Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Department of Energy; Fort St. Vrain, 40354-40357 [2016-14673]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 119 / Tuesday, June 21, 2016 / Notices
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[FR Doc. 2016–14613 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7555–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 72–09; NRC–2015–0150]
Independent Spent Fuel Storage
Installation, Department of Energy;
Fort St. Vrain
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to a request
submitted by the Department of Energy
(DOE or the licensee) on April 27, 2016,
from NRC’s requirement to comply with
the terms, conditions, and specifications
concerning testing and surveillance in
Special Nuclear Material License No.
SNM–2504 for the Fort St. Vrain
independent spent fuel storage
installation (ISFSI). The exemption
request seeks the extension of the time
SUMMARY:
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to perform an O-ring leakage rate test
required by Technical Specification (TS)
3.3.1 of Appendix A of Special Nuclear
Material License No. SNM–2504 and to
perform an aging management
surveillance described in the Fort St.
Vrain (FSV) Final Safety Analysis
Report (FSAR). The DOE requests the
dates for performance of the testing and
surveillance requirements be extended
until December 2016. The NRC
previously granted DOE an exemption
(80 FR 33299 dated, June 11, 2015)
extending the completion date for these
actions until June 2016.
DATES: The exemption is effective on
June 21, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2015–0150 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2015–0150. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
it is mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Bernard White, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–6577; email: Bernard.White@
nrc.gov.
I. Background
The DOE is the holder of Special
Nuclear Material License No. SNM–
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2504 which authorizes receipt,
possession, storage, transfer, and use of
irradiated fuel elements from the
decommissioned FSV Nuclear
Generating Station in Platteville,
Colorado, under part 72 of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR).
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II. Request/Action
In a letter dated, April 27, 2016, the
DOE requested an exemption to delay
performance of both the fuel storage
container O-ring leakage rate test
requirement and the FSAR aging
management surveillance of fuel storage
containers by six months, until
December 31, 2016 (ADAMS Accession
No. ML16120A410). Technical
Specification 3.1.1 in Appendix A of
License No. SNM–2504 stipulates that,
the fuel storage container seal leakage
rate for shall not exceed 1 × 10¥3
reference cubic centimeters per second
(ref-cm3/s). Surveillance Requirement
(SR) 3.3.1.1 requires that one fuel
storage container from each vault to be
leakage rate tested every five years to
confirm that the seal leakage rate is not
exceeded. DOE performed the last
leakage rate test in June 2010 and the
next leakage rate test is scheduled to be
completed in June 2016.
Fort St.Vrain implemented its aging
management program as part of license
renewal in 2011. Condition 9 of SNM–
2504 states, in relevant part, that
authorized use of the material at the
FSV ISFSI shall be ‘‘in accordance with
statements, representations, and the
conditions of the Technical
Specifications and Safety Analysis
Report.’’ Condition 11 of SNM–2504
directs the licensee to operate the
facility in accordance with the
Technical Specifications in Appendix
A. In Chapter 9 of the FSV FSAR the
licensee committed to assess six fuel
storage containers for potential
hydrogen buildup by the end of June
2015. This date was extended until June
2016, with NRC’s grant of an exemption.
The hydrogen sampling schedule was
established to parallel the fuel storage
container seal leakage rate testing
schedule.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 72 when
the exemption is authorized by law, will
not endanger life or property or the
common defense and security, and is
otherwise in the public interest. The
DOE requested an exemption from both
10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and 10 CFR
72.44(c)(3). Section 72.44(c)(1) requires,
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in part, compliance with functional and
operational limits to protect the
integrity of waste containers and to
guard against the uncontrolled release of
radioactive material. Section 72.44(c)(3)
requires compliance with surveillance
requirement in Limiting Condition of
Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 which the
licensee will use show that the ISFSI
has not exceeded the fuel storage
container or storage well seal leakage
rate. For these reasons, the staff also
grants DOE an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and
10 CFR 72.44(c)(3).
As is explained in following
paragraphs, the proposed exemption is
lawful, will not endanger life or
property, or the common defense and
security, and is otherwise in the public
interest.
Authorized by Law
This exemption delays until
December 2016, the licensee’s
performance of (1) a fuel storage
container O-ring leakage rate test
required by TS 3.3.1 of Appendix A of
Special Nuclear Material License No.
SNM–2504 and (2) an FSAR aging
management surveillance to inspect six
fuel storage containers for hydrogen
buildup. Condition 9 of SNM–2504
states, in relevant part, that authorized
use of the material at the FSV’s ISFSI
shall be ‘‘in accordance with statements,
representations, and the conditions of
the Technical Specifications and Safety
Analysis Report.’’ Condition 11 of
SNM–2504 also directs the licensee to
operate the facility in accordance with
the Technical Specifications in
Appendix A.
The provisions in 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1)
and (3) require the licensee to follow the
technical specifications and the
functional and operational limits for the
facility. The testing and inspection
requirements from which DOE
requested exemption are detailed in the
Special Nuclear Material License No.
SNM–2504, the FSAR, and FSV’s
technical specifications and must be
complied with pursuant to 10 CFR part
72. Section 72.7 allows the NRC to grant
specific exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 72.
Issuance of this exemption is consistent
with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and not otherwise
inconsistent with NRC regulations or
other applicable laws. Therefore, the
exemption is authorized by law.
Will Not Endanger Life or Property or
the Common Defense and Security
In granting the March 19, 2015
exemption request, the NRC staff
determined that it would not endanger
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40355
life or property, or the common defense
and security. The current exemption
extends the deadline for performance of
the testing and surveillance
requirements until December 2016. The
staff evaluated whether the additional
six month extension provided by this
exemption would change its earlier
finding; the staff finds that the current
exemption does not endanger life or
property, or the common defense and
security for the reasons discussed
below.
Potential Corrosion
Fort St. Vrain’s ISFSI Aging
Management Program described in
Section 9.8 of FSV’s ISFSI FSAR
identifies a commitment to test one fuel
storage container in each vault for
hydrogen buildup. The test is designed
to identify corrosion in the interior of
the fuel storage containers. In its FSAR
the licensee committed to complete
testing for hydrogen buildup on the
same schedule as the leak test, which
required the test to be completed no
later than June 2015. In its March 2015
exemption request, FSV concluded that
hydrogen buildup had not occurred in
fuel storage containers in its ISFSI. The
NRC extended the completion date for
the sampling for actual hydrogen
buildup until to June 2016. Fort St.
Vrain’s conclusions were supported by
the following observations:
1. The fuel was stored in dry helium
prior to placement in the fuel storage
containers.
2. General corrosion, as opposed to
galvanic corrosion, was the only
corrosion mechanism of concern for the
canister.
3. The expected corrosion reactions
would not generate significant
quantities of hydrogen, because any
water inside the fuel storage container is
expected to have neutral pH (i.e., not
acidic).
Therefore, FSV concluded there were no
safety implications associated with
delaying the hydrogen test for one year.
The licensee presented the same
conclusions and observations in support
of its April 2016 request to extend the
testing date.
The staff conducted its own
evaluation of the data supporting FSV’s
March 2015 and April 2016 requests
and found no safety implications
associated with delaying the hydrogen
test until December 2016. The staff
made specific determinations
concerning the safety of granting the
exemption, including that the maximum
hydrogen volume fraction is 7 percent
inside the fuel storage container.
Therefore, a fire or explosion of
hydrogen at this level is very unlikely
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and does not present a significant safety
issue. The staff’s calculation of the
hydrogen volume fraction was a time
independent calculation to determine
the maximum hydrogen concentration
assuming the possible reactants, oxygen
and water, were fully consumed. A
delay in performing the hydrogen test
for six additional months will increase
the container storage period from 25
years to 25.5 years without the
performance of a hydrogen test.
However, the staff finds that the
extension will not increase the
probability of either a hydrogen ignition
event during storage or failure of the
fuel storage container integrity due to
corrosion, and therefore, fuel storage
container safety is not reduced.
The NRC staff concludes that
hydrogen ignition events associated
with handling fuel storage containers
are very unlikely to occur because the
Modular Vault Dry Store building where
the fuel storage canisters are located
contains no volatile materials or gases.
A full discussion of this issue is found
in FSV’s SAR 3 (see ADAMS Accession
No. ML102380351). The Component
Operational Testing procedures in the
Aging Management Program, which
must be implemented after license
renewal, are described in FSV’s SAR
(see ADAMS Accession No.
ML103640385). These procedures
eliminate hydrogen ignition sources by
sampling and analyzing the air inside
containers for the presence of hydrogen
and purging hydrogen before moving or
removing lids from containers holding
spent fuel.
Leakage Rate
Limiting Condition of Operation 3.3.1
in Appendix A of License No. SNM–
2504 states that the fuel storage
containers seal leakage rate shall not
exceed 1 × 10¥3 ref-cm3/s. Surveillance
Requirement 3.3.1.1 stipulates that one
fuel storage container from each vault be
subject to a leakage rate test every 5
years. The basis for SR 3.3.1.1 is that
performance of a leakage rate test of at
least six fuel storage containers every 5
years provides reasonable assurance of
continued integrity. The original leakage
rate test at FSV was performed in 1991
after the loading of canisters;
subsequent leakage rate tests were
performed on one fuel storage container
from each vault in years 1996, 2001,
2005, and 2010. The results of all FSV’s
leakage rate tests have never exceeded
the maximum rate of 1 × 10¥3 refcm3/s.
As part of its April 2016 exemption
request, DOE evaluated whether the
exemption is consistent with the
confinement barrier requirements
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described in FSV’s FSAR at 3.3.2.1 and
in SR 3.3.1.1. The DOE classified the
failure of the redundant metal O-ring
seals in a fuel storage cylinder as a low
probability event. In addition, Section
8.2.15 of the FSV FSAR identifies no
credible failure mechanisms for the fuel
storage container O-rings. The DOE
calculated that in June 2017, the average
and maximum O-ring seal leakage rates
for fuel storage containers are expected
to be 3.75 × 10¥4 and 6.76 × 10¥4 refcm3/s, respectively. These conservative
calculations are presented in
Engineering Design File-10727,
Estimation of 2017 Leak Rates of Fort St.
Vrain Fuel Storage Containers (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15104A064). Both the
average and maximum seal leakage rate
values are below the maximum leakage
rate of 1 × 10¥3 ref-cm3/s, permitted by
TS 3.3.1. The DOE identified O-ring
failure as a potential failure mode that
could result in leakage in excess of 1 ×
10¥3 ref-c cm3/s, although DOE did not
provide specific details of potential Oring failure mechanisms.
The NRC staff’s evaluation notes that
typical failure modes for O-ring seals
include:
1. Corrosion of the O-ring,
2. corrosion of the O-ring flange
sealing surface (area in contact with the
O-ring), and
3. creep or relaxation of the O-ring.
The DOE’s March 2015 exemption
request, as supplemented on June 1,
2015 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15153A280), describes the O-rings as
silver plated alloy X–750 in the workhardened condition. The O-rings are
installed with a grease/lubricant to
facilitate sealing and prevent damage to
the O-rings during lid installation and
compression of the O-rings. The
presence of grease, the construction
materials used, and the limited amount
of water in the vicinity of the O-rings
reduce the likelihood of corrosion of the
O-rings and the O-ring seal area on the
fuel storage containers.
The NRC staff reviewed the testing
methods and the test pressures
generated by previous leakage rate tests.
In addition, the staff evaluated the
correlations between leakage rate and
pressure drop for the O-ring seals. These
estimated O-ring seal leakage rates were
reported in EDF–10727. The NRC staff
determined that the data and
correlations that DOE used accurately
predict the June 2017 fuel storage
container O-ring seal leakage rates. The
staff confirmed that DOE’s average and
maximum 2017 leakage rate estimates of
3.75 × 10¥4 and 6.76 × 10¥4 ref-cm3/s
are both acceptable and below the
maximum limit of 1 × 10¥3 ref-cm3/s in
LCO 3.3.1.
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The NRC staff also reviewed Section
8.2.15 of FSV’s FSAR and DOE’s
analyses of the consequences associated
with a radiological release from a fuel
storage container. The staff confirmed
that even if the leakage rate of 1 × 10¥3
ref-cm3/s were grossly exceeded, the
consequences would be minimal. For
example,
1. The radiological consequences at
the controlled area boundary would be
within the requirements of 10 CFR
72.106.
2. A radiological release with a
leakage rate greater than 1 × 10¥3 refcm3/s that passes beyond the redundant
O-ring seals would be bounded by the
maximum credible accident described
in the FSV’s FSAR at 8.2.15.
3. Furthermore, the failure of the
redundant metallic seals (loss of
confinement) is considered a low
probability event during the entire
storage period.
Based on the findings discussed in
this section, the NRC staff concludes
that granting the DOE’s exemption will
not endanger public health and safety or
the common defense and security.
Delaying the fuel storage container Oring leakage rate test required by TS
3.1.1 and the aging management
monitoring of six fuel storage containers
for hydrogen buildup until December
2016, will not increase the likelihood of
a seal leak occurring. Therefore, the
extension permitted by the current
exemption does not change the
licensing basis of the ISFSI design and
it does not alter the staff’s conclusion in
June 2015, that the fuel storage
container design and lid seals are
acceptable.
Otherwise in the Public Interest
In the March 2016 exemption
application, the DOE sought a delay of
the fuel storage container O-ring leakage
rate test and FSAR aging management
surveillance for one year. The DOE
explained that the extension would
allow it to prioritize activities at the
FSV site and reduce the administrative
burden on the licensee and the NRC
staff to perform the June 2016 test. The
staff finds these statements are still
valid and support a six-month
extension, therefore issuance of the
proposed exemption is otherwise in the
public interest.
Environmental Consideration
The NRC staff evaluated whether
significant environmental impacts are
associated with the issuance of the
requested exemption. The NRC staff
determined that the proposed action fits
a category of actions that does not
require an environmental assessment or
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environmental impact statement. The
exemption meets the categorical
exclusion criteria of 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25)(i)–(vi).
Granting an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and
10 CFR 72.44(c)(3) will extend the time
for DOE to conduct the inspection and
surveillance of the fuel storage container
O-ring leakage rate test required by TS
3.3.1 and the FSAR aging management
surveillance of fuel storage containers
for hydrogen buildup required by
license Condition No. 9. A categorical
exclusion for inspection and
surveillance requirements is provided
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi)(C), when
the criteria in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)–(v)
are also satisfied. In its review of the
exemption request, the NRC staff
determined that, under 10 CFR
51.22(c)(25) granting the exemption: (i)
Does not involve a significant hazards
consideration because it does not reduce
a margin of safety, create a new or
different kind of accident not previously
evaluated, or significantly increase the
probability or consequences of an
unevaluated accident; (ii) would not
significantly change the types or
amounts of effluents that may be
released offsite because the exemption
does not change or produce additional
avenues of effluent release; (iii) would
not significantly increase occupational
or public radiation exposure,
individually or cumulatively, because
the exemption does not introduce new
or increased radiological hazards; (iv)
would not result in significant
construction impacts because the
exemption does not involve
construction or other ground disturbing
activities, or change the footprint of the
existing ISFSI; and (v) would not
increase the potential for or the
consequences of radiological accidents.
For example, a gross leak from a fuel
storage container or excessive hydrogen
buildup in a fuel storage container is
unlikely because the exemption does
not reduce the ability of the container to
confine radioactive material or create
new accident precursors at FSV’s ISFSI.
Accordingly, this exemption meets the
eligibility criteria for categorical
exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). There
are no significant radiological
environmental impacts associated with
the proposed action.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the NRC has determined
that, pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, this
exemption is authorized by law, will not
endanger life or property or the common
defense and security, and is otherwise
in the public interest. Therefore, the
NRC hereby grants DOE an exemption
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from the regulations at 10 CFR
72.44(c)(1) and 10 CFR 72.44(c)(3) to
permit a delay by six months of the
monitoring and surveillance scheduled
for June 2016. The exemption extends
the date for completion of the O-ring
leakage rate test under SR 3.3.1.1 for one
fuel storage container from each vault
and the FSAR aging management
inspection of FSCs for hydrogen until
December 31, 2016. This exemption is
effective as of June 21, 2016.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day
of June, 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John McKirgan,
Chief, Spent Fuel Licensing Branch, Division
of Spent Fuel Management, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016–14673 Filed 6–20–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
[Docket No. 52–036; NRC–2008–0616]
Entergy Operations, Inc., River Bend
Station, Unit 3
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Application for combined
license; withdrawal.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is withdrawing an
application for a combined license
(COL) for a single unit of the Economic
Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor. This
reactor would be identified as River
Bend Station, Unit 3 (RBS3) and would
be located at the current River Bend
Nuclear Station site near St.
Francisville, Louisiana in West
Feliciana Parish.
DATES: The effective date of the
withdrawal of the application for
combined license is June 21, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2008–0616 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
information related to this action by the
following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2008–0616. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
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(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly
available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced (if it is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
it is mentioned in this document.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
SUMMARY:
40357
˜
Adrian Muniz, Office of New Reactors,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
301–415–4093; email: Adrian.Muniz@
nrc.gov.
A notice
of receipt and availability of this
application was previously published in
the Federal Register on November 17,
2008 (73 FR 67895). On December 10,
2008 (73 FR 75141), a subsequent notice
was published in the Federal Register
announcing the acceptance of the RBS3
COL application for docketing in
accordance with part 2 of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),
‘‘Agency Rules of Practice and
Procedure,’’ and 10 CFR part 52,
‘‘Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals
for Nuclear Power Plants.’’ The docket
number established for this application
is 52–036.
By letter dated January 9, 2009,
Entergy Operations, Inc. (EOI) requested
that the NRC temporarily suspend the
COL application review, including any
supporting reviews by external agencies,
until further notice (ADAMS Accession
No. ML090130174). The NRC granted
the suspension request (ADAMS
Accession No. ML090080277). By letter
dated December 4, 2015, EOI requested
the NRC to withdraw the RBS3 COL
application from the docket (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15338A298). Pursuant
to the requirements in 10 CFR part 2,
the Commission grants EOI its request to
withdraw the RBS3 COL application.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 14th day
of June, 2016.
E:\FR\FM\21JNN1.SGM
21JNN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 119 (Tuesday, June 21, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 40354-40357]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-14673]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 72-09; NRC-2015-0150]
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, Department of
Energy; Fort St. Vrain
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption in response to a request submitted by the Department of
Energy (DOE or the licensee) on April 27, 2016, from NRC's requirement
to comply with the terms, conditions, and specifications concerning
testing and surveillance in Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-
2504 for the Fort St. Vrain independent spent fuel storage installation
(ISFSI). The exemption request seeks the extension of the time to
perform an O-ring leakage rate test required by Technical Specification
(TS) 3.3.1 of Appendix A of Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-
2504 and to perform an aging management surveillance described in the
Fort St. Vrain (FSV) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The DOE
requests the dates for performance of the testing and surveillance
requirements be extended until December 2016. The NRC previously
granted DOE an exemption (80 FR 33299 dated, June 11, 2015) extending
the completion date for these actions until June 2016.
DATES: The exemption is effective on June 21, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0150 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0150. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this
document.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Bernard White, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-6577; email:
Bernard.White@nrc.gov.
I. Background
The DOE is the holder of Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-
[[Page 40355]]
2504 which authorizes receipt, possession, storage, transfer, and use
of irradiated fuel elements from the decommissioned FSV Nuclear
Generating Station in Platteville, Colorado, under part 72 of title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR).
II. Request/Action
In a letter dated, April 27, 2016, the DOE requested an exemption
to delay performance of both the fuel storage container O-ring leakage
rate test requirement and the FSAR aging management surveillance of
fuel storage containers by six months, until December 31, 2016 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML16120A410). Technical Specification 3.1.1 in Appendix A
of License No. SNM-2504 stipulates that, the fuel storage container
seal leakage rate for shall not exceed 1 x 10-\3\ reference
cubic centimeters per second (ref-cm\3\/s). Surveillance Requirement
(SR) 3.3.1.1 requires that one fuel storage container from each vault
to be leakage rate tested every five years to confirm that the seal
leakage rate is not exceeded. DOE performed the last leakage rate test
in June 2010 and the next leakage rate test is scheduled to be
completed in June 2016.
Fort St.Vrain implemented its aging management program as part of
license renewal in 2011. Condition 9 of SNM-2504 states, in relevant
part, that authorized use of the material at the FSV ISFSI shall be
``in accordance with statements, representations, and the conditions of
the Technical Specifications and Safety Analysis Report.'' Condition 11
of SNM-2504 directs the licensee to operate the facility in accordance
with the Technical Specifications in Appendix A. In Chapter 9 of the
FSV FSAR the licensee committed to assess six fuel storage containers
for potential hydrogen buildup by the end of June 2015. This date was
extended until June 2016, with NRC's grant of an exemption. The
hydrogen sampling schedule was established to parallel the fuel storage
container seal leakage rate testing schedule.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 72 when the exemption is authorized by
law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and
security, and is otherwise in the public interest. The DOE requested an
exemption from both 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and 10 CFR 72.44(c)(3). Section
72.44(c)(1) requires, in part, compliance with functional and
operational limits to protect the integrity of waste containers and to
guard against the uncontrolled release of radioactive material. Section
72.44(c)(3) requires compliance with surveillance requirement in
Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.3.1 which the licensee will use
show that the ISFSI has not exceeded the fuel storage container or
storage well seal leakage rate. For these reasons, the staff also
grants DOE an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and
10 CFR 72.44(c)(3).
As is explained in following paragraphs, the proposed exemption is
lawful, will not endanger life or property, or the common defense and
security, and is otherwise in the public interest.
Authorized by Law
This exemption delays until December 2016, the licensee's
performance of (1) a fuel storage container O-ring leakage rate test
required by TS 3.3.1 of Appendix A of Special Nuclear Material License
No. SNM-2504 and (2) an FSAR aging management surveillance to inspect
six fuel storage containers for hydrogen buildup. Condition 9 of SNM-
2504 states, in relevant part, that authorized use of the material at
the FSV's ISFSI shall be ``in accordance with statements,
representations, and the conditions of the Technical Specifications and
Safety Analysis Report.'' Condition 11 of SNM-2504 also directs the
licensee to operate the facility in accordance with the Technical
Specifications in Appendix A.
The provisions in 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and (3) require the licensee
to follow the technical specifications and the functional and
operational limits for the facility. The testing and inspection
requirements from which DOE requested exemption are detailed in the
Special Nuclear Material License No. SNM-2504, the FSAR, and FSV's
technical specifications and must be complied with pursuant to 10 CFR
part 72. Section 72.7 allows the NRC to grant specific exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 72. Issuance of this exemption is
consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and not
otherwise inconsistent with NRC regulations or other applicable laws.
Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and Security
In granting the March 19, 2015 exemption request, the NRC staff
determined that it would not endanger life or property, or the common
defense and security. The current exemption extends the deadline for
performance of the testing and surveillance requirements until December
2016. The staff evaluated whether the additional six month extension
provided by this exemption would change its earlier finding; the staff
finds that the current exemption does not endanger life or property, or
the common defense and security for the reasons discussed below.
Potential Corrosion
Fort St. Vrain's ISFSI Aging Management Program described in
Section 9.8 of FSV's ISFSI FSAR identifies a commitment to test one
fuel storage container in each vault for hydrogen buildup. The test is
designed to identify corrosion in the interior of the fuel storage
containers. In its FSAR the licensee committed to complete testing for
hydrogen buildup on the same schedule as the leak test, which required
the test to be completed no later than June 2015. In its March 2015
exemption request, FSV concluded that hydrogen buildup had not occurred
in fuel storage containers in its ISFSI. The NRC extended the
completion date for the sampling for actual hydrogen buildup until to
June 2016. Fort St. Vrain's conclusions were supported by the following
observations:
1. The fuel was stored in dry helium prior to placement in the fuel
storage containers.
2. General corrosion, as opposed to galvanic corrosion, was the
only corrosion mechanism of concern for the canister.
3. The expected corrosion reactions would not generate significant
quantities of hydrogen, because any water inside the fuel storage
container is expected to have neutral pH (i.e., not acidic).
Therefore, FSV concluded there were no safety implications associated
with delaying the hydrogen test for one year. The licensee presented
the same conclusions and observations in support of its April 2016
request to extend the testing date.
The staff conducted its own evaluation of the data supporting FSV's
March 2015 and April 2016 requests and found no safety implications
associated with delaying the hydrogen test until December 2016. The
staff made specific determinations concerning the safety of granting
the exemption, including that the maximum hydrogen volume fraction is 7
percent inside the fuel storage container. Therefore, a fire or
explosion of hydrogen at this level is very unlikely
[[Page 40356]]
and does not present a significant safety issue. The staff's
calculation of the hydrogen volume fraction was a time independent
calculation to determine the maximum hydrogen concentration assuming
the possible reactants, oxygen and water, were fully consumed. A delay
in performing the hydrogen test for six additional months will increase
the container storage period from 25 years to 25.5 years without the
performance of a hydrogen test. However, the staff finds that the
extension will not increase the probability of either a hydrogen
ignition event during storage or failure of the fuel storage container
integrity due to corrosion, and therefore, fuel storage container
safety is not reduced.
The NRC staff concludes that hydrogen ignition events associated
with handling fuel storage containers are very unlikely to occur
because the Modular Vault Dry Store building where the fuel storage
canisters are located contains no volatile materials or gases. A full
discussion of this issue is found in FSV's SAR 3 (see ADAMS Accession
No. ML102380351). The Component Operational Testing procedures in the
Aging Management Program, which must be implemented after license
renewal, are described in FSV's SAR (see ADAMS Accession No.
ML103640385). These procedures eliminate hydrogen ignition sources by
sampling and analyzing the air inside containers for the presence of
hydrogen and purging hydrogen before moving or removing lids from
containers holding spent fuel.
Leakage Rate
Limiting Condition of Operation 3.3.1 in Appendix A of License No.
SNM-2504 states that the fuel storage containers seal leakage rate
shall not exceed 1 x 10-\3\ ref-cm\3\/s. Surveillance
Requirement 3.3.1.1 stipulates that one fuel storage container from
each vault be subject to a leakage rate test every 5 years. The basis
for SR 3.3.1.1 is that performance of a leakage rate test of at least
six fuel storage containers every 5 years provides reasonable assurance
of continued integrity. The original leakage rate test at FSV was
performed in 1991 after the loading of canisters; subsequent leakage
rate tests were performed on one fuel storage container from each vault
in years 1996, 2001, 2005, and 2010. The results of all FSV's leakage
rate tests have never exceeded the maximum rate of 1 x
10-\3\ ref- cm\3\/s.
As part of its April 2016 exemption request, DOE evaluated whether
the exemption is consistent with the confinement barrier requirements
described in FSV's FSAR at 3.3.2.1 and in SR 3.3.1.1. The DOE
classified the failure of the redundant metal O-ring seals in a fuel
storage cylinder as a low probability event. In addition, Section
8.2.15 of the FSV FSAR identifies no credible failure mechanisms for
the fuel storage container O-rings. The DOE calculated that in June
2017, the average and maximum O-ring seal leakage rates for fuel
storage containers are expected to be 3.75 x 10-\4\ and 6.76
x 10-\4\ ref-cm\3\/s, respectively. These conservative
calculations are presented in Engineering Design File-10727, Estimation
of 2017 Leak Rates of Fort St. Vrain Fuel Storage Containers (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15104A064). Both the average and maximum seal leakage
rate values are below the maximum leakage rate of 1 x 10-\3\
ref-cm\3\/s, permitted by TS 3.3.1. The DOE identified O-ring failure
as a potential failure mode that could result in leakage in excess of 1
x 10-\3\ ref-c cm\3\/s, although DOE did not provide
specific details of potential O-ring failure mechanisms.
The NRC staff's evaluation notes that typical failure modes for O-
ring seals include:
1. Corrosion of the O-ring,
2. corrosion of the O-ring flange sealing surface (area in contact
with the O-ring), and
3. creep or relaxation of the O-ring.
The DOE's March 2015 exemption request, as supplemented on June 1,
2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15153A280), describes the O-rings as silver
plated alloy X-750 in the work-hardened condition. The O-rings are
installed with a grease/lubricant to facilitate sealing and prevent
damage to the O-rings during lid installation and compression of the O-
rings. The presence of grease, the construction materials used, and the
limited amount of water in the vicinity of the O-rings reduce the
likelihood of corrosion of the O-rings and the O-ring seal area on the
fuel storage containers.
The NRC staff reviewed the testing methods and the test pressures
generated by previous leakage rate tests. In addition, the staff
evaluated the correlations between leakage rate and pressure drop for
the O-ring seals. These estimated O-ring seal leakage rates were
reported in EDF-10727. The NRC staff determined that the data and
correlations that DOE used accurately predict the June 2017 fuel
storage container O-ring seal leakage rates. The staff confirmed that
DOE's average and maximum 2017 leakage rate estimates of 3.75 x
10-\4\ and 6.76 x 10-\4\ ref-cm\3\/s are both
acceptable and below the maximum limit of 1 x 10-\3\ ref-
cm\3\/s in LCO 3.3.1.
The NRC staff also reviewed Section 8.2.15 of FSV's FSAR and DOE's
analyses of the consequences associated with a radiological release
from a fuel storage container. The staff confirmed that even if the
leakage rate of 1 x 10-\3\ ref-cm\3\/s were grossly
exceeded, the consequences would be minimal. For example,
1. The radiological consequences at the controlled area boundary
would be within the requirements of 10 CFR 72.106.
2. A radiological release with a leakage rate greater than 1 x
10-\3\ ref-cm\3\/s that passes beyond the redundant O-ring
seals would be bounded by the maximum credible accident described in
the FSV's FSAR at 8.2.15.
3. Furthermore, the failure of the redundant metallic seals (loss
of confinement) is considered a low probability event during the entire
storage period.
Based on the findings discussed in this section, the NRC staff
concludes that granting the DOE's exemption will not endanger public
health and safety or the common defense and security. Delaying the fuel
storage container O-ring leakage rate test required by TS 3.1.1 and the
aging management monitoring of six fuel storage containers for hydrogen
buildup until December 2016, will not increase the likelihood of a seal
leak occurring. Therefore, the extension permitted by the current
exemption does not change the licensing basis of the ISFSI design and
it does not alter the staff's conclusion in June 2015, that the fuel
storage container design and lid seals are acceptable.
Otherwise in the Public Interest
In the March 2016 exemption application, the DOE sought a delay of
the fuel storage container O-ring leakage rate test and FSAR aging
management surveillance for one year. The DOE explained that the
extension would allow it to prioritize activities at the FSV site and
reduce the administrative burden on the licensee and the NRC staff to
perform the June 2016 test. The staff finds these statements are still
valid and support a six-month extension, therefore issuance of the
proposed exemption is otherwise in the public interest.
Environmental Consideration
The NRC staff evaluated whether significant environmental impacts
are associated with the issuance of the requested exemption. The NRC
staff determined that the proposed action fits a category of actions
that does not require an environmental assessment or
[[Page 40357]]
environmental impact statement. The exemption meets the categorical
exclusion criteria of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)-(vi).
Granting an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1)
and 10 CFR 72.44(c)(3) will extend the time for DOE to conduct the
inspection and surveillance of the fuel storage container O-ring
leakage rate test required by TS 3.3.1 and the FSAR aging management
surveillance of fuel storage containers for hydrogen buildup required
by license Condition No. 9. A categorical exclusion for inspection and
surveillance requirements is provided under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(vi)(C),
when the criteria in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25)(i)-(v) are also satisfied. In
its review of the exemption request, the NRC staff determined that,
under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25) granting the exemption: (i) Does not involve
a significant hazards consideration because it does not reduce a margin
of safety, create a new or different kind of accident not previously
evaluated, or significantly increase the probability or consequences of
an unevaluated accident; (ii) would not significantly change the types
or amounts of effluents that may be released offsite because the
exemption does not change or produce additional avenues of effluent
release; (iii) would not significantly increase occupational or public
radiation exposure, individually or cumulatively, because the exemption
does not introduce new or increased radiological hazards; (iv) would
not result in significant construction impacts because the exemption
does not involve construction or other ground disturbing activities, or
change the footprint of the existing ISFSI; and (v) would not increase
the potential for or the consequences of radiological accidents. For
example, a gross leak from a fuel storage container or excessive
hydrogen buildup in a fuel storage container is unlikely because the
exemption does not reduce the ability of the container to confine
radioactive material or create new accident precursors at FSV's ISFSI.
Accordingly, this exemption meets the eligibility criteria for
categorical exclusion in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25). There are no significant
radiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed action.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the NRC has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 72.7,
this exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property
or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public
interest. Therefore, the NRC hereby grants DOE an exemption from the
regulations at 10 CFR 72.44(c)(1) and 10 CFR 72.44(c)(3) to permit a
delay by six months of the monitoring and surveillance scheduled for
June 2016. The exemption extends the date for completion of the O-ring
leakage rate test under SR 3.3.1.1 for one fuel storage container from
each vault and the FSAR aging management inspection of FSCs for
hydrogen until December 31, 2016. This exemption is effective as of
June 21, 2016.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 15th day of June, 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John McKirgan,
Chief, Spent Fuel Licensing Branch, Division of Spent Fuel Management,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016-14673 Filed 6-20-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P