Disruptions to Communications, 45055-45068 [2016-16274]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 133 (Tuesday, July 12, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 45055-45068]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-16274]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 4

[ET Docket No. 04-35; FCC 16-63]


Disruptions to Communications

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this Report and Order, the Commission updates several of 
its outage reporting metrics, methodologies, and procedures for a 
number of providers covered in the Commission's rules concerning 
disruptions to communications and directs the Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) to further evaluate issues related to 
the sharing of information from the Commission's Network Outage 
Reporting System (NORS) with state and federal partners. The Order on 
Reconsideration limits outage reporting for events affecting airports 
to outages that impact airport critical communications, and exempts 
satellite and terrestrial wireless carriers from reporting outages 
affecting all ``special offices and facilities.''

DATES: The final rules are effective August 11, 2016, except 47 CFR 
4.5(b) and (c), 4.7(d) and (e)(2), and 4.9 (a)(2), the second sentence 
in paragraph (a)(4), the second and sixth sentence in paragraph (b), 
(e), (f)(2), and the second sentence in paragraph (f)(4) which contain 
new or modified information collection requirements that have not been 
approved by OMB. The Federal Communications Commission will publish a 
document in the Federal Register announcing the effective date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda D. Villanueva, Attorney 
Advisor, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-7005 or 
brenda.villanueva@fcc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Report 
and Order and Order on Reconsideration in PS Docket Nos. 11-82 and 15-
80 and ET Docket No. 04-35, adopted on May 25, 2016, and released on 
May 26, 2016. The full text of this document is available for public 
inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 
Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 20554, or online at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-63A1.pdf. This 
Order updates several of the Commission's outage reporting metrics, 
methodologies, and procedures for a number of providers covered under 
its part 4 rules concerning disruptions to communications and directs 
the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (Bureau) to further 
evaluate issues related to the sharing of information from the 
Commission's NORS program with state and federal partners.

Synopsis of the Report and Order

I. Report and Order

    1. Codified in part 4 of our rules, outage reporting requirements 
support our public safety goals by directing providers to report 
network outages that exceed specified magnitude and duration 
thresholds. Outage data give the Commission an overall picture of 
communications network reliability that

[[Page 45056]]

enables it to identify adverse trends. In turn, the data enable 
Commission staff, working closely with providers and industry working 
groups, to understand and address systemic vulnerabilities. Such 
collaborative efforts have led to measurable improvements in network 
reliability and resiliency, and to the formulation of policies to 
promote more reliable and secure communications. Moreover, outage 
reports, particularly in the early stages of a communications 
disruption, provide critical situational awareness that enables the 
Commission to be an effective participant in emergency response and 
service restoration efforts.

A. Major Transport Facility Outages

1. Major Transport Facility Outage Metric and Threshold
    2. In 2004, the Commission required outage reporting for 
communication disruptions impacting major transport facilities, 
specifically those with significant traffic-carrying capacity, such as 
DS3 circuits. The Commission created a metric and threshold for this 
outage reporting in standards defined in impacts to DS3 circuits; 
specifically, the Commission adopted DS3 as the base metric and 1,350 
DS3 minutes as the reporting threshold. Since then, our part 4 rules 
require a covered provider to file reports with the Commission in the 
NORS online database when a DS3 circuit (or its equivalent) that it 
owns, operates, leases, or otherwise utilizes, experiences a 
communication disruption that lasts for at least 30 minutes and meets 
the 1,350 DS3 minute threshold. When the Commission originally adopted 
the part 4 rules, DS3 circuits were the ``common denominator,'' that 
is, the standard facility used in networks for major traffic transport. 
Today, however, providers use larger, fiber facilities for major 
traffic transport, and thus have decreased their use of DS3 circuits. 
This shift has rendered the DS3-based reporting metric and the 
corresponding 1,350 DS3 minute threshold obsolete and unhelpful for 
outage analysis. This is borne out by the past ten years' NORS data, 
which show a marked increase in reported DS3 standard-based incidents 
that involve only minor disruptions that are unlikely to have any 
significant communications impact or jeopardize public safety. In the 
same period, the industry has broadly adopted OC3 as the predominate 
architecture for major transport facilities.
    3. Accordingly, in the Notice, we proposed to change the base major 
transport facility outage reporting metric from DS3 to OC3, to preserve 
our near-and medium-term ability to obtain critical information to 
analyze communications network reliability. We also proposed a 
corresponding reporting threshold shift from DS3 minutes to OC3 
minutes. Finally, we proposed language to ensure inclusion of other 
transport facilities beyond OC3, i.e., ``other circuits or aggregations 
of circuits that provide equal or greater capacity.'' To effectuate 
that technologically neutral objective, we proposed to adjust the 
number of OC3 minutes based on some measure of equivalency to the 
current 900,000 user-minute threshold for voice-grade users, which we 
posited as 667 OC3 minutes. Despite suggestions to move our metric to 
OC12 or higher, we find that OC3 gives us the right amount of 
visibility into customer access circuits that may not be captured by a 
metric above OC3.
    4. The record reflects strong support for adjusting the major 
transport facility outage metric and threshold as we proposed in the 
Notice. Several commenters agree that major transport traffic now takes 
place more on fiber than on DS3 circuits. Many commenters also 
acknowledge that changing the standard as proposed will give the 
Commission information on significant outages that are more likely to 
have a material impact on users. Indeed, commenters predict that the 
change from DS3 to OC (whether at OC3 or above) will enhance outage 
reporting efficiency and reduce reporting burdens while also ensuring 
that the rules continue to target high-capacity facilities and track 
major outage events that have a material impact on users. Commenters 
also agree that changing the standard from a DS3 basis to a higher 
capacity level basis will reduce the number of outage reports required 
for relatively minor incidents.
    5. Despite broad support that the major transport facility outage 
reporting metric should change from a DS3 to a higher capacity, those 
supporting the change do not agree on what that specific capacity level 
should be. Several commenters share our view that the new metric should 
be based on OC3--where the threshold would be 667 OC3 minutes. Others, 
however, propose alternative metrics and thresholds. For example, some 
commenters suggest OC12 (or similarly high capacity level) as the 
appropriate standard because, in their view, it more properly reflects 
the past decade's network technology advancements than OC3. Others, 
like CenturyLink, push for an even higher metric, e.g., OC48 or OC192.
    6. AT&T, on the other hand, recommends an OC12-based metric, and 
further proposes to measure the transport facility's ``working'' 
capacity, as opposed to our current measure of ``failed'' capacity, as 
the appropriate standard for reporting. In support of its working 
capacity proposal, AT&T explains that OC3 circuits are usually on its 
network edge (e.g., enterprise local loop and access services), and 
thus it argues that an OC3 metric would provide little insight on 
outages affecting the core of the network. Ultimately, AT&T proposes 
the elimination of major transport facility outage reporting 
altogether, and advocates instead that the Commission focus on events 
that impact customer service, such as ``end office isolations, SS7 
isolations, call blockages, and E911 failures.'' AT&T maintains that in 
proposing a new metric and threshold, we miss an opportunity to conduct 
a comprehensive review of the information that will ``best apprise [the 
Commission] of the overall health of the nation's networks,'' and, that 
failed transport capacity is an inadequate metric because it does not 
necessarily reveal the effect on customers' service or provide an 
accurate portrayal of network health.
    7. Comcast proposes to abandon a time-division multiplexing (TDM)-
based metric and advocates using a bandwidth-based metric instead. 
Comcast advocates for the adoption of a ``bandwidth-based standard, 
such as 1GB outage that lasts for at least 30 minutes.'' Comcast 
further suggests that its approach can accommodate future changes more 
readily than a TDM-based standard. Verizon disagrees, arguing that more 
study is needed to ensure Comcast's platform-shift approach would 
capture a ``genuine outage or significant degradation of service,'' and 
``apply on a cross-platform basis.''
    8. We adopt our proposals to (i) change the metric and threshold 
for major facility outages from a DS3-based to an OC3-based metric, and 
(ii) adjust the threshold to 667 OC3 user minutes accordingly. There is 
substantial record support for moving our metric to a standard based on 
higher capacity levels (e.g., to OC3 or higher). These changes update 
our major transport facility reporting to reflect prevalent 
technological changes in networks, and do so in a logical and 
technologically neutral manner. Compliance with this revised metric 
shall begin no later than 6 months after the Effective Date of the 
rules.
    9. Moreover, multiple commenters agree that providers have been 
moving a majority of their traffic onto larger fiber facilities, a 
trend that is likely to continue. Thus, although a DS3-based

[[Page 45057]]

metric may have been the right standard for 2004's predominant 
technology for major transport, it is no longer appropriate. At this 
time, adjusting the metric to OC3 will streamline the reporting in 
general, a benefit both to providers and the Commission alike through 
reduced reporting of minor incidents, allowing time and resources for 
an increased focus on meaningful outage reporting that is more likely 
to have a user material impact.
    10. At this time, we are not persuaded by those commenters who 
advocate for a higher OC level. An OC3-based metric will generate the 
visibility into the network components that an OC12-based metric may 
not, as it would capture access circuit outages for business customers. 
Setting a metric at OC12 would provide the Commission with limited, 
inadequate visibility into major transport facility infrastructure and 
related outages, i.e., those beyond the network core. Further, we 
recognize that some networks may utilize OC3 circuits as access 
circuits and others may utilize them for interoffice facility traffic, 
and so an OC3-based metric may not provide the same degree of 
visibility into operational health for all providers' networks. 
Nevertheless, we believe that basing our outage reporting requirements 
at the OC3 level ``or their equivalents'' as proposed in the Notice 
captures the important communication disruptions in networks large and 
small, regardless of providers' OC3 circuit usage. Moreover, an OC3 
metric allows the Commission to better focus on outage trends that may 
uniquely affect small and medium-sized businesses, whose traffic is 
often transported over OC3 facilities. Therefore, we adopt an OC3 
metric for major facility outages.
    11. In doing so, we affirm the importance of an independent outage 
reporting requirement for major transport facility failures. Through 
the collected information on the ``potential impact on all 
communications services of major infrastructure failures,'' 
specifically information about ``infrastructure components having 
significant traffic-carrying capacity,'' as the part 4 rules were 
intended to capture, our work has led to increased collaborative 
efforts with providers and a more efficient mitigation of outage 
trends. AT&T's proposal to eliminate major transport facility reporting 
requirements assumes that (1) our 900,000 user-minute threshold 
captures the same visibility of major transport facilities as our 
current DS3 metric and threshold, and that (2) providers only use OC3 
circuits as access circuits to conclude that the adoption of our 
proposal would lead to duplicative reporting. While a few communication 
disruptions may be reportable outages because they meet both thresholds 
(900,000 user minutes; 1,350 DS3 minutes), by having the two metrics 
and thresholds we capture outages caused by switch failures or major 
transport equipment failures. Therefore, if we eliminated the major 
transport outage reporting, we would likely miss communication 
disruptions experienced in interoffice transport facilities. Moreover, 
while some providers, such as AT&T, may use OC3 circuits as access 
circuits, other providers may design their networks differently and 
some customers, like small and medium-sized businesses may be uniquely 
impacted at the OC3 level. To address networks designed like AT&T's, 
the rules adopted today capture communication disruptions experienced 
in higher capacity levels than OC3, by defining OC3 minutes using OC3 
``or their equivalents.''
    12. The adoption of the OC3 metric ensures an appropriate level of 
Commission visibility into the resiliency and reliability of critical 
infrastructure presently--and for at least the near-to-medium term--in 
use in communications networks for major traffic transport. Such 
visibility, adjusted to the OC3 level, is an essential component of the 
Commission's network reliability and public safety duties. Thus, we 
decline proposals to eliminate major transport facility outage 
reporting.
    13. Finally, two commenters suggest alternative proposals, neither 
of which provides the needed visibility into the nation's networks for 
the Commission to ensure communications are reliable and resilient. 
AT&T's ``working capacity'' proposal would use a measure such as ``the 
percentage of the circuit dedicated to voice channels.'' It would thus 
require providers to assess whether and when to give the Commission the 
major transport facility outage reports it needs. Our current 
requirements give clear direction: once a DS3 circuit experiences a 
communication disruption for at least 1,350 DS3 minutes and lasts for 
at least 30 minutes, the provider must report the outage accordingly. 
As announced in 2004, we continue to believe that ``our concern is the 
failure of working DS3s regardless of the services being carried or the 
fill at the time of the failure.'' Significantly, AT&T's ``working 
capacity'' proposal would generate burdens on providers by imposing 
measurement mechanisms based on a working capacity metric that, as an 
initial step, would require the provider to identify the percentage of 
the circuit dedicated to voice channels. It remains unclear whether 
other providers can measure working capacity on their facilities at 
this time, or the costs involved with such monitoring. It is also 
unclear how AT&T's proposal applies in the legacy or the transition 
network contexts. Further, AT&T's proposal would constitute a shift 
that does not comport with the logic of outage reporting, which 
necessarily focuses on what does not work, instead of what does work. 
Accordingly, we reject AT&T's ``working capacity'' proposal.
    14. Comcast proposes a bandwidth-based standard for major transport 
facility outages, as described above. The proposal requires further 
study and therefore cannot be the basis to change our metric and 
threshold for major transport facility outage reporting at this time. 
We agree with Comcast that data traffic makes up an increasingly large 
part of bandwidth needs for transport services. We also note that we 
are in a state of transition from TDM to IP. This state of transition 
requires reporting requirements that are sufficient to capture outages 
in both TDM and IP networks, including specifically those outages 
impacting physical facilities and network components (e.g., copper and 
fiber cables, networking switches and routers). We also believe that 
the successful and reliable delivery of IP-based services and 
applications (e.g., email) is important. The OC3 metric and 667 OC3 
minute threshold adopted today address outages in major transport 
facilities carried through TDM-based and SONET facilities. We 
nevertheless find that Comcast's proposal has merit and seek further 
input on broadband reporting thresholds in the related Further Notice. 
Therefore, we decline to adopt Comcast's proposal for a bandwidth-based 
standard for reporting at this time.
2. Simplex Outage Reporting
    15. Under our current rules, providers must file reports for 
simplex event outages lasting five days or more. A simplex event occurs 
when a DS3 circuit, designed with multiple paths to provide circuit 
resiliency, experiences a failure on one working path. In the Notice, 
we proposed to shorten the reporting window for simplex events to 48 
hours. As we explained, in recent years the Commission has noticed an 
uptick in simplex outage reports, which suggests that our expectations 
that providers would implement best practices for resolving such events 
when we established the five-day reporting window were not met. Thus, 
in the Notice, we concluded that our proposed 48-hour window would 
ensure that

[[Page 45058]]

providers properly prioritize service maintenance and restoration in 
the event of simplex outages.
    16. Most commenters oppose our proposal to reduce the reporting 
window from five days to 48 hours. Several commenters argue that 
factors such as weather, other hazardous conditions, or the complexity 
of repair tasks could render a 48-hour target unattainable in many 
cases. Other commenters claim that a 48-hour window would unnecessarily 
increase reporting burdens as well as compliance costs without 
corresponding benefits. Some commenters maintain that, rather than 
tighten the window, the Commission should eliminate outage reporting 
for simplex events entirety. And, although Verizon supports the status 
quo, it argues that a three-day threshold would be preferable to a 48-
hour threshold as a way to better accommodate service providers' 
practices and technician maintenance and work schedules.
    17. We conclude that simplex outage reporting remains an important 
part of the situational awareness matrix that NORS provides. The 
Commission has a responsibility to ensure network reliability and 
resiliency, including in major transport facilities designed with a 
built-in path protection. Over the years, we have observed a rise in 
simplex event outage reports as the rule stands now with the five-day 
reporting window, which appears to indicate that providers filing these 
reports are not able to repair the simplex events in a period less than 
five days.
    18. We are persuaded by the record, however, that moving the 
reporting window from five days to 48 hours may not strike the proper 
balance between providers' best practice-driven repair and maintenance 
capabilities and incentives, and the Commission's situational awareness 
needs and network reliability-assurance goals through simplex event 
outage reports. We acknowledge, as some commenters argue, that factors 
such as weather or hazardous conditions impact service repair. We 
cannot, however, ignore that extended simplex events jeopardize service 
reliability.
    19. Accordingly, we adopt a four-day interval for simplex outage 
reports. Further, compliance with this revised interval shall begin no 
later than six (6) months after OMB approval. In this regard, we reject 
proposals by some commenters to maintain the current five-day window, 
which we view as inadequate to incent timely repair, and we reject 
those calls for eliminating simplex reporting altogether. The 
Commission has a responsibility to ensure network reliability and 
resiliency, including in major transport facilities designed with 
built-in path protection, and simplex reporting is a needed and helpful 
tool used to meet this responsibility.
    20. Currently, we require that providers report simplex events 
lasting longer than 5 days; we have not required reports for events 
repaired within five days. A provider may experience a short simplex 
event, conduct necessary repairs within five days and not be obligated 
to report the event under part 4. We no longer believe that our five-
day reporting window for simplex outages is an adequate measurement 
tool to ensure network reliability and resiliency. The four-day 
reporting window that we adopt today is designed to alert the 
Commission to trends that include significant outages, while also 
accommodating Verizon's suggested need for providing a reasonable 
amount of time to address the outages before the reporting threshold is 
met.

B. Wireless Outage Reporting

1. Calculating the Number of Potentially Affected Users in Wireless 
Outages
    21. To determine if a wireless network outage is reportable based 
on meeting the 900,000 user-minute threshold, a wireless service 
provider must calculate the number of users ``potentially affected'' by 
the outage. Pursuant to Sections 4.7(e) and 4.9(e), providers should 
perform the calculation ``by multiplying the simultaneous call capacity 
of the affected equipment by a concentration ratio of 8.'' This call 
capacity measurement is typically undertaken at the mobile switching 
center (MSC). As wireless technologies have evolved, however, providers 
have made different technological and engineering choices, resulting in 
a variety of methods by which they measure simultaneous call capacity. 
These developments have led to a lack of methodological consistency 
among providers in reporting outages. Such inconsistencies compromise 
the Commission's ability to detect and analyze wireless network outage 
trends.
    22. We proposed in the Notice to adopt a more standardized, 
technologically neutral method for calculating the number of users 
``potentially affected'' by a wireless network outage. Under the first 
approach, wireless providers would calculate potentially affected users 
by multiplying the number of disabled cell sites by the average number 
of users the provider serves per site. Under the second approach, 
providers would use the Visitor Location Register (VLR) to determine 
the actual number of users that were being served at each affected cell 
site when the outage commenced.
    23. The majority of commenters support our proposal to adopt a more 
standardized method for wireless providers to calculate the number of 
users ``potentially affected'' by an outage. While ATIS appreciates our 
goal, it does recommend that wireless providers should be allowed to 
pick the method they want to use. CCA opposes the proposal on the basis 
that it would create two separate metrics, one for Public Safety 
Answering Point (PSAP) outages and the other for all other outages, 
which would complicate outage reporting or impose administrative 
burdens on carriers, particularly smaller carriers with limited staff 
support.
    24. The majority of commenters also support adopting the first 
approach to calculating potentially affected users--multiplying the 
number of disabled sites by the average number of users per site. 
Commenters universally oppose the VLR option for determining the number 
of potentially affected users in a wireless outage. Several commenters 
assert the use of the VLR makes the calculation more complex, would 
potentially be costly to implement, and would likely lead to 
potentially inconsistent reporting. Many commenters also point out that 
the VLR is being phased out, as wireless technology advances.
    25. We believe that a more standardized, technologically neutral 
method for calculating the number of ``potentially affected'' users for 
wireless network outages is critically important to ensure consistency 
in reporting across providers, regardless of the technological 
differences in their networks, and that such consistent reporting will 
enhance our situational awareness through more uniform, accurate, and 
reliable NORS data. To accomplish these aims, we adopt the first of our 
proposed approaches: to determine if an outage meets the 900,000 user-
minute threshold, a wireless provider must multiply the number of macro 
cell sites disabled in the outage by the average number of users served 
per site, which is calculated as the total number of users for the 
provider divided by the total number of the provider's macro cell 
sites. For purposes of this calculation, wireless providers should 
include only traditional cell tower deployments, i.e., macro cell 
sites, and not small cell sites (e.g., femto-cells, pico-cells, and 
micro-cells) or other wireless architecture (e.g., Wi-Fi, Distributed 
Antenna Systems).

[[Page 45059]]

Compliance with this revised methodology shall begin no later than nine 
(9) months after the Effective Date of the rules.
    26. We agree with commenters that this approach is simpler than the 
current measurement and can be implemented at little to no additional 
cost. This simplicity of measurement and implementation promotes 
consistent outage reporting that should facilitate accurate analysis of 
the NORS data we receive. Conversely, as several commenters noted, 
using data from the VLR (i.e., the second approach) would be costly to 
implement, less likely to provide consistent data among providers and, 
in any event, would be less useful over time because the VLR itself is 
currently being phased out.
    27. Given that the method we adopt is relatively straight-forward 
for carriers to calculate and will result in uniform, consistent 
reporting, we disagree with ATIS that wireless providers should be 
allowed to pick the method they want to use. Such an approach would 
lead to inconsistent data among providers, thwarting the very goal of 
adopting the new metric. Also, given that we believe, and providers 
tend to agree, that the new method will be easy to implement, we 
disagree with CCA that implementing a new, uniform method for 
calculating the number of ``potentially affected'' users with wireless 
outages would complicate outage reporting or impose administrative 
burdens on carriers, particularly smaller carriers with limited staff 
support. Although we are sympathetic to CCA's concern that wireless 
providers will have to use one calculation for wireless outages 
generally and another for those affecting PSAPs, the scenarios are 
different and warrant different treatment. One calculation ensures the 
Commission has situational awareness of network health holistically, 
while the other provides direct public safety/emergency preparedness 
awareness through 911-specific outage reporting. We intend to monitor 
the need to revisit this reporting scheme based on experience, as small 
cells become capable of covering more capacity.
    28. Finally, we note that Verizon and T-Mobile each propose 
alternatives that depart from using the ``user-minutes'' standard. 
Verizon suggests simply notifying the Commission whenever 30 macro cell 
sites go out in a particular geographic area, such as a Cellular Market 
Area (CMA) or Partial Economic Area (PEA). We believe the approach we 
adopt effectively achieves Verizon's simplicity objectives through per-
cell site reporting, maintaining the user-minute reporting standard 
common across various platforms (wireless, wireline, VoIP, satellite, 
etc.). Moreover, Verizon's threshold of 30 cell sites within a CMA or 
PEA would not cover many--if not most--rural areas. T-Mobile advocates 
allowing carriers to measure outages ``using real-time data where 
technically feasible,'' and when it is not feasible, to use the 
approach we adopt herein. We are concerned that, too often, such data 
will not be available, which will result in only a few carriers 
reporting using this data, resulting in the kind of reporting 
inconsistency we seek to avoid.
2. Calculating the Number of Potentially Affected Wireless Users for 
Wireless Outages Affecting a PSAP
    29. Under our rules, wireless service providers must report any 
outage of at least 30 minutes duration that ``potentially affects'' a 
911 special facility (i.e., PSAP). An outage potentially affects a 911 
special facility whenever, among other things, there is a loss of 
communications to a PSAP potentially affecting at least 900,000 user 
minutes. Shortly after the Commission adopted part 4, Sprint asked for 
clarification of this requirement when a wireless outage affects only 
some of the subtending PSAPs. Specifically, Sprint proposed that 
wireless providers be able to allocate the users covered by the MSC 
equally among the number of subtending PSAPs affected by the outage.
    30. Sprint's proposed method of allocation, however, does not take 
into account the fact that PSAPs vary greatly in the number of users 
served. Therefore, in the Notice we proposed that wireless providers 
can allocate capacity when only one subtending PSAP is affected, but if 
they do, they must do so in reasonable proportion to the size of the 
PSAP in terms of number of users served. As we stated in the Notice, 
this calculation method is consistent with what we observe to be the 
current reporting practice of most providers. Several commenters 
support our proposal to allocate capacity to each subtending PSAP in 
reasonable proportion to its size in terms of number of users served.
    31. We adopt our proposal and allow wireless providers to allocate 
capacity when an outage only affects some PSAPs served by an MSC, so 
long as the allocation is done in reasonable proportion to the size of 
the subtending PSAP(s) in terms of number of users. As noted by the 
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), PSAPs vary greatly in 
size nationwide, and allocating capacity to subtending PSAPs will limit 
reporting to those significant outages that potentially impact public 
safety and for which the rules are intended. In determining the number 
of potentially affected users served by a PSAP, providers can use 
various sources for the data so long as the method they choose provides 
a reasonable estimate of the relative size of the PSAP and can be 
occasionally updated. Reasonable estimates could be based on but are 
not limited to the following sources: the subtending PSAPs' relative 
size determined by using the number of 911 calls sent to the PSAP on a 
historical basis; the number of 911 calls to each PSAP during the 
outage (if available in real time); or the population served by each 
PSAP determined either through subjective data or extrapolated from 
census or other objective data sources that would be relied upon by a 
population statistician. Any of these methods should account for the 
relative size of the PSAP affected by the outage. Compliance with this 
revised allocation standard shall begin no later than nine (9) months 
after the Effective Date of this requirement.
    32. We decline to adopt an across-the-board allocation standard, 
such as Sprint apparently suggests; however, providers may use the 
Sprint allocation approach or an alternate method that provides a 
reasonable estimate of the relative size of the PSAP. Providers must 
inform the Commission, in writing, of the approach they are using via 
the first NORS filing in which they are reporting data based on their 
approach. While Sprint's approach may be simple to calculate, dividing 
simply by the number of subtending PSAPs would not capture the 
significance of the outage. Only by allocating capacity based on the 
size of the PSAP will the estimate reflect an accurate picture of the 
size of the outage. We recognize, as ATIS and CTIA note, PSAP 
boundaries can fluctuate and the number of users allocated to the PSAP 
may change. Based on our experience dealing with PSAPs on a regular 
basis, we do not anticipate that these fluctuations will be significant 
or occur frequently, although the Commission would revisit this issue 
in the future if necessary. So long as the method reasonably captures 
the relative size of PSAPs, the method of allocation will be acceptable 
and, to the extent that it is needed, providers can work with 
Commission staff informally for further guidance.

[[Page 45060]]

C. Call Failures--Reporting on Outages That Significantly Degrade 
Communications to PSAPs

    33. On January 26, 2011, a significant snow and ice storm hit the 
Washington, DC metropolitan area, causing widespread problems for all 
affected counties and cities in a several hundred mile swath from 
central Virginia through Baltimore, Maryland. These problems included 
the failure of roughly 10,000 wireless 911 calls carried over a major 
wireless provider's network to reach PSAPs in Montgomery and Prince 
George's Counties, Maryland. The provider did not report these outages, 
nor the problem(s) that caused them, to either the Commission or to 
affected PSAPs.
    34. Inquiry into the outages revealed the root cause: cascading, 
``wink'' failures of the Centralized Automatic Message Accounting 
(CAMA) trunks used in the provider's 911 network architecture. ``Wink'' 
failures occur when a selective router attempts to deliver a 911 call 
to a PSAP over an idle trunk, but the hand-off protocol between the 
router and the PSAP (the ``wink'') ultimately fails. More specifically, 
this means that the PSAP's customer premises equipment (CPE) fails to 
communicate to the selective router that it is ``off-hook'', i.e., open 
and able to receive ANI and ALI information associated with the 911 
call. This can occur when the CPE fails to recognize quickly enough 
that a 911 caller has disconnected--i.e., that an ``on-hook'' condition 
has become an ``off-hook'' one--and, thus, that that a new 911 call can 
be received (``seized''). The result is a miscommunication that that 
particular trunk is unavailable to receive a call from the 911 
selective router (a ``no-wink'' failure), which then pushes the call to 
the next best available trunk. If a call is re-presented to the 
original trunk that had the no-wink failure (as is common in heavy call 
volume periods) and the same problem occurs (a ``double wink'' 
failure), the 911 selective router will stop attempting to deliver 
calls via that trunk. If a heavy call volume event persists, the 
problem can cascade to all trunks serving a PSAP, leading to reduced, 
or total loss of, call-handling capacity within the trunk groups 
serving a particular PSAP. CAMA trunk arrangements are commonly used in 
legacy wireline network architecture for 911 call delivery, so the 
``wink'' failures during the January 2011 storm are not specific to the 
provider's network trunk arrangements.
    35. In the Notice, the Commission proposed to codify in part 4 how 
to address this situation, and asked commenters to discuss specific 
rules proposed toward that end. Specifically, we sought comment on 
whether to amend Section 4.5(e)(1) to specify when ``degradation of 
communications to a PSAP constitutes a reportable outage'' under part 
4. By doing so, we rejected the notion that PSAP-related outages need 
only be reported ``when a PSAP is rendered unable to receive any 911 
calls for a long enough period to meet the reporting threshold.'' We 
proposed revising Section 4.5(e)(1) to provide that ``any network 
malfunction or higher-level issue that significantly degrades or 
prevents 911 calls from being completed constitutes a `loss of 
communications to PSAP(s),' regardless of whether the PSAP is rendered 
completely unable to receive 911 calls.''
    36. Many public safety, state, and carrier commenters agree that 
the Commission should specify the circumstances under which a ``loss of 
communications'' to PSAPs rises to the level of ``significant 
degradation'' such that it would be reportable under part 4. APCO 
advises that ``knowledge of a significant degradation of service short 
of a complete failure is of high value to PSAPs and emergency 
managers,'' a sentiment echoed by NASNA, which believes that ``it 
should not matter'' whether a PSAP has suffered a complete or only a 
partial loss of ability to receive 911 calls.
    37. Comcast, CenturyLink and XO Communications do not oppose such 
an approach, so long as the Commission (i) does not require reporting 
when re-routing is available for all calls to PSAPs, (ii) requires 
reporting only when an outage that meets the 30 minute/900,000 user 
minutes threshold ``actually'' impacts emergency call handling or 
completion, and (iii) gives providers sufficient lead time to make the 
necessary adjustments to ensure compliance (e.g., through properly 
configuring alarms on trunks, etc.).
    38. On the other hand, wireless providers are largely opposed to 
the proposal to include ``loss of communications'' to PSAPs under 
Section 4.5(e). Sprint opposes the proposed rules on the grounds that 
``CMRS providers do not have visibility into PSAP facilities on the 
PSAP side of the point of demarcation, so CMRS providers would not be 
able to report on whether a PSAP is experiencing an issue that 
significantly degrades or prevents 9-1-1 calls from being completed.'' 
Several providers maintain that part 4 reports should only be required 
where a PSAP is completely unable to receive 911 calls.
    39. Part 4's purpose is to collect information on ``service 
disruptions that could affect homeland security, public health or 
safety.'' To meet this goal, the rules must include the kinds of 911 
call-impacting trunk failures at issue in the January 2011 DC area 
storm. Indeed, subsequent work done by the Commission (and, eventually, 
by industry vis-[agrave]-vis ATIS) to identify, study and develop 
solutions to the CAMA trunk failures is a model of what could--and 
should--have happened under part 4: A ``systematic analysis of the 
conditions that le[d] to [significant communications] degradations 
[that] help[ed] reveal potential solutions.'' The ability to analyze, 
develop solutions, and work with providers to implement those solutions 
enhances public safety.
    40. With respect to 911-related outages, our rules are quantitative 
and qualitative in scope and application, and define reportable outages 
both in terms of total connectivity failure and qualitative failures. 
Consistent with that approach, we adopt the proposal in the Notice to 
specify that a ``loss of communications'' should trigger part 4 
reporting obligations in the same way as a ``network malfunction or 
higher-level issue that significantly degrades or prevents 911 calls 
from being completed to PSAPs.'' We provide that a ``loss of 
communications'' occurs when at least 80 percent of a 911 service 
provider's trunks serving a PSAP (i.e., trunks over which the 911 
service provider has control) become impaired to the point that they 
cannot support 911 call delivery in accordance with the Commission's 
rules, including the information typically delivered with 911 calls. In 
other words, a 911 service provider would not need to report when 80 
percent of its trunks go down if the remaining 20 percent could support 
delivery of 911 calls, including the number and location information, 
but it must report if not all 911 traffic can be re-routed, or if the 
re-routed traffic cannot be delivered without stripping it of number or 
location information. We disagree with Comcast that the Commission must 
further define ``impairment'' of a 911 call for service providers to 
comply with the reporting rules. Moreover, this approach maintains the 
thrust of the rule as currently written: If sufficient re-routing is 
available for all affected 911 calls and no necessary information is 
stripped from those calls, then providers are not required to report to 
the Commission, irrespective of the percentage of available trunk 
capacity.
    41. We find this to be a clear, objective metric about which 911 
service providers would ``become reasonably aware pursuant to normal 
business practices,'' such as the

[[Page 45061]]

installation and monitoring of trunk alarms. We do not intend to list, 
define, or otherwise impose particular compliance solutions for 
providers, consistent with the Commission's long-standing practice of 
deferring to network service providers in the design and engineering of 
their networks. Trunk alarms are already ubiquitous as a network 
reliability ``best practice,'' and would presumably enable providers to 
determine when the 80 percent threshold is approaching or is reached in 
a given event. We acknowledge Sprint and Verizon's comments about 
needing visibility into trunks to know when a ``loss in 
communications'' occurs, but we note that this rule applies to 911 
service providers, which, by definition, do have visibility into such 
trunks. We also believe that this metric strikes a fair balance between 
proposals from the public safety community who believe the bar should 
be set as low as possible and include even non-critical outages, and 
911 service providers who want only to report in instances of complete 
911 call failure across all trunks (which would not include the January 
2011 incident described above).
    42. We also agree with CenturyLink that an 80 percent threshold 
will not be overly burdensome so long as providers are given the lead 
time necessary to manage the costs of solution development and 
implementation needed for their particular networks. To allow time for 
compliance with other 911-related Commission requirements, CenturyLink 
initially proposed a one-year implementation deadline for this 
requirement. We recognize that some providers will be able to move 
faster and achieve compliance well before one year, given present or 
scheduled investments in necessary facilities, but others will need 
more time to comply with the requirements. Further, we note that 
providers have had ample time to comply with the requirements 
underlying CenturyLink's concern, but we nevertheless feel a one-year 
implementation timeframe is appropriate to allow flexibility for 
smaller carriers. Thus, because it does not interfere with other part 4 
reporting requirements, we find that a one-year implementation 
timeframe should be sufficient for both small and large providers to 
achieve compliance, and incorporate that timeframe into our rules. 
Accordingly, compliance with this revised metric shall begin no later 
than one year after OMB approval.
    43. Finally, we disagree with CTIA's argument that our concerns are 
``speculative'': The 10,000 911 call failures associated with the 
January 2011 DC area storm had a significant real world impact but was 
nevertheless deemed non-reportable by a licensee. Nor do we believe our 
proposals are ``unworkable'': 911 service providers should reasonably 
be expected to have adequate visibility into PSAP trunk failure.

D. Special Offices and Facilities

1. Identifying Special Offices and Facilities
    44. A major underlying goal of outage reporting generally, and for 
reporting on ``special offices and facilities'' in particular, is for 
the Federal government--including Federal government users--to have 
situational awareness of events that impact homeland security and the 
nation's economic well-being. When the Commission adopted rules in 
2004, the Commission deferred to the National Communications System 
(NCS) to determine which facilities would be considered major military 
installations or key government facilities, and would, under certain 
conditions, report ``mission-affecting outages'' to the NCS. The NCS 
would in turn forward reports of those outages to the Commission. 
However, the NCS was dissolved in 2012. Accordingly, in the Notice, the 
Commission sought comment on how it should thereafter identify 
``special offices and facilities'' for part 4.
    45. We note that reporting requirements applicable to ``special 
offices and facilities'' have been an integral part of part 4 since the 
rules' adoption in 2004. As it relates to covered airports, the rules 
stated that all outages lasting 30 minutes or longer that ``potentially 
affect communications'' must be reported, and that ``mission-affecting 
outages'' to certain government facilities and military installations 
(as determined by NCS) also were covered by part 4.
    46. We proposed to classify as ``special offices and facilities'' 
those facilities enrolled in or eligible for the Telecommunications 
Service Priority (TSP) Program, which prioritizes the restoration and 
provisioning of circuits used by entities with National Security/
Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) responsibilities and duties. We also 
asked whether there were alternative classification frameworks that 
would be more suitable, including broadening the scope of the 
definition of ``special offices and facilities'' to include those 
facilities that are guaranteed priority restoration under ``TSP-like'' 
provisions in service-level agreements. We concluded by requesting 
comment on our assumption that redefining the term ``special offices 
and facilities'' to include some variant of TSP-enrolled and/or-
eligible facilities would not have an appreciable cost impact.
    47. Comments on our ``special offices and facilities'' 
classification proposal range from a call to eliminate reporting all 
together, to multiple alternatives for identifying the subject 
facilities. Most commenters who oppose the special facilities reporting 
proposal (to include all TSP enrollees and eligible participants) feel 
that it would subject too many entities to the rules, without a 
corresponding increase in public safety or situational awareness; would 
needlessly divert a provider's resources to tracking down and tagging 
circuits; and would require providers to identify tens of thousands of 
new, potentially TSP-eligible parties.
    48. Many commenters express support for our proposal so long as the 
Commission limits applicability of the rules to entities that are (1) 
enrolled in the TSP program, and (2) only those designated at the 
highest TSP priority levels (i.e., Levels 1 and 2). In its comments, 
Comcast suggests that the Commission include, in any new or amended 
rule, only those TSP participants that constitute ``major military 
installations'' or ``key government facilities'' as ``special offices 
and facilities:''

For the most part, such entities will be those enrolled in TSP 
priority Level 1 or Level 2. Extending the definition to all 
entities that are enrolled in the TSP program, irrespective of 
priority level, would flood the Commission with reports related to 
outages that do not actually impact a ``special office or 
facility.'' Although such offices and facilities unquestionably are 
important and should be part of the TSP program, reporting outages 
that affect such facilities, rather than ``major military 
installations'' or ``key government facilities,'' risks obfuscating 
truly critical outages.

    49. As a preliminary matter, we reject comments suggesting the 
``special offices and facilities'' reporting rule itself is outdated 
and ought to be eliminated altogether. Under the rules that have been 
in place since 2004, neither the NCS nor its member agencies appear to 
have followed the applicable portions of Sections 4.5 (on self-
identification as a ``special office or facility'') and 4.13 (on member 
agencies reporting qualifying outages to the NCS, and NCS using its 
discretion to forward those outage reports to the Commission), so that 
previous ``special offices and facilities'' formula did not work as the 
Commission intended. We do not believe, however, that this fact in and 
of itself signifies that reporting outages at special offices and 
facilities is

[[Page 45062]]

not useful. Rather, we should fix the rule, not eliminate it, to 
facilitate its original goals. Reporting on ``special offices and 
facilities'' (as amended) is an important component in our efforts to 
promote public safety.
    50. Today, we characterize ``special offices and facilities'' as 
those enrolled in Levels 1 or 2 of the TSP program. To close the 
significant reporting gap on special offices and facilities, we 
proposed initially to classify all facilities enrolled in, or eligible 
for, the TSP program as ``special offices and facilities'' for part 4 
reporting purposes. As we observed in the Notice, the TSP program 
prioritizes the restoration and provisioning of circuits used by 
entities with NS/EP responsibilities and duties and comprises five 
priority levels, with Levels 1 and 2 reserved for critical national 
security and military communications and the remaining levels dedicated 
to the protection of public safety and health and the continued 
functioning of the economy. As the Bureau previously has noted, 
``[v]ery few circuits receive a TSP priority Level 1 or Level 2 
assignment.'' Compliance with this requirement shall begin no later 
than eighteen (18) months after OMB approval.
    51. We believe that outages affecting highest-priority TSP 
enrollees (i.e., Levels 1 and 2) are the types of outages for which we 
must have situational awareness; the communication security of TSP 
enrollees affects our nation's security leadership and posture, its 
public safety and public health, and our national economic system, and 
the Commission must be aware of any trends, through NORS analysis, that 
relate to certain TSP enrollees. As commenters note, were we to adopt a 
formula to cover all entities that were either enrolled or eligible to 
be enrolled in the TSP program, the number of reportable events would 
overwhelm both the covered parties and available Commission resources, 
with no concomitant increase in public safety or national security. 
Even to include parties that are enrolled at all priority levels in the 
program would have posed significant challenges. Thus, we believe 
limiting coverage to only Levels 1 and 2 strikes an appropriate balance 
between the untenable position of eliminating any rules applicable to 
``special offices and facilities,'' and extending the rules to all 
entities that are enrolled or eligible to be enrolled in the TSP 
program at any of the five priority levels, which we concede could 
incur a significant cost for a minimal benefit. We find that limiting 
our rule to Levels 1 and 2 will not present widespread technical, 
administrative, or financial burdens to covered parties.
2. Section 4.13
    52. Section 4.13 directs special offices and facilities to report 
outages to the now-dissolved NCS, which could then forward the reported 
information to the Commission at its discretion. Because our rules 
separately impose requirements on communications providers to report 
outages that potentially affect ``special offices and facilities,'' and 
in light of the elimination of the NCS, we proposed deleting Section 
4.13 ``as redundant with respect to information that providers are 
already required to supply, and obsolete with respect to obligations 
regarding the NCS.''
    53. We agree with commenters that we should remove Section 4.13 
from our rules as redundant of other provisions within part 4, and 
accordingly will delete it. While supporting elimination of Section 
4.13, AT&T added that we should incorporate elsewhere in the rules a 
requirement that ``affected facilities'' initiate contact with the 
communications provider about the disruption in service. We decline to 
adopt AT&T's proposal, finding it would unnecessarily preclude 
alternative methods that providers may use to receive information about 
outages without corresponding benefit.
3. Airport Reporting Requirements
    54. Airports included in the Federal Aviation Administration's 
(FAA) National Plan of Integrated Airports Systems (NPIAS) are 
designated as falling into one of four categories: Primary commercial 
service (PR), non-primary commercial service (CM), reliever (RL), and 
general aviation (GA). Currently, airports designated as PR, CM, and RL 
are defined as ``special offices and facilities'' for purposes of 
Section 4.5(b) of the Commission's rules, and so are subject to outage 
reporting requirements set forth in Sections 4.11 and 4.13 of the 
Commission's rules that do not apply to outages affecting other kinds 
of facilities.
    55. In the Notice, we proposed two significant changes to our 
reporting requirements for outages that affect airport communications. 
First, we proposed amending Section 4.5(b)'s definition of the types of 
airports considered as ``special offices and facilities,'' to narrow 
its focus to airports designated as PR. Second, we proposed to clarify 
that reportable outages are those that impact ``critical 
communications'' at those airports.
    56. Regarding narrowing the scope of airports to only those 
designated ``PR,'' we noted that most reports concerned outages not 
significant enough to pose a substantial threat to public safety, 
particularly at smaller regional airports, and thus we sought comment 
on amending the definition of ``special offices and facilities'' to 
exclude all airports other than those designated ``primary commercial 
service'' airports (i.e., the nation's most heavily trafficked 
airports, where even minor degradations in critical communications can 
pose grave threats to public safety and national security) in the 
NPIAS.
    57. With respect to our proposal to clarify that only outages that 
potentially affect critical communications at an airport should be 
reported, we sought comment on defining the phrase ``critical 
communications.'' From 1994 through 2004, under 47 CFR 63.100(a)(6), 
the Commission defined outages affecting ``critical communications'' at 
airports. We also noted that, were we to clarify that our intent was to 
receive reports only of outages that affected critical communications 
at airports, then few (if any) outages at an airport would rise to the 
threshold of being reportable, which in turn would represent an 
affirmative cost savings to communications providers.
    58. In 2004, the Commission proposed to incorporate, but ultimately 
did not adopt, the Part 63 definition of an outage that ``potentially 
affects'' an airport:

    (i) Disrupts 50 percent or more of the air traffic control links 
or other FAA communications links to any airport; or
    (ii) has caused an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) or 
airport to lose its radar; or
    (iii) causes a loss of both primary and backup facilities at any 
ARTCC or airport; or
    (iv) affects an ARTCC or airport that is deemed important by the 
FAA as indicated by FAA inquiry to the provider's management 
personnel; or
    (v) has affected any ARTCC or airport and that has received any 
media attention of which the communications provider's reporting 
personnel are aware.

    59. Most commenters agree that we should adopt the proposal in the 
Notice to narrow the scope of airports to only those designated PR in 
NPIAS. On the issue of the types of communication outages that would be 
reportable, commenters agree that only outages that potentially affect 
critical communications at an airport should be considered, but raised 
some concerns. CenturyLink, for example, notes that while it generally 
supports the proposal to clarify what constitutes ``critical

[[Page 45063]]

communications,'' ``there is some question on the details of the NPRM's 
proposal to define what outages potentially affect an airport and would 
be reportable,'' believing the 2004 Part 4 NPRM definition was not 
sufficiently clear on how providers would be able to assess when 50 
percent of an airport's air traffic control links are disrupted, along 
with vagueness on how providers would be notified of airports ``deemed 
important'' by the FAA.
    60. On whether to narrow the scope of airports covered by our 
rules, we agree that the rule as currently written is unnecessarily 
broad. The airport-originating reports received by the Commission in 
recent years have generally related to outages within the retail 
sections of an airport. We agree with commenters that requiring 
providers to report these outages represents a substantial financial 
and administrative burden on those providers. Moreover, we do not 
believe that eliminating communications outage reporting from non-
primary commercial service and reliever airports will negatively impact 
the safe operation of our nation's airports and air travel system. We 
therefore amend Section 4.5(b) to limit the requirement of reporting 
outages that ``potentially affect'' an airport to only those determined 
by the FAA to provide primary commercial service.
    61. On the issue of limiting the type of communications subject to 
this rule, we clarify that our concern is only with outages that 
potentially affect critical communications at covered airports. We note 
that the Commission first adopted the ``five-point'' definition in 
1994, to provide clarity and thoroughness in reporting, as 47 CFR 
63.100(a)(6), although it did not apply this definition in 47 CFR part 
4.5(c). In the Notice, we posited that, even though the Commission 
refrained from adopting it in 2004, the definition from former rule 47 
CFR 63.100(a)(6) would be appropriate to make clear that for reporting 
purposes, only outages that impact critical communications at an 
airport are of concern. We find that the concerns raised by CenturyLink 
about ambiguity in the definition from the 2004 Part 4 Notice are 
unfounded. Regarding CenturyLink's concern about a provider's ability 
to ascertain when 50 percent of an airport's control links are 
disrupted, we conclude that providers have sufficient ability to 
quantify outages at this level, which is a rational expectation of a 
provider's network monitoring practices and capability. Thus, the 
definition the Commission adopted in 1994 in part 63, used through 
2004, and proposed to incorporate into Part 4 in 2004, and does 
incorporate here, provides necessary and sufficient clarity. We note 
that Section 63.100(a)(6) had long been in force and that carriers 
should already be familiar with this definition. For example, we note 
Sprint's 2004 petition for reconsideration requesting that the 
Commission, inter alia, require reporting only in those scenarios 
defined by the ``previous outage reporting rules, see 47 CFR 
63.100(a)(6).'' Regarding CenturyLink's concern regarding whether an 
airport has been deemed ``important'' by the FAA, we believe our 
narrowing the scope of airports covered by our rules resolves this 
issue, adding only that providers that serve airports must make 
themselves aware of the category of those airports (i.e., we do not 
anticipate or expect the airport itself to notify providers as to the 
airport's FAA classification).
    62. We note that commercial aviation is increasingly dependent on 
information systems that are not collocated with airport facilities and 
invite comment in the related Further Notice as to whether non-airport 
critical aviation information facilities should be eligible for outage 
reporting perhaps as enrollees in the previously mentioned TSP Levels 3 
and 4.
4. Reporting Obligations of Satellite and Terrestrial Wireless Service 
Providers as to ``Special Offices and Facilities''
    63. In 2004, the Commission determined that because the critical 
communications infrastructure serving airports is landline-based, 
satellite and terrestrial wireless communications providers were exempt 
from reporting outages potentially affecting airports. CTIA, Cingular 
Wireless and Sprint each filed petitions arguing that wireless 
providers should be exempt from reporting outages pertaining to all 
other ``special offices and facilities,'' on the grounds that the 
rationale for excluding wireless carriers from outage reporting for 
airports applies equally to all special offices and facilities, that 
is, that wireless carriers lacked dedicated access lines to all special 
offices and facilities. In the Notice, we asked whether, in spite of 
the continued growth in the use of wireless networks, we should extend 
the satellite and terrestrial wireless exemption to all ``special 
offices and facilities.''
    64. Commenters on this issue all agree that the current exemption 
afforded satellite and terrestrial wireless providers with respect to 
airports ought to be retained, and that such providers further should 
be exempt from reporting outages potentially affecting all special 
offices and facilities. Sprint supports extending the wireless 
providers' exemption to all special offices and facilities, arguing 
that, as with airports, ``the communications infrastructure serving 
other special offices and facilities remain primarily `landline based,' 
'' and that unless a wireless carrier provides a dedicated access line 
to a special office or facility, it has no way of knowing whether one 
of its phones was being used by personnel at such office or facility.
    65. Although wireless service has become ubiquitous in many 
respects throughout the United States, we have not observed special 
offices and facilities adopting such service for their critical 
communications, and otherwise abandoning wireline-based communications. 
As CTIA points out, the Department of Defense (DoD) commented in our 
Technology Transitions proceeding that DoD and federal executive 
agencies continue to rely heavily on wireline TDM-based networks and 
services and would do so for the foreseeable future. We will, 
therefore, continue to exempt satellite and terrestrial wireless 
providers from reporting outages potentially affecting airports, and 
will extend that exemption to all special offices and facilities. To 
the extent our decision today responds affirmatively to the requests of 
CTIA, Cingular, and Sprint to exempt wireless carriers from being 
required to report outages potentially affecting all special offices 
and facilities, we grant their petitions.

E. Information Sharing

    66. Section 4.2 of our rules provides that reports filed in NORS 
are presumed confidential, and thus withheld from routine public 
inspection. This presumption recognizes both the ``likelihood of 
substantial competitive harm from disclosure of information in outage 
reports'' and the Commission's concern that ``the national defense and 
public safety goals that we seek to achieve by requiring these outage 
reports would be seriously undermined if we were to permit these 
reports to fall into the hands of terrorists who seek to cripple the 
nation's communications infrastructure.'' The Commission routinely 
shares NORS reports with the Office of Emergency Communications at the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which may ``provide information 
from those reports to such other governmental authorities as it may 
deem to be appropriate,'' but the Commission does not share NORS 
information directly with state governments. In 2009, the CPUC filed a 
petition requesting that the Commission amend

[[Page 45064]]

its rules to permit state agencies to directly access the NORS 
database.
    67. The Notice proposed to grant state governments ``read-only 
access to those portions of the NORS database that pertain to 
communications outages in their respective states,'' conditioned on a 
certification that each state ``will keep the data confidential and 
that it has in place confidentiality protections at least equivalent to 
those set forth in the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).'' The 
Commission sought comment on this proposal, as well as whether states' 
use of NORS data should be restricted to activities relating to its 
``traditional role of protecting public health and safety'' and, if so, 
what activities such a role would encompass. In addition, the 
Commission sough comment on whether information collected under part 4 
should be shared directly with the National Coordinating Center for 
Communications (NCC), a government-industry initiative led by DHS 
representing 24 federal agencies and more than 50 private-sector 
communications and information technology companies.
    68. Commenters generally support providing state and federal 
officials with direct access to NORS, as long as there are sufficient 
security and confidentiality protections to prevent disclosure to 
competitors or hostile parties. The National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners, for example, notes that it unanimously adopted a 
resolution in support of the CPUC Petition, adding that ``[w]hile 
California filed the Petition on its own behalf, and some States do 
receive certain outage information directly from carriers, all States 
share the need for immediate, secure and confidential access to the 
service outage detail provided in NORS.''
    69. Commenters disagree, however, on many of the details of 
implementation for sharing information with state entities, including 
the nature and extent of confidentiality measures and whether the 
Commission should attach conditions to the use of information obtained 
from NORS. Service providers argue for a broad range of conditions such 
as: Limitations on the number and job description of state personnel 
with access to NORS; security training or nondisclosure agreements for 
such personnel; data breach notifications to the Commission, to 
affected service providers, or to both; tracking or auditing of states' 
use of NORS information; and loss of access or other penalties for 
states that fail to maintain confidentiality. Industry commenters also 
question whether a certification of confidentiality protections ``at 
least equivalent to FOIA'' would be an effective safeguard in light of 
variations in state open records laws and the tendency of some state 
courts to construe such laws in favor of disclosure. Consequently, 
several commenters urge the Commission to explore mechanisms other than 
FOIA and its state equivalents as a basis for stronger legal 
protections for NORS data.
    70. Some commenters urge the Commission to preempt state open 
records laws to the extent they could allow disclosure of NORS 
information, while others suggest ``a rule with language similar to the 
statutory language that Congress enacted to govern a federal agency's 
sharing of homeland security information with a state government.'' 
Commenters point to several other contexts in which the Commission has 
shared information on a confidential basis with state counterparts, 
such as the existing processes for sharing state-specific Form 477 data 
on broadband subscribership and numbering resources from the North 
American Numbering Plan Administration. But the record also reflects 
concerns that these models may be inadequate to provide states with 
real-time access to NORS data or to provide state-specific data on 
outages affecting multiple states. Intrado further suggests that outage 
information could not realistically be shared with states on a 
confidential basis without an extensive redesign of the NORS database 
and associated form fields.
    71. States and service providers also dispute whether use of NORS 
data should be limited to the states' ``traditional role of protecting 
public health and safety,'' a phrase that first appeared in the CPUC 
Petition but here receives support from industry commenters as a 
condition on states' access to NORS. AT&T, for example, comments that 
``the Commission should restrict state commissions' use of the NORS 
data to evaluating the cause of outages to monitor communications 
network functionality within a state.'' State governments generally 
agree that they should only receive information on outages within their 
geographic boundaries but oppose other limitations on their use of NORS 
data. Michigan, for example, asserts that ``[r]estricting the 
information that states can access regarding service outages would 
obscure the true picture of the providers' services . . . rendering the 
reporting--and any conclusions drawn thereon--incomplete.''
    72. Commenters also disagree on the extent to which direct access 
to NORS data should replace state-level outage reporting requirements. 
Without routine access to NORS data, many states independently require 
communications providers to file network outage reports with their 
public utility commissions or similar agencies. Industry commenters 
argue that ``sharing appropriate data with state agencies could 
minimize the burden on providers for filing multiple reports given that 
the content of some state outage reporting overlaps with Part 4 
reporting,'' but also that ``the Commission should condition a state's 
access to NORS data on the state's waiver or elimination of any 
independent outage reporting requirement imposed by state law.'' 
Intrado further contends that ``[d]ual reporting is unnecessary, unduly 
expensive and inappropriate,'' and that ``[n]ot every state needs 
access to NORS.'' State commissions tend to disagree, generally arguing 
that states should remain free to adopt their own independent 
requirements.
    73. The record reflects broad agreement that state and federal 
partners would benefit from more direct access to NORS data, and we 
conclude that such a process would serve the public interest if 
implemented with appropriate and sufficient safeguards. But, with 
competitively sensitive information and critical communications 
infrastructure at stake, we also conclude that this process requires 
more careful consideration of details that may determine the long-term 
success and effectiveness of the NORS program. Accordingly, while we 
agree that other FCC processes may be helpful models in developing 
appropriate procedures for sharing NORS data, we are not persuaded that 
existing processes for information sharing can be replicated in the 
context of NORS without important refinements.
    74. In light of the significant security and confidentiality 
concerns described above, as well as federalism concerns that may be 
inherent in any national coordination of outage reporting requirements, 
we find that the Commission's part 4 information sharing proposals 
raise a number of complex issues that warrant further consideration. We 
seek comment in the related Further Notice with respect to how NORS 
data from broadband providers could be properly shared with state and 
federal entities other than DHS, including instances where state law 
may prohibit information sharing. Furthermore, to assist the Commission 
in addressing these issues, we direct the Bureau to study these issues, 
and develop proposals for the Commission consideration regarding how 
NORS

[[Page 45065]]

filings and information collected from all part 4 providers could be 
shared in real time with state commissions, with other federal 
partners, and with the NCC, keeping in mind current information sharing 
privileges granted to DHS.

F. Cost-Benefit Analysis

    In the Notice we provided estimates of the annual industry-wide 
cost of adoption of the proposed rules. In total, we estimated that 
industry-wide reporting costs would fall by $307,520 due to a net 
decrease of 1,922 reports per year. While several commenters argued 
that our per-report cost estimates were too low, only AT&T provided a 
revised quantitative estimate. AT&T argued that it spends approximately 
twelve hours to prepare and file outage reports, in contrast to our 
estimate of two hours. Although we are not convinced that twelve hours 
are necessary, we note that using AT&T's figure, the resulting decrease 
in costs would be six times our estimate, or $1,845,120. In either 
case, we conclude that the rule changes adopted in this Report and 
Order will have the overall effect of reducing reporting costs.
    75. As to benefits, our part 4 rules enhancements will ensure the 
Commission receives the appropriate type and quality of outage and 
operational status information to allow us to continue to fulfill our 
statutory obligation to promote ``safety of life and property'' by 
protecting the nation's communications networks. The current part 4 
outage reporting rules played a significant and well-documented role in 
the Commission's successful efforts to promote more reliable and 
resilient communications networks. The Commission's receipt of data on 
major transport facility outages, wireless outages, outages that 
significantly degrade communications to PSAPs, and outages affecting 
special offices and facilities will enable it to adapt this established 
practice to a wider cross-section of the critical communication 
infrastructure.
    76. We further believe that the benefits of the adopted rules will 
substantially exceed the minimal costs expected to be imposed by some 
of these rules, and we expect that the combined effect of all these 
rules will be to reduce the costs imposed on affected parties. Outage 
reporting provides the Commission with critical data on communications 
reliability that it has no means of gathering on a consistent and 
reliable basis from any other source. Absent these rules, the 
Commission lacks adequate visibility into the reliability of major 
transport facilities and wireless communications infrastructure, and 
has inadequate visibility into degradations of special offices and 
facilities as well as communications to PSAPs. This lack of visibility 
hinders the Commission's ability to discharge its public safety 
responsibilities. The data gathered by these outage reports will permit 
Commission staff, working closely with providers and industry working 
groups, to identify and address systemic vulnerabilities. Such 
collaborative efforts have led to measurable improvements in network 
reliability and resiliency, and to the formulation of policies to 
promote more reliable and secure communications. Moreover, outage 
reports, particularly in the early stages of a communications 
disruption, provide critical situational awareness to the Commission 
that enable it to participate effectively in emergency response and 
service restoration efforts.

II. Order on Reconsideration

A. Airport Reporting Requirements

    77. In January 2005, in response to the 2004 Part 4 Order, Sprint 
filed a petition requesting that, among other issues, the Commission 
``clarify that wireline carriers are only required to report outages 
affecting airports when such outages `disrupt[ ] 50% or more of the air 
traffic control lines or other FAA communications links' as was the 
case under the previous outage reporting rules, see 47 CFR 
63.100(a)(6).'' Sprint argues that in adopting the new part 4 rules, 
``[t]he Commission did not mention, let alone justify, doing away with 
the Section 63.100(a)(6) limitation that carriers report only outages 
affecting the critical communications facilities serving airports'' and 
urges the Commission ``to clarify that it had no intention of removing 
the Section 63.100(a)(6) language from Part 4 that limits reporting of 
airport outages to disruptions in communications being carried over 
critical infrastructure serving such airports, i.e., air traffic 
control or other FAA communications links[,] and to restore such 
language to Section 4.5 of the rules.''
    78. As noted above, reports in this category generally have 
involved communications outages within the retail sections of an 
airport. A strict interpretation of current Section 4.5(c)--i.e. that 
``[a]ll outages that potentially affect communications for at least 30 
minutes with any airport that qualifies as a `special office and 
facility' . . . shall be reported,''--would have required providers to 
report outages that were not mission-critical, and which could 
represent a financial and administrative burden on those providers, 
with virtually no public safety benefit or public policy goal. 
Therefore, we amend Section 4.5(c) to clarify that carriers need only 
report disruptions of critical communications, which impact the 
airports covered by our rules. To the extent our decision today 
responds affirmatively to Sprint's request, we grant its request for 
clarification, which will be reflected in our ordering clause.

B. Reporting Obligations of Satellite and Terrestrial Wireless Service 
Providers

    79. In 2004, the Commission exempted satellite and terrestrial 
wireless communications providers from reporting outages potentially 
affecting airports, on the grounds that the critical communications 
infrastructure serving those airports was landline-based. CTIA, 
Cingular Wireless, and Sprint filed petitions urging the Commission to 
exempt wireless providers from reporting outages pertaining to all 
other special offices and facilities, positing that the rationale for 
excluding wireless carriers from outage reporting for airports, i.e., 
that critical communications were landline-based, applied as well to 
all special offices and facilities. In the 2015 Part 4 Notice, we asked 
whether, in spite of the continued growth in the use of wireless 
networks, we should extend the satellite and terrestrial wireless 
exemption to all ``special offices and facilities.'' CTIA and Sprint 
again urged that the exemption be extended. CTIA notes that, today as 
in 2004, wireless networks provide undifferentiated service to all end 
users, even with the growth of wireless telephone in the past decade. 
As a matter of practice, wireless providers do not assign dedicated 
access lines to specific end users, and therefore do not have dedicated 
access lines for the critical portions of any of the special offices 
and facilities. Sprint argues that, as with airports, the 
communications infrastructure serving all special offices and 
facilities remains primarily landline-based, and that unless a wireless 
carrier provides a dedicated access line to a special office or 
facility, it has no way of knowing whether one of its phones is being 
used by personnel at such an office or facility.
    80. As previously noted, we will extend the wireless exemption for 
satellite and terrestrial wireless carriers to all special offices and 
facilities. To the extent our decision today responds affirmatively to 
the requests of CTIA, Cingular, and Sprint to exempt wireless carriers 
from being required to report outages potentially affecting all special 
offices and facilities, we grant their

[[Page 45066]]

requests, which will be reflected in our ordering clause.

III. Procedural Matters

A. Accessible Formats

    81. To request materials in accessible formats for people with 
disabilities (braille, large print, electronic files, audio format), 
send an email to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer & Governmental 
Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

B. Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995

    82. The Report and Order contains new or modified information 
collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 
(PRA), Public Law 104-13. It will be submitted to the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Section 3507(d) of the 
PRA. OMB, the general public, and other Federal agencies will be 
invited to comment on the new or modified information collection 
requirements contained in this proceeding. In addition, we note that 
pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 
107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought specific 
comment on how the Commission might further reduce the information 
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 
employees. In this Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, we 
have assessed the effects of updates to the part 4 outage reporting 
rules, and find that these updates does not have significant effects on 
business with fewer than 25 employees.

IV. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    83. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as 
amended (RFA), an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was 
incorporated in the Amendments to Part 4 of the Commission's Rules 
Concerning Disruptions to Communications; New Part 4 of the 
Commission's Rules Concerning Disruptions to Communications, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, Second Report and Order, and Order on 
Reconsideration. The Commission sought written public comment on the 
proposals in the Notice, including comment on the IRFA. No comments 
were received. This present Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(FRFA) conforms to the RFA.

A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Report and Order and Order on 
Reconsideration

    84. In this Report and Order, we take specific steps to improve our 
current part 4 rules by adopting various proposals made in a Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (Notice) adopted in 2015. These specific amendments 
stem from our experience with outage reporting over the past ten years, 
and will enhance the information we receive on outages for services 
already covered in part 4. In this Report and Order, we adopt the 
following changes to our part 4 outage reporting rules:
     Update the reporting metric and threshold for 
communication disruptions impacting major transport facilities from a 
DS3-based to OC3-based standard, and reduce the reporting window for 
simplex events (transmission line disruptions) from five days to four 
days;
     update the reporting of wireless outages by adopting a 
standardized method to calculate the number of users ``potentially 
affected'' in an outage, and clarify that, when an outage affects only 
some 911 calling centers, or PSAPs, served by a mobile switching 
center, wireless providers may utilize their own identifiable scheme to 
allocate the number of potentially affected users so long as the 
allocation reflects the relative size of the affected PSAP(s);
     find that a ``loss of communications'' to a PSAP occurs 
when there is a network malfunction or higher-level issue that 
significantly degrades or prevents 911 calls from being completed to 
PSAPs, including when 80 percent or more of a provider's trunks serving 
a PSAP become disabled;
     update the rules regarding reporting of outages affecting 
``special offices and facilities'' by (i) extending the reporting 
obligation to high-level enrollees in the Telecommunications Service 
Priority program, (ii) eliminating outdated and non-applicable rules, 
(iii) narrowing the types of airports that are considered ``special 
offices and facilities,'' and (iv) limiting outage reporting from 
airports to critical communications only; and
     conclude that direct access to NORS by our state and 
federal partners is in the public interest, but determine that further 
consideration is warranted to ensure that the process includes adequate 
safeguards to maintain the security and confidentiality of sensitive 
information, and accordingly direct the Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau (Bureau) to study these issues and develop 
recommendations for the successful implementation of our information-
sharing proposals.
    85. The Order on Reconsideration limits outage reporting for events 
affecting airports to those outages that impact airport critical 
communications, and exempts satellite and terrestrial wireless carriers 
from reporting outages affecting all ``special offices and 
facilities,'' extending the exemption previously limited to airports.

B. Legal Basis

    86. The legal bases for the rule changes adopted in this Report and 
Order are contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 251(e)(3), 254, 
301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-
1, and 615c of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 
706 of the Communications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 
251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 
332, 403, 615a-1, 615c, and 1302.

C. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in Response 
to the IRFA

    87. The IRFA solicited comment on the impact of the proposed rules 
to small businesses, as required by the RFA. While no comments were 
submitted specifically in response to the IRFA, a few commenters 
express concerns about the estimated costs for reporting. NTCA urges 
the Commission to consider small rural service providers and their 
unique circumstances. Other commenters argue that we underestimate the 
time burdens associated with filing NORS reports. We maintain that the 
reports cost an estimated $160 to file, and that other costs associated 
with ``setting up and implementing a monitoring regime'' are routine 
business costs independent of our reporting requirements.

D. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which 
Rules Will Apply

    88. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, 
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may 
be affected by rules such as those adopted herein. The RFA generally 
defines the term ``small entity'' the same as the terms ``small 
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental 
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same 
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business 
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently 
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and 
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA).
    89. Our action may, over time, affect small entities that are not 
easily categorized at present. We therefore describe here, at the 
outset, three comprehensive, statutory small entity size standards. 
First, nationwide, there

[[Page 45067]]

are a total of approximately 28.2 million small businesses, according 
to the SBA. In addition, a ``small organization'' is generally ``any 
not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned and operated and 
is not dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of 2007, there were 
approximately 1,621,315 small organizations. Finally, the term ``small 
governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as ``governments of 
cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special 
districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.'' Census 
Bureau data for 2011 indicate that there were 89,476 local governmental 
jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of this total, as 
many as 88,506 entities may qualify as ``small governmental 
jurisdictions.'' Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions 
are small. We believe that the Report and Order and Order on 
Reconsideration may affect the following small entities, as further 
discussed in the document, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-63A1.pdf: (1) Wireline providers, including 
incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (incumbent LECs); and interexchange 
carriers; (2) Wireless Providers-Fixed and Mobile, including wireless 
telecommunications carriers (except satellite); (3) Satellite Service 
Providers, including satellite telecommunications providers and all 
telecommunications providers; (4) Cable Service Providers, including 
cable companies and systems and cable system operators; and (5) All 
Other Telecommunications.

E. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other 
Compliance Requirements for Small Entities

    90. The rules adopted in the Report and Order and Order on 
Reconsideration require telecommunications providers to report those 
outages that meet specified NORS outage reporting threshold criteria, 
now determined by a variety of factors, including the number of end 
users potentially affected by the outage and the duration of the 
outage. Providers must now comply with an updated OC3 metric for major 
transport facilities; adjust calculations for determining when there 
has been a ``loss of communications'' such that reporting is required; 
and report outages affecting as Level 1 and 2 enrollees of the 
Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP) program as ``special offices 
and facilities.'' The document, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-63A1.pdf, discusses the requirements in full.

F. Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small 
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered

    91. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant 
alternatives that it has considered in developing its approach, which 
may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) The 
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or 
timetables that take into account the resources available to small 
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of 
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small 
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and 
(4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for 
such small entities.''
    92. The new and updated reporting requirements are minimally 
necessary to assure that we receive adequate information to perform our 
statutory responsibilities with respect to the reliability of 
telecommunications and their infrastructures. The Commission considered 
other possible proposals and sought comment on the reporting thresholds 
and the analysis presented. Ultimately, we believe that outage 
reporting triggers are set sufficiently high as to make it unlikely 
that small businesses would be impacted significantly by the final 
rules. In fact, we anticipate that in many instances, small businesses 
will find their burden decreased by the new reporting thresholds. In 
the Commission's experience administering NORS, small companies only 
rarely experience outages that meet the NORS outage reporting threshold 
criteria, and we expect that small companies will only be slightly 
impacted by our rule changes adopted today. Telecommunications 
providers already file required notifications and reports for internal 
purposes. We believe the only burden associated with the reporting 
requirements contained here will be the time required to complete any 
additional notifications and reports following the proposed changes.

V. Congressional Review Act

    93. The Commission will send a copy of this Report and Order and 
Order on Reconsideration to Congress and the Government Accountability 
Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 
801(a)(1)(A).

VI. Ordering Clauses

    94. Accordingly it is ordered that, pursuant to the authority 
contained in Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 
303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, and 615c of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and Section 706 of the 
Communications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 251(e)(3), 
254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 
615a-1, 615c, and 1302, this Report and Order in PS Docket 15-80 and 
11-82 is ADOPTED.
    95. It is further ordered that the Commission's Public Safety and 
Homeland Security Bureau shall develop and recommend to the Commission 
proposed rules, published elsewhere in this Federal Register, for NORS 
information sharing in accordance with its delegated authority and this 
Report and Order.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR Part 4

    Airports, Communications common carriers, Communications equipment, 
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Telecommunications.

    Federal Communications Commission.
Gloria J. Miles,
Federal Register Liaison Officer, Office of the Secretary.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 4 as follows:

PART 4--DISRUPTIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 4 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 
303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, 
and 615c of Pub. L. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended, and section 
706 of Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56; 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & 
(o), 251(e)(3), 254, 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 
309(j), 316, 332, 403, 615a-1, 615c, and 1302, unless otherwise 
noted.


0
2. Section 4.5 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) as follows 
and removing and reserving paragraph (d):


Sec.  4.5  Definitions of outage, special offices and facilities, and 
911 special facilities.

* * * * *
    (b) Special offices and facilities are defined as entities enrolled 
in the Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) Program at priority 
Levels 1 and 2, which may include, but are not limited to, major 
military installations, key government facilities, nuclear power 
plants, and those airports that are listed as current primary (PR) 
airports in the FAA's National Plan of Integrated Airports Systems 
(NPIAS) (as issued at

[[Page 45068]]

least one calendar year prior to the outage).
    (c) A critical communications outage that potentially affects an 
airport is defined as an outage that:
    (1) Disrupts 50 percent or more of the air traffic control links or 
other FAA communications links to any airport;
    (2) Has caused an Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) or 
airport to lose its radar;
    (3) Causes a loss of both primary and backup facilities at any 
ARTCC or airport;
    (4) Affects an ARTCC or airport that is deemed important by the FAA 
as indicated by FAA inquiry to the provider's management personnel; or
    (5) Has affected any ARTCC or airport and that has received any 
media attention of which the communications provider's reporting 
personnel are aware.
    (d) [Reserved]
* * * * *

0
3. Section 4.7 is amended by revising paragraphs (d) and (e)(2) to read 
as follows:


Sec.  4.7  Definition of metrics used to determine the general outage-
reporting threshold criteria.

* * * * *
    (d) Optical Carrier 3 (OC3) minutes are defined as the mathematical 
result of multiplying the duration of an outage, expressed in minutes, 
by the number of previously operating OC3 circuits or their equivalents 
that were affected by the outage.
    (e) * * *
    (2) The mathematical result of multiplying the duration of an 
outage, expressed in minutes, by the number of end users potentially 
affected by the outage, for all other forms of communications. For 
interconnected VoIP service providers to mobile users, the number of 
potentially affected users should be determined by multiplying the 
simultaneous call capacity of the affected equipment by a concentration 
ratio of 8.
* * * * *

0
4. Section 4.9 is amended by revising paragraph (a)(2), the second 
sentence in paragraph (a)(4), revising the second and sixth sentence in 
paragraph (b), revising paragraph (e), (f)(2) and the second sentence 
in paragraph (f)(4) to read as follows:


Sec.  4.9  Outage reporting requirements--threshold criteria.

    (a) * * *
    (2) Affects at least 667 OC3 minutes;
* * * * *
    (4) * * * (OC3 minutes and user minutes are defined in paragraphs 
(d) and (e) of Sec.  4.7.) * * *
* * * * *
    (b) * * * Providers must report IXC and LEC tandem outages of at 
least 30 minutes duration in which at least 90,000 calls are blocked or 
at least 667 OC3-minutes are lost.* * * (OC3 minutes are defined in 
paragraph (d) of Sec.  4.7.) * * *
* * * * *
    (e)(1) All wireless service providers shall submit electronically a 
Notification to the Commission within 120 minutes of discovering that 
they have experienced on any facilities that they own, operate, lease, 
or otherwise utilize, an outage of at least 30 minutes duration:
    (i) Of a Mobile Switching Center (MSC);
    (ii) That potentially affects at least 900,000 user minutes of 
either telephony and associated data (2nd generation or lower) service 
or paging service;
    (iii) That affects at least 667 OC3 minutes (as defined in Sec.  
4.7);
    (iv) That potentially affects any special offices and facilities 
(in accordance with paragraphs (a) through (d) of Sec.  4.5) other than 
airports through direct service facility agreements; or
    (v) That potentially affects a 911 special facility (as defined in 
paragraph (e) of Sec.  4.5), in which case they also shall notify, as 
soon as possible by telephone or other electronic means, any official 
who has been designated by the management of the affected 911 facility 
as the provider's contact person for communications outages at that 
facility, and they shall convey to that person all available 
information that may be useful to the management of the affected 
facility in mitigating the effects of the outage on callers to that 
facility.
    (2) In determining the number of users potentially affected by a 
failure of a switch, a wireless provider must multiply the number of 
macro cell sites disabled in the outage by the average number of users 
served per site, which is calculated as the total number of users for 
the provider divided by the total number of the provider's macro cell 
sites.
    (3) For providers of paging service only, a notification must be 
submitted if the failure of a switch for at least 30 minutes duration 
potentially affects at least 900,000 user-minutes.
    (4) Not later than 72 hours after discovering the outage, the 
provider shall submit electronically an Initial Communications Outage 
Report to the Commission. Not later than 30 days after discovering the 
outage, the provider shall submit electronically a Final Communications 
Outage Report to the Commission.
    (5) The Notification and Initial and Final reports shall comply 
with the requirements of Sec.  4.11.
    (f) * * *
    (2) Affects at least 667 OC3 minutes;
* * * * *
    (4) * * * (OC3 minutes and user minutes are defined in paragraphs 
(d) and (e) of Sec.  4.7.) * * *
* * * * *


Sec.  4.13  [Removed and Reserved]

0
5. Section 4.13 is removed and reserved.
[FR Doc. 2016-16274 Filed 7-8-16; 11:15 am]
 BILLING CODE 6712-01-P