Mandatory Contractual Stay Requirements for Qualified Financial Contracts, 55381-55402 [2016-19671]

Agencies

• Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
• DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 161 (Friday, August 19, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 55381-55402]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-19671]


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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 161 / Friday, August 19, 2016 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 55381]]



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Parts 3, 47 and 50

[Docket ID OCC-2016-0009]
RIN 1557-AE05


Mandatory Contractual Stay Requirements for Qualified Financial 
Contracts

AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The OCC is proposing to add a new part to its rules to enhance 
the resilience and the safety and soundness of federally chartered and 
licensed financial institutions by addressing concerns relating to the 
exercise of default rights of certain financial contracts that could 
interfere with the orderly resolution of certain systemically important 
financial firms. Under this proposed rule, a covered bank would be 
required to ensure that a covered qualified financial contract (1) 
contains a contractual stay-and-transfer provision analogous to the 
statutory stay-and-transfer provision imposed under Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act and in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, and (2) limits 
the exercise of default rights based on the insolvency of an affiliate 
of the covered bank. In addition, this proposed rule would make 
conforming amendments to the OCC's Capital Adequacy Standards and the 
Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards in its regulations. The 
requirements of this proposed rule are substantively identical to those 
contained in a notice of proposed rulemaking issued by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System on May 3, 2016.

DATES: Comments must be received by October 18, 2016.

ADDRESSES: Because paper mail in the Washington, DC area and at the OCC 
is subject to delay, commenters are encouraged to submit comments 
through the Federal eRulemaking Portal or email, if possible. Please 
use the title ``Mandatory Contractual Stay Requirements for Qualified 
Financial Contracts'' to facilitate the organization and distribution 
of the comments. You may submit comments by any of the following 
methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal--``Regulations.gov'': Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2016-0009'' in the Search 
Box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Comment Now'' to submit public 
comments.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for 
submitting public comments.
     Email: regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.
     Mail: Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 400 7th Street SW., Suite 
3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
     Hand Delivery/Courier: 400 7th Street SW., Suite 3E-218, 
Mail Stop 9W-11, Washington, DC 20219.
     Fax: (571) 465-4326.
    Instructions: You must include ``OCC'' as the agency name and 
``Docket ID OCC-2016-0009'' in your comment. In general, OCC will enter 
all comments received into the docket and publish them on the 
Regulations.gov Web site without change, including any business or 
personal information that you provide such as name and address 
information, email addresses, or phone numbers. Comments received, 
including attachments and other supporting materials, are part of the 
public record and subject to public disclosure. Do not include any 
information in your comment or supporting materials that you consider 
confidential or inappropriate for public disclosure.
    You may review comments and other related materials that pertain to 
this rulemaking action by any of the following methods:
     Viewing Comments Electronically: Go to 
www.regulations.gov. Enter ``Docket ID OCC-2016-0009'' in the Search 
box and click ``Search.'' Click on ``Open Docket Folder'' on the right 
side of the screen and then ``Comments.'' Comments can be filtered by 
clicking on ``View All'' and then using the filtering tools on the left 
side of the screen.
     Click on the ``Help'' tab on the Regulations.gov home page 
to get information on using Regulations.gov. Supporting materials may 
be viewed by clicking on ``Open Docket Folder'' and then clicking on 
``Supporting Documents.'' The docket may be viewed after the close of 
the comment period in the same manner as during the comment period.
     Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect 
and photocopy comments at the OCC, 400 7th Street SW., Washington, DC. 
For security reasons, the OCC requires that visitors make an 
appointment to inspect comments. You may do so by calling (202) 649-
6700 or, for persons who are deaf or hard of hearing, TTY, (202) 649-
5597. Upon arrival, visitors will be required to present valid 
government-issued photo identification and submit to security screening 
in order to inspect and photocopy comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Valerie Song, Assistant Director, or 
Scott Burnett, Attorney, Bank Activities and Structure Division, (202) 
649-5500; Rima Kundnani, Attorney, or Ron Shimabukuro, Senior Counsel, 
Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, (202) 649-6282, 400 7th 
Street SW., Washington, DC 20219.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
II. Background
    A. Qualified Financial Contracts, Default Rights, and Financial 
Stability
    B. QFC Default Rights and GSIB Resolution Strategies
    C. Default Rights and Relevant Resolution Laws
III. Description of the Proposal
    A. Overview, Purpose, and Authority
    B. Covered Banks
    C. Covered QFCs
    D. Definition of ``Default Right''
    E. Required Contractual Provisions Related to U.S. Special 
Resolution Regimes
    F. Prohibited Cross-Default Rights
    G. Process for Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protections
    H. Transition Periods
    I. Amendments to Capital Rules
IV. Request for Comments
V. Regulatory Analysis
    A. Paperwork Reduction Act
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
    D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act 
of 1994

[[Page 55382]]

I. Introduction

    In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-08, U.S. and 
international financial regulators have placed increased focus on 
improving the resolvability of large, complex financial institutions 
that operate in multiple jurisdictions, often called global 
systemically important banking organizations (GSIBs).
    In connection with these ongoing efforts, on May 3, 2016, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB or Board) issued a 
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) pursuant to section 165 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank 
Act) as part of its ongoing efforts to improve the resolvability of 
U.S. GSIBs and foreign GSIBs that operate in the United States 
(collectively, ``covered entities'' \1\).\2\ The OCC is issuing this 
parallel proposed rule applicable to OCC-regulated institutions that 
are part of a covered entity under the FRB NPRM. The OCC intends this 
proposed rule to complement and work in tandem with the FRB NPRM.
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    \1\ The FRB NPRM applies to ``covered entities.'' The term 
``covered entity'' includes: any U.S. top-tier bank holding company 
identified as a GSIB under the Board's NPRM establishing risk-based 
capital surcharges for GSIBs, set forth at 12 CFR 217.402; any 
subsidiary of such bank holding company (other than a ``covered 
bank''); and any U.S. subsidiary, U.S. branch, or U.S. agency of a 
foreign GSIB (other than a ``covered bank''). See FRB NPRM Sec.  
252.82. The term ``covered entity'' does not include ``covered 
banks,'' which are instead covered by the provisions of this 
proposed rule.
    \2\ ``Restrictions on Qualified Financial Contracts of 
Systemically Important U.S. Banking Organizations and the U.S. 
Operations of Systemically Important Foreign Banking Organizations; 
Revisions to the Definition of Qualifying Master Netting Agreement 
and Related Definitions,'' 81 FR 29691, 29170 (May 11, 2016) (FRB 
Proposal, FRB NPRM, Board's Proposal, or Board's NPRM).
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    The purpose of the Board's NPRM is to improve the resolvability of 
covered entities by ``limiting disruptions to a failed GSIB through its 
financial contracts with other companies.'' \3\ Specifically, the 
Board's NPRM addresses a threat to financial stability posed by the 
potential disorderly exercise of default rights contained in several 
important categories of financial contracts collectively known as 
``qualified financial contracts'' (QFCs).\4\
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    \3\ Id. at 29170.
    \4\ Id. The Board's Proposal adopts the definition of 
``qualified financial contract'' set out in section 210(c)(8)(D) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D). See Board's Proposal 
Sec.  252.81. This definition includes, among other things, 
derivatives, repurchase agreements (also known as ``repos'') and 
reverse repos, and securities lending and borrowing agreements.
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    As described more fully in the Board's NPRM and in the Background 
section of this preamble, this threat to financial stability arises 
because GSIBs are interconnected with other financial firms, including 
other GSIBs, through large volumes of QFCs. The failure of one entity 
within a GSIB can trigger disruptive terminations of these contracts if 
the counterparties of both the failed entity and its affiliates 
exercise their contractual rights to terminate the contracts and 
liquidate collateral.\5\ These terminations, especially if 
counterparties lose confidence in the GSIB quickly, and in large 
numbers, can destabilize the financial system and potentially spark a 
financial crisis through several channels. For example, they can 
destabilize the failed entity's otherwise solvent affiliates, causing 
them to weaken or fail with adverse consequences to their 
counterparties that can result in a chain reaction that ripples through 
the financial system. They also may result in ``fire sales'' of large 
volumes of financial assets, in particular, the collateral that secures 
the contracts, which can in turn weaken and cause stress for other 
firms by depressing the value of similar assets that they hold.
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    \5\ As used in this proposed rule, the term ``GSIB'' can refer 
to any entity in the GSIB group, including the top-tier parent 
entity or any subsidiary thereof. The term ``GSIB entity'' is 
sometimes used to refer to an individual component of the GSIB 
group.
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    As discussed in detail in the Section I.B., the OCC, as the primary 
regulator for national banks, Federal savings associations (FSAs), and 
Federal branches and agencies, has a strong safety and soundness 
interest in preventing such a disorderly termination of QFCs upon a 
GSIB's entry into resolution proceedings. QFCs are typically entered 
into by various operating entities in the GSIB group, which will often 
include a large depository institution that is subject to the OCC's 
supervision. These OCC-supervised entities are some of the largest 
entities by asset size in the GSIB group, and often a party to large 
volumes of QFCs, making these entities highly interconnected with other 
large financial firms.\6\ The exercise of default rights against an 
otherwise healthy national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency 
resulting from the failure of its affiliate, for example its top-tier 
U.S. holding company, may cause it to weaken or fail, and in turn 
spread contagion throughout the financial system, including among the 
system of federally chartered and licensed institutions that the OCC 
supervises, by causing a chain of failures by other financial 
institutions--including other national banks, FSAs, or Federal branches 
or agencies--that are its QFC counterparties. Furthermore, if an OCC-
supervised entity itself were to fail, it is imperative that the 
default rights triggered by such an event are exercised in an orderly 
manner, both by domestic and foreign counterparties, to ensure that 
contagion does not spread to other federally chartered and licensed 
institutions and beyond throughout the Federal banking system.\7\
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    \6\ 81 FR 29619, 29172 (``From the standpoint of financial 
stability, the most important of these operating subsidiaries are 
generally a U.S. insured depository institution, a U.S. broker-
dealer, and similar entities organized in other countries.'').
    \7\ As used in this proposed rule, the term ``Federal banking 
system'' refers to all OCC-supervised entities, including national 
banks, Federal savings associations, and Federal branches and 
agencies. Accordingly, references to impacts on the Federal banking 
system refer to how destabilization can adversely affect all such 
entities, not just covered banks.
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    Accordingly, OCC-supervised affiliates or branches of U.S. or 
foreign GSIBs are exposed, through the interconnectedness of their QFCs 
and their affiliates' QFCs, to destabilizing effects if their 
counterparties or the counterparties of their affiliates exercise 
default rights upon the entry into resolution of the covered bank 
itself or its GSIB affiliate. These potential destabilizing effects are 
best addressed by requiring all GSIB entities to amend their QFCs to 
include contractual provisions aimed at avoiding such destabilization. 
As the primary supervisor of covered banks, the OCC has a significant 
interest in preventing or mitigating these destabilizing effects; 
otherwise, the result will be adverse to safety and soundness of 
covered banks individually and collectively, with the potential for 
spill-over beyond GSIB-affiliated banks and Federal branches and 
agencies to the Federal banking system.
    As described in the Board's NPRM, measures aimed at improving 
financial stability and the probability of a successful resolution of 
GSIBs likely will affect the operations of GSIB subsidiaries. In most 
cases, the largest GSIB subsidiary by asset size is a national bank 
supervised by the OCC. While the ultimate aim of the Board's NPRM and 
this proposed rule is focused on the resolution of a GSIB, the proposed 
preventative measures would be required to be implemented by GSIBs 
while they are going concerns. The OCC has an inherent supervisory 
interest in ensuring that measures aimed at improving resolvability in 
the event of a GSIB's failure are also consistent with

[[Page 55383]]

the safe and sound operation of the OCC-supervised subsidiary as a 
going concern. Accordingly, to ensure that the QFCs entered into by 
such entities do not threaten the stability or safety and soundness of 
covered banks individually or collectively, the OCC is issuing this 
proposed rule, which imposes substantively identical requirements 
contained in the FRB NPRM on national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches 
and agencies (covered banks). The OCC worked closely with the FRB to 
develop this proposed rule.\8\ In addition, the OCC plans to work with 
the FRB to coordinate the development of the final rule and may share 
comments received in response to the proposed rule, as appropriate.
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    \8\ 12 U.S.C. 5365(b)(4) (requiring the Board to consult with 
each Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) member that 
primarily supervises any subsidiary when any prudential standard is 
likely to have a ``significant impact'' on such subsidiary).
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II. Background

    The following background discussion describes in detail the 
financial contracts that are the subject of this proposed rule, the 
default rights often contained in such contracts, and impacts on 
financial stability resulting from the exercise of such default rights. 
This section also provides background information on the resolution 
strategies for GSIBs and how they fit within the resolution frameworks 
in the United States.\9\
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    \9\ See 81 FR 29169, 29170-73 (May 11, 2016), from which this 
discussion is adapted.
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A. Qualified Financial Contracts, Default Rights, and Financial 
Stability

    The proposed rule covers QFCs, which include swaps, other 
derivative contracts, repurchase agreements (repos) and reverse repos, 
and securities lending and borrowing agreements. GSIB entities enter 
into QFCs to borrow money to finance their investments, to lend money, 
to manage risk, to attempt to profit from market movements, and to 
enable their clients and counterparties to perform these financial 
activities.
    QFCs play a role in economically valuable financial intermediation 
when markets are functioning normally. But they are also a major source 
of financial interconnectedness, which may pose a threat to financial 
stability in times of stress. This proposed rule, along with the FRB 
NPRM, focuses on one of the most serious threats to both a global 
systemically important bank holding company (BHC) and its covered banks 
subsidiaries--the failure of a GSIB that is party to large volumes of 
QFCs, which are likely to involve QFCs with counterparties that are 
themselves systemically important.
    By contract, a party to a QFC generally has the right to take 
certain actions if its counterparty defaults on the QFC (that is, if it 
fails to meet certain contractual obligations). Common default rights 
include the right to suspend performance of the non-defaulting party's 
obligations, the right to terminate or accelerate the contract, the 
right to set off amounts owed between the parties, the right to seize 
and liquidate the defaulting party's collateral. In general, default 
rights allow a party to a QFC to reduce the credit risk associated with 
the QFC by granting it the right to exit the QFC and thereby reduce its 
exposure to its counterparty upon the occurrence of a specified 
condition, such as its counterparty's entry into resolution 
proceedings.
    This proposed rule focuses on two distinct scenarios in which a 
non-defaulting party to a QFC is commonly able to exercise default 
rights. These two scenarios involve a default that occurs when either 
the defaulting party to the QFC or an affiliate of that party enters a 
resolution proceeding.\10\
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    \10\ This preamble uses phrases such as ``entering a resolution 
proceeding'' and ``going into resolution'' to refer to the concept 
of ``becoming subject to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding.'' These phrases refer to 
proceedings established by law to deal with a failed legal entity. 
In the context of the failure of a global systemically important 
bank holding company, the most relevant types of resolution 
proceeding include: (1) For most U.S.-based legal entities, the 
bankruptcy process established by the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Title 
11, United States Code); (2) for U.S. insured depository 
institutions, a receivership administered by the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(12 U.S.C. 1821); (3) for companies whose ``resolution under 
otherwise applicable Federal or State law would have serious adverse 
effects on the financial stability of the United States,'' the Dodd-
Frank Act's Orderly Liquidation Authority (12 U.S.C. 5383(b)(2)); 
and, (4) for entities based outside the United States, resolution 
proceedings created by foreign law.
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    The first scenario occurs when a legal entity that is itself a 
party to the QFC enters a resolution proceeding. This proposed rule 
refers to such a scenario as a ``direct default'' and refers to the 
contractual default rights that arise from a direct default as ``direct 
default rights.'' \11\
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    \11\ For convenience, this preamble uses the general term 
``default'' to refer specifically to a default that occurs when a 
QFC party or its affiliate enters a resolution proceeding.
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    The second scenario occurs when an affiliate of the legal entity 
that is a direct party to the QFC (such as the direct party's parent 
holding company) enters a resolution proceeding. This proposed rule 
refers to such a scenario as a ``cross-default'' and refers to 
contractual default rights that arise from a cross-default as ``cross-
default rights.'' For example, a GSIB parent entity might guarantee the 
derivatives transactions of its subsidiaries and those derivatives 
contracts could contain cross-default rights against a subsidiary of 
the GSIB that would be triggered by the bankruptcy filing of the GSIB 
parent entity even though the subsidiary continues to meet all of its 
financial obligations.
    Direct default rights and cross-default rights are referred to 
collectively in this proposed rule as ``default rights.''
    As noted in the FRB NPRM, if a significant number of QFC 
counterparties exercise their default rights precipitously and in a 
manner that would impede an orderly resolution of a GSIB, all QFC 
counterparties and the broader financial system, including institutions 
supervised by the OCC, may potentially be worse off and less stable.
    The destabilization can occur in several ways. First, 
counterparties' exercise of default rights may drain liquidity from the 
troubled GSIB, forcing it to sell off assets at depressed prices, both 
because the sales must be done on a short timeframe and because the 
elevated supply will push prices down. These asset ``fire sales'' may 
cause or deepen balance-sheet insolvency at the GSIB, reducing the 
amount that its other creditors can recover and thereby imposing losses 
on those creditors and threatening their solvency (and, indirectly, the 
solvency of their own creditors, and so on). The GSIB may also respond 
by withdrawing liquidity that it had offered to other firms, forcing 
them to engage in asset fire sales. Alternatively, if the GSIB's QFC 
counterparty itself liquidates the QFC collateral at fire sale prices, 
the effect will again be to weaken the GSIB's balance sheet, because 
the debt satisfied by the liquidation would be less than what the value 
of the collateral would have been outside the fire sale context. The 
counterparty's setoff rights may allow it to further drain the GSIB's 
capital and liquidity by withholding payments owed to the GSIB. The 
GSIB may also have rehypothecated collateral that it received from QFC 
counterparties, for instance in back-to-back repo or securities lending 
transactions, in which case demands from those counterparties for the 
early return of their rehypothecated collateral could be especially 
disruptive.
    The asset fire sales can also spread contagion throughout the 
financial system by increasing volatility and by lowering the value of 
similar assets held by other financial institutions, potentially 
causing them to suffer

[[Page 55384]]

diminished market confidence in their own solvency, mark-to-market 
losses, margin calls, and creditor runs (which could lead to further 
fire sales, worsening the contagion). Finally, the early terminations 
of derivatives that the defaulting GSIB relied on to hedge its risks 
could leave major risks unhedged, increasing the GSIB's probable losses 
going forward.
    Where there are significant simultaneous terminations and these 
effects occur contemporaneously, such as upon the failure of a GSIB 
that is party to a large volume of QFCs, they may pose a substantial 
risk to financial stability. In short, QFC continuity is important for 
the orderly resolution of a GSIB so that the instability caused by 
asset fire sales can be avoided.\12\
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    \12\ The Board and the FDIC identified the exercise of default 
rights in financial contracts as a potential obstacle to orderly 
resolution in the context of resolution plans filed pursuant to 
section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act and, accordingly, instructed 
the most systemically important firms to demonstrate that they are 
``amending, on an industry-wide and firm-specific basis, financial 
contracts to provide for a stay of certain early termination rights 
of external counterparties triggered by insolvency proceedings.'' 
FRB and FDIC, ``Agencies Provide Feedback on Second Round Resolution 
Plans of `First-Wave' Filers'' (August 5, 2014), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140805a.htm. See 
also FRB and FDIC, ``Agencies Provide Feedback on Resolution Plans 
of Three Foreign Banking Organizations'' (March 23, 2015), available 
at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150323a.htm; FRB and FDIC, ``Guidance for 2013 165(d) Annual 
Resolution Plan Submissions by Domestic Covered Companies that 
Submitted Initial Resolution Plans in 2012'' 5-6 (April 15, 2013), 
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130415c2.pdf.
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    As will be discussed further, the proposed rule is primarily 
concerned only with default rights that run against a GSIB--that is, 
direct default rights and cross-default rights that arise from the 
entry into resolution of a GSIB. The proposed rule would not affect 
contractual default rights that a GSIB (or any other entity) may have 
against a counterparty that is not a GSIB. The OCC believes that this 
limited scope is appropriate because the risk posed to financial 
stability by the exercise of QFC default rights is greatest when the 
defaulting counterparty is a GSIB.

B. QFC Default Rights and GSIB Resolution Strategies

    Under the Dodd-Frank Act, many complex GSIBs are required to submit 
resolution plans to the Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), detailing how the company can be resolved in a 
rapid and orderly manner in the event of material financial distress or 
failure of the company. In response to these requirements, these firms 
have developed resolution strategies that, broadly speaking, fall into 
two categories: The single-point-of-entry (SPOE) strategy and the 
multiple-point-of-entry (MPOE) strategy. As noted in the Board's 
Proposal, cross-default rights in QFCs pose a potential obstacle to the 
implementation of either of these strategies.
    In an SPOE resolution, only a single legal entity--the GSIB's top-
tier BHC--would enter a resolution proceeding. The losses that led to 
the GSIB's failure would be passed up from the operating subsidiaries 
that incurred the losses to the holding company and would then be 
imposed on the equity holders and unsecured creditors of the holding 
company through the resolution process. This strategy is designed to 
help ensure that the GSIB's subsidiaries remain adequately capitalized. 
An SPOE resolution could thereby prevent those operating subsidiaries 
from failing or entering resolution themselves and allow them to 
instead continue normal operations. The expectation that the holding 
company's equity holders and unsecured creditors would absorb the 
GSIB's losses in the event of failure would help to maintain the 
confidence of the operating subsidiaries' creditors and counterparties 
(including QFC counterparties), reducing their incentive to engage in 
potentially destabilizing funding runs or margin calls and thus 
lowering the risk of asset fire sales.
    An SPOE proceeding can avoid the need for covered banks to be 
placed into receivership or similar proceedings, as they would continue 
to operate as going concerns, only if the parent's entry into 
resolution proceedings does not trigger the exercise of cross-default 
rights. Accordingly, this proposed rule, by limiting such cross-default 
rights based on an affiliate's entry into resolution proceedings, 
enables the SPOE strategy, and in turn, would assist in stabilizing 
both the covered bank and the Federal banking system.
    This proposed rule would also yield benefits for resolution under 
the MPOE strategy. Unlike the SPOE strategy, an MPOE strategy involves 
several entities in the GSIB group entering proceedings. For example, 
an MPOE strategy might involve a foreign GSIB's U.S. intermediate 
holding company going into resolution or a GSIB's U.S. insured 
depository institution entering resolution under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act. Similar to the benefits associated with the SPOE 
strategy, this proposed rule would help support the continued operation 
of affiliates of an entity experiencing resolution to the extent the 
affiliate continues to perform on its QFCs.

C. Default Rights and Relevant Resolution Laws

    In order to understand the connection between direct defaults, 
cross-defaults, the SPOE and MPOE resolution strategies, and the 
threats to financial stability discussed previously, it is necessary to 
understand how QFCs, and the default rights contained therein, are 
treated when an entity enters resolution. The following sections 
discuss the treatment of QFCs in greater detail under three U.S. 
resolution laws: the Bankruptcy Code, the Orderly Liquidation 
Authority, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. As discussed in these 
sections, each of these resolution laws has special provisions 
detailing the treatment of QFCs upon an entity's entry into such 
proceedings.
    U.S. Bankruptcy Code. While covered banks themselves are not 
subject to resolution under the Bankruptcy Code, in general, if a BHC 
were to fail, it would be resolved under the Bankruptcy Code. When an 
entity goes into resolution under the Bankruptcy Code, attempts by the 
creditors of the debtor to enforce their debts through any means other 
than participation in the bankruptcy proceeding (for instance, by suing 
in another court, seeking enforcement of a preexisting judgment, or 
seizing and liquidating collateral) are generally blocked by the 
imposition of an automatic stay, which generally persists throughout 
the bankruptcy proceeding.\13\ A key purpose of the automatic stay, and 
of bankruptcy law in general, is to maximize the value of the 
bankruptcy estate and the creditors' ultimate recoveries by 
facilitating an orderly liquidation or restructuring of the debtor. As 
a result, the automatic stay addresses the collective action problem, 
in which the creditors' individual incentives to race to recover as 
much from the debtor as possible, before other creditors can do so, 
collectively cause a value-destroying disorderly liquidation of the 
debtor.\14\
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    \13\ See 11 U.S.C. 362.
    \14\ See, e.g., Aiello v. Providian Financial Corp., 239 F.3d 
876, 879 (7th Cir. 2001).
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    The Bankruptcy Code, however, largely exempts QFC counterparties 
from the automatic stay through special ``safe harbor'' provisions.\15\ 
Under these provisions, any contractual rights that a QFC counterparty 
has to terminate the contract, set off obligations, and liquidate 
collateral in response to a direct default or cross-default are not

[[Page 55385]]

subject to the stay and may be exercised at any time.\16\
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    \15\ 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(6), (7), (17), (27), 362(o), 555, 556, 
559, 560, 561.
    \16\ The Bankruptcy Code does not itself confer any default 
rights upon QFC counterparties; it merely permits QFC counterparties 
to exercise certain contractual rights that they have under the 
terms of the QFC. This proposed rule does not propose to restrict 
the exercise of any default rights that fall within the Bankruptcy 
Code's safe harbor provisions, which are described here to provide 
context.
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    Where the failed firm is a GSIB's holding company with covered 
banks that are going concerns and are party to large volumes of QFCs, 
the mass exercise of default rights under the QFCs based on the 
affiliate default represents a significant impediment to the SPOE 
resolution strategy.\17\ This is because the failure of a covered 
bank's affiliate will trigger the mass exercise of cross-default rights 
against the covered bank, which will not be stayed by the affiliate's 
entry into bankruptcy proceedings. This will in turn lead to fire sales 
that will threaten the ongoing viability of the covered bank and the 
successful resolution of the particular GSIB--and thus will also pose a 
threat to the federal banking system and broader financial system.
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    \17\ As noted previously, the MPOE strategy will similarly 
benefit from the override of cross-defaults. The SPOE strategy is 
used here for illustrative purposes only.
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    Special Resolution Regimes Under U.S. Law. For purposes of this 
proposed rule, there are two special resolution regimes under U.S. law: 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Orderly Liquidation Authority 
(OLA); and the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). While these 
regimes both impose certain limitations on the ability of 
counterparties to exercise default rights--thus mitigating the 
potential for disorderly resolution due to the exercise by 
counterparties of such default rights--these limitations may not be 
applicable or clearly enforceable in certain contexts.
    Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the Orderly Resolution 
Authority. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes an alternative 
resolution framework intended ``to provide the necessary authority to 
liquidate failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to 
the financial stability of the United States in a manner that mitigates 
such risk and minimizes moral hazard.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ 12 U.S.C. 5384(a) (Section 204(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As noted, although a failed BHC would generally be resolved under 
the Bankruptcy Code, Congress recognized that a U.S. financial company 
might fail under extraordinary circumstances, in which an attempt to 
resolve it through the bankruptcy process would have serious adverse 
effects on financial stability in the United States. Title II therefore 
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, upon the recommendation of 
other government agencies and a determination that several 
preconditions are met, to place a U.S. financial company into a 
receivership conducted by the FDIC as an alternative to bankruptcy.
    Title II empowers the FDIC, when it acts as receiver in an OLA 
resolution, to protect financial stability against the QFC-related 
threats discussed previously. Title II addresses direct default rights 
in a number of ways. First, Title II empowers the FDIC to transfer the 
QFCs to some other financial company that is not in a resolution 
proceeding.\19\ To give the FDIC time to effect this transfer, Title II 
temporarily stays QFC counterparties of the failed entity from 
exercising termination, netting, and collateral liquidation rights 
``solely by reason of or incidental to'' the failed entity's entry into 
OLA resolution, its insolvency, or its financial condition.\20\ Second, 
once the QFCs are transferred in accord with the statute, Title II 
permanently stays the exercise of those direct default rights based on 
the prior event of default and receivership.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(9).
    \20\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(10)(B)(i)(I). This temporary stay 
generally lasts until 5:00 p.m. eastern time on the business day 
following the appointment of the FDIC as receiver.
    \21\ If the QFCs are transferred to a solvent third party before 
the stay expires, the counterparty is permanently enjoined from 
exercising such rights based upon the appointment of the FDIC as 
receiver of the financial company (or the insolvency or financial 
condition of the financial company), but is not stayed from 
exercising such rights based upon other events of default. 12 U.S.C. 
5390(c)(10)(B)(i)(II).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Title II addresses cross-default rights through a similar 
procedure. It empowers the FDIC ``to enforce contracts of subsidiaries 
or affiliates'' of the failed company that are guaranteed or otherwise 
supported by or linked to the covered financial company, 
notwithstanding any contractual right to cause the termination, 
liquidation, or acceleration of such contracts based solely on the 
insolvency, financial condition, or receivership of the failed company, 
so long as the FDIC takes certain steps to protect the QFC 
counterparty's interests by the end of the business day following the 
company's entry into OLA resolution.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(16); 12 CFR 380.12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These stay-and-transfer provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act go far to 
mitigate the threat posed by QFC default rights by preventing mass 
closeouts against the entity that has entered into OLA proceedings or 
its going concern affiliates. At the same time, they allow for 
appropriate protections for QFC counterparties of the failed financial 
company. They only stay the exercise of default rights based on the 
failed company's entry into resolution, the fact of its insolvency, or 
its financial condition. And the stay period is brief, unless the FDIC 
transfers the QFCs to another financial company that is not in 
resolution and should therefore be capable of performing under the 
QFCs.
    Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Under the FDIA, a failing insured 
depository institution would generally enter a receivership 
administered by the FDIC.\23\ The FDIA addresses direct default rights 
in the failed bank's QFCs with stay-and-transfer provisions that are 
substantially similar to the provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank 
Act as discussed.\24\ However, the FDIA does not address cross-default 
rights, leaving the QFC counterparties of the failed depository 
institution's affiliates free to exercise any contractual rights they 
may have to terminate, net, and liquidate collateral based on the 
depository institution's entry into resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ 12 U.S.C. 1821(c).
    \24\ See 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(8)-(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

III. Description of the Proposal

A. Overview, Purpose, and Authority

    As discussed previously, and in the Board's Proposal, the exercise 
of default rights by counterparties of a failed GSIB can have a 
significant impact on financial stability. This financial stability 
concern is necessarily intertwined with the safety and soundness of 
covered banks and the federal banking system--the disorderly exercise 
of default rights can produce a sudden, contemporaneous threat to the 
safety and soundness of individual institutions throughout the system, 
which in turn threatens the system as a whole.[hairsp] Accordingly, 
national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies are affected by 
financial instability--even if such instability is precipitated outside 
the Federal banking system--and can themselves also be sources of 
financial destabilization due to the interconnectedness of these 
institutions to each other and to other entities within the financial 
system. Thus, safety and soundness of individual national banks, FSAs, 
and Federal branches and agencies, the federal banking system, and 
financial stability of the system as a whole are interconnected.

[[Page 55386]]

    The purpose of this proposed rule is to enhance the safety and 
soundness of covered banks and the federal banking system, thereby also 
bolstering financial stability generally, by addressing the two main 
issues raised by covered QFCs with the orderly resolution of these 
covered banks as generally described in the Board's Proposal.
    While Title II and the FDIA empower the use of the QFC stay-and-
transfer provisions, a court in a foreign jurisdiction may decline to 
enforce these important provisions. The proposed rule directly improves 
the safety and soundness of covered banks by clarifying the 
applicability of U.S. special resolution regimes to all counterparties, 
whether they are foreign or domestic. Although domestic entities are 
clearly subject to the temporary stay provisions of OLA and the FDIA, 
these stays may be difficult to enforce in a cross-border context. As a 
result, domestic counterparties of a failed U.S. financial institution 
may be disadvantaged relative to foreign counterparties, as the 
domestic counterparties would be subject to the stay, and accompanying 
potential market volatility, while if the stay was not enforced by 
foreign authorities, foreign counterparties could close out 
immediately. Furthermore, a mass close out by such foreign 
counterparties would likely exacerbate market volatility, which in turn 
would likely magnify harm to the stayed U.S. counterparties' positions, 
which are likely to include other national banks and FSAs. This 
proposed rule would eliminate the potential for these adverse 
consequences by requiring covered banks to condition the exercise of 
default rights in covered contracts on the stay provisions of OLA and 
the FDIA.
    In spite of the QFC stay-and-transfer provisions in Title II and 
the FDIA, the affiliates of a global systemically important BHC that 
goes into resolution under the Bankruptcy Code may face disruptions to 
their QFCs as their counterparties exercise cross-default rights. Thus, 
a healthy covered bank whose parent BHC entered resolution proceedings 
could fail due to its counterparties exercising cross-default rights. 
This is clearly both a safety and soundness concern for the otherwise 
healthy covered bank, but it also has the additional negative effect of 
defeating the orderly resolution of the GSIB, since a key element of 
SPOE resolution in the United States is ensuring that critical 
operating subsidiaries--such as covered banks--continue to operate on a 
going concern basis. This proposed rule would address this issue by 
generally restricting the exercise of cross-default rights by 
counterparties against a covered bank.
    Moreover, a disorderly resolution like that described previously 
could jeopardize not just the covered bank and the orderly resolution 
of its failed parent BHC, but all surviving counterparties, many of 
which are likely to be other national banks and other FSAs, regardless 
of size or interconnectedness, by harming the overall condition of the 
Federal banking system and the financial system as a whole. A 
disorderly resolution could result in additional defaults, fire sales 
of collateral, and other consequences likely to amplify the systemic 
fallout of the resolution of a covered bank.
    The proposed rule is designed to minimize such disorder, and 
therefore enhance the safety and soundness of all individual national 
banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies, the Federal banking 
system, and the broader financial system. This is particularly 
important because financial institutions are more sensitive than other 
firms to the overall health of the financial system.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ The OCC, along with the FDIC and FRB, recently made this 
point in the swap margin NPRM. 79 FR 57348, 57361 (September 24, 
2014) (``Financial firms present a higher level of risk than other 
types of counterparties because the profitability and viability of 
financial firms is more tightly linked to the health of the 
financial system than other types of counterparties. Because 
financial counterparties are more likely to default during a period 
of financial stress, they pose greater systemic risk and risk to the 
safety and soundness of the covered swap entity.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule covers the OCC-supervised operations of foreign 
banking organizations (FBOs) designated as systemically important, 
including national bank and FSA subsidiaries, as well as Federal 
branches and agencies, of these FBOs. As with a national bank or FSA 
subsidiary of a U.S. global systemically important BHC, the OCC 
believes that this proposed rule should apply to a national bank or FSA 
subsidiary of a global systematically important FBO for essentially the 
same reasons. While the national bank or FSA may not be considered 
systemically important itself, as part of a GSIB, the disorderly 
resolution of the covered national banks and FSAs could have a 
significant negative impact on the Federal banking system and on the 
U.S. financial system, in general.
    Specifically, the proposed rule is designed to prevent the failure 
of a global systemically important FBO from disrupting the ongoing 
operations or orderly resolution of the covered bank by protecting the 
healthy national bank or FSA from the mass triggering of default rights 
by the QFC counterparties. Additionally, the application of this 
proposed rule to the QFCs of these national bank and FSA subsidiaries 
should avoid creating what may otherwise be an incentive for 
counterparties to concentrate QFCs in these firms because they are 
subject to fewer counterparty restrictions.
    Similarly, it is important to cover any Federal branch or agency of 
a global systemically important FBO in order to ensure the orderly 
resolution of these entities if the parent FBO were to be placed into 
resolution in its home jurisdiction. However, to avoid unduly broad 
application of the proposed rule and imposing unnecessary restrictions 
on the QFCs of global systemically important FBOs, the proposed rule 
would exclude certain QFCs that do not have a clear nexus to its U.S. 
operations. Specifically, the proposed rule would exclude covered QFCs 
under multi-branch arrangements that either are not booked at the 
Federal branch or agency or do not provide for payment or delivery at 
the Federal branch or agency. The OCC believes that this provides a 
reasonable limitation on the scope of the proposed rule to those QFCs 
of covered Federal branches and agencies that have a direct effect on 
the Federal banking system and the general financial stability of the 
United States.
    The OCC is issuing this proposed rule under its authorities under 
the National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 1 et seq.), the Home Owners' Loan Act 
(12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.), and the International Banking Act of 1978 (12 
U.S.C. 3101 et seq.), including its general rulemaking authorities.\26\ 
As discussed in detail in Section I. B., the OCC views the proposed 
rule as consistent with its overall statutory mandate of assuring the 
safety and soundness of entities subject to its supervision, including 
national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ See 12 U.S.C. 93a, 1463(a)(2), and 3108(a).
    \27\ See 12 U.S.C. 1. This primary responsibility is also 
defined in various provisions throughout the OCC's express statutory 
authorities with respect to each institution type under their 
respective statutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Covered Banks (Section 47.3(a), (b), (c))

    The proposed rule would apply to all ``covered banks.'' The term 
``covered bank'' would be defined to include (i) any national bank or 
FSA that is a subsidiary of a global systemically important BHC that 
has been designated pursuant to subpart I of 12 CFR part 252 of this 
title (FRB Regulation YY); or (ii) is a national bank or FSA 
subsidiary, or Federal branch or agency of a global systemically 
important FBO that has

[[Page 55387]]

been designated pursuant to FRB Regulation YY.
    The proposed rule defines global systemically important BHC and 
global systemically important FBO by cross-reference to newly added 
subpart I of 12 CFR part 252 of the Board's Proposal. The list of 
banking organizations that meet the methodology proposed in the FRB 
NPRM is currently the same set of banking organizations that meet the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) definition of a GSIB.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ In November 2015, the Financial Stability Board and BCBS 
published a list of banks that meet the BCBS definition of a global 
systemically important bank (BCBS G-SIB) based on year-end 2014 
data. A list based on year-end 2014 data was published November 3, 
2015 (available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2015-update-of-list-of-global-systemically-important-banks-G-SIBs.pdf). 
The U.S. top-tier BHCs that are currently identified as a BCBS G-
SIBs are Bank of America Corporation, Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan 
Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, and Wells 
Fargo & Company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule covers national bank and FSA subsidiaries of 
global systemically important BHCs and FBOs, and Federal branches and 
agencies of global systemically important FBOs. In the United States, 
covered QFCs typically are entered into at the subsidiary level, which 
would include through the national bank, FSA or Federal branch or 
agency, rather than through the U.S. intermediate holding company.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Under the clean holding company component of the FRB's 
recent Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) proposal, the U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of foreign GSIB entities would be 
prohibited from entering into QFCs with third parties. See 80 FR 
74926 (November 30, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The OCC believes if the orderly resolution of a covered entity as 
defined under the FRB's Proposal is to be successful, then it is 
necessary that all national banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and 
agencies of systemically important global systemically important BHCs 
and FBOs be subject to the mandatory contractual requirements in this 
proposed rule. Moreover, this proposed rule would make clear that the 
mandatory contractual stay requirements apply to the subsidiaries of 
any national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency that is a covered 
bank. Under the proposed rule, the term covered bank also includes any 
subsidiary of a national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or agency. The 
definition of ``subsidiary of covered bank'' in the proposed rule 
mirrors the definition of subsidiary in the FRB's Regulation YY (12 CFR 
252.2), and it is intended to be substantially the same as the FRB's 
definition with respect to a subsidiary of a covered bank. Essentially, 
for the same reasons that it is necessary to cover all national banks, 
FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies of global systemically 
important BHCs and FBOs under the proposed rule, the OCC believes that 
it is necessary that all subsidiaries of those covered banks also be 
subject to the mandatory contractual stay requirements. As mentioned, 
unless all entities that are part of a GSIB are covered, counterparties 
might have incentives to migrate their covered QFCs to uncovered 
entities.
    Question 1: While the exercise of mass closeout rights against any 
individual national bank, FSA or Federal branch or agency would raise 
concerns, the OCC is especially concerned about the potential spill-
over effect such mass closeouts would have, either individually or 
collectively, on the Federal banking system if the entity itself is 
systemically important or part of a larger banking group that is 
systemically important. Are there alternative approaches for 
determining which national banks, FSAs and Federal branches and 
agencies should be considered systemically important?
    Question 2: While the primary focus of this rule is on, covered 
banks--i.e., those that are subsidiaries or branches of U.S. or foreign 
GSIBS--there is some concern that given the interconnected nature of 
QFCs, a market disruption could significantly impact all national 
banks, FSAs and Federal branches and agencies. Should this proposed 
rule be expanded to cover more OCC-regulated entities, for example, 
those national banks, FSAs or Federal branches and agencies with 
material levels of QFC activities? How could material levels of QFC 
activities be defined and measured?
    Question 3: Conversely, is the scope of this proposed rule too 
broad? The proposed rule would apply to all covered QFCs of covered 
banks as well as all of their subsidiaries, regardless of size or 
volume of transactions. A key policy concern is that unless all 
subsidiaries of a covered bank are subject to the direct and cross-
default restrictions of the proposed rule, covered banks and their 
counterparties would have the incentive to transfer their QFCs to 
unprotected subsidiaries of the covered bank. Could the scope of 
entities covered by the proposed rule be narrowed while still achieving 
its policy objectives? If so, what criteria could be used? For example, 
should a subsidiary of covered banks that only engages in some de 
minimis level of covered QFCs be safely excluded from the scope of this 
proposed rule? Are there alternative ways to define what will be 
considered subsidiaries for purposes of this rule?
    Question 4: Some of the subsidiaries of covered banks under the 
proposed rule could be subject to additional supervision by another 
U.S. agency, such as the case of a broker-dealer subsidiary of a 
national bank. Does the issue of potentially conflicting jurisdiction 
need to be addressed? If so, how? For example, should the rule provide 
a carve out for a subsidiary of a covered bank that is subject to 
comparable requirements under the regulations of another agency?
    Question 5: The scope of this proposed rule is designed to cover 
any national bank or FSA that is a subsidiary of a global systemically 
important BHC or FBO under the FRB NPRM. While this scope of coverage 
ensures that all national banks or FSAs under a global systemically 
important BHC or FBO would be subject to the same substantive 
contractual mandatory stay under the FRB NPRM, the proposed rule does 
not take into account the potential situation of a standalone national 
bank or FSA, not under a BHC, that might itself be considered 
systemically important. Although no such entity exists currently, the 
OCC is considering whether to amend the definition of covered bank to 
include any national bank or FSB that meets a certain asset threshold 
test. In this case, the OCC is considering using the $700 billion in 
total consolidated assets that is used in the Enhanced Supplementary 
Leverage Ratio.\30\ Should the OCC decide to address standalone 
national banks and FSBs, what methodology and factors should the OCC 
consider in deciding which institutions to include?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ See 79 FR 24528 (May 1, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Covered QFCs (Sections 47.4(a), 47.5(a), 47.7, 47.8)

    General requirement. The proposed rule would require covered banks 
to ensure that each ``covered QFC'' conforms to the requirements of 
sections 47.4 and 47.5. These sections require that a covered QFC (1) 
contain contractual stay-and-transfer provisions similar to those 
imposed under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDIA, and (2) 
limit the exercise of default rights based on the insolvency of an 
affiliate of the covered bank. A ``covered QFC'' is generally defined 
as any QFC that a covered bank enters, executes, or otherwise becomes 
party to. A party to a QFC includes a party acting as agent under the 
QFC. ``Qualified financial contract'' or ``QFC'' would be defined to 
have the same meaning as in section 210(c)(8)(D) of Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank

[[Page 55388]]

Act and would include derivatives, swaps, repurchase, reverse 
repurchase, and securities lending and borrowing transactions.
    Except for certain QFCs under multi-branch master agreements, the 
definition of QFC would include a single QFC, but also all QFCs under a 
master agreement. Master agreements are contracts that contain general 
terms that the parties wish to apply to multiple transactions between 
them; having executed the master agreement, the parties can then 
include those terms in future contracts through reference to the master 
agreement. The proposed rule defines master agreement as defined by 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act or any master agreement designated by 
regulation by the FDIC. Under the definition, master agreements for 
QFCs, together with all supplements to the master agreement (including 
underlying transactions), would be treated as a single QFC.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(viii); see also 12 U.S.C. 
1821(e)(8)(D)(vii); 109 H. Rpt. 31, Part 1 (April 8, 2005) 
(explaining that a ``master agreement for one or more securities 
contracts, commodity contracts, forward contracts, repurchase 
agreements or swap agreements will be treated as a single QFC under 
the FDIA or the FCUA (but only with respect to the underlying 
agreements are themselves QFCs)'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed definition of ``QFC'' is intended to cover those 
financial transactions whose disorderly unwind has substantial 
potential to frustrate, directly or indirectly, the orderly resolution 
of the covered bank or any affiliate of such covered bank. The Dodd-
Frank Act uses its definition of ``qualified financial contract'' to 
determine the scope of the stay-and-transfer provisions that it applies 
to direct default and cross-default rights in an OLA resolution. By 
adopting the Dodd-Frank Act's definition, the proposed rule would track 
Congress's judgment as to which financial transactions could, if not 
subject to appropriate restrictions, pose an obstacle to the orderly 
resolution of a systemically important financial company.
    Question 6: With regard to the proposed definitions of ``QFC'' and 
``covered QFC'' are there other types of financial contracts or 
transactions that should be included in the definition of a ``covered 
QFC'' in the proposed rule because they could pose a similar risk to 
the safety and soundness of the covered national banks, FSAs, and 
Federal branches and agencies and to the Federal banking system? 
Conversely, is the definition of covered QFC too broad? Are there types 
of financial contracts that fall within the definition of covered QFC 
that could be excluded without compromising the policy objectives of 
the proposed rule?
    Question 7: Should this proposed rule include a reservation of 
authority provision that would maintain OCC's supervisory flexibility, 
on a case-by-case basis, to include or exclude from the proposed rule 
(1) specific OCC-supervised entities (and their subsidiaries) and (2) 
financial contracts or transactions, if consistent with the purposes of 
the proposed rule?
    Exclusion of cleared QFCs. The proposed rule would exclude from the 
definition of ``covered QFC'' all QFCs that are cleared through a 
central counterparty (CCP). The OCC continues to consider the 
appropriate treatment of centrally cleared QFCs, in light of 
differences between cleared and uncleared QFCs with respect to 
contractual arrangements, counterparty credit risk, default management, 
and supervision.
    Question 8: Should the QFCs between a CCP (or other financial 
market utility) and a member covered bank be subject to the 
requirements of this proposed rule? What additional risks do such 
cleared QFCs pose to the orderly resolution of covered banks and the 
Federal banking system? What other factors should be considered?
    Exclusion of certain QFCs under foreign bank multi-branch master 
agreements. Under the proposed rule, the definition of a ``QFC'' would 
include a master agreement that covers other QFCs. In addition, under 
this definition those QFCs covered by the master agreement would be 
treated as a single QFC. By design, this definition of QFC is intended 
to ensure that the proposed rule would apply to all of the relevant 
QFCs entered into by a covered bank. However, as applied to the QFCs of 
Federal branches and agencies under a multi-branch master agreement, 
this definition may be too broad in its scope.
    Foreign banks have multi-branch master agreements that permit 
transactions to be entered into both at a U.S. branch or agency of the 
foreign bank and at a foreign branch (located outside of the United 
States) of the foreign bank. Under this proposed rule, a QFC of a 
Federal branch or agency, as well as all of the QFCs entered into by 
foreign branches under the same multi-branch master agreement would be 
treated as a single QFC of the Federal branch or agency, and would 
therefore be subject to the requirements of this proposed rule. Where 
the QFC of the foreign branch has some U.S. nexus, such as permitting 
payment or delivery in the United States, the OCC believes that 
subjecting those QFCs to this proposed rule is reasonable and 
consistent with protecting the safety and soundness of the Federal 
banking system. However, where the QFC of the foreign branch does not 
permit any payment or delivery in the United States, the OCC believes 
that applying this proposed rule to such QFCs lacks a sufficient 
connection to the U.S. operations of the Federal branch or agency and 
may be unduly broad.
    Absent the possibility under the QFC of payment or delivery in the 
United States, the OCC believes that the impact of such QFCs on the 
Federal branch or agency covered by this proposed rule, or on the 
Federal banking system and the United States as a whole, is indirect 
and relatively immaterial. For this reason, the proposed rule would 
exclude QFCs under such a ``multi-branch master agreement'' that are 
not booked at a Federal branch or agency covered by this proposed rule, 
and for which no payment or delivery may be made at the Federal branch 
or agency. Conversely, the multi-branch master agreement would be a 
covered QFC with respect to QFC transactions that are booked and 
permits payment and delivery at a Federal branch or agency covered by 
this proposed rule.
    Question 9: Should the scope of the proposed rule be limited to 
only those transactions that are booked, or provide for payment and 
delivery, at the Federal branch or agency?

D. Definition of ``Default Right''

    As discussed previously, a party to a QFC generally has a number of 
rights that it can exercise if its counterparty defaults on the QFC by 
failing to meet certain contractual obligations. These rights are 
generally, but not always, contractual in nature. One common default 
right is a setoff right which is the right to reduce the total amount 
that the non-defaulting party must pay by the amount that its 
defaulting counterparty owes. A second common default right is the 
right to liquidate pledged collateral and use the proceeds to pay the 
defaulting party's net obligation to the non-defaulting party. Other 
common rights include the ability to suspend or delay the non-
defaulting party's performance under the contract or to accelerate the 
obligations of the defaulting party.
    Finally, the non-defaulting party typically has the right to 
terminate the QFC, meaning that the parties would not make payments 
that would have been required under the QFC in the future. The phrase 
``default right'' in the proposed rule text at Sec.  47.2 is broadly 
defined to include these common rights as well as ``any similar 
rights.'' Additionally, the definition includes all

[[Page 55389]]

such rights regardless of source, including rights existing under 
contract, statute, or common law.
    However, the proposed definition excludes two rights that are 
typically associated with the business-as-usual functioning of a QFC. 
First, same-day netting that occurs during the life of the QFC in order 
to reduce the number and amount of payments each party owes the other 
is excluded from the definition of ``default right.'' \32\ Second, 
contractual margin requirements that arise solely from the change in 
the value of the collateral or the amount of an economic exposure are 
also excluded from the definition.\33\ The effect of these exclusions 
is to leave such rights unaffected by the proposed rule. The exclusions 
are appropriate because the proposed rule is intended to improve 
resolvability by addressing default rights that could disrupt an 
orderly resolution, and not to interrupt the parties' business-as-usual 
dealings under a QFC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ See Proposed Rule Sec.  47.2.
    \33\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, certain QFCs are also commonly subject to rights that 
would increase the amount of collateral or margin that the defaulting 
party (or a guarantor) must provide upon an event of default. The 
financial impact of such default rights on a covered bank could be 
similar to the impact of the liquidation and acceleration rights 
discussed previously. Therefore, the proposed definition of ``default 
right'' includes such rights (with the exception discussed in the 
previous paragraph for margin requirements that depend solely on the 
value of collateral or the amount of an economic exposure).\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, contractual rights to terminate without the need to show 
cause, including rights to terminate on demand and rights to terminate 
at contractually specified intervals, are excluded from the definition 
of ``default right'' for purposes the proposed rule's restrictions on 
cross-default rights (section 47.5 of the proposed rule).\35\ This is 
consistent with the proposed rule's objective of restricting only 
default rights that are related, directly or indirectly, to the entry 
into resolution of an affiliate of the covered bank, while leaving 
other default rights unrestricted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \35\ See Proposed Rule Sec. Sec.  47.2 and 47.5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 10: The OCC invites comment on all aspects of the proposed 
definition of ``default right'' In particular, are the proposed 
exclusions appropriate in light of the objectives of the proposal? To 
what extent does the exclusion of rights that allow a party to 
terminate the contract ``on demand or at its option at a specified 
time, or from time to time, without the need to show cause'' create an 
incentive for firms to include these rights in future contracts to 
evade the proposed restrictions? To what extent should other regulatory 
requirements (e.g., liquidity coverage ratio or the short-term 
wholesale funding components of the GSIB surcharge rule) be revised to 
create a counterincentive? Would additional exclusions be appropriate? 
To what extent should it be clarified that the ``need to show cause'' 
includes the need to negotiate alternative terms with the other party 
prior to termination or similar requirements (e.g., Master Securities 
Loan Agreement, Annex III--Term Loans)?

E. Required Contractual Provisions Related to U.S. Special Resolution 
Regimes (Section 47.4)

    Under the proposed rule, a covered QFC would be required to 
explicitly provide both (a) that the transfer of the QFC (and any 
interest or obligation in or under it and any property collateralizing 
it) from the covered bank to a transferee would be effective to the 
same extent as it would be under the U.S. special resolution regimes if 
the covered QFC were governed by the laws of the United States or of a 
state of the United States and (b) that default rights with respect to 
the covered QFC that could be exercised against a covered bank could be 
exercised to no greater extent than they could be exercised under the 
U.S. special resolution regimes if the covered QFC were governed by the 
laws of the United States or of a state of the United States.\36\ The 
proposed rule would define the term ``U.S. Special Resolution Regimes'' 
to mean the FDIA \37\ and Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act,\38\ along 
with regulations issued under those statutes.\39\
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    \36\ See Proposed Rule Sec.  47.4.
    \37\ 12 U.S.C. 1811-1835a.
    \38\ 12 U.S.C. 5381-5394.
    \39\ See Proposed Rule Sec.  47.2.
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    The proposed requirements are not intended to imply that a given 
covered QFC is not governed by the laws of the United States or of a 
state of the United States, or that the statutory stay-and-transfer 
provisions would not in fact apply to a given covered QFC. This section 
of the proposed rule would not have any substantive impact on those 
covered QFCs that are already subject to the U.S. special resolution 
regimes. Rather, the requirements are intended to provide certainty 
that all covered QFCs would be treated the same way in the context of a 
receivership of a covered bank under the Dodd-Frank Act or the FDIA. 
Thus, the purpose of this provision is to ensure that if a national 
bank or FSA covered by this proposed rule is placed into receivership 
under any U.S. special resolution regime, the stay-and-transfer 
provisions would extend to all foreign counterparties as a matter of 
contract law.
    The stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S. special resolution 
regimes should be enforced with respect to all contracts of any U.S. 
GSIB entity that enters resolution under a U.S. special resolution 
regime as well as all transactions of the subsidiaries of such an 
entity. Nonetheless, it is possible that a court in a foreign 
jurisdiction would decline to enforce those provisions in cases brought 
before it (such as a case regarding a covered QFC between a covered 
bank and a non-U.S. entity that is governed by non-U.S. law and secured 
by collateral located outside the United States). By requiring that the 
effect of the statutory stay-and-transfer provisions be incorporated 
directly into the QFC contractually, the proposed requirement would 
help ensure that a court in a foreign jurisdiction would enforce the 
effect of those provisions, regardless of whether the court would 
otherwise have decided to enforce the U.S. statutory provisions 
themselves.\40\ For example, the proposed provisions should prevent a 
U.K. counterparty of a U.S. GSIB from persuading a U.K. court that it 
should be permitted to seize and liquidate collateral located in the 
United Kingdom in response to the U.S. GSIB's entry into OLA 
resolution. And the knowledge that a court in a foreign jurisdiction 
would reject the purported exercise of default rights in violation of 
the required provisions would deter covered banks' counterparties from 
attempting to exercise such rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ See generally Financial Stability Board, ``Principles for 
Cross-border Effectiveness of Resolution Actions'' (November 3, 
2015), available at https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/Principles-for-Cross-border-Effectiveness-of-Resolution-Actions.pdf.
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    The OCC believes that this proposed rule directly addresses a major 
QFC-related obstacle to the orderly resolution of covered banks. As 
discussed previously, restrictions on the exercise of QFC default 
rights are an important prerequisite for an orderly GSIB resolution. 
Congress recognized the importance of such restrictions when it enacted 
the stay-and-transfer provisions of the U.S. special resolution 
regimes. As demonstrated by the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the modern 
financial system is global in scope, and covered banks are party to 
large volumes of

[[Page 55390]]

QFCs with connections to foreign jurisdictions. The stay-and-transfer 
provisions of the U.S. special resolution regimes would not achieve 
their purpose of facilitating orderly resolution in the context of the 
failure of a GSIB with large volumes of such QFCs if QFCs could escape 
the effect of those provisions. As discussed in detail in Section I of 
this proposed rule, the OCC has a supervisory interest in preventing or 
mitigating the destabilizing effects of a disorderly GSIB resolution; 
otherwise, the result will be adverse to safety and soundness of 
covered banks individually and collectively, as well as the broader 
Federal banking system. To remove any doubt about the scope of coverage 
of these provisions, the proposed requirement would ensure that the 
stay-and-transfer provisions apply as a matter of contract to all 
covered QFCs, wherever the transaction. This will advance the 
resolvability goals of the Dodd-Frank Act and the FDIA.\41\
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    \41\ As noted in the Board's Proposal, this proposed rule is 
consistent with efforts by regulators in other jurisdictions to 
address similar risks by requiring that financial firms within their 
jurisdictions ensure that the effect of the similar provisions under 
these foreign jurisdictions' respective special resolution regimes 
would be enforced by courts in other jurisdictions, including the 
United States. See e.g., PRA Rulebook: CRR Firms and Non-Authorised 
Persons: Stay in Resolution Instrument 2015, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/publications/ps/2015/ps2515app1.pdf; see also Bank of England, Prudential Regulation 
Authority, ``Contractual stays in financial contracts governed by 
third-country law'' (PS25/15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 11: While the direct default requirements are proposed to 
apply broadly to all covered QFCs of covered banks, the primary focus 
of this requirements is with QFCs with foreign counterparties not 
directly subject to the U.S. special resolution regimes. U.S. 
counterparties are less of a concern because these counterparties would 
already be subject to the stay-and-transfer requirements under 
statutory requirements of the U.S. special resolution regimes. With 
respect to the direct default requirements, the proposed rule does not 
distinguish between U.S. and foreign counterparties because the OCC 
believes that the broad application of this proposed rule would be 
simpler to implement and less burdensome given the standardized nature 
of QFCs and their associated master netting agreements. Should the 
direct default requirements of the proposed rule apply only to covered 
QFCs with foreign counterparties not subject to U.S. special resolution 
regimes? What would be the costs and regulatory burden associated with 
identifying and maintaining separate versions of covered QFCs for U.S. 
and foreign counterparties?

F. Prohibited Cross-Default Rights (Section 47.5)

    Definitions. Section 47.5 of the proposed rule pertains to cross-
default rights in QFCs between covered banks and their counterparties, 
many of which are subject to credit enhancements (such as guarantees) 
provided by an affiliate of the covered bank. Because credit 
enhancements on QFCs are themselves ``qualified financial contracts'' 
under the Dodd-Frank Act's definition of that term (which this proposed 
rule would adopt), the proposed rule includes the following additional 
definitions in order to precisely describe the relationships to which 
this section applies.
    First, the proposed rule distinguishes between a credit enhancement 
and a ``direct QFC,'' which is defined as any QFC that is not a credit 
enhancement. The proposed rule also defines ``direct party'' to mean a 
covered bank that itself is a party to the direct QFC, as distinct from 
an entity that provide a credit enhancement. In addition, the proposed 
rule defines ``affiliate credit enhancement'' to mean ``a credit 
enhancement that is provided by an affiliate of the party to the direct 
QFC that the credit enhancement supports,'' as distinct from a credit 
enhancement provided by either the direct party itself or by an 
unaffiliated party. Moreover, the proposed rule defines ``covered 
affiliate credit enhancement'' to mean an affiliate credit enhancement 
provided by a covered bank, or a covered entity under the Board's 
proposal, and defines ``covered affiliate support provider to mean the 
covered bank that provides the covered affiliate credit enhancement. 
Finally, the proposed rule defines the term ``supported party'' to mean 
any party that is the beneficiary of a covered affiliate credit 
enhancement (that is, the QFC counterparty of a direct party, assuming 
that the direct QFC is subject to a covered affiliate credit 
enhancement).
    General Prohibition. Subject to the substantial exceptions to be 
discussed, the proposed rule would prohibit a covered bank from being a 
party to a covered QFC that allows for the exercise of any default 
right that is related, directly or indirectly, to the entry into 
resolution of an affiliate of the covered bank. The proposed rule also 
would generally prohibit a covered bank from being party to a covered 
QFC that would prohibit the transfer of any credit enhancement 
applicable to the QFC (such as another entity's guarantee of the 
covered bank's obligations under the QFC), along with associated 
obligations or collateral, upon the entry into resolution of an 
affiliate of the covered bank.\42\
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    \42\ This prohibition would be subject to an exception that 
would allow supported parties to exercise default rights with 
respect to a QFC if the supported party would be prohibited from 
being the beneficiary of a credit enhancement provided by the 
transferee under any applicable law, including the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and the Investment Company 
Act of 1940. This exception is substantially similar to an exception 
to the transfer restrictions in section 2(f) of the ISDA 2014 
Resolution Stay Protocol (2014 Protocol) and the ISDA 2015 Universal 
Resolution Stay Protocol, which was added to address the concerns 
expressed by asset managers during the drafting of the 2014 
Protocol.
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    A primary purpose of the proposed restrictions is to facilitate the 
resolution of a GSIB outside of Title II, including under the 
Bankruptcy Code. As discussed in the background section, the potential 
for the mass exercise of QFC default rights is a major reason why the 
failure of a global systemically important BHC could have a severe 
negative impact on financial stability and on the Federal banking 
system. In the context of an SPOE resolution, if the global 
systemically important BHC's entry into resolution triggers the mass 
exercise of cross-default rights by the subsidiaries' QFC 
counterparties of the covered QFCs against the national bank or FSA 
subsidiary, then the national bank or FSA could themselves experience 
financial distress or failure. Moreover, the mass exercise of covered 
QFC default rights would entail asset fire sales, which could affect 
other U.S. financial companies and undermine financial stability of the 
U.S. financial system. Similar disruptive results can occur with an 
MPOE resolution of an affiliate of an otherwise performing entity 
triggers default rights on QFCs involving the performing covered bank.
    In an SPOE resolution, this damage can be avoided if actions of the 
following two types are prevented: The exercise of direct default 
rights against the top-tier holding company that has entered 
resolution, and the exercise of cross-default rights against the 
national bank and FSA subsidiaries and other operating subsidiaries 
based on their parent's entry into resolution. Direct default rights 
against the national bank or FSA subsidiary would not be exercisable, 
because that subsidiary would continue normal operations and would not 
enter resolution. In an MPOE resolution, this damage occurs from the 
exercise of default rights against a performing entity based on the 
failure of an affiliate.
    Under the OLA, the Dodd-Frank Act's stay-and-transfer provisions 
would address both direct default rights and cross-default rights. But, 
as explained in the Background section, no similar

[[Page 55391]]

statutory provisions would apply to a resolution under the Bankruptcy 
Code. This proposed rule attempts to address these obstacles to orderly 
resolution under the Bankruptcy Code by extending the stay-and 
transfer-provisions to any type of resolution. Similarly, the proposed 
rule would facilitate a transfer of the GSIB parent's interests in its 
subsidiaries, along with any credit enhancements it provides for those 
subsidiaries, to a solvent financial company by prohibiting covered 
banks from having QFCs that would allow the QFC counterparty to prevent 
such a transfer or to use it as a ground for exercising default rights. 
Accordingly, the proposed rule would broadly prevent the unanticipated 
failure of any one GSIB entity from bringing about the disorderly 
failures of its affiliates by preventing the affiliates' QFC 
counterparties from using the first entity's failure as a ground for 
exercising default rights against those affiliates that continue meet 
to their obligations.\43\
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    \43\ As noted in the Board's Proposal, this proposed rule will 
also facilitate many approaches to GSIB resolution, including where 
the U.S. intermediate holding company of a foreign GSIB enters 
proceedings as part of a broader MPOE resolution.
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    The proposed rule is intended to enhance the potential for orderly 
resolution of a GSIB under the Bankruptcy Code, the FDIA, or similar 
resolution proceedings. In doing so, the proposed rule would advance 
the Dodd-Frank Act's goal of making orderly resolution of a workable 
covered bank under the Bankruptcy Code.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ See 12 U.S.C. 5365(d).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule could also prevent the disorderly failure of the 
national bank or FSA subsidiary and allow it to continue normal 
operations. In addition, while it may be in the individual interest of 
any given counterparty to exercise any available contractual rights to 
run on the national bank or FSA subsidiary, the mass exercise of such 
rights could harm the collective interest of all the counterparties by 
causing the subsidiary to fail. Therefore, like the automatic stay in 
bankruptcy, which also serves to maximize creditors' ultimate 
recoveries by preventing a disorderly liquidation of the debtor, the 
proposed rule would mitigate this collective action problem to the 
benefit of the creditors and counterparties of covered banks by 
preventing a disorderly resolution. And because many of these 
counterparties and creditors are themselves covered banks, or other 
systemically important financial firms, improving outcomes for these 
creditors and counterparties would further protect the safety and 
soundness of the Federal banking system and financial stability of the 
United States.
    General creditor protections. While the proposed restrictions would 
facilitate orderly resolution, they would also have the effect of 
diminishing the ability of the counterparties of the covered banks to 
include protections for themselves in covered QFCs. In order to reduce 
this effect, the proposed rule includes several significant exceptions 
to the proposed restrictions. These permitted creditor protections are 
intended to allow creditors to exercise cross-default rights outside of 
an orderly resolution of a GSIB (as described previously and in the 
Board's Proposal) and therefore would not be expected to undermine such 
a resolution.
    First, to ensure that the proposed prohibitions would apply only to 
cross-default rights (and not direct default rights), the proposed rule 
would provide that a covered QFC may permit the exercise of default 
rights based on the direct party's entry into a resolution proceeding, 
other than a proceeding under a U.S. or foreign special resolution 
regime.\45\ This provision would help ensure that, if the direct party 
to a QFC were to enter bankruptcy, its QFC counterparties could 
exercise any relevant direct default rights. Thus, a covered bank's 
direct QFC counterparties would not risk the delay and expense 
associated with becoming involved in a bankruptcy proceeding, and would 
be able to take advantage of default rights that would fall within the 
Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ Special resolution regimes typically stay direct default 
rights, but may not stay cross-default rights. For example, as 
discussed previously, the FDIA stays direct default rights, see 12 
U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B), but does not stay cross-default rights, 
whereas the Dodd-Frank Act's OLA stays direct default rights and 
cross-defaults arising from a parent's receivership, see 12 U.S.C. 
5390(c)(10)(B), 5390(c)(16).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rule would also allow covered QFCs to permit the 
exercise of default rights based on the failure of (1) the direct 
party, (2) a covered affiliate support provider, or (3) a transferee 
that assumes a credit enhancement to satisfy its payment or delivery 
obligations under the direct QFC or credit enhancement. Moreover, the 
proposed rule would allow covered QFCs to permit the exercise of a 
default right in one QFC that is triggered by the direct party's 
failure to satisfy its payment or delivery obligations under another 
contract between the same parties. This exception takes appropriate 
account of the interdependence that exists among the contracts in 
effect between the same counterparties.
    The proposed exceptions for the creditor protections described are 
intended to help ensure that the proposed rule permits a covered bank's 
QFC counterparties to protect themselves from imminent financial loss 
and does not create a risk of delivery gridlocks or daisy-chain 
effects, in which a covered bank's failure to make a payment or 
delivery when due leaves its counterparty unable to meet its own 
payment and delivery obligations (the daisy-chain effect would be 
prevented because the covered bank's counterparty would be permitted to 
exercise its default rights, such as by liquidating collateral). These 
exceptions are generally consistent with the treatment of payment and 
delivery obligations under the U.S. special resolution regimes.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \46\ See 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(8)(G)(ii), 5390(c)(8)(F)(ii) 
(suspending payment and delivery obligations for one business day or 
less).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These exceptions also help to ensure that a covered entity's QFC 
counterparty would not risk the delay and expense associated with 
becoming involved in a bankruptcy proceeding, since, unlike a typical 
creditor of an entity that enters bankruptcy, the QFC counterparty 
would retain its ability under the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbors to 
exercise direct default rights. This should further reduce the 
counterparty's incentive to run. Reducing incentives to run in the lead 
up to resolution promotes orderly resolution because a QFC creditor run 
(such as a mass withdrawal of repo funding) could lead to a disorderly 
resolution and pose a threat to financial stability.
    Additional creditor protections for supported QFCs. The proposed 
rule would allow additional creditor protections for a non-defaulting 
counterparty that is the beneficiary of a credit enhancement from an 
affiliate of the covered bank that is also a covered bank under the 
proposed rule. The proposed rule would allow these creditor protections 
in recognition of the supported party's interest in receiving the 
benefit of its credit enhancement. The Board has concluded that these 
creditor protections would not undermine an SPOE resolution of a 
GSIB.\47\
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    \47\ See 81 FR 29169 (May 11, 2016).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where a covered QFC is supported by a covered affiliate credit 
enhancement,\48\ the covered QFC and

[[Page 55392]]

the credit enhancement would be permitted to allow the exercise of 
default rights under the circumstances after the expiration of a stay 
period. Under the proposed rule, the applicable stay period would begin 
when the credit support provider enters resolution and would end at the 
later of 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on the next business day and 48 hours 
after the entry into resolution. This portion of the proposed rule is 
similar to the stay treatment provided in a resolution under the OLA or 
the FDIA.\49\
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    \48\ Note that the proposed rule would not apply with respect to 
credit enhancements that are not covered affiliate credit 
enhancements. In particular, it would not apply with respect to a 
credit enhancement provided by a non-U.S. entity of a foreign GSIB, 
which would not be a covered bank under the proposed rule.
    \49\ See U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B)(I), 5390(c)(10)(B)(i), 
5390(c)(16)(A). While the proposed stay period is similar to the 
stay periods that would be imposed by the U.S. special resolution 
regimes, it could run longer than those stay periods under some 
circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposed rule, default rights could be exercised at the 
end of the stay period if the covered affiliate credit enhancement has 
not been transferred away from the covered affiliate support provider 
and that support provider becomes subject to a resolution proceeding 
other than a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.\50\ 
Default rights could also be exercised at the end of the stay period if 
the transferee (if any) of the credit enhancement enters a resolution 
proceeding, protecting the supported party from a transfer of the 
credit enhancement to a transferee that is unable to meet its financial 
obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ Chapter 11 (11 U.S.C. 1101-1174) is the portion of the 
Bankruptcy Code that provides for the reorganization of the failed 
company, as opposed to its liquidation, and, relative to special 
resolution regimes, is generally well-understood by market 
participants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Default rights could also be exercised at the end of the stay 
period if the original credit support provider does not remain, and no 
transferee becomes, obligated to the same (or substantially similar) 
extent as the original credit support provider was obligated 
immediately prior to entering a resolution proceeding (including a 
Chapter 11 proceeding) with respect to (a) the credit enhancement 
applicable to the covered QFC, (b) all other credit enhancements 
provided by the credit support provider on any other QFCs between the 
same parties, and (c) all credit enhancements provided by the credit 
support provider between the direct party and affiliates of the direct 
party's QFC counterparty. Such creditor protections would be permitted 
to prevent the support provider or the transferee from ``cherry 
picking'' by assuming only those QFCs of a given counterparty that are 
favorable to the support provider or transferee. Title II of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the FDIA contain similar provisions to prevent cherry 
picking.
    Finally, if the covered affiliate credit enhancement is transferred 
to a transferee, then the non-defaulting counterparty could exercise 
default rights at the end of the stay period unless either (a) all of 
the support provider's ownership interests in the direct party are also 
transferred to the transferee or (b) reasonable assurance is provided 
that substantially all of the support provider's assets (or the net 
proceeds from the sale of those assets) will be transferred to the 
transferee in a timely manner. These conditions would help to assure 
the supported party that the transferee would be at least roughly as 
financially capable of providing the credit enhancement as the covered 
affiliate support provider.
    Creditor protections related to FDIA proceedings. Moreover, in the 
case of a covered QFC that is supported by a covered affiliate credit 
enhancement, both the covered QFC and the credit enhancement would be 
permitted to allow the exercise of default rights related to the credit 
support provider's entry into resolution proceedings under the FDIA 
\51\ under the following circumstances: (a) After the FDIA stay 
period,\52\ if the credit enhancement is not transferred under the 
relevant provisions of the FDIA \53\ and associated regulations, and 
(b) during the FDIA stay period, to the extent that the default right 
permits the supported party to suspend performance under the covered 
QFC to the same extent as that party would be entitled to do if the 
covered QFC were with the credit support provider itself and were 
treated in the same manner as the credit enhancement. This provision is 
intended to ensure that a QFC counterparty of a subsidiary of a covered 
bank that goes into FDIA receivership can receive the same level of 
protection that the FDIA provides to QFC counterparties of the covered 
bank itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ As discussed, the FDIA stays direct default rights against 
the failed depository institution but does not stay the exercise of 
cross-default rights against its affiliates.
    \52\ Under the FDIA, the relevant stay period runs until 5:00 
p.m. (eastern time) on the business day following the appointment of 
the FDIC as receiver. 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(10)(B)(I).
    \53\ 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(9)-(10).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Prohibited terminations. In case of a legal dispute as to a party's 
right to exercise a default right under a covered QFC, the proposed 
rule would require that a covered QFC must provide that, after an 
affiliate of the direct party has entered a resolution proceeding, (a) 
the party seeking to exercise the default right shall bear the burden 
of proof that the exercise of that right is indeed permitted by the 
covered QFC and (b) the party seeking to exercise the default right 
must meet a ``clear and convincing evidence'' standard,\54\ a similar 
standard, or a more demanding standard.
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    \54\ The reference to a ``similar'' burden of proof is intended 
to allow covered QFCs to provide for the application of a standard 
that is analogous to clear and convincing evidence in jurisdictions 
that do not recognize that particular standard. A covered QFC would 
not be permitted to provide for a lower standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The purpose of this proposed requirement is to prevent QFC 
counterparties from circumventing the limitations on resolution-related 
default rights in this proposal by exercising other contractual default 
rights in instances where such QFC counterparty cannot demonstrate that 
the exercise of such other contractual default rights is unrelated to 
the affiliate's entry into resolution.
    Agency transactions. In addition to entering into QFCs as 
principal, GSIBs may engage in QFCs as agent for other principals. For 
example, a GSIB subsidiary may enter into a master securities lending 
arrangement with a foreign bank as agent for a U.S.-based pension fund. 
The GSIB would document its role as agent for the pension fund, often 
through an annex to the master agreement, and would generally provide 
to its customer (the principal party) a securities replacement 
guarantee or indemnification for any shortfall in collateral in the 
event of the default of the foreign bank.\55\ A covered bank may also 
enter into a QFC as principal where there is an agent acting on its 
behalf or on behalf of its counterparty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ The definition of QFC under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act 
includes security agreements and other credit enhancements as well 
as master agreements (including supplements). 12 U.S.C. 
5390(c)(8)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This proposed rule would apply to a covered QFC regardless of 
whether the covered bank or the covered bank's direct counterparty is 
acting as a principal or as an agent. This proposed rule does not 
distinguish between agents and principals with respect to default 
rights or transfer restrictions applicable to covered QFCs. The 
proposed rule would limit default rights and transfer restrictions that 
the principal and its agent may have against a covered bank consistent 
with the U.S. special resolution regimes. This proposed rule would 
ensure that, subject to the enumerated creditor protections, neither 
the agent nor the

[[Page 55393]]

principal could exercise cross-default rights under the covered QFC 
against the covered bank based on the resolution of an affiliate of the 
covered bank.\56\
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    \56\ If a covered bank (acting as agent) is a direct party to a 
covered QFC, then the general prohibitions of section 47.5(d) would 
only affect the substantive rights of the agent's principal(s) to 
the extent that the covered QFC provides default rights based 
directly or indirectly on the entry into resolution of an affiliate 
of the covered bank (acting as agent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 12: With respect to the proposed restrictions on cross-
default rights in covered banks' QFCs, is the proposed rule 
sufficiently clear, such that parties to a conforming QFC will 
understand what default rights are, and are not exercisable, in the 
context of a GSIB resolution? How could the proposed restrictions be 
further clarified?
    Question 13: Section 47.5(e)(2) of the proposed rule, addressing 
general creditor protections, would permit the exercise of default 
rights based on the failure of the direct party to satisfy its payment 
or delivery obligations under the covered QFC or ``another contract 
between the same parties'' that give rise to a default right in the 
covered QFC. This exception is not limited to covered QFCs but is 
intended to reflect the interdependence among all contracts between the 
same counterparties. Does the scope of the terms ``contract'' and 
``same parties'' need to be clarified? Should the term ``same parties'' 
be clarified to include affiliate credit support providers as well as 
counterparties?
    Question 14: Are the proposed restrictions on cross-default rights 
under-inclusive, such that the proposed terms would permit default 
rights that would have the same or similar potential to undermine an 
orderly SPOE resolution and should therefore be subjected to similar 
restrictions?
    Question 15: Would it be appropriate for the prohibition to 
explicitly cover default rights that are based on or related to the 
``financial condition'' of an affiliate of the direct party (for 
example, rights based on an affiliate's credit rating, stock price, or 
regulatory capital levels)?
    Question 16: Should the proposed restrictions be expanded to cover 
contractual rights that a QFC counterparty may have to exit the 
termination at will or without cause, including rights that arise on a 
periodic basis? Could such rights be used to circumvent the proposed 
restrictions on cross-default rights? If so, how, if at all, should the 
proposed rule regulate such contractual rights?
    Question 17: With respect to the proposed provisions permitting 
specific creditor protections in a covered QFC, does the proposed rule 
draw an appropriate balance between protecting financial stability from 
risks associated with QFC unwinds and maintaining important creditor 
protections? Should the proposed set of permitted creditor protections 
be expanded to allow for other creditor protections that would fall 
within the proposed restrictions? Is the proposed set of permitted 
creditor protections sufficiently clear?
    Question 18: With respect to the proposed requirement for burden-
of-proof provisions in a covered QFC, is the standard clear? Would the 
proposed requirement advance the goals of this proposed rule? Would 
those goals be better advanced by alternative or complementary 
provisions?
    Question 19: Should the proposed rule require periodic legal review 
of the legal enforceability of the required provisions in relevant 
jurisdictions? If periodic legal review is not required, should covered 
banks be required to monitor the applicable law in the relevant 
jurisdiction for material changes in law?
    Question 20: The OCC invites comment on all aspects of the proposed 
treatment of agency transactions, including whether credit protections 
should apply to QFCs where the direct party is acting as agent under 
the QFC.

G. Process for Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protections (Section 47.6)

    As discussed previously, the proposed restrictions would leave many 
creditor protections that are commonly included in QFCs unaffected. The 
proposed rule would also allow any covered bank to submit to the OCC a 
request to approve as compliant with the proposed rule one or more QFCs 
that contain additional creditor protections--that is, creditor 
protections that would be impermissible under the proposed restrictions 
set forth previously. A covered bank making such a request would be 
required to explain how its request is consistent with the purposes of 
this proposed rule, including an analysis of the contractual terms for 
which approval is requested in light of a range of factors that are 
laid out by the proposed rule and intended to facilitate the OCC's 
consideration of whether permitting the contractual terms would be 
consistent with the proposed restrictions. The OCC expects to consult 
with the FDIC and Board during its consideration of a request under 
this section.
    The first two factors concern the potential impact of the requested 
creditor protections on GSIB resilience and resolvability. The next 
four concern the potential scope of the covered bank's request: 
Adoption on an industry-wide basis, coverage of existing and future 
transactions, coverage of one or multiple QFCs, and coverage of some or 
all covered banks. Creditor protections that may be applied on an 
industry-wide basis may help to ensure that impediments to resolution 
are addressed on a uniform basis, which could increase market 
certainty, transparency, and equitable treatment. Creditor protections 
that apply broadly to a range of QFCs and covered banks would increase 
the chance that all of a GSIB's QFC counterparties would be treated the 
same way during a resolution of that GSIB and may improve the prospects 
for an orderly resolution of that GSIB. By contrast, covered bank 
requests that would expand counterparties' rights beyond those afforded 
under existing QFCs would conflict with the proposed rule's goal of 
reducing the risk of mass unwinds of GSIB QFCs. The proposed rule also 
includes three factors that focus on the creditor protections specific 
to supported parties. The OCC may weigh the appropriateness of 
additional protections for supported QFCs against the potential impact 
of such provisions on the orderly resolution of a GSIB.
    In addition to analyzing the request under the enumerated factors, 
a covered bank requesting that the OCC approve enhanced creditor 
protections would be required to submit a legal opinion stating that 
the requested terms would be valid and enforceable under the applicable 
law of the relevant jurisdictions, along with any additional relevant 
information requested by the OCC.
    Under the proposed rule, the OCC could approve a request for an 
alternative set of creditor protections if the terms of that QFC, as 
compared to a covered QFC containing only the limited exceptions 
discussed previously, would promote the orderly resolution of federally 
chartered or licensed institutions or their affiliates, prevent or 
mitigate risks to the financial stability of the United States or the 
Federal banking system that could arise from the failure of a global 
systemically important BHC or global systemically important FBO, and 
protect the safety and soundness of covered banks to at least the same 
extent. The proposed request-and-approval process would improve 
flexibility by allowing for an industry-proposed alternative to the set 
of creditor protections permitted by the proposed rule while ensuring 
that any

[[Page 55394]]

approved alternative would serve the proposed rule's policy goals to at 
least the same extent.
    Compliance with the International Swaps and Derivatives Association 
(ISDA) 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol. In lieu of the process 
for the approval of enhanced creditor protections that are described 
previously, a covered bank would be permitted to comply with the 
proposed rule by amending a covered QFC through adherence to the ISDA 
2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol (including immaterial 
amendments to the Protocol).\57\ The Protocol ``enables parties to 
amend the terms of their financial contracts to contractually recognize 
the cross-border application of special resolution regimes applicable 
to certain financial companies and support the resolution of certain 
financial companies under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.'' \58\ The Protocol 
amends ISDA Master Agreements, which are used for derivatives 
transactions. Market participants also may amend their master 
agreements for securities financing transactions by adhering to the 
Securities Financing Transaction Annex \59\ to the Protocol and may 
amend all other QFCs by adhering to the Other Agreements Annex. Thus, a 
covered bank would be able to comply with the proposed rule with 
respect to all of its covered QFCs through adherence to the Protocol 
and the annexes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \57\ International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., 
``ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol'' (November 4, 2015), 
available at https://assets.isda.org/media/ac6b533f-3/5a7c32f8-pdf/. 
The Protocol was developed by a working group of member institutions 
of the ISDA, in coordination with the FRB, the FDIC, the OCC, and 
foreign financial supervisory agencies. ISDA is expected to 
supplement the Protocol with ISDA Resolution Stay Jurisdictional 
Modular Protocols for the United States and other jurisdictions. A 
U.S. module that is the same in all respects to the Protocol aside 
from exempting QFCs between adherents that are not covered banks 
would be consistent with the current proposed rule.
    \58\ Protocol Press Release at https://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/protocol-management/protocol/22.
    \59\ The Securities Financing Transaction Annex was developed by 
the International Capital Markets Association, the International 
Securities Lending Association, and the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association, in coordination with the ISDA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Protocol has the same general objective as the proposed rule, 
which is to make GSIB entities more resolvable by amending their 
contracts to, in effect, contractually recognize the applicability of 
special resolution regimes (including the OLA and the FDIA) and to 
restrict cross-default provisions to facilitate orderly resolution 
under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The provisions of the Protocol largely 
track the requirements of the proposed rule.\60\ However, the Protocol 
does have a narrower scope than the proposed rule,\61\ and it allows 
for somewhat stronger creditor protections than would otherwise be 
permitted under the proposed rule.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ For example, sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Protocol impose 
general prohibitions on cross-default rights based on the entry of 
an affiliate of the direct party into the most common U.S. 
resolution proceedings, including resolution under the Bankruptcy 
Code. By allowing the exercise of ``Performance Default Rights'' and 
``Unrelated Default Rights,'' as those terms are defined in section 
6 of the Protocol, sections 2(a) and 2(b) also generally permit the 
creditor protections that would be allowed under the proposed rule. 
Section 2(f) of the Protocol overrides certain contractual 
provisions that would block the transfer of a credit enhancement to 
a transferee entity. Section 2(i), complemented by the Protocol's 
definition of the term ``Unrelated Default Rights,'' provides that a 
party seeking to exercise permitted default rights must bear the 
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that those 
rights may indeed be exercised.
    \61\ The restrictions on default rights imposed by section 2 of 
the Protocol apply only when an affiliate of the direct party enters 
``U.S. Insolvency Proceedings,'' which is defined to include 
proceedings under Chapters 7 and 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
FDIA, and the Securities Investor Protection Act. By contrast, 
section 47.4 of the proposed rule would apply broadly to default 
rights related to affiliates of the direct party ``becoming subject 
to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar 
proceeding,'' which encompasses proceedings under State and foreign 
law.
    \62\ For example, the Protocol allows a non-defaulting party to 
exercise cross-default rights based on the entry of an affiliate of 
the direct party into certain resolution proceedings if the direct 
party's U.S. parent has not gone into resolution. See paragraph (b) 
of the Protocol's definition of ``Unrelated Default Rights''; see 
also sections 1 and 3(b) of the Protocol. As another example, if the 
affiliate credit support provider that has entered bankruptcy 
remains obligated under the credit enhancement, rather than 
transferring it to a transferee, then the Protocol's restrictions on 
the exercise of default rights continue to apply beyond the stay 
period only if the Bankruptcy Court issues a ``Creditor Protection 
Order.'' Such an order would, among other things, grant 
administrative expense status to the non-defaulting party's claims 
under the credit enhancement. See sections 2(b)(i)(B) and 
2(b)(iii)(B) of the Protocol and the Protocol's definitions of 
``Creditor Protection Order'' and ``DIP Stay Conditions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Protocol also includes a feature, not included in the proposed 
rule, that compensates for the Protocol's narrower scope and allowance 
for stronger creditor protections: When an entity (whether or not it is 
a covered bank) adheres to the Protocol, it necessarily adheres to the 
Protocol with respect to all covered entities that have also adhered to 
the Protocol.\63\ Thus, if all covered banks adhere to the Protocol, 
any other entity that chooses to adhere will simultaneously adhere with 
respect to all covered entities and covered banks. By allowing for all 
covered QFCs to be modified by the same contractual terms, this ``all-
or-none'' feature would promote transparency, predictability, and equal 
treatment with respect to counterparties' default rights during the 
resolution of a GSIB entity and thereby advance the proposed rule's 
objective of increasing the likelihood that such a resolution could be 
carried out in an orderly manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ Under section 4(a) of the Protocol, the Protocol is 
generally effective as between any two adhering parties, once the 
relevant effective date has arrived. Under section 4(b)(ii), an 
adhering party that is not a covered bank may choose to opt out of 
section 2 of the Protocol with respect to its contracts with any 
other adhering party that is also not a covered bank. However, the 
Protocol will apply to relationships between any covered bank that 
adheres and any other adhering party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Like section 47.5 of the proposed rule, section 2 of the Protocol 
was developed to increase GSIB resolvability under the Bankruptcy Code 
and other U.S. insolvency regimes. The Protocol does allow for somewhat 
broader creditor protections than would otherwise be permitted under 
the proposed rule, but, consistent with the Protocol's purpose, those 
additional creditor protections would not materially diminish the 
prospects for the orderly resolution of a GSIB. And the Protocol 
carries the desirable all-or-none feature, which would further increase 
a GSIB entity's resolvability and which the proposed rule otherwise 
lacks. For these reasons, and consistent with the broad policy 
objective of enhancing the stability of the U.S. financial system by 
increasing the resolvability of systemically important financial 
companies in the United States, the proposed rule would allow a covered 
bank to bring its covered QFCs into compliance by amending them through 
adherence to the Protocol (and, as relevant, the annexes to the 
Protocol).
    Question 21: Are the proposed considerations for the approval of 
enhanced credit protections the appropriate factors for the OCC to take 
into account in deciding whether to grant a request for approval? What 
other considerations are potentially relevant to such a decision?
    Question 22: Should the OCC provide greater specificity for the 
process and procedures for the submission and approval of requests for 
alternative enhanced credit protections? If so, what processes and 
procedures could be adopted without imposing undue regulatory burden?
    Question 23: The OCC invites comment on its proposal to treat as 
compliant with section 47.6 of the proposal any covered QFC that has 
been amended by the Protocol. Does adherence to the Protocol suffice to 
meet the goals of this proposed rule, appropriately protect the Federal 
banking system and safeguard U.S. financial stability? Should 
additional

[[Page 55395]]

guidance be provided that would clarify the consultation process with 
the FRB or any other relevant supervisory agency?

H. Transition Periods (Sections 47.4 and 47.5)

    Under this proposed rule, the final rule would take effect on the 
first day of the first calendar quarter that begins at least one year 
after the issuance of the final rule (effective date).\64\ National 
banks, FSAs, and Federal branches and agencies that are covered banks 
when the final rule is issued would be required to comply with the 
proposed requirements beginning on the effective date. Thus, a covered 
bank would be required to ensure that covered QFCs entered into on or 
after the effective date comply with the rule's requirements. Moreover, 
a covered bank would be required to bring preexisting covered QFCs 
entered into prior to the effective date into compliance with the rule 
no later than the first date on or after the effective date on which 
the covered bank enters into a new covered QFC with the counterparty to 
the preexisting covered QFC or with an affiliate of that counterparty. 
Thus, a covered bank would not be required to conform a preexisting QFC 
if that covered bank does not enter into any new QFCs with the same 
counterparty or an affiliate of that counterparty on or after the 
effective date. Finally, a national bank, FSA, or Federal branch or 
agency that becomes a covered bank after the final rule is issued would 
be required to comply by the first day of the first calendar quarter 
that begins at least one year after it becomes a covered bank.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ Under section 302(b) of the Riegle Community Development 
and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, new regulations that impose 
requirements on insured depository institutions generally must 
``take effect on the first day of a calendar quarter which begins on 
or after the date on which the regulations are published in final 
form.'' 12 U.S.C. 4802(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By permitting a covered bank to remain party to nonconforming QFCs 
entered into before the effective date unless the covered bank enters 
into new QFCs with the same counterparty or its affiliate, the proposed 
rule draws a balance between ensuring QFC continuity if a global 
systemically important BHC or FBO were to fail and ensuring that 
covered banks and their existing counterparties can avoid any 
compliance costs associated with conforming existing QFCs by refraining 
from entering into new QFCs and avoiding unnecessary disruption to 
existing QFCs. The requirement that a covered bank ensure that all 
existing QFCs are compliant before entering into a new QFC with the 
same counterparty or its affiliate will provide covered banks with an 
incentive to seek the modifications necessary to ensure that their QFCs 
with the most significant counterparties are compliant.
    A covered bank would be required to bring a preexisting covered QFC 
entered into prior to the effective date into compliance with the rule 
no later than the first date on or after the effective date on which 
the covered bank or an affiliate (that is also a covered entity or 
covered bank) enters into a new covered QFC with the counterparty to 
the preexisting covered QFC or an affiliate of the counterparty. The 
OCC believes such an approach is warranted to ensure that adoption of 
the contractual provisions required by the proposed rule are consistent 
between a given counterparty, any affiliate of the counterparty, and 
the covered bank and all of the affiliates of the covered bank (which 
would essentially be all of the entities under a global systemically 
important BHC or FBO). The OCC is concerned that to allow 
counterparties to adopt the required contractual provisions with 
affiliated covered entities, but not the covered bank, poses a risk to 
the safety and soundness of the covered bank and would frustrate the 
goal of facilitating the orderly resolution of the covered bank (and 
its affiliate covered entities). Furthermore, the OCC expects that, as 
a practical matter, the decision of how to comply with this proposed 
rule and the FRB Proposal with respect to a given counterparty, and its 
affiliates, will be made in close coordination between the covered bank 
and its affiliated covered entities.
    The OCC believes that adoption of the modifications required by the 
proposed rule should be consistent between a given counterparty and all 
entities under a global systemically important BHC or FBO, which 
necessitates allowing a trade by either a covered bank or a covered 
entity to trigger adoption of the required provisions. Moreover, the 
volume of nonconforming covered QFCs outstanding can be expected to 
decrease over time and eventually to reach zero. In light of these 
considerations, and to avoid creating potentially inappropriate 
compliance costs with respect to existing QFCs (which a covered bank 
would generally be unable to modify without its counterparty's 
consent), it may be appropriate to permit a limited number of 
nonconforming QFCs to remain outstanding, in keeping with the terms 
described previously. The OCC will monitor covered banks' levels of 
nonconforming QFCs and evaluate the risk, if any, that they pose to the 
safety and soundness of the covered banks or to the Federal banking 
system and to U.S. financial stability.
    Question 24: With respect to the proposed transaction periods, 
would there be a reasonable basis for adopting different compliance 
deadlines with respect to different classes of QFCs? If so, how should 
those classes be distinguished, and what would be a reasonable time 
frame for compliance?
    Question 25: Is it necessary for a covered bank to bring 
preexisting covered QFCs entered into prior to the effective date into 
compliance with the rule based on a covered bank's affiliate's (that is 
also a covered entity or covered bank) transaction with a counterparty 
or its affiliates? Is it appropriate to ensure consistent treatment 
across all affiliated covered banks, covered entities, and affiliated 
counterparties?

I. Amendments to Capital Rules

    The Basel III Capital Framework, as implemented by the OCC and the 
other banking agencies, permits a bank to measure exposure from certain 
types of financial contracts on a net basis and recognize the risk-
mitigating effect of financial collateral for other types of exposures, 
provided that the contracts are subject to a ``qualifying master 
netting agreement,'' a collateral agreement, eligible margin loan, or 
repo-style transaction (collectively referred to as netting agreements) 
that provides for certain rights upon a counterparty default. With 
limited exception, to qualify for netting treatment, a qualifying 
netting agreement must permit a bank to terminate, apply close-out 
netting, and promptly liquidate or set-off collateral upon an event of 
default of the counterparty (default rights), thereby reducing its 
counterparty exposure and market risks.\65\ Measuring the amount of 
exposure of these contracts on a net basis, rather than a gross basis, 
results in a lower measure of exposure, and thus, a lower capital 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \65\ See 12 CFR 3.2 definition of collateral agreement, eligible 
margin loan, repo-style transaction, and qualifying master netting 
agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    An exception to the immediate close-out requirement is made for the 
stay of default rights if the financial company is in receivership, 
conservatorship, or resolution under Title II of the Dodd-Frank 
Act,\66\ or the FDIA.\67\ Accordingly, transactions conducted under 
netting agreements where default rights may be stayed under Title II of 
the

[[Page 55396]]

Dodd-Frank Act or the FDIA would not be disqualified from netting 
treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)-(16).
    \67\ See 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(8)-(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 30, 2014, the OCC and the FRB issued an interim final 
rule (effective January 1, 2015) that amended the definitions of 
``qualifying master netting agreement,'' ``collateral agreement,'' 
``eligible margin loan,'' and ``repo-style transaction,'' in the OCC 
and FRB regulatory capital rules, and ``qualifying master netting 
agreement'' in the OCC and FRB liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) rules to 
expand the exception to the immediate close-out requirement to ensure 
that the current netting treatment under the regulatory capital, 
liquidity, and lending limits rules for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, repo-style transactions, eligible margin loans, and other 
collateralized transactions would be unaffected by the adoption of 
various foreign special resolution regimes through the ISDA 
Protocol.\68\ In particular, the interim final rule amended these 
definitions to provide that a relevant netting agreement or collateral 
agreement may provide for a limited stay or avoidance of rights where 
the agreement is subject by its terms to, or incorporates, certain 
resolution regimes applicable to financial companies, including Title 
II of the Dodd-Frank Act, the FDIA, or any similar foreign resolution 
regime that provides for limited stays substantially similar to the 
stay for qualified financial contracts provided in Title II of the 
Dodd-Frank Act or the FDIA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \68\ The FDIC issued a NPRM on January 30, 2015 to propose these 
conforming amendments. See 80 FR 5063 (January 30, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Section 47.4 of the proposed rule essentially limits the default 
rights exercisable against a covered bank to the same stay and transfer 
restrictions imposed under the U.S. special resolution regime against a 
direct counterparty. Section 47.4 of the proposed rule mirrors the 
contractual stay and transfer restrictions reflected in the ISDA 
Protocol with one notable difference. While adoption of the ISDA 
Protocol is voluntary, covered banks subject to the proposed rule must 
conform their covered QFCs to the stay and transfer restrictions in 
section 47.4.
    With respect to limitations on cross-default rights in proposed 
section 47.5, the OCC is proposing amendments in order to maintain the 
existing netting treatment for covered QFCs for purposes of the 
regulatory capital, liquidity, and lending limits rules. Specifically, 
the OCC is proposing to amend the definition of ``qualifying master 
netting agreement,'' as well as to make conforming amendments to 
``collateral agreement, ``eligible margin loan,'' and ``repo-style 
transaction,'' in the regulatory capital rules in part 3, and 
``qualifying master netting agreement'' in the LCR rules in part 50 to 
ensure that the regulatory capital, liquidity, and lending limits 
treatment of OTC derivatives, repo-style transactions, eligible margin 
loans, and other collateralized transactions would be unaffected by the 
adoption of proposed section 47.5. Without these proposed amendments, 
covered banks that amend their covered QFCs to comply with this 
proposed rule would no longer be permitted to recognize covered QFCs as 
subject to a qualifying master netting agreement or satisfying the 
criteria necessary for the current regulatory capital, liquidity, and 
lending limits treatment, and would be required to measure exposure 
from these contracts on a gross, rather than net, basis. This result 
would undermine the proposed requirements in section 47.5. The OCC does 
not believe that the disqualification of covered QFCs from master 
netting agreements would accurately reflect the risk posed by these OTC 
derivative transactions.
    Although the proposed rule reformats some of the definitions in 
parts 3 and 50 to include the text from the interim final rule, the 
proposed amendments do not alter the substance or effect of the prior 
amendment adopted by the interim final rule.
    The rule establishing margin and capital requirements for covered 
swap entities (swap margin rule) defines the term ``eligible master 
netting agreement'' in a manner similar to the definition of 
``qualifying master netting agreement.'' \69\ Thus, it may also be 
appropriate to amend the definition of ``eligible master netting 
agreement'' to account for the proposed restrictions on covered 
entities' QFCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \69\ 80 FR 74840, 74861-74862 (November 30, 2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Question 26: As noted, the requirements of this proposed rule are 
mandatory for all covered banks with respect to their covered QFCs. 
Under the proposed rule failure by a covered bank to conform its 
covered QFCs to the mandatory requirements would be a violation of the 
rule. In light of the important policy objectives of this proposed 
rule, should the regulatory capital and LCR rules require that 
nonconforming covered QFCs that violate the requirements of the 
proposed rule be disqualified from netting treatment?
    Question 27. In order to qualify for netting treatment under the 
regulatory capital rules, eligible margin loans, qualifying master 
netting agreements, and repo-style transactions require national banks 
and FSAs to conduct sufficient legal review to ensure that the 
provisions of these financial contracts would be enforceable in all 
relevant jurisdictions. Should the scope of the legal review 
requirement be expanded to explicitly include the enforceability of the 
direct default and cross-default provisions required by the proposed 
rule?

IV. Request for Comments

    In addition to the specifically enumerated questions in the 
preamble, the OCC requests comment on all aspects of this proposed 
rule. The OCC requests that, for the specifically enumerated questions, 
commenters include the number of the question in their response to make 
review of the comments more efficient.

V. Regulatory Analysis

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    In accordance with section 3512 of the Paperwork Reduction Act 
(PRA) of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521) (as amended), the OCC may not 
conduct or sponsor, and a respondent is not required to respond to, an 
information collection unless it displays a currently valid Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) control number.
    Certain provisions of the proposed rule contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the PRA. In accordance 
with the requirements of the PRA, the OCC may not conduct or sponsor, 
and the respondent is not required to respond to, an information 
collection unless it displays a currently-valid OMB control number. The 
information collection requirements contained in this proposed 
rulemaking have been submitted to OMB for review and approval under 
section 3507(d) of the PRA (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) and section 1320.11 of 
the OMB's implementing regulations (5 CFR 1320).
    Comments are invited on:
    (a) Whether the collections of information are necessary for the 
proper performance of the OCC's functions, including whether the 
information has practical utility;
    (b) The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information 
collections, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions 
used;
    (c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the 
information to be collected;
    (d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collections on 
respondents, including through the use

[[Page 55397]]

of automated collection techniques or other forms of information 
technology; and
    (e) Estimates of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, 
maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.
    All comments will become a matter of public record. Comments on 
aspects of this notice that may affect reporting, recordkeeping, or 
disclosure requirements and burden estimates should be sent to the 
addresses listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document. A copy of 
the comments may also be submitted to the OMB desk officer for the 
agencies: by mail to U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th 
Street NW., #10235, Washington, DC 20503; by facsimile to (202) 395-
5806; or by email to: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov, Attention, Federal 
Banking Agency Desk Officer.
    Title of Information Collection: Mandatory Contractual Stay 
Requirements for Qualified Financial Contracts.
    Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.
    Respondents: Banks or FSAs (including any subsidiary of a bank or 
FSA) that are subsidiaries of a global systemically important BHC that 
has been designated pursuant to 252.82(a)(1) of the Federal Reserve 
Board's Regulation YY; Banks or FSAs (including any subsidiary of a 
bank or FSA) that are subsidiaries of a global systemically important 
FBO designated pursuant to section 252.87 of the Federal Reserve 
Board's Regulation YY; and Federal branches and agencies (including any 
U.S. subsidiary of a Federal branch or agency), of a global 
systemically important FBO that has been designated pursuant to section 
252.87 of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY.
    Abstract: Section 47.6 provides that a covered bank may request 
that the OCC approve as compliant with the requirements of section 
47.5, regarding insolvency proceedings, provisions of one or more forms 
of covered QFCs, or amendments to one or more forms of covered QFCs, 
with enhanced creditor protection conditions. The request must include: 
(1) an analysis of the proposal under each consideration of the 
relevance of creditor protection provisions; (2) a written legal 
opinion verifying that proposed provisions or amendments would be valid 
and enforceable under applicable law of the relevant jurisdictions, 
including, in the case of proposed amendments, the validity and 
enforceability of the proposal to amend the covered QFCs; and (3) any 
additional information relevant to its approval that the OCC requests.
    Burden Estimates:
    Estimated Number of Respondents: 42.
    Estimated Burden per Respondent:
    Reporting (Sec.  47.7): 40 hours.
    Total Estimated Burden: 1,680 hours.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. (``RFA''), 
generally requires that, in connection with a NPRM, an agency prepare 
and make available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility 
analysis that describes the impact of a proposed rule on small 
entities.\70\ The Small Business Administration has defined ``small 
entities'' for banking purposes to include a bank or savings 
association with $175 million or less in assets.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
    \71\ See 13 CFR 121.201.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The OCC currently supervises approximately 1,032 small entities. 
The scope of the proposal is limited to large banks and their 
affiliates. Therefore, the proposed rule will not impact any OCC-
supervised small entities. Accordingly, the proposal will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    The OCC has analyzed the proposed rule under the factors in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA).\72\ Under this analysis, 
the OCC considered whether the proposed rule includes a Federal mandate 
that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal 
governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 
million or more in any one year (adjusted annually for inflation). The 
UMRA does not apply to regulations that incorporate requirements 
specifically set forth in law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \72\ 2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The OCC's estimated UMRA cost is less than $2 million. Therefore, 
the OCC finds that the proposed rule does not trigger the UMRA cost 
threshold. Accordingly, the OCC has not prepared the written statement 
described in section 202 of the UMRA.

D. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994

    Pursuant to section 302(a) of the Riegle Community Development and 
Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (RCDRI Act),\73\ in determining the 
effective date and administrative compliance requirements for new 
regulations that impose additional reporting, disclosure, or other 
requirements on insured depository institutions, the OCC will consider, 
consistent with the principles of safety and soundness and the public 
interest: (1) Any administrative burdens that the proposed rule would 
place on depository institutions, including small depository 
institutions and customers of depository institutions, and (2) the 
benefits of the proposed rule. The OCC requests comment on any 
administrative burdens that the proposed rule would place on depository 
institutions, including small depository institutions, and their 
customers, and the benefits of the proposed rule that the OCC should 
consider in determining the effective date and administrative 
compliance requirements for a final rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \73\ 12 U.S.C. 4802(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects

12 CFR Part 3

    Administrative practice and procedure; Capital; Federal savings 
associations; National banks; Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; 
Risk.

12 CFR Part 47

    Administrative practice and procedure; Banks and banking; Bank 
resolution; Default rights; Federal savings associations, National 
banks, Qualified financial contracts; Reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements; Securities.

12 CFR Part 50

    Administrative practice and procedure; Banks and banking; 
Liquidity; Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; Savings 
associations.

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons stated in the Supplementary Information, the Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency proposes to amend part 3, add a new 
part 47, and amend part 50 as follows:

PART 3--CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS

0
1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1818, 
1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n note, 1835, 3907, 3909, and 5412(b)(2)(B).

0
2. Section 3.2 is amended by:
0
a. Revising the definition of ``collateral agreement'' by:
0
i. Removing the word ``or'' at the end of paragraph (1);
0
ii. Removing the period at the end of paragraph (2) and adding in its 
place ``; or''; and
0
iii. Adding a new paragraph (3).

[[Page 55398]]

0
b. Revising paragraph (1)(iii) of the definition of ``eligible margin 
loan''; and
0
c. Revising the definition of ``qualifying master netting agreement'' 
by:
0
i. Removing the word ``or'' at the end of paragraph (2)(i);
0
ii. Removing the '';'' at the end of paragraph (2)(ii) and adding in 
its place ``; or''; and
0
iii. Adding a new paragraph (2)(iii).
0
d. Revising paragraph (3)(ii)(A) of the definition of ``repo-style 
transaction''.
    The revisions are set forth below:


Sec.  3.2  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Collateral agreement means * * *
* * * * *
    (3) Where the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a 
net basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-
off collateral promptly upon an event of default of the counterparty is 
limited only to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of 
part 47 of this title 12 or any similar requirements of another U.S. 
Federal banking agency, as applicable.
* * * * *
    Eligible margin loan means: (1) * * *
* * * * *
    (iii) The extension of credit is conducted under an agreement that 
provides the national bank or Federal savings association the right to 
accelerate and terminate the extension of credit and to liquidate or 
set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default, including upon an 
event of receivership, insolvency, liquidation, conservatorship, or 
similar proceeding, of the counterparty, provided that, in any such 
case, any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed or 
avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other than:
    (A) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under 
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs,\5\ or laws of foreign 
jurisdictions that are substantially similar \6\ to the U.S. laws 
referenced in this paragraph in order to facilitate the orderly 
resolution of the defaulting counterparty; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ This requirement is met where all transactions under the 
agreement are (i) executed under U.S. law and (ii) constitute 
``securities contracts'' under section 555 of the Bankruptcy Code 
(11 U.S.C. 555), qualified financial contracts under section 
11(e)(8) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, or netting contracts 
between or among financial institutions under sections 401-407 of 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act or the 
FRB's Regulation EE (12 CFR part 231).
    \6\ The OCC expects to evaluate jointly with the FRB and FDIC 
whether foreign special resolution regimes meet the requirements of 
this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (B) Where the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a 
net basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-
off collateral promptly upon an event of default of the counterparty is 
limited only to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of 
part 47 of this title 12 or any similar requirements of another U.S. 
Federal banking agency, as applicable;
    or
* * * * *
    Qualifying master netting agreement means a written, legally 
enforceable agreement provided that:
* * * * *
    (2) * * *
* * * * *
    (iii) Where the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a 
net basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-
off collateral promptly upon an event of default of the counterparty is 
limited only to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of 
part 47 of this title 12 or any similar requirements of another U.S. 
Federal banking agency, as applicable.
* * * * *
    Repo-style transaction means a repurchase or reverse repurchase 
transaction, or a securities borrowing or securities lending 
transaction, including a transaction in which the national bank or 
Federal savings association acts as agent for a customer and 
indemnifies the customer against loss, provided that:
* * * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) * * *
    (A) The transaction is executed under an agreement that provides 
the national bank or Federal savings association the right to 
accelerate, terminate, and close-out the transaction on a net basis and 
to liquidate or set-off collateral promptly upon an event of default, 
including upon an event of receivership, insolvency, liquidation, or 
similar proceeding, of the counterparty, provided that, in any such 
case, any exercise of rights under the agreement will not be stayed or 
avoided under applicable law in the relevant jurisdictions, other than:
    (1) In receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or under 
any similar insolvency law applicable to GSEs, or laws of foreign 
jurisdictions that are substantially similar \8\ to the U.S. laws 
referenced in this paragraph (3)(ii)(a) in order to facilitate the 
orderly resolution of the defaulting counterparty; or
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ The OCC expects to evaluate jointly with the FRB and FDIC 
whether foreign special resolution regimes meet the requirements of 
this paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (2) Where the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a 
net basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-
off collateral promptly upon an event of default of the counterparty is 
limited only to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of 
part 47 of this title 12 or any similar requirements of another U.S. 
Federal banking agency, as applicable; or
* * * * *

PART 47--MANDATORY CONTRACTUAL STAY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED 
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS

0
3. The authority citation for Part 47 shall read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 481, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1467a, 
1818, 1828, 1831n, 1831o, 1831p-1, 1831w, 1835, 3102(b), 3108(a), 
5412(b)(2)(B), (D)-(F).
0
4. Add new Part 47 to read as follows:

PART 47--MANDATORY CONTRACTUAL STAY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED 
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS

Sec.
47.1 Authority and Purpose.
47.2 Definitions.
47.3 Applicability.
47.4 U.S. Special Resolution Regimes.
47.5 Insolvency Proceedings.
47.6 Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protection Conditions.
47.7 Exclusion of Certain QFCs.
47.8 Foreign Bank Multi-Branch Master Agreements.

PART 47--MANDATORY CONTRACTUAL STAY REQUIREMENTS FOR QUALIFIED 
FINANCIAL CONTRACTS


Sec.  47.1  Authority and Purpose.

    (a) Authority. 12 U.S.C. 1, 93a, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1467a, 1818, 
1828, 1831n, 1831p-1, 1831w, 1835, 3102(b), 3108(a), 5412(b)(2)(B), 
(D)-(F).
    (b) Purpose. The purpose of this part is to promote the safety and 
soundness of federally chartered or licensed institutions by mitigating 
the potential destabilizing effects of the resolution of a global 
significantly important banking entity on an affiliate that is a 
covered bank (as defined by this part) by requiring covered banks to 
include in financial contracts covered by this part certain mandatory 
contractual

[[Page 55399]]

provisions relating to stays on acceleration and close out rights and 
transfer rights.


Sec.  47.2  Definitions.

    Central counterparty or CCP has the same meaning as in section 
252.81 of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR 252.81).
    Chapter 11 proceeding means a proceeding under the provisions of 
Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy laws of the United States at 11 U.S.C. 
1101-74 (Chapter 11 of Title 11, United States Code).
    Covered entity has the same meaning as in section 252.82(a) of the 
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR 252.82).
    Covered QFC means a QFC as defined in sections 47.4(a) and 47.5(a) 
of this part.
    Credit enhancement means a QFC of the type set forth in Title II of 
the Dodd-Frank Act at section 210(c)(8)(D)(ii)(XII), (iii)(X), (iv)(V), 
(v)(VI), or (vi)(VI), 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(ii)(XII), (iii)(X), 
(iv)(V), (v)(VI), or (vi)(VI); or a credit enhancement that the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation determines by regulation is a QFC 
pursuant to section 210(c)(8)(D)(i), 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(i), of the 
Dodd-Frank Act.
    Default right (1) Means, with respect to a QFC, any:
    (i) Right of a party, whether contractual or otherwise (including, 
without limitation, rights incorporated by reference to any other 
contract, agreement, or document, and rights afforded by statute, civil 
code, regulation, and common law), to liquidate, terminate, cancel, 
rescind, or accelerate such agreement or transactions thereunder, set 
off or net amounts owing in respect thereto (except rights related to 
same-day payment netting), exercise remedies in respect of collateral 
or other credit support or property related thereto (including the 
purchase and sale of property), demand payment or delivery thereunder 
or in respect thereof (other than a right or operation of a contractual 
provision arising solely from a change in the value of collateral or 
margin or a change in the amount of an economic exposure), suspend, 
delay, or defer payment or performance thereunder, or modify the 
obligations of a party thereunder, or any similar rights; and
    (ii) Right or contractual provision that alters the amount of 
collateral or margin that must be provided with respect to an exposure 
thereunder, including by altering any initial amount, threshold amount, 
variation margin, minimum transfer amount, the margin value of 
collateral, or any similar amount, that entitles a party to demand the 
return of any collateral or margin transferred by it to the other party 
or a custodian or that modifies a transferee's right to reuse 
collateral or margin (if such right previously existed), or any similar 
rights, in each case, other than a right or operation of a contractual 
provision arising solely from a change in the value of collateral or 
margin or a change in the amount of an economic exposure;
    (2) With respect to section 47.5 of this part, does not include any 
right under a contract that allows a party to terminate the contract on 
demand, or at its option at a specified time, or from time to time, 
without the need to show cause.
    Dodd-Frank Act means the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010).
    FDIA proceeding means a proceeding in which the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation is appointed as conservator or receiver under 
section 11 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821.
    FDIA stay period means, in connection with an FDIA proceeding, the 
period of time during which a party to a QFC whose counterparty is 
subject to an FDIA proceeding may not exercise any right that the 
counterparty has to terminate, liquidate, or net such QFC, in 
accordance with section 11(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 
U.S.C. 1821(e), and any implementing regulations.
    Master agreement means a QFC of the type set forth in Title II of 
the Dodd-Frank Act at section 210(c)(8)(D)(ii)(XI), (iii)(IX), 
(iv)(IV), (v)(V), or (vi)(V), 12 U.S.C. 5390(c)(8)(D)(ii)(XI), 
(iii)(IX), (iv)(IV), (v)(V), or (vi)(V); or a master agreement that the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation determines by regulation is a QFC 
pursuant to section 210(c)(8)(D)(i) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 
5390(c)(8)(D)(i).
    QFC or qualified financial contract has the same meaning as in 
section 210(c)(8)(D) of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 
5390(c)(8)(D).
    Subsidiary of covered bank means any operating subsidiary of a 
national bank, Federal savings association, or Federal branch or agency 
as defined in 12 CFR 5.34 (national banks) or 12 CFR 5.38 (FSAs), or 
any other subsidiary of a covered bank as defined in section 
252.82(a)(2) and (3) of the Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY (12 
CFR 252.82(a)(2) and (3)).
    U.S. special resolution regimes means the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act at 12 U.S.C. 1811-1835a and regulations promulgated thereunder and 
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. 5381-5394, and regulations 
promulgated thereunder.


Sec.  47.3  Applicability.

    (a) Scope of applicability. This part applies to a ``covered 
bank,'' which includes:
    (i) A national bank or Federal savings association (including any 
subsidiary of a national bank or a Federal savings association) that is 
a subsidiary of a global systemically important bank holding company 
that has been designated pursuant to section 252.82(a)(1) of the 
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR 252.82(a)(1)); or
    (ii) A national bank or Federal savings association (including any 
subsidiary of a national bank or a Federal savings association) that is 
a subsidiary of a global systemically important foreign banking 
organization that has been designated pursuant to section 252.87 of the 
Federal Reserve Board's Regulation YY (12 CFR 252.87); or
    (iii) A Federal branch or agency, as defined in the Subpart B of 
Part 28 of this Chapter (governing Federal branches and agencies), and 
any U.S. subsidiary of the Federal branch or agency, of a global 
systemically important foreign banking organization that has been 
designated pursuant to section 252.87 of the Federal Reserve Board's 
Regulation YY (12 CFR 252.87).
    (b) Subsidiary of a covered bank. This part generally applies to 
the subsidiary of any national bank, Federal savings association, or 
Federal branch or agency that is a covered bank under paragraph (a)(1) 
of this section. Specifically, the covered bank is required to ensure 
that a covered QFC to which the subsidiary is a party (as a direct 
counterparty or a support provider) satisfies the requirements of 
sections 47.4 and 47.5 of this part in the same manner and to the same 
extent applicable to the covered bank.
    (c) Initial applicability of requirements for covered QFCs. A 
covered bank must comply with the requirements of sections 47.4 and 
47.5 beginning on the later of
    (1) The first day of the calendar quarter immediately following 365 
days (1 year) after becoming a covered bank; or
    (2) The date this subpart first becomes effective.
    (d) Rule of construction. For purposes of this subpart, the 
exercise of a default right with respect to a covered QFC includes the 
automatic or deemed exercise of the default right pursuant to the terms 
of the QFC or other arrangement.

[[Page 55400]]

Sec.  47.4  U.S. Special Resolution Regimes.

    (a) QFCs required to be conformed. (1) A covered bank must ensure 
that each of its covered QFCs conforms to the requirements of this 
section 47.4.
    (2) For purposes of this section 47.4, a covered QFC means a QFC 
that the covered bank:
    (i) Enters, executes, or otherwise becomes a party to; or
    (ii) Entered, executed, or otherwise became a party to before the 
date this subpart first becomes effective, if the covered bank or any 
affiliate that is a covered bank or covered entity also enters, 
executes, or otherwise becomes a party to a QFC with the same person or 
affiliate of the same person on or after the date this subpart first 
becomes effective.
    (3) To the extent that the covered bank is acting as agent with 
respect to a QFC, the requirements of this section apply to the extent 
the transfer of the QFC relates to the covered bank or the default 
rights relate to the covered bank or an affiliate of the covered bank.
    (b) Provisions required. A covered QFC must explicitly provide 
that:
    (1) The transfer of the covered QFC (and any interest and 
obligation in or under, and any property securing, the covered QFC) 
from the covered bank will be effective to the same extent as the 
transfer would be effective under the U.S. special resolution regimes 
if the covered QFC (and any interest and obligation in or under, and 
any property securing, the covered QFC) were governed by the laws of 
the United States or a state of the United States and the covered bank 
were under the U.S. special resolution regime; and
    (2) Default rights with respect to the covered QFC that may be 
exercised against the covered bank are permitted to be exercised to no 
greater extent than the default rights could be exercised under the 
U.S. special resolution regimes if the covered QFC was governed by the 
laws of the United States or a state of the United States and the 
covered bank were under the U.S. special resolution regime.
    (c) Relevance of creditor protection provisions. The requirements 
of this section apply notwithstanding paragraphs (e), (g), and (i) of 
section 47.5.


Sec.  47.5  Insolvency Proceedings.

    (a) QFCs required to be conformed. (1) A covered bank must ensure 
that each covered QFC conforms to the requirements of this section 
47.5.
    (2) For purposes of this section 47.5, a covered QFC has the same 
definition as in paragraph (a)(2) of section 47.4.
    (3) To the extent that the covered bank is acting as agent with 
respect to a QFC, the requirements of this section apply to the extent 
the transfer of the QFC relates to the covered bank or the default 
rights relate to an affiliate of the covered bank.
    (b) General Prohibitions. (1) A covered QFC may not permit the 
exercise of any default right with respect to the covered QFC that is 
related, directly or indirectly, to an affiliate of the direct party 
becoming subject to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding.
    (2) A covered QFC may not prohibit the transfer of a covered 
affiliate credit enhancement, any interest or obligation in or under 
the covered affiliate credit enhancement, or any property securing the 
covered affiliate credit enhancement to a transferee upon an affiliate 
of the direct party becoming subject to a receivership, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding unless the transfer 
would result in the supported party being the beneficiary of the credit 
enhancement in violation of any law applicable to the supported party.
    (c) Definitions relevant to the general prohibitions and this part. 
(1) Direct party. Direct party means covered bank, or covered entity 
referenced in section 47.2, that is a party to the direct QFC.
    (2) Direct QFC. Direct QFC means a QFC that is not a credit 
enhancement, provided that, for a QFC that is a master agreement that 
includes an affiliate credit enhancement as a supplement to the master 
agreement, the direct QFC does not include the affiliate credit 
enhancement.
    (3) Affiliate credit enhancement. Affiliate credit enhancement 
means a credit enhancement that is provided by an affiliate of a party 
to the direct QFC that the credit enhancement supports.
    (d) Treatment of agent transactions. With respect to a QFC that is 
a covered QFC for a covered bank solely because the covered bank is 
acting as agent under the QFC, the covered bank is the direct party.
    (e) General creditor protections. Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of 
this section, a covered direct QFC and covered affiliate credit 
enhancement that supports the covered direct QFC may permit the 
exercise of a default right with respect to the covered QFC that arises 
as a result of:
    (1) The direct party becoming subject to a receivership, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding other than a 
receivership, conservatorship, or resolution under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, or laws of foreign jurisdictions that are 
substantially similar to the U.S. laws referenced in this paragraph 
(e)(1) in order to facilitate the orderly resolution of the direct 
party;
    (2) The direct party not satisfying a payment or delivery 
obligation pursuant to the covered QFC or another contract between the 
same parties that gives rise to a default right in the covered QFC; or
    (3) The covered affiliate support provider or transferee not 
satisfying a payment or delivery obligation pursuant to a covered 
affiliate credit enhancement that supports the covered direct QFC.
    (f) Definitions relevant to the general creditor protections and 
this part. (1) Covered direct QFC. Covered direct QFC means a direct 
QFC to which a covered bank, or a covered entity referenced in section 
47.2, is a party.
    (2) Covered affiliate credit enhancement. Covered affiliate credit 
enhancement means an affiliate credit enhancement in which a covered 
bank, or a covered entity referenced in section 47.2, is the obligor of 
the credit enhancement.
    (3) Covered affiliate support provider. Covered affiliate support 
provider means, with respect to a covered affiliate credit enhancement, 
the affiliate of the direct party that is obligated under the covered 
affiliate credit enhancement and is not a transferee.
    (4) Supported party. Supported party means, with respect to a 
covered affiliate credit enhancement and the direct QFC that the 
covered affiliate credit enhancement supports, a party that is a 
beneficiary of the covered affiliate support provider's obligation 
under the covered affiliate credit enhancement.
    (g) Additional creditor protections for supported QFCs. 
Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this section, with respect to a 
covered direct QFC that is supported by a covered affiliate credit 
enhancement, the covered direct QFC and the covered affiliate credit 
enhancement may permit the exercise of a default right that is related, 
directly or indirectly, to the covered affiliate support provider after 
the stay period if:
    (1) The covered affiliate support provider that remains obligated 
under the covered affiliate credit enhancement becomes subject to a 
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar 
proceeding other than a Chapter 11 proceeding;
    (2) Subject to paragraph (i) of this section, the transferee, if 
any, becomes subject to a receivership, insolvency,

[[Page 55401]]

liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
    (3) The covered affiliate support provider does not remain, and a 
transferee does not become, obligated to the same, or substantially 
similar, extent as the covered affiliate support provider was obligated 
immediately prior to entering the receivership, insolvency, 
liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding with respect to:
    (i) The covered affiliate credit enhancement,
    (ii) All other covered affiliate credit enhancements provided by 
the covered affiliate support provider in support of other covered 
direct QFCs between the direct party and the supported party under the 
covered affiliate credit enhancement referenced in paragraph 
47(g)(3)(i), and
    (iii) All covered affiliate credit enhancements provided by the 
covered affiliate support provider in support of covered direct QFCs 
between the direct party and affiliates of the supported party 
referenced in paragraph 47.5(g)(3)(ii); or
    (4) In the case of a transfer of the covered affiliate credit 
enhancement to a transferee:
    (i) All of the ownership interests of the direct party directly or 
indirectly held by the covered affiliate support provider are not 
transferred to the transferee; or
    (ii) Reasonable assurance has not been provided that all or 
substantially all of the assets of the covered affiliate support 
provider (or net proceeds therefrom), excluding any assets reserved for 
the payment of costs and expenses of administration in the 
receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar 
proceeding, will be transferred or sold to the transferee in a timely 
manner.
    (h) Definitions relevant to the additional creditor protections for 
supported QFCs and this part. (1) Stay period. Stay period means, with 
respect to a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or 
similar proceeding, the period of time beginning on the commencement of 
the proceeding and ending at the later of 5:00 p.m. (eastern time) on 
the business day following the date of the commencement of the 
proceeding and 48 hours after the commencement of the proceeding.
    (2) Business day. Business day means a day on which commercial 
banks in the jurisdiction the proceeding is commenced are open for 
general business (including dealings in foreign exchange and foreign 
currency deposits).
    (3) Transferee. Transferee means a person to whom a covered 
affiliate credit enhancement is transferred upon the covered affiliate 
support provider entering a receivership, insolvency, liquidation, 
resolution, or similar proceeding or thereafter as part of the 
restructuring or reorganization involving the covered affiliate support 
provider.
    (i) Creditor protections related to FDIA proceedings. 
Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this section, with respect to a 
covered direct QFC that is supported by a covered affiliate credit 
enhancement, the covered direct QFC and the covered affiliate credit 
enhancement may permit the exercise of a default right that is related, 
directly or indirectly, to the covered affiliate support provider 
becoming subject to FDIA proceedings:
    (1) After the FDIA stay period, if the covered affiliate credit 
enhancement is not transferred pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 1821(e)(9)-(e)(10) 
and any regulations promulgated thereunder; or
    (2) During the FDIA stay period, if the default right may only be 
exercised so as to permit the supported party under the covered 
affiliate credit enhancement to suspend performance with respect to the 
supported party's obligations under the covered direct QFC to the same 
extent as the supported party would be entitled to do if the covered 
direct QFC were with the covered affiliate support provider and were 
treated in the same manner as the covered affiliate credit enhancement.
    (j) Prohibited terminations. A covered QFC must require, after an 
affiliate of the direct party has become subject to a receivership, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding:
    (1) The party seeking to exercise a default right to bear the 
burden of proof that the exercise is permitted under the covered QFC; 
and
    (2) Clear and convincing evidence or a similar or higher burden of 
proof to exercise a default right.


Sec.  47.6  Approval of Enhanced Creditor Protection Conditions.

    (a) Protocol compliance. A covered QFC may permit the exercise of a 
default right with respect to the covered QFC if the covered QFC has 
been amended by the ISDA 2015 Universal Resolution Stay Protocol, 
including the Securities Financing Transaction Annex and Other 
Agreements Annex published by the International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association, Inc., as of May 3, 2016, and minor or technical amendments 
thereto.
    (b) Proposal of enhanced creditor protection conditions. (1) A 
covered bank may request that the OCC approve as compliant with the 
requirements of section 47.5 of this part provisions of one or more 
forms of covered QFCs, or amendments to one or more forms of covered 
QFCs, with enhanced creditor protection conditions.
    (2) Enhanced creditor protection conditions means a set of limited 
exemptions to the requirements of section 47.5(b) of this part that are 
different than that of paragraphs (e), (g), and (i) of section 46.5 of 
this part.
    (3) A covered bank making a request under paragraph (b)(1) of this 
section must provide:
    (i) An analysis of the proposal that addresses each consideration 
in paragraph (d) of this section;
    (ii) A written legal opinion verifying that proposed provisions or 
amendments would be valid and enforceable under applicable law of the 
relevant jurisdictions, including, in the case of proposed amendments, 
the validity and enforceability of the proposal to amend the covered 
QFCs; and
    (iii) Any other relevant information that the OCC requests.
    (c) OCC approval. The OCC may approve, subject to any conditions or 
commitments the OCC may impose, a proposal by a covered bank under 
paragraph (b) of this section if the proposal, as compared to a covered 
QFC that contains only the limited exemptions in paragraphs of (e), 
(g), and (i) of section 47.5 of this part, would promote the safety and 
soundness of federally chartered or licensed institutions by mitigating 
the potential destabilizing effects of the resolution of a global 
significantly important banking entity that is an affiliate of the 
covered bank, at least to the same extent.
    (d) Considerations. In reviewing a proposal under this section, the 
OCC may consider all facts and circumstances related to the proposal, 
including:
    (1) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would reduce the 
resiliency of such covered banks during distress or increase the impact 
of the failure of one or more of the covered banks;
    (2) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would materially 
decrease the ability of a covered bank, or an affiliate of a covered 
bank, to be resolved in a rapid and orderly manner in the event of the 
financial distress or failure of the entity that is required to submit 
a resolution plan pursuant to Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 
U.S.C. 5635(d), and the implementing regulations in 12 CFR

[[Page 55402]]

part 243 (FRB) and 12 CFR part 381 (FDIC);
    (3) Whether, and the extent to which, the set of conditions or the 
mechanism in which they are applied facilitates, on an industry-wide 
basis, contractual modifications to remove impediments to resolution 
and increase market certainty, transparency, and equitable treatment 
with respect to the default rights of non-defaulting parties to a 
covered QFC;
    (4) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal applies to 
existing and future transactions;
    (5) Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would apply to 
multiple forms of QFCs or multiple covered banks;
    (6) Whether the proposal would permit a party to a covered QFC that 
is within the scope of the proposal to adhere to the proposal with 
respect to only one or a subset of covered banks;
    (7) With respect to a supported party, the degree of assurance the 
proposal provides to the supported party that the material payment and 
delivery obligations of the covered affiliate credit enhancement and 
the covered direct QFC it supports will continue to be performed after 
the covered affiliate support provider enters a receivership, 
insolvency, liquidation, resolution, or similar proceeding;
    (8) The presence, nature, and extent of any provisions that require 
a covered affiliate support provider or transferee to meet conditions 
other than material payment or delivery obligations to its creditors;
    (9) The extent to which the supported party's overall credit risk 
to the direct party may increase if the enhanced creditor protection 
conditions are not met and the likelihood that the supported party's 
credit risk to the direct party would decrease or remain the same if 
the enhanced creditor protection conditions are met; and
    (10) Whether the proposal provides the counterparty with additional 
default rights or other rights.


Sec.  47.7  Exclusion of Certain QFCs.

    (a) Exclusion of CCP-cleared QFCs. A covered bank is not required 
to conform a covered QFC to which a CCP is a party to the requirements 
of sections 47.4 and 47.5.
    (b) Exclusion of covered entity QFCs. A covered bank is not 
required to conform a covered QFC to the requirements of sections 47.4 
and 47.5 to the extent that a covered entity is required to conform the 
covered QFC to similar requirements of the Federal Reserve Board if the 
QFC is either a direct QFC to which a covered entity is a direct party 
or an affiliate credit enhancement to which a covered entity is the 
obligor.


Sec.  47.8  Foreign Bank Multi-branch Master Agreements.

    (a) Treatment of foreign bank multi-branch master agreements. With 
respect to a Federal branch or agency of a globally significant foreign 
banking organization, a foreign bank multi-branch master agreement that 
is a covered QFC solely because the master agreement permits agreements 
or transactions that are QFCs to be entered into at one or more Federal 
branches or agencies of the globally significant foreign banking 
organization will be considered a covered QFC for purposes of this 
subpart only with respect to such agreements or transactions booked at 
such Federal branches or agencies or for which a payment or delivery 
may be made at such Federal branches or agencies.
    (b) Definition of foreign bank multi-branch master agreements. A 
foreign bank multi-branch master agreement means a master agreement 
that permits a Federal branch or agency and another place of business 
of a foreign bank that is outside the United States to enter 
transactions under the agreement.

PART 50--LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT STANDARDS

0
5. The authority citation for part 50 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., 93a, 481, 1818, and 1462 et seq.

0
6. Section 50.3 is amended by revising the definition of ``qualifying 
master netting agreement'' by:
0
i. Removing the word ``or'' at the end of paragraph (2)(i);
0
ii. Removing the '';'' at the end of paragraph (2)(ii) and adding in 
its place ``; or''; and
0
iii. Adding a new paragraph (2)(iii).
    The revisions are set forth below:


Sec.  50.3  Definitions.

* * * * *
    Qualifying master netting agreement means a written, legally 
enforceable agreement provided that:
* * * * *
    (2) * * *
* * * * *
    (iii) Where the right to accelerate, terminate, and close-out on a 
net basis all transactions under the agreement and to liquidate or set-
off collateral promptly upon an event of default of the counterparty is 
limited only to the extent necessary to comply with the requirements of 
part 47 of this title 12 or any similar requirements of another U.S. 
Federal banking agency, as applicable.
* * * * *

    Dated: August 10, 2016.
Thomas J. Curry,
Comptroller of the Currency.
[FR Doc. 2016-19671 Filed 8-18-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-33-P