Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-12 National Security Complex, 45138-45140 [2016-16439]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 12, 2016 / Notices
Dated: July 7, 2016.
Johan E. Uvin,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Delegated the
Duties of the Assistant Secretary for Career,
Technical, and Adult Education.
[FR Doc. 2016–16454 Filed 7–11–16; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
[OE Docket No. EA–422]
Application To Export Electric Energy;
Tidal Energy Marketing Inc.
Office of Electricity Delivery
and Energy Reliability, DOE.
ACTION: Notice of application.
AGENCY:
Tidal Energy Marketing, Inc.
(Applicant or Tidal) has applied for
authority to transmit electric energy
from the United States to Canada
pursuant to section 202(e) of the Federal
Power Act.
DATES: Comments, protests, or motions
to intervene must be submitted on or
before August 11, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Comments, protests,
motions to intervene, or requests for
more information should be addressed
to: Office of Electricity Delivery and
Energy Reliability, Mail Code: OE–20,
U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, DC 20585–0350. Because
of delays in handling conventional mail,
it is recommended that documents be
transmitted by overnight mail, by
electronic mail to
Electricity.Exports@hq.doe.gov, or by
facsimile to 202–586–8008.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Exports of
electricity from the United States to a
foreign country are regulated by the
Department of Energy (DOE) pursuant to
sections 301(b) and 402(f) of the
Department of Energy Organization Act
(42 U.S.C. 7151(b), 7172(f)) and require
authorization under section 202(e) of
the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.
824a(e)).
On June 8, 2016, DOE received an
application from Tidal for authority to
transmit electric energy from the United
States to Canada as a power marketer for
five years using existing international
transmission facilities. Tidal is
contemporaneously applying to make
wholesale power sales at market-based
rates from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC).
In its application, Tidal states that it
does not own or operate any electric
generation or transmission facilities,
and it does not have a franchised service
area. The electric energy that Tidal
proposes to export to Canada would be
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SUMMARY:
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surplus energy purchased from third
parties such as electric utilities and
Federal power marketing agencies
pursuant to voluntary agreements. The
existing international transmission
facilities to be utilized by Tidal have
previously been authorized by
Presidential permits issued pursuant to
Executive Order 10485, as amended,
and are appropriate for open access
transmission by third parties.
Procedural Matters: Any person
desiring to be heard in this proceeding
should file a comment or protest to the
application at the address provided
above. Protests should be filed in
accordance with Rule 211 of the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC)
Rules of Practice and Procedures (18
CFR 385.211). Any person desiring to
become a party to these proceedings
should file a motion to intervene at the
above address in accordance with FERC
Rule 214 (18 CFR 385.214). Five copies
of such comments, protests, or motions
to intervene should be sent to the
address provided above on or before the
date listed above.
Comments and other filings
concerning Tidal’s application to export
electric energy to Canada should be
clearly marked with OE Docket No. EA–
422. An additional copy is to be
provided directly to both Stacy Myers,
Enbridge Energy Company, Inc., 1100
Louisiana, Suite 3300, Houston, TX
77002 and Kari Olesen, Tidal Energy
Marketing Inc., 425 1st Street SW.,
Calgary, Alberta T2P 3L8.
A final decision will be made on this
application after the environmental
impacts have been evaluated pursuant
to DOE’s National Environmental Policy
Act Implementing Procedures (10 CFR
part 1021) and after a determination is
made by DOE that the proposed action
will not have an adverse impact on the
sufficiency of supply or reliability of the
U.S. electric power supply system.
Copies of this application will be
made available, upon request, for public
inspection and copying at the address
provided above, by accessing the
program Web site at https://energy.gov/
node/11845, or by emailing Angela Troy
at Angela.Troy@hq.doe.gov.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 5, 2016.
Christopher Lawrence,
Electricity Policy Analyst, Office of Electricity
Delivery and Energy Reliability.
[FR Doc. 2016–16442 Filed 7–11–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6450–01–P
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security
Administration
Amended Record of Decision for the
Continued Operation of the Y–12
National Security Complex
National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
AGENCY:
The National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), is
amending its July 20, 2011, Record of
Decision for the Continued Operation of
the Y–12 National Security Complex
(2011 ROD) (76 FR 43319) to reflect its
decision to implement a revised
approach for meeting enriched uranium
(EU) requirements, by upgrading
existing EU processing buildings and
constructing a new Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF). Additionally, NNSA has
decided to separate the single-structure
UPF design concept into a new design
consisting of multiple buildings, with
each constructed to safety and security
requirements appropriate to the
building’s function. This revised
approach is a hybrid of two alternatives
previously analyzed in the 2011 Final
Site-Wide Environmental Impact
Statement for the Y–12 National
Security Complex, DOE/EIS–0387 (Y–12
SWEIS). The scope of this Amended
ROD is limited to actions which have
been found necessary to sustain Y–12’s
capability to conduct EU processing
operations in a safe and secure
environment. Those actions are also
addressed in a Supplement Analysis
(SA) (DOE/EIS–0387–SA–01), issued by
NNSA in April 2016. All other defense
mission activities and non-defense
mission activities conducted at Y–12
under the alternative selected for
implementation in the 2011 ROD are
outside the scope of this decision. As a
result of preparing the SA, NNSA has
determined that no further National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
analysis is needed to support this
Amended ROD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
further information on this Amended
ROD, the SA, or to receive a copy of the
SA, contact: Ms. Pam Gorman, SA
Document Manager, U.S. Department of
Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, UPF Project Office, P.O.
Box 2050, Oak Ridge, TN 37831–8116;
or Pamela.Gorman@upo.doe.gov; or
(865) 576–9918. For information on the
DOE NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol
M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 12, 2016 / Notices
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Policy and Compliance (GC–54), U.S.
Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue SW.,
Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586–4600,
or leave a message at (800) 472–2756.
This Amended ROD, the SA, and related
NEPA documents are available on the
DOE NEPA Web site at www.energy.gov/
nepa.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Y–12 is NNSA’s primary site for
uranium operations, including EU
processing and storage, and is one of the
primary manufacturing facilities for
maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. In the Y–12 SWEIS, NNSA
analyzed the potential environmental
impacts of ongoing and future
operations and activities at Y–12. Five
alternatives were analyzed in the Y–12
SWEIS: (1) No Action Alternative
(maintain the status quo), (2) UPF
Alternative, (3) Upgrade in-Place
Alternative (4) Capability-sized UPF
Alternative, and (5) No Net Production/
Capability-sized UPF Alternative (the
environmentally preferable alternative
in the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS). In the 2011
ROD, NNSA decided to implement the
preferred alternative from the Y–12
SWEIS, the Capability-sized UPF
Alternative, and to construct and
operate a single-structure Capabilitysized UPF at Y–12 as a replacement for
certain existing buildings.
In January 2014, as a result of
concerns about UPF cost and schedule
growth, the Acting Administrator of the
NNSA requested that the Director of the
Oak Ridge National Laboratory lead a
‘‘project peer review’’ of the UPF. The
result of that review, the ‘‘Final Report
of the Committee to Recommend
Alternatives to the Uranium Processing
Facility Plan in Meeting the Nation’s
Enriched Uranium Strategy’’ (the Red
Team Report) was released in April
2014. The Red Team Report emphasized
the importance of UPF in the context of
a broader set of uranium mission
requirements: Sustaining and
modernizing EU manufacturing
capabilities, reducing material at risk
(MAR) in Y–12’s EU processing
facilities, making investments in
enduring buildings, constructing new
floor space and enabling transition of
critical Building 9212 capabilities into
the UPF no later than 2025.
Under the revised strategy that
resulted from this review, NNSA would:
(1) Construct and operate a new facility
(the UPF) consisting of multiple
buildings rather than the singlestructure UPF facility analyzed in the
Y–12 SWEIS, and (2) perform necessary
maintenance and upgrades to some
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existing EU facilities. In the revised UPF
design approach, the multiple UPF
buildings would each be constructed to
safety and security requirements
appropriate to the building’s function.
The revised strategy is described in
detail in Chapter 3 of the SA (and
referred to, therein, as the proposed
action).
NEPA Process for Amending the ROD
The Y–12 SWEIS evaluated the
potential impacts of the reasonable
range of alternatives for continuing EU
processing operations at Y–12 and
provided a basis for the 2011 ROD. The
Y–12 SWEIS provides much of the basis
for this current decision. As discussed
in the Summary, NNSA’s revised
strategy of upgrading existing EU
buildings and constructing UPF with
multiple buildings is different from the
Capability-sized UPF that NNSA
selected in the 2011 ROD. Instead, it is
a hybrid approach that combines
elements of the Upgrade in-Place
Alternative and the Capability-sized
UPF Alternative, Alternatives (3) and
(4).
NNSA prepared an SA (DOE/EIS–
0387–SA–01) in accordance with
Council on Environmental Quality and
DOE regulations implementing NEPA
(40 CFR 1502.9(c) and 10 CFR
1021.314(c)) to determine whether the
preparation of a new or Supplemental
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
would be required. In preparing the SA,
NNSA considered new information
relevant to environmental concerns that
has emerged since the 2011 Y–12
SWEIS and also examined other ongoing
or proposed actions at Y–12 and within
the surrounding region of influence to
determine whether these presented any
potentially significant cumulative
impacts.
Summary of Impacts
Section 2.1 of the SA discusses
environmental changes at Y–12 and in
the surrounding region, which have
occurred since publication of the Y–12
SWEIS and that are relevant to the
analysis in the SA. Information from the
U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) 2014
Update of the United States National
Seismic Hazard Maps is included in this
section of the SA.
The SA analyzes the potential impacts
of the proposed action on land use,
aesthetics, climate and air quality,
geology and soils, water resources,
ecological resources, cultural resources,
infrastructure and utilities,
socioeconomics, waste management,
human health and safety, accidents and
intentional destructive acts,
transportation, and environmental
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45139
justice. Section 4.2 of the SA provides:
(1) A summary of the potential
environmental impacts from the Y–12
SWEIS, (2) the estimate of potential
impacts specific to the proposed action,
and (3) a more detailed analysis of
potential impacts for those NEPA
resource areas where NNSA determined
that there might be potentially
significant new circumstances or
information relevant to environmental
concerns. Table 4–1 of the SA presents
this information in a comparative
fashion for each resource area.
As presented in Table 4–1, impacts to
climate and air quality, geology and
soils, water resources, cultural
resources, infrastructure and utilities,
socioeconomics, waste management,
transportation, and environmental
justice would be bounded by the
analysis in the Y–12 SWEIS. With
respect to ecological resources, since
publication of the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS,
the northern long-eared bat (Myotis
septentrionalis) has been listed as
threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service (USFWS), and Y–12 falls within
the range for this species. However,
NNSA does not anticipate any
significant adverse effects to this special
status species. As discussed in the SA,
the activities associated with the
proposed action would occur on an
existing highly industrial site. Also, the
potentially impacted habitat for the
northern long-eared bat habitat overlaps
with that of the Indiana bat and gray bat.
Accordingly, NNSA determined that the
proposed action described in the SA
would not require a revision of the 2011
Y–12 SWEIS Biological Assessment.
The USFWS concurs with NNSA’s ‘‘no
effect’’ determinations for the federally
endangered gray bat (Myotis grisescens),
Indiana bat (Myotis sodalist), and
threatened northern long-eared bat
(Myotis septentrionalis).
Potential impacts to human health,
from either normal EU processing
operations or accidents (including
intentional destructive acts), would also
be bounded by the analysis in the Y–12
SWEIS. Both the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS and
the SA evaluated the safety of the
continued use of existing facilities and
concluded that all radiation doses from
normal operations would be below
regulatory standards with no
statistically significant impact on the
health and safety of workers or the
public. With regard to seismic risks
specifically, both the 2011 Y–12 SWEIS
and the SA evaluated the potential
impacts of the release of radioactive
materials to the environment that could
result from severe seismic events. For
both the public and workers, less than
1 latent cancer fatality from radiological
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45140
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 133 / Tuesday, July 12, 2016 / Notices
exposures would be expected for any of
the seismic accident scenarios
evaluated. Further, the risk 1
assessments for these seismic accident
scenarios are bounded by those of other
severe accidents for all facilities
associated with EU operations at Y–12.
This conclusion has not changed as a
result of the new USGS seismic map for
the eastern Tennessee area. NNSA has
taken and will continue to take steps to
reduce the MAR administrative limits
for existing EU facilities to further
reduce the radiological consequences of
potential accidents.
Although land disturbance and visual
impacts would be slightly greater than
the analysis in the Y–12 SWEIS (due to
transmission line construction), those
impacts would not be significant.
The analysis in the SA indicates that
the potential environmental impacts of
the NNSA’s revised strategy would not
be significantly different or significantly
greater than those NNSA identified in
the Y–12 SWEIS. For the resource areas
analyzed, no differences or only minor
differences in potential environmental
impacts would be expected to result.
Detailed descriptions of these
differences are presented in Table 4–1 of
the SA. After comparing the analysis of
potential environmental impacts
associated with the proposed actions in
the SA to those analyzed in the Y–12
SWEIS, NNSA determined that
preparation of a supplemental or new
EIS is not warranted.
Based on the analysis in the SA,
NNSA’s revised strategy is not a
substantial change to the proposals
covered by the Y–12 SWEIS, nor does it
represent significant new circumstances
or information relevant to
environmental concerns, and is
adequately supported by existing NEPA
documentation, including the Y–12
SWEIS and additional NEPA analyses
(identified in Section 1.4 of the SA)
prepared to address specific activities at
Y–12. Thus, consistent with 10 CFR
1021.315(e), the existing 2011 ROD for
the Y–12 SWEIS can be amended, and
no further NEPA documentation is
required to implement the proposed
action at Y–12.
mstockstill on DSK3G9T082PROD with NOTICES
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
In the 2011 ROD, NNSA designated
the No Net Production/Capability-sized
UPF Alternative (Alternative 5) as the
environmentally preferable alternative.
NNSA believes that alternative is still
1 Although ‘‘risk’’ is a term that can be used to
express the general concept that an adverse effect
could occur, in DOE quantitative assessments it
refers to the numeric product of the probability and
consequences.
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the environmentally preferable
alternative.
Amended Decision
NNSA has decided to continue to
operate Y–12 to meet the stockpile
stewardship mission critical activities
assigned to the site. NNSA will meet EU
requirements using the proposed action
described in Section 3.0 of the SA. That
proposed action is a hybrid approach of
upgrading existing EU buildings and
separating the single-structure UPF into
multiple buildings, with each
constructed to safety and security
requirements appropriate to the
building’s function.
Basis for Decision
National security policies continue to
require NNSA to maintain the nation’s
nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as its
core technical competencies and
capabilities. As was the case when
NNSA issued its Record of Decision for
the Y–12 SWEIS in 2011, NNSA’s
decisions are based on its mission
responsibilities and its need to sustain
Y–12’s ability to operate in a manner
that allows it to fulfill its
responsibilities in an environmentally
sound, timely, and fiscally prudent
manner. NNSA continues to require Y–
12 EU processing facilities to provide
reliable, long-term enriched uranium
processing capability with modern
technologies and equipment, improved
security posture for Special Nuclear
Material; reduced accident risks;
improved health and safety for workers
and the public; improved operational
efficiency; and reduction in the cost of
operating and maintaining key facilities.
This amended decision will enable
NNSA to maintain the required
expertise and capabilities to deliver
uranium products while modernizing
production facilities. This amended
decision will also avoid many of the
safety risks of operating aged buildings
and equipment by relocating processes
that cannot be sustained in existing,
enduring buildings. It will also allow
NNSA to reduce the risks of EU
operations through process
improvements enabled by NNSA’s
investments in developing new
technologies to apply in Y–12 facilities.
Through an extended life program,
mission-critical existing and enduring
buildings and infrastructure will be
maintained and/or upgraded, further
enhancing safety and security at the Y–
12 site.
Mitigation Measures
Y–12 will continue to operate in
compliance with environmental laws,
regulations, policies, and within a
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framework of contractual requirements.
In the 2011 ROD, NNSA adopted the
measures identified in the 2011 Y–12
SWEIS, to avoid, minimize and mitigate
environmental impacts from the
Capability-sized UPF Alternative
(Alternative 4). NNSA will continue to
impose contractual requirements for
actions necessary to comply with the
identified mitigation measures.
Additionally, as a result of
consultations with the USFWS, NNSA
is extending by one month the time
frame for tree cutting restrictions,
established for the protection of roosting
and swarming bats. These contractually
required restrictions will now remain in
effect annually from March 31st through
November 15th.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 5th,
2016.
Frank G. Klotz,
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016–16439 Filed 7–11–16; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
[Docket No. ER16–2010–000]
Hancock Wind, LLC; Supplemental
Notice That Initial Market-Based Rate
Filing Includes Request for Blanket
Section 204 Authorization
This is a supplemental notice in the
above-referenced proceeding of Hancock
Wind, LLC‘s application for marketbased rate authority, with an
accompanying rate tariff, noting that
such application includes a request for
blanket authorization, under 18 CFR
part 34, of future issuances of securities
and assumptions of liability.
Any person desiring to intervene or to
protest should file with the Federal
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First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426,
in accordance with Rules 211 and 214
of the Commission’s Rules of Practice
and Procedure
(18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214).
Anyone filing a motion to intervene or
protest must serve a copy of that
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Notice is hereby given that the
deadline for filing protests with regard
to the applicant’s request for blanket
authorization, under 18 CFR part 34, of
future issuances of securities and
assumptions of liability, is July 26,
2016.
The Commission encourages
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E:\FR\FM\12JYN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 133 (Tuesday, July 12, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 45138-45140]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-16439]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
National Nuclear Security Administration
Amended Record of Decision for the Continued Operation of the Y-
12 National Security Complex
AGENCY: National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.
ACTION: Record of decision.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a
separately organized agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE),
is amending its July 20, 2011, Record of Decision for the Continued
Operation of the Y-12 National Security Complex (2011 ROD) (76 FR
43319) to reflect its decision to implement a revised approach for
meeting enriched uranium (EU) requirements, by upgrading existing EU
processing buildings and constructing a new Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF). Additionally, NNSA has decided to separate the single-structure
UPF design concept into a new design consisting of multiple buildings,
with each constructed to safety and security requirements appropriate
to the building's function. This revised approach is a hybrid of two
alternatives previously analyzed in the 2011 Final Site-Wide
Environmental Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex,
DOE/EIS-0387 (Y-12 SWEIS). The scope of this Amended ROD is limited to
actions which have been found necessary to sustain Y-12's capability to
conduct EU processing operations in a safe and secure environment.
Those actions are also addressed in a Supplement Analysis (SA) (DOE/
EIS-0387-SA-01), issued by NNSA in April 2016. All other defense
mission activities and non-defense mission activities conducted at Y-12
under the alternative selected for implementation in the 2011 ROD are
outside the scope of this decision. As a result of preparing the SA,
NNSA has determined that no further National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) analysis is needed to support this Amended ROD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on this
Amended ROD, the SA, or to receive a copy of the SA, contact: Ms. Pam
Gorman, SA Document Manager, U.S. Department of Energy, National
Nuclear Security Administration, UPF Project Office, P.O. Box 2050, Oak
Ridge, TN 37831-8116; or Pamela.Gorman@upo.doe.gov; or (865) 576-9918.
For information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Ms. Carol M.
Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA
[[Page 45139]]
Policy and Compliance (GC-54), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000
Independence Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave
a message at (800) 472-2756. This Amended ROD, the SA, and related NEPA
documents are available on the DOE NEPA Web site at www.energy.gov/nepa.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Y-12 is NNSA's primary site for uranium operations, including EU
processing and storage, and is one of the primary manufacturing
facilities for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. In the
Y-12 SWEIS, NNSA analyzed the potential environmental impacts of
ongoing and future operations and activities at Y-12. Five alternatives
were analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS: (1) No Action Alternative (maintain
the status quo), (2) UPF Alternative, (3) Upgrade in-Place Alternative
(4) Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and (5) No Net Production/
Capability-sized UPF Alternative (the environmentally preferable
alternative in the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS). In the 2011 ROD, NNSA decided to
implement the preferred alternative from the Y-12 SWEIS, the
Capability-sized UPF Alternative, and to construct and operate a
single-structure Capability-sized UPF at Y-12 as a replacement for
certain existing buildings.
In January 2014, as a result of concerns about UPF cost and
schedule growth, the Acting Administrator of the NNSA requested that
the Director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory lead a ``project peer
review'' of the UPF. The result of that review, the ``Final Report of
the Committee to Recommend Alternatives to the Uranium Processing
Facility Plan in Meeting the Nation's Enriched Uranium Strategy'' (the
Red Team Report) was released in April 2014. The Red Team Report
emphasized the importance of UPF in the context of a broader set of
uranium mission requirements: Sustaining and modernizing EU
manufacturing capabilities, reducing material at risk (MAR) in Y-12's
EU processing facilities, making investments in enduring buildings,
constructing new floor space and enabling transition of critical
Building 9212 capabilities into the UPF no later than 2025.
Under the revised strategy that resulted from this review, NNSA
would: (1) Construct and operate a new facility (the UPF) consisting of
multiple buildings rather than the single-structure UPF facility
analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS, and (2) perform necessary maintenance and
upgrades to some existing EU facilities. In the revised UPF design
approach, the multiple UPF buildings would each be constructed to
safety and security requirements appropriate to the building's
function. The revised strategy is described in detail in Chapter 3 of
the SA (and referred to, therein, as the proposed action).
NEPA Process for Amending the ROD
The Y-12 SWEIS evaluated the potential impacts of the reasonable
range of alternatives for continuing EU processing operations at Y-12
and provided a basis for the 2011 ROD. The Y-12 SWEIS provides much of
the basis for this current decision. As discussed in the Summary,
NNSA's revised strategy of upgrading existing EU buildings and
constructing UPF with multiple buildings is different from the
Capability-sized UPF that NNSA selected in the 2011 ROD. Instead, it is
a hybrid approach that combines elements of the Upgrade in-Place
Alternative and the Capability-sized UPF Alternative, Alternatives (3)
and (4).
NNSA prepared an SA (DOE/EIS-0387-SA-01) in accordance with Council
on Environmental Quality and DOE regulations implementing NEPA (40 CFR
1502.9(c) and 10 CFR 1021.314(c)) to determine whether the preparation
of a new or Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) would be
required. In preparing the SA, NNSA considered new information relevant
to environmental concerns that has emerged since the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS
and also examined other ongoing or proposed actions at Y-12 and within
the surrounding region of influence to determine whether these
presented any potentially significant cumulative impacts.
Summary of Impacts
Section 2.1 of the SA discusses environmental changes at Y-12 and
in the surrounding region, which have occurred since publication of the
Y-12 SWEIS and that are relevant to the analysis in the SA. Information
from the U.S. Geologic Survey (USGS) 2014 Update of the United States
National Seismic Hazard Maps is included in this section of the SA.
The SA analyzes the potential impacts of the proposed action on
land use, aesthetics, climate and air quality, geology and soils, water
resources, ecological resources, cultural resources, infrastructure and
utilities, socioeconomics, waste management, human health and safety,
accidents and intentional destructive acts, transportation, and
environmental justice. Section 4.2 of the SA provides: (1) A summary of
the potential environmental impacts from the Y-12 SWEIS, (2) the
estimate of potential impacts specific to the proposed action, and (3)
a more detailed analysis of potential impacts for those NEPA resource
areas where NNSA determined that there might be potentially significant
new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns.
Table 4-1 of the SA presents this information in a comparative fashion
for each resource area.
As presented in Table 4-1, impacts to climate and air quality,
geology and soils, water resources, cultural resources, infrastructure
and utilities, socioeconomics, waste management, transportation, and
environmental justice would be bounded by the analysis in the Y-12
SWEIS. With respect to ecological resources, since publication of the
2011 Y-12 SWEIS, the northern long-eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis)
has been listed as threatened by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS), and Y-12 falls within the range for this species. However,
NNSA does not anticipate any significant adverse effects to this
special status species. As discussed in the SA, the activities
associated with the proposed action would occur on an existing highly
industrial site. Also, the potentially impacted habitat for the
northern long-eared bat habitat overlaps with that of the Indiana bat
and gray bat. Accordingly, NNSA determined that the proposed action
described in the SA would not require a revision of the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS
Biological Assessment. The USFWS concurs with NNSA's ``no effect''
determinations for the federally endangered gray bat (Myotis
grisescens), Indiana bat (Myotis sodalist), and threatened northern
long-eared bat (Myotis septentrionalis).
Potential impacts to human health, from either normal EU processing
operations or accidents (including intentional destructive acts), would
also be bounded by the analysis in the Y-12 SWEIS. Both the 2011 Y-12
SWEIS and the SA evaluated the safety of the continued use of existing
facilities and concluded that all radiation doses from normal
operations would be below regulatory standards with no statistically
significant impact on the health and safety of workers or the public.
With regard to seismic risks specifically, both the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS and
the SA evaluated the potential impacts of the release of radioactive
materials to the environment that could result from severe seismic
events. For both the public and workers, less than 1 latent cancer
fatality from radiological
[[Page 45140]]
exposures would be expected for any of the seismic accident scenarios
evaluated. Further, the risk \1\ assessments for these seismic accident
scenarios are bounded by those of other severe accidents for all
facilities associated with EU operations at Y-12. This conclusion has
not changed as a result of the new USGS seismic map for the eastern
Tennessee area. NNSA has taken and will continue to take steps to
reduce the MAR administrative limits for existing EU facilities to
further reduce the radiological consequences of potential accidents.
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\1\ Although ``risk'' is a term that can be used to express the
general concept that an adverse effect could occur, in DOE
quantitative assessments it refers to the numeric product of the
probability and consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although land disturbance and visual impacts would be slightly
greater than the analysis in the Y-12 SWEIS (due to transmission line
construction), those impacts would not be significant.
The analysis in the SA indicates that the potential environmental
impacts of the NNSA's revised strategy would not be significantly
different or significantly greater than those NNSA identified in the Y-
12 SWEIS. For the resource areas analyzed, no differences or only minor
differences in potential environmental impacts would be expected to
result. Detailed descriptions of these differences are presented in
Table 4-1 of the SA. After comparing the analysis of potential
environmental impacts associated with the proposed actions in the SA to
those analyzed in the Y-12 SWEIS, NNSA determined that preparation of a
supplemental or new EIS is not warranted.
Based on the analysis in the SA, NNSA's revised strategy is not a
substantial change to the proposals covered by the Y-12 SWEIS, nor does
it represent significant new circumstances or information relevant to
environmental concerns, and is adequately supported by existing NEPA
documentation, including the Y-12 SWEIS and additional NEPA analyses
(identified in Section 1.4 of the SA) prepared to address specific
activities at Y-12. Thus, consistent with 10 CFR 1021.315(e), the
existing 2011 ROD for the Y-12 SWEIS can be amended, and no further
NEPA documentation is required to implement the proposed action at Y-
12.
Environmentally Preferable Alternative
In the 2011 ROD, NNSA designated the No Net Production/Capability-
sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 5) as the environmentally preferable
alternative. NNSA believes that alternative is still the
environmentally preferable alternative.
Amended Decision
NNSA has decided to continue to operate Y-12 to meet the stockpile
stewardship mission critical activities assigned to the site. NNSA will
meet EU requirements using the proposed action described in Section 3.0
of the SA. That proposed action is a hybrid approach of upgrading
existing EU buildings and separating the single-structure UPF into
multiple buildings, with each constructed to safety and security
requirements appropriate to the building's function.
Basis for Decision
National security policies continue to require NNSA to maintain the
nation's nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as its core technical
competencies and capabilities. As was the case when NNSA issued its
Record of Decision for the Y-12 SWEIS in 2011, NNSA's decisions are
based on its mission responsibilities and its need to sustain Y-12's
ability to operate in a manner that allows it to fulfill its
responsibilities in an environmentally sound, timely, and fiscally
prudent manner. NNSA continues to require Y-12 EU processing facilities
to provide reliable, long-term enriched uranium processing capability
with modern technologies and equipment, improved security posture for
Special Nuclear Material; reduced accident risks; improved health and
safety for workers and the public; improved operational efficiency; and
reduction in the cost of operating and maintaining key facilities.
This amended decision will enable NNSA to maintain the required
expertise and capabilities to deliver uranium products while
modernizing production facilities. This amended decision will also
avoid many of the safety risks of operating aged buildings and
equipment by relocating processes that cannot be sustained in existing,
enduring buildings. It will also allow NNSA to reduce the risks of EU
operations through process improvements enabled by NNSA's investments
in developing new technologies to apply in Y-12 facilities. Through an
extended life program, mission-critical existing and enduring buildings
and infrastructure will be maintained and/or upgraded, further
enhancing safety and security at the Y-12 site.
Mitigation Measures
Y-12 will continue to operate in compliance with environmental
laws, regulations, policies, and within a framework of contractual
requirements. In the 2011 ROD, NNSA adopted the measures identified in
the 2011 Y-12 SWEIS, to avoid, minimize and mitigate environmental
impacts from the Capability-sized UPF Alternative (Alternative 4). NNSA
will continue to impose contractual requirements for actions necessary
to comply with the identified mitigation measures.
Additionally, as a result of consultations with the USFWS, NNSA is
extending by one month the time frame for tree cutting restrictions,
established for the protection of roosting and swarming bats. These
contractually required restrictions will now remain in effect annually
from March 31st through November 15th.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 5th, 2016.
Frank G. Klotz,
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration.
[FR Doc. 2016-16439 Filed 7-11-16; 8:45 am]
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