Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of Homeland Security/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database System of Records, 19857-19858 [2016-07896]
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19857
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 81, No. 66
Wednesday, April 6, 2016
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of
new books are listed in the first FEDERAL
REGISTER issue of each week.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
of the Privacy Act because of criminal,
civil, and administrative enforcement
requirements. DHS issued the
‘‘Department of Homeland Security/
ALL–030 Use of the Terrorist Screening
Database System of Records’’ in the
Federal Register at 81 FR 3811 on
January 22, 2016, to provide notice to
the public that DHS was adding two
new consumers to the ‘‘DHS Watchlist
Service.’’ DHS also clarified an existing
category of individuals, added two new
categories of individuals, and clarified
the categories of records maintained in
this system. DHS invited comments on
both the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) and System of Records Notice
(SORN).
[Docket No. DHS–2016–0025]
II. Public Comments
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of
Exemptions; Department of Homeland
Security/ALL–030 Use of the Terrorist
Screening Database System of
Records
DHS received three comments. Two
comments were from private
individuals who complemented DHS for
this update. DHS received an identical
comment from a public interest research
center on the SORN and NPRM. The
commenter raised concerns regarding
the number of exemptions taken by
DHS, particularly exemptions related to
access and accounting for disclosures.
Specifically, the commenter questioned
the need to exempt records once an
investigation was complete.
In response, DHS emphasizes that the
Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
belongs to the Department of Justice
(DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). DHS does not change or alter
these records. All records within the
DHS/ALL–030 Use of the Terrorist
Screening Database System of Records
are collected and disseminated by the
DOJ/FBI and are covered by the DOJ/
FBI–019, ‘‘Terrorist Screening Records
Center System,’’ 72 FR 77846 (Dec. 14,
2011). Because DHS does not make any
changes to the records obtained from
DOJ/FBI, the same exemptions outlined
in the DOJ/FBI SORN, and reasons
provided in its implementing
regulations for use of such exemptions
at 28 CFR 16.96, transfer and apply. For
instance, disclosing this information to
individuals who have been
misidentified as known or suspected
terrorists due to a close name similarity,
and of which the investigation has been
completed, could reveal the
Government’s investigative interest in a
terrorist suspect for an ongoing
investigation, because it could make
known the name of the individual who
Privacy Office, Department of
Homeland Security.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is issuing a final rule to
amend its regulations to exempt
portions of an existing system of records
titled, ‘‘Department of Homeland
Security/ALL–030 Use of the Terrorist
Screening Database System of Records’’
from certain provisions of the Privacy
Act. Specifically, the Department
exempts portions of the ‘‘Department of
Homeland Security/ALL–030 Use of the
Terrorist Screening Database System of
Records’’ from one or more provisions
of the Privacy Act because of criminal,
civil, and administrative enforcement
requirements.
SUMMARY:
This final rule is effective April
6, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Karen L. Neuman, (202) 343–1717, Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office,
Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
DATES:
I. Background
The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal
Register at 81 FR 3758, on January 22,
2016, to exempt portions of the system
of records from one or more provisions
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:28 Apr 05, 2016
Jkt 238001
PO 00000
Frm 00001
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
actually is the subject of the
Government’s interest. Similarly,
providing any type of notice to a
misidentified known or suspected
terrorist due to a close name similarity
could alert the actual known or
suspected terrorist of the Government’s
investigative interest in that individual.
Further, amendment of these records
would impose an impossible
administrative burden by requiring
investigations, analyses, and reports to
be continuously reinvestigated and
revised. DHS is not taking any new
exemptions as a result of the expansion
to the categories of individuals in the
TSDB. As noted in the NPRM,
permitting access and amendment to
watchlist records could disclose
sensitive information that could be
detrimental to national security. Release
of the accounting of disclosures could
reveal the details of watchlist matching
measures, as well as capabilities and
vulnerabilities of the watchlist matching
process, the release of which could
permit an individual to evade future
detection and thereby impede efforts to
ensure national security.
However, DHS does agree that some
of the exemptions proposed in the
NPRM are unnecessary. With the
publication of this Final Rule, DHS is
removing the exemption from
subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency
Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules),
because DHS has already established
requirements, rules, or procedures with
respect to individual access and will
review each request for access on a caseby-case basis. Concurrent with this
Final Rule, DHS is republishing the
DHS/ALL–030 Use of the Terrorist
Screening Database System of Records
to reflect this change.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, DHS amends chapter I of title
6, Code of Federal Regulations, as
follows:
PART 5—DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS
AND INFORMATION
1. The authority citation for part 5
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135;
(6 U.S.C. 101 et seq.); 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart
A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552. Subpart B
also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
E:\FR\FM\06APR1.SGM
06APR1
19858
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 6, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
2. In appendix C to part 5, revise
paragraph 66 to read as follows:
■
Appendix C to Part 5—DHS Systems of
Records Exempt From the Privacy Act
*
*
*
*
*
66. The DHS/ALL–030 Use of the
Terrorist Screening Database System of
Records consists of electronic and paper
records and will be used by DHS and its
Components. The DHS/ALL–030 Use of
the Terrorist Screening Database System
of Records is a repository of information
held by DHS in connection with its
several and varied missions and
functions, including, the enforcement of
civil and criminal laws; investigations,
inquiries, and proceedings thereunder;
and national security and intelligence
activities. The Terrorist Screening
Database belongs to the Department of
Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). DHS does not
change or alter these records. All
records within the DHS/ALL–030 Use of
the Terrorist Screening Database System
of Records are collected and
disseminated by the DOJ/FBI and are
covered by the DOJ/FBI–019, ‘‘Terrorist
Screening Records Center System,’’ 72
FR 77846 (Dec. 14, 2011). Because DHS
does not make any changes to the
records obtained from DOJ/FBI, the
same exemptions outlined in the DOJ/
FBI SORN, and reasons provided in its
implementing regulations for use of
such exemptions at 28 CFR 16.96,
transfer and apply. The Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this
system from the following provisions of
the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3),
(c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(5),
(e)(8), and (g). When a record has been
received from DOJ/FBI–019 Terrorist
Screening Records System of Records
and has been exempted in that source
system, DHS will claim the same
exemptions for those records that are
claimed for that original primary system
of records from which they originated
and claims any additional exemptions
set forth here. Exemptions from these
particular subsections are justified, on a
case-by-case basis to be determined at
the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4)
(Accounting for Disclosures) because
release of the accounting of disclosures
could alert the subject of an
investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to
the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS as well as the recipient agency.
Disclosure of the accounting would
therefore present a serious impediment
to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
■
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:28 Apr 05, 2016
Jkt 238001
to preserve national security. Disclosure
of the accounting would also permit the
individual who is the subject of a record
to impede the investigation, to tamper
with witnesses or evidence, and to
avoid detection or apprehension, which
would undermine the entire
investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to
Records) because access to the records
contained in this system of records
could inform the subject of an
investigation of an actual or potential
criminal, civil, or regulatory violation to
the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part
of DHS or another agency. Access to the
records could permit the individual
who is the subject of a record to impede
the investigation, to tamper with
witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension. Amendment
of the records could interfere with
ongoing investigations and law
enforcement activities and would
impose an unreasonable administrative
burden by requiring investigations to be
continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to
such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that
could be detrimental to homeland
security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy
and Necessity of Information) because
in the course of investigations into
potential violations of Federal law, the
accuracy of information obtained or
introduced occasionally may be unclear,
or the information may not be strictly
relevant or necessary to a specific
investigation. In the interests of effective
law enforcement, it is appropriate to
retain all information that may aid in
establishing patterns of unlawful
activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection
of Information from Individuals)
because requiring that information be
collected from the subject of an
investigation would alert the subject to
the nature or existence of the
investigation, thereby interfering with
that investigation and related law
enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to
Subjects) because providing such
detailed information could impede law
enforcement by compromising the
existence of a confidential investigation
or reveal the identity of witnesses or
confidential informants.
(f) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection
of Information) because with the
collection of information for law
enforcement purposes, it is impossible
to determine in advance what
information is accurate, relevant, timely,
and complete. Compliance with
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
subsection (e)(5) would preclude DHS
agents from using their investigative
training and exercise of good judgment
to both conduct and report on
investigations.
(g) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on
Individuals) because compliance would
interfere with DHS’s ability to obtain,
serve, and issue subpoenas, warrants,
and other law enforcement mechanisms
that may be filed under seal and could
result in disclosure of investigative
techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(h) From subsection (g) (Civil
Remedies) to the extent that the system
is exempt from other specific
subsections of the Privacy Act.
*
*
*
*
*
Dated: March 22, 2016.
Karen L. Neuman,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of
Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2016–07896 Filed 4–5–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–9B–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 71
[Docket No. FAA–2015–4010; Airspace
Docket No. 15–ASO–11]
Establishment of Class D and Class E
Airspace, and Amendment of Class E
Airspace; Lake City, FL
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
This action establishes Class
D airspace and Class E surface area
airspace at Lake City, FL, providing the
controlled airspace required for the Air
Traffic Control Tower at Lake City
Gateway Airport. This action also
amends existing Class E airspace by
recognizing the airport’s name change.
Controlled airspace is necessary for the
safety and management of instrument
flight rules (IFR) operations at the
airport. A minor adjustment is made to
the geographic coordinates of the
airport.
SUMMARY:
Effective 0901 UTC, May 26,
2016. The Director of the Federal
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the annual revision of FAA Order
7400.9 and publication of conforming
amendments.
DATES:
FAA Order 7400.9Z,
Airspace Designations and Reporting
Points, and subsequent amendments can
ADDRESSES:
E:\FR\FM\06APR1.SGM
06APR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 66 (Wednesday, April 6, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 19857-19858]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07896]
========================================================================
Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents
having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed
to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published
under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents.
Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each
week.
========================================================================
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 66 / Wednesday, April 6, 2016 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 19857]]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
6 CFR Part 5
[Docket No. DHS-2016-0025]
Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of
Homeland Security/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database
System of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is issuing a final
rule to amend its regulations to exempt portions of an existing system
of records titled, ``Department of Homeland Security/ALL-030 Use of the
Terrorist Screening Database System of Records'' from certain
provisions of the Privacy Act. Specifically, the Department exempts
portions of the ``Department of Homeland Security/ALL-030 Use of the
Terrorist Screening Database System of Records'' from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of criminal, civil, and
administrative enforcement requirements.
DATES: This final rule is effective April 6, 2016.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karen L. Neuman, (202) 343-1717, Chief
Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register at 81 FR 3758, on January
22, 2016, to exempt portions of the system of records from one or more
provisions of the Privacy Act because of criminal, civil, and
administrative enforcement requirements. DHS issued the ``Department of
Homeland Security/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database
System of Records'' in the Federal Register at 81 FR 3811 on January
22, 2016, to provide notice to the public that DHS was adding two new
consumers to the ``DHS Watchlist Service.'' DHS also clarified an
existing category of individuals, added two new categories of
individuals, and clarified the categories of records maintained in this
system. DHS invited comments on both the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) and System of Records Notice (SORN).
II. Public Comments
DHS received three comments. Two comments were from private
individuals who complemented DHS for this update. DHS received an
identical comment from a public interest research center on the SORN
and NPRM. The commenter raised concerns regarding the number of
exemptions taken by DHS, particularly exemptions related to access and
accounting for disclosures. Specifically, the commenter questioned the
need to exempt records once an investigation was complete.
In response, DHS emphasizes that the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB) belongs to the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). DHS does not change or alter these records. All
records within the DHS/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database
System of Records are collected and disseminated by the DOJ/FBI and are
covered by the DOJ/FBI-019, ``Terrorist Screening Records Center
System,'' 72 FR 77846 (Dec. 14, 2011). Because DHS does not make any
changes to the records obtained from DOJ/FBI, the same exemptions
outlined in the DOJ/FBI SORN, and reasons provided in its implementing
regulations for use of such exemptions at 28 CFR 16.96, transfer and
apply. For instance, disclosing this information to individuals who
have been misidentified as known or suspected terrorists due to a close
name similarity, and of which the investigation has been completed,
could reveal the Government's investigative interest in a terrorist
suspect for an ongoing investigation, because it could make known the
name of the individual who actually is the subject of the Government's
interest. Similarly, providing any type of notice to a misidentified
known or suspected terrorist due to a close name similarity could alert
the actual known or suspected terrorist of the Government's
investigative interest in that individual. Further, amendment of these
records would impose an impossible administrative burden by requiring
investigations, analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated
and revised. DHS is not taking any new exemptions as a result of the
expansion to the categories of individuals in the TSDB. As noted in the
NPRM, permitting access and amendment to watchlist records could
disclose sensitive information that could be detrimental to national
security. Release of the accounting of disclosures could reveal the
details of watchlist matching measures, as well as capabilities and
vulnerabilities of the watchlist matching process, the release of which
could permit an individual to evade future detection and thereby impede
efforts to ensure national security.
However, DHS does agree that some of the exemptions proposed in the
NPRM are unnecessary. With the publication of this Final Rule, DHS is
removing the exemption from subsections 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(4)(G),
(e)(4)(H), and (e)(4)(I) (Agency Requirements) and (f) (Agency Rules),
because DHS has already established requirements, rules, or procedures
with respect to individual access and will review each request for
access on a case-by-case basis. Concurrent with this Final Rule, DHS is
republishing the DHS/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database
System of Records to reflect this change.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5
Freedom of information, Privacy.
For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS amends chapter I of
title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:
PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION
0
1. The authority citation for part 5 continues to read as follows:
Authority: Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135; (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.); 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.
Subpart B also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552a.
[[Page 19858]]
0
2. In appendix C to part 5, revise paragraph 66 to read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy
Act
* * * * *
0
66. The DHS/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database System of
Records consists of electronic and paper records and will be used by
DHS and its Components. The DHS/ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening
Database System of Records is a repository of information held by DHS
in connection with its several and varied missions and functions,
including, the enforcement of civil and criminal laws; investigations,
inquiries, and proceedings thereunder; and national security and
intelligence activities. The Terrorist Screening Database belongs to
the Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
DHS does not change or alter these records. All records within the DHS/
ALL-030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database System of Records are
collected and disseminated by the DOJ/FBI and are covered by the DOJ/
FBI-019, ``Terrorist Screening Records Center System,'' 72 FR 77846
(Dec. 14, 2011). Because DHS does not make any changes to the records
obtained from DOJ/FBI, the same exemptions outlined in the DOJ/FBI
SORN, and reasons provided in its implementing regulations for use of
such exemptions at 28 CFR 16.96, transfer and apply. The Secretary of
Homeland Security, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), has exempted this
system from the following provisions of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C.
552a(c)(3), (c)(4), (d), (e)(1), (e)(2), (e)(3), (e)(5), (e)(8), and
(g). When a record has been received from DOJ/FBI-019 Terrorist
Screening Records System of Records and has been exempted in that
source system, DHS will claim the same exemptions for those records
that are claimed for that original primary system of records from which
they originated and claims any additional exemptions set forth here.
Exemptions from these particular subsections are justified, on a case-
by-case basis to be determined at the time a request is made, for the
following reasons:
(a) From subsection (c)(3) and (4) (Accounting for Disclosures)
because release of the accounting of disclosures could alert the
subject of an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil,
or regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and
reveal investigative interest on the part of DHS as well as the
recipient agency. Disclosure of the accounting would therefore present
a serious impediment to law enforcement efforts and/or efforts to
preserve national security. Disclosure of the accounting would also
permit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and to avoid
detection or apprehension, which would undermine the entire
investigative process.
(b) From subsection (d) (Access to Records) because access to the
records contained in this system of records could inform the subject of
an investigation of an actual or potential criminal, civil, or
regulatory violation to the existence of that investigation and reveal
investigative interest on the part of DHS or another agency. Access to
the records could permit the individual who is the subject of a record
to impede the investigation, to tamper with witnesses or evidence, and
to avoid detection or apprehension. Amendment of the records could
interfere with ongoing investigations and law enforcement activities
and would impose an unreasonable administrative burden by requiring
investigations to be continually reinvestigated. In addition,
permitting access and amendment to such information could disclose
security-sensitive information that could be detrimental to homeland
security.
(c) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of Information)
because in the course of investigations into potential violations of
Federal law, the accuracy of information obtained or introduced
occasionally may be unclear, or the information may not be strictly
relevant or necessary to a specific investigation. In the interests of
effective law enforcement, it is appropriate to retain all information
that may aid in establishing patterns of unlawful activity.
(d) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from
Individuals) because requiring that information be collected from the
subject of an investigation would alert the subject to the nature or
existence of the investigation, thereby interfering with that
investigation and related law enforcement activities.
(e) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects) because providing
such detailed information could impede law enforcement by compromising
the existence of a confidential investigation or reveal the identity of
witnesses or confidential informants.
(f) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because with
the collection of information for law enforcement purposes, it is
impossible to determine in advance what information is accurate,
relevant, timely, and complete. Compliance with subsection (e)(5) would
preclude DHS agents from using their investigative training and
exercise of good judgment to both conduct and report on investigations.
(g) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because
compliance would interfere with DHS's ability to obtain, serve, and
issue subpoenas, warrants, and other law enforcement mechanisms that
may be filed under seal and could result in disclosure of investigative
techniques, procedures, and evidence.
(h) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.
* * * * *
Dated: March 22, 2016.
Karen L. Neuman,
Chief Privacy Officer, Department of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2016-07896 Filed 4-5-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-9B-P
