List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Holtec International HI-STORM 100 Cask System; Certificate of Compliance No. 1014, Amendment No. 10, 70004-70011 [2016-24466]
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used to report the financial status of an
award; however, a financial report must
contain an itemization of actual dollar
amounts expended on the project during
the reporting period (in line with the
approved budget), and cumulative totals
expended for each budget category from
the start date of the award.
(b) Financial reporting due dates:
(1) Quarterly and semi-annual reports
are due no later than 30 calendar days
after the reporting period.
(2) Annual reports are due no later
than 90 days following the end of the
award anniversary date (i.e., one year
following the month and day when the
period of performance begins, and each
year thereafter up until a final report is
required).
(c) Final financial report:
(1) Requests for extensions must be
submitted to the ADO.
(2) Regardless of Agency-provided
extensions for submission of the final
financial report, funds will not be
available for any drawdowns/payments
that exceed statutory limits, as well as
any expiring appropriations.
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§ 550.124 Technical and property reporting
requirements.
(a) Technical performance report. The
Cooperator must submit technical
performance reports at the interval
required by the REE Agency, as
identified on the Award Face Sheet, and
may submit performance reports to the
REE Agency electronically.
(1) The performance report must
follow the format of the Government
wide Research Performance Progress
Report, and must include the
information described in 2 CFR
200.328(b)(2)(i) through (iii). (2) The
final performance report covers the
entire period of performance of the
award, and must describe progress made
during the entire timeframe of the
project.
(b) Intellectual property reporting.
Reporting intellectual property resulting
from a REE Agency award will be
carried out through Interagency Edison
(iEdison). The non-Federal entity must
submit Invention Reports and
Utilization Reports, including other
relevant reports, at the iEdison web
interface: www.iedison.gov.
(c) Tangible personal property report.
Upon termination or expiration of the
award, the non-Federal entity must
identify personal property/equipment
purchased with any Federal funds
under the award on the OMB-approved
SF–428, ‘‘Tangible Personal Property
Report and Instructions.’’
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Dated: September 23, 2016.
Catherine Woteki,
Chief Scientist, USDA, Under Secretary,
Research, Education, and Economics.
[FR Doc. 2016–23884 Filed 10–7–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410–03–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 72
[NRC–2015–0270]
RIN 3150–AJ71
List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage
Casks: Holtec International HI–STORM
100 Cask System; Certificate of
Compliance No. 1014, Amendment No.
10
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Direct final rule; comment
responses.
AGENCY:
On May 31, 2016, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
confirmed the effective date of May 31,
2016, for the direct final rule that was
published in the Federal Register on
March 14, 2016. The direct final rule
amended the NRC’s spent fuel storage
regulations by revising the Holtec
International (Holtec) HI–STORM 100
Cask System listing within the ‘‘List of
approved spent fuel storage casks’’ to
include Amendment No. 10 to
Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No.
1014. The NRC confirmed the effective
date because it determined that none of
the comments submitted on the direct
final rule met any of the criteria for a
significant adverse comment. The
purpose of this document is to provide
responses to the comments received on
the direct final rule.
DATES: The comment responses are
available on October 11, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2015–0270 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information
related to this action by any of the
following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2015–0270. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
SUMMARY:
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(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert MacDougall, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–5175; email:
Robert.MacDougall@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On March 14, 2016 (81 FR 13265), the
NRC published a direct final rule
amending its regulations in § 72.214 of
title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) by revising the
Holtec HI–STORM 100 Cask System
listing within the ‘‘List of approved
spent fuel storage casks’’ to include
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014.
Amendment No. 10 adds new fuel
classes to the contents approved for the
loading of 16 × 16 class fuel assemblies
into a HI–STORM 100 Cask System;
allows a minor increase in manganese in
an alloy material for the system’s
overpack and transfer cask; clarifies the
minimum water displacement required
of a dummy fuel rod (i.e., a rod not
filled with uranium pellets); and
clarifies the design pressures needed for
normal operation of forced helium
drying systems. Additionally,
Amendment No. 10 revises Condition
No. 9 of CoC No. 1014 to provide clearer
direction on the measurement of air
velocity and modeling of heat
distribution through the storage system.
The NRC received four comment
submissions with 22 individual
comments on the companion proposed
rule (81 FR 13295; March 14, 2016).
Electronic copies of these comments can
be obtained from the Federal
Rulemaking Web site, https://
www.regulations.gov, by searching for
Docket ID NRC–2015–0270. The
comments are also available in ADAMS
under Accession Nos. ML16105A426,
ML16105A425, ML16105A424, and
ML16105A423. As explained in the
March 14, 2016, direct final rule, the
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NRC would withdraw the direct final
rule only if it received a ‘‘significant
adverse comment.’’ This is a comment
where the commenter explains why the
rule would be inappropriate, including
challenges to the rule’s underlying
premise or approach, or would be
ineffective or unacceptable without a
change. A comment is adverse and
significant if:
(1) The comment opposes the rule and
provides a reason sufficient to require a
substantive response in a notice-andcomment process. For example, a
substantive response is required when:
(a) The comment causes the NRC staff
to reevaluate (or reconsider) its position
or conduct additional analysis;
(b) The comment raises an issue
serious enough to warrant a substantive
response to clarify or complete the
record; or
(c) The comment raises a relevant
issue that was not previously addressed
or considered by the NRC staff.
(2) The comment proposes a change
or an addition to the rule, and it is
apparent that the rule would be
ineffective or unacceptable without
incorporation of the change or addition.
(3) The comment causes the NRC staff
to make a change (other than editorial)
to the rule, CoC, or Technical
Specifications (TSs).
The NRC determined that none of the
comments submitted on the direct final
rule met any of these criteria and
confirmed the effective date of May 31,
2016, for the direct final rule on May 31,
2016 (81 FR 34241). The comments
either were already addressed by the
NRC staff’s preliminary safety
evaluation report (SER) (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15331A309) for this
rulemaking, were beyond the scope of
this rulemaking, or were already
addressed in a previous rulemaking.
The NRC did not make any changes to
the direct final rule as a result of the
public comments. However, in Section
II, ‘‘Public Comment Analysis,’’ of this
document, the NRC is taking this
opportunity to respond to the comments
in an effort to clarify information about
the 10 CFR part 72 CoC rulemaking
process.
II. Public Comment Analysis
For rulemakings amending or revising
a CoC, the scope of the rulemaking is
limited to the specific changes in the
applicant’s request for the amendment
or amendment revision. Therefore,
comments about the system or spent
fuel storage in general that are not
applicable to the changes requested are
outside the scope of this rulemaking.
Comments about details of the
particular system subject to the
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rulemaking that do not address the
rulemaking’s specific proposed changes
have already been resolved in prior
rulemakings. Persons who have
concerns about prior rulemakings and
the resulting final rules may consider
the NRC’s process for petitions for
rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802.
Additionally, safety concerns about any
NRC-regulated activity may be reported
to the NRC in accordance with the
guidance posted on the NRC’s Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
regulatory/allegations/safetyconcern.html. This Web page provides
information on how to notify the NRC
of emergency or non-emergency issues.
The following paragraphs summarize
each individual comment followed by
the NRC response.
Comment 1: Noting that this is
Holtec’s tenth request to amend CoC No.
1014 for the HI–STORM 100 Cask
System, one commenter stated that
many people find this pattern
disturbing. The nine earlier
amendments and revisions to CoC No.
1014 suggest that Holtec’s overall
performance in achieving technical
accuracy has been poor, not only in the
originally-submitted TSs and quality
assurance (QA) for this cask, but in the
nine subsequent amendments and
revisions that the NRC has approved.
Because this is Holtec’s tenth
amendment, this commenter asserted
that Holtec has failed to address the full
range of the cask’s technical deficiencies
comprehensively, and appears instead
to have applied the needed QA only in
incremental steps.
NRC Response: This comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC is
providing a specific response, however,
to clarify the NRC’s process for issuing
and amending CoCs for dry storage
system (DSS) casks.
When the NRC first approves a CoC
for a particular storage cask design, the
CoC is based on a postulated generic
spent fuel design using a composite of
fuel characteristics and engineered
features of the DSS. Important fuel
characteristics include the level of the
uranium enrichment in the fuel pellets
and their burnup time in the reactor.
Fuel assembly variables include the
composition of the alloys used in the
fuel cladding and assembly hardware;
the diameter, number, and length of the
fuel rods; and the spacing between
them. These fuel characteristics and
assembly design variables affect the
overall heat load that the cask and
multipurpose canister (MPC) holding
the fuel assemblies inside the cask must
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be able to withstand, with a
conservative margin of safety, to
maintain their integrity for long-term
storage under normal, off-normal, and
accident conditions. The residual heat
and level of uranium burnup in the
spent fuel, and the spacing of the fuel
in the assemblies, in turn affect the
number of fuel assemblies that can be
loaded into the MPC, which must have
internal components tailored to
maintain the configuration of the fuel in
the canister. Burnup also affects the
composition and physical configuration
of the neutron-absorbing materials
arranged around the assemblies within
the MPC. Each of these considerations
must be evaluated with each fuel design
to ensure the long-term performance of
the overall cask system with an
adequate margin of safety.
Fuel and fuel assembly designs have
evolved since each storage cask design
was originally certified by the NRC.
Contemporary fuel assembly designs
now differ in several important respects
from the generic designs postulated for
the casks’ original CoCs. To save costs
and reduce worker exposures to
radiation, for example, many
contemporary assembly designs are
optimized for fuel with higher
enrichment levels to stay in the reactor’s
core to ‘‘burn,’’ or fission, a larger
fraction of uranium for a longer period.
This produces fewer spent fuel
assemblies per unit of power generated.
It also stretches out the time between refuelings, when workers need to remove
the reactor’s head to load new fuel
assemblies, off-load used ones, and
rearrange partially-burned assemblies to
maintain the efficiency of the overall
fuel burnup within the reactor core. To
accommodate the changes in fuel
enrichment, fuel cladding materials, and
fuel assembly materials and
configurations, a similar evolution is
continuing in MPC componentry,
including neutron-absorbing alloys and
other materials, so that casks can safely
accept evolving fuel designs.
Therefore, the nine amendments to
CoC No. 1014, like amendments to other
CoCs, each represent an NRC safety
finding about the vendor’s analysis of
proposed measures to adapt the cask to
a new fuel design for long-term storage.
The nine amendments, and the tenth
issued in May 2016, are not the product
of trial and error, nor of the incremental
application of QA, which must be
applied in a safety-graded fashion to all
aspects of cask design, fabrication,
loading, and deployment.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 2: One commenter asserted
that in the absence of actual evidence
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from operational experience or testing,
using computer models to estimate a
system’s behavior or performance has
produced ‘‘extreme failures’’ and ‘‘major
departures between [the computer
model’s] predictions and [the system’s]
actual performance.’’ These departures,
the commenter stated, resulted in a
January 2012, radiation release at San
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station’s
(SONGS) Unit 2 that eventually led to
its premature retirement.
NRC Response: This comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The commenter
does not identify an issue related to any
of the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014.
Instead, this comment is about a reactor
licensee’s computer models for the
performance of a reactor system, not the
cask vendor’s models for the
performance of the HI–STORM 100 Cask
System at issue in this rulemaking.
Different types of computer models are
typically validated using different
methods. The NRC uses industry
accepted practices to evaluate an
applicant’s computational modeling
software for storage casks in accordance
with Interim Staff Guidance SFST–ISG–
21, ‘‘Use of Computational Modeling
Software’’ (ADAMS Accession No.
ML061080669). Because Amendment
No. 10 does not involve computational
modeling for reactor systems, the
comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking.
As the commenter pointed out, there
was a radiation release to the
environment at SONGS in January 2012.
This comment too is about an issue
beyond the scope of this rulemaking.
The commenter can obtain more
information about the release, which
was well below allowable limits, in
Southern California Edison’s (SCE)
report to the NRC on the incident
(ADAMS Accession No. ML12090A153),
and a report by the NRC Office of the
Inspector General (ADAMS Accession
No. ML14276A478).
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 3: One commenter stated
that the proposed CoC amendment
pertains to the same or similar Holtec
cask as that to be installed at SONGS,
and southern California stakeholders are
‘‘extremely disappointed’’ that SONGS’
licensee, SCE, has chosen Holtec’s 5⁄8″
thin metal cask over 14″-to-20″ thick
casks that the commenter stated can be
inspected in real time to monitor the
condition of the spent fuel and measure
the depth of stress corrosion cracking.
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NRC Response: This comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The commenter
does not identify an issue related to any
of the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014,
and this rulemaking does not concern
SCE’s choice of cask products. In
addition, the NRC has not approved any
spent fuel dry storage cask design that
permits the continuous real time
inspection or monitoring of the
condition of the fuel in the cask, or the
continuous or periodic direct
measurement of the extent or depth of
stress corrosion cracking. Such
inspection, monitoring, and
measurement cannot be accomplished
without the additional worker radiation
exposures that would be necessary to
open the cask overpack and canister.
The NRC’s regulation at 10 CFR
20.1101(b), however, requires radiation
doses to workers and members of the
public to be as low as is reasonably
achievable. This makes such additional
exposures to open casks and overpacks
difficult to justify in light of the very
slow rates of degradation in the cask
system and its contents that have been
measured under realistic conditions in a
laboratory.
The commenter’s description of
Holtec’s product as a ‘‘5⁄8″ thin metal
cask,’’ however, compels a response for
clarification purposes. The comment
appears to conflate the MPC, which is
not a cask, with the entirety of the HI–
STORM dry cask storage system. The
HI–STORM 100 MPC, which has 1⁄2″
thick stainless steel walls, holds the
spent fuel assemblies and their
hardware within an overpack. The
overpack consists of outer and inner
steel walls with the annulus between
them filled with concrete. The overpack,
with 291⁄2″ thick concrete and steel
walls, provides radiation shielding and
mass for stability against such natural
phenomena as winds, floods, and
earthquakes. The MPC, an internal
component of the cask system, is not
directly exposed to these outside
phenomena.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 4: One commenter stated
that the NRC has ‘‘mostly ‘dismissed’
multiple credible public safety
concerns.’’ The commenter also noted
that SCE’s ‘‘Community Engagement
Panel’’ has failed to function as an
independent advisory panel of experts,
and instead ‘‘functions more as a
promotional extension of [SCE’s]
marketing and media platforms.’’
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NRC Response: These comments are
not within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The commenter did
not identify any of the ‘‘multiple
credible public safety concerns’’ that the
NRC is said to have dismissed. Nor did
the commenter explain how any of these
concerns pertain to any specific revision
proposed in Amendment No. 10 to CoC
No. 1014.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of these comments.
Comment 5: One commenter asserted
that many stakeholders believe that the
NRC has allowed ‘‘a utility to
improperly apply credit for performing
an ‘educational’ function’’ that has
involved, among other things,
‘‘extensive private meetings with
elected officials in adjacent
communities in San Diego and Orange
County.’’
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. In addition, the
NRC’s safety-focused mission does not
include authority to allow or prohibit a
licensee from engaging in public
relations activities, which do not
directly relate to the design, fabrication,
configuration, loading, or deployment of
the dry cask storage system at issue
here.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 6: A commenter stated that
many stakeholders are asserting that
SONGS licensee, SCE, ‘‘consistently
underestimates’’ the actual extent of
potential public safety risks associated
with its decommissioning plan.
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The SCE’s
decommissioning plan does not pertain
to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014;
nor does the comment identify any
specific potential public safety risks
pertinent to the other purposes of this
amendment.
The NRC has a safety hotline that
members of the public can use to report
any identified public safety risk, such as
may be associated with any
decommissioning action. The hotline
number is 1–800–695–7403. Note that a
call during normal business hours (7:00
a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Eastern Time) will
automatically be directed to the NRC
Regional Office for the caller’s
geographical area. If the call is placed
after normal business hours, or can’t be
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answered by the Regional Office during
its normal business hours, the call will
be directed to the NRC’s Headquarters
Operations Center, which is staffed 24
hours a day and has a recorded
telephone line.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 7: A commenter stated that
the licensee expecting to acquire the
Holtec casks subject to Amendment No.
10 for spent fuel storage at SONGS has
‘‘severely overestimated performance
capabilities of equipment, components
and parts, defense in depth, operator
training, emergency response capability,
system reliability, cost containment, and
technical capability to safely implement
Aging Management Programs.’’
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. As noted in the
response to Comment 6, the NRC has a
safety hotline that members of the
public can use to report any identified
public safety risk.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 8: Noting the ‘‘large
inventory’’ of high-burnup fuel (HBF) in
storage at SONGS, a commenter stated
that stakeholders have ‘‘extreme safety
concerns’’ about the accuracy of the
predicted service life of the Holtec
underground maximum capacity
(UMAX) casks containing HBF, which
typically has higher heat loads and
radiation levels. Among these concerns,
the commenter explained, are ‘‘thermal
tolerance variability, measurement of air
velocity, modeling of heat load
distribution, performance capability and
integrity of fuel cladding.’’
This commenter also stated that with
the applicant’s proposed changes in the
composition of alloy material in MPC
componentry, stakeholders have
concerns about the accuracy of
predicted helium pressure limits for the
MPC in underground installations
where closed loop forced helium
dehydration (FHD) is mandatory for
drying MPCs with one or more HBF
assemblies or a higher heat load.
NRC Response: The comment about
HBF storage at SONGS is not within the
scope of this rulemaking, which is
limited to the specific revisions
proposed in Amendment No. 10 to CoC
No. 1014. None of these revisions
included a change in spent fuel burnup
specifications. The comment is about
the HI–STORM UMAX Canister Storage
system, which was authorized
generically for underground
emplacement under CoC No. 1040 and
approved on March 6, 2015 (80 FR
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12073). The SONGS will be utilizing
cask systems specified by Amendment
No. 1 to CoC No. 1040, not Amendment
No. 10 to CoC No. 1014.
The commenter also expressed
concerns about the accuracy of
predicted helium pressure limits for the
MPC where closed loop forced FHD is
mandatory for drying MPCs with one or
more HBF assemblies or a higher heat
load. The comment does not explain the
basis for the commenter’s concern about
the predicted pressure limit for drying.
This limit was established to provide an
ample safety margin against both
inadequate pressure for thorough drying
and excessive pressure that could result
in damage to the spent fuel or other
hardware. To maintain this margin,
helium pressure limits are controlled
during FHD operations at all times.
During FHD drying, the MPC’s inlet
(drain port) and exit (vent port) each
have calibrated pressure-indicating
devices that show inlet and outlet
pressure during drying operations.
Trained operators use the helium
regulator in accordance with the site’s
procedures to ensure that the 75-psi
limit is not exceeded.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 9: One stakeholder stated
that despite Holtec’s unproven
assurances about the performance
capabilities of its casks, a 2015 Sandia
National Laboratory report contained
evidence that similar thin-metal casks
had through-wall cracks in only 5 years.
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The Sandia
National Laboratory report referred to by
the commenter was for a set of design
specifications for a Standardized
Transportation, Aging, and Disposal
(STAD) canister for eventual
emplacement in a geologic repository
(ADAMS Accession No. ML16132A321).
The NRC could find nothing in this
report to support the commenter’s
assertion that it ‘‘contained evidence
that similar thin metal casks had
through-wall cracks in only 5 years.’’
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 10: As evidence that Holtec
casks are ‘‘an inferior choice’’ for spent
fuel storage, one commenter, speaking
for ‘‘stakeholders in California,’’ referred
the NRC to the Web site
‘‘sanonofresafety.org.’’
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014 and does not
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concern SCE’s choice of cask products.
Beyond the issue of SCE’s choice, if the
commenter has concerns about prior
spent fuel storage cask rulemakings, or
other issues beyond the scope of this
rulemaking that make Holtec casks ‘‘an
inferior choice,’’ the commenter may
consider the NRC’s process for petitions
for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802.
Additionally, safety concerns about any
NRC-regulated activity may be reported
to the NRC in accordance with the
guidance posted on the NRC’s Web site
at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/
regulatory/allegations/safetyconcern.html. This Web page provides
information on how to notify the NRC
of emergency or non-emergency issues.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 11: One commenter
criticized the NRC for giving in to
Holtec’s corporate lawyers and failing to
hold the company responsible for
‘‘creating inadequate safety measures
within this [cask] design.’’ The
commenter exhorted the NRC to ‘‘stop
paying for fraud’’ and force Holtec to
‘‘spend [its] own treasure . . ., not tax
dollars,’’ to fix the problem.
NRC Response: This comment does
not provide sufficient information to
identify the ‘‘inadequate safety
measures’’ in the Holtec cask’s design
that the commenter has in mind. With
respect to the concern regarding
payment for the NRC’s review and
oversight, these functions are not
performed at taxpayers’ expense. The
vendor, in this case Holtec, pays for the
NRC’s evaluation of the application, as
the NRC bills the vendor for the review.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 12: A commenter expressed
concern that in permitting a cask system
to accept additional classes of spent
fuel, the NRC does not decrease the
ability of these storage systems to
contain the fuel under adverse
conditions. The commenter wanted to
know whether current requirements for
the durability of spent fuel storage
systems are sufficient to contain these
additional fuels, whatever they may be,
in the event of a disaster.
NRC Response: The general issue of
the durability of spent fuel storage
systems to contain additional types of
spent fuel in the event of a disaster is
not within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC is
addressing the commenter’s concern,
however, for educational and
clarification purposes.
The NRC addressed a similar
comment about the ability of HI–
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STORM UMAX Canister Storage
Systems to withstand seismic events
during the CoC No. 1040 certification
rulemaking. It should be noted that the
certification provided by approval of the
HI–STORM 100 Cask System does not,
in and of itself, authorize the use of this
system at any specific site. Under 10
CFR 72.212(b)(5), before applying the
changes authorized by an amended CoC
and loading a cask, a general licensee
wishing to use this cask system must
perform written evaluations in
accordance with 10 CFR 72.212 to
establish, among other things, that:
• Cask storage pads and areas have
been designed to adequately support the
static and dynamic loads of the stored
casks, considering potential
amplification of earthquakes through
soil-structure interaction, and soil
liquefaction potential or other soil
instability due to vibratory ground
motion; and
• The independent spent fuel storage
installation at the reactor site where the
casks will be located will meet the
requirements of 10 CFR 72.104 to ensure
that radiation doses beyond the reactor’s
controlled area do not exceed 0.25 mSv
(25 mrem) to the whole body, 0.75 mSv
(75 mrem) to the thyroid, and 0.25 mSv
(25 mrem) to any other critical organ,
and are further controlled to a level as
low as is reasonably achievable.
The seismic design levels of the HI–
STORM 100 Cask System CoC are
acceptable for most areas in the
continental United States. For locations
with potential for seismic activity
beyond those analyzed for this system,
additional NRC evaluations and
certifications may be required before the
system may be used in those locations.
Similarly, although the design levels
of the HI–STORM 100 Cask System CoC
for flooding are also acceptable for most
areas in the continental United States—
again depending on site-specific
analyses—the NRC staff previously
evaluated the impacts of flooding during
the review of the initial certification for
the HI–STORM Flood/Wind (FW)
System. In its March 28, 2011, SER for
the initial certification of the HI–
STORM FW MPC Storage System (see
Sections 4.8.2 and 7.3.1 of ADAMS
Accession No. ML103020151), the NRC
staff considered both full and partial
flooding for both the vertical and
horizontal positions for the MPC. The
NRC staff found that the fully flooded
condition would produce the highest
reactivity in the spent fuel, and that the
fully flooded model for safety
evaluations ‘‘is acceptable and
applicable to all of the assembly
configurations that are to be stored in
the HI–STORM FW MPC Storage
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system,’’ including damaged fuel
configurations. In its March 28, 2011,
SER, the NRC staff also noted the
system’s design measures to limit the
rise in fuel cladding temperature under
the most adverse flood event (one with
a water level just high enough to block
the MPC overpack’s air convection inlet
duct). The changes requested in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014 do
not affect the NRC’s prior flooding
evaluation for the initial certification of
this system.
In addition, under 10 CFR
72.212(b)(6), before using the general
license, the reactor licensee must review
the Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
referenced in the CoC or amended CoC
and the NRC’s SER evaluating the SAR
to determine whether the reactor site
parameters, including analyses of
earthquake intensity, tornado missiles,
and flooding, are enveloped by the cask
design bases considered in these
reports. Like those for seismic activity,
the flooding and tornado missile design
levels of the HI–STORM 100 Cask
System CoC are acceptable for most
areas in the continental United States.
For locations with potential for flooding
or tornado activity beyond those
analyzed for this system, additional
NRC evaluations and certifications may
be required before the system may be
used in those locations.
Therefore, the ability of a particular
cask system to protect additional spent
fuel types against postulated natural
disasters is required to be subject to
rigorous analyses, both generic and sitespecific, before the fuel can be loaded at
any given site. If the design basis of the
HI–STORM 100 Cask System CoC No.
1014, Amendment No. 10, cannot be
shown to envelop a particular site’s
parameters, Holtec or another vendor
would need to obtain NRC certification
for another system meeting the design
specifications of the subject spent fuel
before it could be loaded for dry storage.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 13: One commenter
suggested that the NRC was in collusion
with the licensee and cited an email
exchange between the licensee and a
member of the NRC staff as evidence of
such collusion.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees
with the comment. In its capacity as a
regulator, the NRC regularly engages in
discussions with licensees and
applicants to facilitate a mutual
understanding of the need for any
licensing action, as well as the scope
and intent of the licensing action. The
NRC strives to make as much
information as possible, including these
interactions, publicly available
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whenever possible except where legal
obligations dictate otherwise, such as
for proprietary or security-related
sensitive information. (see NRC
Management Directive 3.4, ‘‘Release of
Information to the Public’’ (ADAMS
Accession No. ML080310417)). The
email exchange cited by the commenter,
which is a publicly available document
in ADAMS, is one such example of this
type of discussion. The NRC grounds its
licensing actions on thorough and
documented reviews of technical
documents that enable the NRC to reach
findings that public health and safety, as
well as the common defense and
security, will be adequately protected.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 14: One commenter
objected to the use of a newer American
Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) code standard for the
manganese content in a carbon steel
alloy used in some components of the
cask system and one commenter
asserted that at the 1.5 percent
manganese content in the proposed
standard, the steel becomes brittle.
Furthermore, the commenter contended,
these standards are not specific to the
nuclear industry, and cannot
compensate for poor design. Therefore,
the alloy formula must be tested and
specific for this particular design and
nuclear spent fuel use.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees
with these comments, and has provided
its detailed assessment in the
preliminary SER for Amendment No. 10
to CoC No. 1014 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML15331A309). The minor change
in manganese and carbon content of the
proposed alloy has been endorsed by
the ASME. This endorsement provides a
high level of confidence in the quality
and safety of the material for nuclear as
well as non-nuclear applications. Any
change in an ASME standard must be
documented by rigorous testing under
carefully controlled conditions. Based
on this extensive and peer-reviewed
testing, the fact that there is no change
to the properties used in the original
technical basis for the HI–STORM 100
Cask System CoC, and the fact that none
of the safety analyses for this CoC are
affected by the minor change in
manganese content, the NRC believes
that further testing for this specific
application is unnecessary.
The proposed increase in manganese
content from 1.2 percent to 1.5 percent
maintains, if not improves, the
toughness properties of the SA–516
Grade 70 steel used in the HI–STORM
100 Cask System overpack. The NRC’s
preliminary SER for Amendment No. 10
to CoC No. 1014 analyzed this proposed
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amendment and related Holtec
documents and found that there is no
change to the material strength, material
density, or thermal properties of the
SA–516 alloy steel, as indicated in the
ASME 2007 and 2010 codes. In order to
use the alloy approved in the updated
2007–2010 ASME codes, Holtec was
required to request an amendment to
use these codes for this alloy because
the original HI–STORM 100 Cask
System CoC references only the 1995–
1997 ASME codes.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 15: A commenter stated that
concrete temperature should be
properly measured on a continuous
basis. The same commenter also stated
that each cask should be tested due to
possible defects or damage during
loading, as well as differences in the
types and ages of spent fuel. Because
conditions change over time, monitoring
should be constant.
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC agrees
that concrete temperatures are
important and should be properly
measured, but disagrees that continuous
measurement of these temperatures and
constant monitoring are needed.
Continuous measurement and constant
monitoring of temperatures are
unnecessary in an operating
environment of very gradual
temperature changes. Revision 1 of
NUREG–1536, ‘‘Standard Review Plan
for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems at a
General License Facility’’ (ADAMS
Accession No. ML101040620), notes
that for storage systems with internal air
flow passages, the NRC has accepted
periodic visual inspection of vents
coupled with temperature
measurements to verify proper thermal
performance and detect flow blockages.
The inspections are to take place within
an interval that will allow sufficient
time for corrective actions to be taken
before the limiting accident temperature
for spent fuel cladding is reached. The
inspection interval should be more
frequent than the time interval required
for the fuel to heat up to the established
accident temperature criteria, assuming
a total blockage of all inlets and outlets.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 16: A commenter
contended that all airflow and
temperature measurements should be
made ‘‘constantly . . . not one time
only,’’ and performed ‘‘on intake and
output and within the annulus and with
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an up to date measurement device and
not an antiquated anemometer.’’
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees
with these comments. The NRC
evaluated the proposed conditions for
airflow and temperature measurements
in its final SER (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003711865) for the initial issuance of
CoC No. 1014 in 2000, and did not find
that constant temperature measurements
were necessary. That SER noted that in
addition to the mandatory initial air
temperature rise test when the system is
first placed in service, the overpack air
inlet and outlet vents would be
periodically surveyed or an optional
overpack air temperature program
would be implemented to verify
continued operability of the heat
removal system. Operating experience
with this cask system since that time
has given the NRC no reason to change
its initial position on the need for
constant temperature measurement.
Concerning the commenter’s
statement about the need for an up-todate measurement device, the NRC has
not specifically required the use of hotwire anemometer or any other airflow
measurement technology. The applicant
may propose the use of any technology
it believes will measure airflow with
sufficient accuracy and reliability. The
NRC is not aware of any basis to
prohibit the use of hot-wire anemometer
technology for measuring airflow or
temperature.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of these comments.
Comment 17: The same commenter
that provided Comment 16 objected that
Holtec and the NRC did not provide
adequate information on ‘‘other topics,’’
and that this must be presumed to
diminish the safety of the ‘‘flimsy’’
Holtec cask system.
NRC Response: The commenter did
not specify any grounds for
pronouncing the HI–STORM 100 Cask
System flimsy, or any ‘‘other topics’’ for
which additional information might be
considered adequate.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 18: A commenter
contended that ‘‘measurements are not
supposed to validate methods outside of
experiments testing theory,’’ and that
the requirement to ‘‘demonstrate’’ an
airflow model with measurements
implies ‘‘fraudulent’’ intent to ‘‘play
with numbers to get what [NRC] and/or
Holtec want’’ to show the safety of the
storage cask system.
NRC Response: These comments are
not within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC also
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70009
disagrees with these comments. The
NRC does not require measurements to
validate methods that cannot be tested
experimentally. The commenter
particularly disapproved of a draft NRC
requirement in an email to Holtec
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15327A043)
in which users of the HI–STORM 100
Cask System would be required to
perform a ‘‘thermal validation test’’ to
measure the total air mass flow rate
through the cask system using direct
measurements of air velocity in the inlet
vents. The user would then be required
to do an analysis of the cask system
with these measurements ‘‘to
demonstrate that the measurements
validate the analytic methods’’
described in Chapter 4 of Holtec’s Final
Safety Analysis Report (ADAMS
Accession No. ML14086A412),
supporting its application for CoC No.
1014. The NRC has reason to require a
licensee to demonstrate that an analytic
method for thermal modeling of airflow
through a cask is supported by realworld measurements. In making this
demonstration, a licensee could ‘‘play
with numbers’’ if it were allowed to
measure anywhere it chose, but that is
not the case here. The licensee is
required to take measurements at NRCspecified locations.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of these comments.
Comment 19: Citing NRC regulations
at 10 CFR 72.236, ‘‘Specific
requirements for spent fuel storage cask
approval and fabrication,’’ one
commenter alleged that Holtec violated
U.S. law because ‘‘the only protection
from lethal radiation leaks is the 1⁄2 inch
MPC, whereas ‘The spent fuel storage
cask must be designed to provide
redundant sealing of confinement
systems.’ ’’
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC also
disagrees with this comment. The MPC
does provide protection from radiation
leaks, but it is not the only protective
barrier. Radiation shielding is also
provided by the HI–STORM 100 Cask
System overpack that is composed of
inner and outer steel shells with the
annulus between them filled with
concrete, which is the primary radiation
shielding material. If the commenter
was referring only to leakage of
radioactive materials from the MPC,
however, Section 7.1 of the SER
(ADAMS Accession No. ML003711865)
for the HI–STORM 100 Cask System
confirms the presence of redundant
sealing of confinement systems in the
canister’s design:
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The [MPC] confinement boundary
includes the MPC shell, the bottom
baseplate, the MPC lid (including the
vent and drain port cover plates), the
MPC closure ring, and the associated
welds. . . . The MPC lid (with the vent
and drain port cover plates welded to
the lid) and closure ring are welded to
the upper part of the MPC shell at the
loading site. This provides redundant
sealing of the confinement boundary.
. . . The redundant closures of the MPC
satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR
72.236(e) for redundant sealing of
confinement systems.
The MPC’s confinement design has
multiple related purposes. The
confinement design ensures that
potentially contaminated air is
contained within the MPC and that the
MPC remains filled with helium
coolant, so that the MPC can fulfill a
third purpose: to keep outside air from
contacting the spent nuclear fuel for the
licensed life of the system.
In addition to the redundant barriers
to airborne radiation leakage in the
design of the HI–STORM 100 MPC and
cask system, there are procedural
requirements to ensure that the system
and its components function in
operation as designed. In accordance
with the CoC itself (ADAMS Accession
No. ML15331A307), the design,
purchase, fabrication, assembly,
inspection, testing, operation,
maintenance, repair, and modification
of all structures, systems, and
components that are important to safety,
both for the MPC and the system as a
whole, must be conducted in
accordance with a Commissionapproved quality assurance program
that satisfies the applicable
requirements of 10 CFR part 72, subpart
G.
The CoC also requires that when the
MPC shell is welded to its baseplate, the
fabricator must perform a helium leak
test of the MPC weld’s confinement
using a helium mass spectrometer. This
weld leakage test must include the base
metals of the MPC shell and baseplate.
Another helium leak test must be
performed on the base metal of the
fabricated MPC lid. Then, in the field,
a helium leak test must be performed on
the vent and drain port confinement
welds and cover plate base metal before
the loaded MPC can be emplaced within
the concrete overpack. All MPC
confinement boundary leakage rate tests
must be performed in accordance with
ANSI N14.5 to ‘‘leaktight’’ criteria. If the
user detects a leakage rate exceeding the
acceptance criteria, the user must
determine the area of leakage and repair
it to meet ASME Code Section III,
Subsection NB requirements. The
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affected area must then be re-tested
until the leakage rate acceptance
criterion is met.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 20: Citing NRC regulations
at 10 CFR 72.236, ‘‘Specific
requirements for spent fuel storage cask
approval and fabrication,’’ a commenter
asserted that Holtec violated U.S. law
also because its storage cask is not
designed to provide adequate heat
removal capacity without active cooling
systems, and ‘‘[t]he refusal to properly
test [the cask’s heat removal capacity]
appears intentional to avoid knowing if
it properly removes heat.’’
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. The comment also
does not explain how Holtec storage
casks are not designed to meet the 10
CFR 72.236 requirement to provide
adequate heat removal capacity without
active cooling systems. HI–STORM 100
Cask Systems have been deployed at
independent spent fuel storage
installations for more than a decade
without active cooling systems.
The NRC disagrees with the comment.
The NRC’s preliminary SER evaluated
Holtec’s supporting thermal analysis for
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014
and found that the HI–STORM 100 Cask
System certification ‘‘continues to be
designed with a heat-removal capability
having verifiability and reliability
consistent with its importance to
safety.’’ The SER also found that spent
fuel cladding continues to be protected
against thermal degradation leading to
gross ruptures, and other cask
component temperatures continue to be
maintained below the allowable limits
for the accidents evaluated.
There has been no refusal to test the
cask system’s heat removal capacity.
The CoC language has been revised to
require CoC No. 1014, Amendment No.
10, users to submit thermal validation
test and analysis results in a letter report
to the NRC within 180 days of either the
user’s loading of the first cask or
undertaking the first spent fuel transfer
operation with a cask fabricated to
Amendment No. 10 specifications. The
revised condition also states, however,
that for casks of the same system type,
users may document in their 10 CFR
72.212 report a previously performed
test and analysis that has demonstrated
adequate validation of the analytic
thermal methods. The NRC will
evaluate whether this previous test and
analysis continues to demonstrate
adequate validation of thermal analysis
methods in light of the uncertainty of
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airflow measurements at the previouslyspecified locations.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
Comment 21: One commenter stated
that the NRC has violated the Plain
Writing Act of 2010 by failing to make
the topics associated with this
rulemaking clear, and failing to ‘‘attach
. . . the relevant documents in an
orderly, clear manner.’’
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees
with these comments. The topics
associated with this rulemaking must
necessarily address the CoC
amendments requested by the applicant,
and these are by nature highly technical.
The March 14, 2016 (81 FR 13265),
Federal Register notice of the direct
final rule does, however, seek to explain
in language as non-technical as possible
the practical effects of the amendment
requests for the use of the Holtec HI–
STORM 100 Cask System under
Amendment No. 10 of CoC No. 1014. In
general, the NRC strives to write agency
documents in a clear, concise, wellorganized manner that also follows
other best practices appropriate to the
subject and the intended audience.
As to the comment that documents
relevant to this rulemaking were not
‘‘attached . . . in an orderly, clear
manner,’’ the NRC followed its normal
process of providing the ADAMS
accession numbers to referenced
documents so that interested persons
may obtain access to the documents. If
the commenter was referring instead to
the table of references provided in the
Federal Register notice for the direct
final rule, the NRC also disagrees that
the relevant documents were not
presented in an orderly, clear manner.
The order of the references starts with
the applicant’s amendment request,
moves to the proposed revised CoC and
TS documents supporting it, and
concludes with the NRC’s response to
these submittals in the form of its SER
on the proposed revisions.
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of these comments.
Comment 22: One commenter stated
that the percentage of the NRC’s budget
that must be recovered should be
recovered in fines and not fees.
NRC Response: The comment is not
within the scope of this rulemaking,
which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No.
10 to CoC No. 1014. Under the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, as
amended, the NRC is required by law to
recover 90 percent of its budget through
fees for licensing and other actions.
Therefore, any change in this
requirement can only be achieved by an
act of Congress.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 196 / Tuesday, October 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day
of September, 2016
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael R. Johnson,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2016–24466 Filed 10–7–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2016–5042; Directorate
Identifier 2015–NM–140–AD; Amendment
39–18680; AD 2016–20–14]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700,
–700C, –800, –900 and –900ER series
airplanes. This AD was prompted by an
evaluation by the design approval
holder (DAH) indicating that certain
fastener locations in the window corner
surround structure are subject to
widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This
AD requires repetitive high frequency
eddy current (HFEC) inspections for
cracking in certain fastener locations in
the window corner surround structure,
and repair if necessary. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct fatigue
cracking around certain fastener
locations that could cause multiple
window corner skin cracks, which
could result in rapid decompression and
consequent loss of structural integrity of
the airplane.
DATES: This AD is effective November
15, 2016.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in this AD
as of November 15, 2016.
ADDRESSES: For service information
identified in this final rule, contact
Boeing Commercial Airplanes,
Attention: Data & Services Management,
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, Seattle, WA
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SUMMARY:
14:37 Oct 07, 2016
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98124–2207; telephone: 206–544–5000,
extension 1; fax: 206–766–5680;
Internet: https://
www.myboeingfleet.com.You may view
this referenced service information at
the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA,
call 425–227–1221. It is also available
on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
5042.
consequent loss of structural integrity of
the airplane.
Examining the AD Docket
The NRC made no changes to the rule
as a result of this comment.
In summary, the NRC did not receive
any comments that warranted
withdrawal of the direct final rule.
Therefore, none of these comments
required a change in the rule’s effective
date of May 31, 2016.
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70011
Effect of Winglets on Accomplishment
of the Proposed Actions
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that
accomplishing the supplemental type
certificate (STC) ST00830SE does not
affect compliance with the actions
specified in the NPRM.
We agree with the commenter. We
have redesignated paragraph (c) as (c)(1)
and added a new paragraph (c)(2) to this
AD to state that installation of STC
ST00830SE does not affect the ability to
accomplish the actions required by this
final rule. Therefore, for airplanes on
which STC ST00830SE is installed, a
‘‘change in product’’ alternative method
of compliance (AMOC) approval request
is not necessary to comply with the
requirements of 14 CFR 39.17.
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
5042; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is
Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gaetano Settineri, Aerospace Engineer,
Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6577;
fax: 425–917–6590; email:
gaetano.settineri@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would
apply to all The Boeing Company Model
737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900 and
–900ER series airplanes. The NPRM
published in the Federal Register on
April 5, 2016 (81 FR 19512) (‘‘the
NPRM’’). The NPRM was prompted by
an evaluation by the DAH indicating
that certain fastener locations in the
window corner surround structure are
subject to WFD. The NPRM proposed to
require repetitive HFEC inspections for
cracking in certain fastener locations in
the window corner surround structure,
and repair if necessary. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct fatigue
cracking around certain fastener
locations that could cause multiple
window corner skin cracks, which
could result in rapid decompression and
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. The
following presents the comments
received on the NPRM and the FAA’s
response to each comment.
Support for the NPRM
Boeing and the Airline Pilots
Association, International supported the
content of the NPRM.
Request for Clarification of Extent of
Boeing Organization Designation
Authority (ODA)
Southwest Airlines (SWA) asked for
clarification that the Boeing ODA
identified in paragraph (i)(3) of the
proposed AD can provide an AMOC for
any ‘‘repair, modification, or alteration’’
that includes the authority to approve
existing repairs in the inspection area
that inhibit accomplishment of the AD
requirements as terminating action to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. SWA
also asked if the ODA has the authority
to provide alternative inspection
procedures for repaired areas where the
inspection in paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD cannot be accomplished.
Additionally, SWA asked that we clarify
that the Boeing ODA identified in
paragraph (i)(3) of the proposed AD is
able to issue an AMOC to the proposed
AD for an existing repair at the S–14 lap
joint (where the location of the repair
inhibits accomplishing the initial
inspection), provided the repair was
approved by any FAA designation
authority, and there is a minimum of
three fastener rows above and below the
lap joint. SWA stated that neither
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737–
53A1351, dated July 8, 2015, nor the
NPRM clearly state how to address
existing repairs that prevent
E:\FR\FM\11OCR1.SGM
11OCR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 196 (Tuesday, October 11, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 70004-70011]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-24466]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
10 CFR Part 72
[NRC-2015-0270]
RIN 3150-AJ71
List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Holtec International
HI-STORM 100 Cask System; Certificate of Compliance No. 1014, Amendment
No. 10
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Direct final rule; comment responses.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On May 31, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
confirmed the effective date of May 31, 2016, for the direct final rule
that was published in the Federal Register on March 14, 2016. The
direct final rule amended the NRC's spent fuel storage regulations by
revising the Holtec International (Holtec) HI-STORM 100 Cask System
listing within the ``List of approved spent fuel storage casks'' to
include Amendment No. 10 to Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 1014.
The NRC confirmed the effective date because it determined that none of
the comments submitted on the direct final rule met any of the criteria
for a significant adverse comment. The purpose of this document is to
provide responses to the comments received on the direct final rule.
DATES: The comment responses are available on October 11, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0270 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of
the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0270. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert MacDougall, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-5175; email:
Robert.MacDougall@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On March 14, 2016 (81 FR 13265), the NRC published a direct final
rule amending its regulations in Sec. 72.214 of title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) by revising the Holtec HI-STORM 100
Cask System listing within the ``List of approved spent fuel storage
casks'' to include Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. Amendment No. 10
adds new fuel classes to the contents approved for the loading of 16 x
16 class fuel assemblies into a HI-STORM 100 Cask System; allows a
minor increase in manganese in an alloy material for the system's
overpack and transfer cask; clarifies the minimum water displacement
required of a dummy fuel rod (i.e., a rod not filled with uranium
pellets); and clarifies the design pressures needed for normal
operation of forced helium drying systems. Additionally, Amendment No.
10 revises Condition No. 9 of CoC No. 1014 to provide clearer direction
on the measurement of air velocity and modeling of heat distribution
through the storage system.
The NRC received four comment submissions with 22 individual
comments on the companion proposed rule (81 FR 13295; March 14, 2016).
Electronic copies of these comments can be obtained from the Federal
Rulemaking Web site, https://www.regulations.gov, by searching for
Docket ID NRC-2015-0270. The comments are also available in ADAMS under
Accession Nos. ML16105A426, ML16105A425, ML16105A424, and ML16105A423.
As explained in the March 14, 2016, direct final rule, the
[[Page 70005]]
NRC would withdraw the direct final rule only if it received a
``significant adverse comment.'' This is a comment where the commenter
explains why the rule would be inappropriate, including challenges to
the rule's underlying premise or approach, or would be ineffective or
unacceptable without a change. A comment is adverse and significant if:
(1) The comment opposes the rule and provides a reason sufficient
to require a substantive response in a notice-and-comment process. For
example, a substantive response is required when:
(a) The comment causes the NRC staff to reevaluate (or reconsider)
its position or conduct additional analysis;
(b) The comment raises an issue serious enough to warrant a
substantive response to clarify or complete the record; or
(c) The comment raises a relevant issue that was not previously
addressed or considered by the NRC staff.
(2) The comment proposes a change or an addition to the rule, and
it is apparent that the rule would be ineffective or unacceptable
without incorporation of the change or addition.
(3) The comment causes the NRC staff to make a change (other than
editorial) to the rule, CoC, or Technical Specifications (TSs).
The NRC determined that none of the comments submitted on the
direct final rule met any of these criteria and confirmed the effective
date of May 31, 2016, for the direct final rule on May 31, 2016 (81 FR
34241). The comments either were already addressed by the NRC staff's
preliminary safety evaluation report (SER) (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15331A309) for this rulemaking, were beyond the scope of this
rulemaking, or were already addressed in a previous rulemaking. The NRC
did not make any changes to the direct final rule as a result of the
public comments. However, in Section II, ``Public Comment Analysis,''
of this document, the NRC is taking this opportunity to respond to the
comments in an effort to clarify information about the 10 CFR part 72
CoC rulemaking process.
II. Public Comment Analysis
For rulemakings amending or revising a CoC, the scope of the
rulemaking is limited to the specific changes in the applicant's
request for the amendment or amendment revision. Therefore, comments
about the system or spent fuel storage in general that are not
applicable to the changes requested are outside the scope of this
rulemaking. Comments about details of the particular system subject to
the rulemaking that do not address the rulemaking's specific proposed
changes have already been resolved in prior rulemakings. Persons who
have concerns about prior rulemakings and the resulting final rules may
consider the NRC's process for petitions for rulemaking under 10 CFR
2.802. Additionally, safety concerns about any NRC-regulated activity
may be reported to the NRC in accordance with the guidance posted on
the NRC's Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html. This Web page provides information on
how to notify the NRC of emergency or non-emergency issues.
The following paragraphs summarize each individual comment followed
by the NRC response.
Comment 1: Noting that this is Holtec's tenth request to amend CoC
No. 1014 for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System, one commenter stated that
many people find this pattern disturbing. The nine earlier amendments
and revisions to CoC No. 1014 suggest that Holtec's overall performance
in achieving technical accuracy has been poor, not only in the
originally-submitted TSs and quality assurance (QA) for this cask, but
in the nine subsequent amendments and revisions that the NRC has
approved. Because this is Holtec's tenth amendment, this commenter
asserted that Holtec has failed to address the full range of the cask's
technical deficiencies comprehensively, and appears instead to have
applied the needed QA only in incremental steps.
NRC Response: This comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC is providing a specific
response, however, to clarify the NRC's process for issuing and
amending CoCs for dry storage system (DSS) casks.
When the NRC first approves a CoC for a particular storage cask
design, the CoC is based on a postulated generic spent fuel design
using a composite of fuel characteristics and engineered features of
the DSS. Important fuel characteristics include the level of the
uranium enrichment in the fuel pellets and their burnup time in the
reactor. Fuel assembly variables include the composition of the alloys
used in the fuel cladding and assembly hardware; the diameter, number,
and length of the fuel rods; and the spacing between them. These fuel
characteristics and assembly design variables affect the overall heat
load that the cask and multipurpose canister (MPC) holding the fuel
assemblies inside the cask must be able to withstand, with a
conservative margin of safety, to maintain their integrity for long-
term storage under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. The
residual heat and level of uranium burnup in the spent fuel, and the
spacing of the fuel in the assemblies, in turn affect the number of
fuel assemblies that can be loaded into the MPC, which must have
internal components tailored to maintain the configuration of the fuel
in the canister. Burnup also affects the composition and physical
configuration of the neutron-absorbing materials arranged around the
assemblies within the MPC. Each of these considerations must be
evaluated with each fuel design to ensure the long-term performance of
the overall cask system with an adequate margin of safety.
Fuel and fuel assembly designs have evolved since each storage cask
design was originally certified by the NRC. Contemporary fuel assembly
designs now differ in several important respects from the generic
designs postulated for the casks' original CoCs. To save costs and
reduce worker exposures to radiation, for example, many contemporary
assembly designs are optimized for fuel with higher enrichment levels
to stay in the reactor's core to ``burn,'' or fission, a larger
fraction of uranium for a longer period. This produces fewer spent fuel
assemblies per unit of power generated. It also stretches out the time
between re-fuelings, when workers need to remove the reactor's head to
load new fuel assemblies, off-load used ones, and rearrange partially-
burned assemblies to maintain the efficiency of the overall fuel burnup
within the reactor core. To accommodate the changes in fuel enrichment,
fuel cladding materials, and fuel assembly materials and
configurations, a similar evolution is continuing in MPC componentry,
including neutron-absorbing alloys and other materials, so that casks
can safely accept evolving fuel designs.
Therefore, the nine amendments to CoC No. 1014, like amendments to
other CoCs, each represent an NRC safety finding about the vendor's
analysis of proposed measures to adapt the cask to a new fuel design
for long-term storage. The nine amendments, and the tenth issued in May
2016, are not the product of trial and error, nor of the incremental
application of QA, which must be applied in a safety-graded fashion to
all aspects of cask design, fabrication, loading, and deployment.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 2: One commenter asserted that in the absence of actual
evidence
[[Page 70006]]
from operational experience or testing, using computer models to
estimate a system's behavior or performance has produced ``extreme
failures'' and ``major departures between [the computer model's]
predictions and [the system's] actual performance.'' These departures,
the commenter stated, resulted in a January 2012, radiation release at
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station's (SONGS) Unit 2 that eventually
led to its premature retirement.
NRC Response: This comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The commenter does not identify an
issue related to any of the specific revisions proposed in Amendment
No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. Instead, this comment is about a reactor
licensee's computer models for the performance of a reactor system, not
the cask vendor's models for the performance of the HI-STORM 100 Cask
System at issue in this rulemaking. Different types of computer models
are typically validated using different methods. The NRC uses industry
accepted practices to evaluate an applicant's computational modeling
software for storage casks in accordance with Interim Staff Guidance
SFST-ISG-21, ``Use of Computational Modeling Software'' (ADAMS
Accession No. ML061080669). Because Amendment No. 10 does not involve
computational modeling for reactor systems, the comment is not within
the scope of this rulemaking.
As the commenter pointed out, there was a radiation release to the
environment at SONGS in January 2012. This comment too is about an
issue beyond the scope of this rulemaking. The commenter can obtain
more information about the release, which was well below allowable
limits, in Southern California Edison's (SCE) report to the NRC on the
incident (ADAMS Accession No. ML12090A153), and a report by the NRC
Office of the Inspector General (ADAMS Accession No. ML14276A478).
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 3: One commenter stated that the proposed CoC amendment
pertains to the same or similar Holtec cask as that to be installed at
SONGS, and southern California stakeholders are ``extremely
disappointed'' that SONGS' licensee, SCE, has chosen Holtec's \5/8\''
thin metal cask over 14''-to-20'' thick casks that the commenter stated
can be inspected in real time to monitor the condition of the spent
fuel and measure the depth of stress corrosion cracking.
NRC Response: This comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The commenter does not identify an
issue related to any of the specific revisions proposed in Amendment
No. 10 to CoC No. 1014, and this rulemaking does not concern SCE's
choice of cask products. In addition, the NRC has not approved any
spent fuel dry storage cask design that permits the continuous real
time inspection or monitoring of the condition of the fuel in the cask,
or the continuous or periodic direct measurement of the extent or depth
of stress corrosion cracking. Such inspection, monitoring, and
measurement cannot be accomplished without the additional worker
radiation exposures that would be necessary to open the cask overpack
and canister. The NRC's regulation at 10 CFR 20.1101(b), however,
requires radiation doses to workers and members of the public to be as
low as is reasonably achievable. This makes such additional exposures
to open casks and overpacks difficult to justify in light of the very
slow rates of degradation in the cask system and its contents that have
been measured under realistic conditions in a laboratory.
The commenter's description of Holtec's product as a ``\5/8\'' thin
metal cask,'' however, compels a response for clarification purposes.
The comment appears to conflate the MPC, which is not a cask, with the
entirety of the HI-STORM dry cask storage system. The HI-STORM 100 MPC,
which has \1/2\'' thick stainless steel walls, holds the spent fuel
assemblies and their hardware within an overpack. The overpack consists
of outer and inner steel walls with the annulus between them filled
with concrete. The overpack, with 29\1/2\'' thick concrete and steel
walls, provides radiation shielding and mass for stability against such
natural phenomena as winds, floods, and earthquakes. The MPC, an
internal component of the cask system, is not directly exposed to these
outside phenomena.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 4: One commenter stated that the NRC has ``mostly
`dismissed' multiple credible public safety concerns.'' The commenter
also noted that SCE's ``Community Engagement Panel'' has failed to
function as an independent advisory panel of experts, and instead
``functions more as a promotional extension of [SCE's] marketing and
media platforms.''
NRC Response: These comments are not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The commenter did not identify any of
the ``multiple credible public safety concerns'' that the NRC is said
to have dismissed. Nor did the commenter explain how any of these
concerns pertain to any specific revision proposed in Amendment No. 10
to CoC No. 1014.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of these comments.
Comment 5: One commenter asserted that many stakeholders believe
that the NRC has allowed ``a utility to improperly apply credit for
performing an `educational' function'' that has involved, among other
things, ``extensive private meetings with elected officials in adjacent
communities in San Diego and Orange County.''
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. In addition, the NRC's safety-focused
mission does not include authority to allow or prohibit a licensee from
engaging in public relations activities, which do not directly relate
to the design, fabrication, configuration, loading, or deployment of
the dry cask storage system at issue here.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 6: A commenter stated that many stakeholders are asserting
that SONGS licensee, SCE, ``consistently underestimates'' the actual
extent of potential public safety risks associated with its
decommissioning plan.
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The SCE's decommissioning plan does
not pertain to the specific revisions proposed in Amendment No. 10 to
CoC No. 1014; nor does the comment identify any specific potential
public safety risks pertinent to the other purposes of this amendment.
The NRC has a safety hotline that members of the public can use to
report any identified public safety risk, such as may be associated
with any decommissioning action. The hotline number is 1-800-695-7403.
Note that a call during normal business hours (7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Eastern Time) will automatically be directed to the NRC Regional Office
for the caller's geographical area. If the call is placed after normal
business hours, or can't be
[[Page 70007]]
answered by the Regional Office during its normal business hours, the
call will be directed to the NRC's Headquarters Operations Center,
which is staffed 24 hours a day and has a recorded telephone line.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 7: A commenter stated that the licensee expecting to
acquire the Holtec casks subject to Amendment No. 10 for spent fuel
storage at SONGS has ``severely overestimated performance capabilities
of equipment, components and parts, defense in depth, operator
training, emergency response capability, system reliability, cost
containment, and technical capability to safely implement Aging
Management Programs.''
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. As noted in the response to Comment
6, the NRC has a safety hotline that members of the public can use to
report any identified public safety risk.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 8: Noting the ``large inventory'' of high-burnup fuel (HBF)
in storage at SONGS, a commenter stated that stakeholders have
``extreme safety concerns'' about the accuracy of the predicted service
life of the Holtec underground maximum capacity (UMAX) casks containing
HBF, which typically has higher heat loads and radiation levels. Among
these concerns, the commenter explained, are ``thermal tolerance
variability, measurement of air velocity, modeling of heat load
distribution, performance capability and integrity of fuel cladding.''
This commenter also stated that with the applicant's proposed
changes in the composition of alloy material in MPC componentry,
stakeholders have concerns about the accuracy of predicted helium
pressure limits for the MPC in underground installations where closed
loop forced helium dehydration (FHD) is mandatory for drying MPCs with
one or more HBF assemblies or a higher heat load.
NRC Response: The comment about HBF storage at SONGS is not within
the scope of this rulemaking, which is limited to the specific
revisions proposed in Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. None of these
revisions included a change in spent fuel burnup specifications. The
comment is about the HI-STORM UMAX Canister Storage system, which was
authorized generically for underground emplacement under CoC No. 1040
and approved on March 6, 2015 (80 FR 12073). The SONGS will be
utilizing cask systems specified by Amendment No. 1 to CoC No. 1040,
not Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014.
The commenter also expressed concerns about the accuracy of
predicted helium pressure limits for the MPC where closed loop forced
FHD is mandatory for drying MPCs with one or more HBF assemblies or a
higher heat load. The comment does not explain the basis for the
commenter's concern about the predicted pressure limit for drying. This
limit was established to provide an ample safety margin against both
inadequate pressure for thorough drying and excessive pressure that
could result in damage to the spent fuel or other hardware. To maintain
this margin, helium pressure limits are controlled during FHD
operations at all times. During FHD drying, the MPC's inlet (drain
port) and exit (vent port) each have calibrated pressure-indicating
devices that show inlet and outlet pressure during drying operations.
Trained operators use the helium regulator in accordance with the
site's procedures to ensure that the 75-psi limit is not exceeded.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 9: One stakeholder stated that despite Holtec's unproven
assurances about the performance capabilities of its casks, a 2015
Sandia National Laboratory report contained evidence that similar thin-
metal casks had through-wall cracks in only 5 years.
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The Sandia National Laboratory report
referred to by the commenter was for a set of design specifications for
a Standardized Transportation, Aging, and Disposal (STAD) canister for
eventual emplacement in a geologic repository (ADAMS Accession No.
ML16132A321). The NRC could find nothing in this report to support the
commenter's assertion that it ``contained evidence that similar thin
metal casks had through-wall cracks in only 5 years.''
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 10: As evidence that Holtec casks are ``an inferior
choice'' for spent fuel storage, one commenter, speaking for
``stakeholders in California,'' referred the NRC to the Web site
``sanonofresafety.org.''
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014 and does not concern SCE's choice of
cask products. Beyond the issue of SCE's choice, if the commenter has
concerns about prior spent fuel storage cask rulemakings, or other
issues beyond the scope of this rulemaking that make Holtec casks ``an
inferior choice,'' the commenter may consider the NRC's process for
petitions for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802. Additionally, safety
concerns about any NRC-regulated activity may be reported to the NRC in
accordance with the guidance posted on the NRC's Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html. This
Web page provides information on how to notify the NRC of emergency or
non-emergency issues.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 11: One commenter criticized the NRC for giving in to
Holtec's corporate lawyers and failing to hold the company responsible
for ``creating inadequate safety measures within this [cask] design.''
The commenter exhorted the NRC to ``stop paying for fraud'' and force
Holtec to ``spend [its] own treasure . . ., not tax dollars,'' to fix
the problem.
NRC Response: This comment does not provide sufficient information
to identify the ``inadequate safety measures'' in the Holtec cask's
design that the commenter has in mind. With respect to the concern
regarding payment for the NRC's review and oversight, these functions
are not performed at taxpayers' expense. The vendor, in this case
Holtec, pays for the NRC's evaluation of the application, as the NRC
bills the vendor for the review.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 12: A commenter expressed concern that in permitting a cask
system to accept additional classes of spent fuel, the NRC does not
decrease the ability of these storage systems to contain the fuel under
adverse conditions. The commenter wanted to know whether current
requirements for the durability of spent fuel storage systems are
sufficient to contain these additional fuels, whatever they may be, in
the event of a disaster.
NRC Response: The general issue of the durability of spent fuel
storage systems to contain additional types of spent fuel in the event
of a disaster is not within the scope of this rulemaking, which is
limited to the specific revisions proposed in Amendment No. 10 to CoC
No. 1014. The NRC is addressing the commenter's concern, however, for
educational and clarification purposes.
The NRC addressed a similar comment about the ability of HI-
[[Page 70008]]
STORM UMAX Canister Storage Systems to withstand seismic events during
the CoC No. 1040 certification rulemaking. It should be noted that the
certification provided by approval of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System does
not, in and of itself, authorize the use of this system at any specific
site. Under 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5), before applying the changes authorized
by an amended CoC and loading a cask, a general licensee wishing to use
this cask system must perform written evaluations in accordance with 10
CFR 72.212 to establish, among other things, that:
Cask storage pads and areas have been designed to
adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks,
considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-
structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil
instability due to vibratory ground motion; and
The independent spent fuel storage installation at the
reactor site where the casks will be located will meet the requirements
of 10 CFR 72.104 to ensure that radiation doses beyond the reactor's
controlled area do not exceed 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) to the whole body,
0.75 mSv (75 mrem) to the thyroid, and 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) to any other
critical organ, and are further controlled to a level as low as is
reasonably achievable.
The seismic design levels of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System CoC are
acceptable for most areas in the continental United States. For
locations with potential for seismic activity beyond those analyzed for
this system, additional NRC evaluations and certifications may be
required before the system may be used in those locations.
Similarly, although the design levels of the HI-STORM 100 Cask
System CoC for flooding are also acceptable for most areas in the
continental United States--again depending on site-specific analyses--
the NRC staff previously evaluated the impacts of flooding during the
review of the initial certification for the HI-STORM Flood/Wind (FW)
System. In its March 28, 2011, SER for the initial certification of the
HI-STORM FW MPC Storage System (see Sections 4.8.2 and 7.3.1 of ADAMS
Accession No. ML103020151), the NRC staff considered both full and
partial flooding for both the vertical and horizontal positions for the
MPC. The NRC staff found that the fully flooded condition would produce
the highest reactivity in the spent fuel, and that the fully flooded
model for safety evaluations ``is acceptable and applicable to all of
the assembly configurations that are to be stored in the HI-STORM FW
MPC Storage system,'' including damaged fuel configurations. In its
March 28, 2011, SER, the NRC staff also noted the system's design
measures to limit the rise in fuel cladding temperature under the most
adverse flood event (one with a water level just high enough to block
the MPC overpack's air convection inlet duct). The changes requested in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014 do not affect the NRC's prior flooding
evaluation for the initial certification of this system.
In addition, under 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6), before using the general
license, the reactor licensee must review the Safety Analysis Report
(SAR) referenced in the CoC or amended CoC and the NRC's SER evaluating
the SAR to determine whether the reactor site parameters, including
analyses of earthquake intensity, tornado missiles, and flooding, are
enveloped by the cask design bases considered in these reports. Like
those for seismic activity, the flooding and tornado missile design
levels of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System CoC are acceptable for most
areas in the continental United States. For locations with potential
for flooding or tornado activity beyond those analyzed for this system,
additional NRC evaluations and certifications may be required before
the system may be used in those locations.
Therefore, the ability of a particular cask system to protect
additional spent fuel types against postulated natural disasters is
required to be subject to rigorous analyses, both generic and site-
specific, before the fuel can be loaded at any given site. If the
design basis of the HI-STORM 100 Cask System CoC No. 1014, Amendment
No. 10, cannot be shown to envelop a particular site's parameters,
Holtec or another vendor would need to obtain NRC certification for
another system meeting the design specifications of the subject spent
fuel before it could be loaded for dry storage.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 13: One commenter suggested that the NRC was in collusion
with the licensee and cited an email exchange between the licensee and
a member of the NRC staff as evidence of such collusion.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with the comment. In its capacity
as a regulator, the NRC regularly engages in discussions with licensees
and applicants to facilitate a mutual understanding of the need for any
licensing action, as well as the scope and intent of the licensing
action. The NRC strives to make as much information as possible,
including these interactions, publicly available whenever possible
except where legal obligations dictate otherwise, such as for
proprietary or security-related sensitive information. (see NRC
Management Directive 3.4, ``Release of Information to the Public''
(ADAMS Accession No. ML080310417)). The email exchange cited by the
commenter, which is a publicly available document in ADAMS, is one such
example of this type of discussion. The NRC grounds its licensing
actions on thorough and documented reviews of technical documents that
enable the NRC to reach findings that public health and safety, as well
as the common defense and security, will be adequately protected.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 14: One commenter objected to the use of a newer American
Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code standard for the manganese
content in a carbon steel alloy used in some components of the cask
system and one commenter asserted that at the 1.5 percent manganese
content in the proposed standard, the steel becomes brittle.
Furthermore, the commenter contended, these standards are not specific
to the nuclear industry, and cannot compensate for poor design.
Therefore, the alloy formula must be tested and specific for this
particular design and nuclear spent fuel use.
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with these comments, and has
provided its detailed assessment in the preliminary SER for Amendment
No. 10 to CoC No. 1014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15331A309). The minor
change in manganese and carbon content of the proposed alloy has been
endorsed by the ASME. This endorsement provides a high level of
confidence in the quality and safety of the material for nuclear as
well as non-nuclear applications. Any change in an ASME standard must
be documented by rigorous testing under carefully controlled
conditions. Based on this extensive and peer-reviewed testing, the fact
that there is no change to the properties used in the original
technical basis for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System CoC, and the fact that
none of the safety analyses for this CoC are affected by the minor
change in manganese content, the NRC believes that further testing for
this specific application is unnecessary.
The proposed increase in manganese content from 1.2 percent to 1.5
percent maintains, if not improves, the toughness properties of the SA-
516 Grade 70 steel used in the HI-STORM 100 Cask System overpack. The
NRC's preliminary SER for Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014 analyzed
this proposed
[[Page 70009]]
amendment and related Holtec documents and found that there is no
change to the material strength, material density, or thermal
properties of the SA-516 alloy steel, as indicated in the ASME 2007 and
2010 codes. In order to use the alloy approved in the updated 2007-2010
ASME codes, Holtec was required to request an amendment to use these
codes for this alloy because the original HI-STORM 100 Cask System CoC
references only the 1995-1997 ASME codes.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 15: A commenter stated that concrete temperature should be
properly measured on a continuous basis. The same commenter also stated
that each cask should be tested due to possible defects or damage
during loading, as well as differences in the types and ages of spent
fuel. Because conditions change over time, monitoring should be
constant.
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC agrees that concrete
temperatures are important and should be properly measured, but
disagrees that continuous measurement of these temperatures and
constant monitoring are needed. Continuous measurement and constant
monitoring of temperatures are unnecessary in an operating environment
of very gradual temperature changes. Revision 1 of NUREG-1536,
``Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems at a General
License Facility'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML101040620), notes that for
storage systems with internal air flow passages, the NRC has accepted
periodic visual inspection of vents coupled with temperature
measurements to verify proper thermal performance and detect flow
blockages. The inspections are to take place within an interval that
will allow sufficient time for corrective actions to be taken before
the limiting accident temperature for spent fuel cladding is reached.
The inspection interval should be more frequent than the time interval
required for the fuel to heat up to the established accident
temperature criteria, assuming a total blockage of all inlets and
outlets.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 16: A commenter contended that all airflow and temperature
measurements should be made ``constantly . . . not one time only,'' and
performed ``on intake and output and within the annulus and with an up
to date measurement device and not an antiquated anemometer.''
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The NRC
evaluated the proposed conditions for airflow and temperature
measurements in its final SER (ADAMS Accession No. ML003711865) for the
initial issuance of CoC No. 1014 in 2000, and did not find that
constant temperature measurements were necessary. That SER noted that
in addition to the mandatory initial air temperature rise test when the
system is first placed in service, the overpack air inlet and outlet
vents would be periodically surveyed or an optional overpack air
temperature program would be implemented to verify continued
operability of the heat removal system. Operating experience with this
cask system since that time has given the NRC no reason to change its
initial position on the need for constant temperature measurement.
Concerning the commenter's statement about the need for an up-to-
date measurement device, the NRC has not specifically required the use
of hot-wire anemometer or any other airflow measurement technology. The
applicant may propose the use of any technology it believes will
measure airflow with sufficient accuracy and reliability. The NRC is
not aware of any basis to prohibit the use of hot-wire anemometer
technology for measuring airflow or temperature.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of these comments.
Comment 17: The same commenter that provided Comment 16 objected
that Holtec and the NRC did not provide adequate information on ``other
topics,'' and that this must be presumed to diminish the safety of the
``flimsy'' Holtec cask system.
NRC Response: The commenter did not specify any grounds for
pronouncing the HI-STORM 100 Cask System flimsy, or any ``other
topics'' for which additional information might be considered adequate.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 18: A commenter contended that ``measurements are not
supposed to validate methods outside of experiments testing theory,''
and that the requirement to ``demonstrate'' an airflow model with
measurements implies ``fraudulent'' intent to ``play with numbers to
get what [NRC] and/or Holtec want'' to show the safety of the storage
cask system.
NRC Response: These comments are not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC also disagrees with these
comments. The NRC does not require measurements to validate methods
that cannot be tested experimentally. The commenter particularly
disapproved of a draft NRC requirement in an email to Holtec (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15327A043) in which users of the HI-STORM 100 Cask
System would be required to perform a ``thermal validation test'' to
measure the total air mass flow rate through the cask system using
direct measurements of air velocity in the inlet vents. The user would
then be required to do an analysis of the cask system with these
measurements ``to demonstrate that the measurements validate the
analytic methods'' described in Chapter 4 of Holtec's Final Safety
Analysis Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML14086A412), supporting its
application for CoC No. 1014. The NRC has reason to require a licensee
to demonstrate that an analytic method for thermal modeling of airflow
through a cask is supported by real-world measurements. In making this
demonstration, a licensee could ``play with numbers'' if it were
allowed to measure anywhere it chose, but that is not the case here.
The licensee is required to take measurements at NRC-specified
locations.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of these comments.
Comment 19: Citing NRC regulations at 10 CFR 72.236, ``Specific
requirements for spent fuel storage cask approval and fabrication,''
one commenter alleged that Holtec violated U.S. law because ``the only
protection from lethal radiation leaks is the \1/2\ inch MPC, whereas
`The spent fuel storage cask must be designed to provide redundant
sealing of confinement systems.' ''
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The NRC also disagrees with this
comment. The MPC does provide protection from radiation leaks, but it
is not the only protective barrier. Radiation shielding is also
provided by the HI-STORM 100 Cask System overpack that is composed of
inner and outer steel shells with the annulus between them filled with
concrete, which is the primary radiation shielding material. If the
commenter was referring only to leakage of radioactive materials from
the MPC, however, Section 7.1 of the SER (ADAMS Accession No.
ML003711865) for the HI-STORM 100 Cask System confirms the presence of
redundant sealing of confinement systems in the canister's design:
[[Page 70010]]
The [MPC] confinement boundary includes the MPC shell, the bottom
baseplate, the MPC lid (including the vent and drain port cover
plates), the MPC closure ring, and the associated welds. . . . The MPC
lid (with the vent and drain port cover plates welded to the lid) and
closure ring are welded to the upper part of the MPC shell at the
loading site. This provides redundant sealing of the confinement
boundary. . . . The redundant closures of the MPC satisfy the
requirements of 10 CFR 72.236(e) for redundant sealing of confinement
systems.
The MPC's confinement design has multiple related purposes. The
confinement design ensures that potentially contaminated air is
contained within the MPC and that the MPC remains filled with helium
coolant, so that the MPC can fulfill a third purpose: to keep outside
air from contacting the spent nuclear fuel for the licensed life of the
system.
In addition to the redundant barriers to airborne radiation leakage
in the design of the HI-STORM 100 MPC and cask system, there are
procedural requirements to ensure that the system and its components
function in operation as designed. In accordance with the CoC itself
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15331A307), the design, purchase, fabrication,
assembly, inspection, testing, operation, maintenance, repair, and
modification of all structures, systems, and components that are
important to safety, both for the MPC and the system as a whole, must
be conducted in accordance with a Commission-approved quality assurance
program that satisfies the applicable requirements of 10 CFR part 72,
subpart G.
The CoC also requires that when the MPC shell is welded to its
baseplate, the fabricator must perform a helium leak test of the MPC
weld's confinement using a helium mass spectrometer. This weld leakage
test must include the base metals of the MPC shell and baseplate.
Another helium leak test must be performed on the base metal of the
fabricated MPC lid. Then, in the field, a helium leak test must be
performed on the vent and drain port confinement welds and cover plate
base metal before the loaded MPC can be emplaced within the concrete
overpack. All MPC confinement boundary leakage rate tests must be
performed in accordance with ANSI N14.5 to ``leaktight'' criteria. If
the user detects a leakage rate exceeding the acceptance criteria, the
user must determine the area of leakage and repair it to meet ASME Code
Section III, Subsection NB requirements. The affected area must then be
re-tested until the leakage rate acceptance criterion is met.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 20: Citing NRC regulations at 10 CFR 72.236, ``Specific
requirements for spent fuel storage cask approval and fabrication,'' a
commenter asserted that Holtec violated U.S. law also because its
storage cask is not designed to provide adequate heat removal capacity
without active cooling systems, and ``[t]he refusal to properly test
[the cask's heat removal capacity] appears intentional to avoid knowing
if it properly removes heat.''
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. The comment also does not explain how
Holtec storage casks are not designed to meet the 10 CFR 72.236
requirement to provide adequate heat removal capacity without active
cooling systems. HI-STORM 100 Cask Systems have been deployed at
independent spent fuel storage installations for more than a decade
without active cooling systems.
The NRC disagrees with the comment. The NRC's preliminary SER
evaluated Holtec's supporting thermal analysis for Amendment No. 10 to
CoC No. 1014 and found that the HI-STORM 100 Cask System certification
``continues to be designed with a heat-removal capability having
verifiability and reliability consistent with its importance to
safety.'' The SER also found that spent fuel cladding continues to be
protected against thermal degradation leading to gross ruptures, and
other cask component temperatures continue to be maintained below the
allowable limits for the accidents evaluated.
There has been no refusal to test the cask system's heat removal
capacity. The CoC language has been revised to require CoC No. 1014,
Amendment No. 10, users to submit thermal validation test and analysis
results in a letter report to the NRC within 180 days of either the
user's loading of the first cask or undertaking the first spent fuel
transfer operation with a cask fabricated to Amendment No. 10
specifications. The revised condition also states, however, that for
casks of the same system type, users may document in their 10 CFR
72.212 report a previously performed test and analysis that has
demonstrated adequate validation of the analytic thermal methods. The
NRC will evaluate whether this previous test and analysis continues to
demonstrate adequate validation of thermal analysis methods in light of
the uncertainty of airflow measurements at the previously-specified
locations.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
Comment 21: One commenter stated that the NRC has violated the
Plain Writing Act of 2010 by failing to make the topics associated with
this rulemaking clear, and failing to ``attach . . . the relevant
documents in an orderly, clear manner.''
NRC Response: The NRC disagrees with these comments. The topics
associated with this rulemaking must necessarily address the CoC
amendments requested by the applicant, and these are by nature highly
technical. The March 14, 2016 (81 FR 13265), Federal Register notice of
the direct final rule does, however, seek to explain in language as
non-technical as possible the practical effects of the amendment
requests for the use of the Holtec HI-STORM 100 Cask System under
Amendment No. 10 of CoC No. 1014. In general, the NRC strives to write
agency documents in a clear, concise, well-organized manner that also
follows other best practices appropriate to the subject and the
intended audience.
As to the comment that documents relevant to this rulemaking were
not ``attached . . . in an orderly, clear manner,'' the NRC followed
its normal process of providing the ADAMS accession numbers to
referenced documents so that interested persons may obtain access to
the documents. If the commenter was referring instead to the table of
references provided in the Federal Register notice for the direct final
rule, the NRC also disagrees that the relevant documents were not
presented in an orderly, clear manner. The order of the references
starts with the applicant's amendment request, moves to the proposed
revised CoC and TS documents supporting it, and concludes with the
NRC's response to these submittals in the form of its SER on the
proposed revisions.
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of these comments.
Comment 22: One commenter stated that the percentage of the NRC's
budget that must be recovered should be recovered in fines and not
fees.
NRC Response: The comment is not within the scope of this
rulemaking, which is limited to the specific revisions proposed in
Amendment No. 10 to CoC No. 1014. Under the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, as amended, the NRC is required by law to
recover 90 percent of its budget through fees for licensing and other
actions. Therefore, any change in this requirement can only be achieved
by an act of Congress.
[[Page 70011]]
The NRC made no changes to the rule as a result of this comment.
In summary, the NRC did not receive any comments that warranted
withdrawal of the direct final rule. Therefore, none of these comments
required a change in the rule's effective date of May 31, 2016.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day of September, 2016
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Michael R. Johnson,
Acting Executive Director for Operations.
[FR Doc. 2016-24466 Filed 10-7-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
