, such 
as the interest rate swaps subject to this rulemaking.\138\ Thus, 
customer claims would have priority over proprietary claims and general 
creditor claims. Customer funds would be distributed to swap customers, 
including interest rate swap customers, in accordance with Commission 
regulations and section 766(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Commission's rules thereunder (in particular 11 
U.S.C. 764(b) and 17 CFR 190.06) permit the transfer of customer 
positions and collateral to solvent clearing members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \136\ The Commission observes that an FCM or DCO also may be 
subject to resolution under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act to the 
extent it would qualify as a covered financial company (as defined 
in section 201(a)(8) of the Dodd-Frank Act). Under Title II, 
different rules would apply to the resolution of an FCM or DCO. 
Discussion in this section relating to what might occur in the event 
an FCM or DCO defaults or becomes insolvent describes procedures and 
powers that exist in the absence of a Title II receivership.
    \137\ If an FCM also is registered as a broker-dealer, certain 
issues related to its insolvency proceeding also would be governed 
by the Securities Investor Protection Act.
    \138\ Claims seeking payment for the administration of customer 
property would share this priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Similarly, 11 U.S.C. 761-767 and part 190 would govern the 
bankruptcy of a DCO where the DCO is the subject of a proceeding under 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, in conjunction with DCO rules providing for 
the termination of outstanding contracts and/or return of remaining 
clearing member and customer property to clearing members.

2. Applicable Legal Regime--U.K.

    With regard to LCH, the Commission understands that the default of 
a clearing member of LCH would be governed by LCH's rules. LCH, a DCO 
based in the U.K., has represented that pursuant to European Union law, 
LCH's rules would supersede English insolvency laws.\139\ Under its 
rules, LCH would be permitted to close out and/or transfer positions of 
a defaulting clearing member that is an FCM pursuant to the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code and part 190 of the Commission's regulations. According 
to LCH's submission, the insolvency of LCH itself would be governed by 
English insolvency law, which protects the enforceability of the 
default-related provisions of LCH's rulebook, including in respect of 
compliance with applicable provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and 
part 190 of the Commission's regulations. LCH has obtained, and shared 
with the Commission, legal opinions that support the existence of such 
legal certainty in relation to the protection of customer and swap 
counterparty positions, funds, and property in the event of the 
insolvency of one or more of its clearing members.\140\
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    \139\ The U.K. is bound by European Union legislation, including 
the Settlement Finality Directive (Council Directive 98/26/EC). The 
U.K.'s implementing legislation (The Financial Markets and 
Insolvency (Settlement Finality) Regulations 1999) acts to disapply, 
in certain instances, national U.K. insolvency law in favor of the 
rules of a designated system, and LCH has been so designated.
    \140\ Letters of counsel on file with the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission also considered the implications of the U.K.'s 
recent referendum vote to withdraw from the European Union. The terms 
of any such withdrawal cannot be known at this time. Negotiations have 
not begun, and the U.K. has not yet given notice under Article 50 of 
the Treaty on the European Union to begin the withdrawal process. Thus, 
there is no indication at this time that there will be changes to the 
U.K.'s financial regulation regime that is based on European Union law. 
On June 24, 2016, the day after the vote, the Bank of England Governor 
Mark Carney indicated that the Bank of England's responsibilities for 
monetary and financial stability were unchanged by the referendum's 
result.\141\ In addition, the U.K.'s Financial Conduct Authority issued 
a statement confirming that U.K. financial regulation derived from 
European Union legislation would ``remain applicable until any changes 
are made.'' \142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \141\ Bank of England, Governor Mark Carney's statement 
following EU referendum result (June 24, 2016), available at: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/news/2016/056.pdf.
    \142\ U.K. Financial Conduct Authority, Statement on European 
Union referendum result (June 24, 2016), available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/european-union-referendum-result-statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    LCH has advised the Commission that it does not anticipate 
proposing any changes to its rulebook in light of the referendum, nor 
does it anticipate any changes to applicable law at this time. The 
Commission therefore expects LCH's legal opinions related to insolvency 
to remain valid until further notice and expects that a default of a 
clearing member of LCH will continue to be governed by LCH's rules. The 
Commission will continue to monitor developments related to the U.K. 
referendum.
3. Applicable Legal Regime--Singapore
    With regard to SGX, the Commission understands that the default of 
an SGX clearing member, or SGX itself, would be governed by Singapore 
law, except for certain SGX rules relating to cleared swaps customer 
collateral, as part 22 of the Commission's regulations defines that 
term, which are governed by U.S. law. Like LCH, SGX has obtained, and 
shared with the Commission, a legal opinion that support the existence 
of such legal certainty.\143\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \143\ Letter of counsel on file with the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

4. Comments Received
    Better Markets and Citadel commented that they agree with the 
Commission that reasonable legal certainty exists in the event of an 
insolvency of a DCO or one or more of its clearing members with respect 
to the interest rate swaps covered by the NPRM. Citadel noted that the 
legal framework set forth in the CEA, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and 
Commission regulations applies equally to any swap cleared by a DCO. 
Citadel believes that the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act has 
strengthened this legal framework. The Commission received no other 
comments related to legal certainty in the event of insolvency.

[[Page 71223]]

    For the reasons described above and in light of the comments 
received, the Commission reaffirms its conclusion stated in the NPRM 
that reasonable legal certainty exists in the event of the insolvency 
of each of the relevant DCOs or one or more of their clearing members 
with regard to the treatment of customer and swap counterparty 
positions, funds, and property to expand the clearing requirement so 
that it includes the swaps subject to this rulemaking, which are 
referenced in revised regulation 50.4(a).

C. Generally Applicable Comments

    The Commission received a number of generally applicable comments 
that are separated into three broad topics for discussion below: (i) 
Access to DCOs, (ii) additional data considered by the Commission in 
response to ISDA's request, and (iii) the Commission's trade execution 
requirement.
i. Access to DCOs
    JBA raised concerns about possibly needing to establish a clearing 
relationship with a new DCO in order to comply with the proposed 
expanded clearing requirement.\144\ In light of the fact that there are 
only three swaps covered by the determination that currently are 
offered for clearing by solely one DCO (MXN-denominated fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps, currently offered for clearing only at 
CME; and AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS, currently offered for clearing 
only at LCH), and LCH and CME have indicated that they intend to begin 
offering to clear each of these swaps, respectively, before the end of 
2016, the Commission believes that JBA's concerns about a swap market 
participant having to establish a new clearing arrangement even if the 
participant already has a clearing arrangement in place at CME or LCH 
will be largely addressed. For certain products, if market participants 
do not have clearing arrangements in place at CME or LCH, they may need 
to establish a new clearing arrangement (either as a clearing member or 
as a customer of a clearing member) at one of those DCOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \144\ See also discussion of JBA's comment in section II.B.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CME Group raised concerns about market participants being able to 
establish an account with a clearing member. In response to comments 
about access to DCOs, the Commission notes, as it did in the First 
Clearing Requirement Determination, that any market participant may 
petition for relief under Commission regulation 140.99 if the entity is 
unable to find an FCM to clear its swaps or if it needs additional time 
to complete requisite documentation.\145\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \145\ First Clearing Requirement Determination, 77 FR at 74320. 
See also further discussion of this issue in the cost benefit 
consideration section below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Additional Data Considered by the Commission
    One commenter, ISDA, raised an issue about the type of data and 
analysis included in the NPRM. In its comment letter, ISDA said that 
based on the data presented in the NPRM, ``it is difficult to determine 
the impact that the [clearing requirement expansion] would have on 
market participants,'' particularly for ``market participants in an 
individual jurisdiction.'' ISDA requested data on (1) the volume of 
transactions entered into by entities subject to the CFTC's new 
clearing requirement that currently enter into swaps subject to this 
rulemaking on an uncleared basis, and (2) the percentage of each swap 
subject to this rulemaking that is cleared voluntarily, on a 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis.
    The Commission notes that ISDA's suggested data analysis is not 
specifically required under the five statutory factors that the 
Commission must consider when making a clearing requirement 
determination, as outlined in sections 2(h)(2)(D)(ii)(I)-(V) of the 
CEA.\146\ Furthermore, the Commission observes that it is difficult to 
determine with precision, at this point in time, what effect a new, 
expanded clearing requirement will have on market participants because 
some may choose to clear their transactions for the risk-reducing 
benefits of clearing, regardless of whether the Commission adopts a new 
clearing requirement for such swaps.\147\ Nonetheless, the Commission 
considered relevant, publicly available data and conducted an analysis 
in order to address, and respond to, the concerns expressed in ISDA's 
comment letter. This data and analysis is described below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \146\ The Commission's analysis and data used to support its 
assessment of each of the five factors is discussed in section 
II.B.iii.
    \147\ It is also possible that some market participants would 
respond to the new clearing requirement by decreasing their use of 
such swaps. See also the discussion in section V.B.ii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Data Analysis
    Recognizing that the interest rate swaps market is global and 
market participants are interconnected, the Commission reviewed 
worldwide data collected in the BIS triennial central bank survey for 
interest rate derivatives \148\ to consider further the effect that the 
expanded clearing requirement could have on market participants (data 
from this survey also is presented in Table 5 above). Table 16 shows 
the daily average turnover of OTC single currency interest rate 
derivatives, in each of the nine additional currencies, by currency and 
by country.\149\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \148\ BIS data refers to interest rate derivatives transactions, 
which include forward rate agreements, interest rate swaps, and 
interest rate options. For the purposes of this discussion on BIS 
data, the Commission uses the term ``interest rate derivatives'' 
because that is the terminology used by BIS to describe the interest 
rate swaps market. A description of the instruments included in the 
BIS' Triennial Survey results is included in the BIS Triennial Bank 
Survey, OTC interest rate derivatives turnover in April 2013: 
preliminary global results (Sept. 2013), at 14, available at https://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13ir.pdf.
    \149\ ISDA requested data based on ``jurisdiction'' and the BIS 
reports its data by ``country.'' For purposes of this analysis and 
discussion, the terms ``country'' and ``jurisdiction'' can be 
understood to mean the same thing. Furthermore, a market for a swap 
denominated in a particular currency can be understood to include 
both trading in the home country for that currency and trading 
outside of the home country for that currency.

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[[Page 71224]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR14OC16.000

    In addition to the data on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, 
Table 16 includes calculations by Commission staff \152\ presented in 
order to convey the relative amount of swaps activity taking place in 
each jurisdiction, as compared to other jurisdictions and the U.S.\153\ 
As this BIS data demonstrates, the turnover in each of the nine 
additional currencies represents a small percentage of the overall 
interest rate derivatives turnover in the U.S. market, especially as 
compared with the USD-denominated swaps subject to the First Clearing 
Requirement Determination.\154\ The data also shows that for most of 
these currencies, a significant percentage of the activity in the 
derivatives denominated in a particular currency occurs in the home 
country that issues that currency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ BIS Triennial Central Bank Survey, Interest Rate 
Derivatives Market Turnover in 2013, Tables 3.1-3.6 (Dec. 2013), 
available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf13irt.pdf; CFTC staff 
calculations.
    \151\ Data as of April 2013. BIS converted the figures to USD.
    \152\ Commission staff calculated percentages reflected in 
column B and rows E, G, and H.
    \153\ The Commission notes that similar BIS data was presented 
in ESMA's Consultation Paper on the Clearing Obligation under EMIR 
(no.4), at 26, available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/esma-2015-807_-_consultation_paper_no_4_on_the_clearing_obligation_irs_2.pdf.
    \154\ Based on the same data from the BIS Triennial Central Bank 
Survey, Interest Rate Derivatives Market Turnover in 2013, the 
following represent percentages of turnover for each of the 
currencies that were subject to the Commission's First Clearing 
Requirement Determination: Turnover of USD-denominated interest rate 
derivatives represented 86.96% of the U.S. market; turnover of EUR-
denominated interest rate derivatives represented 4.31% of the U.S. 
market; turnover of GBP-denominated interest rate derivatives 
represented 0.50% of the U.S. market; and turnover of JPY-
denominated interest rate derivatives represented 0.69% of the U.S. 
market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    According to Row E in Table 16, anywhere from 18% to 70% of the 
interest rate derivatives denominated in a particular currency are 
transacted in the home country that issued the currency. The percentage 
of activity that occurs in the home country supports the decision made 
by each domestic authority to establish a clearing mandate for 
particular interest rate swaps denominated in that currency. But in 
each case, there also is measurable trading activity taking place 
outside of the home country jurisdiction.
    In terms of which market participants are trading in particular 
markets, the BIS data available does not categorize the daily average 
turnover by transactions entered into by U.S. or non-

[[Page 71225]]

U.S. market participants. As a result, the Commission cannot estimate 
precisely what portion of these transactions would be subject to this 
clearing requirement determination based on the BIS data. However, the 
estimated overall percentage of activity in the U.S. is shown in Rows G 
and H. In April 2013, the interest rate derivatives denominated in the 
currencies subject to this rulemaking represented between 0.02% and 
2.84% of the total U.S.-based interest rate derivatives market (i.e., 
the amount of daily average turnover that BIS estimated was taking 
place in the U.S.). The Commission recognizes that the interest rate 
derivatives transacted in the nine additional currencies do not 
represent a large percentage of the overall U.S. market for interest 
rate swaps, but the levels transacted are significant in the specific 
market for each currency.\155\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \155\ For example, daily average turnover in MXN-denominated 
interest rate derivatives in the U.S. represented only 1.44% of the 
daily average turnover of all interest rate derivatives in the U.S. 
during April 2013 but represented 74% of the MXN-denominated 
interest rate derivatives market globally.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Policy Considerations
    Foreign jurisdictions have expressed concern that potential market 
dislocation and competitive disadvantage may result if there is no U.S. 
clearing requirement covering the same swaps that are mandated to be 
cleared by non-U.S. jurisdictions. This concern is driven by the fact 
that a market participant's choice in counterparty may be influenced by 
the existence or absence of a clearing requirement. Similarly, from the 
U.S. perspective, distortion of market participants' choices could be 
competitively detrimental to the extent that U.S. market participants 
are subject to a clearing requirement under U.S. law, but their 
competitors in a foreign jurisdiction are not. Recognizing this 
concern, international authorities agreed to harmonize clearing 
mandates across jurisdictions to the extent practicable and as 
appropriate.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \156\ See, e.g., Report of the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group 
(ODRG) to G20 Leaders on Cross-Border Implementation Issues, 
November 2015, available at: https://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@internationalaffairs/documents/file/odrgreportg20_1115.pdf (``ODRG 
members previously agreed to a framework for consulting one another 
on mandatory clearing determinations, with the aim of harmonizing 
mandatory clearing determinations across jurisdictions to the extent 
practicable and as appropriate, subject to jurisdictions' 
determination procedures. Inconsistent clearing mandates across 
jurisdictions may create the potential for regulatory arbitrage. 
ODRG members are considering ways to enhance the existing framework 
for such cooperation.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Another variable that likely is affecting decisions made by both 
U.S. and non-U.S. market participants vis-[agrave]-vis central clearing 
is the imposition of margin for uncleared swaps. The new uncleared 
margin regulations began phasing in on September 1, 2016.\157\ To the 
extent that market participants have a choice of counterparties, and 
perceive the costs of maintaining uncleared transactions to be lower 
than the costs of clearing, market participants may choose to transact 
with counterparties that are not subject to mandatory clearing. 
Conversely, if market participants view the costs of clearing as less 
than the costs of margining their uncleared swaps then there will be an 
incentive to clear regardless of whether it is required under CFTC 
regulations or not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \157\ See section V.C.ii for a discussion about the costs 
related to collateralization of cleared swaps positions compared to 
the costs of complying with the uncleared swap margin regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission cannot predict exactly how market participants will 
be affected by the implementation of an analogous clearing requirement 
in the U.S., particularly in the current environment where multiple, 
changing factors, including new margin requirements, may influence a 
market participant's decision about whether to clear a swap. The 
Commission and its staff are committed to monitoring market activity in 
order to assess the impact of its regulations on market behavior. In 
its ongoing work, the Commission intends to rely on publicly available 
data, such as the forthcoming BIS triennial survey, as well as the data 
market participants report to SDRs under part 45 of the Commission's 
regulations.
iii. Trade Execution Requirement
    Three comment letters discussed the possibility of a trade 
execution requirement concerning some or all of the interest rate swaps 
subject to this rulemaking.\158\ ISDA expressed concern that an 
expanded clearing requirement could lead to new trade execution 
requirements for swaps that have limited liquidity. Consequently, ISDA 
urged the Commission to take any available steps to ensure that a trade 
execution requirement applies only to swaps with sufficient trading 
liquidity. Finally, ISDA expressed particular concern about the 
interpretation of the term ``U.S. person'' described in the 
Commission's cross-border guidance concerning swaps regulations,\159\ 
which ISDA asserted could lead to a potentially detrimental impact on 
trading liquidity outside the U.S., including possible market 
fragmentation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \158\ Pursuant to section 2(h)(8) of the CEA, once a swap is 
subject to a Commission-issued clearing requirement, then a market 
participant must execute the swap on a SEF or DCM, if a SEF or DCM 
makes the swap available to trade (``made-available-to-trade''). The 
Commission issued regulations 37.10 and 38.12 to implement the trade 
execution requirement.
    \159\ Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding 
Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (July 26, 
2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SIFMA AMG commented that the Commission should temporarily suspend 
acceptance of ``made-available-to-trade'' submissions, under Commission 
regulations 37.10 and 38.12, for swaps covered by the expanded clearing 
requirement until amendments to the made-available-to-trade process 
have been adopted. SIFMA AMG provided five specific comments on how the 
made-available-to-trade regulations should be amended.
    Finally, Citadel commented that the Commission should proceed with 
finalizing the expanded clearing requirement despite the ongoing 
discussions regarding a revised made-available-to-trade process.
    As the Commission stated in the NPRM, pursuant to section 2(h)(8) 
of the CEA and Commission regulations 37.10 and 38.12, a trade 
execution requirement could, in the future, apply to some or all of the 
interest rate swaps covered by this rulemaking.\160\ The process for 
determining which swaps are subject to the trade execution requirement 
is separate from the clearing requirement determination process. 
Therefore, it is beyond the scope of this rulemaking for the Commission 
to address the suitability of particular swaps for a trade execution 
requirement or to address issues related to the ``made-available-to-
trade'' process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \160\ 81 FR at 39516, n. 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Expanded and Amended Regulation 50.4(a)

    The Commission promulgated regulation 50.4 in 2012 when it issued 
the First Clearing Requirement Determination, which applied to certain 
interest rate swaps and credit default swaps.\161\ Regulation 50.4 sets 
forth the basic specifications of the classes of swaps that the 
Commission requires to be cleared in order to allow counterparties 
contemplating entering into a swap to quickly determine whether or not 
the particular swap may be subject to a clearing requirement.\162\ 
Paragraph (a) of regulation 50.4 sets forth the four classes of 
interest rate

[[Page 71226]]

swaps that are currently required to be cleared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \161\ First Clearing Requirement Determination, 77 FR 74284 
(Dec. 13, 2012).
    \162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the reasons discussed above, the Commission has decided to 
expand regulation 50.4(a) as proposed, with the exception of not 
adopting a requirement to clear AUD-denominated FRAs. Thus the 
Commission is adopting amendments to regulation 50.4(a) as follows: (i) 
Adding fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps denominated in the nine 
additional currencies; (ii) adding AUD-denominated basis swaps; (iii) 
adding NOK-, PLN-, and SEK-denominated FRAs; (iv) changing the maximum 
stated termination date for USD-, GBP-, and EUR-denominated OIS to 
three years from two years; and (v) adding AUD- and CAD-denominated 
OIS. The specifications of the swaps set forth in revised regulation 
50.4(a) are consistent with those that are the subject of clearing 
requirements proposed or issued by other jurisdictions.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ See discussion of clearing requirements in other 
jurisdictions in section I.C.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its comment letter, Scotiabank suggested that four of the 
specifications in proposed regulation 50.4(a) describing MXN-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps should be finalized 
differently from the specifications proposed. For the reasons described 
below, the Commission has decided to finalize the specifications as 
proposed.
    First, Scotiabank suggested that the floating rate index should be 
described as ``TIIE 28'' instead of ``TIIE'' \164\ because the Mexican 
clearing requirement covers swaps referencing the 28-day average 
Mexican interbank interest rate. The Commission agrees that ``TIIE 28'' 
is the rate referenced in the Mexican clearing requirement, and it is 
also the rate to which amended regulation 50.4(a) is intended to refer. 
The Commission understands that (1) the 28-day average is the rate 
referenced by the MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps 
accepted for clearing at CME; and (2) the 28-day average is the rate 
specified in the MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps 
that will be offered for clearing at LCH. Therefore, the Commission 
intends for ``TIIE-BANXICO'' in amended regulation 50.4(a) to refer to 
the 28-day TIIE.\165\ However, the Commission is opting to finalize the 
description of that rate without specifying the particular version of 
floating rates because it has not done so with regard to the other 
rates referenced in regulation 50.4(a), such as 3-month LIBOR or 6-
month LIBOR.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \164\ ``TIIE'' refers to the Mexican interbank equilibrium 
interest rate.
    \165\ In this final rulemaking, regulation 50.4(a) is amended to 
specify the ``TIIE-BANXICO'' rate instead of ``TIIE,'' as was 
proposed in the NPRM. CME's regulation 39.5(b) submission specified 
the ``TIIE-BANXICO'' rate. LCH's offering in MXN-denominated fixed-
to-floating swaps will reference this same rate. The Commission 
observes that ``TIIE'' and ``TIIE-BANXICO'' both refer to the same 
rate; ``BANXICO'' simply refers to the Banco de Mexico, which 
calculates the ``TIIE.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, Scotiabank commented that the maximum termination date 
range for MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps covered 
by expanded regulation 50.4(a) should be 30 years in order to match the 
exact product specifications of the Mexican clearing requirement, 
instead of 21 years, as the Commission proposed. The Commission notes 
that CME, the only registered DCO currently offering to clear these 
swaps, offers to clear swaps having a maximum term of 21 years. 
Therefore, the Commission is finalizing the termination date range as 
proposed.
    Third, Scotiabank suggested that MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps subject to the Commission's clearing requirement 
should cover only swaps having notional amounts in multiples of MXN 
100,000 because Asigna, a Mexican clearinghouse, offers to clear only 
swaps having such notional amounts.\166\ However, because CME's product 
specifications do not limit clearing MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps to notional amounts in multiples of MXN 100,000, 
the Commission does not believe that it is necessary to limit 
regulation 50.4(a) in this manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \166\ Asigna is not a Commission-registered DCO, and the 
Commission has not exempted Asigna from registration under section 
5b(h) of the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, Scotiabank suggested that the MXN-denominated fixed-to-
floating interest rate swaps subject to the Commission's clearing 
requirement should contain an exception for counterparties having ``low 
net exposure,'' in order to match the Mexican clearing requirement. As 
an initial matter, section 2(h) of the CEA defines the participant 
scope of the Commission's clearing requirement: All swap market 
participants are expected to comply with a Commission-issued clearing 
requirement, except for certain non-financial end-users.\167\ The 
Commission has implemented this statutory exception, along with other 
limited exemptions, in subpart C of part 50. This statutory and 
regulatory framework does not contemplate exclusions based on level of 
market activity, and the Commission believes it would not be 
appropriate to deviate from this framework for the MXN-denominated 
fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps subject to this rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In their comment letters, JBA and Scotiabank requested confirmation 
that a market participant subject to the expanded clearing requirement 
would be required to clear swaps subject to this final rulemaking that 
are executed on or after the effective date of the final rulemaking, 
but not be required to backload swaps executed prior to that date. In 
response to this comment, the Commission confirms, as it did in the 
First Clearing Requirement Determination, that market participants will 
not be required to clear swaps subject to this rulemaking that are 
executed prior to the effective date of this final rulemaking.\168\ In 
addition, the Commission will not require the backloading of swaps 
subject to this rulemaking that are executed after the effective date 
but before the applicable compliance date for this final rulemaking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \168\ See Commission regulation 50.5(b) (exempting from required 
clearing those swaps that are entered into after July 21, 2010 (the 
enactment date of the Dodd-Frank Act) but ``before the application 
of the clearing requirement for a particular class of swaps under 
Sec. Sec.  50.2 and 50.4 of this part''). See also implementation 
schedule described in section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

IV. Implementation Schedule

    In the NPRM, the Commission stated that it did not intend to rely 
upon its schedule for phasing-in the clearing requirement by market 
participant type, as codified in Commission regulation 50.25 and relied 
upon for the First Clearing Requirement Determination. The Commission 
further proposed two alternative methods for establishing a CFTC 
clearing requirement compliance date.
    The Commission received comments on four aspects of the overall 
proposed implementation schedule. First, commenters discussed whether 
the Commission should offer a compliance date phase-in by market 
participant type. The Commission addresses these comments in section 
IV.A below. Second, commenters discussed whether the Commission should 
adopt a single compliance date for all products subject to this 
determination, or whether the Commission should adopt compliance dates 
based on the effective date of a non-U.S. jurisdiction's clearing 
mandate. The Commission addresses these comments in section IV.B below. 
Third, commenters requested clarifications on a number of discrete 
points related to the implementation schedule. The Commission addresses 
these comments in section IV.C below. Finally, commenters discussed 
whether

[[Page 71227]]

the Commission should change the scope of its clearing requirement to 
match the categories of market participants that are required to clear 
the products under a non-U.S. jurisdiction's clearing requirement. The 
Commission addresses these comments in section IV.D below.

A. No Compliance Date Phase-In by Type of Market Participant

    The Commission proposed adopting one compliance date for all market 
participant types, rather than rely on the phase-in schedule codified 
in regulation 50.25.\169\ The Commission has decided that because many 
market participants are currently clearing the products subject to this 
determination and because the Commission previously adopted a clearing 
requirement determination for the class of interest rate swaps subject 
to this final rulemaking, there is no need to phase-in the compliance 
dates by type of market participant.\170\ A number of commenters agreed 
with the Commission's position and advocated for a compliance date 
without a phase-in by market participant type.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \169\ See Swap Transaction Compliance and Implementation 
Schedule: Clearing Requirement Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 FR 
44441 (July 30, 2012), [hereinafter referred to as the 
Implementation Release].
    \170\ In the Implementation Release, the Commission stated that 
the ``use of the schedule contained in this [release] is at the 
Commission's discretion; in situations where the Commission 
determines that the benefits of delayed implementation do not 
justify the additional costs of such a delay, the Commission may 
require immediate compliance. . . .'' 77 FR 44441, 44450 (July 30, 
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

i. Comments Received
    MFA supported the Commission's proposal not to phase-in the 
compliance date by market participant type and agreed that market 
participants are ready, willing, and able to clear the swaps subject to 
this rulemaking. Citadel agreed with the Commission's position that the 
phase-in by counterparty type is not necessary. Citadel pointed out 
that because market participants, in most cases, have established 
clearing arrangements with DCOs and are familiar with the process of 
central clearing, there is no need to delay compliance dates by 
including a phase-in by market participant type. LCH Group commented 
that while the use of a compliance date phase-in by market participant 
type was successful in connection with the Commission's First Clearing 
Requirement Determination, it would not be equally beneficial in this 
context.
    Of the two commenters that requested a compliance date phase-in by 
market participant type, one thought that market participants would be 
unable to comply with the clearing requirement in the time frame 
established. ISDA urged the Commission to adopt an implementation 
schedule that incorporates the 270-day phase-in schedule outlined in 
Commission regulation 50.25. ISDA expressed concern about the 
consequences for entities that currently may not be subject to an 
analogous clearing mandate outside of the U.S. in terms of addressing 
legal, documentation, operational, and other considerations. SIFMA AMG 
also recommended that the Commission use a phase-in schedule by market 
participant type, but did not specify a reason for this recommendation.
    The Commission recognizes that the compliance date phase-in by 
market participant type was beneficial in the context of the First 
Clearing Requirement Determination. However, because market 
participants are experienced in clearing USD, EUR, GBP, and/or JPY-
denominated interest rate swaps and there is a substantial amount of 
voluntary clearing activity in the swaps subject to this rulemaking, 
the Commission has decided that there is no need to phase-in the 
compliance dates for this clearing requirement by market participant 
type in accordance with regulation 50.25 or otherwise. Regulation 50.25 
provides the Commission with the discretion to phase in compliance. 
Regulation 50.25(b) provides that upon issuing a clearing requirement 
determination under section 2(h)(2) of the CEA, the Commission may 
determine, based on the group, category, type, or class of swaps 
subject to such determination, that the specified schedule for 
compliance with the requirements of section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA shall 
apply.
    A broad cross-section of market participants, including both direct 
clearing members and their clients or customers, has experience 
clearing the four classes of interest rate swaps under regulation 
50.4(a) and has been clearing certain swaps subject to this final 
rulemaking on a voluntary basis. The Commission believes that most 
market participants that would be subject to the expanded clearing 
requirement already clear, or have clearing service arrangements in 
place to clear, the types of interest rate swaps subject to the 
existing clearing requirement. The Commission does not expect that 
these types of market participants, for the most part, would need to 
establish connectivity to DCOs, document new client clearing 
arrangements, or otherwise prepare themselves and/or their customers in 
order to comply with this clearing requirement determination as they 
may have needed to do in order to comply with the First Clearing 
Requirement Determination. The Commission will consider carefully any 
concerns raised by market participants that cannot gain access to a DCO 
in order to clear swaps subject to this rulemaking before an applicable 
compliance date.
    The Commission received similar comments concerning the difficulty 
market participants may have in accessing DCOs and establishing 
relationships with FCMs at the time it was considering the First 
Clearing Requirement Determination. In response to those comments, the 
Commission noted that ``any market participant may petition for relief 
under regulation 140.99 if that entity is unable to find an FCM to 
clear its swaps or if it needs additional time to complete requisite 
documentation.'' \171\ If a market participant is unable to find an FCM 
to clear its swaps, the Commission reaffirms the fact that market 
participants may petition for relief under regulation 140.99.\172\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \171\ First Clearing Requirement Determination, 77 FR at 74320 
and n.172.
    \172\ Commission regulation 140.99 sets forth the process for 
addressing requests for exemptive, no-action, and interpretative 
letters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Compliance Date Tied to a Non-U.S. Jurisdiction Clearing Requirement

    The Commission proposed two alternative implementation scenarios in 
the NPRM. Under the first scenario, all swaps subject to this 
rulemaking would be required to be cleared on the same date--60 days 
after the final rulemaking is published in the Federal Register 
(Scenario I). Under the second scenario, the compliance date for each 
swap product would be the earlier of: (a) 60 days after the effective 
date of an analogous clearing mandate adopted by a regulator in a non-
U.S. jurisdiction, provided that such requirement would not be 
effective until at least 60 days after the Commission's final rule is 
published in the Federal Register, and (b) two years after the 
Commission's final rule is published in the Federal Register (Scenario 
II).
    After reviewing comments on the two implementation scenarios 
proposed, the Commission has determined that it will adopt Scenario II 
and will tie the CFTC's compliance date for each product to the first 
compliance date for a market participant in a non-U.S. jurisdiction.

[[Page 71228]]

i. Comments Received
    The Commission received eight comments on whether to implement 
Scenario I or Scenario II. MFA supported Scenario I because it would 
allow the Commission to move forward promptly with expanding the 
clearing requirement for the products subject to this determination. 
MFA noted that Scenario II was a reasonable option, but preferred 
Scenario I. Citadel stated that Scenario I was realistic and concluded 
that most market participants were prepared for the clearing 
requirement and had infrastructure in place to comply. Scenario I 
received support for its simple application and because it would bring 
the clearing requirement into force for certain products more quickly 
than under Scenario II. While the Commission agrees with these points, 
and notes that Scenario I would provide market participants with 
certainty and simplicity, it has decided to adopt Scenario II.
    To the extent practicable, the Commission believes it is important 
to account for non-U.S. jurisdictions' timelines for mandating clearing 
when imposing a compliance date for U.S. market participants. The 
implementation schedule under Scenario II will provide flexibility for 
market participants, will facilitate compliance by phasing-in the 
clearing requirement by specific product, and will further the 
Commission's goals of harmonizing clearing requirements with those 
abroad.
    Six commenters supported adoption of implementation Scenario II. 
JBA requested that the Commission adopt Scenario II in order to promote 
market liquidity and stability and to harmonize with clearing 
requirements issued by non-U.S. jurisdictions. ASX advocated for the 
Commission to adopt Scenario II to minimize any potential disruptions 
caused by differences in implementation timing of clearing mandates 
across jurisdictions. ISDA preferred Scenario II on the grounds that it 
would promote global harmonization and is consistent with maximizing 
liquidity and reducing risk. SIFMA AMG recommended Scenario II because 
it would further the Commission's efforts to harmonize with other 
jurisdictions. LCH Group agreed with the Commission that Scenario II 
would provide flexibility and certainty and would foster further 
international harmonization of adoption of clearing requirements. 
Finally, CME Group stated that the Commission should work cooperatively 
with regulators in other jurisdictions and that it supports the 
extension of the Commission's clearing requirement determination where 
it is necessary for global harmonization.
    The Commission has determined that Scenario II will be used to 
determine compliance dates for market participants subject to the 
Commission's clearing requirements (hereinafter referred to as the 
Implementation Schedule). Thus, the Commission's clearing requirement 
compliance date for each interest rate swap product covered by this 
determination will be the earlier of: (i) The first date that U.S. 
markets are open 60 calendar days after any person is first required to 
comply with an analogous clearing requirement that has been adopted by 
a regulator in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, provided that any such date for 
any swap covered by the final rule shall not be earlier than the date 
which is 60 calendar days after the Commission's final rule is 
published, or (ii) the first date U.S. markets are open two years after 
the Commission's final rule is published in the Federal Register. If 
the clearing requirement compliance date falls on a Saturday, Sunday, 
or U.S. federal public holiday, the compliance date shall be the next 
available business day. No compliance date shall be set on a day when 
markets are not open in the U.S.

C. Clarifications to the Implementation Schedule

    A number of commenters raised questions about details in the 
Commission's proposed implementation schedule, as it was described in 
the NPRM. The Commission responds below to each of the comments and 
provides clarifications to the Implementation Schedule, as appropriate.
i. Comments Received--60-Day Delay
    SIFMA AMG suggested that the Commission extend the time period that 
will elapse between a non-U.S. jurisdiction adopting a clearing mandate 
and the Commission's implementation of a compliance date for swaps 
subject to amended regulation 50.4(a). Specifically, SIFMA AMG 
recommended that the Commission wait 180 days after an effective date 
in a non-U.S. jurisdiction before requiring compliance with this final 
rulemaking.
    The Commission has considered the timeframe necessary for U.S. 
market participants to prepare for, and comply with, a clearing 
requirement for the swaps subject to this determination and decided 
that 60 calendar days will provide enough time for U.S. market 
participants to comply.\173\ As noted above, the Commission does not 
expect market participants to need significant, additional time to 
prepare for this expansion of the clearing requirement because a number 
of market participants clear these products already and/or are familiar 
with clearing other interest rate swaps products.\174\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \173\ The Commission is clarifying the language in this final 
release to specify that the 60-day time period will be measured in 
calendar days; however, the Commission's clearing requirement will 
begin only on the next available business day. See Projected 
Compliance Dates in section IV.E. This change was made in response 
to one commenter's request to the Commission to clarify whether the 
60-day delay (between the date on which a non-U.S. jurisdiction's 
clearing requirement takes effect and the date that compliance will 
be required with the Commission's clearing requirement) is measured 
in calendar days or business days. See Scotiabank letter.
    \174\ See also the discussion in section IV.A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Comments Received--Effective Date is the First Date Upon Which a 
Product is Required to be Cleared
    Citadel asked the Commission to clarify how the Commission would 
establish the ``effective date'' in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, which is 
used to determine the CFTC compliance date. Citadel pointed out that 
when a non-U.S. jurisdiction's uses of a phased-in compliance schedule 
it could create ambiguity if the Commission's rule is not clarified.
    The Commission recognizes that the term ``effective date'' can have 
a different meaning in different jurisdictions based on local law and 
procedure. Therefore, the Commission is clarifying that the CFTC's 
clearing requirement will be based on the first date upon which any 
person in the non-U.S. jurisdiction is initially subject to a clearing 
mandate for new trades, i.e., any front-loading or back-loading 
requirements if they take effect earlier would not be relevant for 
purposes of the Implementation Schedule.
iii. Comments Received--Two-Year Time Limit
    As proposed in the NPRM, Scenario II included a two-year time limit 
providing that compliance with the expanded clearing requirement would 
be required no later than two years after the final rule is published 
in the Federal Register. The Commission received five comment letters 
related to Scenario II's two-year time limit and certainty regarding 
compliance dates.
    MFA commented that, while it preferred Scenario I, Scenario II was 
a reasonable option because the Commission included a two-year time 
limit. In its comment letter, Citadel recognized the importance of 
retaining the two-year time limit and noted that ``it is important to 
retain an outer bound

[[Page 71229]]

of two years for when the final Commission rule may become effective in 
order to provide certainty to market participants regarding 
implementation.'' LCH Group supported Scenario II because ``this 
approach provides flexibility and certainty . . . [that] . . . will 
foster further international harmonization in the adoption of clearing 
requirements.''
    SIFMA AMG recommended that the Commission revise its proposed 
implementation schedule to remove the ``proviso'' that would cause an 
automatic effective date no later than two years after the date that 
the final rulemaking is published in the Federal Register. SIFMA AMG 
expressed concern based on the idea that ``clearing mandates [are] 
being imposed on U.S. market participants in the name of harmonization 
when there is ultimately no foreign clearing mandate with which to 
harmonize.'' JBA noted that some uncertainty would remain even with a 
schedule that implements all clearing requirements no later than two 
years after publication, unless non-U.S. regulators align their 
regulatory actions with the Commission's implementation schedule.
    The Commission observes that since the publication of the NPRM, 
significant progress has been made with regard to the status of 
clearing requirements in almost all non-U.S. jurisdictions relevant to 
this rulemaking. Five of the seven jurisdictions have established 
compliance dates for their market participants to begin clearing 
pursuant to their analogous clearing mandates. Only Singapore and 
Switzerland have not yet finalized their clearing mandates and set 
compliance dates.
    In order to assure market participants that there will be a date 
certain by which they will be required to comply with the clearing 
requirement for these swaps, particularly for the SGD-denominated 
fixed-to-floating and CHF-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate 
swaps, the Commission has decided to retain the two-year time limit in 
the Implementation Schedule. In reaching this conclusion, the 
Commission is cognizant of its obligations to provide legal certainty 
under applicable statutory procedures. The Commission also recognizes 
the importance of providing market participants with certainty about 
compliance dates so that they can begin operational planning and 
preparation for required clearing of all swaps subject to this final 
rulemaking. To the extent that market participants need adequate time 
to onboard clients and establish connectivity to eligible DCOs, 
retaining the two-year time limit is important.
    In finalizing this rulemaking, the Commission seeks to balance 
flexibility with certainty in its Implementation Schedule. In the event 
that Singapore and Switzerland do not finalize their clearing mandates 
and set compliance dates within the two-year time limit, the Commission 
and Commission staff would be open to considering options for modifying 
the compliance deadline as necessary and appropriate.

D. Scope of Entities Subject to the Implementation Schedule

    The Commission received a number of comments that requested an 
analysis of the scope of entities subject to the non-U.S. 
jurisdiction's clearing requirement and consideration of whether the 
entities subject to the CFTC's clearing requirement were ``analogous.'' 
ASX suggested that the CFTC's assessment of analogous clearing 
requirements in non-U.S. jurisdictions should include an analysis of 
the classes of counterparties that are subject to such clearing 
requirements. Scotiabank asked the Commission to consider the fact that 
the Banco de M[eacute]xico's regulations contain an exception from the 
clearing mandate for entities with low net derivatives exposure. And 
ISDA pointed out that the scope of entities subject to a non-U.S. 
clearing mandate may be narrower than the scope of market participants 
subject to the Commission's clearing requirement rules under part 50.
    By contrast, in its comment letter, Citadel cautioned that if the 
Commission were to adopt rules that incorporated the entity scope of 
each non-U.S. jurisdiction's clearing mandate, the U.S. framework would 
``become a confusing patchwork of foreign regulation, compelling U.S. 
market participants to apply different criteria on a currency-by-
currency basis to determine whether (and when) they are in-scope.''
    As discussed above, section 2(h)(7) of the CEA sets forth the 
participant scope for the clearing requirement: It shall be unlawful 
for any person not to clear a swap if that swap is required to be 
cleared, except if one of the counterparties to the swap meets certain 
conditions enumerated in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. The Commission has 
implemented the statutory exception under section 2(h)(7), along with 
other limited exemptions, in subpart C of part 50 of the Commission's 
regulations. Based on this statutory and regulatory framework as well 
as its consideration of the comments presented, the Commission confirms 
that this final rulemaking applies to the same scope of market 
participants to which Commission regulation 50.4(a) currently applies.

E. Projected Compliance Dates

    The Commission has been monitoring, and will continue to follow 
closely, clearing mandate developments in other jurisdictions that 
relate to this clearing requirement determination. As discussed above, 
the Commission's clearing requirement compliance date is specific to 
each product and will be calculated by following the Implementation 
Schedule presented herein. With respect to products that do not yet 
have a compliance date set for an analogous clearing mandate in a non-
U.S. jurisdiction, the Commission is including the date that is two 
years after the date of publication in the Federal Register. If a non-
U.S. jurisdiction modifies any existing initial clearing requirement 
compliance date, or adopts a clearing requirement for either the CHF-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps or the SGD-
denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swaps that would require a 
CFTC compliance date for a market participant earlier than two years 
after the publication date in the Federal Register, then the Commission 
staff will publish a press release on the CFTC's Web site setting forth 
the Commission's clearing requirement compliance date for the relevant 
interest rate swaps in advance of the date upon which compliance will 
be required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \175\ Section I.C. contains a more detailed discussion of the 
regulatory regimes and compliance dates for mandatory clearing of 
these products adopted by non-U.S. regulators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Below is a chart identifying the projected compliance date for each 
of the products subject to this determination.

[[Page 71230]]



------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  First clearing
                                   requirement
                                 compliance  date      CFTC clearing
            Product               in a non-U.S.         requirement
                                   jurisdiction       compliance date
                                      \175\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD-denominated Fixed-to-       April 4, 2016....  60 days after
 floating interest rate swap.                       publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
CAD-denominated Fixed-to-       May 9, 2017......  July 10, 2017.
 floating interest rate swap.
CHF-denominated Fixed-to-       None to date.....  No later than 730
 floating interest rate swap.                       days after
                                                    publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
HKD-denominated Fixed-to-       July 1, 2017.....  August 30, 2017.
 floating interest rate swap.
MXN-denominated Fixed-to-       April 1, 2016....  60 days after
 floating interest rate swap.                       publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
NOK-denominated Fixed-to-       February 9, 2017.  April 10, 2017.
 floating interest rate swap.
PLN-denominated Fixed-to-       February 9, 2017.  April 10, 2017.
 floating interest rate swap.
SEK-denominated Fixed-to-       February 9, 2017.  April 10, 2017.
 floating interest rate swap.
SGD-denominated Fixed-to-       None to date.....  No later than 730
 floating interest rate swap.                       days after
                                                    publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
AUD-denominated basis swap....  April 4, 2016....  60 days after
                                                    publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
NOK-denominated FRA...........  February 9, 2017.  April 10, 2017.
PLN-denominated FRA...........  February 9, 2017.  April 10, 2017.
SEK-denominated FRA...........  February 9, 2017.  April 10, 2017.
EUR-denominated OIS (2-3 year   June 21, 2016....  60 days after
 term).                                             publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
GBP-denominated OIS (2-3 year   June 21, 2016....  60 days after
 term).                                             publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
USD-denominated OIS (2-3 year   June 21, 2016....  60 days after
 term).                                             publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
AUD-denominated OIS...........  October 3, 2016..  60 days after
                                                    publication of this
                                                    final rulemaking in
                                                    the Federal
                                                    Register.
CAD-denominated OIS...........  May 9, 2017......  July 10, 2017.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

V. Cost Benefit Considerations

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

    Expanded Commission regulation 50.4(a) identifies certain swaps 
that would be required to be cleared under section 2(h)(1)(A) of the 
CEA in addition to those currently required to be cleared by existing 
regulations 50.2 and 50.4(a). This clearing requirement determination 
is designed to standardize and reduce counterparty risk associated with 
swaps, and in turn, mitigate the potential systemic impact of such 
risks and reduce the likelihood for swaps to cause or exacerbate 
instability in the financial system. As stated in the NPRM, the 
Commission believes this determination is consistent with one of the 
fundamental premises of the Dodd-Frank Act and the 2009 commitments 
adopted by the G20 nations: The use of central clearing can reduce 
systemic risk.
    Regulation 39.5 provides an outline for the Commission's review of 
swaps for required clearing. Regulation 39.5 allows the Commission to 
review swaps submitted by DCOs. Under section 2(h)(2)(D) of the CEA, in 
reviewing swaps for a clearing requirement determination, the 
Commission must take into account the following factors: (1) 
Significant outstanding notional exposures, trading liquidity and 
adequate pricing data; (2) the availability of rule framework, 
capacity, operational expertise and credit support infrastructure to 
clear the contract on terms that are consistent with the material terms 
and trading conventions on which the contract is then traded; (3) the 
effect on the mitigation of systemic risk; (4) the effect on 
competition; and (5) the existence of reasonable legal certainty in the 
event of the insolvency of the DCO or one or more of its clearing 
members.\176\ Regulation 39.5 also directs DCOs to provide to the 
Commission other information, such as product specifications, 
participant eligibility standards, pricing sources, risk management 
procedures, a description of the manner in which the DCO has provided 
notice of the submission to its members and any additional information 
requested by the Commission.\177\ This information is designed to 
assist the Commission in identifying those swaps that are required to 
be cleared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \176\ Section 2(h)(2)(D) of the CEA.
    \177\ Commission regulation 39.5(b)(3)(ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following discussion is a consideration of the costs and 
benefits of the Commission's action in this rulemaking, pursuant to the 
regulatory requirements above. The Commission exercises its discretion 
under section 2(h)(2)(D) of the CEA to determine whether swaps that are 
submitted for a clearing requirement determination are required to be 
cleared.

B. Overview of Swap Clearing

i. How Clearing Reduces Risk
    When a bilateral swap is cleared, the DCO becomes the counterparty 
to each original counterparty to the swap. This arrangement mitigates 
counterparty credit risk because the DCO: (1) Monitors and mitigates 
the risk of a counterparty default; (2) collects sufficient initial 
margin to cover potential future exposures and regularly collects and 
pays variation margin to cover current exposures; (3) facilitates 
netting within portfolios of swaps and among counterparties; and (4) 
holds collateral in a guaranty fund in order to mutualize the remaining 
tail risk not covered by initial margin contributions among clearing 
members. Central clearing mitigates the interconnectedness among swap 
market participants, insofar as, upon acceptance of a swap for 
clearing, a DCO becomes the new counterparty to each of the original 
counterparties and guarantees performance on the contract. Moreover, 
DCOs are independent third parties that are subject to regulatory 
oversight--including, among other things, financial resources 
requirements and risk management requirements. Accordingly, from the 
perspective of market participants, DCOs pose significantly less 
counterparty credit risk than their original counterparties.

[[Page 71231]]

    DCOs have demonstrated resilience in the face of past market 
stress. DCOs remained financially sound and effectively settled 
positions in the midst of turbulent financial conditions in 2007-2008 
that threatened the financial health and stability of many other types 
of entities.
    The Commission believes that central clearing through DCOs will 
continue to mitigate systemic risk because DCOs have numerous risk 
management tools available that are effective in monitoring and 
managing counterparty credit risk. These tools include the contractual 
right to: (1) Collect initial and variation margin associated with 
outstanding swap positions; (2) mark positions to market regularly, 
usually multiple times per day, and issue margin calls whenever the 
margin in a clearing member's or customer's account has dropped below 
predetermined levels set by the DCO; (3) adjust the amount of margin 
that is required to be held against swap positions in light of changing 
market circumstances, such as increased volatility in the underlying 
product; and (4) close out the swap positions of a clearing member or 
customer that does not meet margin calls within a specified period of 
time.
    Moreover, in the event that a clearing member defaults on its 
obligations to the DCO, the DCO has numerous remedies available to 
manage risk, including transferring the swap positions of the defaulted 
member to another clearing member, and covering any losses that may 
have accrued with the defaulting member's margin on deposit. In order 
to transfer the swap positions of a defaulting member and manage the 
risk of those positions, the DCO has the ability to take a number of 
steps, including: (1) Hedge the portfolio of positions of the 
defaulting member to limit future losses; (2) partition the portfolio 
into smaller pieces; and (3) auction off the pieces of the portfolio, 
together with their corresponding hedges, to other members of the DCO. 
In order to cover the losses associated with such a default, the DCO 
would typically draw from: (1) The initial margin posted by the 
defaulting member; (2) the guaranty fund contribution of the defaulting 
member; (3) the DCO's own capital contribution; (4) the guaranty fund 
contributions of non-defaulting members; and (5) an assessment on the 
non-defaulting members. These mutualized risk mitigation capabilities 
are largely unique to clearinghouses and help to ensure that they 
remain solvent and creditworthy swap counterparties even when clearing 
members default or there are stressed market circumstances.
ii. The Clearing Requirement and Role of the Commission
    With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress gave the 
Commission the responsibility for determining which swaps would be 
required to be cleared pursuant to section 2(h)(1)(A) of the CEA. 
Therefore, the costs and benefits associated with a clearing 
requirement are attributable to both the CEA, as amended by the Dodd-
Frank Act, and the Commission acting in accordance with the CEA. As a 
result, it is difficult to distinguish between the costs associated 
with the Dodd-Frank Act itself, and the costs associated with the 
Commission exercising the authority granted to it by the Dodd-Frank 
Act.
    There also is evidence that the interest rate swaps market has been 
migrating into clearing for many years in response to market 
incentives, in anticipation of the Dodd-Frank Act's clearing 
requirement, and as a result of the First Clearing Requirement 
Determination. This shift can be seen in the volumes of interest rate 
swaps currently being cleared by CME and LCH, the two DCOs that 
submitted a significant portion of the information contained in the 
NPRM as well as this determination. The open notional value of interest 
rate swaps cleared at CME has increased from approximately $2.2 
trillion to over $5.5 trillion between June 10, 2013 and September 10, 
2013, two implementation dates for the First Clearing Requirement 
Determination.\178\ Because the volume of interest rate swaps being 
cleared also has increased voluntarily, it is impossible to precisely 
determine the extent to which any increased use of clearing would 
result from statutory or regulatory requirements, as compared to the 
desire of swap market participants to clear swaps for the risk-
mitigating benefits.\179\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \178\ See CME Group comment letter of Sept. 16, 2013 in response 
the Commission's notice of proposed rulemaking concerning DCOs and 
International Standards, 78 FR 50260 (Aug. 16, 2013). The CME Group 
comment letter is available on the Commission's Web site at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/CommentList.aspx?id=1391.
    \179\ It is also possible that some market participants would 
respond to the rule's requirement that certain interest rate swaps 
be cleared by decreasing their use of such swaps. This possibility 
contributes to the uncertainty regarding how the determination will 
affect the quantity of swaps that are cleared.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For these reasons, the Commission has determined that the costs and 
benefits related to the required clearing of the interest rate swaps 
subject to this rulemaking are attributable, in part to (1) Congress's 
stated goal of reducing systemic risk by, among other things, requiring 
clearing of swaps and (2) the Commission's exercise of its discretion 
in selecting swaps or classes of swaps to achieve those ends. The 
Commission will discuss the costs and benefits of the overall move from 
voluntary clearing to required clearing for the swaps subject to this 
rulemaking below.
    In the NPRM, the Commission requested comment concerning its 
assumption that a shift towards clearing may be due to the Dodd-Frank 
Act's general clearing requirement or other motivations including 
independent business reasons and incentives from other regulators, such 
as prudential authorities. While no commenter answered this question 
directly, Citadel suggested that a shift towards clearing may be due to 
cost savings attributable to clearing swaps at central 
counterparties.\180\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \180\ According to Citadel's description of academic research, 
``the implementation of the Commission's clearing and trading 
reforms in the USD interest rate swap market led to a significant 
improvement in liquidity and a significant reduction in execution 
costs.'' (citations omitted). This comment from Citadel also is 
discussed in the Commission's analysis of the fourth factor under 
section 2(h)(2)(D) in section II.B.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Consideration of the Costs and Benefits of the Commission's Action

i. CEA Section 15(a)
    Section 15(a) of the CEA requires the Commission to consider the 
costs and benefits of its actions before promulgating a regulation 
under the CEA or issuing certain orders. Section 15(a) further 
specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated in light of 
the following five broad areas of market and public concern: (1) 
Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency, 
competitiveness and financial integrity; (3) price discovery; (4) sound 
risk management practices; and (5) other public interest considerations 
(collectively referred to herein as the Section 15(a) Factors). 
Accordingly, the Commission considers the costs and benefits associated 
with the clearing requirement determination in light of the Section 
15(a) Factors.
    The Commission notes that the consideration of costs and benefits 
below is based on the understanding that the markets function 
internationally, with many transactions involving U.S. firms taking 
place across international boundaries; with some Commission registrants 
being organized outside of the United States; with industry members 
typically conducting operations both within and outside the United 
States; and with industry members commonly following substantially 
similar business practices wherever located. Where the

[[Page 71232]]

Commission does not specifically refer to matters of location, the 
below discussion of costs and benefits refers to the effects of the 
final rules on all activity subject to the amended regulations, whether 
by virtue of the activity's physical location in the United States or 
by virtue of the activity's connection with or effect on U.S. commerce 
under section 2(i) of the CEA.
    As stated above, the Commission received 10 comment letters 
following publication of the NPRM, seven of which supported the 
proposed determination. Some commenters generally addressed the costs 
and benefits of the current rule.
    In the sections that follow, the Commission considers: (1) The 
costs and benefits of required clearing for the swaps subject to this 
clearing requirement determination; (2) the alternatives contemplated 
by the Commission and their costs and benefits; and (3) the impact of 
required clearing for the swaps subject to this final rulemaking and 
listed in expanded regulation 50.4(a) in light of the Section 15(a) 
Factors.
ii. Costs and Benefits of Required Clearing Under the Final Rule
    Market participants may incur certain costs in order to clear the 
interest rate swaps included in this adopting release. For example, 
market participants that are not already clearing interest rate swaps 
either voluntarily or pursuant to the First Clearing Requirement 
Determination may incur certain startup and ongoing costs related to 
developing technology and infrastructure, updating or creating new 
legal agreements, service provider fees, and collateralization of the 
cleared positions. The per-entity costs described above are likely to 
vary widely depending on the needs of each market participant. Such 
costs likely will be lower for the market participants that have 
experience clearing the interest rate swaps covered by the First 
Clearing Requirement Determination and/or that have been clearing the 
interest rate swaps subject to this clearing requirement determination 
on a voluntary basis. The opposite likely would be true for market 
participants that must begin clearing because of this expanded 
determination. Although these market participants may have otherwise 
incurred costs associated with margining their uncleared swaps with 
bilateral counterparties, as well as incurring other costs associated 
with bilateral uncleared swaps, such as startup or ongoing costs 
related to developing technology and infrastructure, and updating or 
creating new legal agreements related to their uncleared swaps 
positions. Moreover, operational costs for these market participants 
would increase based on the number of different counterparties with 
whom they enter into uncleared swaps. The overall costs of 
collateralization are likely to vary depending on whether or not an 
entity is subject to the new margin requirements for uncleared 
swaps,\181\ whether or not an entity is subject to capital 
requirements, and the differential between the cost of capital for the 
assets they use as collateral, and the returns realized on those 
assets.
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    \181\ The Commission's margin requirements for uncleared swaps 
are codified in subpart E of part 23 of the Commission's 
regulations. The prudential regulators also established minimum 
margin and capital requirements for certain registered SDs, MSPs, 
security-based swap dealers, and major security-based swap 
participants in November 2015.
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    Market participants that would begin clearing the interest rate 
swaps subject to this rulemaking also will obtain the benefits 
associated with clearing. These benefits include reduced and 
standardized counterparty risk, increased transparency, and easier 
access to the swap markets. Together, these benefits will contribute 
significantly to the stability and efficiency of the financial system. 
However, these benefits are difficult to quantify with any degree of 
precision, and market participants already clearing these swaps already 
realize the benefits of clearing.
    In the NPRM, the Commission requested comment concerning the costs 
of clearing, including from both U.S. and non-U.S. swap counterparties 
that may be affected by the determination. The Commission also 
requested comment as to the benefits that market participants could 
realize as a result of the proposed rule. JBA generally commented that 
it was opposed to the proposed determination because rising costs 
incurred by clearing brokers, due to capital leverage requirements, for 
example, have decreased the number of available clearing brokers.\182\ 
By contrast, as mentioned above, Citadel suggested that the clearing 
requirement would create cost savings for market participants because 
central clearing, together with execution of swaps on SEFs, has brought 
down costs significantly.\183\
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    \182\ See discussion of JBA's comment in section II.A. In its 
comment letter, CME Group also generally expressed concern about 
participants being able to access cleared markets in light of 
capital considerations arising from the calculation of leverage 
ratio.
    \183\ See discussion of Citadel's comment letter in sections 
II.B.iii.d and V.B.
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a. Technology, Infrastructure, and Legal Costs
    Market participants already clearing their swaps may incur costs in 
making necessary changes to technology systems to support the clearing 
required by the final rule. Market participants that are not currently 
clearing swaps may incur costs if they need to implement middleware 
technology to connect to FCMs that will clear their transactions. 
Similarly, legal costs will vary depending on the extent to which a 
market participant is already clearing swaps. The Commission does not 
have the information necessary to determine either the costs associated 
with entities that need to establish relationships with one or more 
FCMs or the costs associated with entities that already have 
relationships with one or more FCMs but need to revise their 
agreements.\184\ The costs are likely to depend on the specific 
business needs of each entity and would therefore vary widely among 
market participants. As a general matter, the Commission would expect 
that most market participants already will have undertaken the steps 
necessary to accommodate the clearing of required swaps based on the 
First Clearing Requirement Determination and that the burden associated 
with these additional interest rate swaps should be lessened.
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    \184\ The Commission does not have current information regarding 
such fees. In the NPRM and in the First Clearing Requirement 
Determination (77 FR 74284 at 74324), the Commission noted that it 
had been estimated that it would cost smaller financial institutions 
between $2,500 and $25,000 to review and negotiate legal agreements 
to establish a new business relationship with an FCM (citing comment 
letters from Chatham Financial and Webster Bank submitted to the 
Commission in 2012 in response to the Commission's request for 
comment concerning the cost benefit analysis regarding a potential 
clearing exception for certain small financial institutions under 
the end-user exception, available at: https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58077 and https://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58076). The 
Commission received no new information from commenters regarding the 
costs of establishing a clearing relationship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the NPRM, the Commission requested comment, including any 
quantifiable data and analysis, on the changes that market participants 
will have to make to their technological and legal infrastructures in 
order to clear the interest rate swaps that would be subject to the 
expanded clearing requirement. JBA commented that swap market 
participants may incur costs as a result of having to become a clearing 
member of a new DCO, or enter into a new client clearing relationship 
with a DCO clearing member, if there is only one DCO offering to clear 
a particular swap

[[Page 71233]]

subject to the determination, and the swap market participant is not 
already a clearing member, or customer of a clearing member, of that 
DCO.\185\ As the Commission noted above, in light of the fact that 
there are three swaps covered by the determination that are currently 
offered for clearing by only one DCO (MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps, currently offered for clearing only at CME; and 
AUD- and CAD-denominated OIS, currently offered for clearing only at 
LCH), and LCH and CME have indicated that they intend to begin offering 
to clear each of these swaps, respectively, before the end of 2016, the 
Commission believes that JBA's concerns about a swap market participant 
having to establish a new clearing arrangement even if the participant 
already has a clearing arrangement in place at CME or LCH will be 
largely addressed.\186\ Moreover, Citadel commented that swap market 
participants generally prefer to clear swaps at one DCO instead of at 
multiple DCOs in order to reduce costs by maximizing netting, 
compression, and margin offsets.\187\
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    \185\ See also discussion of JBA's comment in the Commission's 
analysis of the fourth factor under section 2(h)(2)(D) in section 
II.B.iii.
    \186\ Id.
    \187\ See also discussion of Citadel's comment in the 
Commission's analysis of the fourth factor under section 2(h)(2)(D) 
in section II.B.iii.
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b. Ongoing Costs Related to FCMs and Other Service Providers
    In addition to costs associated with technological and legal 
infrastructures, market participants transacting in swaps subject to 
the expanded clearing requirement will face ongoing costs associated 
with fees charged by FCMs. DCOs typically charge each FCM an initial 
transaction fee for each cleared interest rate swap its customers 
enter, as well as an annual maintenance fee for each open position. 
CME, LCH, Eurex, and SGX offer a variety of fee schedules for clearing 
interest rate swaps. In general, the schedules depend on the length of 
a swap's term, the number of swaps cleared per year, and/or a clearing 
member's initial margin requirement at the DCO. For example, at LCH and 
Eurex, different fee schedules are available depending on whether a 
clearing member is clearing for its proprietary account or for a 
customer account.\188\ In the case of customer clearing, fees are 
generally charged to the clearing member, not the customer.
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    \188\ LCH and Eurex their fees schedules on their Web sites, 
available at: https://www.lch.com/asset-classes/otc-interest-rate-derivatives/fees and https://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-en/markets-services/eurex-otc-clear/about-eurex-otc-clear.
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    The Commission understands that FCMs generally pass onto their 
customers the fees that they have been charged by the DCO. In addition, 
as noted in the NPRM, the Commission understands that customers that 
occasionally transact in swaps are typically required by their FCMs to 
pay a monthly or annual fee to each FCM.\189\
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    \189\ The Commission does not have current information regarding 
such fees. In the NPRM and in the First Clearing Requirement 
Determination (77 FR 74284 at 74325), the Commission noted that 
customers that occasionally transact in swaps are typically required 
to pay a monthly or annual fee to each FCM that ranges from $75,000 
to $125,000 per year (citing comment letters from Chatham Financial 
and Webster Bank). The Commission received no new information from 
commenters regarding these costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As discussed above, it is difficult to predict precisely how the 
requirement to clear the additional swaps covered by this final 
rulemaking will increase the use of swap clearing, as compared to the 
use of clearing that would occur in the absence of the requirement. The 
Commission expects that the expanded clearing requirement generally 
will increase the use of clearing, leading in most cases to an 
incremental increase in the clearing fees noted above. However, while 
total clearing fees may increase, it may nonetheless be the case that 
total costs come down due to offsetting benefits. For instance, market 
competition could cause swap prices to decrease, and market 
participants may realize benefits due to netting, compression, offsets, 
and portfolio margining. The Commission expects that most market 
participants already will have undertaken the steps necessary to 
accommodate the clearing of required swaps, and that the burden 
associated with the additional interest rate swaps should be lessened.
    In response to the NPRM, Citadel commented that fees charged by 
FCMs, rather than fees charged by DCOs, are the major source of 
clearing costs.\190\ Moreover, according to Citadel, the fees charged 
by FCMs depend primarily on the portfolio the customer wishes to clear 
rather than on the number of DCOs offering to clear a particular swap. 
Citadel also commented that the clearing requirement could lead a DCO 
or FCM to expand its clearing offerings because of the increased 
clearing volumes that may result from the clearing requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \190\ FCMs provide their customers with access to DCOs in their 
capacity as DCO-clearing members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, CME Group generally expressed concern about market 
participants being able to access clearinghouses due to the general 
reduction in clearing members' ``appetite to provide clearing services 
for smaller firms.'' CME Group referenced an ESMA consultation paper 
proposing a postponement of the implementation of its clearing mandate 
on such smaller market participants. The Commission is aware that ESMA 
released a consultation paper on July 13, 2016, requesting comments on 
a proposal to extend the phase-in period for the clearing obligation 
for counterparties in a third category under the European Union's 
clearing regime.\191\ ESMA acknowledges that the participant scope of 
Europe's clearing obligation regulation is different than in most other 
jurisdictions because the underlying legislation (EMIR) does not 
contain the same types of exemptions from mandatory clearing for 
counterparties with limited activity.\192\
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    \191\ See Consultation Paper: On the clearing obligation for 
financial counterparties with a limited volume of activity, Jul. 13, 
2016, available at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/consultations/consultation-clearing-obligation-financial-counterparties-limited-volume.
    \192\ Id. at 9.
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    The Commission's statutory authority under Dodd-Frank contains 
certain enumerated exceptions and exemptions from the clearing 
requirement.\193\ In light of the fact that there are counterparties 
that qualify for an exception or exemption from the CFTC's clearing 
requirement, the Commission does not face the same policy 
considerations as its European counterparts with regard to certain 
entities under EMIR.\194\ As noted above, in response to CME Group's 
comment, the Commission reiterates, that any market participant may 
petition for relief under Commission regulation 140.99 if the entity is 
unable to find an FCM to clear its swaps or if it needs additional time 
to complete requisite documentation.\195\
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    \193\ See Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA and subpart C of part 50 of 
the Commission's regulations.
    \194\ In particular, ESMA's consultation focuses on financial 
counterparties, and certain investment funds that qualify as non-
financial counterparties, that satisfy the threshold level of 
derivatives activity (e.g., a gross notional value of EUR 3 billion 
for interest rate derivatives contracts) but have an outstanding 
gross notional amount of derivatives below EUR 8 billion for a 
particular point in time.
    \195\ First Clearing Requirement Determination, 77 FR at 74320.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Costs Related to Collateralization of Cleared Swap Positions
    Market participants that enter into the interest rate swaps subject 
to the amended rule will be required to post initial margin at a DCO. 
The Commission understands that some of the swaps subject to this 
rulemaking are currently being cleared on a voluntary

[[Page 71234]]

basis.\196\ In the NPRM, the Commission published the following 
estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \196\ See Clarus Newsletter by Chris Barnes (June 14, 2016) 
available at: https://www.clarusft.com/the-cftcs-new-clearing-mandate-2016/ (discussing the NPRM, its data, and the percentage of 
the interest rate swap market already cleared on a voluntary basis).

 Table 17--Part 45 Data--Estimated Percentages of the Interest Rate Swap
                       Market Cleared Voluntarily
                       [Second Quarter 2015] \197\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                         Percentage of
                       Product                           market cleared
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 65
CAD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 72
CHF-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 83
HKD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 49
MXN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 25
NOK-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 40
PLN-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 66
SEK-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 45
SGD-denominated fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.                 24
AUD-denominated basis swap...........................                 28
NOK-denominated FRA..................................                 94
PLN-denominated FRA..................................                 32
SEK-denominated FRA..................................                 25
EUR-denominated OIS (2-3 year term)..................                100
GBP-denominated OIS (2-3 year term)..................                100
USD-denominated OIS (2-3 year term)..................                100
AUD-denominated OIS..................................                 18
CAD-denominated OIS..................................                 88
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With information provided by CME, LCH, and SGX,\198\ the Commission 
has estimated the amounts of initial margin currently on deposit at 
these three DCOs allocable to the interest rate swaps subject to this 
rulemaking. Using this information, the Commission estimated in the 
NPRM that this clearing requirement determination would require market 
participants to post the following amounts of additional initial margin 
with DCOs for each of the interest rate swaps covered by this 
determination.\199\ The amounts in Table 18 below do not, however, 
account for any additional margin market participants would post to 
their bilateral counterparties under the new rules for uncleared swap 
margin.
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    \197\ The Commission used part 45 Data to make these estimates 
based on swap activity occurring during the second quarter of 2015. 
Like the part 43 Data referenced above, part 45 Data includes swaps 
entered into by U.S. persons as well as by certain non-U.S. persons. 
See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance 
With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292, 45368-69 (July 26, 
2013). The data set used for Table 17 does not include swaps entered 
into by affiliated counterparties. Data from the third and fourth 
quarters of 2015 were used to calculate the estimates for EUR-, GBP-
, and USD-denominated OIS with terms of two to three years. Data 
from January 2016 was used to calculate the estimates for AUD- and 
CAD-denominated OIS.
    \198\ The Commission is not including margin data from Eurex for 
purposes of this calculation because it does not affect the overall 
percentages significantly.
    \199\ The Commission made these calculations using the following 
formula:
    X/Y-X.
    X = Current value of margin on deposit at DCOs for an interest 
rate swap denominated in a particular currency.
    Y = Percentage of the market for that swap that is currently 
cleared. This same methodology was used in the First Clearing 
Requirement Determination as a rough proxy for estimating the total 
costs of required clearing in terms of initial margin. As discussed 
above, commission risk surveillance staff has sophisticated tools 
for assessing risk-based margin methodologies and coverage levels.

      Table 18--Aggregate Initial Margin Due to DCOs Under Clearing
                        Requirement Determination
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Amount of margin
                         Swap                            USD equivalent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUD-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.     $1,107,287,108
CAD-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.        419,208,078
CHF-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.        105,963,972
HKD-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.        216,677,823
MXN-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.      1,867,370,001
NOK-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.        241,288,835
PLN-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.         84,789,768
SEK-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.        603,185,677
SGD-denominated Fixed-to-floating interest rate swap.      1,113,041,264
AUD-denominated basis swap...........................        612,166,597
NOK-denominated FRA..................................         10,746,747
PLN-denominated FRA..................................        186,238,075
SEK-denominated FRA..................................        942,845,508
EUR-denominated OIS (2-3 year term)..................                  0
GBP-denominated OIS (2-3 year term)..................                  0
USD-denominated OIS (2-3 year term)..................                  0
AUD-denominated OIS..................................         84,254,007

[[Page 71235]]

 
CAD-denominated OIS..................................          6,630,342
                                                      ------------------
    Total............................................      7,601,693,801
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted in the NPRM, the Commission believes that these estimates 
may be higher than the actual amounts of initial margin that would need 
to be posted as a result of this determination because these estimates 
are based on several assumptions. First, the estimates assume that none 
of the swaps that are currently executed on an uncleared basis are 
currently collateralized. By contrast, an ISDA survey reported that as 
of December 31, 2014, 88.9% of all uncleared fixed income derivative 
transactions are subject to a credit support annex.\200\ Moreover, 
uncleared swaps between certain SDs, MSPs, and ``financial end-users,'' 
will be subject to initial and variation margin requirements pursuant 
to the Commission's and the prudential regulators' margin regulations 
for uncleared swaps, as discussed further below.\201\ Second, the 
estimates listed in Table 18 are based on the assumption that none of 
the swaps, when entered into on an uncleared basis, are priced to 
include implicit contingent liabilities and counterparty risk borne by 
the counterparty to the swap. Third, not all swaps having the 
additional denominations or maturities adopted herein will necessarily 
be eligible for clearing if they are not otherwise covered by the 
clearing requirement (i.e., the specifications set forth in revised 
regulation 50.4(a)) or if the swaps have terms that prevent them from 
being cleared. Finally, certain entities may elect an exception or 
exemption from the clearing requirement, which would not require such 
an entity to clear the swaps covered by this determination.\202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \200\ See ISDA Margin Survey 2015 at page 12, Table 6, available 
at: https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/margin-surveys/. Although it is unclear exactly how many of the derivatives 
covered by this survey are swaps, it is reasonable to assume that a 
large part of them are.
    \201\ Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers 
and Major Swap Participants, 81 FR 636 (Jan. 6, 2016) and Margin and 
Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 FR 74840 (Nov. 
30, 2015) (together the ``uncleared swap margin regulations'').
    \202\ See Subpart C of part 50 (Exceptions and Exemptions to the 
Clearing Requirement). There also is a possibility that the 
estimates listed in Table 18 are lower than the actual figures 
because certain market participants with directional portfolios may 
be unable to benefit from margin offsets that could come from 
clearing. However, the Commission believes that the estimates listed 
in Table 18 are more likely to overstate the required additional 
margin amounts than to underestimate them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The amounts of initial margin that the Commission estimates would 
be required to be posted due to this rule (listed in Table 18) do not 
include the costs that some market participants may incur to obtain 
this collateral. Some entities may have to raise funds to acquire 
assets that a DCO accepts as initial margin. The greater the funding 
cost relative to the rate of return on the asset used as initial 
margin, the greater the cost of procuring this asset. Quantifying this 
cost with any precision is challenging because different entities may 
have different funding costs and may choose assets with different rates 
of return. Moreover, funding costs will vary as interest rates and 
interest rate spreads vary. One way to estimate the funding cost of 
procuring assets to be used as initial margin is to compare the rate of 
return, or yield, on an asset that is usually accepted by a DCO for 
initial margin with the cost of funding the asset with debt financing. 
Based on the Commission's experience and understanding, the Commission 
has decided to estimate this cost using an average borrowing cost of 
3.35% \203\ and then subtracting the 1.14% return that a 5-year U.S. 
Treasury bond yields.\204\ This calculation produces an estimated 
funding cost of 2.21%. By multiplying the total estimated initial 
margin amount of $7,601,693,801 (Table 18) by 2.21%, the Commission 
estimates that the cost of funding the total initial margin that will 
be required to be posted due to this rule is approximately 
$167,997,433. It also should be noted that some entities, such as 
pension funds and asset managers, may use as initial margin assets that 
they already own. In these cases, the market participants would not 
incur a funding cost in order to post initial margin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ Bank of America Merrill Lynch U.S. Corporate BBB effective 
yield for August 8, 2016.
    \204\ On August 8, 2016, a 5-year U.S. treasury bond yielded 
1.14%.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission received no comments in response to its question 
about the cost of funding initial margin or funding costs that market 
participants may face due to interest rates on bonds issued by a 
sovereign nation.
    The Commission recognizes further that the new initial margin 
amounts that will be required to be posted as a result of this clearing 
requirement will, for entities required to post initial margin under 
either the clearing requirement or the uncleared swap margin 
regulations, replace current bilateral market practice. The new 
uncleared swap margin regulations require SDs and MSPs to post and 
collect initial and variation margin for uncleared swaps executed with 
their counterparties that are other SDs or MSPs or are ``financial end-
users,'' subject to various conditions and limitations.\205\
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    \205\ See Subpart E of part 23 of the Commission's regulations. 
Swap clearing requirements under part 50 of the Commission's 
regulations apply to a broader scope of market participants than the 
Commission's uncleared swap margin rules. For example, under subpart 
E of part 23, a financial end-user that does not have ``material 
swaps exposure'' (as defined by regulation 23.151) is not required 
to post initial margin, but such an entity may be subject to the 
swap clearing requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission expects that the initial margin that will be 
required to be posted for a cleared swap subject to this determination 
will typically be less than the initial margin that would be required 
to be posted for uncleared swaps pursuant to the uncleared swap margin 
regulations. Whereas the initial margin requirement for cleared swaps 
must be established according to a margin period of risk of at least 
five days,\206\ under the uncleared swap margin regulations, the 
minimum initial margin requirement is generally set with a margin 
period of risk of 10-days or, under certain circumstances, less or no 
initial margin for inter-affiliate transactions.\207\ The uncleared 
swap margin regulations are being phased in

[[Page 71236]]

between September 1, 2016 and September 1, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \206\ Commission regulation 39.13(g)(2)(ii)(C).
    \207\ Commission regulations 23.154(b)(2)(i) and 23.159. See 
also Margin and Capital Requirements for Covered Swap Entities, 80 
FR 74840 (Nov. 30, 2015). For an uncleared swap, entered into by an 
SD or MSP supervised by a prudential regulator, which would be 
subject to the Commission's clearing requirement under part 50 but 
is not cleared due to the election of the exemption for a swap 
between certain affiliated entities (Commission regulation 50.52), 
the margin period of risk is at least five days. For an uncleared 
swap, entered into by an SD or MSP supervised by the Commission, no 
margin is required if the swap is exempt from the uncleared margin 
regulations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With respect to swaps that will be subject to this clearing 
requirement determination, but not subject to the uncleared swap margin 
regulations, the Commission believes that the new initial margin 
amounts that will be posted at the DCO will be a displacement of a cost 
that is currently embedded in the prices and fees for transacting the 
swaps on an uncleared and perhaps uncollateralized basis rather than a 
new cost.\208\ Entering into a swap is costly for any market 
participant because of the default risk posed by its counterparty, 
whether the counterparty is a DCO, SD, MSP, or other market 
participant. When a market participant faces the DCO, the DCO accounts 
for that counterparty credit risk by requiring collateral to be posted, 
and the cost of capital for the collateral is part of the cost that is 
necessary to maintain the swap position. When a market participant 
faces an SD or other counterparty in an uncleared swap, however, the 
uncleared swap contains an implicit line of credit upon which the 
market participant effectively draws when its swap position is out of 
the money.
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    \208\ Under part 50 of the Commission's regulations, the 
clearing requirement applies to all market participants except for 
those subject to an exception or exemption under subpart C of part 
50. Under part 23 of the Commission's regulations, the Commission's 
uncleared swap margin rules apply only to swaps between Commission-
registered SDs and/or MSPs that do not have a prudential regulator 
and to swaps between such an entity and certain ``financial end 
users.'' See Commission regulations 23.151 (definition of financial 
end users), 23.152 (collection and posting of initial margin), and 
23.153 (collection and posting of variation margin). Commission-
registered SDs and MSPs that have a prudential regulator are subject 
to uncleared swap margin rules promulgated by those authorities. 
Thus, part 50 has a broader scope than part 23. See also note 212.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Counterparties charge for this implicit line of credit in the 
spread they offer on uncollateralized, uncleared swaps. It has been 
argued that the cash flows of an uncollateralized swap (i.e., a swap 
with an implicit line of credit) are, over time, substantially 
equivalent to the cash flows of a collateralized swap with an explicit 
line of credit.\209\ And because the counterparty credit risk created 
by the implicit line of credit is the same as the counterparty risk 
that would result from an explicit line of credit provided to the same 
market participant, to a first order approximation, the charge for each 
should be the same as well.\210\ This means that the cost of capital 
for additional collateral posted as a consequence of requiring 
uncollateralized swaps to be cleared takes a cost that is implicit in 
an uncleared, uncollateralized swap and makes it explicit. This 
observation applies to capital costs associated with both initial 
margin and variation margin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See Antonio S. Mello and John E. Parsons, ``Margins, 
Liquidity, and the Cost of Hedging.'' MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research, May 2012, available at: https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/70896/2012-005.pdf?sequence=1.
    \210\ See id., Mello and Parsons state in their paper: 
``[h]edging is costly. But the real source of the cost is not the 
margin posted, but the underlying credit risk that motivates 
counterparties to demand that margin be posted.'' Id. at 12. They go 
on to demonstrate that, ``[t]o a first approximation, the cost 
charged for the non-margined swap must be equal to the cost of 
funding the margin account. This follows from the fact that the non-
margined swap just includes funding of the margin account as an 
embedded feature of the package.'' Id. at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, the rule may result in added operational costs. With 
uncleared swaps, counterparties may agree not to collect variation 
margin until certain thresholds of exposure are reached, thus reducing 
or entirely eliminating the need to exchange variation margin as 
exposure changes. DCOs, on the other hand, collect and pay variation 
margin on a daily basis and sometimes more frequently. As a 
consequence, increased required clearing may increase certain 
operational costs associated with exchanging variation margin with the 
DCO (although the exchange of variation margin may be expected to 
provide the benefit of lowering the build-up of current exposure). On 
the other hand, increased clearing also could lead to reduced 
operational costs related to valuation disputes about posted 
collateral, as parties to cleared swaps agree to post collateral that 
is less susceptible to valuation disputes.
    The rule also may result in additional costs for clearing members 
in the form of guaranty fund contributions. However, it also could 
decrease guaranty fund contributions for certain clearing members. Once 
the expanded clearing requirement takes effect, market participants 
that currently transact swaps bilaterally must either become clearing 
members of a DCO or submit such swaps for clearing through an existing 
clearing member. A market participant that becomes a direct clearing 
member must make a guaranty fund contribution, while a market 
participant that clears its swaps through a clearing member may pay 
higher fees if the clearing member passes the costs of the guaranty 
fund contribution to its customers. While not certain, the possible 
addition of new clearing members and/or new customers for existing 
clearing members may result in an increase in guaranty fund 
requirements. However, it should be noted that if (1) any new clearing 
members are not among the two clearing members used to calculate the 
guaranty fund and (2) any new customers trading through a clearing 
member do not increase the size of uncollateralized risks at either of 
the two clearing members used to calculate the guaranty fund, all else 
held constant, existing clearing members may experience a decrease in 
their guaranty fund requirement.
    In the NPRM, the Commission requested comment regarding the total 
amount of additional collateral that would be required due to the 
proposed clearing requirement. In particular, the Commission sought 
quantifiable data and analysis.\211\ No commenter addressed the 
quantitative approach laid out by the Commission in the NPRM. Nor did 
any commenter provide quantifiable data and analysis to support or 
refute such analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \211\ 81 FR at 39531.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Benefits of Clearing
    As noted above, the benefits of swap clearing are generally 
significant. The Commission believes that while the requirement to 
margin uncleared swaps in certain circumstances also will mitigate 
counterparty credit risk, such risk is mitigated further for swaps that 
are cleared through a central counterparty. Moreover, as discussed 
above, the clearing requirement under part 50 of the Commission 
regulations applies to a larger set of market participants than the 
uncleared swaps margin regulations.\212\ Thus, to the extent that the 
clearing requirement for additional interest rate swaps leads to 
increased clearing, these benefits are likely to be realized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \212\ Section II.B.iii sets forth the Commission's view that 
central clearing offers greater risk mitigation than bilateral 
margining for swaps. Included in that section was a summary of 
Citadel's comment agreeing with the Commission's view. As noted 
above, the clearing requirement applies to a broader scope of market 
participants than the Commission's uncleared swap margin rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As is the case for the costs noted above, it is impossible to 
predict the precise extent to which the use of clearing will increase 
as a result of the final rule, and therefore the benefits of the final 
rule cannot be precisely quantified. However, the Commission believes 
that the benefits of increased central clearing resulting from the rule 
will be substantial, because the additional swaps required to be 
cleared by the rule have significant volumes within the overall 
interest rate swap market.

[[Page 71237]]

    The rule's requirement that certain swaps be cleared is expected to 
increase the use of central clearing, as well as the number of swap 
market participants that will benefit from reduced counterparty credit 
risk and the other risk mitigating tools offered by central clearing 
through DCOs that are subject to CFTC regulation and supervisory 
oversight.
    As noted above, several commenters praised the Commission's 
approach to further harmonizing the Commission's swap clearing 
requirement with requirements issued by non-U.S. jurisdictions.\213\ 
Citadel commented that such harmonization would lead to the benefit of 
eliminating regulatory arbitrage. LCH Group stated that such 
harmonization would promote certainty for market participants. SIFMA 
AMG commented that such harmonization would improve the functioning of 
swaps markets and reduce operational complexity. ISDA commented that 
harmonization is crucial to effective and efficient implementation of 
all of the reforms of the derivatives markets sought by the G20. MFA 
commented that the Commission's approach to harmonizing its clearing 
requirement with those of other jurisdictions would increase 
transparency and market integrity. MFA also suggested that if the 
Commission proceeds with the expanded clearing requirement, then other 
jurisdictions will follow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \213\ See summary of these comments in section II.B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Costs and Benefits of the Commission's Action as Compared to 
Alternatives

    As noted in the NPRM, this determination is a function of both the 
market importance of these products and the fact that they already are 
widely cleared. The Commission believes the interest rate swaps subject 
to this rulemaking are appropriate to require to be cleared because 
they are widely used and already have a blueprint for clearing and risk 
management.
    Given the implementation of the Commission's First Clearing 
Requirement Determination for interest rate swaps, and the widespread 
use of central clearing for the additional products included in this 
determination, DCOs, FCMs, and market participants already have 
experience clearing the types of swaps subject to this rulemaking. The 
Commission therefore expects that DCOs and FCMs are prepared to handle 
the increases in volumes and outstanding notional amounts in these 
swaps that are likely to result from this determination. Because of the 
widespread use of these swaps and their importance to the market, and 
because these swaps are already successfully being cleared, the 
Commission has determined that certain additional interest rate swaps 
be subject to the clearing requirement.
    The Commission considered two alternative implementation scenarios. 
First, the Commission considered a scenario under which the clearing 
requirement for all swaps subject to the rulemaking would take effect 
at the same time, regardless of whether an analogous clearing 
requirement has been promulgated by an authority of a non-U.S. 
jurisdiction. The benefits associated with implementing the clearing 
requirement for all swaps subject to this rulemaking on a single date 
would include giving market participants certainty and making it easier 
for industry members to update relevant policies and procedures at one 
time.
    As a second option, the Commission considered a scenario under 
which compliance with the clearing requirement would be required upon 
the earlier of (a) the date 60 days after the effective date of an 
analogous clearing requirement that has been adopted by a regulator in 
a non-U.S. jurisdiction, provided that any such date for any swap 
covered by the final rule shall not be earlier than the date which is 
60 days after the Commission's final rule is published in the Federal 
Register, or (b) the date two years after the Commission's final rule 
is published in the Federal Register. As described in the NPRM, the 
second scenario allows the Commission to coordinate compliance dates 
with the effective dates set by non-U.S. jurisdictions in order to 
promote international harmonization of clearing requirements while 
maintaining certainty that compliance with the expanded clearing 
requirement will be required within a specific time period (i.e., all 
products subject to the determination will be subject to a clearing 
requirement no later than two years after the final rule is published).
    As discussed above, after considering comments on the two proposed 
implementation schedules, the Commission has decided to proceed with 
the second option, a schedule that is tied to the first date upon which 
any person in a non-U.S. jurisdiction is first subject to a clearing 
mandate issued by a non-U.S. jurisdiction, not including any front-
loading or back-loading requirements.\214\ Compared to the first option 
of requiring implementation of the clearing requirement for all 
products on a single date, the second option will delay implementation 
of the clearing requirement for certain products, and thus will delay 
the realization of the costs and benefits of mandatory clearing for 
these products. However, the Commission is adopting the second option 
in light of the benefits of international harmonization of clearing 
requirements on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis, including 
mitigation of regulatory arbitrage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \214\ See discussion, including summary of comments received, in 
section IV.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Section 15(a) Factors

    As noted above, the requirement to clear the fixed-to-floating 
interest rate swaps, basis swaps, FRAs, and OIS covered by this 
adopting release is expected to result in increased use of central 
clearing, although it is not feasible to quantify with certainty the 
extent of that increase. Thus, this section discusses the expected 
results from an overall increase in the use of swap clearing in terms 
of the factors set forth in section 15(a) of the CEA.
i. Protection of Market Participants and the Public
    As described above, required clearing of the interest rate swaps 
identified in this clearing requirement determination is expected to 
most likely reduce counterparty risk for market participants that clear 
those swaps because they will face the DCO rather than another market 
participant that lacks the full array of risk management tools that the 
DCO has at its disposal. This also reduces uncertainty in times of 
market stress because market participants facing a DCO are less 
concerned with the impact of such stress on the solvency of their 
counterparty for cleared trades.
    By requiring clearing of certain interest rate swaps, all of which 
are already available for clearing, the Commission expects, as it 
stated in the NPRM, that this rule will encourage a smooth transition 
by creating an opportunity for market participants to work out 
challenges related to required clearing of swaps while operating in 
familiar terrain. More specifically, the DCOs currently clearing these 
interest rate swaps, CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX, will clear an increased 
volume of swaps that they already understand and have experience 
managing. Similarly, FCMs likely will realize increased customer and 
transaction volume as a result of the requirement, but will not have to 
simultaneously learn how to operationalize clearing for the covered 
interest rate swaps. The experience of FCMs with these types of 
products also is likely to benefit any customers that are new to 
clearing, as the FCM guides

[[Page 71238]]

them through initial experiences with cleared swaps.
    In addition, uncleared swaps subject to collateral agreements can 
be the subject of valuation disputes. These valuation disputes 
sometimes require several months or longer to resolve. Potential future 
exposures can grow significantly and even beyond the amount of initial 
margin posted during that time, leaving one of the two counterparties 
exposed to counterparty credit risk. DCOs significantly reduce and 
potentially may eliminate valuation disputes for cleared swaps, as well 
as the risk that uncollateralized exposure can develop and accumulate 
during the time when such a dispute would have otherwise occurred, thus 
providing additional protection to market participants that transact in 
swaps that are required to be cleared.
    As far as costs are concerned, market participants that do not 
currently have established clearing relationships with an FCM will have 
to set up and maintain such a relationship in order to clear swaps that 
are required to be cleared. As discussed above, market participants 
that conduct a limited number of swaps per year likely will be required 
to pay monthly or annual fees that FCMs charge to maintain both the 
relationship and outstanding swap positions belonging to the customer. 
In addition, the FCM is likely to pass along fees charged by the DCO 
for establishing and maintaining open positions.\215\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \215\ See sections II.B.iii. and V.C.ii for a summary of JBA's 
comment concerning the potential costs of establishing a new 
clearing arrangement at a DCO in response to this rulemaking, and 
the Commission's response to that comment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is expected that most market participants already will have had 
experience complying with prior clearing requirements and that the 
incremental burdens associated with clearing the additional interest 
rate swaps subject to this rulemaking should be minimal, especially 
given the similarities that these products have to those already 
included within the prior clearing requirement determination and the 
fact that they are already widely cleared products.
ii. Efficiency, Competitiveness, and Financial Integrity of Swap 
Markets
    The Commission continues to expect that swap clearing will reduce 
counterparty risk in times of market stress and promote liquidity and 
efficiency during those times. Increased liquidity promotes the ability 
of market participants to limit losses by exiting positions effectively 
and efficiently when necessary in order to manage risk during a time of 
market stress.
    In addition, to the extent that positions move from facing multiple 
counterparties in the bilateral market to being cleared through a 
smaller number of clearinghouses, clearing facilitates increased 
netting. This reduces the amount of collateral that a party must post 
in margin accounts.
    As discussed above, in setting forth this new clearing requirement 
determination, the Commission took into account a number of specific 
factors that relate to the financial integrity of the swap markets. 
Specifically, the NPRM and the discussion above include an assessment 
of whether CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX, each of which currently clears 
interest rate swaps, have the rule framework, capacity, operational 
expertise and resources, and credit support infrastructure to clear 
these swaps on terms that are consistent with the material terms and 
trading conventions on which the contract is now traded. The Commission 
also considered the resources of DCOs to handle additional clearing 
during stressed and non-stressed market conditions, as well as the 
existence of reasonable legal certainty in the event of a clearing 
member or DCO insolvency.\216\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \216\ See section II.C.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In considering the efficiencies, competitiveness, and financial 
integrity of the swap markets associated with this clearing requirement 
determination, the Commission observes that the use of bilateral swaps 
generates a need for market participants to conduct due diligence on 
each potential counterparty due to concerns about counterparty credit 
risk. Requiring certain types of swaps to be centrally cleared reduces 
the number of separate counterparties for which such due diligence is 
necessary, thereby potentially contributing to the overall efficiency 
and competitiveness of the swap markets.
    In support of this reasoning, Citadel's comments suggest that 
extinguishing bilateral counterparty credit exposure and eliminating 
complex bilateral trading documentation for swaps subject to a clearing 
requirement enables market participants to access a wider range of 
execution counterparties and encourages the entry of new liquidity 
providers.\217\ As a result, when a clearing requirement is in effect, 
price competition tends to increase, execution costs for investors and 
customers tend to decrease, and overall market liquidity would 
therefore improve for the swaps subject to the clearing requirement. 
Citadel also notes that the imposition of a clearing requirement may 
create the commercial rationale for another DCO or FCM to launch or 
expand its clearing offering given the expected increase in overall 
cleared volumes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \217\ Commission regulation 39.12(b)(6) requires a DCO to 
establish rules providing that upon acceptance of a swap for 
clearing, the original swap is extinguished and replaced by an equal 
and opposite swap between the DCO and each clearing member acting as 
principal for a house trade or acting as agent for a customer trade. 
This process extinguishes counterparty credit risk between the 
original executing counterparties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In adopting this clearing requirement for interest rate swaps, the 
Commission must consider the effect on competition, including 
appropriate fees and charges applied to clearing. As discussed in more 
detail in section II.B.iii, there are a number of potential outcomes 
that may result from required clearing. Some of these outcomes may 
impose costs, such as if a DCO possessed market power and exercised 
that power in an anticompetitive manner, and some of the outcomes would 
be positive, such as if the clearing requirement facilitated a stronger 
entry opportunity for competitors.\218\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ See section II.B.iii for full discussion of comments 
related to competition issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Price Discovery
    As the Commission noted in the NPRM, central clearing, in general, 
encourages better price discovery because it eliminates the importance 
of counterparty creditworthiness in pricing swaps cleared through a 
given DCO. That is, by making the counterparty creditworthiness of all 
swaps of a certain type essentially the same, prices should reflect 
factors related to the terms of the swap, rather than the idiosyncratic 
risk posed by the entities trading it.
    As discussed in section II.C.iii.a above, CME, Eurex, LCH, and SGX 
obtain adequate pricing data for the interest rate swaps that they 
clear. Each of these DCOs establishes a rule framework for its pricing 
methodology and rigorously tests its pricing models to ensure that the 
cornerstone of its risk management regime is as sound as possible.
iv. Sound Risk Management Practices
    If a firm enters into uncleared and uncollateralized swaps to hedge 
certain positions and then the counterparty to those swaps defaults 
unexpectedly, the firm could be left with large outstanding exposures. 
Even for uncleared swaps that are subject to the new uncleared swap 
margin regulations, some counterparty credit risk remains.\219\ As

[[Page 71239]]

explained in the NPRM and as stated above, when a swap is cleared the 
DCO becomes the counterparty facing each of the two original 
participants in the swap. This standardizes and reduces counterparty 
risk for each of the two original participants. To the extent that a 
market participant's hedges comprise swaps that are required to be 
cleared, the requirement enhances the market participant's risk 
management practices by reducing its counterparty risk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \219\ For example, there is a small risk of a sudden price move 
so large that a counterparty would be unable to post sufficient 
variation margin to cover the loss, which may exceed the amount of 
initial margin posted, and could be forced into default.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, required clearing reduces the complexity of unwinding 
or transferring swap positions from large entities that default. 
Procedures for transfer of swap positions and mutualization of losses 
among DCO members are already in place, and the Commission anticipates 
that they are much more likely to function in a manner that enables 
rapid transfer of defaulted positions than legal processes that would 
surround the enforcement of bilateral contracts for uncleared 
swaps.\220\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \220\ As discussed in sections I.E.iii, II.B.iii, and V.B., 
sound risk management practices are critical for all DCOs, 
especially those offering clearing for interest rate swaps. In 
section II.B.ii, the Commission considered whether each Sec.  
39.5(b) submission under review was consistent with the core 
principles for DCOs. In particular, the Commission considered the 
DCO submissions in light of Core Principle D, which relates to risk 
management. See also section II.B.iii for a discussion of the effect 
on the mitigation of systemic risk in the interest rate swap market, 
as well as the protection of market participants during insolvency 
events at either the clearing member or DCO level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Central clearing has evolved since the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh Summit, 
when G20 leaders committed to central clearing of all standardized 
swaps. The percentage of the swap market that is centrally cleared has 
increased significantly, clearinghouses have expanded their offerings, 
and the range of banks and other financial institutions that submit 
swaps to clearinghouses has broadened. At the same time, the numbers of 
swap clearinghouses and swap clearing members has remained highly 
concentrated. This has created concerns about a concentration of credit 
and liquidity risk at clearinghouses that could have systemic 
implications.\221\ However, the Commission believes that DCOs are 
capable of risk managing the interest rate swaps subject to this 
rulemaking. Moreover, because only a very small percentage of the swap 
market will be affected by this clearing requirement determination and 
because significant percentages of the swaps covered by this 
determination are already cleared voluntarily, this clearing 
requirement determination will not significantly increase credit risk 
and liquidity risk to DCOs. The Commission requested comment on this 
issue and did not receive any comments in response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \221\ See Dietrich Domanski, Leonardo Gambacorta, and Cristina 
Picillo, ``Central clearing: Trends and current issues,'' BIS 
Quarterly Review (Dec. 2015), available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.pdf. and 2015 Financial Stability Report published 
by the Office of Financial Research of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury (Dec. 15, 2015), available at: https://financialresearch.gov/financial-stability-reports/files/OFR_2015-Financial-Stability-Report_12-15-2015.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

v. Other Public Interest Considerations
    In September 2009, the President and the other leaders of the G20 
nations met in Pittsburgh and committed to a program of action that 
includes, among other things, central clearing of all standardized 
swaps.\222\ The Commission believes that this clearing requirement will 
represent another step toward the fulfillment of the G20's commitment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \222\ The G20 Leaders Statement made in Pittsburgh is available 
at: https://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI. Related Matters

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) requires agencies to consider 
whether the rules they propose will have a significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities and, if so, provide a 
regulatory flexibility analysis respecting the impact.\223\ As stated 
in the NPRM, this clearing requirement determination will not affect 
any small entities, as the RFA uses that term.\224\ Pursuant to section 
2(e) of the CEA, only eligible contract participants (ECPs) may enter 
into swaps, unless the swap is listed on a DCM. The Commission has 
previously determined that ECPs are not small entities for purposes of 
the RFA.\225\ As stated in the NPRM, the clearing requirement 
determination will only affect ECPs because all persons that are not 
ECPs are required to execute their swaps on a DCM, and all contracts 
executed on a DCM must be cleared by a DCO, as required by statute and 
regulation, not by operation of any clearing requirement determination. 
The Commission did not receive comments on this conclusion. Therefore, 
the Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, hereby certifies pursuant to 
5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rulemaking will not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \223\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \224\ 81 FR at 39534-39535.
    \225\ 66 FR 20740, 20743 (Apr. 25, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) \226\ imposes certain 
requirements on federal agencies, including the Commission, in 
connection with conducting or sponsoring any collection of information 
as defined by the PRA. This rulemaking will not require a new 
collection of information from any persons or entities. The Commission 
did not receive any comments relating to the PRA in response to the 
NPRM.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \226\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Part 50

    Business and industry, Clearing, Swaps.

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission amends 17 CFR part 50 as follows:

PART 50--CLEARING REQUIREMENT AND RELATED RULES

0
1. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2(h) and 7a-1 as amended by Pub. L. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376.

0
2. Revise Sec.  50.4(a) to read as follows:


Sec.  50.4  Classes of swaps required to be cleared.

    (a) Interest rate swaps. Swaps that have the following 
specifications are required to be cleared under section 2(h)(1) of the 
Act, and shall be cleared pursuant to the rules of any derivatives 
clearing organization eligible to clear such swaps under Sec.  39.5(a) 
of this chapter.

[[Page 71240]]



                                                                        Table 1a
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specification                                                                  Fixed-to-floating swap class
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Currency.....................  Australian Dollar   Canadian Dollar     Euro (EUR)........  Hong Kong Dollar    Mexican Peso (MXN)  Norwegian Krone
                                   (AUD).              (CAD).                                  (HKD).                                  (NOK).
2. Floating Rate Indexes........  BBSW..............  CDOR..............  EURIBOR...........  HIBOR.............  TIIE-BANXICO......  NIBOR.
3. Stated Termination Date Range  28 days to 30       28 days to 30       28 days to 50       28 days to 10       28 days to 21       28 days to 10
                                   years.              years.              years.              years.              years.              years.
4. Optionality..................  No................  No................  No................  No................  No................  No.
5. Dual Currencies..............  No................  No................  No................  No................  No................  No.
6. Conditional Notional Amounts.  No................  No................  No................  No................  No................  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                                        Table 1b
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specification                                                                 Fixed-to-floating swap class
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Currency..................  Polish Zloty      Singapore Dollar  Swedish Krona     Swiss Franc       Sterling (GBP).  U.S. Dollar      Yen (JPY).
                                (PLN).            (SGD).            (SEK).            (CHF).                             (USD).
2. Floating Rate Indexes.....  WIBOR...........  SOR-VWAP........  STIBOR..........  LIBOR...........  LIBOR..........  LIBOR..........  LIBOR.
3. Stated Termination Date     28 days to 10     28 days to 10     28 days to 15     28 days to 30     28 days to 50    28 days to 50    28 days to 30
 Range.                         years.            years.            years.            years.            years.           years.           years.
4. Optionality...............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No.............  No.............  No.
5. Dual Currencies...........  No..............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No.............  No.............  No.
6. Conditional Notional        No..............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No.............  No.............  No.
 Amounts.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                                         Table 2
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specification                                                                          Basis swap class
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Currency........................  Australian Dollar       Euro (EUR)............  Sterling (GBP).......  U.S. Dollar (USD)....  Yen (JPY).
                                      (AUD).
2. Floating Rate Indexes...........  BBSW..................  EURIBOR...............  LIBOR................  LIBOR................  LIBOR.
3. Stated Termination Date Range...  28 days to 30 years...  28 days to 50 years...  28 days to 50 years..  28 days to 50 years..  28 days to 30 years.
4. Optionality.....................  No....................  No....................  No...................  No...................  No.
5. Dual Currencies.................  No....................  No....................  No...................  No...................  No.
6. Conditional Notional Amounts....  No....................  No....................  No...................  No...................  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                                         Table 3
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specification                                                                 Forward rate agreement class
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Currency..................  Euro (EUR)......  Polish Zloty      Norwegian Krone   Swedish Krona     Sterling (GBP).  U.S. Dollar      Yen (JPY).
                                                  (PLN).            (NOK).            (SEK).                             (USD).
2. Floating Rate Indexes.....  EURIBOR.........  WIBOR...........  NIBOR...........  STIBOR..........  LIBOR..........  LIBOR..........  LIBOR.
3. Stated Termination Date     3 days to 3       3 days to 2       3 days to 2       3 days to 3       3 days to 3      3 days to 3      3 days to 3
 Range.                         years.            years.            years.            years.            years.           years.           years.
4. Optionality...............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No.............  No.............  No.
5. Dual Currencies...........  No..............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No.............  No.............  No.
6. Conditional Notional        No..............  No..............  No..............  No..............  No.............  No.............  No.
 Amounts.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                                         Table 4
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specification                                                                     Overnight index swap class
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Currency........................  Australian Dollar       Canadian Dollar (CAD).  Euro (EUR)...........  Sterling (GBP).......  U.S. Dollar (USD).
                                      (AUD).
2. Floating Rate Indexes...........  AONIA-OIS.............  CORRA-OIS.............  EONIA................  SONIA................  FedFunds.
3. Stated Termination Date Range...  7 days to 2 years.....  7 days to 2 years.....  7 days to 3 years....  7 days to 3 years....  7 days to 3 years.
4. Optionality.....................  No....................  No....................  No...................  No...................  No.
5. Dual Currencies.................  No....................  No....................  No...................  No...................  No.
6. Conditional Notional Amounts....  No....................  No....................  No...................  No...................  No.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 71241]]

* * * * *

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 28, 2016, by the 
Commission.
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.

    Note:  The following appendices will not appear in the Code of 
Federal Regulations.

Appendices to Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act for Interest Rate Swaps--Commission Voting 
Summary and Chairman's Statement

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

    On this matter, Chairman Massad and Commissioners Bowen and 
Giancarlo voted in the affirmative. No Commissioner voted in the 
negative.

Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman Timothy G. Massad

    Central clearing is one of the great innovations of the 
financial system. Indeed, increasing the use of central clearing for 
over-the-counter swaps is one of the most important goals of the 
2009 G20 Leaders' agreement and the Dodd-Frank Act.
    Of course, central clearing does not eliminate the risk of 
transactions. But clearinghouses can monitor and mitigate that risk, 
which can make our financial system more stable.
    In just a few short years, the percentage of over-the-counter 
swaps being cleared has increased substantially. And today, I am 
very pleased that we are continuing this progress by expanding the 
Commission's swap clearing requirement to include interest rate 
swaps denominated in nine additional currencies. Our counterparts in 
the relevant non-U.S. jurisdictions have mandated, or are expected 
soon to mandate, central clearing for these products, and our 
requirements will be phased based on when the corresponding clearing 
requirements have taken effect in non-U.S. jurisdictions.
    The Commission's first clearing requirement, adopted in 2012, 
applied to interest rate swaps denominated in four currencies--U.S. 
dollar, euro, British sterling, and Japanese yen. Today, we have 
expanded the interest rate swap clearing requirement to include 
those denominated in the Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Hong 
Kong dollar, Singapore dollar, Mexican peso, Norwegian krone, Polish 
zloty, Swedish krona, and Swiss franc.
    Requiring clearing for these swaps will further reduce risk 
within our financial system. Today's determination also represents 
another important step toward cross-border harmonization of swaps 
regulations, which is critically important to creating an effective 
regulatory framework.
    This rule reflects the CFTC's close coordination with our fellow 
regulatory authorities from the various jurisdictions with whom we 
are seeking to harmonize. We also consulted and coordinated with our 
fellow financial regulators here in the United States.
    I want to thank the hardworking CFTC staff for their efforts on 
this important measure. I'd also like to thank my fellow 
Commissioners Bowen and Giancarlo for their support.

[FR Doc. 2016-23983 Filed 10-13-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6351-01-P