Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, 12799-12802 [2016-05258]
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
(i) Piper Aircraft, Inc. Service Bulletin No.
1273A, dated October 22, 2015.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Piper Aircraft, Inc. service
information identified in this AD, contact
Piper Aircraft, Inc. 2926 Piper Drive, Vero
Beach, FL 32960; telephone: (415) 330–9500;
email: sales@atp.com; and Internet: https://
www.piper.com/technical-publications/.
(4) You may view this referenced service
information at the FAA, Small Airplane
Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City,
Missouri 64106. For information on the
availability of this material at the FAA, call
(816) 329–4148.
(5) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call
202–741–6030, or go to: https://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on
February 24, 2016.
Robert P. Busto,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2016–04417 Filed 3–10–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2016–4280; Directorate
Identifier 2016–SW–008–AD; Amendment
39–18429; AD 2016–05–11]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky
Aircraft Corporation
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky)
Model S–92A helicopters. This AD
requires certain inspections of the main
rotor and tail rotor control pushrods
(pushrods). This AD is prompted by a
Sikorsky investigation that indicated
that some pushrods may have
incorrectly installed locking
mechanisms. These AD actions are
intended to detect an incorrectly
installed locking mechanism, which if
not corrected, could result in a loose
jam nut, failure of the pushrod, loss of
main rotor or tail rotor flight control,
and consequent loss of helicopter
control.
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
SUMMARY:
This AD becomes effective
March 28, 2016.
DATES:
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The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain document listed in this AD
as of March 28, 2016.
We must receive comments on this
AD by May 10, 2016.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by
any of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
• Fax: 202–493–2251.
• Mail: Send comments to the U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590–0001.
• Hand Delivery: Deliver to the
‘‘Mail’’ address between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
4280; or in person at the Docket
Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, any incorporated by
reference service information, the
economic evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
Office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
For service information identified in
this final rule, contact Sikorsky Aircraft
Corporation, Customer Service
Engineering, 124 Quarry Road,
Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1–800Winged-S or 203–416–4299; email
sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com. You may
review the referenced service
information at the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,
10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N–321,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is also
available on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2016–
4280.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer,
Boston Aircraft Certification Office,
Engine & Propeller Directorate, 1200
District Avenue, Burlington,
Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781)
238–7161; email blaine.williams@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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12799
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves
requirements affecting flight safety, and
we did not provide you with notice and
an opportunity to provide your
comments prior to it becoming effective.
However, we invite you to participate in
this rulemaking by submitting written
comments, data, or views. We also
invite comments relating to the
economic, environmental, energy, or
federalism impacts that resulted from
adopting this AD. The most helpful
comments reference a specific portion of
the AD, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. To ensure the docket
does not contain duplicate comments,
commenters should send only one copy
of written comments, or if comments are
filed electronically, commenters should
submit them only one time. We will file
in the docket all comments that we
receive, as well as a report summarizing
each substantive public contact with
FAA personnel concerning this
rulemaking during the comment period.
We will consider all the comments we
receive and may conduct additional
rulemaking based on those comments.
Discussion
We propose to adopt a new AD for
Sikorsky Model S–92A helicopters with
certain main rotor or tail rotor control
pushrods installed. After a review of a
failed pushrod, Sikorsky investigated
the airworthiness of pushrods installed
on its helicopters. The investigation
indicates that the pushrods installed on
Model S–92A helicopters may have
incorrect safety cable routing, incorrect
jam nut torque, and/or incorrect locking
device serrations and key engagement.
This AD consequently requires
inspecting the pushrods for safety cable
routing, engagement of serrations of the
locking device, engagement of keys on
the locking device, thread engagement,
and jam nut torque. This AD requires
either repairing or replacing the
pushrod assembly, depending on the
inspection’s outcome. These AD actions
are intended to detect and correct an
incorrectly installed locking mechanism
resulting in a loose jam nut, failure of
the pushrods, loss of main rotor or tail
rotor flight control, and consequent loss
of helicopter control.
FAA’s Determination
We are issuing this AD because we
evaluated all the relevant information
and determined the unsafe condition
described previously is likely to exist or
develop in other products of these same
type designs.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
Related Service Information Under 1
CFR Part 51
We reviewed Sikorsky S–92
Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB
92–67–006, Revision A, dated February
19, 2016 (ASB), which specifies a onetime inspection of the pushrod
assemblies for safety cable routing,
engagement of serrations of the locking
device, engagement of keys on the
locking device, thread engagement, and
torque of the jam nuts. The ASB also
specifies documenting any noncompliant inspection results and, if any
discrepancies are found during the
inspection, removing, reworking, and
reinstalling or replacing the pushrod.
The ASB specifies performing a rig
check as required.
This service information is reasonably
available because the interested parties
have access to it through their normal
course of business or by the means
identified in the ADDRESSES section.
AD Requirements
This AD requires within 5 hours timein-service (TIS):
• For each pushrod adjustable end,
except for the upper deck quadrant
pushrod, removing the safety cable and
using finger pressure, inspecting each
jam nut for movement. If a jam nut
moves with finger pressure, removing
the pushrod assembly from service.
Æ Inspecting to determine whether a
0.02 inch diameter safety wire can pass
through the inspection hole. If the safety
wire passes through the inspection hole,
repairing the pushrod, which is
terminating action for that adjustable
end.
Æ Inspecting for correct engagement
of serrations and keys of the locking
device. If a locking device is not
correctly engaged, repairing the locking
device, which is terminating action for
that adjustable end.
Æ Torqueing each jam nut and
installing the safety cable, making sure
the right-hand threads have safety cable
correctly routed, and the left-hand
threads have safety cable correctly
routed.
• For the upper deck quadrant
pushrod, this AD requires determining
whether there is any gap between the
jam nut, locking device, and the
adjustable end. It also requires:
Æ If there is a gap, gaining access to
the pushrod, removing the safety cable
and using finger pressure, inspecting the
jam nut for movement. If the jam nut
moves with finger pressure, removing
the pushrod assembly from service. If
the jam nut does not move, performing
corrective actions.
Æ If there is no gap, visually
inspecting the adjustable end for correct
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safety cable routing, correct engagement
of serrations and keys of the locking
device, and determining whether any
thread is visible in the inspection hole.
If the safety cable is routed incorrectly,
if the locking device is not correctly
engaged, or if there is no thread in the
inspection hole, gaining access to the
pushrod. Using finger pressure,
inspecting the jam nut for movement. If
the jam nut moves with finger pressure,
removing the pushrod assembly from
service. If the jam nut does not move
with finger pressure, performing
corrective actions.
Differences Between This AD and the
Service Information
Sikorsky specifies compliance by May
16, 2016. We require compliance within
5 hours TIS. We also do not require you
to contact Sikorsky or record
information on the Pushrod Data Sheet.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect
80 helicopters of U.S. Registry and labor
costs average $85 per work-hour. Based
on these estimates, we expect the
following costs:
• Inspecting all pushrod assemblies
requires 2 work-hours for a labor cost of
$170. No parts are needed for a total
fleet cost of $13,600.
• Replacing a pushrod requires 2
work-hours for a labor cost $170. Parts
cost an average of $2,500 for a total cost
of $2,670 per pushrod.
• Repairing a pushrod requires an
average 2 work-hours per helicopter for
a labor cost of $170 and minimal part
costs.
FAA’s Justification and Determination
of the Effective Date
Providing an opportunity for public
comments prior to adopting these AD
requirements would delay
implementing the safety actions needed
to correct this known unsafe condition.
Therefore, we find that the risk to the
flying public justifies waiving notice
and comment prior to the adoption of
this rule because the required corrective
actions must be accomplished within 5
hours TIS.
Since an unsafe condition exists that
requires the immediate adoption of this
AD, we determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment
before issuing this AD are impracticable
and contrary to the public interest and
that good cause exists to make this AD
effective in less than 30 days.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
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section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not
have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national Government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed, I certify
that this AD:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in
Alaska to the extent that it justifies
making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
§ 39.13
Docket No. FAA–2016–4280; Directorate
Identifier 2016–SW–008–AD.
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2016–05–11 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
(Sikorsky): Amendment 39–18429;
(a) Applicability
12801
input pushrod with a part number (P/N)
listed in Table 1 to paragraph (a) of this AD,
certificated in any category.
This AD applies to Sikorsky Model S–92A
helicopters, serial numbers 920006 through
920291, with a main rotor or tail rotor servo
TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (a)
Name
P/N
Yaw Boost Input Pushrod ......................................................................................................................
Pitch Boost Input Pushrod .....................................................................................................................
Collective Boost Input Pushrod .............................................................................................................
Roll Boost Input Pushrod .......................................................................................................................
Yaw Boost Out Pushrod ........................................................................................................................
Roll Boost Out Pushrod .........................................................................................................................
Pitch Boost Out Pushrod .......................................................................................................................
Collective Boost Out Pushrod ...............................................................................................................
Limiter Pushrod ......................................................................................................................................
Pitch to Roll Pushrod .............................................................................................................................
Left Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod ...................................................................................................
Forward Main Rotor Servo Pushrod ......................................................................................................
Right Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod .................................................................................................
Upper Deck Quadrant Pushrod .............................................................................................................
Tail Rotor Servo Input Pushrod .............................................................................................................
92400–04801–108
92400–04801–107
92400–04801–107
92400–04801–109
92400–04802–109
92400–04803–103
92400–04803–102
92400–04802–108
92400–04803–106
92400–04803–107
92400–04801–110
92400–04801–111
92400–04801–112
92400–04802–105
92400–04802–107
(b) Unsafe Condition
This AD defines the unsafe condition as an
incorrectly installed locking mechanism
resulting in a loose jam nut. This condition,
if not detected and corrected, could result in
failure of the main rotor or tail rotor control
pushrod, loss of main rotor or tail rotor flight
control and consequent loss of helicopter
control.
(c) Effective Date
This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016.
(d) Compliance
You are responsible for performing each
action required by this AD within the
specified compliance time unless it has
already been accomplished prior to that time.
asabaliauskas on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
(e) Required Actions
Within 5 hours time-in-service:
(1) For each control input pushrod
(pushrod) adjustable end, except for the
upper deck quadrant pushrod:
(i) Remove the safety cable and using finger
pressure, inspect each jam nut for movement.
If a jam nut moves with finger pressure,
remove the pushrod assembly from service.
(ii) Inspect to determine whether a 0.02
inch diameter safety wire can pass through
the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes
through the inspection hole, repair the
pushrod in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs
C.(2)(b) through C.(2)(l) of Sikorsky S–92
Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92–
67–006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016
(ASB), which is terminating action for that
adjustable end.
(iii) Where locking devices are used,
inspect for correct engagement of serrations
and keys of the locking device as shown in
Figure 4 of the ASB. If a locking device is not
correctly engaged, repair the locking device
in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs C.(3)(c) through
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C.(3)(f) of the ASB, which is terminating
action for that adjustable end.
(iv) Torque each jam nut using the torque
values listed in Table 1 to paragraph (a) of
this AD. Install the safety cable, making sure
the right-hand threads have safety cable
routed as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB, and
the left-hand threads have safety cable routed
as shown in Figure 3 of the ASB.
(2) For the upper deck quadrant pushrod,
determine whether there is any gap between
the jam nut, locking device, and adjustable
end.
(i) If there is a gap, gain access to the
pushrod, remove the safety cable, and using
finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for
movement. If the jam nut moves with finger
pressure, remove the pushrod assembly from
service. If the jam nut does not move,
perform the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii)
through (e)(1)(iv) of this AD.
(ii) If there is no gap, visually inspect the
adjustable end for correct safety cable routing
as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB, correct
engagement of serrations and keys of the
locking device as shown in Figure 4 of the
ASB, and to determine whether any thread is
visible in the inspection hole. If the safety
cable is routed incorrectly, if the locking
device is not correctly engaged, or if there is
no thread in the inspection hole, gain access
to the pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspect
the jam nut for movement. If the jam nut
moves with finger pressure, remove the
pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut
does not move with finger pressure, perform
the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through
(e)(1)(iv) of this AD.
(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, may approve
AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to:
Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer, Boston
Aircraft Certification Office, Engine &
Propeller Directorate, 1200 District Avenue,
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Torque value
60–100 inch pounds.
43 inch pounds.
350 inch pounds.
43 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
350 inch pounds.
350 inch pounds.
350 inch pounds.
60–100 inch pounds.
40–46 inch pounds.
Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone
(781) 238–7161; email blaine.williams@
faa.gov.
(2) For operations conducted under a 14
CFR part 119 operating certificate or under
14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that
you notify your principal inspector, or
lacking a principal inspector, the manager of
the local flight standards district office or
certificate holding district office before
operating any aircraft complying with this
AD through an AMOC.
(g) Subject
Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC)
Code: 6700, Rotorcraft Flight Control.
(h) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference of
the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Sikorsky S–92 Helicopter Alert Service
Bulletin ASB 92–67–006, Revision A, dated
February 19, 2016.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Sikorsky service information
identified in this final rule, contact Sikorsky
Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service
Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT
06611; telephone 1–800–Winged–S or 203–
416–4299; email sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com.
(4) You may view this service information
at FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel,
Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy.,
Room 6N–321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (817) 222–5110.
(5) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call
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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 48 / Friday, March 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations
(202) 741–6030, or go to: https://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 2,
2016.
Scott A. Horn,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2016–05258 Filed 3–10–16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Examining the AD Docket
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2015–3658; Directorate
Identifier 2014–SW–039–AD; Amendment
39–18427; AD 2016–05–09]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; MD
Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Helicopters
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
MDHI Model 369A (Army OH–6A),
369H, 369HE, 369HM, 369HS, 369D,
369E, 369F, 369FF, and 500N
helicopters. This AD requires inspecting
the auxiliary fuel pump (fuel pump)
wire routing in the left-hand fuel cell
and corrective action, if necessary. This
AD also requires installing a warning
decal on the left-hand fuel cell access
cover. This AD was prompted by
accidents resulting from incorrectly
positioned fuel pump wiring within the
fuel tank interfering with the operation
of the fuel quantity sensor float, which
caused an erroneous fuel quantity
indication in the cockpit. The actions
are intended to detect and correct
routing of the fuel pump wiring to
prevent interference with the fuel
quantity sensor float, an erroneous fuel
quantity indication in the cockpit, and
subsequent fuel exhaustion and
emergency landing.
DATES: This AD is effective April 15,
2016.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain documents listed in this AD
as of April 15, 2016.
ADDRESSES: For service information
identified in this final rule, contact MD
Helicopters, Inc., Attn: Customer
Support Division, 4555 E. McDowell
Rd., Mail Stop M615, Mesa, AZ 85215–
9734; telephone 1–800–388–3378; fax
480–346–6813; or at https://
www.mdhelicopters.com. You may
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SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
15:58 Mar 10, 2016
review a copy of the referenced service
information at the FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region,
10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N–321,
Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is also
available on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2015–
3658.
Jkt 238001
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2015–
3658; or in person at the Docket
Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, any incorporated-byreference service information, the
economic evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations Office, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Danny Nguyen, Aerospace Engineer, Los
Angeles Aircraft Certification Office,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
3960 Paramount Blvd., Lakewood,
California 90712; telephone (562) 627–
5247; email danny.nguyen@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
On September 2, 2015, at 80 FR
53030, the Federal Register published
our notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM), which proposed to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that
would apply to certain MDHI Model
369A (Army OH–6A), 369H, 369HE,
369HM, 369HS, 369D, 369E, 369F,
369FF, and 500N helicopters. The
NPRM proposed to require inspecting
the routing of the fuel pump wiring to
determine whether the fuel pump wire
is properly wrapped around the fuel
inlet hose and correcting the routing of
the wiring if it is not. The NPRM also
proposed to require installing a decal
regarding correct installation of the fuel
pump wiring. The NPRM was prompted
by two accidents and one incident that
occurred on Model 369D helicopters
resulting from an incorrectly positioned
fuel pump wire within the fuel tank
interfering with the operation of the fuel
quantity sensor float, which caused an
erroneous fuel quantity reading in the
cockpit. Because the fuel pump is
installed on all the affected model
helicopters, we are including them in
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the applicability. According to MDHI,
because maintenance personnel caused
the incorrect wire routing by failing to
follow procedures for installing the fuel
pump, it is also necessary to install a
decal on the left-hand fuel cell access
cover to refer maintenance personnel to
the appropriate manual procedures. The
proposed requirements were intended to
detect and correct routing of the fuel
pump wiring to prevent interference
with the fuel quantity sensor float, an
erroneous fuel quantity indication in the
cockpit, and subsequent fuel exhaustion
and emergency landing.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD, but
we did not receive any comments on the
NPRM (80 FR 53030, September 2,
2015).
FAA’s Determination
We have reviewed the relevant
information and determined that an
unsafe condition exists and is likely to
exist or develop on other products of the
same type designs and that air safety
and the public interest require adopting
the AD requirements as proposed.
Related Service Information Under 1
CFR Part 51
MD Helicopters issued one service
bulletin on April 30, 2014, with five
different numbers: SB369H–255,
SB369E–111, SB500N–049, SB369D–
213, and SB369F–098. The service
bulletin specifies a one-time inspection
of the routing of the fuel pump wire in
the left-hand fuel cell and corrective
action, if necessary. The service bulletin
also specifies installing a warning decal
on the left-hand fuel cell access cover
that refers personnel to the procedures
for routing the fuel pump wire that is
contained in the appropriate
maintenance manual. The service
bulletin states that recent field incidents
have occurred where maintenance
personnel have not followed the
procedures for installation of the fuel
pump. Also, the service bulletin states
that an incorrectly installed fuel pump
wire can interfere with the fuel quantity
sensor float, which can result in
erroneous fuel quantity indications. To
prevent this situation, the service
information states that the fuel pump
wire must be wrapped around the fuel
inlet hose as shown in the applicable
maintenance manual.
This service information is reasonably
available because the interested parties
have access to it through their normal
course of business or by the means
identified in the ADDRESSES section.
E:\FR\FM\11MRR1.SGM
11MRR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 48 (Friday, March 11, 2016)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12799-12802]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-05258]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2016-4280; Directorate Identifier 2016-SW-008-AD;
Amendment 39-18429; AD 2016-05-11]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. This
AD requires certain inspections of the main rotor and tail rotor
control pushrods (pushrods). This AD is prompted by a Sikorsky
investigation that indicated that some pushrods may have incorrectly
installed locking mechanisms. These AD actions are intended to detect
an incorrectly installed locking mechanism, which if not corrected,
could result in a loose jam nut, failure of the pushrod, loss of main
rotor or tail rotor flight control, and consequent loss of helicopter
control.
DATES: This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain document listed in this AD as of March 28, 2016.
We must receive comments on this AD by May 10, 2016.
ADDRESSES: You may send comments by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Docket: Go to https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Fax: 202-493-2251.
Mail: Send comments to the U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery: Deliver to the ``Mail'' address between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-
4280; or in person at the Docket Operations Office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, any incorporated by reference service information,
the economic evaluation, any comments received, and other information.
The street address for the Docket Operations Office (telephone 800-647-
5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD
docket shortly after receipt.
For service information identified in this final rule, contact
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service Engineering, 124 Quarry
Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-Winged-S or 203-416-4299;
email sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com. You may review the referenced service
information at the FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest
Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy, Room 6N-321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. It is
also available on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2016-4280.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Blaine Williams, Aerospace Engineer,
Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & Propeller Directorate,
1200 District Avenue, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781)
238-7161; email blaine.williams@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight
safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to
provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we
invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written
comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the
economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted
from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific
portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and
include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain
duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written
comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should
submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that
we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public
contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking during the
comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may
conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments.
Discussion
We propose to adopt a new AD for Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters
with certain main rotor or tail rotor control pushrods installed. After
a review of a failed pushrod, Sikorsky investigated the airworthiness
of pushrods installed on its helicopters. The investigation indicates
that the pushrods installed on Model S-92A helicopters may have
incorrect safety cable routing, incorrect jam nut torque, and/or
incorrect locking device serrations and key engagement. This AD
consequently requires inspecting the pushrods for safety cable routing,
engagement of serrations of the locking device, engagement of keys on
the locking device, thread engagement, and jam nut torque. This AD
requires either repairing or replacing the pushrod assembly, depending
on the inspection's outcome. These AD actions are intended to detect
and correct an incorrectly installed locking mechanism resulting in a
loose jam nut, failure of the pushrods, loss of main rotor or tail
rotor flight control, and consequent loss of helicopter control.
FAA's Determination
We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all the relevant
information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is
likely to exist or develop in other products of these same type
designs.
[[Page 12800]]
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
We reviewed Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-
67-006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 (ASB), which specifies a
one-time inspection of the pushrod assemblies for safety cable routing,
engagement of serrations of the locking device, engagement of keys on
the locking device, thread engagement, and torque of the jam nuts. The
ASB also specifies documenting any non-compliant inspection results
and, if any discrepancies are found during the inspection, removing,
reworking, and reinstalling or replacing the pushrod. The ASB specifies
performing a rig check as required.
This service information is reasonably available because the
interested parties have access to it through their normal course of
business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
AD Requirements
This AD requires within 5 hours time-in-service (TIS):
For each pushrod adjustable end, except for the upper deck
quadrant pushrod, removing the safety cable and using finger pressure,
inspecting each jam nut for movement. If a jam nut moves with finger
pressure, removing the pushrod assembly from service.
[cir] Inspecting to determine whether a 0.02 inch diameter safety
wire can pass through the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes
through the inspection hole, repairing the pushrod, which is
terminating action for that adjustable end.
[cir] Inspecting for correct engagement of serrations and keys of
the locking device. If a locking device is not correctly engaged,
repairing the locking device, which is terminating action for that
adjustable end.
[cir] Torqueing each jam nut and installing the safety cable,
making sure the right-hand threads have safety cable correctly routed,
and the left-hand threads have safety cable correctly routed.
For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, this AD requires
determining whether there is any gap between the jam nut, locking
device, and the adjustable end. It also requires:
[cir] If there is a gap, gaining access to the pushrod, removing
the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspecting the jam nut for
movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the
pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move, performing
corrective actions.
[cir] If there is no gap, visually inspecting the adjustable end
for correct safety cable routing, correct engagement of serrations and
keys of the locking device, and determining whether any thread is
visible in the inspection hole. If the safety cable is routed
incorrectly, if the locking device is not correctly engaged, or if
there is no thread in the inspection hole, gaining access to the
pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspecting the jam nut for movement. If
the jam nut moves with finger pressure, removing the pushrod assembly
from service. If the jam nut does not move with finger pressure,
performing corrective actions.
Differences Between This AD and the Service Information
Sikorsky specifies compliance by May 16, 2016. We require
compliance within 5 hours TIS. We also do not require you to contact
Sikorsky or record information on the Pushrod Data Sheet.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 80 helicopters of U.S.
Registry and labor costs average $85 per work-hour. Based on these
estimates, we expect the following costs:
Inspecting all pushrod assemblies requires 2 work-hours
for a labor cost of $170. No parts are needed for a total fleet cost of
$13,600.
Replacing a pushrod requires 2 work-hours for a labor cost
$170. Parts cost an average of $2,500 for a total cost of $2,670 per
pushrod.
Repairing a pushrod requires an average 2 work-hours per
helicopter for a labor cost of $170 and minimal part costs.
FAA's Justification and Determination of the Effective Date
Providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adopting
these AD requirements would delay implementing the safety actions
needed to correct this known unsafe condition. Therefore, we find that
the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment
prior to the adoption of this rule because the required corrective
actions must be accomplished within 5 hours TIS.
Since an unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate
adoption of this AD, we determined that notice and opportunity for
prior public comment before issuing this AD are impracticable and
contrary to the public interest and that good cause exists to make this
AD effective in less than 30 days.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that
it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply
with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
[[Page 12801]]
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2016-05-11 Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky): Amendment 39-
18429; Docket No. FAA-2016-4280; Directorate Identifier 2016-SW-008-
AD.
(a) Applicability
This AD applies to Sikorsky Model S-92A helicopters, serial
numbers 920006 through 920291, with a main rotor or tail rotor servo
input pushrod with a part number (P/N) listed in Table 1 to
paragraph (a) of this AD, certificated in any category.
Table 1 to Paragraph (a)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Name P/N Torque value
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yaw Boost Input Pushrod........................ 92400-04801-108 60-100 inch pounds.
Pitch Boost Input Pushrod...................... 92400-04801-107 43 inch pounds.
Collective Boost Input Pushrod................. 92400-04801-107 350 inch pounds.
Roll Boost Input Pushrod....................... 92400-04801-109 43 inch pounds.
Yaw Boost Out Pushrod.......................... 92400-04802-109 40-46 inch pounds.
Roll Boost Out Pushrod......................... 92400-04803-103 40-46 inch pounds.
Pitch Boost Out Pushrod........................ 92400-04803-102 40-46 inch pounds.
Collective Boost Out Pushrod................... 92400-04802-108 40-46 inch pounds.
Limiter Pushrod................................ 92400-04803-106 40-46 inch pounds.
Pitch to Roll Pushrod.......................... 92400-04803-107 40-46 inch pounds.
Left Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............. 92400-04801-110 350 inch pounds.
Forward Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............... 92400-04801-111 350 inch pounds.
Right Hand Main Rotor Servo Pushrod............ 92400-04801-112 350 inch pounds.
Upper Deck Quadrant Pushrod.................... 92400-04802-105 60-100 inch pounds.
Tail Rotor Servo Input Pushrod................. 92400-04802-107 40-46 inch pounds.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(b) Unsafe Condition
This AD defines the unsafe condition as an incorrectly installed
locking mechanism resulting in a loose jam nut. This condition, if
not detected and corrected, could result in failure of the main
rotor or tail rotor control pushrod, loss of main rotor or tail
rotor flight control and consequent loss of helicopter control.
(c) Effective Date
This AD becomes effective March 28, 2016.
(d) Compliance
You are responsible for performing each action required by this
AD within the specified compliance time unless it has already been
accomplished prior to that time.
(e) Required Actions
Within 5 hours time-in-service:
(1) For each control input pushrod (pushrod) adjustable end,
except for the upper deck quadrant pushrod:
(i) Remove the safety cable and using finger pressure, inspect
each jam nut for movement. If a jam nut moves with finger pressure,
remove the pushrod assembly from service.
(ii) Inspect to determine whether a 0.02 inch diameter safety
wire can pass through the inspection hole. If the safety wire passes
through the inspection hole, repair the pushrod in accordance with
the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs C.(2)(b) through
C.(2)(l) of Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-
67-006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016 (ASB), which is
terminating action for that adjustable end.
(iii) Where locking devices are used, inspect for correct
engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device as shown in
Figure 4 of the ASB. If a locking device is not correctly engaged,
repair the locking device in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions, paragraphs C.(3)(c) through C.(3)(f) of the ASB, which
is terminating action for that adjustable end.
(iv) Torque each jam nut using the torque values listed in Table
1 to paragraph (a) of this AD. Install the safety cable, making sure
the right-hand threads have safety cable routed as shown in Figure 2
of the ASB, and the left-hand threads have safety cable routed as
shown in Figure 3 of the ASB.
(2) For the upper deck quadrant pushrod, determine whether there
is any gap between the jam nut, locking device, and adjustable end.
(i) If there is a gap, gain access to the pushrod, remove the
safety cable, and using finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for
movement. If the jam nut moves with finger pressure, remove the
pushrod assembly from service. If the jam nut does not move, perform
the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through (e)(1)(iv) of this AD.
(ii) If there is no gap, visually inspect the adjustable end for
correct safety cable routing as shown in Figure 2 of the ASB,
correct engagement of serrations and keys of the locking device as
shown in Figure 4 of the ASB, and to determine whether any thread is
visible in the inspection hole. If the safety cable is routed
incorrectly, if the locking device is not correctly engaged, or if
there is no thread in the inspection hole, gain access to the
pushrod. Using finger pressure, inspect the jam nut for movement. If
the jam nut moves with finger pressure, remove the pushrod assembly
from service. If the jam nut does not move with finger pressure,
perform the actions in paragraphs (e)(1)(ii) through (e)(1)(iv) of
this AD.
(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, may
approve AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: Blaine Williams,
Aerospace Engineer, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine &
Propeller Directorate, 1200 District Avenue, Burlington,
Massachusetts 01803; telephone (781) 238-7161; email
blaine.williams@faa.gov.
(2) For operations conducted under a 14 CFR part 119 operating
certificate or under 14 CFR part 91, subpart K, we suggest that you
notify your principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the local flight standards district office or
certificate holding district office before operating any aircraft
complying with this AD through an AMOC.
(g) Subject
Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) Code: 6700, Rotorcraft
Flight Control.
(h) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Sikorsky S-92 Helicopter Alert Service Bulletin ASB 92-67-
006, Revision A, dated February 19, 2016.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Sikorsky service information identified in this final
rule, contact Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Customer Service
Engineering, 124 Quarry Road, Trumbull, CT 06611; telephone 1-800-
Winged-S or 203-416-4299; email sikorskywcs@sikorsky.com.
(4) You may view this service information at FAA, Office of the
Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, 10101 Hillwood Pkwy., Room 6N-
321, Fort Worth, TX 76177. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call (817) 222-5110.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call
[[Page 12802]]
(202) 741-6030, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 2, 2016.
Scott A. Horn,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2016-05258 Filed 3-10-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
