Duke Energy Florida, Inc. Crystal River, Unit 3, 18652-18656 [2016-07305]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 62 / Thursday, March 31, 2016 / Notices
Clearance Officer, David Cullison,
Office of the Chief Information Officer,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone:
(301) 415–2084; email:
INFOCOLLECTS.Resource@NRC.GOV.
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B. Submitting Comments
The NRC cautions you not to include
identifying or contact information in
comment submissions that you do not
want to be publicly disclosed in your
comment submission. All comment
submissions are posted at https://
www.regulations.gov and entered into
ADAMS. Comment submissions are not
routinely edited to remove identifying
or contact information.
If you are requesting or aggregating
comments from other persons for
submission to the OMB, then you
should inform those persons not to
include identifying or contact
information that they do not want to be
publicly disclosed in their comment
submission. Your request should state
that comment submissions are not
routinely edited to remove such
information before making the comment
submissions available to the public or
entering the comment into ADAMS.
II. Background
Under the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. Chapter 35), the NRC recently
submitted a request for renewal of an
existing collection of information to
OMB for review titled, ‘‘Specific
Domestic Licenses to Manufacture or
Transfer Certain Items Containing
Byproduct Material.’’ The NRC hereby
informs potential respondents that an
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and
that a person is not required to respond
to, a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control
number. The NRC published a Federal
Register notice with a 60-day comment
period on this information collection on
September 10, 2015 (80 FR 54596).
1. The title of the information
collection: 10 CFR part 32, ‘‘Specific
Domestic Licenses to Manufacture or
Transfer Certain Items Containing
Byproduct Material.’’
2. OMB approval number: 3150–0001.
3. Type of submission: Extension.
4. The form number if applicable:
NRC Form 653, NRC Form 653A, and
NRC Form 653B.
5. How often the collection is required
or requested: There is a one-time
submittal of information to receive a
certificate of registration for a sealed
source and/or device. Certificates of
registration for sealed sources and/or
devices can be amended at any time. In
addition, licensee recordkeeping must
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be performed on an on-going basis, and
reporting of transfer of byproduct
material must be reported every
calendar year, and in some cases, every
calendar quarter.
6. Who will be required or asked to
respond: All specific licensees who
manufacture or initially transfer items
containing byproduct material for sale
or distribution to general licensees, or
persons exempt from licensing, medical
use product distributors to specific
licensees, and those requesting a
certificate of registration for a sealed
source and/or device.
7. The estimated number of annual
responses: 3,937 [2,807 responses (446
NRC responses + 2,361 Agreement State
responses)] + 535 recordkeepers (172
NRC + 363 Agreement State) + 595
third-party recordkeepers (186 NRC +
409 Agreement State)].
8. The estimated number of annual
respondents: 713 (204 NRC licensees,
registration certificate holders and 509
Agreement State licensees and
registration certificate holders).
9. An estimate of the total number of
hours needed annually to comply with
the information collection requirement
or request: 164,608 (13,139 reporting +
1,257 recordkeeping + 150,212 thirdparty).
10. Abstract: Part 32 of title 10 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
establishes requirements for specific
licenses for the introduction of
byproduct material into products or
materials and transfer of the products or
materials to general licensees, or
persons exempt from licensing, medical
use product distributors to specific
licensees, and those requesting a
certificate of registration for a sealed
source and/or device. It also prescribes
requirements governing holders of the
specific licenses. Some of the
requirements are for information which
must be submitted in an application for
a certificate of registration for a sealed
source and/or device, records which
must be kept, reports which must be
submitted, and information which must
be forwarded to general licensees and
persons exempt from licensing. As
mentioned, 10 CFR part 32 also
prescribes requirements for the issuance
of certificates of registration (concerning
radiation safety information about a
product) to manufacturers or initial
transferors of sealed sources and
devices. Submission or retention of the
information is mandatory for persons
subject to the 10 CFR part 32
requirements. The information is used
by the NRC to make licensing and other
regulatory determinations concerning
the use of radioactive byproduct
material in products and devices.
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Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 25th day
of March 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brenda Miles,
Acting NRC Clearance Officer, Office of the
Chief Information Officer.
[FR Doc. 2016–07212 Filed 3–30–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–302; NRC–2016–0048]
Duke Energy Florida, Inc. Crystal
River, Unit 3
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
AGENCY:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption from the requirement to
maintain a specified level of onsite
property damage insurance in response
to a request from Duke Energy Florida,
Inc. (DEF or the licensee) dated
December 17, 2015. This exemption
would permit the licensee to reduce its
onsite property damage insurance from
$1.06 billion to $50 million at the
Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generating
Station (CR–3) based on the reduced
risks and consequences of a nuclear
incident at a decommissioning nuclear
power reactor.
DATES: March 31, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID
NRC–2016–0048 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of
information regarding this document.
You may obtain publicly-available
information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
• Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov and search
for Docket ID NRC–2016–0048. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol
Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463;
email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For
technical questions, contact the
individual listed in the FOR FURTHER
INFORMATION CONTACT section of this
document.
• NRC’s Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents on-line in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at
https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC’s Public
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 62 / Thursday, March 31, 2016 / Notices
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced in this document
(if that document is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
a document is referenced.
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and
purchase copies of public documents at
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
B. Hickman, Office of Nuclear Material
Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415–
3017; email: John.Hickman@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The CR–3 facility is a
decommissioning power reactor located
in Citrus County, Florida. The licensee,
DEF, is the holder of CR–3 Facility
Operating License No. DPR–72. The
license provides, among other things,
that the facility is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the NRC now
or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated February 20, 2013
(ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A005),
DEF submitted to the NRC a
certification in accordance with section
50.82(a)(1)(i) of title 10 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) indicating
it would permanently cease power
operations, and with 10 CFR
50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently
defueled the reactor vessel at CR–3. On
May 28, 2011, DEF completed the final
removal of fuel from the reactor vessel
at CR–3. Because CR–3 is a permanently
shutdown and defueled facility, and in
accordance with section 50.82(a)(2),
DEF is no longer authorized to operate
the reactor or emplace nuclear fuel into
the reactor vessel. The licensee is still
authorized to possess and store
irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel. The
spent fuel is currently being stored
onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP).
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II. Request/Action
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific
exemptions,’’ DEF requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by
a letter dated December 17, 2015
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15351A490).
The exemption from the requirements of
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit DEF
to reduce the amount of its onsite
property damage insurance from $1.06
billion to $50 million.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
requires each licensee to have and
maintain onsite property damage
insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor
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site in the event of an accident. The
onsite insurance coverage must be either
$1.06 billion or whatever amount of
insurance is generally available from
private sources (whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk and
consequences of an accident at a
permanently shutdown and defueled
reactor are much less than the risk and
consequences from an accident at an
operating power reactor. In addition,
since reactor operation is no longer
authorized at CR–3, no events could
occur that would require the
stabilization of reactor conditions after
an accident. Similarly, the risk of an
accident that would result in significant
onsite contamination at CR–3 is also
much lower than the risk of such an
event at operating reactors. Therefore,
DEF is requesting an exemption from 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite
property damage insurance from $1.06
billion to $50 million, commensurate
with the reduced risk of an accident at
the permanently shutdown and
defueled CR–3 site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may, upon application by any interested
person or upon its own initiative, grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions
are authorized by law, will not present
an undue risk to public health or safety,
and are consistent with the common
defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after
the Three Mile Island accident in 1979
out of concern that licensees may be
unable to financially cover onsite
cleanup costs in the event of a major
nuclear accident. The NRC based the
$1.06 billion coverage amount
requirement on an analysis of an
accident at a nuclear reactor operating at
power that results in a large fission
product release and requires significant
resource expenditures to stabilize the
reactor conditions and ultimately
decontaminate and remediate the site.
These activities would be similar to the
stabilization and cleanup activities at
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
facility following the damage from a
severe earthquake and tsunami.
The NRC developed these cost
estimates based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating
nuclear reactor and the consequences of
a release of radioactive material from
the reactor. Although the risk of an
accident at an operating reactor is very
low, the consequences can be large. In
an operating plant, the high temperature
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and pressure of the reactor coolant
system (RCS), as well as the inventory
of relatively short-lived radionuclides,
contribute to both the risk and
consequences of an accident. With the
permanent cessation of reactor
operations at CR–3 (i.e., the reactor,
RCS, and supporting systems no longer
operate) and the permanent removal of
the fuel from the reactor core,
postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or
supporting systems are no longer
possible. Additionally, these systems
and components cannot support the
storage of the irradiated fuel.
During reactor decommissioning, the
principal radiological risks are
associated with the storage of spent fuel
onsite. In its December 17, 2015,
exemption request, DEF discusses both
design-basis and beyond-design-basis
events involving irradiated fuel stored
in the SFP. The licensee states that there
are no possible design-basis events at
CR–3 that could result in a radiological
release exceeding the limits established
by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency’s (EPA) early-phase Protective
Action Guidelines (PAG) of 1 Roentgen
Equivalent Man (REM) at the exclusion
area boundary. The only accident that
might lead to a significant radiological
release at the decommissioning reactor
is a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire
scenario is a postulated, but highly
unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident
scenario that involves loss of all water
inventory from the SFP, resulting in a
significant heat-up of the spent fuel, and
culminating in substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage.
The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of
the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium
fire scenario continue to decrease as a
function of the time that CR–3 has been
permanently shut down.
The licensee provided a detailed
analysis of hypothetical beyond-designbasis accidents that could result in a
radiological release at CR–3 in its
September 6, 2013, emergency
planning-related license amendment
and exemption requests (ADAMS
Accession No. ML13274A584). One of
these beyond-design-basis accidents
involves a complete loss of SFP water
inventory, where cooling of the spent
fuel would be primarily accomplished
by natural circulation of air through the
uncovered spent fuel assemblies. The
licensee’s analysis of this accident
shows that as of September 26, 2013,
air-cooling of the spent fuel assemblies
will be sufficient to keep the fuel within
a safe temperature range indefinitely
without fuel damage or radiological
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 62 / Thursday, March 31, 2016 / Notices
release. This is important because the
NRC staff has previously authorized a
lesser amount of onsite property damage
insurance coverage based on analysis of
the zirconium fire risk. In SECY–96–
256, ‘‘Changes to Financial Protection
Requirements for Permanently
Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors, 10
CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,’’
dated December 17, 1996 (ADAMS
Accession No. ML15062A483), the staff
recommended changes to the power
reactor insurance regulations that would
allow licensees to lower onsite
insurance levels to $50 million upon
demonstration that the fuel stored in the
SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff
Requirements Memorandum to SECY–
96–256, dated January 28, 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454),
the Commission supported the staff’s
recommendation that, among other
things, would allow permanently
shutdown power reactor licensees to
reduce commercial onsite property
damage insurance coverage to $50
million when the licensee was able to
demonstrate the technical criterion that
the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the
SFP was drained of water. The staff has
used this technical criterion to grant
similar exemptions to other
decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g.,
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station,
published in the Federal Register on
January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion
Nuclear Power Station, published in the
Federal Register on December 28, 1999
(64 FR 72700); and Kewaunee Nuclear
Power Plant, published in the Federal
Register on April 13, 2015 (80 FR
19697)). The NRC based these prior
exemptions on the licensees’
demonstrating that the SFP could be aircooled, consistent with the technical
criterion discussed above.
In SECY–00–0145, ‘‘Integrated
Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,’’ dated June 28,
2000, and SECY–01–0100, ‘‘Policy
Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance,
and Emergency Preparedness
Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in
the Spent Fuel Pools,’’ dated June 4,
2001 (ADAMS Accession Nos.
ML003721626 and ML011450420,
respectively), the NRC staff discussed
additional information concerning SFP
zirconium fire risks at decommissioning
reactors and associated implications for
onsite property damage insurance. As
discussed in SECY–00–0145, providing
an analysis of when the spent fuel
stored in the SFP is capable of aircooling is one measure that a licensee
can use to demonstrate that the
probability of a zirconium fire is
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exceedingly low. More recently, as
discussed in SECY–01–0100, the staff
has used an additional analysis that
bounds an incomplete drain down of
the SFP water or some other
catastrophic event (such as a complete
drainage of the SFP with rearrangement
of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The
analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via
conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is
often referred to as an adiabatic heatup
analysis.
The DEF analyses, as referenced in
DEF’s December 15, 2015, exemption
request, demonstrate that under
conditions where the SFP water
inventory has drained and only aircooling of the stored irradiated fuel is
available, there is reasonable assurance
that as of September 26, 2013, the CR–
3 spent fuel will remain at temperatures
far below those associated with a
significant radiological release. In
addition, the licensee has also provided
an adiabatic heatup analysis,
demonstrating that as of September 26,
2013, there will be at least 19.7 hours
after the loss of all means of cooling
(both air and/or water) before the spent
fuel cladding would reach a temperature
where the potential for a significant
offsite radiological release could occur.
The licensee states that should all
means to cool the spent fuel be lost, 19.7
hours is sufficient time for personnel to
respond with additional resources,
equipment, and capability to restore
cooling to the SFP, even after a noncredible, catastrophic event.
In the NRC’s March 30, 2015, safety
evaluation (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15058A906) of the licensee’s request
for exemptions from certain emergency
planning requirements, the NRC staff
assessed the DEF accident analyses
associated with the radiological risks
from a zirconium fire at the
permanently shutdown and defueled
CR–3 site. The staff has confirmed that
under conditions where cooling airflow
can develop, suitably conservative
calculations indicate that as of
September 26, 2013, the fuel will
remain at temperatures where the
cladding will be undamaged for an
unlimited period. For the very unlikely
beyond-design-basis accident scenario,
where the SFP coolant inventory is lost
in such a manner that all methods of
heat removal from the spent fuel are no
longer available, there will be a
minimum of 19.7 hours from the
initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where
offsite radiological release might occur.
The staff found that 19.7 hours was
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sufficient time to support deployment of
mitigation equipment to prevent the
zirconium cladding from reaching a
point of rapid oxidation. Even more
time would be available now, given that
more than two years have passed since
the analysis was performed and the
risks from a zirconium fire scenario
continue to decrease as a function of the
time that the fuel has cooled since CR–
3 permanently shut down.
In response to a request for additional
information related to the licensee’s
request for exemptions from certain
emergency planning requirements, the
licensee also provided an analysis of a
postulated airborne dispersal of
radioactive waste resin upon dropping a
High Integrity Container (HIC) outside
the power block. Although an airborne
release is not expected to occur with a
drop, or while in storage awaiting
shipment, due to the low flammability
and reactivity of the spent resin, a
release is nevertheless postulated. The
event is based on a release of radioactive
material with activity and isotopic mix
taken from the resin shipments that
occurred during a recent 51⁄2 year
period. The licensee reviewed resin
shipments made from 2008 through
June 2013 and obtained the isotopic
distribution (except for Cobalt-60) from
the shipment with the highest overall
activity. Cobalt-60 activity was taken
from a different shipment to assure that
the highest activity was used and the
dose was maximized. This created a
composite maximum shipment having a
total activity of approximately 116
curies, which is approximately twice
the activity of the average shipment
made during this period. The analysis
assumed a release of 10 percent of the
total radioactive material inventory and
that the release would occur outside of
the CR–3 site’s Auxiliary Building on
the south berm. The analysis of the
dropped spent resin HIC consequences
indicates that the dose would be 40
mrem total effective dose equivalent at
the site boundary over a 2-hour period,
which is well below the PAG limit of 1
rem.
In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff
provided its basis as to why it considers
$50 million to be an adequate level of
onsite property damage insurance for a
decommissioning reactor, once the
spent fuel in the SFP is no longer
susceptible to a zirconium fire. The staff
has postulated that there is still a
potential for other radiological incidents
at a decommissioning reactor that could
result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire.
In SECY–96–256, the NRC staff cited the
rupture of a large contaminated liquid
storage tank, causing soil contamination
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and potential groundwater
contamination, as the most costly
postulated event to decontaminate and
remediate (other than a SFP zirconium
fire). The NRC determined that the
postulated large liquid radiological
waste storage tank rupture event would
have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of
approximately $50 million.
The NRC staff has found that DEF’s
proposed reduction in onsite property
damage insurance coverage to a level of
$50 million is consistent with SECY–
96–256. In addition, the staff notes that
there is a precedent of granting a similar
exemption to other permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactor
licensees. As previously stated, the staff
concluded that as of September 26,
2013, sufficient irradiated fuel decay
time has elapsed at CR–3 to decrease to
negligible levels the probability of an
onsite radiological release from a
postulated zirconium fire accident. In
addition, the licensee’s proposal to
reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50
million is consistent with the maximum
estimated cleanup costs for the recovery
from the rupture of a large liquid
radiological waste storage tank.
IV. Regulatory Requirements
A. Authorized by Law
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission
may grant exemptions from the
regulations in 10 CFR part 50 that the
Commission determines are authorized
by law. The NRC staff has determined
that granting of the licensee’s proposed
exemption will not result in a violation
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, or other laws. Therefore, the
exemption is authorized by law.
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B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and
Safety
The NRC established the onsite
property damage insurance
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to
provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident,
onsite conditions could be stabilized
and the site decontaminated. The
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and
the existing level of onsite insurance
coverage for CR–3 are predicated on the
assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, CR–3 is a permanently
shutdown and defueled facility. As
explained in section III of this
document, the permanently defueled
status of the facility has resulted in a
significant reduction in the number and
severity of potential accidents, and
correspondingly, a significant reduction
in the potential for and severity of
onsite property damage. The proposed
reduction in the amount of onsite
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insurance coverage does not impact the
probability or consequences of potential
accidents. The proposed level of
insurance coverage is commensurate
with the reduced risk and reduced cost
consequences of potential nuclear
accidents at CR–3. Therefore, the NRC
staff concludes that granting the
requested exemption will not present an
undue risk to the health and safety of
the public.
C. Consistent With the Common Defense
and Security
The proposed exemption would not
eliminate any requirements associated
with physical protection of the site and
would not adversely affect DEF’s ability
to physically secure the site or protect
special nuclear material. Physical
security measures at CR–3 are not
affected by the requested exemption.
Therefore, the proposed exemption is
consistent with the common defense
and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special
circumstances are present if the
application of the regulation in the
particular circumstances would not
serve the underlying purpose of the rule
or is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. The
underlying purpose of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable
assurance that adequate funds will be
available to stabilize conditions and
cover onsite cleanup costs associated
with site decontamination, following an
accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological
material. As explained in section III of
this document, because CR–3 is
permanently shut down and defueled,
the radiological consequences of designbasis accidents or other credible events
at CR–3 cannot possibly exceed the
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion
area boundary. The licensee has
performed site-specific analyses of
highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis
zirconium fire accidents involving the
stored irradiated fuel in the SFP. The
analyses show that as of September 26,
2013, the probabilities of such an
accident are minimal. The NRC staff’s
evaluation of the licensee’s analyses
confirm this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that DEF’s
proposed $50 million level of onsite
insurance is consistent with the
bounding cleanup and decontamination
cost, as discussed in SECY–96–256, to
account for hypothetical rupture of a
large liquid radiological waste tank at
the CR–3 site, should such an event
occur. Therefore, the staff concludes
that the application of the current
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18655
requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to
maintain $1.06 billion in onsite
insurance coverage is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the
rule for the permanently shutdown and
defueled CR–3 reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special
circumstances are present whenever
compliance would result in undue
hardship or other costs that are
significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted, or that are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated. The NRC staff
concludes that if the licensee were
required to continue to maintain an
onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion,
the associated insurance premiums
would be in excess of those necessary
and commensurate with the radiological
contamination risks posed by the site. In
addition, such insurance levels would
be significantly in excess of other
decommissioning reactor facilities that
have been granted similar exemptions
by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that DEF’s
compliance with the existing rule would
result in an undue hardship or other
costs that are significantly in excess of
those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted and are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances
required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC approval of the exemption
from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of
actions that the Commission, by rule or
regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion from further
environmental analysis, after first
finding that the category of actions does
not individually or cumulatively have a
significant effect on the human
environment. Specifically, the
exemption is categorically excluded
from further analysis under
§ 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting
an exemption from the requirements of
any regulation in Chapter I of 10 CFR is
a categorical exclusion provided that:
(1) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (2) there is no significant
change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents
that may be released offsite; (3) there is
no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational
radiation exposure; (4) there is no
significant construction impact; (5)
there is no significant increase in the
potential for or consequences from
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18656
Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 62 / Thursday, March 31, 2016 / Notices
radiological accidents; and (6) the
requirements from which an exemption
is sought involve: Surety, insurance, or
indemnity requirements.
Utilizing the standards set forth in 10
CFR 50.92, the NRC has determined that
approval of the exemption request
involves no significant hazards
consideration because reducing the
licensee’s onsite property damage
insurance for CR–3 does not: (1) Involve
a significant increase in the probability
or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; or (2) create the
possibility of a new or different kind of
accident from any accident previously
evaluated; or (3) involve a significant
reduction in a margin of safety. The
exempted financial protection
regulation is unrelated to the operation
of CR–3. Accordingly, there is no
significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of
any effluents that may be released
offsite; and no significant increase in
individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The
exempted regulation is not associated
with construction, so there is no
significant construction impact. The
exempted regulation does not concern
the source term (i.e., potential amount
of radiation in an accident), nor
mitigation. Therefore, there is no
significant increase in the potential for,
or consequences of, a radiological
accident. In addition, there would be no
significant impacts to biota, water
resources, historic properties, cultural
resources, or socioeconomic conditions
in the region. The requirement for onsite
property damage insurance may be
viewed as involving surety, insurance,
or indemnity matters.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR
51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
approval of this exemption request.
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
V. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the requested exemption is
authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to the public health and
safety, and is consistent with the
common defense and security. Also,
special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants DEF an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), to
permit the licensee to reduce its onsite
property damage insurance to a level of
$50 million.
The exemption is effective upon
issuance.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
19:09 Mar 30, 2016
Jkt 238001
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day
of March 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John R. Tappert,
Director, Division of Decommissioning,
Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs,
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016–07305 Filed 3–30–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION
Proposed Submission of Information
Collection for OMB Review; Comment
Request; Filings for Reconsideration
Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation.
ACTION: Notice of intent to request
extension of OMB approval of
information collection.
AGENCY:
The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (‘‘PBGC’’) intends to
request the Office of Management and
Budget (‘‘OMB’’) to extend approval
without change, under the Paperwork
Reduction Act, of a collection of
information under its regulation on
Rules for Administrative Review of
Agency Decisions. This notice informs
the public of PBGC’s intent and solicits
public comment on the collection of
information.
SUMMARY:
Comments should be submitted
by May 31, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be
submitted by any of the following
methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the Web
site instructions for submitting
comments.
Email: paperwork.comments@
pbgc.gov.
Fax: 202–326–4224.
Mail or Hand Delivery: Regulatory
Affairs Group, Office of the General
Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, 1200 K Street NW.,
Washington, DC 20005–4026.
PBGC will make all comments
available on its Web site, www.pbgc.gov.
Copies of the collection of
information may also be obtained
without charge by writing to the
Disclosure Division of the Office of the
General Counsel of PBGC at the above
address or by visiting the Disclosure
Division or calling 202–326–4040
during normal business hours. (TTY and
TDD users may call the Federal relay
service toll-free at 1–800–877–8339 and
ask to be connected to 202–326–4040.)
PBGC’s regulation on Administrative
DATES:
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Appeals may be accessed on PBGC’s
Web site at www.pbgc.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Deborah C. Murphy, Deputy Assistant
General Counsel, or Donald McCabe,
Attorney, Regulatory Affairs Group,
Office of the General Counsel, Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 1200 K
Street NW., Washington, DC 20005–
4026, 202–326–4400. (For TTY and
TDD, call 800–877–8339 and request
connection to 202–326–4024.)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PBGC’s
regulation on Rules for Administrative
Review of Agency Decisions (29 CFR
part 4003) prescribes rules governing
the issuance of initial determinations by
PBGC and the procedures for requesting
and obtaining administrative review of
initial determinations through
reconsideration or appeal. Subpart A of
the regulation specifies which initial
determinations are subject to
reconsideration. Subpart C prescribes
rules on who may request
reconsideration, when to make such a
request, where to submit it, form and
content of reconsideration requests, and
other matters relating to
reconsiderations.
Any person aggrieved by an initial
determination of PBGC under
§ 4003.1(b)(1) (determinations that a
plan is covered by section 4021 of
ERISA), § 4003.1(b)(2) (determinations
concerning premiums, interest, and late
payment penalties under section 4007 of
ERISA), § 4003.1(b)(3) (determinations
concerning voluntary terminations),
§ 4003.1(b)(4) (determinations
concerning allocation of assets under
section 4044 of ERISA), or § 4003.1(b)(5)
(determinations with respect to
penalties under section 4071 of ERISA)
may request reconsideration of the
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and a person is not required to respond
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PBGC estimates that an average of
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E:\FR\FM\31MRN1.SGM
31MRN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 62 (Thursday, March 31, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 18652-18656]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-07305]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-302; NRC-2016-0048]
Duke Energy Florida, Inc. Crystal River, Unit 3
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Exemption; issuance.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an
exemption from the requirement to maintain a specified level of onsite
property damage insurance in response to a request from Duke Energy
Florida, Inc. (DEF or the licensee) dated December 17, 2015. This
exemption would permit the licensee to reduce its onsite property
damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million at the Crystal River
Unit 3 Nuclear Generating Station (CR-3) based on the reduced risks and
consequences of a nuclear incident at a decommissioning nuclear power
reactor.
DATES: March 31, 2016.
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0048 when contacting the
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document
using any of the following methods:
Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0048. Address
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of
this document.
NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents on-line in the
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS,
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by
[[Page 18653]]
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each
document referenced in this document (if that document is available in
ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced.
NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John B. Hickman, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3017; email:
John.Hickman@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The CR-3 facility is a decommissioning power reactor located in
Citrus County, Florida. The licensee, DEF, is the holder of CR-3
Facility Operating License No. DPR-72. The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations,
and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML13056A005), DEF submitted to the NRC a certification in accordance
with section 50.82(a)(1)(i) of title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR) indicating it would permanently cease power
operations, and with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii) that it had permanently
defueled the reactor vessel at CR-3. On May 28, 2011, DEF completed the
final removal of fuel from the reactor vessel at CR-3. Because CR-3 is
a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and in accordance with
section 50.82(a)(2), DEF is no longer authorized to operate the reactor
or emplace nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. The licensee is still
authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent) nuclear fuel.
The spent fuel is currently being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool
(SFP).
II. Request/Action
Under 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' DEF requested an
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) by a letter dated December 17, 2015
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15351A490). The exemption from the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit DEF to reduce the amount of its
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million.
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires each licensee to have
and maintain onsite property damage insurance to stabilize and
decontaminate the reactor and reactor site in the event of an accident.
The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources
(whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk and consequences of an accident
at a permanently shutdown and defueled reactor are much less than the
risk and consequences from an accident at an operating power reactor.
In addition, since reactor operation is no longer authorized at CR-3,
no events could occur that would require the stabilization of reactor
conditions after an accident. Similarly, the risk of an accident that
would result in significant onsite contamination at CR-3 is also much
lower than the risk of such an event at operating reactors. Therefore,
DEF is requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its
onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million,
commensurate with the reduced risk of an accident at the permanently
shutdown and defueled CR-3 site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any
interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized
by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and
are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the
special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 out of concern
that licensees may be unable to financially cover onsite cleanup costs
in the event of a major nuclear accident. The NRC based the $1.06
billion coverage amount requirement on an analysis of an accident at a
nuclear reactor operating at power that results in a large fission
product release and requires significant resource expenditures to
stabilize the reactor conditions and ultimately decontaminate and
remediate the site. These activities would be similar to the
stabilization and cleanup activities at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power facility following the damage from a severe earthquake and
tsunami.
The NRC developed these cost estimates based on the spectrum of
postulated accidents for an operating nuclear reactor and the
consequences of a release of radioactive material from the reactor.
Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor is very low,
the consequences can be large. In an operating plant, the high
temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant system (RCS), as well
as the inventory of relatively short-lived radionuclides, contribute to
both the risk and consequences of an accident. With the permanent
cessation of reactor operations at CR-3 (i.e., the reactor, RCS, and
supporting systems no longer operate) and the permanent removal of the
fuel from the reactor core, postulated accidents involving failure or
malfunction of the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer
possible. Additionally, these systems and components cannot support the
storage of the irradiated fuel.
During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its December
17, 2015, exemption request, DEF discusses both design-basis and
beyond-design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP.
The licensee states that there are no possible design-basis events at
CR-3 that could result in a radiological release exceeding the limits
established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) early-
phase Protective Action Guidelines (PAG) of 1 Roentgen Equivalent Man
(REM) at the exclusion area boundary. The only accident that might lead
to a significant radiological release at the decommissioning reactor is
a zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but
highly unlikely, beyond-design-basis accident scenario that involves
loss of all water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant
heat-up of the spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium
cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in
the SFP. Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue
to decrease as a function of the time that CR-3 has been permanently
shut down.
The licensee provided a detailed analysis of hypothetical beyond-
design-basis accidents that could result in a radiological release at
CR-3 in its September 6, 2013, emergency planning-related license
amendment and exemption requests (ADAMS Accession No. ML13274A584). One
of these beyond-design-basis accidents involves a complete loss of SFP
water inventory, where cooling of the spent fuel would be primarily
accomplished by natural circulation of air through the uncovered spent
fuel assemblies. The licensee's analysis of this accident shows that as
of September 26, 2013, air-cooling of the spent fuel assemblies will be
sufficient to keep the fuel within a safe temperature range
indefinitely without fuel damage or radiological
[[Page 18654]]
release. This is important because the NRC staff has previously
authorized a lesser amount of onsite property damage insurance coverage
based on analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In SECY-96-256, ``Changes
to Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear
Power Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December
17, 1996 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483), the staff recommended
changes to the power reactor insurance regulations that would allow
licensees to lower onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon
demonstration that the fuel stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its
Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY-96-256, dated January 28, 1997
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A454), the Commission supported the staff's
recommendation that, among other things, would allow permanently
shutdown power reactor licensees to reduce commercial onsite property
damage insurance coverage to $50 million when the licensee was able to
demonstrate the technical criterion that the spent fuel could be air-
cooled if the SFP was drained of water. The staff has used this
technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to other
decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power
Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64 FR
2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal Register on
December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); and Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant,
published in the Federal Register on April 13, 2015 (80 FR 19697)). The
NRC based these prior exemptions on the licensees' demonstrating that
the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent with the technical criterion
discussed above.
In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100,
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants
Storing Fuel in the Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS
Accession Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC
staff discussed additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire
risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for
onsite property damage insurance. As discussed in SECY-00-0145,
providing an analysis of when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is
capable of air-cooling is one measure that a licensee can use to
demonstrate that the probability of a zirconium fire is exceedingly
low. More recently, as discussed in SECY-01-0100, the staff has used an
additional analysis that bounds an incomplete drain down of the SFP
water or some other catastrophic event (such as a complete drainage of
the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel rack geometry and/or the
addition of rubble to the SFP). The analysis postulates that decay heat
transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, convection, or radiation
would be impeded. This analysis is often referred to as an adiabatic
heatup analysis.
The DEF analyses, as referenced in DEF's December 15, 2015,
exemption request, demonstrate that under conditions where the SFP
water inventory has drained and only air-cooling of the stored
irradiated fuel is available, there is reasonable assurance that as of
September 26, 2013, the CR-3 spent fuel will remain at temperatures far
below those associated with a significant radiological release. In
addition, the licensee has also provided an adiabatic heatup analysis,
demonstrating that as of September 26, 2013, there will be at least
19.7 hours after the loss of all means of cooling (both air and/or
water) before the spent fuel cladding would reach a temperature where
the potential for a significant offsite radiological release could
occur. The licensee states that should all means to cool the spent fuel
be lost, 19.7 hours is sufficient time for personnel to respond with
additional resources, equipment, and capability to restore cooling to
the SFP, even after a non-credible, catastrophic event.
In the NRC's March 30, 2015, safety evaluation (ADAMS Accession No.
ML15058A906) of the licensee's request for exemptions from certain
emergency planning requirements, the NRC staff assessed the DEF
accident analyses associated with the radiological risks from a
zirconium fire at the permanently shutdown and defueled CR-3 site. The
staff has confirmed that under conditions where cooling airflow can
develop, suitably conservative calculations indicate that as of
September 26, 2013, the fuel will remain at temperatures where the
cladding will be undamaged for an unlimited period. For the very
unlikely beyond-design-basis accident scenario, where the SFP coolant
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal
from the spent fuel are no longer available, there will be a minimum of
19.7 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding
reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur.
The staff found that 19.7 hours was sufficient time to support
deployment of mitigation equipment to prevent the zirconium cladding
from reaching a point of rapid oxidation. Even more time would be
available now, given that more than two years have passed since the
analysis was performed and the risks from a zirconium fire scenario
continue to decrease as a function of the time that the fuel has cooled
since CR-3 permanently shut down.
In response to a request for additional information related to the
licensee's request for exemptions from certain emergency planning
requirements, the licensee also provided an analysis of a postulated
airborne dispersal of radioactive waste resin upon dropping a High
Integrity Container (HIC) outside the power block. Although an airborne
release is not expected to occur with a drop, or while in storage
awaiting shipment, due to the low flammability and reactivity of the
spent resin, a release is nevertheless postulated. The event is based
on a release of radioactive material with activity and isotopic mix
taken from the resin shipments that occurred during a recent 5\1/2\
year period. The licensee reviewed resin shipments made from 2008
through June 2013 and obtained the isotopic distribution (except for
Cobalt-60) from the shipment with the highest overall activity. Cobalt-
60 activity was taken from a different shipment to assure that the
highest activity was used and the dose was maximized. This created a
composite maximum shipment having a total activity of approximately 116
curies, which is approximately twice the activity of the average
shipment made during this period. The analysis assumed a release of 10
percent of the total radioactive material inventory and that the
release would occur outside of the CR-3 site's Auxiliary Building on
the south berm. The analysis of the dropped spent resin HIC
consequences indicates that the dose would be 40 mrem total effective
dose equivalent at the site boundary over a 2-hour period, which is
well below the PAG limit of 1 rem.
In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff provided its basis as to why it
considers $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite property damage
insurance for a decommissioning reactor, once the spent fuel in the SFP
is no longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. The staff has postulated
that there is still a potential for other radiological incidents at a
decommissioning reactor that could result in significant onsite
contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff
cited the rupture of a large contaminated liquid storage tank, causing
soil contamination
[[Page 18655]]
and potential groundwater contamination, as the most costly postulated
event to decontaminate and remediate (other than a SFP zirconium fire).
The NRC determined that the postulated large liquid radiological waste
storage tank rupture event would have a bounding onsite cleanup cost of
approximately $50 million.
The NRC staff has found that DEF's proposed reduction in onsite
property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million is
consistent with SECY-96-256. In addition, the staff notes that there is
a precedent of granting a similar exemption to other permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactor licensees. As previously stated,
the staff concluded that as of September 26, 2013, sufficient
irradiated fuel decay time has elapsed at CR-3 to decrease to
negligible levels the probability of an onsite radiological release
from a postulated zirconium fire accident. In addition, the licensee's
proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is
consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery
from the rupture of a large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
IV. Regulatory Requirements
A. Authorized by Law
Under 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may grant exemptions from the
regulations in 10 CFR part 50 that the Commission determines are
authorized by law. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the
licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or other laws. Therefore, the
exemption is authorized by law.
B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The NRC established the onsite property damage insurance
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to provide financial assurance that
following a significant nuclear incident, onsite conditions could be
stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of 10 CFR
50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for CR-
3 are predicated on the assumption that the reactor is operating.
However, CR-3 is a permanently shutdown and defueled facility. As
explained in section III of this document, the permanently defueled
status of the facility has resulted in a significant reduction in the
number and severity of potential accidents, and correspondingly, a
significant reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite
property damage. The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite
insurance coverage does not impact the probability or consequences of
potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance coverage is
commensurate with the reduced risk and reduced cost consequences of
potential nuclear accidents at CR-3. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes
that granting the requested exemption will not present an undue risk to
the health and safety of the public.
C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements
associated with physical protection of the site and would not adversely
affect DEF's ability to physically secure the site or protect special
nuclear material. Physical security measures at CR-3 are not affected
by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption is
consistent with the common defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), special circumstances are present if
the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable assurance that adequate
funds will be available to stabilize conditions and cover onsite
cleanup costs associated with site decontamination, following an
accident that results in the release of a significant amount of
radiological material. As explained in section III of this document,
because CR-3 is permanently shut down and defueled, the radiological
consequences of design-basis accidents or other credible events at CR-3
cannot possibly exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area
boundary. The licensee has performed site-specific analyses of highly
unlikely, beyond-design-basis zirconium fire accidents involving the
stored irradiated fuel in the SFP. The analyses show that as of
September 26, 2013, the probabilities of such an accident are minimal.
The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's analyses confirm this
conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that DEF's proposed $50 million level of
onsite insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and
decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for
hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the
CR-3 site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the staff concludes
that the application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1)
to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite insurance coverage is not necessary
to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the permanently
shutdown and defueled CR-3 reactor.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present
whenever compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs that
are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the regulation
was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those incurred by
others similarly situated. The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee
were required to continue to maintain an onsite insurance level of
$1.06 billion, the associated insurance premiums would be in excess of
those necessary and commensurate with the radiological contamination
risks posed by the site. In addition, such insurance levels would be
significantly in excess of other decommissioning reactor facilities
that have been granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that DEF's compliance with the existing rule
would result in an undue hardship or other costs that are significantly
in excess of those contemplated when the regulation was adopted and are
significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR
50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRC approval of the exemption from insurance or indemnity
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion from
further environmental analysis, after first finding that the category
of actions does not individually or cumulatively have a significant
effect on the human environment. Specifically, the exemption is
categorically excluded from further analysis under Sec. 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting an exemption from the
requirements of any regulation in Chapter I of 10 CFR is a categorical
exclusion provided that: (1) There is no significant hazards
consideration; (2) there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be
released offsite; (3) there is no significant increase in individual or
cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; (4) there is no
significant construction impact; (5) there is no significant increase
in the potential for or consequences from
[[Page 18656]]
radiological accidents; and (6) the requirements from which an
exemption is sought involve: Surety, insurance, or indemnity
requirements.
Utilizing the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, the NRC has
determined that approval of the exemption request involves no
significant hazards consideration because reducing the licensee's
onsite property damage insurance for CR-3 does not: (1) Involve a
significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident
previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted
financial protection regulation is unrelated to the operation of CR-3.
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite;
and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not
associated with construction, so there is no significant construction
impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e.,
potential amount of radiation in an accident), nor mitigation.
Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for, or
consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there would be
no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties,
cultural resources, or socioeconomic conditions in the region. The
requirement for onsite property damage insurance may be viewed as
involving surety, insurance, or indemnity matters.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.
V. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the requested exemption is authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEF
an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1), to permit the
licensee to reduce its onsite property damage insurance to a level of
$50 million.
The exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 16th day of March 2016.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
John R. Tappert,
Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. 2016-07305 Filed 3-30-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
