Petition for Rulemaking To Adopt Revised Competitive Switching Rules; Reciprocal Switching, 51149-51165 [2016-17980]

Agencies

• Surface Transportation Board

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 149 (Wednesday, August 3, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 51149-51165]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-17980]


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SURFACE TRANSPORTATION BOARD

49 CFR Parts 1144 and 1145

[Docket No. EP 711; Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1)]


Petition for Rulemaking To Adopt Revised Competitive Switching 
Rules; Reciprocal Switching

AGENCY: Surface Transportation Board (the Board or STB).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: In this decision, the Board grants in part a petition for 
rulemaking filed by the National Industrial Transportation League 
seeking revised reciprocal switching regulations. The Board proposes 
new regulations governing reciprocal switching in Docket No. EP 711 
(Sub-No. 1), which would allow a party to seek a reciprocal switching 
prescription that is either practicable and in the public interest or 
necessary to provide competitive rail service.

DATES: Comments are due by September 26, 2016. Replies are due by 
October 25, 2016. Requests for ex parte meetings with Board Members are 
due by October 10, 2016 and meetings will be conducted between October 
25, 2016 and November 14, 2016. Meeting summaries are to be submitted 
within two business days of the ex parte meeting.

ADDRESSES: Comments and replies may be submitted either via the Board's 
e-filing format or in paper format. Any person using e-filing should 
attach a document and otherwise comply with the instructions found on 
the Board's Web site at ``www.stb.dot.gov'' at the ``E-FILING'' link. 
Any person submitting a filing in paper format should send an original 
and 10 paper copies of the filing to: Surface Transportation Board, 
Attn: Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1), 395 E Street SW., Washington, DC 
20423-0001. Copies of written comments and replies will be available 
for viewing and self-copying at the Board's Public Docket Room, Room 
131, and will be posted to the Board's Web site.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Allison Davis at (202) 245-0378. 
Assistance for the hearing impaired is available through the Federal 
Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1-800-877-8339.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Competitive access generally refers to the 
ability of a shipper or a competitor railroad to use the facilities or 
services of an incumbent railroad to extend the reach of the services 
provided by the competitor railroad. The Interstate Commerce Act makes 
three competitive

[[Page 51150]]

access remedies available to shippers and carriers: The prescription of 
through routes, terminal trackage rights, and, as relevant here, 
reciprocal switching. Under reciprocal switching, or as it is sometimes 
called, ``competitive switching,'' an incumbent carrier transports a 
shipper's traffic to an interchange point, where it switches the cars 
over to the competing carrier. The competing carrier pays the incumbent 
carrier a switching fee for bringing or taking the cars from the 
shipper's facility to the interchange point, or vice versa, which is 
incorporated into the competing carrier's total rate to the shipper. 
Reciprocal switching thus enables a competing carrier to offer its own 
single-line rate to compete with the incumbent carrier's single-line 
rate, even if the competing carrier's lines do not physically reach a 
shipper's facility.
    On July 7, 2011, the National Industrial Transportation League 
(NITL) filed a petition to institute a rulemaking proceeding to modify 
the Board's standards for reciprocal switching. The Board took public 
comment and held a hearing on the issues raised in the petition. After 
consideration of the petition and the comments and testimony received, 
the Board is granting NITL's petition in part and instituting a 
rulemaking proceeding in Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1) to modify the 
Board's standards for reciprocal switching. Because we are proposing 
rules in a separate sub-docket, we will also close the docket in Docket 
No. EP 711.

Statutory and Regulatory History

    Reciprocal switching can occur as part of a voluntary arrangement 
between carriers, or it may be ordered by the Board. The statutory 
provision governing the Board's authority to order reciprocal switching 
arrangements was first enacted by Congress in the Staggers Rail Act of 
1980, Public Law 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895 (Staggers Act). Under the 
Staggers Act, the agency may require rail carriers to enter into 
reciprocal switching agreements, where it finds such agreements to be 
practicable and in the public interest, or where such agreements are 
necessary to provide competitive rail service. The rail carriers 
entering into such an agreement shall establish the conditions and 
compensation applicable to such agreement, but, if the rail carriers 
cannot agree upon such conditions and compensation within a reasonable 
period of time, the Board may establish such conditions and 
compensation. 49 U.S.C. 11102(c)(1) (emphasis added) (previously 
codified at 49 U.S.C. 11103(c) (1980)).
    In 1985, the Board's predecessor agency, the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC), adopted regulations pertaining to competitive access, 
including reciprocal switching.\1\ Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 
I.C.C.2d 822 (1985), aff'd sub nom Balt. Gas & Elec. v. United States, 
817 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Those regulations were adopted upon the 
filing of petitions from NITL and the Association of American Railroads 
(AAR) asking the agency to adopt rules that they had negotiated. A 
subsequent joint petition was filed by the AAR and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association (CMA) that clarified the negotiated NITL-AAR 
agreement. The ICC adopted this agreed-upon proposal, with some 
modifications. Id. The regulations provided that reciprocal switching 
would only be prescribed if the agency determines that it is necessary 
to remedy or prevent an act that is contrary to the competition 
policies of 49 U.S.C. 10101 or is otherwise anticompetitive,'' and 
``otherwise satisfies the criteria of . . . 11102(c). 49 CFR 
1144.2(a)(1); \2\ see also Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 I.C.C.2d at 
830, 841.
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    \1\ These regulations did not include a prescription for 
terminal trackage rights. The ICC stated that ``there is no present 
need to adopt rules for prescription of terminal trackage rights. 
Such rights have rarely been sought in recent years, and we do not 
anticipate a surge of such cases.'' Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 
I.C.C.2d at 835.
    \2\ Formerly codified at 49 CFR 1144.5(a)(1). The regulations at 
1144.2(a) also provide a list of relevant factors that the agency 
shall take into account in making this determination in subsection 
(a)(1), along with a ``standing'' requirement in subsection (a)(2).
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    The following year, in 1986, the ICC decided its first reciprocal 
switching case under the new regulations. In Midtec Paper Corp. v. 
Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. (Midtec Paper Corp.), 3 
I.C.C.2d 171 (1986), the ICC denied a shipper's petition for 
competitive access either via terminal trackage rights or reciprocal 
switching. In so doing, the ICC elaborated on the rules it adopted in 
Intramodal Rail Competition and their relation to the statute:

    [W]e think it correct to view the Staggers [Act] changes as 
directed to situations where some competitive failure occurs. There 
is a vast difference between using the Commission's regulatory power 
to correct abuses that result from insufficient intramodal 
competition and using that power to initiate an open-ended 
restructuring of service to and within terminal areas solely to 
introduce additional carrier service.

Id. at 174. Thus, although ``[u]nder [11102(c)], awarding reciprocal 
switching is discretionary,'' the ICC explained that the key issue 
under its then-new regulations was whether the incumbent railroad ``has 
engaged or is likely to engage in conduct that is contrary to the rail 
transportation policy or is otherwise anticompetitive.'' Id. at 181. In 
assessing anticompetitive conduct, the essential questions for the ICC 
were whether the railroad had used its market power to extract 
unreasonable terms or had shown a disregard for the shipper's needs by 
furnishing inadequate service. Id. The shipper in Midtec Paper Corp. 
made general allegations about the carrier's rates and specific 
allegations about its service as evidence of anticompetitive conduct, 
but the ICC found no evidence that the rates to the complaining shipper 
were higher than other shippers and found the evidence of service 
inadequacies unconvincing. Id. at 182-85. Accordingly, the ICC rejected 
the request for reciprocal switching.
    On appeal of Midtec Paper Corp., the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the application of the 
reciprocal switching regulations, including the anticompetitive conduct 
requirement, as a permissible exercise of the agency's discretion, 
stating:

    [The Intramodal] rules narrow the agency's discretion under 
section 1110[2] by describing, for example, the circumstances in 
which it would not grant discretionary relief--where there is no 
reasonable fear of anticompetitive behavior. We could not say in 
Baltimore Gas, and cannot say now, that the Commission's narrowing 
of its own discretion is manifestly inconsistent with the terms or 
the purposes of section 1110[2], or with the broader purposes of the 
Staggers Act.

Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d 1487, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 
1988) (statutory sections updated to reflect current numbering); see 
also Balt. Gas & Elec., 817 F.2d at 115 (stating that ICC's competitive 
access rules are ``a reasonable accommodation of the conflicting 
policies set out in its governing statute.'').
    Since adoption of the agency's competitive access regulations in 
1985, the regulations have not changed substantively. Few requests for 
reciprocal switching have been filed with the agency since then, and in 
none of those cases has the Board granted a request for reciprocal 
switching. See, e.g., Midtec Paper Corp., 3 I.C.C.2d at 171; Vista 
Chem. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 5 I.C.C.2d 331 (1989).

[[Page 51151]]

NITL's Petition and Comments Received

    In June 2011, the Board held a public hearing in Competition in the 
Railroad Industry, Docket No. EP 705, to explore the current state of 
competition in the railroad industry and possible policy alternatives 
to facilitate more competition, and asked parties to comment on issues 
pertaining to the Board's authority to impose reciprocal switching 
under 49 U.S.C. 11102(c), among other items. Soon after the hearing, 
NITL filed a petition for rulemaking in Petition for Rulemaking to 
Adopt Revised Competitive Switching Rules, Docket No. EP 711. NITL's 
petition, which it describes as ``flow[ing] from the inquiry that the 
Board initiated in Ex Parte No. 705,'' urges regulatory change and 
argues that the Board's reciprocal switching regulations have not 
promoted Congress's goal in enacting 11102(c), which was to encourage 
greater competition through reciprocal switching. (NITL Pet. 2, 17.) 
\3\ NITL therefore proposes new regulations under which reciprocal 
switching by a Class I rail carrier would be mandatory if certain 
conditions were present. (Id. at 2-6.)
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    \3\ Unless otherwise noted, all record cites are to submissions 
made in Petition for Rulemaking to Adopt Revised Competitive 
Switching Rules, Docket No. EP 711. Additionally, all references to 
comments and replies in Docket No. EP 711 refer to those received in 
response to the Board's July 25, 2012 decision.
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    Specifically, NITL proposes regulations under which Board-ordered 
competitive switching by a Class I rail carrier would be mandatory if 
four criteria were met: (1) The shipper (or group of shippers) is 
served by a single Class I rail carrier; (2) there is no effective 
intermodal or intramodal competition for the movements for which 
competitive switching is sought; (3) there is or can be ``a working 
interchange'' between a Class I carrier and another carrier within a 
``reasonable distance'' of the shipper's facility; and (4) switching is 
safe and feasible and would not unduly hamper the carrier's ability to 
serve existing shippers. (Id. at 7.)
    NITL's proposal includes several conclusive presumptions. With 
respect to the criterion that no effective competition exists, NITL 
proposes two presumptions. Specifically, a shipper would be 
conclusively presumed to lack effective intermodal or intramodal 
competition where either: (a) The rate for the movement for which 
switching is sought has a revenue-to-variable cost ratio of 240% or 
more (R/VC>=240), or (b) where the incumbent carrier serving 
the shipper's facilities for which switching is sought has handled 75% 
or more of the transported volumes of the movements at issue for the 
12-month period prior to the petition requesting that the Board order 
switching. (Id. at 8.)
    With respect to the criterion that there is a working interchange 
within a reasonable distance, NITL also proposes two presumptions. 
Specifically, the presence of a working interchange within a reasonable 
distance of the shipper's facility would be presumed if either: (a) The 
shipper's facility is within the boundaries of a ``terminal'' of the 
Class I rail carrier, at which cars are ``regularly switched,'' or (b) 
the shipper's facility is within 30 miles of an interchange between the 
Class I rail carrier and another rail carrier, at which cars are 
``regularly switched.'' (Id. at 8.)
    Following receipt of NITL's petition, the Board received a number 
of replies to the petition. The Board initially deferred consideration 
of NITL's petition pending a review of the comments received in Docket 
No. EP 705, in a decision served on November 4, 2011. In a decision 
served on July 25, 2012, the Board, without instituting a rulemaking 
proceeding, sought comments and further study of a number of issues 
with the NITL proposal, and subsequently received comments and replies. 
The Board also received oral testimony in a hearing held on March 25 
and 26, 2014. For a list of the numerous parties that have participated 
in this proceeding at various stages, see the Appendix.\4\ Most 
shippers who commented support NITL's general proposal that the Board 
should revise its reciprocal switching regulations in order to make the 
remedy more widely available. Supporters of the NITL proposal contend 
that it would introduce more competition into the rail transportation 
marketplace. (E.g., ACC Comments 3-5; NITL Comments 6.) Pointing to the 
Canadian experience with ``interswitching,'' \5\ supporters argue that 
the proposal is practicable. (E.g., Diversified CPC Comments 8-10; 
Highroad Comments 17-20; NITL Comments 59-63.) They also argue that the 
proposal could improve rail service generally, would not harm shippers 
ineligible for a switching order, and would not undermine rail network 
efficiency. (AECC Reply 7-11; Diversified CPC Comments 6; Highroad 
Comments 9-10; NITL Comments 56-63; NITL Reply 27-34.)
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    \4\ To the extent this decision refers to parties by 
abbreviations, those abbreviations are listed in the Appendix.
    \5\ ``Interswitching'' refers to government-mandated reciprocal 
switching for shippers within a certain distance of a competing 
carrier's interchange.
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    Some commenters generally support modifying the Board's competitive 
access regulations in a manner similar to NITL's proposal, but disagree 
over the precise changes the Board should adopt. For example, although 
some parties support using R/VC>=240 to determine effective 
competition (see, e.g., GLE Comments 8-10), others instead support the 
use of R/VC>=180 or a carrier's Revenue Shortfall Allocation 
Methodology benchmark (see Agricultural Parties Comments 17-18, 23; 
Diversified CPC Comments 12; Highroad Comments 16-17; Roanoke Cement 
Comments 11-12; USDA Comments 6). Similarly, although some parties 
appear to agree on having a limitation based on distance, they disagree 
on what a reasonable distance would be and the number of miles that 
should be used for a presumption. (See Agricultural Parties Comments 
24; Highroad Comments 16; Roanoke Cement Comments 8.) In addition, some 
commenters state that they are not in favor of any rule that would 
require shippers to prove market dominance or prove that rates exceed a 
regulatory benchmark in order to obtain competitive access. 
(Diversified CPC Comments 9; Highroad Comments 16, 22; Roanoke Cement 
Comments 11.)
    Moreover, some shipper groups that generally support NITL's 
proposal acknowledge that their members would have few opportunities to 
qualify for reciprocal switching under the proposal. (ARC Comments 13; 
Agricultural Parties Reply 4-5.) Additionally, many shippers or shipper 
groups question whether the NITL proposal would in fact increase 
competition or have an appreciable impact on rates. Olin contends that 
NITL's proposal is flawed because it is ``premised on the false 
assumption that the railroads are actually interested in competing for 
business.'' (Olin Comments 6.) The Chlorine Institute argues that 
NITL's proposal would not ensure that any rate offered by a second 
carrier would be reasonable or competitive. (Chlorine Institute 
Comments 1-2.) Agricultural Parties, though not opposing NITL's 
proposal, state that the Board ``should not conclusively presume that 
access to an alternative Class I railroad via mandatory switching will 
result in effective competition,'' or that any competition that occurs 
would ensure reasonable rates and service. (Agricultural Parties 
Comments 15 (emphasis in original).) According to Joint Coal Shippers, 
``any assumption that the availability of mandatory switching 
constitutes de facto

[[Page 51152]]

competition would constitute a significant and unjustifiable harm to 
captive shippers.'' (Joint Coal Shippers Comments 11.) Similarly, ARC 
maintains that shifting freight from one railroad to a potential 
competitor does not guarantee any reduction in rates. (ARC Comments 8.)
    Rail carriers and rail interests oppose NITL's proposal for a 
variety of reasons. They contend that the proposal is unnecessary 
because shippers are concerned more about rates than access to 
additional rail carriers, as revealed in the testimony given in Docket 
No. EP 705. (CSXT Comments 21-23; KCS Comments 3-7.) Moreover, rail 
carriers argue that the proposal is unwise because it would favor a 
small group of shippers to the detriment of others. (AAR Comments 5-6, 
Joint V.S. Eakin & Meitzen 3-5; CEI Reply 3; NSR Reply 28-30.) 
Additionally, they contend that the proposal would have serious, 
adverse effects on rail service, carrier revenues, network efficiency, 
and incentives to invest in the rail network. (See, e.g., CEI Reply 3; 
CSXT Comments 24-48; KCS Comments 14-16; NSR Comments 79-80.) In 
response to some shippers' claim that the Canadian interswitching model 
demonstrates the practicability of the NITL proposal, railroads argue 
that differences between the Canadian and U.S. rail networks make the 
Canadian regulatory regime an unreliable guide as to what would happen 
under NITL's proposal. (AAR Reply 31-32; CSXT Reply 42-47; KCS Reply 
30-33; CEI Reply 7; UTU-NY Reply 3.)
    Rail carriers and carrier interests also argue that the NITL 
proposal is legally flawed. They contend that it is unlawful because 
Congress ``ratified'' the Midtec Paper Corp. standard of 
anticompetitive behavior when Congress re-enacted the reciprocal 
switching language in 11102 without change in the ICC Termination Act 
of 1995 (ICCTA), Pub. L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803. (CSXT Comments 11-21; 
NSR Comments 23-28.).
    Rail interests also question the practicality of NITL's proposal, 
argue that there are too many unknowns regarding its parameters for it 
to be easily implemented, and contend that these unknowns will lead to 
increased litigation before the Board. These unknowns, according to the 
carriers, include matters such as access pricing, agreement terms, yard 
and line capacity, service levels, routing issues, labor protection, 
environmental impacts, general switching standards and procedures, 
whether the 75% presumption for lack of effective competition applies 
regardless of price level or availability of other modes of 
transportation, how the 30-mile limit would be calculated 
(specifically, whether it would be route miles or radial miles), and 
whether qualifying for mandatory switching lasts in perpetuity. (See, 
e.g., CSXT Comments 2, 54-57; KCS Comments 17-19.) Additionally, they 
argue that NITL did not define several terms, including ``terminal,'' 
``regular switching,'' ``safe and feasible operations,'' what it would 
mean to ``unduly hamper'' the ability of a carrier to serve shippers, 
and the meaning of the phrase ``shipper (or group of shippers) served 
by a single Class I carrier.'' (CSXT Comments 49; KCS Comments 19; NSR 
Comments 64.) NSR also argues that NITL's presumptions are not 
conclusive because, under NITL's proposal, if one of the presumptions 
does not apply, the shipper can still litigate the issue before the 
Board. (NSR Comments 40.)
    Commenters also disagreed on the impact the proposal would have on 
the railroad industry. Based on analyses of waybill data, supporters of 
NITL's proposal argue that the proposal would affect a relatively 
modest amount of traffic and carrier revenue. (DOT Comments 2-3; NITL 
Comments 43; NITL Reply 23; USDA Comments 10-11.) NITL estimates that 
4% of carloads on the networks of the four larger Class I rail carriers 
(BNSF, CSXT, NSR, and UP) under ``full competition'' \6\ would be 
subject to potential reciprocal switching under its proposal. (See NITL 
Comments 43.) The railroads generally argue that NITL's proposal is too 
vague to derive proper estimates. (AAR Comments 10-13; BNSF Comments 1; 
NSR Comments 5.) Given the data available, AAR surmises that NITL's 
proposal could affect approximately half of the stations currently 
served by only one Class I carrier. (AAR Comments 13.) DOT estimates, 
based on the four Class I railroads it examined, that NITL's proposal 
would affect 2.1% of revenue and 1.3% of carloads. (DOT Comments 2-3.)
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    \6\ NITL describes ``full competition'' as a scenario where the 
incumbent and competing carriers compete vigorously to win the 
traffic after a reciprocal switch arrangement is put in place, 
resulting in a rate that is ``equal to the average `competitive' 
rate, for that carrier, commodity and mileage block.'' This full 
competition rate is contrasted with the broader ``reduced 
competition'' rate, in which a railroad might lower a shipper's rate 
in response to the possibility of being required to provide 
reciprocal switching under the NITL's proposal, but not down to the 
maximum competitive rate. (NITL Hearing Presentation, Slide 15 
(filed Mar. 25, 2014).)
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The Need To Revisit the Board's 11102(c) Interpretation and Reciprocal 
Switching Regulations

    Many commenters in both this proceeding and in Docket No. EP 705 
expressed the view that the agency's decision to narrow its discretion 
under 11102(c)--by requiring anticompetitive conduct--has proven, over 
time, to set an unrealistically high bar for shippers to obtain 
reciprocal switching, as demonstrated by the fact that shippers have 
not filed petitions for reciprocal switching in many years, despite 
expressing concerns about competition.\7\ The sheer dearth of cases 
brought under 11102(c) in the three decades since Intramodal Rail 
Competition, despite continued shipper concerns about competitive 
options and quality of service, suggests that part 1144 and Midtec 
Paper Corp. have effectively operated as a bar to relief rather than as 
a standard under which relief could be granted.
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    \7\ See, e.g., Agricultural Parties Comments 4; USDA Comments 2. 
See also CURE Comments 11-12, Apr. 12, 2011, Competition in the R.R. 
Indus., EP 705; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. Comments 12, Apr. 12, 
2011, Competition in the R.R. Indus., EP 705; USDA Comments 5, Apr. 
12, 2011, Competition in the R.R. Indus., EP 705.
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    In other contexts where the Board has observed that important 
available remedies have become dormant, the agency has examined the 
underlying regulations and pursued modifications, where appropriate. 
See, e.g., Simplified Standards for Rail Rate Cases, EP 646 (Sub-No. 1) 
(STB served Sep. 5, 2007) (revising the Board's regulations for smaller 
rate disputes). For this reason alone, it is appropriate to revisit the 
agency's regulations and precedent with regard to reciprocal switching.
    But there have also been many changes that have occurred in the 
rail industry since Intramodal Rail Competition and Midtec Paper Corp. 
In the 1980s, the rail industry was reeling from decades of 
inefficiency and serial bankruptcies. The significant changes since 
then include, but are not limited to, the improved economic health of 
the railroad industry and increased consolidation in the Class I 
railroad sector. In its report on the recently enacted Surface 
Transportation Board Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-110, 129 
Stat. 2228, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation noted that ``[t]he U.S. freight railroad industry has 
undergone a remarkable transformation since the enactment of the 
Staggers Rail Act of 1980,'' and elaborated that ``the industry has 
evolved and the railroads' financial viability has drastically 
improved.'' S. Rep. No. 114-52, at 1-2 (2015).

[[Page 51153]]

Particularly relevant to reciprocal switching, the consolidation of 
Class I carriers and the creation of short lines that may have strong 
ties to a particular Class I likely reduces the chance of naturally 
occurring reciprocal switching as carriers seek to optimize their own 
large networks. While this is not in itself problematic, it could lead 
to reduced competitive options for some shippers and thus should be 
considered. Likewise, to avoid obsolescence of the Board's regulatory 
policies, we must consider the better overall economic health of the 
rail industry as well as increased productivity and technological 
advances.\8\
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    \8\ Moreover, the increase in access provided by this regulation 
also addresses the mandate from the President of the United States 
to federal agencies to consider ``pro-competitive rulemaking and 
regulations'' and ``eliminating regulations that create barriers to 
or limit competition.'' Exec. Order No. 13,725, 81 FR 23,417 (Apr. 
15, 2016).
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    For these reasons, the Board concludes that the agency's 
regulations and precedent, in which the public interest and competition 
statutory bases for reciprocal switching were consolidated into a 
single competitive abuse standard, makes less sense in today's 
regulatory and economic environment. Therefore, to the extent that the 
ICC adopted a single anticompetitive act standard in awarding 
reciprocal switching under 11102(c) in Intramodal Rail Competition and 
Midtec Paper Corp., the Board proposes to reverse that policy. However, 
before turning to the issue of what revised reciprocal switching 
regulations should entail, we will first address the scope of the 
Board's authority to revise its interpretation of 11102(c) and adopt 
new reciprocal switching regulations.

The Board's Authority To Revise Its Interpretation of 11102(c) and 
Adopt New Reciprocal Switching Regulations

    As discussed above, the Board has broad discretion under 11102(c) 
to require carriers to enter into reciprocal switching arrangements 
when they are practicable and in the public interest or necessary to 
provide competitive rail service. The agency's primary duty in 
exercising its statutory reciprocal switching discretion is to ensure 
it does so in a manner that is not ``manifestly contrary'' to the 
statute. Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d at 1500.
    Even though it adopted one set of regulations in 1985, the agency 
retains broad authority to revise its statutory interpretation and the 
resulting regulations. It is an axiom of administrative law that an 
agency's adoption of a particular statutory interpretation at one point 
in time does not preclude later different interpretations. See, e.g., 
Hinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1995). If it changes 
course, an agency must provide ``a reasoned analysis indicating that 
prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed and not 
casually ignored,'' Grace Petroleum Corp. v. FERC, 815 F.2d 589, 591 
(10th Cir. 1987) (citing Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 
841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), and its new interpretation must be 
permissible under the governing statute, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
    In proposing new reciprocal switching rules, the Board has provided 
a reasoned explanation for departing from past precedent and has 
explained why the rules are a permissible exercise of its jurisdiction 
under 11102. The agency is free to do so because nothing in the plain 
language of 11102 [then 11103] required the agency in 1985 to adopt the 
anticompetitive act framework proposed by AAR and NITL. Neither of the 
two statutory bases for reciprocal switching--practicable and in the 
public interest, or necessary to provide competitive rail service--
mandates a finding that a rail carrier has engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct. Although the ICC chose to order reciprocal switching only when 
there had been a ``competitive failure,'' the agency appeared to 
recognize that the anticompetitive act standard was merely one approach 
of several it could take. Midtec Paper Corp., 3 I.C.C.2d at 174. The 
fact that the ICC chose (based largely on stakeholder negotiations) \9\ 
the anticompetitive conduct approach over other approaches did not 
eliminate those other interpretations from later adoption. As the court 
in Baltimore Gas & Electric made clear, given the broad statutory 
language and conflicting rail transportation policies, the agency has a 
wide range of options for competitive access regulation. 817 F.2d at 
115 (observing that the complainant's open access statutory 
interpretation, rejected by the ICC, ``might well reflect sound 
economics, and might--we do not decide--be a reasonable interpretation 
of the statute. Certainly, however, it is not the only reasonable 
interpretation, because as we have noted, the statutory directives 
under which the ICC operates do not all point in the same 
direction.''). In response to NITL's petition, CSXT and NSR argue that 
the Board lacks the authority to change its reciprocal switching rules 
because Congress ``ratified'' the Midtec Paper Corp. standard when it 
reenacted the reciprocal switching language in ICCTA. (CSXT Comments 
11-21; NSR Comments 23-28.) Legislative ratification (also known as 
legislative reenactment) is a doctrine that examines whether Congress' 
decision to leave undisturbed a statutory provision that an agency has 
interpreted in a particular manner can be read as tacit approval of the 
interpretation, thereby giving the agency's interpretation ``the force 
and effect of law.'' Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1989). 
Recognizing that Congressional reenactment of the same statutory 
language does not ordinarily ``freeze all pre-existing agency 
interpretations of language, forever after immunizing them from 
change,'' Bernardo v. Johnson, 814 F.3d 481, 498 (1st Cir. 2016), 
courts apply the doctrine cautiously. The doctrine applies ``[w]hen a 
Congress that re-enacts a statute voices its approval of an 
administrative or other interpretation . . . .'' United States v. Bd. 
of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 134 (1978).
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    \9\ Having encouraged rail carriers and shippers to work 
together on implementation issues arising from the Staggers Act, one 
important basis for the ICC's competitive access regulations was to 
give as much effect as possible to proposed rules that had been 
negotiated by AAR, NITL, and CMA. Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 
I.C.C.2d at 822-23 (``In adopting the regulations set forth below, 
we have attempted to preserve to the maximum extent possible the 
product of negotiation and compromise among the major carrier and 
shipper interests.'') Those negotiated rules included the concept 
that competitive access would only be available upon a finding that 
it was necessary to remedy or prevent an anticompetitive act. See 50 
FR 13,051 (1985).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The arguments offered by NSR and CSXT do not persuade us that the 
Board lacks authority to alter its interpretation of 11102. NSR 
suggests that ratification requires only that Congress was aware of an 
issue and reenacted the statutory provision without change, but NSR 
ignores the searching analysis ordinarily performed by courts to 
determine whether there was some affirmative expression of approval by 
Congress. (See NSR Comments 23-28.) Courts seek to ``ascertain whether 
Congress has spoken clearly enough to constitute acceptance and 
approval of an administrative interpretation. Mere reenactment is 
insufficient.'' Isaacs, 865 F.2d at 468 (stating that Congress must 
have ``expressed approval'' of an agency interpretation by taking ``an 
affirmative step to ratify it''); Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. ICC, 564 F.2d 
486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (explaining that the doctrine requires 
awareness by Congress plus some affirmative indication to preclude 
subsequent reinterpretation).\10\ Indeed,

[[Page 51154]]

the consensus upon which ratification is based must be ``so broad and 
unquestioned'' as to permit an assumption that Congress knew of and 
endorsed that interpretation. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf't, 543 
U.S. 335, 349 (2005). Application of the doctrine is particularly 
difficult when the legislative term is ambiguous or subject to an 
agency's discretion. See Bernardo, 814 F.3d at 488.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Even in those cases where the courts have not expressly 
stated that applicability of ratification requires a review of 
Congressional intent, many courts have nonetheless performed such a 
review. See, e.g., Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 782 n.15 (1985) 
(explaining that the court need not rely on ``bare force of this 
assumption'' regarding reenactment because legislative history 
indicated that Congress intended interpretation to continue); FDIC 
v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (stating that the 
legislative history indicated that Congress intended to include the 
FDIC's prior interpretation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Here, while Congress in ICCTA reenacted the reciprocal switching 
provision without change, CSXT and NSR do not cite any legislative 
history in which Congress even mentioned the agency's interpretation of 
former 11103 (now 11102), much less voiced approval for it. The absence 
of any such affirmation or discussion by Congress, combined with 
judicial recognition that reciprocal switching is a matter of agency 
discretion, renders the ratification doctrine inapplicable here.
    Nor have NSR and CSXT persuaded us that the doctrine of 
ratification can be used to wholly eliminate the agency's broad policy 
discretion, particularly where that broad discretion and the potential 
for varying, reasonable interpretations of 11102 have been judicially 
recognized prior to legislative reenactment. In reviewing the 
competitive access rules adopted in Intramodal Rail Competition, the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the agency's exercise of 
its reciprocal switching discretion was a ``reasonable accommodation of 
the conflicting policies set out in its governing statute.'' Balt. Gas 
& Elec., 817 F.2d at 115 (noting that there were ``fifteen different 
and not entirely consistent goals'' in the rail transportation policy 
of 10101 and rejecting the argument that there was only one reasonable 
interpretation). Likewise, the Midtec Paper Corp. court found that the 
agency had ``narrowed its own discretion in a manner that was not 
manifestly inconsistent with [ 11102] or the broader purposes of the 
Staggers Act.'' If the ICC was able to narrow its discretion, by 
implication, it must also be able to broaden its discretion, so long as 
the agency does not exceed the limitations set forth in the statute. 
Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d at 1500 (``[T]he 
Commission is under no mandatory duty to prescribe reciprocal switching 
where it believes that doing so would be unwise as a matter of policy. 
. . . In order to support its exercise of discretion, the agency must 
provide a reasoned analysis that is not manifestly contrary to the 
purposes of the legislation it administers.'').\11\ Given that the ICC 
in Intramodal Rail Competition and Midtec Paper Corp. did not say that 
its anticompetitive conduct standard was required by the statute, and 
given the absence of any suggestion that Congress intended to limit the 
agency's discretion with regard to reciprocal switching, the Board 
cannot conclude that the doctrine of ratification (even if it were 
applicable) would compel this result. (See NITL Reply 45 (``To the 
extent there was any `ratification,' it was to ratify the very 
discretion that Congress gave the Board in the statute's original 
iteration.''); ACC Reply 5 (``Congress's failure to change 11102(c) in 
ICCTA indicates, at most, nothing more than Congress's view that the 
1985 competitive access rules were within the realm of permissible uses 
of ICC competitive switching discretion.'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ In Midtec Paper Corp., the agency likewise recognized its 
own discretion: ``Under [former] 11103(c), awarding reciprocal 
switching is discretionary. Nevertheless, under the rules adopted in 
Intramodal, we will award that relief if significant use will be 
made of it, and when switching is necessary to remedy or prevent an 
act that is either contrary to the competition policies of 49 U.S.C. 
10101a or otherwise anticompetitive.'' 3 I.C.C.2d at 176.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

New Reciprocal Switching Regulations

    Having determined that the ICC's interpretation of 11102, including 
its anticompetitive conduct requirement, may no longer be appropriate 
and that the agency has the authority to revise its reciprocal 
switching regulations, the Board must appropriately balance the 
competing policy considerations in proposing new regulations. To do so, 
we will first examine the concerns that we have with some aspects of 
the proposed regulations put forth by NITL in Docket No. EP 711. We 
will then discuss the Board's proposed regulations in Docket No. EP 711 
(Sub-No. 1), including how they differ from both NITL's approach and 
the agency's current regulations.

Docket No. EP 711

    The Board has reviewed NITL's petition and the numerous comments 
and testimony in this docket. We conclude that NITL's proposal, while a 
valuable starting point for new reciprocal switching regulations, does 
not, on its own, strike the appropriate policy balance. The Board is 
chiefly concerned that NITL's approach, with its substantial reliance 
on conclusive presumptions, would lead to problems regarding fairness 
among different categories of shippers. The Board prefers a reciprocal 
switching standard that makes the remedy more equally available to all 
shippers, rather than a limited subset of shippers, and that would 
allow the Board to examine reciprocal switching on a case-by-case 
basis.
    NITL's use of multiple presumptions raises questions of fairness in 
terms of who would be able to take advantage of the NITL proposal and 
who would not. Whatever presumptions are adopted--whether those 
proposed by NITL or others--lines would be drawn that would favor some 
shippers (for example, those within a 30-mile radius of an interchange) 
over other shippers (for example, those outside the 30-mile radius). 
Under NITL's proposal, some shippers who want reciprocal switching 
might not be eligible for improved access to reciprocal shipping 
because they do not meet the criteria.\12\ Conversely, not all shippers 
who qualify under the presumptions would necessarily want or need 
reciprocal switching. Put more simply, basing the availability of 
reciprocal switching primarily on conclusive presumptions based on 
bright-line cut-offs would make this remedy both overinclusive and 
underinclusive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ We recognize that, under NITL's proposal, a shipper could 
still seek to obtain reciprocal switching by proving the criteria 
without use of the conclusive presumptions. (NITL Pet. 35-36; NITL 
Reply 35-36.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The record here suggests that shippers of certain commodities, 
particularly chemical shippers, would be the major beneficiaries of the 
conclusive presumptions proposed by NITL, as these shippers move 
traffic with higher R/VC ratios and thus would be more likely to meet 
the R/VC>=240 presumptions. (See, e.g., ACC Comments 4-5 
(stating that more than half of all chemical traffic has R/VC ratios 
above 240% and that ``[c]hemical shipments have the largest potential 
savings of any commodity group'' under the proposal).) A significant 
number of chemical shippers are also located within 30 miles of 
multiple railroads. In contrast, shippers of other commodities, 
particularly agricultural shippers, would tend not to qualify under the 
conclusive presumptions proposed by NITL, as agricultural shippers tend 
to be located in more remote locations that are generally only served 
by one railroad, and thus are less likely to be within 30 miles of an 
interchange. (See Agricultural Parties Reply 3 (``[L]ess than 6% (and 
probably substantially less) of [agricultural commodities] . . . would 
be shipped to and from facilities

[[Page 51155]]

that met the conclusive presumptions under the Proposal.''); USDA 
Comments 5 (noting difficulties that many agricultural shippers in the 
West would have meeting the presumptions); see also ARC Comments 13 
(same).)
    Our concerns about the issue of fairness are reinforced by comments 
regarding the potential impacts of NITL's proposal on shippers that 
would not be eligible under the proposal's presumptions. NITL maintains 
that the impacts on ineligible shippers would be ``nil,'' arguing that 
railroads would be unlikely to raise rates on such shippers because the 
carriers are presumably already maximizing revenues on this ineligible 
traffic. (NITL Comments 56-57.) \13\ In addition to AAR (AAR Comments 
17), however, Agricultural Parties also suggest that there might be 
rate impacts on ineligible shippers, stating that ``the fact that so 
few NGFA Commodity shippers could qualify for competitive switching 
could expose the NGFA Commodity shippers as a class to rate increases 
imposed to offset the reductions obtained by other rail shippers . . . 
as a result of the establishment of competitive switching for their 
facilities.'' (Agricultural Parties Comments 23.) Further, some 
commenters argue that even if rail carriers do not raise the rates of 
those shippers that are not eligible, there could be other negative 
impacts on service and investment. (AAR Comments 17; KCS Reply 26 
(stating that ineligible shippers would suffer service problems and be 
competitively disadvantaged compared to their competitors who are 
eligible); UP Comments 66 (``[T]he most significant impacts of NITL's 
proposal on shippers that cannot use forced switching would likely be 
the impacts on their rail service and on competition in markets for the 
goods they ship or receive.'').)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ UP also argues that widespread rate increases would be 
unlikely. (UP Comments 66.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After reviewing these comments, we are concerned that reciprocal 
switching based on the proposed conclusive presumptions could have 
adverse effects on categories of shippers not eligible under NITL's 
proposal. If NITL's proposal places downward pressure on the rates of 
those shippers who are eligible, then there may be an incentive for 
railroads that cannot make up any shortfall to raise the rates of 
ineligible shippers or degrade service in an effort to cut costs. While 
these incentives might exist to some degree with any increase in 
reciprocal switching (a remedy expressly authorized by Congress), we 
are concerned about the effects on categories of shippers who have less 
access to relief under a presumption-based approach.
    For these reasons, the Board prefers a reciprocal switching 
standard that makes the remedy more equally available to all shippers, 
rather than a limited subset of shippers. Imposing reciprocal switching 
on a case-by-case basis would also allow the Board a greater degree of 
precision when mandating reciprocal switching than is afforded under 
the approach advanced by NITL. We believe such an approach would allow 
the Board to better balance the needs of the individual shipper versus 
the needs of the railroads and other shippers. Therefore, although the 
Board's proposal is guided in many instances by NITL's proposal, we are 
deviating from NITL's proposal in several respects. We are granting 
NITL's petition to institute a rulemaking in part, closing the 
proceeding in Docket No. EP 711, and instituting a rulemaking 
proceeding in Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1). The Board's proposal is 
outlined below.

Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1)

    In developing new reciprocal switching regulations, we begin by 
looking back to Congress' directive, as set forth in the statute 
(11102(c)). As noted, we must also weigh and balance the various rail 
transportation policy (RTP) factors enumerated in 49 U.S.C. 10101. See, 
e.g., Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 I.C.C.2d at 823.
    It has long been the position of the agency and the courts that 
11102 (and other Staggers Act routing provisions) were not designed to 
provide shippers with full, open access routing. See, e.g., Midtec 
Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 F.2d at 1507 (there is no indication 
that Congress intended the agency to prescribe reciprocal switching 
whenever it would enhance competition); Review of Rail Access & 
Competition Issues, EP 575, slip op. at 6 (STB served Apr. 17, 1998) 
(noting that statute requires a showing of need for access remedies and 
does not permit such remedies merely ``on demand'').\14\ However, 11102 
was clearly intended to empower the agency to encourage the 
availability of reciprocal switching when appropriate. H.R. Rep. No. 
96-1035 at 67 (1980); see also Midtec Paper Corp. v. United States, 857 
F.2d at 1500-01 (acknowledging Congress' desire for the agency to 
``encourage'' reciprocal switching). As explained above, 11102(c) sets 
out two prongs by which the Board can order reciprocal switching: where 
reciprocal switching is practicable and in the public interest, or 
where reciprocal switching is necessary to provide competitive rail 
service. The ICC, through its decisions in Intramodal Rail Competition 
and Midtec Paper Corp., essentially consolidated those two prongs into 
a single standard, which requires shippers to demonstrate 
anticompetitive conduct by the railroad. For reasons discussed above, 
we conclude that the ICC's consolidation of these two prongs is overly 
restrictive in today's environment.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ See also Balt. Gas & Elec., 817 F.2d at 115 (``We see not 
the slightest indication that Congress intended to mandate a radical 
restructuring of the railroad regulatory scheme [by making a 
bottleneck monopoly impossible through mandated open access] so as 
to parallel telecommunications regulation''); Cent. Power & Light 
Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., NOR 41242, et al., slip op. at 5 (STB 
served Dec. 31, 1996) (``Congress chose not to provide for the open 
routing that shippers seek here.'').
    \15\ NITL's proposal also combined the two criteria. (NITL Pet. 
67.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In determining whether to adopt competitive new access rules, the 
Board must also weigh and balance the various rail transportation 
policy (RTP) factors enumerated in 49 U.S.C. 10101. See, e.g., 
Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 I.C.C.2d at 823.\16\ Here, there are 
several RTP factors relevant to our analysis, including relying on and 
encouraging effective competition (10101(1), (4), (5), (6)), promoting 
a safe and efficient rail transportation system by allowing carriers to 
earn adequate revenues (10101(3)), promoting public health and safety 
(10101(8)), avoiding undue concentrations of market power (10101(12)), 
and providing fair and expeditious handling of issues (10101(2), (15).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ It is well established that the Board's statutory 
directives are often conflicting or contradictory. See Mkt. 
Dominance Determinations--Prod. & Geographic Competition, 5 S.T.B. 
492, 497 (STB served Apr. 3, 2001) (acknowledging that the RTP 
``contains 15 separate and sometimes conflicting policy goals that 
together establish the framework for regulatory oversight of the 
rail industry. No special significance attaches to the order in 
which these various policy goals are set out in the statute.''); see 
also Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. STB, 306 F.3d 1108, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 
2002); Balt. Gas & Elec., 817 F.2d at 115. Nevertheless, we have and 
will continue to strive to balance the competing statutory 
directives appropriately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that one way to reinterpret 11102(c) and undo the 
restriction on access to reciprocal switching is to adhere more closely 
to the statutory language than the ICC did, thereby broadening the 
framework under which reciprocal switching could be justified. By 
explicitly recognizing Congress' decision to provide two distinct 
pathways to obtain reciprocal switching--practicable and in the public 
interest or necessary to provide competitive rail service--we would 
enhance the ability of shippers and carriers to make a case for (or 
against)

[[Page 51156]]

reciprocal switching in a particular instance. Accordingly, we propose 
a two-pronged approach, pursuant to which the Board would have the 
ability to order reciprocal switching either when it is practicable and 
in the public interest or when it is necessary to provide competitive 
rail service. The two-pronged approach would be consistent with the RTP 
in weighing issues such as competition and market power, rail service 
needs (for complaining and non-complaining shippers), the impact on the 
involved carriers, and whether specific facilities are appropriate for 
particular switching operations.
    The proposed regulations would revise the Board's reciprocal 
switching rules to promote further use and availability of reciprocal 
switching, but--consistent with the agency's and the courts' long-
established precedent--they would not provide shippers unfettered open 
access to carriers and routes. Indeed, one of the Board's concerns is 
the potential for operational challenges in gateways and terminals that 
are vital to the fluidity of the rail network. Most major gateways and 
terminals (including St. Louis, Memphis, Houston, Minneapolis-St. Paul, 
Los Angeles, and Kansas City, to name a few) are served by at least two 
Class I carriers. In Chicago, the most important hub in the rail 
network, there are six Class I carriers, as is also the case in New 
Orleans. As has been demonstrated by real-world instances, operational 
issues in the gateways and terminals can easily spread to other parts 
of the rail network. The service crises of the late 1990s \17\ and the 
winter of 2013-2014 \18\ are stark reminders that local congestion can 
turn quickly into regional and national backlogs, affecting shippers of 
all commodities. The Board's proposal provides for a case-by-case 
review, in which the Board can evaluate a switching arrangement based 
on the specific circumstances at hand. In this way, the Board can 
exercise a greater degree of precision when mandating reciprocal 
switching, thus mitigating the chance of operational challenges in a 
given area.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ The service crisis of the late 1990s, for example, began in 
the Houston area and quickly spread throughout the western United 
States. See Joint Pet. for Service Order, 2 S.T.B. 725, 729-30 & n.4 
(1997); Union Pac. Corp.--Control & Merger--S. Pac. Rail Corp., 3 
S.T.B. 1030, 1036 (1998).
    \18\ The Board recognized the ``longstanding importance of 
Chicago as a hub in national rail operations and the impact that 
recent extreme congestion in Chicago has had on rail service in the 
Upper Midwest and nationwide.'' U.S. Rail Serv. Issues--Performance 
Data Reporting, EP 724 (Sub-No. 4), slip op. at 6 (STB served Dec. 
30, 2014).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the proposal, the availability of reciprocal switching would 
not be presumed based on one-size-fits-all criteria, but instead would 
be based on factual determinations derived from the evidence provided 
by the parties. Pursuant to the RTP, we believe this approach would be 
fairer than both the current regulations as well as the NITL proposal 
in EP 711. Specifically, as discussed below, a particularized analysis 
is warranted.
    In this notice of proposed rulemaking, we propose to remove 
references to reciprocal switching from 49 CFR part 1144 (which also 
governs the prescriptions of through routes) and to create a new Part 
1145 to govern reciprocal switching under either of the two statutory 
prongs provided in 11102(c). The proposed regulations can be found in 
below.

Practicable and in the Public Interest Prong

    The first prong under which a party could obtain a reciprocal 
switching prescription is by showing that the proposed switching would 
be practicable and in the public interest. The ICC has previously 
explained that there is no mechanical test for determining what is 
practicable and in the public interest, and the totality of the 
circumstances should be considered. See Midtec Paper Corp. v. Chicago & 
NW. Transp. Co., 1 I.C.C.2d 362, 363-64 (1985). ``In determining what 
is `in the public interest,' the Commission considers not only the 
interests of particular shippers at or near the terminal in question, 
but also the interests of the carriers and the general public.'' Del. & 
Hudson Ry. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 367 I.C.C. 718, 720 (1983) (citing 
Jamestown Chamber of Commerce v. Jamestown, Westfield & Nw. R.R., 195 
I.C.C. 289 (1933)).
    The Board proposes three criteria that shippers must satisfy to 
demonstrate that reciprocal switching is practicable and in the public 
interest: (1) That the facilities of the shipper(s) and/or receiver(s) 
for whom such switching is sought are served by Class I rail 
carrier(s); (2) that there is or can be a working interchange between 
the Class I carrier servicing the party seeking switching and another 
Class I rail carrier within a reasonable distance of the facilities of 
the party seeking switching; and (3) that the potential benefits from 
the proposed switching arrangement outweigh the potential detriments. 
In making this third determination, in addition to questions about 
operational feasibility and safety, the Board may consider any relevant 
factor including, but not limited to: The efficiency of the route, 
access to new markets, the impact on capital investment, the impact on 
service quality, the impact on employees, the amount of traffic that 
would use the switching arrangement, the impact on the rail 
transportation network, and the RTP factors. Notwithstanding these 
three showings, however, the Board will not find a switching 
arrangement to be practicable and in the public interest if either rail 
carrier shows that the proposed switching is not feasible or is unsafe, 
or that the presence of such switching will unduly hamper the ability 
of that carrier to serve its shippers.
    The non-exhaustive list of factors included within the proposed 
regulation provides a sufficient basis for parties to argue that a 
switching prescription would or would not be practicable and in the 
public interest. The Board will not attempt to formalize the precise 
showings that parties would make in a given case to address the third 
factor or the rail carrier arguments against switching, which are all 
intended to be flexible. However, parties should present these factors 
to the Board with specificity relating to the factual circumstances of 
each case. Individual reciprocal switching proceedings are not an 
appropriate forum to litigate, for example, the general merits of 
reciprocal switching as a statutory remedy, the general health of the 
rail industry, or revenue adequacy. Accordingly, we expect that 
parties' presentations would be focused on the particular proposed 
switching arrangement and would not attempt to litigate broad 
regulatory policies. In designing case-specific presentations on these 
issues, we believe that the Board's current petition for exemption 
process is instructive. 49 U.S.C. 10502. Under the petition for 
exemption process, the Board considers whether the application of a 
particular statutory provision is necessary to carry out the RTP with 
regard to a particular action. See, e.g., Cal. High-Speed Rail Auth.--
Construction Exemption--in Fresno, King, Tulare, & Kern Ctys, Cal., FD 
35724 (Sub-No. 1) slip op. at 12-14 (STB served Aug. 12, 2014). This 
analysis does not entail going factor by factor through the RTP, but 
instead addresses only those RTP factors that are relevant to the 
specific exemption proceeding. Nor does it involve large-scale 
litigation over industry-wide policy determinations. See id.

Necessary To Provide Competitive Rail Service Prong

    The second prong under which a party could obtain a reciprocal 
switching prescription is by showing

[[Page 51157]]

that the proposed switching is necessary to provide competitive rail 
service. Again, the Board proposes three criteria that shippers must 
satisfy: (1) That the facilities of the shipper(s) and/or receiver(s) 
for whom such switching is sought are served by a single Class I rail 
carrier; (2) intermodal and intramodal competition is not effective 
with respect to the movements of the shipper(s) and/or receivers(s) for 
whom switching is sought; and (3) there is or can be a working 
interchange between the Class I carrier servicing the party seeking 
switching and another Class I rail carrier within a reasonable distance 
of the facilities of the party seeking switching. Again, 
notwithstanding these three showings, the Board will not find a 
switching arrangement to be practicable and in the public interest if 
either rail carrier shows that the proposed switching is not feasible 
or is unsafe, or that the presence of such switching will unduly hamper 
the ability of that carrier to serve its shippers.

Feasibility, Safety, and Service

    Under both prongs, either of the railroads that would potentially 
be subject to a reciprocal switching order may attempt to show as an 
affirmative defense that the proposed switching is not feasible or is 
unsafe, or that the presence of such switching will unduly hamper the 
ability of that carrier to serve its shippers. If a railroad carries 
its burden in making this showing, the Board will not order reciprocal 
switching. In addressing these issues, parties might present evidence 
regarding: Traffic density; the line's capacity; yard capacity; right-
of-way widths; grade separations; drainage; hazardous materials; 
network effects; and characteristics of the surrounding area (e.g., 
urban, rural, industrial). These forms of evidence are examples only, 
and parties may also present other evidence that is relevant to 
feasibility, safety, and service quality.

Removal of Anticompetitive Conduct Requirement

    Unlike the agency's current regulations, neither prong of these 
proposed regulations requires a showing of anticompetitive conduct. But 
removal of this requirement does not create ``open access'' or ``on 
demand'' routing.\19\ Under the Board's proposal, reciprocal switching 
would not be ``open'' to any party ``on demand,'' and any request under 
this section would be subject to a detailed review. In particular, 
shippers would be required (as is the case today) to initiate a 
proceeding with the Board and bear the burden of showing that 
reciprocal switching is needed. There would be no presumption of 
need.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ See, e.g., Union Pac. Corp.--Control & Merger--S. Pac. Rail 
Corp., 3 S.T.B. 1030, 1032 (1998) (stating that the Board's 
governing statute does not provide for open access).
    \20\ Section 11102(c) does not set out a time period for how 
long a reciprocal switching prescription would last. Accordingly, 
the Board proposes that a prescription would last for as long as the 
criteria for each prong are met, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Board in a particular circumstance, with parties free to petition 
the Board for reopening if there are substantially changed 
circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Additional Aspects of Proposed Rules

    Several of the factors in each of these prongs stem from NITL's 
proposal. For example, both prongs of the Board's proposal require a 
showing that there is or can be a working interchange within a 
reasonable distance, as did NITL. And both provide that a switching 
arrangement would not be established if either rail carrier shows that 
the proposed switching is not feasible or is unsafe, or that such 
switching would unduly hamper the ability of the carrier to serve its 
shippers. There are several additional aspects of the rules that differ 
from NITL's proposal, which we describe in greater detail below. 
However, the most notable is the absence of conclusive presumptions; as 
previously described, the Board would make an individualized 
determination on the facts of each case under the proposed rules.
    We will now address specific aspects of the proposed rules, 
including, where relevant, how the proposal deviates from NITL's 
proposal.
Class I Carriers
    Under both prongs of the proposed regulations, prescriptions of 
reciprocal switching would be limited to instances in which both the 
incumbent railroad and the competing railroad are Class I carriers. 
NITL's proposal specifically limited the proposed remedy to situations 
where the incumbent railroad was a Class I carrier by requiring that 
the party seeking switching be ``served by rail only by a single, Class 
I rail carrier (or a controlled affiliate).'' (NITL Pet. 67.) Under 
NITL's proposal, reciprocal switching would be ordered between this 
Class I rail carrier and ``another carrier.'' NITL states that its 
proposal thus does not distinguish between Class I and Class II or III 
carriers vis-[agrave]-vis the competing carrier. (NITL Pet. 53.)
    The only commenter to address this question in detail, ASLRRA, 
states that, ``if the Board decides to adopt the NITL petition, it 
should expressly limit the application to situations in which no Class 
II or Class III railroad participates at any point in the movement of 
the traffic whether or not the small railroad appears on the waybill.'' 
(See ASLRRA Reply 1-4; Testimony of Richard F. Timmons 4-6, Mar. 26, 
2014.) The record contains little information on the potential effects 
on the industry that would result from making Class II and/or Class III 
rail carriers subject to reciprocal switching prescriptions.
    Although the ICC rejected a request to exempt smaller carriers from 
its reciprocal switching regulations in Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 
I.C.C.2d at 835-36, the Board is proposing in this decision to limit 
the availability of reciprocal switching prescriptions to those 
situations that only involve Class I rail carriers due to the lack of 
specific information on this matter and the concerns raised by ASLRRA. 
However, we request comments on this issue in order to consider whether 
the Board should, now or in the future, extend the rules to include 
smaller carriers.
Working Interchanges Within a Reasonable Distance
    Under both prongs of the proposed regulations, the party seeking 
switching must show that ``there is or can be a working interchange 
between the Class I carrier servicing the party seeking switching and 
another Class I rail carrier within a reasonable distance of the 
facilities of the party seeking switching.'' This showing, while based 
on NITL's proposal, does not include any conclusive presumption as to 
what is or is not a reasonable distance or what is or is not a working 
interchange. (See NITL Pet. 67.) NITL had proposed that the Board 
conclusively presume that there is a working interchange within a 
reasonable distance if either: (1) A shipper's facility is within the 
boundaries of a ``terminal'' of a Class I carrier in which cars are 
``regularly switched,'' or (2) there is an interchange at which cars 
are regularly switched within 30 miles of the shipper's facilities. As 
commenters pointed out, NITL did not define ``terminal,'' or 
``regularly switched.'' (See, e.g., NSR Comments 49-50.) While the fact 
that cars are regularly switched at a point on the rail system would 
certainly be evidence of a working interchange, these determinations 
should be made on a case-by-case basis. The Board, nonetheless, invites 
comments on defining the term ``reasonable distance'' in an effort to 
provide guidelines to parties that may seek switching under the 
proposed regulations.
    The proposal also deviates from NITL's insofar as it would define 
the

[[Page 51158]]

term ``is or can be'' a working interchange. NITL stated in its 
petition that this requirement would not be ``limited to existing 
interchanges, but the petitioner could prove on the basis of facts and 
circumstances that a working interchange could reasonably be 
constructed.'' (NITL Pet. 53.) Few comments were received specifically 
on this point. The Board is concerned that the breadth of NITL's 
proposed language could be read to imply that railroads be required to 
construct brand-new interchange facilities to satisfy a switching 
prescription. Thus, we are proposing that the Board would determine 
that there ``is'' a working interchange if one already exists and is 
currently engaged in switching operations. The Board would determine 
that there ``can be'' a working interchange only if the infrastructure 
currently exists to support switching, without the need for 
construction, regardless of whether switching operations are taking 
place or have taken place using that infrastructure. We recognize that 
there was a lack of comment on this point and that we may be proposing 
a narrower definition than the one proposed by NITL. We therefore also 
specifically seek comment on this matter.
Effective Intermodal and Intramodal Competition
    Under the competition prong of the proposed regulations, a 
petitioner for switching must show that intermodal and intramodal 
competition is not effective with respect to the movements for which 
switching is sought. This aligns with one of the elements of NITL's 
proposal, which would have made reciprocal switching available ``only 
for movements that are without effective inter- or intra-modal 
competition.'' (NITL Pet. 7.) However, for the reasons discussed above, 
the conclusive presumptions proposed by NITL have not been adopted. 
Applying this factor without conclusive presumptions, according to 
NITL, would involve ``an individualized inquiry in light of the 
applicant's relevant facts and circumstances.'' (NITL Reply 35-36.)
    The Board already has a framework for conducting such an 
individualized inquiry--specifically, in determining the reasonableness 
of rates, the Board performs a market dominance analysis. See 49 U.S.C. 
10707 (requiring ``an absence of effective competition from other rail 
carriers or modes of transportation,'' which the statute describes as 
``market dominance''). The Board's market dominance test has a 
quantitative component and a qualitative component. Under the 
quantitative component, if the rail carrier proves that the rate at 
issue results in a R/VC ratio less than 180%, the Board will find that 
the rate is subject to effective competition. See 10707(d)(1)(A). If 
this quantitative R/VC ratio threshold is met, the Board moves to the 
second component, a qualitative analysis. Wis. Power & Light Co. v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 5 S.T.B. 955, 961 (2001), aff'd sub nom. Union Pac. 
R.R. v. STB, 62 F. App'x 354 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In this analysis, the 
Board determines whether there are any feasible transportation 
alternatives that are sufficient to constrain the railroad's rates to 
competitive levels, considering both intramodal and intermodal 
competition. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. CSX Transp., Inc., NOR 
42099, slip op. at 2 (STB served June 30, 2008). Even where feasible 
transportation alternatives are shown to exist, those alternatives may 
not provide ``effective competition.'' See Mkt. Dominance 
Determinations & Consideration of Prod. Competition, 365 I.C.C. 118, 
129 (1981) (``Effective competition for a firm providing a good or 
service means that there must be pressures on that firm to perform up 
to standards and at reasonable prices, or lose desirable business.''), 
aff'd sub nom. W. Coal Traffic League v. United States, 719 F.2d 772 
(5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
    The Board proposes to apply the market dominance test to determine 
whether a movement is without effective intermodal or intramodal 
competition.\21\ The ICC, in Midtec Paper Corp., held that market 
dominance is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to obtaining relief in 
an access proceeding under 11102. 3 I.C.C.2d at 180. That remains the 
case; unlike rate reasonableness cases, where the statute creates such 
a prerequisite to obtaining rate relief, 49 U.S.C. 10707(c), there is 
no such statutory requirement for reciprocal switching. However, there 
is nothing in 11102 that prohibits the use of the market dominance test 
here as part of the analysis, rather than a jurisdictional 
prerequisite. The Board has developed this methodology through numerous 
rate reasonableness decisions, and although it was developed in the 
context of rate cases, it answers the same question that the Board 
would address under the competition prong of the proposed reciprocal 
switching analysis: Whether effective competition exists for an 
individual movement or movements. It is therefore appropriate to apply 
this approach, which is familiar to litigants before the Board, under 
the competition prong of the reciprocal switching analysis as well. Use 
of a mature analytical framework to gauge whether a shipper lacks 
effective competition is desirable. Accordingly, the proposed rules 
would apply the Board's existing market dominance test to determine the 
intramodal/intermodal competition element under the competition prong.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ We note that NITL, while arguing against applying a market 
dominance framework, advocated for a presumption of the absence of 
effective competition in cases where the R/VC ratio for the traffic 
at issue was 240% and above. (See NITL Reply 59-60.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Effect on Market Dominance Determinations in Rate Reasonableness Cases
    NITL and several other commenters express concern regarding the 
potential effects of a reciprocal switching order on market dominance 
determinations in rate reasonableness cases. (See, e.g., NITL Comments 
14-16; USDA Comments 7.) For example, Joint Coal Shippers argue that 
the availability of a reciprocal switching remedy should not change the 
Board's methodology for assessing market dominance and that losing the 
ability to pursue maximum rate relief would seriously harm shippers. 
(Joint Coal Shippers Comments 7-14; Joint Coal Shippers Reply 2-9.) 
These commenters emphasize that 49 U.S.C. 10707, which establishes the 
market dominance threshold for rate reasonableness cases, requires 
effective competition, and they argue that a transportation alternative 
provided by a reciprocal switching order would not necessarily be an 
effective constraint on the incumbent railroad's pricing power. (E.g., 
Joint Coal Shippers Comments 8-9, 13-14.)
    At least one railroad commenter appears to view the situation 
similarly--that is, in market dominance analyses, the Board would 
assess a reciprocal switching order in the same way as other 
transportation alternatives to determine whether or not it provides 
effective competition. (See CSXT Reply 49-50 (urging the Board against 
``a blanket ruling that these newly available competitive remedies are 
not an effective competitive option for rate reasonableness purposes'') 
(emphasis added).) AAR, however, asserts that because shippers claim 
NITL's proposal would introduce competition and reduce rates, should 
they be successful in getting a switching order from the Board, they 
should not be ``allowed to bring rate cases that are permitted only in 
the absence of competition.'' (AAR Reply 28.) Similarly, BNSF contends 
that ``mandated reciprocal switching . . . would create an effective 
competitive alternative that would

[[Page 51159]]

preclude a finding of market dominance under the statute.'' (BNSF Reply 
8.)
    There is no need to issue a blanket rule that the existence of a 
reciprocal switching order would (or would not) preclude a finding of 
market dominance in rate cases. Instead, a reciprocal switching 
prescription should be treated in the same way as any other 
transportation alternative that would be assessed in our market 
dominance inquiry. AAR and BNSF provide no support for their claims 
that reciprocal switching would automatically be a source of effective 
competition. The Board has held that even where feasible transportation 
alternatives are shown to exist, those alternatives may not provide 
effective competition. E.g., M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., NOR 42123, slip op. at 2 (STB served Sept. 27, 2012) (citing Mkt. 
Dominance Determinations & Consideration of Prod. Competition, 365 
I.C.C. 118, 129 (1981)). In evaluating market dominance in rate 
reasonableness cases, we propose to continue to analyze whether or not 
a transportation alternative provides effective competition, including 
an alternative provided under a reciprocal switching order.
Access Pricing
    Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 11102(c)(1), ``[t]he rail carriers entering 
into [reciprocal switching ordered by the Board] shall establish the 
conditions and compensation applicable to such [switching], but, if the 
rail carriers cannot agree upon such conditions and compensation within 
a reasonable period of time, the Board may establish such conditions 
and compensation.'' Thus, the determination of access fees is left, by 
statute, to the carriers in the first instance.
    To the extent that the Board would become involved in establishing 
switching fees (i.e., when the rail carriers do not agree), several 
parties note in their comments that NITL's petition does not address 
the issue of access pricing methodology. (See, e.g., Agricultural 
Parties 18; KCS Comments 20; NSR Comments 36; AAR Reply 17; UP Reply 
6.) Several commenters offer proposals for access pricing, which are 
summarized below.
    Although NITL did not address access pricing in its petition for 
rulemaking, in its opening comments in response to the Board's order 
requesting additional information, it uses a simplified version of the 
Canadian interswitching model, arguing that the Canadian access pricing 
model is ``rigorously determined by the Canadian Transportation Agency, 
on the basis of railway costs and other information supplied by the 
Canadian carriers and . . . is designed to cover both variable costs 
and a share of the carriers' fixed costs.'' (NITL Comments 31-32.) \22\ 
Using the simplified version of this model, which eliminates the use of 
varying prices based on distance zones, NITL assumes access fees of 
$300 per car for movements involving 1-59 cars and $89 per car for 
movements involving 60 or more cars, based on Canada's latest figures 
at the time. (Id. at 34.) Similarly, USDA recommends that the Board use 
the average of Canadian interswitching rates for access prices, 
estimating $279 per car for 1-59 car movements and $84 per car for 
movements 60 cars or greater. (USDA Comments 20.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ Under the Canadian interswitching access pricing model, the 
switching fee is based on distance zones, with the price increasing 
the greater the distance from the shipper's facility to the point of 
interchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Highroad, Diversified CPC, and Roanoke Cement favor adoption of the 
Canadian interswitching model without modification. (Highroad Comments 
22; Diversified CPC Comments 8-10; Roanoke Cement Comments 9-10.) They 
contend that the Canadian model is straightforward and easy to 
implement. Although Agricultural Parties do not believe that the Board 
should adopt the Canadian model, they express the view that it merits 
further study by the Board. (Agricultural Parties Comments 19.)
    Agricultural Parties also note that there are numerous U.S. 
terminal switching rates that might serve as a benchmark for access 
pricing here, but state that they are not in a position to perform the 
study necessary to make such an evaluation. (Agricultural Parties 
Comments 19-20.)
    Some commenters suggest that trackage rights fees are a form of 
access pricing and that the Board should look to how those fees are 
set. GLE states that it supports the use of mutually agreed trackage 
rights fees or haulage rights fees for access pricing. (GLE Comments 
3.) Citing the ICC's decision in Arkansas & Missouri Railroad v. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad, 6 I.C.C.2d 619 (1990), Agricultural Parties, 
however, state that they examined the agency's methodology used in 
trackage rights cases, referred to as ``SSW Compensation,'' but believe 
that this type of approach to compensation is not appropriate where the 
instigating party is a shipper as opposed to a railroad. (Agricultural 
Parties Comments 18.)
    While not offering a specific methodology, some parties comment on 
the principles that the Board should consider if it is required to set 
an access price. UP, for example, argues that the access price must 
cover the serving railroad's actual cost of providing the switching 
service as well as the serving railroad's lost contribution from the 
long-haul. (UP Comments 61-62.) KCS argues that any proposed access 
standard must allow an incumbent carrier to assess switching charges 
that allow that carrier to move toward revenue adequacy. As such, KCS 
argues that a prescribed switching rate below an incumbent carrier's 
RSAM would be inconsistent with the RTP. (KCS Comments 38.)
    Given the importance of the issue and the relative lack of detail 
in the record regarding access pricing methodologies, the Board will 
propose two alternative approaches to access pricing for public 
comment.
    Under Alternative 1, we propose to determine access pricing based 
on a specified set of factors, in the event that the Board is called 
upon to establish compensation. Based on precedent, such factors could 
include the geography where the proposed switch would occur, the 
distance between the shipper/receiver and the proposed interchange, the 
cost of the service, the capacity of the interchange facility and other 
case-specific factors. See Switching Charges & Absorption Thereof at 
Shreveport, La., 339 I.C.C. 65 (1971) (discussing revenues, cost of 
service, amount of switching, other terminals in adjacent territory, 
and other factors); CSX Corp.--Control & Operating Leases/Agreements--
Conrail Inc., FD 33388 et al. (STB served Dec. 18, 1998) (discussing 
appropriate switching fees in New York Terminal Area based on specific 
cost relative to actual operations). We also seek comment on whether 
the list of factors should include any portion of the incumbent rail 
carrier's loss contribution or opportunity costs, per UP's suggestion.
    Under Alternative 2, we seek comment on the adoption of a variant 
of the agency's SSW Compensation methodology to establish switching 
fees, in the event that the Board is called upon to establish 
compensation. Although SSW Compensation is used primarily in trackage 
rights cases where one rail carrier is actually operating over another 
rail carrier's lines, many of the principles that inform the 
methodology would apply in the reciprocal switching fee context as 
well. Thus, what we call Rental Income in SSW Compensation would have 
an analogy in a directed switch in the form of Imputed Rental Income. A 
switching fee set by the Board could seek to compensate the incumbent 
for the expenses incurred to provide the service, plus a fair and

[[Page 51160]]

reasonable return on capital employed. Given that the regulatory goals 
in trackage rights compensation and reciprocal switching compensation 
are similar, we seek comment on whether and how SSW Compensation could 
be adapted to devise fair access fees in reciprocal switching cases.
    Parties may also comment on other potential access fee 
methodologies.
Separation of Through Routes
    The Board's current regulations in Part 1144 address not only 
reciprocal switching under 49 U.S.C. 11102(c), but also through routes 
under 49 U.S.C. 10705. As explained, the Board proposes to implement 
the changes proposed here by separating through routes and reciprocal 
switching in the Board's regulations. In other words, the previously-
shared regulations at Part 1144 would be modified to eliminate 
references to reciprocal switching, and then adopt new Part 1145 to 
address reciprocal switching. The Board also recognizes that, from a 
theoretical perspective, some of the issues addressed in this 
proceeding could arguably apply to through routes as well. Today's 
decision, however, is a proposed incremental change to the Board's 
competitive access regulations based on NITL's petition and the record 
built in response, all of which pertain to reciprocal switching 
specifically. Thus, aside from removing references to reciprocal 
switching from Part 1144, the current standards for through routes 
would be maintained.
Changes From Part 1144
    Although the standard governing reciprocal switching in new Part 
1145 differs from that governing through routes in Part 1144, we have 
attempted to model Part 1145 on Part 1144, as they both pertain to 
competitive access remedies that have previously been closely aligned. 
Thus, for example, the Board proposes to include in Part 1145 the same 
provision on negotiation that exists in Part 1144. To the extent that 
we depart from some of the language in Part 1144, we address those 
departures below.
    Section 1144.2(a)(2) of the Board's regulations currently states 
that a through route or reciprocal switching order requires a finding 
that either ``[t]he complaining shipper has used or would use the 
through route, through rate, or reciprocal switching to meet a 
significant portion of its current or future railroad transportation 
needs between the origin and destination,'' or ``[t]he complaining 
carrier has used or would use the affected through route, through rate, 
or reciprocal switching for a significant amount of traffic.'' This 
requirement, referred to by the ICC as the ``standing'' requirement, 
was adopted because the statute at the time provided that the ICC could 
not suspend a proposed cancellation of a through route and/or a joint 
rate pursuant to former 10705 and 10707 unless it appeared that failure 
to suspend would cause substantial injury to the protestant. Intramodal 
Rail Competition, 1 I.C.C.2d at 825-26, 830. However, because the 
statutory provisions regarding cancellation of through routes and/or 
joint rates are no longer in force, it is not necessary to include the 
standing requirement in the Board's proposed reciprocal switching 
regulations. The Board would continue to consider this factor in 
evaluating whether a reciprocal switching arrangement would be 
practicable and in the public interest, as that could be a relevant 
factor under that prong. We would not, however, include it as part of 
the determination of whether a reciprocal switching arrangement is 
necessary to provide competitive rail service. The purpose of ordering 
reciprocal switching under this prong is to encourage competition 
between two carriers. As such, a shipper would have the choice between 
using the incumbent carrier or the competing carrier depending on which 
one provided the better rates or service. Thus, in order for the 
reciprocal switching order to serve its intended purpose, the shipper 
should be free to choose between the two carriers. Requiring the 
shipper to use the competing carrier pursuant to a reciprocal switching 
order for a significant amount of traffic would limit the shipper's 
flexibility, which would be contrary to the goal of such an order.
    The Board's current regulations in Part 1144 also state that 
``[t]he Board will not consider product competition,'' and, ``[i]f a 
railroad wishes to rely in any way on geographic competition, it will 
have the burden of proving the existence of effective geographic 
competition by clear and convincing evidence.'' 49 CFR 1144.2(b)(1). 
The ICC adopted this language in 1985 in Intramodal Rail Competition, 
stating that the treatment of geographic competition ``is consistent 
with the way this issue will be handled in the market dominance 
context,'' and that the provision eliminating consideration of product 
competition ``reflects a negotiated agreement between the major 
railroad and shipper interests.'' 1 I.C.C.2d at 828-29 & n.6. In 1998, 
however, the Board excluded evidence of product and geographic 
competition from the market dominance inquiry because such evidence was 
not required by 49 U.S.C. 10707(a) and because of the substantial 
burden its inclusion imposed on the parties and the Board. Mkt. 
Dominance Determinations--Prod. & Geographic Competition, 3 S.T.B. 937 
(1998); see also Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. STB, 306 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (denying petition for review of the Board's decision following 
earlier remand); Pet. of Ass'n of Am. R.R.s s to Inst. a Rulemaking 
Proceeding to Reintroduce Indirect Competition as a Factor Considered 
in Mkt. Dominance Determinations for Coal Transported to Utility 
Generation Facilities, EP 717 (STB served Mar. 19, 2013) (denying 
request to consider reintroducing indirect competition as a factor in 
market dominance analyses).
    As discussed above, the second factor under the proposed 
competition prong--the absence of effective intermodal or intramodal 
competition--incorporates the market dominance inquiry of 49 U.S.C. 
10707 (requiring ``an absence of effective competition from other rail 
carriers or modes of transportation''). Moreover, when the ICC adopted 
the current language of 1144.2(b)(1), it explained the treatment of 
geographic competition as being consistent with the agency's approach 
in evaluating market dominance. Accordingly, it is appropriate for the 
Board to address this question consistently in both the reciprocal 
switching and rate reasonableness contexts. Therefore, in proposed Part 
1145, the Board instead proposes language providing that it will not 
consider product or geographic competition.
    Finally, 1144.3(c) of the Board's regulations currently states that 
``[a]ny Board determinations or findings under this part with respect 
to compliance or non-compliance with the standards of 1144.2 shall not 
be given any res judicata or collateral estoppel effect in any 
litigation involving the same facts or controversy arising under the 
antitrust laws of the United States.'' In adopting this provision, the 
ICC explained: ``The parties to the agreement [NITL, AAR, and CMA, now 
known as ACC] have requested adoption of this rule. We only note that 
it is unenforceable by us.'' Intramodal Rail Competition, 1 I.C.C.2d at 
832. As indicated above, the Board's proposal is not based on this 
prior agreement among stakeholders. Therefore, this language is not 
included in the reciprocal switching regulations.

[[Page 51161]]

Procedural Schedule and Ex Parte Waiver

    As the Board explained in United States Rail Service Issues--
Performance Data Reporting, EP 724 (Sub-No. 4), slip op. at 1-2 (STB 
served Nov. 9, 2015), the agency has long interpreted its ex parte 
prohibition as encompassing informal rulemakings. However, the Board 
may waive its own regulations in appropriate proceedings and take steps 
to ensure that a fair process is established, including notice, 
disclosure, and an opportunity for parties to comment on information 
discussed during informal meetings. Id. at 2.
    In this proceeding, we find good reason for a limited waiver of the 
Board's ex parte prohibitions. As we noted in our July 25, 2012 
decision in Docket No. EP 711 in response to NITL's petition, a 
vigorous debate regarding the appropriate methodology for competitive 
access has been ongoing since at least the 1980s. There are many 
different (and often conflicting views) regarding the potential 
benefits of increased reciprocal switching to shippers and the 
potential impact to carriers. As was made clear in the record following 
NITL's petition, those potential benefits and impacts are complicated 
and often inter-related. Given that there has been no significant 
change in agency policy regarding reciprocal switching in more than 30 
years, the Board believes it would be beneficial to hear directly from 
stakeholders on these issues and ask follow-up questions.\23\ These 
stakeholder discussions will supplement the written record and allow 
the Board to better understand these complex issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Ex parte meetings under this decision will only be 
permitted with Board Members, their individual office staffs, and 
certain other staff.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To ensure that the public has a complete record of the evidence and 
arguments that the Board will consider in its decision-making, ex parte 
communications in informal rulemaking proceedings require special 
procedures to maintain both fairness and accessibility. U.S. Rail 
Service Issues, slip op. at 3. We will establish the following measures 
to ensure that all parties have an opportunity to meet with Board 
Members should they choose to do so, have the ability to review the 
substance of all such discussions, and have the opportunity to comment 
on information presented at these discussions. Meetings with Board 
Members will take place between October 25, 2016, either at the Board's 
offices or by telephone conference (pursuant to each party's request). 
Any party seeking to meet with a Board Member should contact the 
Member's office no later than October 10, 2016 to schedule a 
meeting.\24\ If a party wishes to meet with multiple Board Members, 
separate meetings with each Board Member must be scheduled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ Chairman Elliott's office can be reached at (202) 245-0220. 
Vice Chairman Miller's office can be reached at (202) 245-0210. 
Commissioner Begeman's office can be reached at (202) 245-0200. For 
each meeting request, parties should indicate multiple available 
requested days/times and meeting attendees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board will disclose the substance of each meeting by posting, 
in Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1), a summary of the arguments, 
information, and data presented to the Board Member at each meeting 
(including the names/titles of attendees of the meeting) and a copy of 
any handout given or presented to the Board Member. Parties 
participating in ex parte meetings will be responsible for preparing 
the summaries, and we encourage parties to use the Board's staff-
prepared summaries in Rail Service Issues as examples.\25\ Summaries, 
plus any handouts, should be submitted, via email, to the Board Member 
office with whom the party met within two business days of the 
meeting.\26\ The Board expects that meeting summaries will be posted in 
the docket within 14 days of the meeting.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ If multiple parties are present at a single ex parte 
meeting, only one meeting summary should be submitted.
    \26\ Summaries and handouts regarding meetings with Chairman 
Elliott should be sent to Janie Sheng at janie.sheng@stb.dot.gov. 
Summaries and handouts regarding meetings with Vice Chairman Miller 
should be sent to Brian O'Boyle at brian.oboyle@stb.dot.gov. 
Summaries and handouts regarding meetings with Commissioner Begeman 
should be sent to James Boles at james.boles@stb.dot.gov.
    \27\ Parties are directed to limit their communications at these 
meetings (including any handouts) to non-confidential information 
only. To the extent parties wish to provide confidential 
information, they should do so in their written comments, pursuant 
to a protective order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Board will provide notice when all meeting summaries have been 
posted in the record, and set a comment period for replies to the 
meeting summaries in that decision.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, 
generally requires a description and analysis of new rules that would 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. In drafting a rule, an agency is required to: (1) Assess the 
effect that its regulation will have on small entities; (2) analyze 
effective alternatives that may minimize a regulation's impact; and (3) 
make the analysis available for public comment. 601-604. In its notice 
of proposed rulemaking, the agency must either include an initial 
regulatory flexibility analysis, 603(a), or certify that the proposed 
rule would not have a ``significant impact on a substantial number of 
small entities,'' 605(b). Because the goal of the RFA is to reduce the 
cost to small entities of complying with federal regulations, the RFA 
requires an agency to perform a regulatory flexibility analysis of 
small entity impacts only when a rule directly regulates those 
entities. In other words, the impact must be a direct impact on small 
entities ``whose conduct is circumscribed or mandated'' by the proposed 
rule. White Eagle Coop. v. Conner, 553 F.3d 467, 480 (7th Cir. 2009).
    The regulations proposed here are limited to Class I railroads and, 
thus, would not impact a substantial number of small entities.\28\ 
Accordingly, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the Board certifies that the 
regulations proposed herein would not have a significant economic 
impact on a substantial number of small entities within the meaning of 
the RFA. A copy of this decision will be served upon the Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, 
Washington, DC 20416.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ Effective June 30, 2016, for the purpose of RFA analysis, 
the Board defines a ``small business'' as a rail carrier classified 
as a Class III rail carrier under 49 CFR 1201.1-1. See Small Entity 
Size Standards Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, EP 719 (STB 
served June 30, 2016) (Commissioner Begeman dissenting). Class III 
carriers have annual operating revenues of $20 million or less in 
1991 dollars, or $38,060,383 or less when adjusted for inflation 
using 2014 data. Class II rail carriers have annual operating 
revenues of up to $250 million in 1991 dollars or up to $475,754,802 
when adjusted for inflation using 2014 data. The Board calculates 
the revenue deflator factor annually and publishes the railroad 
revenue thresholds on its Web site. 49 CFR 1201.1-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 1144

    Intramodal rail competition.

49 CFR Part 1145

    Reciprocal switching.

    It is ordered:
    1. The Board proposes to amend its rules as set forth in this 
decision. Notice of the proposed rules will be published in the Federal 
Register.
    2. The procedural schedule for Docket No. EP 711 (Sub-No. 1) is 
established as follows: comments regarding the proposed rules are due 
by September 26, 2016; replies are due by October 25, 2016; requests 
for meetings with Board Members are due by October 10, 2016;

[[Page 51162]]

meetings with Board Members will occur between October 25, 2016 and 
November 14, 2016 meeting summaries are to be submitted within two 
business days of the ex parte meeting; the period for comments on 
meeting summaries will be set by separate decision.
    3. A copy of this decision will be served upon the Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, 
Washington, DC 20416.
    4. The Board terminates the proceeding in Docket No. EP 711.
    5. This decision is effective on the day of service.

    Decided: July 25, 2016.

    By the Board, Chairman Elliott, Vice Chairman Miller, and 
Commissioner Begeman. Vice Chairman Miller commented with a separate 
expression and Commissioner Begeman dissented with a separate 
expression.
Brendetta S. Jones,
Clearance Clerk.

VICE CHAIRMAN MILLER, commenting:

    The Board's regulatory mission is set out in the Rail 
Transportation Policy (RTP) at 49 U.S.C. 10101. Two important but 
competing goals in the RTP are to promote an efficient, competitive, 
safe and cost-effective rail network by enabling railroads to earn 
adequate revenues that foster reinvestment in their networks, attract 
outside capital, and provide reliable service, while at the same time 
working to ensure that effective competitions exists between railroads 
and that rates are reasonable where there is a lack of effective 
competition. As in all major rulemakings the Board undertakes, my goal 
here has been to develop a proposal for reciprocal switching that 
properly satisfies both of these goals.
    In finding the appropriate balance, I believe that we have taken a 
prudent approach by creating a standard that is closely tied to the 
statutory language of 49 U.S.C. 11102(c), rather than trying to create 
our own standard out of the statutory language. By doing so, I believe 
we have been able to develop a proposal that would satisfy the 
competing goals, as well as effectuate Congress' express grant of 
authority to permit reciprocal switching in certain circumstances. And 
although I have no doubt both our railroad and shipper stakeholders 
will find things to dislike about today's proposal, I believe that it 
would address the most significant concern raised by each side.
    For shippers, the Board would remove the anticompetitive standard 
that was created in Intramodal Rail Competition and Midtec Paper Corp., 
which has proven to be a nearly impossible bar. Regardless of whatever 
evidence shippers have presented in the handful of cases the agency has 
decided--whether it be high rates or poor service--the agency has 
consistently found it to be lacking. As such, it appears that the only 
way that a shipper could meet this standard would be to provide 
evidence that the railroad was intentionally behaving in an 
anticompetitive manner. But demonstrating such a clear intent is 
difficult. By eliminating the anticompetitive conduct showing, shippers 
will now be free to seek reciprocal switching without having to produce 
a smoking gun. It is undeniable that Congress gave the Board the power 
to order reciprocal switching, yet our existing anticompetitive 
standard has essentially nullified this power. The railroads' arguments 
that the Board should keep the existing standard essentially amount to 
a request that we ignore the Congressional authorization for the Board 
to allow shippers (or other railroads) to be able to obtain reciprocal 
switching in certain instances.
    But even if the anticompetitive conduct standard had not proven to 
be unworkable, I believe that the need for such a high bar on shippers 
to obtain reciprocal switching no longer exists. While the 
anticompetitive standard may have made sense in 1985, just after de-
regulation and in an era where the railroad industry was still trying 
to restore itself to financial health, the landscape today is much 
different. As we have noted in the decision, railroads are in a much 
better financial condition than they were three decades ago. I believe 
that 49 U.S.C. 11102(c) was written in a way that gives the Board 
flexibility to alter the standard for obtaining reciprocal switching 
if, based on our judgment, the balance between the two important goals 
described above has changed. Based on what I have observed of the 
railroad industry in my time at the Board, I believe that we have 
reached that point.
    However, just because the railroads are financially stronger today 
does not mean that the Board should upend the existing regulatory 
scheme with broad, sweeping changes. While a change to the reciprocal 
switching standard is needed, I believe that the NITL approach swings 
too far in the other direction. I believe that for shippers to obtain 
this remedy, a shipper should still have to demonstrate that reciprocal 
switching is needed based on one of the reasons articulated by 
Congress, rather than for it to simply be presumed to be needed. 
Without assessing requests for reciprocal switching on a case-by-case 
basis (at least for now), the potential for unintended consequences is 
too great. For that reason, I ultimately determined that I could not 
support the NITL proposal.
    By rejecting the NITL proposal, today's decision addresses what I 
consider the most significant concern raised by the railroads: that a 
new reciprocal switching standard will result in its widespread 
application, to the significant detriment of the industry's financial 
health and operations. By keeping in place the requirement that 
shippers demonstrate that it is needed on a case-by-case basis, I 
believe that we have addressed that concern. Removing the 
anticompetitive conduct requirement will likely mean that some shippers 
will actually now be able to obtain a reciprocal switching 
prescription, but I believe the criteria proposed here would enable the 
Board to apply it only when appropriate.
    In considering how to revise the reciprocal switching standard, I 
have been acutely aware of the fact that the railroads are currently 
facing changing economic conditions. With the decline of coal traffic, 
which is unlikely to return to previous volumes, and declining or 
sluggish volume growth for other commodities, there is no doubt that 
the railroads today find themselves in a difficult environment. I am 
mindful of the concerns that additional regulation could impact their 
ability to weather this storm. But I do not believe that the proposal 
we have announced today, if adopted, would impose significant burdens 
on the railroad industry. Indeed, it is my hope that the Board will 
rarely be called upon to impose the reciprocal switching remedy, but 
instead, that whatever final rules we adopt will merely provide a bit 
more incentive for carriers to ensure that their customers' needs are 
being met in those instances where that is not the case. So long as a 
carrier meets the needs of its customers, there should be little reason 
for a customer to seek such a remedy. Moreover, it is my belief that 
today's proposal would not undo the accomplishments that have been 
achieved through deregulation under the Staggers Act.
    That being said, I recognize that today's proposal is unlikely to 
be perfect. In fact, there are aspects of the proposal that still 
concern me. However, if the Board were to continue to delay this 
proceeding in order to try to develop a perfect proposal, this 
proceeding would never end. It is my belief that any issues with the 
proposal can be addressed after the Board has had an opportunity to 
hear from the parties. I am particularly pleased that

[[Page 51163]]

we have decided to waive our ex parte communication prohibition in this 
proceeding (though, as I have noted in the past, I still advocate the 
outright elimination of this prohibition, rather than waiving it on 
case-by-case basis). I believe that these meetings will allow the Board 
Members to better understand the impacts this proposal would have and 
ways in which it can be improved.
    As a final point, I would again note my frustration that it has 
taken the Board five years to reach this stage. Much of this delay 
feels like it could have been avoided by not asking the parties to 
submit additional evidence in July 2012. It seems that today's decision 
could have been made without this additional evidence, which was not 
heavily relied on in reaching today's decision. As I have noted on 
other occasions, I find that the amount of time that it takes the Board 
to complete proceedings to be troubling. In addition to the inexcusably 
long time that our stakeholders were kept waiting, they were left in 
the dark as to the progress. If parties are going to have to wait 
unnecessarily long periods of time for outcomes, the Board could at 
least be more transparent on the progress of their cases. No doubt 
having heard such complaints from our stakeholders, Congress required 
the agency to begin issuing quarterly reports on its unfinished 
regulatory proceedings as part of the Surface Transportation Board 
Reauthorization Act of 2015. The benefits of this reporting are already 
being seen, as it has been forced the Board to set deadlines in its 
many long-delayed rulemakings, and the Board has even completed some 
that have been pending for years. It is my belief that the Board needs 
to develop a similar (if not the same) reporting system for its other 
significant proceedings. This would provide parties with greater 
transparency on the progress of their cases, force the Board to develop 
deadlines, and ensure that the agency is adhering to them.

Commissioner Begeman, dissenting in part:

    I want to begin by commending the National Industrial 
Transportation League (NITL) for the considerable and thoughtful effort 
it went to--more than five years ago--in prompting the Board to revisit 
the agency's competitive switching rules. I have valued the views and 
knowledge of the NITL leadership and members since first meeting them 
when I was a young Senate staffer. Then, as now, NITL can be counted on 
to provide insight and to explain how businesses across the county are 
impacted by even the most arcane laws and regulations.
    When stakeholders demonstrate that the agency's regulations or 
processes present too high a bar to allow their use, we have an 
obligation to examine whether we can improve those regulations or 
processes, while keeping the promotion of safe and efficient rail 
service at the top of our agenda. Although I have a number of questions 
and concerns about NITL's competitive switching proposal, many of which 
I shared during the April 2014 hearing, there is no dispute that since 
the current rules were adopted in 1985, very few reciprocal switching 
requests have been filed and none have been granted. As such, it is 
hard to believe that the existing regulations adequately implement 
Congress' intent that the Board order reciprocal switching when 
necessary.
    While I may not be an advocate of the status quo, I do not casually 
embrace regulatory changes. Any altering of the Board's existing 
switching rules must be balanced, fair, and supported by analyses that 
indicate the changes will not have unintended consequences for our 
stakeholders or the public. I do not believe today's proposal meets 
those standards. This decision also ignores fundamental questions that 
the Board should have asked and answered before issuing today's 
proposal, and after five years, there has been ample time to do so. For 
example:
     The reciprocal switching proposal rejects the use of 
conclusive presumptions, which were argued by NITL as necessary to 
mitigate the complexity and costs of litigating competitive switching. 
What does today's proposal offer to mitigate the complexity and costs? 
Should the Board use rebuttable presumptions to create a more 
predictable process for shippers and carriers?
     The Department of Transportation estimated that NITL's 
proposal would affect 2.1 percent of revenue and 1.3 percent of 
carloads, figures that are considered significant inside the agency. 
What impact to revenue and carloads would be permitted under today's 
proposal? Once that level is reached, will the Board no longer consider 
new switching applications?
     The proposal seems to suggest that if the Board acts on a 
case-by-case basis, there is no need to assess the potential impact it 
could have on the rail system overall. But how can the Board provide 
fair and consistent switching judgments on a case-by-case basis without 
creating complexity and cost impacts on the one hand, and not 
introducing more unpredictability to the rail network on the other?
     How long will it take to process the cases envisioned 
under today's proposal? What is the procedural timeline? Do we have any 
projections for how long such a case will take to process inside the 
agency? Currently, the Board is struggling to determine how to meet new 
Congressional mandates for timeliness. How will this type of new access 
case (i.e., presumably time sensitive yet not subject to any specific 
Congressional timing mandate) fit into the Board's crowded priority 
list?
     Given the majority's stated position that it ``will not 
attempt to formalize the precise showings'' that parties would have to 
make in a given case because of its desire to be ``flexible,'' what 
would a party seeking a reciprocal switch really have to demonstrate to 
the Board? What would the carrier have to demonstrate to convince the 
Board the requested switch should not be granted?
     What is the ``reasonable distance'' that is surprisingly 
left undefined in the proposal? While the language that dismisses the 
NITL's conclusive presumptions implies that the Board's proposal could 
involve switches of more than 30 miles, my briefings suggest it may be 
only a very short distance (i.e., the distances that have historically 
been involved with reciprocal switching). How could historical norms of 
switching be relied on while the decision cites massive industry 
changes that would make those historical norms uninformative at best?
     How does today's decision mitigate impacts on network 
efficiency and service, particularly at major gateways and terminals? 
The Board has required weekly performance data reports on the Chicago 
hub since October 2014 because of its importance to national rail 
operations and the impact that congestion in that gateway can have on 
rail service nationwide. Should Chicago and other major gateways be 
excluded from new reciprocal switching requirements?
     Is permanence for a switching arrangement under the 
proposed new rule, which may not require robust evidence, fair to 
either the carrier or the other shippers impacted by that switching 
arrangement?
    Today's decision incorporates a concern I expressed after seeing an 
earlier version of the proposal, which is that short line carriers be 
exempted from the requirements. The decision also waives the Board's 
rigid ex parte rules to allow the members to hear from stakeholders, as 
the Vice Chairman and I insisted. However, I cannot support

[[Page 51164]]

the rest of it. We have no idea how the proposed rule would or even 
could be utilized. We don't know its potential impact on the shippers 
that would be granted a reciprocal switch or its potential impact on 
shippers that wouldn't benefit from a reciprocal switch. We also don't 
know the proposal's potential impact on the rail carriers. Nor do we 
know its potential impact on the fluidity of the rail network. All of 
these impacts matter. After all, rail volumes have been down all of 
2016, and are currently down nearly six percent from just a year ago. I 
firmly believe that what we do here, ultimately, could cause greater 
harm than good. Or, it may result in nothing more than an empty promise 
to prospective applicants.
    It is incumbent on the Board Members and staff to listen to all 
interested stakeholders on these issues if there is to be any hope for 
adopting meaningful, lawful regulations designed to better implement 
the agency's statutory reciprocal switching authority. And I certainly 
recognize that stakeholders are at a disadvantage because today's 
proposal, in my view, is full of gaps by design. The goal appears to be 
that we can slip these and other unanswered questions by now and figure 
them out later. I implore our stakeholders to fully engage this agency 
and not allow such an outcome.
    I support only those aspects of the decision that waive the Board's 
ex parte prohibitions and exclude Class II and Class III carriers from 
reciprocal switching prescriptions. Otherwise, I dissent.
    The Board received written and/or oral comment from the following 
parties in Docket No. EP 711:

 AkzoNobel, Inc.
 Alliance for Rail Competition, Montana Wheat & Barley 
Committee, Colorado Wheat Administrative Committee, Idaho Barley 
Commission, Idaho Wheat Commission, Montana Farmers Union, Nebraska 
Wheat Board, Oklahoma Wheat Commission, South Dakota Wheat Commission, 
Texas Wheat Producers Board, Washington Grain Commission, National 
Association of Wheat Growers (collectively, ARC)
 Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers
 American Chemistry Council (ACC)
 American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA)
 Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corporation (AECC)
 Association of American Railroads (AAR)
 Bayer MaterialScience LLC
 BNSF Railway Company (BNSF)
 Cargill Inc.
 CEMEX, Inc.
 The Chlorine Institute, Inc.
 Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI)
 Consumers United for Rail Equity (CURE)
 CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSXT)
 Diversified CPC International, Inc. (Diversified CPC)
 Dow Chemical Company
 Entergy Arkansas, Inc., Kansas City Power & Light Company, 
Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc., and Wisconsin Electric Power 
Company d/b/a WE Energies (collectively, Joint Coal Shippers)
 The Fertilizer Institute
 Florida East Coast Railway, LLC
 Glacial Lakes Energy, LLC (GLE)
 Glass Producers Transportation Council
 Heartland Consumers Power District
 Highroad Consulting, Ltd. (Highroad)
 Indorama Ventures EO & Glycols, Inc., StarPet, Inc., AlphaPet, 
Inc., and Auriga Polymers Inc.
 International Warehouse Logistics Association
 Interstate Asphalt Corp.
 Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCS)
 National Grain and Feed Association (NGFA)
 NGFA, Agricultural Retailers Association, National Barley 
Growers Association, USA Rice Federation, National Oilseed Processors 
Association, National Chicken Council, National Association of Wheat 
Growers, National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, National Corn Growers 
Association (collectively, Agricultural Parties)
 NITL
 Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NSR)
 Olin Corporation (Olin)
 Paper and Forest Products Industry Transportation Committee
 Portland Cement Association
 PPG Industries, Inc.
 PPL Corporation
 Roanoke Cement Company (Roanoke Cement)
 Steel Manufacturers Association
 Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP)
 United Transportation Union-New York State Legislative Board 
(UTU-NY)
 U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)

    Additionally, the following Members of Congress submitted comments, 
either individually or as joint comments:

 Senator Tammy Baldwin
 Representative Corrine Brown
 Representative Jeff Denham
 Representative William Enyart
 Senator Al Franken
 Representative Nick Rahall
 Representative Bill Shuster
 Senator David Vitter

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Surface 
Transportation Board proposes to amend title 49, chapter X, of the Code 
of Federal Regulations by revising part 1144 and adding part 1145 to 
read as follows:

PART 1144--INTRAMODAL RAIL COMPETITION

0
1. Revise the authority citation for part 1144 to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 1321, 10703, and 10705.

0
2. Revise Sec.  1144.1(a) to read as follows:


 Sec.  1144.1  Negotiation.

    (a) Timing. At least 5 days prior to seeking the prescription of a 
through route or joint rate, the party intending to initiate such 
action must first seek to engage in negotiations to resolve its dispute 
with the prospective defendants.
* * * * *
0
3. Amend Sec.  1144.2 by revising paragraphs (a) introductory text, 
(a)(1) introductory text, (a)(1)(iii) and (iv), (a)(2), and (b)(3) to 
read as follows:


Sec.  1144.2  Prescription.

    (a) General. A through route or a through rate shall be prescribed 
under 49 U.S.C. 10705 if the Board determines:
    (1) That the prescription is necessary to remedy or prevent an act 
that is contrary to the competition policies of 49 U.S.C. 10101 or is 
otherwise anticompetitive, and otherwise satisfies the criteria of 49 
U.S.C. 10705. In making its determination, the Board shall take into 
account all relevant factors, including:
* * * * *
    (iii) The rates charged or sought to be charged by the railroad or 
railroads from which prescription is sought.
    (iv) The revenues, following the prescription, of the involved 
railroads for the traffic in question via the affected route; the costs 
of the involved railroads for that traffic via that route; the ratios 
of those revenues to those costs; and all circumstances relevant to any 
difference in those ratios; provided that the mere loss of revenue to 
an affected carrier shall not be a basis for finding that a 
prescription is necessary to remedy or prevent an act contrary to the 
competitive standards of this section; and

[[Page 51165]]

    (2) That either:
    (i) The complaining shipper has used or would use the through route 
or through rate to meet a significant portion of its current or future 
railroad transportation needs between the origin and destination; or
    (ii) The complaining carrier has used or would use the affected 
through route or through rate for a significant amount of traffic.
    (b) * * *.
    (3) When prescription of a through route or a through rate is 
necessary to remedy or prevent an act contrary to the competitive 
standards of this section, the overall revenue inadequacy of the 
defendant railroad(s) will not be a basis for denying the prescription.
* * * * *
0
4. Add part 1145 to read as follows:

PART 1145--RECIPROCAL SWITCHING

Sec.
1145.1 Negotiation
1145.2 Establishment of Reciprocal Switching Arrangement
1145.3 General

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1321 and 11102.


Sec.  1145.1   Negotiation.

    (a) Timing. At least 5 days prior to seeking the establishment of a 
switching arrangement, the party intending to initiate such action must 
first seek to engage in negotiations to resolve its dispute with the 
prospective defendant(s).
    (b) Participation. Participation or failure to participate in 
negotiations does not waive a party's right to file a timely request 
for the establishment of a switching arrangement.
    (c) Arbitration. The parties may use arbitration as part of the 
negotiation process, or in lieu of litigation before the Board.


Sec.  1145.2  Establishment of reciprocal switching arrangement.

    (a) General. A reciprocal switching arrangement shall be 
established under 49 U.S.C. 11102(c) if the Board determines that such 
arrangement is either practicable and in the public interest, or 
necessary to provide competitive rail service, except as provided in 
paragraph(a)(2)(iv) of this section.
    (1) The Board will find a switching arrangement to be practicable 
and in the public interest when:
    (i) The party seeking such switching shows that the facilities of 
the shipper(s) and/or receiver(s) for whom such switching is sought are 
served by Class I rail carrier(s);
    (ii) The party seeking such switching shows that there is or can be 
a working interchange between the Class I carrier servicing the party 
seeking switching and another Class I rail carrier within a reasonable 
distance of the facilities of the party seeking switching; and
    (iii) The party seeking such switching shows that the potential 
benefits from the proposed switching arrangement outweigh the potential 
detriments. In making this determination, the Board may consider any 
relevant factor, including but not limited to:
    (A) Whether the proposed switching arrangement furthers the rail 
transportation policy of 49 U.S.C. 10101;
    (B) The efficiency of the route under the proposed switching 
arrangement;
    (C) Whether the proposed switching arrangement allows access to new 
markets;
    (D) The impact of the proposed switching arrangement, if any, on 
capital investment;
    (E) The impact of the proposed switching arrangement on service 
quality;
    (F) The impact of the proposed switching arrangement, if any, on 
employees;
    (G) The amount of traffic the party seeking switching would use 
pursuant to the proposed switching arrangement; and
    (H) The impact of the proposed switching arrangement, if any, on 
the rail transportation network.
    (iv) Notwithstanding the provisions of (a)(1)(i)-(iii) of this 
section, the Board shall not find a switching arrangement to be 
practicable and in the public interest under this section if either 
rail carrier between which such switching is sought to be established 
shows that the proposed switching is not feasible or is unsafe, or that 
the presence of such switching will unduly hamper the ability of that 
carrier to serve its shippers.
    (2) The Board will find a switching arrangement to be necessary to 
provide competitive rail service when:
    (i) The party seeking such switching shows that the facilities of 
the shipper(s) and/or receiver(s) for whom such switching is sought are 
served by a single Class I rail carrier;
    (ii) The party seeking such switching shows that intermodal and 
intramodal competition is not effective with respect to the movements 
of the shipper(s) and/or receivers(s) for whom switching is sought; and
    (iii) The party seeking such switching shows that there is or can 
be a working interchange between the Class I carrier servicing the 
party seeking switching and another Class I rail carrier within a 
reasonable distance of the facilities of the party seeking switching.
    (iv) Notwithstanding the provisions of (a)(2)(i)-(iii) of this 
section, a switching arrangement will not be established under this 
section if either rail carrier between which such switching is sought 
to be established shows that the proposed switching is not feasible or 
is unsafe, or that the presence of such switching will unduly hamper 
the ability of that carrier to serve its shippers.
    (b) Other considerations.
    (1) In considering requests for reciprocal switching under (a)(2) 
of this section, the Board will not consider product or geographic 
competition.
    (2) In considering requests for reciprocal switching under (a)(2) 
of this section, the overall revenue inadequacy of the defendant 
railroad will not be a basis for denying the establishment of a 
switching arrangement.
    (3) Any proceeding under the terms of this section will be 
conducted and concluded by the Board on an expedited basis.


Sec.  1145.3  General

    (a) Effective date. These rules will govern the Board's 
adjudication of individual cases pending on or after [EFFECTIVE DATE OF 
FINAL RULE].
    (b) Discovery. Discovery under these rules is governed by the 
Board's general rules of discovery at 49 CFR part 1114.

[FR Doc. 2016-17980 Filed 8-2-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4915-01-P