Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-12 National Security Complex, 45138-45140 [2016-16439]

Download as PDF 45138 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 12, 2016 / Notices Dated: July 7, 2016. Johan E. Uvin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Delegated the Duties of the Assistant Secretary for Career, Technical, and Adult Education. [FR Doc. 2016–16454 Filed 7–11–16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4000–01–P DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY [OE Docket No. EA–422] Application To Export Electric Energy; Tidal Energy Marketing Inc. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, DOE. ACTION: Notice of application. AGENCY: Tidal Energy Marketing, Inc. (Applicant or Tidal) has applied for authority to transmit electric energy from the United States to Canada pursuant to section 202(e) of the Federal Power Act. DATES: Comments, protests, or motions to intervene must be submitted on or before August 11, 2016. ADDRESSES: Comments, protests, motions to intervene, or requests for more information should be addressed to: Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Mail Code: OE–20, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585–0350. Because of delays in handling conventional mail, it is recommended that documents be transmitted by overnight mail, by electronic mail to Electricity.Exports@hq.doe.gov, or by facsimile to 202–586–8008. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Exports of electricity from the United States to a foreign country are regulated by the Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to sections 301(b) and 402(f) of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7151(b), 7172(f)) and require authorization under section 202(e) of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 824a(e)). On June 8, 2016, DOE received an application from Tidal for authority to transmit electric energy from the United States to Canada as a power marketer for five years using existing international transmission facilities. Tidal is contemporaneously applying to make wholesale power sales at market-based rates from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In its application, Tidal states that it does not own or operate any electric generation or transmission facilities, and it does not have a franchised service area. The electric energy that Tidal proposes to export to Canada would be mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES SUMMARY: VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:30 Jul 11, 2016 Jkt 238001 surplus energy purchased from third parties such as electric utilities and Federal power marketing agencies pursuant to voluntary agreements. The existing international transmission facilities to be utilized by Tidal have previously been authorized by Presidential permits issued pursuant to Executive Order 10485, as amended, and are appropriate for open access transmission by third parties. Procedural Matters: Any person desiring to be heard in this proceeding should file a comment or protest to the application at the address provided above. Protests should be filed in accordance with Rule 211 of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) Rules of Practice and Procedures (18 CFR 385.211). Any person desiring to become a party to these proceedings should file a motion to intervene at the above address in accordance with FERC Rule 214 (18 CFR 385.214). Five copies of such comments, protests, or motions to intervene should be sent to the address provided above on or before the date listed above. Comments and other filings concerning Tidal’s application to export electric energy to Canada should be clearly marked with OE Docket No. EA– 422. An additional copy is to be provided directly to both Stacy Myers, Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., 1100 Louisiana, Suite 3300, Houston, TX 77002 and Kari Olesen, Tidal Energy Marketing Inc., 425 1st Street SW., Calgary, Alberta T2P 3L8. A final decision will be made on this application after the environmental impacts have been evaluated pursuant to DOE’s National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures (10 CFR part 1021) and after a determination is made by DOE that the proposed action will not have an adverse impact on the sufficiency of supply or reliability of the U.S. electric power supply system. Copies of this application will be made available, upon request, for public inspection and copying at the address provided above, by accessing the program Web site at http://energy.gov/ node/11845, or by emailing Angela Troy at Angela.Troy@hq.doe.gov. Issued in Washington, DC, on July 5, 2016. Christopher Lawrence, Electricity Policy Analyst, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. [FR Doc. 2016–16442 Filed 7–11–16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450–01–P PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY National Nuclear Security Administration Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y–12 National Security Complex National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy. ACTION: Record of decision. AGENCY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is amending its July 20, 2011, Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y–12 National Security Complex (2011 ROD) (76 FR 43319) to reflect its decision to implement a revised approach for meeting enriched uranium (EU) requirements, by upgrading existing EU processing buildings and constructing a new Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). Additionally, NNSA has decided to separate the single-structure UPF design concept into a new design consisting of multiple buildings, with each constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate to the building’s function. This revised approach is a hybrid of two alternatives previously analyzed in the 2011 Final Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Y–12 National Security Complex, DOE/EIS–0387 (Y–12 SWEIS). The scope of this Amended ROD is limited to actions which have been found necessary to sustain Y–12’s capability to conduct EU processing operations in a safe and secure environment. Those actions are also addressed in a Supplement Analysis (SA) (DOE/EIS–0387–SA–01), issued by NNSA in April 2016. All other defense mission activities and non-defense mission activities conducted at Y–12 under the alternative selected for implementation in the 2011 ROD are outside the scope of this decision. As a result of preparing the SA, NNSA has determined that no further National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis is needed to support this Amended ROD. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on this Amended ROD, the SA, or to receive a copy of the SA, contact: Ms. Pam Gorman, SA Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, UPF Project Office, P.O. Box 2050, Oak Ridge, TN 37831–8116; or Pamela.Gorman@upo.doe.gov; or (865) 576–9918. For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\12JYN1.SGM 12JYN1 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 12, 2016 / Notices mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES Policy and Compliance (GC–54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–4600, or leave a message at (800) 472–2756. This Amended ROD, the SA, and related NEPA documents are available on the DOE NEPA Web site at www.energy.gov/ nepa. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background Y–12 is NNSA’s primary site for uranium operations, including EU processing and storage, and is one of the primary manufacturing facilities for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. In the Y–12 SWEIS, NNSA analyzed the potential environmental impacts of ongoing and future operations and activities at Y–12. Five alternatives were analyzed in the Y–12 SWEIS: (1) No Action Alternative (maintain the status quo), (2) UPF Alternative, (3) Upgrade in-Place Alternative (4) Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and (5) No Net Production/ Capability-sized UPF Alternative (the environmentally preferable alternative in the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS). In the 2011 ROD, NNSA decided to implement the preferred alternative from the Y–12 SWEIS, the Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and to construct and operate a single-structure Capabilitysized UPF at Y–12 as a replacement for certain existing buildings. In January 2014, as a result of concerns about UPF cost and schedule growth, the Acting Administrator of the NNSA requested that the Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory lead a ‘‘project peer review’’ of the UPF. The result of that review, the ‘‘Final Report of the Committee to Recommend Alternatives to the Uranium Processing Facility Plan in Meeting the Nation’s Enriched Uranium Strategy’’ (the Red Team Report) was released in April 2014. The Red Team Report emphasized the importance of UPF in the context of a broader set of uranium mission requirements: Sustaining and modernizing EU manufacturing capabilities, reducing material at risk (MAR) in Y–12’s EU processing facilities, making investments in enduring buildings, constructing new floor space and enabling transition of critical Building 9212 capabilities into the UPF no later than 2025. Under the revised strategy that resulted from this review, NNSA would: (1) Construct and operate a new facility (the UPF) consisting of multiple buildings rather than the singlestructure UPF facility analyzed in the Y–12 SWEIS, and (2) perform necessary maintenance and upgrades to some VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:30 Jul 11, 2016 Jkt 238001 existing EU facilities. In the revised UPF design approach, the multiple UPF buildings would each be constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate to the building’s function. The revised strategy is described in detail in Chapter 3 of the SA (and referred to, therein, as the proposed action). NEPA Process for Amending the ROD The Y–12 SWEIS evaluated the potential impacts of the reasonable range of alternatives for continuing EU processing operations at Y–12 and provided a basis for the 2011 ROD. The Y–12 SWEIS provides much of the basis for this current decision. As discussed in the Summary, NNSA’s revised strategy of upgrading existing EU buildings and constructing UPF with multiple buildings is different from the Capability-sized UPF that NNSA selected in the 2011 ROD. Instead, it is a hybrid approach that combines elements of the Upgrade in-Place Alternative and the Capability-sized UPF Alternative, Alternatives (3) and (4). NNSA prepared an SA (DOE/EIS– 0387–SA–01) in accordance with Council on Environmental Quality and DOE regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1502.9(c) and 10 CFR 1021.314(c)) to determine whether the preparation of a new or Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would be required. In preparing the SA, NNSA considered new information relevant to environmental concerns that has emerged since the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS and also examined other ongoing or proposed actions at Y–12 and within the surrounding region of influence to determine whether these presented any potentially significant cumulative impacts. Summary of Impacts Section 2.1 of the SA discusses environmental changes at Y–12 and in the surrounding region, which have occurred since publication of the Y–12 SWEIS and that are relevant to the analysis in the SA. Information from the U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) 2014 Update of the United States National Seismic Hazard Maps is included in this section of the SA. The SA analyzes the potential impacts of the proposed action on land use, aesthetics, climate and air quality, geology and soils, water resources, ecological resources, cultural resources, infrastructure and utilities, socioeconomics, waste management, human health and safety, accidents and intentional destructive acts, transportation, and environmental PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 45139 justice. Section 4.2 of the SA provides: (1) A summary of the potential environmental impacts from the Y–12 SWEIS, (2) the estimate of potential impacts specific to the proposed action, and (3) a more detailed analysis of potential impacts for those NEPA resource areas where NNSA determined that there might be potentially significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns. Table 4–1 of the SA presents this information in a comparative fashion for each resource area. As presented in Table 4–1, impacts to climate and air quality, geology and soils, water resources, cultural resources, infrastructure and utilities, socioeconomics, waste management, transportation, and environmental justice would be bounded by the analysis in the Y–12 SWEIS. With respect to ecological resources, since publication of the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS, the northern long-eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis) has been listed as threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and Y–12 falls within the range for this species. However, NNSA does not anticipate any significant adverse effects to this special status species. As discussed in the SA, the activities associated with the proposed action would occur on an existing highly industrial site. Also, the potentially impacted habitat for the northern long-eared bat habitat overlaps with that of the Indiana bat and gray bat. Accordingly, NNSA determined that the proposed action described in the SA would not require a revision of the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS Biological Assessment. The USFWS concurs with NNSA’s ‘‘no effect’’ determinations for the federally endangered gray bat (Myotis grisescens), Indiana bat (Myotis sodalist), and threatened northern long-eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis). Potential impacts to human health, from either normal EU processing operations or accidents (including intentional destructive acts), would also be bounded by the analysis in the Y–12 SWEIS. Both the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS and the SA evaluated the safety of the continued use of existing facilities and concluded that all radiation doses from normal operations would be below regulatory standards with no statistically significant impact on the health and safety of workers or the public. With regard to seismic risks specifically, both the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS and the SA evaluated the potential impacts of the release of radioactive materials to the environment that could result from severe seismic events. For both the public and workers, less than 1 latent cancer fatality from radiological E:\FR\FM\12JYN1.SGM 12JYN1 45140 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 12, 2016 / Notices exposures would be expected for any of the seismic accident scenarios evaluated. Further, the risk 1 assessments for these seismic accident scenarios are bounded by those of other severe accidents for all facilities associated with EU operations at Y–12. This conclusion has not changed as a result of the new USGS seismic map for the eastern Tennessee area. NNSA has taken and will continue to take steps to reduce the MAR administrative limits for existing EU facilities to further reduce the radiological consequences of potential accidents. Although land disturbance and visual impacts would be slightly greater than the analysis in the Y–12 SWEIS (due to transmission line construction), those impacts would not be significant. The analysis in the SA indicates that the potential environmental impacts of the NNSA’s revised strategy would not be significantly different or significantly greater than those NNSA identified in the Y–12 SWEIS. For the resource areas analyzed, no differences or only minor differences in potential environmental impacts would be expected to result. Detailed descriptions of these differences are presented in Table 4–1 of the SA. After comparing the analysis of potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed actions in the SA to those analyzed in the Y–12 SWEIS, NNSA determined that preparation of a supplemental or new EIS is not warranted. Based on the analysis in the SA, NNSA’s revised strategy is not a substantial change to the proposals covered by the Y–12 SWEIS, nor does it represent significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns, and is adequately supported by existing NEPA documentation, including the Y–12 SWEIS and additional NEPA analyses (identified in Section 1.4 of the SA) prepared to address specific activities at Y–12. Thus, consistent with 10 CFR 1021.315(e), the existing 2011 ROD for the Y–12 SWEIS can be amended, and no further NEPA documentation is required to implement the proposed action at Y–12. mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES Environmentally Preferable Alternative In the 2011 ROD, NNSA designated the No Net Production/Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 5) as the environmentally preferable alternative. NNSA believes that alternative is still 1 Although ‘‘risk’’ is a term that can be used to express the general concept that an adverse effect could occur, in DOE quantitative assessments it refers to the numeric product of the probability and consequences. VerDate Sep<11>2014 18:30 Jul 11, 2016 Jkt 238001 the environmentally preferable alternative. Amended Decision NNSA has decided to continue to operate Y–12 to meet the stockpile stewardship mission critical activities assigned to the site. NNSA will meet EU requirements using the proposed action described in Section 3.0 of the SA. That proposed action is a hybrid approach of upgrading existing EU buildings and separating the single-structure UPF into multiple buildings, with each constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate to the building’s function. Basis for Decision National security policies continue to require NNSA to maintain the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as its core technical competencies and capabilities. As was the case when NNSA issued its Record of Decision for the Y–12 SWEIS in 2011, NNSA’s decisions are based on its mission responsibilities and its need to sustain Y–12’s ability to operate in a manner that allows it to fulfill its responsibilities in an environmentally sound, timely, and fiscally prudent manner. NNSA continues to require Y– 12 EU processing facilities to provide reliable, long-term enriched uranium processing capability with modern technologies and equipment, improved security posture for Special Nuclear Material; reduced accident risks; improved health and safety for workers and the public; improved operational efficiency; and reduction in the cost of operating and maintaining key facilities. This amended decision will enable NNSA to maintain the required expertise and capabilities to deliver uranium products while modernizing production facilities. This amended decision will also avoid many of the safety risks of operating aged buildings and equipment by relocating processes that cannot be sustained in existing, enduring buildings. It will also allow NNSA to reduce the risks of EU operations through process improvements enabled by NNSA’s investments in developing new technologies to apply in Y–12 facilities. Through an extended life program, mission-critical existing and enduring buildings and infrastructure will be maintained and/or upgraded, further enhancing safety and security at the Y– 12 site. Mitigation Measures Y–12 will continue to operate in compliance with environmental laws, regulations, policies, and within a PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 framework of contractual requirements. In the 2011 ROD, NNSA adopted the measures identified in the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS, to avoid, minimize and mitigate environmental impacts from the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4). NNSA will continue to impose contractual requirements for actions necessary to comply with the identified mitigation measures. Additionally, as a result of consultations with the USFWS, NNSA is extending by one month the time frame for tree cutting restrictions, established for the protection of roosting and swarming bats. These contractually required restrictions will now remain in effect annually from March 31st through November 15th. Issued in Washington, DC, on July 5th, 2016. Frank G. Klotz, Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration. [FR Doc. 2016–16439 Filed 7–11–16; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6450–P DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Federal Energy Regulatory Commission [Docket No. ER16–2010–000] Hancock Wind, LLC; Supplemental Notice That Initial Market-Based Rate Filing Includes Request for Blanket Section 204 Authorization This is a supplemental notice in the above-referenced proceeding of Hancock Wind, LLC‘s application for marketbased rate authority, with an accompanying rate tariff, noting that such application includes a request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of liability. Any person desiring to intervene or to protest should file with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with Rules 211 and 214 of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214). Anyone filing a motion to intervene or protest must serve a copy of that document on the Applicant. Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing protests with regard to the applicant’s request for blanket authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of future issuances of securities and assumptions of liability, is July 26, 2016. The Commission encourages electronic submission of protests and E:\FR\FM\12JYN1.SGM 12JYN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 133 (Tuesday, July 12, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45138-45140]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-16439]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

National Nuclear Security Administration


Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-
12 National Security Complex

AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a 
separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), 
is amending its July 20, 2011, Record of Decision for the Continued 
Operation of the Y-12 National Security Complex (2011 ROD) (76 FR 
43319) to reflect its decision to implement a revised approach for 
meeting enriched uranium (EU) requirements, by upgrading existing EU 
processing buildings and constructing a new Uranium Processing Facility 
(UPF). Additionally, NNSA has decided to separate the single-structure 
UPF design concept into a new design consisting of multiple buildings, 
with each constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate 
to the building's function. This revised approach is a hybrid of two 
alternatives previously analyzed in the 2011 Final Site-Wide 
Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex, 
DOE/EIS-0387 (Y-12 SWEIS). The scope of this Amended ROD is limited to 
actions which have been found necessary to sustain Y-12's capability to 
conduct EU processing operations in a safe and secure environment. 
Those actions are also addressed in a Supplement Analysis (SA) (DOE/
EIS-0387-SA-01), issued by NNSA in April 2016. All other defense 
mission activities and non-defense mission activities conducted at Y-12 
under the alternative selected for implementation in the 2011 ROD are 
outside the scope of this decision. As a result of preparing the SA, 
NNSA has determined that no further National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) analysis is needed to support this Amended ROD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on this 
Amended ROD, the SA, or to receive a copy of the SA, contact: Ms. Pam 
Gorman, SA Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, National 
Nuclear Security Administration, UPF Project Office, P.O. Box 2050, Oak 
Ridge, TN 37831-8116; or Pamela.Gorman@upo.doe.gov; or (865) 576-9918. 
For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M. 
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

[[Page 45139]]

Policy and Compliance (GC-54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave 
a message at (800) 472-2756. This Amended ROD, the SA, and related NEPA 
documents are available on the DOE NEPA Web site at www.energy.gov/nepa.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    Y-12 is NNSA's primary site for uranium operations, including EU 
processing and storage, and is one of the primary manufacturing 
facilities for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. In the 
Y-12 SWEIS, NNSA analyzed the potential environmental impacts of 
ongoing and future operations and activities at Y-12. Five alternatives 
were analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS: (1) No Action Alternative (maintain 
the status quo), (2) UPF Alternative, (3) Upgrade in-Place Alternative 
(4) Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and (5) No Net Production/
Capability-sized UPF Alternative (the environmentally preferable 
alternative in the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS). In the 2011 ROD, NNSA decided to 
implement the preferred alternative from the Y-12 SWEIS, the 
Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and to construct and operate a 
single-structure Capability-sized UPF at Y-12 as a replacement for 
certain existing buildings.
    In January 2014, as a result of concerns about UPF cost and 
schedule growth, the Acting Administrator of the NNSA requested that 
the Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory lead a ``project peer 
review'' of the UPF. The result of that review, the ``Final Report of 
the Committee to Recommend Alternatives to the Uranium Processing 
Facility Plan in Meeting the Nation's Enriched Uranium Strategy'' (the 
Red Team Report) was released in April 2014. The Red Team Report 
emphasized the importance of UPF in the context of a broader set of 
uranium mission requirements: Sustaining and modernizing EU 
manufacturing capabilities, reducing material at risk (MAR) in Y-12's 
EU processing facilities, making investments in enduring buildings, 
constructing new floor space and enabling transition of critical 
Building 9212 capabilities into the UPF no later than 2025.
    Under the revised strategy that resulted from this review, NNSA 
would: (1) Construct and operate a new facility (the UPF) consisting of 
multiple buildings rather than the single-structure UPF facility 
analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS, and (2) perform necessary maintenance and 
upgrades to some existing EU facilities. In the revised UPF design 
approach, the multiple UPF buildings would each be constructed to 
safety and security requirements appropriate to the building's 
function. The revised strategy is described in detail in Chapter 3 of 
the SA (and referred to, therein, as the proposed action).

NEPA Process for Amending the ROD

    The Y-12 SWEIS evaluated the potential impacts of the reasonable 
range of alternatives for continuing EU processing operations at Y-12 
and provided a basis for the 2011 ROD. The Y-12 SWEIS provides much of 
the basis for this current decision. As discussed in the Summary, 
NNSA's revised strategy of upgrading existing EU buildings and 
constructing UPF with multiple buildings is different from the 
Capability-sized UPF that NNSA selected in the 2011 ROD. Instead, it is 
a hybrid approach that combines elements of the Upgrade in-Place 
Alternative and the Capability-sized UPF Alternative, Alternatives (3) 
and (4).
    NNSA prepared an SA (DOE/EIS-0387-SA-01) in accordance with Council 
on Environmental Quality and DOE regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR 
1502.9(c) and 10 CFR 1021.314(c)) to determine whether the preparation 
of a new or Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would be 
required. In preparing the SA, NNSA considered new information relevant 
to environmental concerns that has emerged since the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS 
and also examined other ongoing or proposed actions at Y-12 and within 
the surrounding region of influence to determine whether these 
presented any potentially significant cumulative impacts.

Summary of Impacts

    Section 2.1 of the SA discusses environmental changes at Y-12 and 
in the surrounding region, which have occurred since publication of the 
Y-12 SWEIS and that are relevant to the analysis in the SA. Information 
from the U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) 2014 Update of the United States 
National Seismic Hazard Maps is included in this section of the SA.
    The SA analyzes the potential impacts of the proposed action on 
land use, aesthetics, climate and air quality, geology and soils, water 
resources, ecological resources, cultural resources, infrastructure and 
utilities, socioeconomics, waste management, human health and safety, 
accidents and intentional destructive acts, transportation, and 
environmental justice. Section 4.2 of the SA provides: (1) A summary of 
the potential environmental impacts from the Y-12 SWEIS, (2) the 
estimate of potential impacts specific to the proposed action, and (3) 
a more detailed analysis of potential impacts for those NEPA resource 
areas where NNSA determined that there might be potentially significant 
new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns. 
Table 4-1 of the SA presents this information in a comparative fashion 
for each resource area.
    As presented in Table 4-1, impacts to climate and air quality, 
geology and soils, water resources, cultural resources, infrastructure 
and utilities, socioeconomics, waste management, transportation, and 
environmental justice would be bounded by the analysis in the Y-12 
SWEIS. With respect to ecological resources, since publication of the 
2011 Y-12 SWEIS, the northern long-eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis) 
has been listed as threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS), and Y-12 falls within the range for this species. However, 
NNSA does not anticipate any significant adverse effects to this 
special status species. As discussed in the SA, the activities 
associated with the proposed action would occur on an existing highly 
industrial site. Also, the potentially impacted habitat for the 
northern long-eared bat habitat overlaps with that of the Indiana bat 
and gray bat. Accordingly, NNSA determined that the proposed action 
described in the SA would not require a revision of the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS 
Biological Assessment. The USFWS concurs with NNSA's ``no effect'' 
determinations for the federally endangered gray bat (Myotis 
grisescens), Indiana bat (Myotis sodalist), and threatened northern 
long-eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis).
    Potential impacts to human health, from either normal EU processing 
operations or accidents (including intentional destructive acts), would 
also be bounded by the analysis in the Y-12 SWEIS. Both the 2011 Y-12 
SWEIS and the SA evaluated the safety of the continued use of existing 
facilities and concluded that all radiation doses from normal 
operations would be below regulatory standards with no statistically 
significant impact on the health and safety of workers or the public. 
With regard to seismic risks specifically, both the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS and 
the SA evaluated the potential impacts of the release of radioactive 
materials to the environment that could result from severe seismic 
events. For both the public and workers, less than 1 latent cancer 
fatality from radiological

[[Page 45140]]

exposures would be expected for any of the seismic accident scenarios 
evaluated. Further, the risk \1\ assessments for these seismic accident 
scenarios are bounded by those of other severe accidents for all 
facilities associated with EU operations at Y-12. This conclusion has 
not changed as a result of the new USGS seismic map for the eastern 
Tennessee area. NNSA has taken and will continue to take steps to 
reduce the MAR administrative limits for existing EU facilities to 
further reduce the radiological consequences of potential accidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Although ``risk'' is a term that can be used to express the 
general concept that an adverse effect could occur, in DOE 
quantitative assessments it refers to the numeric product of the 
probability and consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although land disturbance and visual impacts would be slightly 
greater than the analysis in the Y-12 SWEIS (due to transmission line 
construction), those impacts would not be significant.
    The analysis in the SA indicates that the potential environmental 
impacts of the NNSA's revised strategy would not be significantly 
different or significantly greater than those NNSA identified in the Y-
12 SWEIS. For the resource areas analyzed, no differences or only minor 
differences in potential environmental impacts would be expected to 
result. Detailed descriptions of these differences are presented in 
Table 4-1 of the SA. After comparing the analysis of potential 
environmental impacts associated with the proposed actions in the SA to 
those analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS, NNSA determined that preparation of a 
supplemental or new EIS is not warranted.
    Based on the analysis in the SA, NNSA's revised strategy is not a 
substantial change to the proposals covered by the Y-12 SWEIS, nor does 
it represent significant new circumstances or information relevant to 
environmental concerns, and is adequately supported by existing NEPA 
documentation, including the Y-12 SWEIS and additional NEPA analyses 
(identified in Section 1.4 of the SA) prepared to address specific 
activities at Y-12. Thus, consistent with 10 CFR 1021.315(e), the 
existing 2011 ROD for the Y-12 SWEIS can be amended, and no further 
NEPA documentation is required to implement the proposed action at Y-
12.

Environmentally Preferable Alternative

    In the 2011 ROD, NNSA designated the No Net Production/Capability-
sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 5) as the environmentally preferable 
alternative. NNSA believes that alternative is still the 
environmentally preferable alternative.

Amended Decision

    NNSA has decided to continue to operate Y-12 to meet the stockpile 
stewardship mission critical activities assigned to the site. NNSA will 
meet EU requirements using the proposed action described in Section 3.0 
of the SA. That proposed action is a hybrid approach of upgrading 
existing EU buildings and separating the single-structure UPF into 
multiple buildings, with each constructed to safety and security 
requirements appropriate to the building's function.

Basis for Decision

    National security policies continue to require NNSA to maintain the 
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as its core technical 
competencies and capabilities. As was the case when NNSA issued its 
Record of Decision for the Y-12 SWEIS in 2011, NNSA's decisions are 
based on its mission responsibilities and its need to sustain Y-12's 
ability to operate in a manner that allows it to fulfill its 
responsibilities in an environmentally sound, timely, and fiscally 
prudent manner. NNSA continues to require Y-12 EU processing facilities 
to provide reliable, long-term enriched uranium processing capability 
with modern technologies and equipment, improved security posture for 
Special Nuclear Material; reduced accident risks; improved health and 
safety for workers and the public; improved operational efficiency; and 
reduction in the cost of operating and maintaining key facilities.
    This amended decision will enable NNSA to maintain the required 
expertise and capabilities to deliver uranium products while 
modernizing production facilities. This amended decision will also 
avoid many of the safety risks of operating aged buildings and 
equipment by relocating processes that cannot be sustained in existing, 
enduring buildings. It will also allow NNSA to reduce the risks of EU 
operations through process improvements enabled by NNSA's investments 
in developing new technologies to apply in Y-12 facilities. Through an 
extended life program, mission-critical existing and enduring buildings 
and infrastructure will be maintained and/or upgraded, further 
enhancing safety and security at the Y-12 site.

Mitigation Measures

    Y-12 will continue to operate in compliance with environmental 
laws, regulations, policies, and within a framework of contractual 
requirements. In the 2011 ROD, NNSA adopted the measures identified in 
the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, to avoid, minimize and mitigate environmental 
impacts from the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4). NNSA 
will continue to impose contractual requirements for actions necessary 
to comply with the identified mitigation measures.
    Additionally, as a result of consultations with the USFWS, NNSA is 
extending by one month the time frame for tree cutting restrictions, 
established for the protection of roosting and swarming bats. These 
contractually required restrictions will now remain in effect annually 
from March 31st through November 15th.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on July 5th, 2016.
Frank G. Klotz,
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Administrator, National Nuclear 
Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016-16439 Filed 7-11-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6450-P