Hatem M. Ataya, M.D.; Decision and Order; Introduction and Procedural History, 8221-8245 [2016-03359]

Agencies

• Drug Enforcement Administration
• Department of Justice

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 32 (Thursday, February 18, 2016)]
[Notices]
[Pages 8221-8245]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-03359]


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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

[Docket No. 14-20]


Hatem M. Ataya, M.D.; Decision and Order; Introduction and 
Procedural History

    On July 23, 2014, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of 
Diversion Control, issued an Order to Show Cause to Hatem M. Ataya 
(Respondent), of Lapeer, Michigan. ALJ Ex. 1, at 1. The Show Cause 
Order proposed the revocation of Respondent's DEA Certificates of 
Registration, pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense controlled 
substances in schedules II through V, as a practitioner, at the 
registered address of 971 Baldwin Road, Lapeer, Michigan (FA2278201), 
and at the registered address of 3217 W. M-55 Suite B, West Branch, 
Michigan (BA7776353), on the ground that he has committed acts which 
render his registration inconsistent with the public interest.\1\ Id. 
(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4)). The Order also proposed the denial of 
Respondent's applications for two additional registrations,\2\ on the 
ground that ``it is not consistent with the public interest . . . for 
[him] to be registered with the [Agency] to handle controlled 
substances.'' Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 823(f)).
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    \1\ The Order alleged that Respondent's registration number 
FA2278201 expires on June 30, 2016, and that his registration number 
BA7776353 expires on June 30, 2017. ALJ Ex. 1, at 1.
    \2\ The applications are for proposed registered locations in 
Davidson and Flint, Michigan. ALJ Ex. 1, at 1.
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    The Show Cause Order alleged that from 2010 through 2013, 
Respondent ``repeatedly violated [his] obligation under federal law by 
prescribing controlled substances to [his] patients outside of the 
normal course of professional medical practice.'' Id. at 2 (citing 21 
CFR 1306.04(a)). Continuing, the Order specifically alleged that 
Respondent's ``practice of regularly prescribing controlled substances 
to five patients [who were identified by the initials R.E.H., J.W., 
R.K., R.J.H., and J.H.] despite numerous and repeated red flags of drug 
abuse and diversion, [his] repeated failures to take appropriate steps 
to monitor [his] patients' use of controlled substances, and numerous 
other actions [he] took in the course of treating these patients all 
indicate that [he] violated [his] obligations under federal law by 
`prescribing [controlled substances] as much and as frequently as the 
patient demanded' so that `[in] practical effect, [he] acted as a 
large-scale ``pusher'' not as a physician.' '' Id.

[[Page 8222]]

(quoting U.S. v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 143 (1975)). The Show Cause Order 
then set forth detailed allegations regarding Respondent's prescribing 
to each of these patients.\3\ See id. at 2-6.
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    \3\ The patient-specific allegations will be set forth in 
discussing the evidence pertinent to each patient.
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    In addition, the Show Cause Order alleged that on March 26, 2013, 
Respondent was interviewed by a DEA Diversion Investigator and a local 
Detective. Id. at 6. The Show Cause Order further alleged that during 
the interview, Respondent made multiple false statements regarding his 
controlled substance prescribing practices.\4\ Id. at 6-7.
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    \4\ The Show Cause Order specifically alleged that Respondent 
attempted to mislead investigators in an interview on March 26, 
2013, when he told a DEA Diversion Investigator and a Lapeer City 
Detective that he was not aware of any prescription pads being 
stolen, that patient R.E.H.'s fraudulent practices were in the past 
and he was no longer a patient, that no controlled substance 
prescriptions are phoned in, that he attempted to taper patients off 
of methadone over time, that chronic pain patients must have some 
diagnostic finding to support their pain and are required to see a 
specific psychiatrist and attend physical therapy, that each chronic 
pain patient must sign and annually renew a pain management 
contract, that MAPS searches are usually run for chronic pain 
patients on every visit, and that he was unaware of any of his 
patients dying. Id. at 6-7. The Government alleged that Respondent's 
patient files and its investigation indicated that these statements 
and others were false. Id. at 7.
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    Following service of the Show Cause Order, Respondent timely 
requested a hearing on the allegations. ALJ Ex. 2. The matter was 
placed on the docket of the Office of Administrative Law Judges and 
assigned to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Christopher B. McNeil, who 
commenced to conduct pre-hearing procedures and ordered the parties to 
submit their respective pre-hearing statements. GX 3. Thereafter, the 
parties submitted their pre-hearing and supplemental pre-hearing 
statements. The parties also filed various motions, the most 
significant of these being (given the issues raised by the Parties in 
their Exceptions), the Government's Motion to Exclude Respondent's 
Witnesses (ALJ Ex. 41).
    Also, on September 29, 2014, the ALJ conducted an on-the-record 
conference with the Parties at which he set the initial date for the 
evidentiary phase of the proceeding. Tr. 1, 16-17 (Sept. 29, 2014). 
During the conference, the ALJ authorized the taking of testimony at 
either the Agency's Arlington, Virginia hearing facility or ``by video-
teleconferencing in the Detroit DEA Office.'' Id. at 19. The ALJ also 
authorized Respondent and his counsel to appear at either the Arlington 
hearing facility or the ``video-teleconferencing site'' and 
``direct[ed] the Government to make available its DEA District or Field 
Office for this purpose.'' Id. at 19-20.
    On November 3, 2014, the ALJ conducted a further on-the-record 
conference during which he reviewed the parties' proposed stipulations 
and ruled on the Government's Motion to Exclude Respondent's Witnesses. 
See generally Tr. (Nov. 3, 2014). The ALJ granted the Government's 
motion with respect to twelve of Respondent's proposed fact witnesses 
on the ground that Respondent had not identified with sufficient 
particularity their proposed testimony because his pre-hearing 
statements did ``not clearly indicate each and every matter Respondent 
intend[ed] to introduce in opposition to the allegations.'' Id. at 35-
36; see also id. at 37-38. The ALJ also granted the Government's motion 
to exclude the testimony of Respondent's six witnesses who were to 
``either testify or provide testimonials . . . as to [his] character, 
reputation, and qualifications as a physician,'' ALJ Ex. 39, at 3; 
stating his agreement with the Government's contention that their 
testimony was irrelevant and that Respondent did not proffer that ``any 
of these witnesses plan to testify about his treatment of'' the five 
patients. Id.; see also Tr. 38 (Nov. 3, 2014).
    The Government also sought to exclude the testimony of Ms. Michelle 
Ann Richards, who, according to Respondent, would ``testify that she is 
certified in healthcare compliance consulting, coding, and office 
management,'' and ``that she was retained by Respondent to do risk 
assessment audit and risk mitigation for his practice.'' ALJ Ex. 39, at 
3. Respondent also stated that Ms. Richards would testify that she had 
``provided compliance training to Respondent's staff [and] that she is 
continuing to monitor and implement changes to ensure [his] medical 
practice with all State and Federal laws.'' Tr. 39. In addition to the 
ground that Respondent had not adequately summarized Ms. Richards' 
testimony, the Government also argued that the testimony should be 
barred because Respondent had represented that he ``intend[ed] to 
testify that he has never been out of compliance with such laws,'' and 
that his `` `care and treatment [of the five patients] at all times 
comported with reasonable and minimally accepted standards and that all 
prescriptions were issued for a legitimate medical purpose by a 
registered physician within the course of professional practice.' '' 
ALJ Ex. 42, at 4-5 (Gov. Mot.) (quoting Resp. Pre-Hearing Statement, at 
3-4 (Sept. 15, 2014)). Continuing, the Government reasoned that under 
agency precedent, `` `mitigation' evidence is not admissible unless and 
until the registrant fully and unequivocally accepts responsibility for 
the wrongful or unlawful conduct on which registration consequences are 
sought.'' Id. at 5.
    The ALJ granted the Government's motion, agreeing with both of the 
Government's arguments. Specifically, the ALJ agreed that Respondent 
had failed to describe Ms. Richards' testimony ``with sufficient 
particularity'' and thus had not complied with his prehearing order. 
Tr. 39 (Nov. 3, 2014). Also, the ALJ explained that because Respondent 
intended to testify that in prescribing to the five patients he had 
``at all times comported with reasonable and minimally accepted 
standards'' and that all of the prescriptions were issued within the 
usual course of professional practice and for a legitimate medical 
purpose, this ``compels the conclusion that Respondent does not accept 
responsibility for any failure to conform to the requirements of the'' 
CSA. Id. at 40-41. The ALJ thus concluded that there was ``no need to 
address whether the remedial measures that [Respondent] claims to have 
instituted are adequate to protect the public interest.'' Id. at 41.
    Notably, during the conference, the ALJ did not address 
Respondent's contention that the ALJ had misinterpreted the Agency's 
precedents, and that if the case law actually required him to admit to 
misconduct which he did not engage in, ``then that precedent is 
inconsistent with procedural due process.'' ALJ Ex. 45, at 1 (Resp.'s 
Response in Opposition to Govt's Mot. to Exclude Resp.'s Witnesses). 
Nor did the ALJ address Respondent's suggestion that he ``defer'' his 
ruling ``until the hearing itself,'' at which time the ALJ and the 
parties would be in ``a better position to determine whether'' he 
``ha[d] sufficiently titrated his contrition to permit the introduction 
of such testimony.'' Id.
    Finally, the Government moved to exclude the testimony of two 
physicians who Respondent proposed would testify on his behalf as 
experts. While Respondent identified some eight areas on which he 
``anticipated'' that the experts would testify, ALJ Ex. 39, at 3-5; the 
Government argued that the disclosure was inadequate because 
``Respondent has not disclosed any conclusions that the witnesses have 
actually reached regarding the prescribing conduct at issue.'' ALJ Ex. 
42, at 6. The Government further argued that ``[i]t remains a mystery 
if these doctors have actually reached any

[[Page 8223]]

opinions, to which they will subscribe under oath, to support 
Respondent's view that his prescribing was entirely legitimate.'' Id.
    The ALJ granted the Government's motion, reasoning that he could 
not ``tell from the supplemental prehearing statement which witness 
will espouse each of the opinions presented in the supplemental 
prehearing statement'' and ``whether either of the witnesses has a 
sufficient foundation, obtained through the review of patient records, 
or otherwise, to express the opinions presented in the supplemental 
prehearing statement.'' Tr. 42. The ALJ also explained that he could 
not tell which professional standards the witnesses were relying on to 
reach their opinions. Id. at 42-43. Finally, while the ALJ noted that 
Respondent proposed that one of the doctors (who was also from Flint, 
Michigan) would testify that this area ``is infested with drug-seeking 
addicts, who employ sophisticated tricks to deceive and frustrate the 
most vigilant anti-diversion efforts of healthcare providers,'' the ALJ 
reasoned that this evidence was irrelevant because Respondent ``intends 
to establish that his prescription practice complied fully with the 
requirements of the'' CSA. Id. at 43. Subsequently, the ALJ issued a 
Journal Entry and Order memorializing his various rulings as well as 
the various stipulations agreed to by the parties.
    On November 17-18, 2015, the ALJ presided over the evidentiary 
phase of the proceeding, conducting a video-teleconference with he and 
the reporter being present in Arlington, Virginia, and the witnesses 
(including Respondent) and the parties' counsels present at the DEA 
Detroit, Michigan Field Division Office. Id. at 73-74; id. at 423. 
Notably, from the outset, the proceeding was marked by telephonic 
interference and interruptions of the transmission, with interruptions 
occurring nearly 60 times over the course of a day and half of 
testimony. See id. at 72 et seq.
    At the hearing, the Government called four witnesses to testify, 
including Dr. Eugene O. Mitchell, who was accepted as an expert in pain 
medicine. The Government also submitted for the record an extensive 
amount of documentary evidence including, inter alia, the medical 
records of the five patients identified in the Show Cause Order, copies 
of various prescriptions issued to the patients, and copies of reports 
obtained from the Michigan Automated Prescription System (MAPS) showing 
the controlled substance prescriptions obtained and filled by each of 
the five patients.
    Respondent testified on his own behalf. He also submitted several 
exhibits for the record. After the hearing, both parties submitted 
briefs containing their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of 
law.\5\
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    \5\ These briefs will be referred to as Post-hearing Briefs.
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    Thereafter, the ALJ issued his Recommended Decision (hereinafter 
cited as R.D.). Therein, the ALJ found that the Government's evidence 
with respect to Factors Two (Respondent's experience in dispensing 
controlled substances) and Four (compliance with applicable laws 
related to controlled substances) supported the conclusion that 
``Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent with the 
public interest.'' R.D. 66-68.
    More specifically, with respect to Factor Two, the ALJ found that 
``Respondent demonstrated a material lack of . . . experience regarding 
a prescribing source's responsibilities to resolve red flags when 
prescribing controlled substances for persons presenting with symptoms 
of chronic pain and terminate from his practice patients whose drug-
seeking behavior indicates the potential for abuse or diversion (or 
both) of controlled substances.'' Id. at 67. And with respect to Factor 
Four, the ALJ found that ``[a] preponderance of the evidence 
establishes that Respondent issued controlled substance prescriptions 
for the five patients identified [in the Show Cause Order], in a manner 
that was not in the ordinary course of professional medical practice 
and was not based upon legitimate medical justification.'' Id. (citing 
21 CFR 1306.04(a)). The ALJ also found that Respondent violated 
Michigan law by post-dating controlled substance prescriptions and 
failing to include ``the patient's full name and address'' on the 
prescription. Id. at 67-68 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Sec. Sec.  
333.7333(7), 338.3161(1)(a)); see also id. at 64 (Finding of Fact (FoF) 
# 3). Finally, the ALJ found that Respondent violated state and federal 
law by issuing prescriptions for schedule IV controlled substances 
which authorized more than five refills. Id. at 68 (citing 21 U.S.C. 
829(b); Mich. Comp. Laws Sec.  333.7333(4)); see also id. at 64-65 
(FoF#s 3, 5).\6\
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    \6\ Noting that ``the record is silent with respect to the 
recommendation of the . . . state licensing board,'' the ALJ found 
that this factor ``neither supports nor contradicts a finding that 
Respondent's continued . . . registration is inconsistent with the 
public interest.'' R.D. 66. The ALJ also found that the Government 
had neither alleged nor provided evidence that Respondent was 
convicted of a federal or state offense related to the manufacture, 
distribution, or dispensing of controlled substances, and thus, 
Factor Three does not support the revocation of his registrations 
and denial of his pending applications. Id. at 67.
     As for Factor Five--such other conduct which may threaten 
public health or safety--the ALJ found that the Government had not 
proved the allegation that Respondent made various false statements 
to the Diversion Investigator and Detective. Id. at 68. The ALJ 
based his conclusion on the fact that ``the written record of that 
interview was not present'' and ``the questions presented and 
answers given were not sufficiently established in the record so as 
to permit a determination of Respondent's candor during [the] 
interview.'' Id. Because the Government did not take exception to 
the ALJ's findings on the issue of Respondent's candor during the 
interview, I deem it unnecessary to make any findings related to the 
allegation.
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    The ALJ thus concluded that ``the Government has established its 
prima facie case by at least a preponderance of the evidence.'' Id. at 
69. The ALJ explained that ``[w]hen responding to the Government's 
prima facie case . . . Respondent has the opportunity to demonstrate 
that he recognizes any noncompliance with controlled substance laws and 
has taken steps to ensure against future noncompliance.'' Id. at 68-69. 
The ALJ then reasoned that under the Agency's case law, ``in the 
absence of evidence of `sincere[ ] remorse[ ],' a `generalized 
acceptance of responsibility to the allegations' is not enough to open 
the hearing so as to permit evidence of remediation.'' Id. (citing 
Govt's Post-Hrng. Br. 48). Finding that ``Respondent has not provided 
substantial evidence meeting this standard,'' the ALJ concluded that he 
``failed to establish a basis that would permit him to rebut the 
Government's prima facie case.'' Id. The ALJ thus recommended that I 
revoke Respondent registrations and deny his pending applications. Id.
    Both parties filed Exceptions to the ALJ's Recommended Decision. 
Thereafter, the record was forwarded to my Office for Final Agency 
Action.
    On review of the record, I noted that it contained no evidence as 
to whether Respondent is currently authorized under Michigan law to 
dispense controlled substances. Order at 1 (Nov. 10, 2015). 
Accordingly, I directed the parties to address whether Respondent 
currently possesses authority under Michigan law to dispense controlled 
substances and if Respondent does not possess such authority, to 
address what consequence attaches for this proceeding. Id.
    On November 17, 2015, the Government submitted its Response. 
Therein, the Government noted that on July 6, 2015, the Michigan 
Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs had filed an 
Administrative Complaint with the Board of Medicine Disciplinary 
Subcommittee. Govt's. Resp., at 7-8; Govt's Resp. Ex. 3, at 8-14

[[Page 8224]]

(Administrative Complaint, In re Ataya, No. 43-15-137995 (Mich. Bd. of 
Med. July 6, 2015)). When Respondent failed to respond to the 
allegations of the complaint, the allegations were deemed admitted, and 
on October 30, 2015, the Board revoked his medical license. Gov. Resp. 
Ex. 3, at 2-3, 5. In his Response to my Order, Respondent states that 
he does not dispute that the Board has revoked his medical license and 
that he ``no longer has any legal authority to dispense controlled 
substances, which, as a practical matter, he could not accomplish from 
the jail cell he has occupied for the past several months anyway.'' 
Respondent's Resp., at 1.
    Having considered the record in its entirety, including the 
parties' Exceptions, as well as the recent action taken by the Michigan 
Board of Medicine, I issue this Decision and Final Order. I agree with 
the ALJ that the record supports findings that Respondent ignored 
multiple red flags of abuse and/or diversion with respect to each of 
the five patients (FoF #2). I also agree that the record supports the 
ALJ's factual findings specific to Respondent's prescribing of 
controlled substances to each of the five patients (FOF#s 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7), as well as his legal conclusions that Respondent acted outside 
of the usual course of professional practice and lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose in prescribing controlled substances to each of the 
five patients in violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a). See R.D. at 66-67. I 
further agree with the ALJ that Respondent violated federal and state 
law when he issued prescriptions authorizing more than five refills of 
schedule IV controlled substances, as well as when he post-dated a 
prescription and failed to include the patients' names and addresses on 
numerous prescriptions. Finally, I agree with the ALJ's conclusion that 
the Government made out a prima facie case that Respondent's 
registration is inconsistent with the public interest.
    With respect to Respondent's rebuttal case, for reasons explained 
below, I find troubling the ALJ's handling of the issue of whether 
Respondent has adequately accepted responsibility for his misconduct. 
And as for the ALJ's ruling barring Respondent from presenting evidence 
of his remedial measures, I agree with the ALJ that Respondent did not 
sufficiently disclose the scope of the proposed testimony. While this 
alone is sufficient reason to reject Respondent's exception, the ALJ 
further reasoned that under the Agency's precedent, Respondent is 
barred from introducing evidence of his remedial measures absent his 
admission to the allegations before the Government was even required to 
put on its evidence. Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, while a 
respondent's failure to acknowledge his misconduct renders evidence of 
his remedial measures irrelevant, the Agency has never held that a 
respondent must admit to his misconduct prior to even being able to 
test the Government's evidence at the hearing.
    I reject, however, Respondent's contention that a remand is 
warranted for multiple reasons. First, as explained above, I agree with 
the ALJ's conclusion that Respondent did not adequately disclose the 
scope of the proposed testimony on the adequacy of his remedial 
measures. Second, even were I to credit Respondent's admissions at the 
hearing and give weight to his testimony regarding the remedial 
measures he has undertaken, I would nonetheless find that his conduct 
was so egregious that the protection of the public interest warrants 
the revocation of his registrations and the denial of his pending 
applications. Finally, because of the recent action of the Michigan 
Board of Medicine, Respondent is precluded from being registered 
because he no longer holds authority under state law to dispense 
controlled substances, and thus evidence of his acceptance of 
responsibility and remedial measures is irrelevant. See 21 U.S.C. 
802(21), 823(f).

Findings of Fact

Respondent's Licensure and Registration Status

    Respondent was formerly licensed as a physician by the Michigan 
Board of Medicine. However, on July 6, 2015, the Bureau of Professional 
Licensing, acting on behalf of the Michigan Department of Professional 
Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, filed a complaint against Respondent. 
Administrative Complaint, In re Ataya, No. 43-15-137995 (Mich. Bd. of 
Med. July 6, 2015). The Department also ordered that Respondent's 
medical license be summarily suspended. Order of Summary Suspension, In 
re Ataya. Thereafter, on October 30, 2015, the Board of Medicine 
revoked Respondent's medical license. Final Order, In re Ataya.
    Respondent currently holds two DEA practitioner's registrations, 
pursuant to which he is authorized to dispense controlled substances in 
schedules II through V. GX 4, at 1-2. The first of these (BA7776353) is 
for the registered location of 5097 Miller Road, Flint, Michigan and 
does not expire until June 30, 2017. Id. at 1. The second (FA2278201) 
is for the registered location of 971 Baldwin Road, Lapeer, Michigan 
and does not expire until June 30, 2016. GX 3, at 1. Respondent has 
also applied for two additional registrations: One at the address of 
3390 N. State Road, Davison, Michigan; the other at the address of 3400 
Fleckenstein, Flint, Michigan.

The Investigation of Respondent

    Respondent first came to the attention of law enforcement on 
January 5, 2012, when a Detective with the City of Lapeer Police 
Department responded to the death of R.J.H., one of the patients 
identified in the Show Cause Order. Tr. 90; ALJ Ex. 1, at 1-2. 
According to the Detective, he knew R.J.H. from his experience in law 
enforcement and knew him to be an abuser of both ``prescription drugs 
[and] illegal drugs.'' Tr. 93. The Detective testified that R.J.H. bore 
no signs of external injuries and there was no evidence that injuries 
had led to his death. Id. The police did, however, find three empty 
prescription vials, including a vial bearing a label for 120 methadone 
10 \7\ and clonazepam (Klonopin), as well as a syringe, on a nightstand 
in R.J.H.'s bedroom. Id. The Detective subsequently obtained a report 
from the Michigan Automated Prescription System (MAPS) and found that 
both the methadone and Klonopin had been prescribed to R.J.H. by 
Respondent on January 3, 2012. Id. According to the detective, 
toxicology testing led to the conclusion that R.J.H. had died of an 
overdose. Id. at 95. The Detective also learned that R.J.H. had 
overdosed on heroin two days before and was taken to the hospital. Id. 
at 107; GX 5, at 1.
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    \7\ All numbers which follow the name of a drug refer to the 
dose per pill in milligrams.
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    On January 22, 2012, the Detective responded to the death of J.W. 
Tr. 95. The authorities found two pill bottles in J.W.'s coat, as well 
as marijuana. Id. at 96, 108. One vial, which bore a label for 120 
methadone, contained only nine methadone pills; however, the vial also 
included four Klonopin pills and two diazepam. Id. The second vial, 
which bore a label for 120 Klonopin, contained only 91 pills. Id. 
According to the Detective, J.W.'s body bore possible needle marks. Id. 
at 112.
    During his investigation, the Detective determined that on January 
19 (three days earlier), J.W. had obtained prescriptions from 
Respondent for 120 methadone 10 and 120 clonazepam 1. Id. at 96. 
According to the Detective, the investigation and toxicology test 
results led to the conclusion that J.W. had died of an overdose. Id. at 
96-97.

[[Page 8225]]

    During the course of his investigation, the Detective spoke with 
both J.W.'s mother and niece. The Detective testified that J.W.'s 
mother said that J.W. did not like methadone and usually sold it to buy 
other drugs. Id. at 112. According to the Detective, J.S. (J.W.'s 
niece) told him that J.W. had been released from jail only ``a week or 
two prior to his death.'' Id. at 98. J.S.'s niece also told the 
Detective that she had contacted Respondent's office and told him that 
her uncle ``had a problem'' with controlled substances ``and asked him 
not to prescribe any controlled substances'' to her uncle. Id.
    J.S. subsequently testified that her uncle's drug problem ``was 
obvious'' and that ``[e]verybody knew.'' Id. at 125. She testified that 
she spoke with Respondent on the phone a couple of weeks before her 
uncle was released and told Respondent that her uncle ``was sick and he 
didn't need the medications because he wasn't taking them'' and ``was 
selling them.'' Id. at 128-29. According to J.S., Respondent initially 
``blew [her] off.'' Id. at 129. However, when J.S. told Respondent that 
the police ``wanted to know why [J.W.] had two prescriptions for 
Methadone'' which he had not filled, Respondent asked for J.W.'s name, 
address and date of birth. Id. J.S. also told Respondent that J.W. had 
``nearly died from withdrawal'' and asked Respondent not to ``give him 
these strong medications.'' Id. While Respondent said that ``he 
wouldn't do it anymore,'' id. at 130, as found above, Respondent 
subsequently issued the methadone and clonazepam prescriptions to 
J.W.\8\ Id. at 96.
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    \8\ Respondent testified that he does not recall the phone 
conversation about which J.S. testified, explaining that he would 
not remember what patient the conversation involved because he has 
7,500 patients. Tr. 485. He also testified that if someone calls and 
wants to speak to him about a patient, his assistants ask the person 
``to come with the patient and discuss the matter.'' Id. The ALJ did 
not make a finding as to whether J.S.'s testimony was credible. R.D. 
at 9-10. I find her testimony credible, noting that while it may be 
that Respondent would not recall the conversation given the large 
number of patients he treated, one would recall a conversation she 
had with a doctor about a family member.
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    The Detective also testified regarding an investigation conducted 
by a subordinate into the death of R.K. on or about July 21, 2012. Id. 
at 98-100. According to the Detective, there was no evidence that R.K. 
had died of injuries and upon arriving at the scene, the police found a 
prescription vial which, according to the label, had been issued by 
Respondent four days earlier for 90 Xanax. Id. at 100. However, the 
vial was empty. Id.
    The Detective also obtained a MAPS report for R.K. Id. The MAPS 
report shows that on July 17, Respondent issued to R.K. a prescription 
for 90 tablets of methadone 10, which R.K. filled the next day. GX 22, 
at 16. The cause of R.K.'s death was a drug overdose. Id. at 101. 
According to a police report, a person with Community Mental Health 
stated that R.K. was known to abuse heroin, Tramadol, and other 
prescription medications. GX 5, at 17.
    The Detective testified that because his agency did not have a lot 
of experience in prescription drug investigations, after R.K.'s death, 
he sought the assistance of DEA, and on August 13, 2012, met with a DEA 
Diversion Investigator (DI). Tr. 102. Two days after the meeting, the 
mother of another of Respondent's patients (J.L.H.) contacted the 
Lapeer Police and reported that she had taken her daughter to see 
Respondent the day before and that he had issued her prescriptions for 
methadone, tramadol and clonazepam. Id. at 102-03. However, the day 
after J.L.H. saw Respondent, her mother reported that she was unable to 
contact J.L.H. at her residence and could not get her to answer the 
door; she thus requested the assistance of the police. Id. at 103. The 
Detective testified that ``[a] neighbor had climbed up on the roof and 
looked through a second story window and observed [J.L.H.] on the couch 
unresponsive.'' Id. A police officer entered J.L.H.'s home and found 
her ``blue in color and unresponsive.'' Id. J.L.H. was taken to the 
hospital. Id.
    Several months later, the Detective obtained a warrant to search 
Respondent's Lapeer office for several patient charts, and on March 26, 
2013, the Lapeer Police Department, DEA, and members of the Thumb 
Narcotics Unit (a local multijurisdictional task force) executed the 
warrant. Id. at 104. However, the Detective and the DI decided to 
interview Respondent, who was at his Davidson office, prior to 
searching his Lapeer office. Id.
    During the search of the Lapeer office, the Detective determined 
that several of the patient files that were being sought under the 
warrant were not at that office. Id. at 105. Accordingly, the Detective 
obtained an amended warrant, which authorized searches of Respondent's 
Flint and Davidson offices. Id. The records were subsequently seized 
and provided to the DI, who had them scanned. Id.
    The Government also called the DI who worked with the Detective on 
the investigation. The DI testified that she obtained MAPS reports for 
Respondent and found that they showed that he prescribed ``a lot of 
combinations of prescriptions for [m]ethadone, [h]ydrocodone, and . . . 
[a]lprazolam'' and that the patients were ``getting them on a regular 
basis.'' Id. at 146. The DI also testified that when alprazolam is 
taken with methadone or hydrocodone, ``it enhances the effect of the 
narcotic causing somewhat of a heroin-type high.'' Id. at 147. The DI 
further testified that she participated in the execution of the search 
warrant and that she assisted in the seizure of patient charts and 
conducted employee interviews. Id. at 149. According to the DI, she 
determined what charts to seize by reviewing MAPS data and conducting 
``criminal history searches to determine what patients were known to be 
drug seekers or had a positive criminal history.'' Id.
    The DI testified that ``many of the charts contained information 
that [showed] that the patients were not taking the controlled 
substances as they had been prescribed, or that they had drug addiction 
issues, or they were narcotic dependent, or any of a number of red 
flags that were indicated in the charts, and then we sent the patient 
charts out for expert review.'' Id. at 156-57. The DI explained that 
there were ``instances where the patient was coming [back] before the 
30-day[s] had expired, and were [sic] obtaining additional 
prescriptions for the same medication or,'' the patients were 
``obtaining refills of a prescription that had refills written on [it] 
prior to the time [that] they should have used [ ] the medication up if 
they were taking it as directed.'' Id. at 157.
    The DI testified that the patient records included evidence that 
pharmacies had called Respondent raising issues of whether the patients 
``were doctor shopping or obtaining refills early.'' Id. at 158. The DI 
also testified that the files contained ``reports from the State 
alerting [Respondent] about medication issues that they wanted him to 
be aware of'' regarding ``his prescribing of certain drugs,'' as well 
as ``police reports'' and ``hospital reports on several patients 
indicating that they had a history of drug abuse or they had been 
admitted for a drug-related issue.'' Id. The DI testified that she 
provided Dr. Eugene Mitchell, Jr., with the files of the five patients 
at issue in this proceeding and asked him to review the files and 
identify examples of Respondent's issuance of controlled substance 
prescriptions outside of ``the usual course of medical practice'' and 
which lacked a legitimate medical purpose. Id. at 160. According to the 
DI, these specific charts were selected for review by Dr. Mitchell 
because ``the findings in these files . . . were

[[Page 8226]]

egregious'' and four of the five patients were deceased. Id. at 160-
61.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ In addition to obtaining each patient's medical file, the DI 
used the MAPS data to obtain copies of the original prescriptions 
from the various pharmacies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The DI further testified that in reviewing the patient files she 
found evidence of other violations of the Controlled Substance Act and 
DEA regulations. Tr. 172-73. These included instances in which 
Respondent authorized more than five refills on a prescription; 
instances in which he issued early refills; instances in which he 
failed to include a patient's address, which is required information on 
a prescription; and instances in which Respondent post-dated 
prescriptions. Id. at 173-74. The DI then testified as to the following 
examples: (1) A Xanax prescription dated Feb. 9, 2013 issued to R.E.H. 
authorizing six refills (GX 8, at 23); (2) a Klonopin prescription 
dated August 14, 2012 issued to J.H. authorizing six refills (GX 19, at 
117); and (3) a Xanax prescription dated April 10, 2012 issued to R.K. 
authorizing six refills (GX 17, at 49). Tr. 184-86.\10\ The DI also 
discussed two examples of prescriptions which Respondent issued to 
Patient R.E.H. without including his address, and did so even after 
Respondent had received information that R.E.H., who shared the same 
first name as his father, had attempted to fill a methadone 
prescription using his father's name and date of birth. Tr. 182-84; see 
also GX 8, at 42 (methadone and Xanax prescriptions dated April 19, 
2012 with patient's address left blank).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ The DI also testified regarding two methadone prescriptions 
Respondent issued to R.E.H. in October 2012, including one which was 
issued notwithstanding that R.E.H. was a week early, and on which 
the date of the copy in R.E.H.'s file appears to have been altered. 
Tr. 175-80. These prescriptions are discussed more fully in the 
findings regarding Respondent's prescribing to R.E.H.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Government Expert's Testimony

    The Government called Dr. Eugene O. Mitchell, Jr., who testified as 
an expert on pain management. Dr. Mitchell received a Bachelor of 
Science in Biochemistry in 1975 from the University of Florida and a 
Bachelor of Science in Medicine in 1979 from the University of 
Florida's Physician's Assistant Program. GX 25, at 1. Dr. Mitchell 
subsequently obtained a Doctor of Medicine in 1985 from the Wayne State 
University School of Medicine. Id. His post-doctoral training includes 
an internship in internal medicine and a residency in anesthesiology 
(both at the University of Illinois), and a fellowship in pain medicine 
at the University of Michigan. Id.
    Dr. Mitchell holds a medical license issued by the State of 
Michigan and is board certified in both anesthesiology and pain 
medicine. Id. at 2. He is also a member of numerous professional 
societies including the American Academy of Pain Medicine and the 
American Society of Regional Anesthesia and Pain Medicine. Id.
    Since February 2001, Dr. Mitchell has held the position of Clinical 
Assistant Professor in the Department of Anesthesiology, Division of 
Interventional Pain Medicine, at the University of Michigan Medical 
Center. Id. In this position, he lectures medical students on pain 
medicine and trains fellows in pain medicine as well as residents, 
interns, and nursing staff. Id. at 3, Tr. 234. He also is active in 
practice. Id. Dr. Mitchell was qualified as an expert. Id. at 239.
    Dr. Mitchell testified ``all controlled substances have the risk of 
significant morbidities including death from overdose,'' ``withdrawal 
from their use,'' and ``addiction.\11\ '' Id. He testified that to 
reduce the risks associated with the abuse and diversion of controlled 
substances, a physician must ``be familiar with the patient's medical 
history'' and review the patient's records so that the physician has 
``a clear understanding'' of the patient's diagnosis. Id. at 240. Also, 
the physician must review the patient's ``history of abuse'' and 
``[a]ny issue of addictive illness,'' whether it involves tobacco, 
alcohol, and both ``licit'' and ``illicit'' drugs. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \11\ He also testified that the use of controlled substances 
presents a risk of developing both renal and hepatic disease. Tr. 
239.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Mitchell further testified that there are various compliance 
tools that he uses to determine whether patients are abusing or 
diverting controlled substances. The first of these is a ``medication 
agreement'' between the physician and the patient which sets forth the 
``criteria that [the patient] will adhere to'' while ``being prescribed 
controlled substances.'' Id. Dr. Mitchell testified that an essential 
part of the agreement is ``a clause that allows the physician to ask 
the patient'' to provide ``a random body fluid sample,'' whether of 
blood or urine, ``on demand to verify what is or isn't present in'' the 
patient's body. Id. at 241. Dr. Mitchell explained that a further 
compliance tool is to use the MAPS, Michigan's controlled substance 
prescription monitoring program, which allows a physician to obtain a 
list of the controlled substance prescriptions filled by a patient in 
the State. Id.
    Dr. Mitchell also testified that in Michigan, a task force of 
physicians developed Guidelines for the ``appropriate prescribing'' of 
controlled substances for the treatment of pain. Id. at 243; GX 26. 
These Guidelines have been issued by both the Board of Medicine and the 
Board of Osteopathic Medicine & Surgery. GX 26, at 1. The Guidelines 
``recognize that controlled substances, including opioid analgesics, 
may be essential in the treatment of acute pain due to trauma or 
surgery and chronic pain, whether due to cancer or non-cancer 
origins.'' Id. However, the Guidelines caution ``that inappropriate 
prescribing of controlled substances, including opioid analgesics, may 
lead to drug diversion and abuse by individuals who seek them for other 
than legitimate medical use'' and that ``[p]hysicians should be 
diligent in preventing the diversion of drugs for illegitimate 
purposes.'' Id. According to the Guidelines, they ``are not intended to 
define complete or best practice, but rather to communicate what the 
Board considers to be within the boundaries of professional practice.'' 
Id. at 2.
    Dr. Mitchell then testified regarding the ``typical steps taken by 
doctors in treating patients who suffer from chronic pain.'' Tr. 247. 
Dr. Mitchell testified that when a new patient seeks treatment, a 
physician ``take[s] a detailed history'' and asks the patient ``to 
bring [his/her] records'' including imaging findings. Tr. 247; see also 
GX 26, at 3-4. Dr. Mitchell explained that a physician ``document[s] 
what [his/her] chief complaint is'' and why the patient is seeking ``to 
begin care.'' Tr. 247.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that the ``standard medical doctoring for a 
new patient encounter'' includes a ``review of [the patient's] 
systems'' and ``[a]n appropriately detailed physical examination.'' Id. 
The physician then makes a diagnosis and creates a treatment plan. Id. 
The physician also ``modulates the treatment plan'' in accordance with 
the patient's disease process.\12\ Id. at 248.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ With respect to the initial evaluation of the patient, the 
Michigan Guidelines state:
    A complete medical history and physical examination must be 
conducted and documented in the medical record. The medical record 
should document the nature and intensity of the pain, current and 
past treatments for pain, underlying or coexisting diseases or 
conditions, the effect of the pain on physical and psychological 
function, and history of substance abuse. The medical record also 
should document the presence of one or more recognized medical 
indications for the use of a controlled substance.
    GX 26, at 3. With respect to the creation of a treatment plan, 
the Guidelines state:
    The written treatment plan should state objectives that will be 
used to determine treatment success, such as pain relief and 
improved physical and psychosocial function, and should indicate if 
any further diagnostic evaluations or other treatments are planned. 
After treatment begins, the physician should adjust drug therapy to 
the individual medical needs of each patient. Other treatment 
modalities or a rehabilitation program may be necessary depending on 
the etiology of the pain and the extent to which the pain is 
associated with physical and psychosocial impairment.
    Id.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 8227]]

    Re-emphasizing his earlier testimony, Dr. Mitchell testified that 
as part of the process of formulating a plan involving the long term 
prescribing of controlled substances, the physician reviews the 
medication agreement/opioid contract with the patient and explains that 
if the patient violates the agreement, the patient will be discharged 
from the practice.\13\ Id. at 249. Dr. Mitchell further explained that 
the first time a patient presents with a red flag, regardless of 
whether the patient has a history of addiction, the red flag should be 
documented and the patient should be brought in and given the 
``opportunity to explain what's going on.'' Id. at 249-50. Dr. Mitchell 
explained that there is a spectrum of red flags which runs from such 
incidents as a patient claiming to have lost a prescription but having 
``no other infractions,'' to a patient whose ``urine screens are 
inappropriate'' or whose MAPS report shows they are ``multi sourcing. 
'' Id. at 250.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ Relevant to this testimony, the Guidelines state that:
    [i]f the patient is determined to be at high risk for medication 
abuse or have a history of substance abuse, the physician may employ 
the use of a written agreement between physician and patient 
outlining patient responsibilities, including . . . urine/serum 
medication levels screening when requested; . . . number and 
frequency of all prescriptions, refills; and . . . reasons for which 
drug therapy may be discontinued (i.e., violation of agreement).
    GX 26, at 3. The Guidelines further advise physicians to 
periodically ``monitor patient compliance in medication usage and 
related treatment plans.'' Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Regarding the five patients identified in the Show Cause Order, Dr. 
Mitchell testified that he reviewed the patient files including the 
visit notes, MAPS reports, and copies of the prescriptions which 
included the pharmacy labels. Id. at 251. Dr. Mitchell testified that 
he had identified specific prescriptions which he believed were issued 
outside of the usual course of professional medical practice. Id. at 
252. Dr. Mitchell further explained that he has been ``practicing 
medicine for nearly 30 years,'' and that he is ``familiar with what 
constitutes general[ly] appropriate behavior regarding prescribing 
controlled substances.'' Id.

The Patient Specific Evidence

R.E.H.

The Allegations
    With respect to R.E.H., the Government alleged that from August 5, 
2010 through at least March 13, 2013, Respondent repeatedly prescribed 
controlled substances to the patient even after Respondent knew that 
R.E.H. ``was engaged in the abuse and/or diversion of controlled 
substances, as well as prescription fraud.'' ALJ Ex. 1, at 2. 
Specifically, the Government alleged that Respondent repeatedly 
prescribed methadone, a schedule II narcotic controlled substance, and 
other controlled substances to R.E.H., notwithstanding that he 
presented ``numerous red flags of diversion and/or abuse.'' Id. The 
allegations included that:
     R.E.H. repeatedly sought early refills;
     R.E.H. repeatedly claimed that his prescriptions were lost 
or stolen;
     pharmacists repeatedly contacted Respondent's office to 
report suspicious behavior by R.E.H.;
     MAPS reports in R.E.H.'s file corroborated reports that 
R.E.H. and his wife were committing prescription fraud;
     R.E.H. had been recently released from jail; and
     hospital records in his file showed that R.E.H. was using 
illegal drugs.

Id. at 2.

    The Show Cause Order also alleged that R.E.H.'s patient file and 
the prescriptions issued to him show that Respondent prescribed 
methadone on R.E.H.'s ``first visit without undertaking other actions 
typical of medical professionals[,] such as conducting and documenting 
a complete medical history and physical examination, requiring that 
R.E.H. (a self-identified addict) sign a pain management contract or 
undergo a drug test, running a MAPS search on R.E.H., or creating a 
written treatment plan.'' Id. at 2-3. The Show Cause Order then alleged 
that Respondent:
     Never subsequently required R.E.H. to sign a pain 
management contract;
     ``repeatedly issued prescriptions to [him] with 
instructions to take his methadone `PRN'--thus directing that this 
self-identified addict should take this powerful opioid analgesic 
(properly used in scheduled dosages) on an `as needed' basis'';
     issued at least one prescription on a date when R.E.H.'s 
patient file indicates that he did not have an appointment;
     notwithstanding that he knew that R.E.H. was attempting to 
fill the prescriptions using his father's birthdate to avoid being 
detected, Respondent did not take the minimal preventative step of 
including R.E.H's address on his methadone prescriptions as required by 
state and federal law;
     issued a prescription for Xanax to be refilled six times, 
in violation of state and federal law; and
     falsified records to post-date a methadone prescription in 
order to provide R.E.H. with an early refill in violation of state and 
federal law, circumventing the efforts by his staff noting that an 
early refill should not be issued.

Id. at 3.

The Evidence

    On August 5, 2010, R.E.H. made his first visit to Respondent. Tr. 
254; GX 8, at 143. According to his medical record, R.E.H.'s chief 
complaint was back pain. Tr. 256; GX 8, at 143. R.E.H. also reported a 
history of abusing heroin, which is a ``significant addictive illness 
history,'' Tr. 257, as well as tobacco abuse and that he was taking 
methadone; however, there is no indication that Respondent determined 
how much methadone R.E.H. was taking, which according to Dr. Mitchell 
was ``a critical bit of information . . . because methadone . . . is 
approximately five times as potent as morphine.'' Id. at 256. Dr. 
Mitchell also explained that Respondent did not determine if R.E.H.'s 
heroin abuse, which he characterized as a ``significant addictive 
illness history'' was ``currently active'' and whether he had gone (or 
was going to rehabilitation) for it. Id. at 257.
    Dr. Mitchell further found that Respondent's physical examination 
was ``very cursory for a new patient'' as he did not conduct 
neurological and spinal examinations. Id. at 256. He also did not 
require that R.E.H. sign a medication contract, id. at 257-58, even 
though he prescribed 30 tablets of methadone 10, with a dosing 
instruction of TID or one tablet, to be taken three times per day. Id. 
at 255. Dr. Mitchell opined that this prescription was not issued in 
the usual course of medical practice. Id. I agree.
    Even though the prescription should have lasted for ten days, 
R.E.H. returned to Respondent only six days later and obtained a new 
prescription, which was for 90 tablets of methadone, TID (three times a 
day). Id. at 258-59. Dr. Mitchell testified that this was an early 
refill and thus required that Respondent ask R.E.H. why he needed to 
refill his prescription four days early and document the reason he 
needed the early refill. Tr. 259-60. Dr. Mitchell thus found that the 
prescription was not

[[Page 8228]]

issued in the usual course of medical practice. Id. at 259. He further 
explained that R.E.H.'s seeking of the refill was a matter of concern 
because of R.E.H.'s history of drug abuse.\14\ Id. at 260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ The transcript includes a question by Government's counsel 
which suggests that R.E.H.'s second visit occurred on October 11, 
2010. See Tr. 260, at Ls 5-6. However, R.E.H.'s medical record 
includes a progress note for August 11, 2010 and contains no note 
for an October 11, 2010 visit. See GX 8, at 140-42 (progress notes 
for visits of Aug. 11, Sept., 21, and Oct. 13, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    R.E.H.'s third visit occurred on September 21, 2010. Tr. 262. The 
progress note documents, however, that R.E.H. was ``just release [sic] 
from jail'' and that he had been in jail ``15 days.'' GX 8, at 141; Tr. 
262. The note further states that R.E.H.'s methadone dose was increased 
to 10 mg five times a day for two weeks, suggesting that this had 
occurred when he was in jail. Id. The note also states: ``methadone x 6 
months Heroin addiction.'' GX 8, at 141.
    Respondent issued R.E.H. a prescription for 90 pills of methadone 
10, TID. Id. While this should have provided a 30-day supply and thus 
lasted until October 21, R.E.H. returned to Respondent on October 13, 
eight days early, and obtained a new prescription for 90 tablets of 
methadone 10. Tr. 263-64. Dr. Mitchell testified that R.E.H. was 
manifesting a pattern of seeking early refills and Respondent's 
issuance of the prescriptions was not within the usual course of 
medical practice because there was ``no documentation'' that Respondent 
engaged R.E.H. ``as to why this is going on.'' Id. at 265. Moreover, 
Respondent did not attempt to determine if R.E.H. was ``even taking the 
medication'' by demanding that he provide ``a urine sample.'' Id. He 
also did not obtain a MAPS report. Id.
    R.E.H. returned to Respondent on November 1, 2010. GX 8, at 139. 
While R.E.H. was 11 days early, Respondent issued him another 
prescription for 90 tablets of methadone 10 with the same dosing 
instruction. GX 8, at 139; Tr. 266. While R.E.H. was not early at his 
next visit (November 30), when he again obtained a prescription for 90 
methadone 10 (one tablet TID, or three times per day), he returned to 
Respondent on December 23, and obtained a new prescription, which he 
increased to 120 tablets (TID) even though he was a week early. Tr. 
266-67; GX 8, at 137-38; GX 15, at 15-16. According to Dr. Mitchell, 
none of the prescriptions Respondent issued in November-December 2010 
were issued in the usual course of professional practice. Tr. 268. 
However, Respondent did not require that R.E.H. sign a pain contract 
until apparently December 23, 2010.\15\ Tr. 270-71; GX 8, at 242.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \15\ The date does not, however, include the year. GX 8, at 242.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    R.E.H. returned on January 4, 2011. GX 8, at 136; GX 15, at 17. 
Even though R.E.H. was 18 days early, and notwithstanding that the pain 
contract required him to use his ``medicine at a rate no greater than 
the prescribed rate'' and stated that if he used it at a greater rate, 
he would be ``without medication for a period of time,'' GX 8, at 242; 
Respondent issued him another prescription for 90 tablets of methadone 
10 with a dosing instruction of TID and PRN (take as needed). GX 8, at 
136; GX 15, at 17. Dr. Mitchell testified that this prescription was 
not issued in the usual course of professional practice and that the 
usual course of professional practice would be to discharge a patient 
seeking a prescription two weeks early. Tr. 269. He also testified that 
it is not in the usual course of medical practice to prescribe 
methadone with a dosing instruction of PRN because the drug ``has [a] 
very long half-life'' and ``takes a while . . . to enter the blood'' 
stream, and the reason the drug is used for pain is to provide ``a 
stable blood level'' of medication. Id. at 274.
    Respondent did not, however, discharge R.E.H., who returned on 
January 26, 2011. GX 8, at 135. Notwithstanding that R.E.H. was eight 
days early, Respondent issued him a new prescription and increased the 
quantity to 120 pills and the dosing to four tablets per day. GX 15, at 
19-20. Dr. Mitchell testified that this prescription was also not 
issued within the usual course of medical practice. Tr. 270.
    An entry in R.E.H.'s medical record documents that on February 15, 
2011, a pharmacy called and reported that R.E.H. had tried to fill 
three prescriptions for 120 tablets of methadone in less than one 
month. GX 8, at 18. The note documented that on January 26, 2011, 
R.E.H. had filled one such prescription at a different pharmacy using 
insurance, and that on February 1, 2011, he had filled the second 
prescription at a second pharmacy paying cash. Id. Moreover, on 
February 15, R.E.H. had attempted to fill a third prescription at still 
another pharmacy but was denied, after which he took it to the pharmacy 
that called Respondent's office. Id.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that ``this is obviously very concerning 
behavior'' and that a doctor acting the usual course of medical 
practice would summon the patient and ask for an explanation. Tr. 276-
77. He further testified that it would ``[a]bsolutely not'' be within 
the usual course of professional practice to issue a new prescription 
for a controlled substance in these circumstances. Id. at 277.
    R.E.H.'s file includes a MAPS report which was obtained on the 
morning of February 17, 2011, two days after the Respondent's office 
was notified that R.E.H. had filled two prescriptions since January 26 
and had attempted to fill a third. GX 8, 236. The MAPS report 
corroborated the pharmacy's report and showed that R.E.H. had managed 
to fill Respondent's January 26 prescription on both that date and on 
February 1, 2011 at two different pharmacies. Id. Of further note, 
various entries for these two dispensings are circled, thus indicating 
that someone reviewed them. Id. Dr. Mitchell testified that this raised 
``another obvious problem with [R.E.H.'s] compliance,'' and that given 
his ``known history of heroin abuse . . . appropriate medical care 
would dictate engaging the patient in this behavior,'' followed by 
``discharging'' him and urging him ``to go to rehabilitation.'' Tr. 
279.
    While R.E.H. saw Respondent on both February 17 and 22, 2011, there 
is no evidence that Respondent even addressed R.E.H.'s drug-seeking 
behavior, let alone discharged him. Id. at 280-81; see GX 8, at 132-33. 
While Respondent did not prescribe methadone to R.E.H. at any of his 
three visits in February 2011, Tr. 281, on March 2, he issued R.E.H. a 
new prescription for 120 methadone 10, a 30-day supply based on the 
dosing instruction (QID and PRN). GX 8, at 131; GX 15, at 25. Yet only 
21 days later on March 23, Respondent issued to R.E.H. another 
prescription for 120 methadone 10 (also QID and PRN), and only six days 
later on March 29, Respondent issued him a prescription for 90 more 
methadone 10 (TID). Tr. 282; GX 15, at 27-30.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that there was no justification in R.E.H.'s 
chart for Respondent's issuance of prescriptions, which authorized the 
dispensing of a three-month supply of the drug. Tr. 283. He also 
testified that these prescriptions were not issued in the usual course 
of professional practice. Id.
    The evidence further shows that on June 2, 2011,\16\ Respondent 
issued to

[[Page 8229]]

R.E.H. a prescription for 100 tablets of methadone 10 QID. GX 15, at 
37-38. This was followed by additional prescriptions for 120 tablets of 
methadone 10 QID on June 16, July 12, July 14, August 9, and August 23, 
2011. Id. at 41-42, 45-46, 47-48, 51-52, 53-54. The June 16 
prescription was 11 days early, and while the July 12 prescription was 
only four days early, as Dr. Mitchell testified, the July 14 
prescription was 28 days early. Tr. 284-85. Moreover, the August 9 
prescription was also early, and the August 23 prescription was 16 days 
early. Id. at 286. Yet there is no progress note for the August 23 
prescription and no entry in the log used to document various 
activities. GX 8, at 15-20 (log entries); id. at 120-21 (progress notes 
for Aug. 9 and Sept. 13, 2011, but not Aug. 23). Dr. Mitchell testified 
that Respondent's issuance of the early methadone refills during the 
June through August period was not within the usual course of 
professional practice. Id. at 287.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \16\ While the Government did not ask Dr. Mitchell about the 
methadone prescriptions issued in April and May 2011, the pattern of 
early refills continued, as on April 20, 2011, Respondent issued 
R.E.H. a new prescription for 90 methadone 10 TID, this being eight 
days early (ignoring that R.E.H. had also obtained methadone on 
March 23). GX 15, at 31-32. Thereafter, on May 10, 2011, Respondent 
issued R.E.H. a prescription for 120 methadone QID, this being 10 
days early. Id. at 33-34. Thus, the June 2 prescription was one week 
early.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    R.E.H.'s patient file also includes copies of two prescriptions for 
120 Vicodin ES (QID), which were dated November 17 and 22, 2011. GX 8, 
at 191-92. The document bearing the November 17 prescription includes 
the notation: ``Please verify--just filled this RX on 11/17 for 30 day 
supply--then the follow[ing] RX was brought in 11/23/11.'' Id. at 192. 
The document further asked: ``please call Walmart'' and included the 
notation of ``suspicious RX.'' Id.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that ``as a stand-alone incident it's very 
concerning'' because ``[i]t smacks of prescription forgery.'' Tr. 288. 
However, in R.E.H.'s case, it was ``just another incident . . . in his 
history that just masked a horrible addictive illness, diversion or 
both.'' Id. at 288-89. Dr. Mitchell then explained that a physician's 
``primary concern'' is the welfare of his/her patients, and a physician 
``need[s] to protect them from their addictive illness and document it 
and refer them to a'' detoxification facility and not just ``feed'' 
their addiction ``by continuing to write medications.'' Id. at 289.
    R.E.H.'s patient file also includes a MAPS report which Respondent 
obtained on December 9, 2011. GX 8, at 185-90. The report showed that 
during the months of October and November 2011, R.E.H. had filled six 
prescriptions for 120 methadone 10 (with four of the prescriptions 
having been filled between Nov. 10 and 29) and that R.E.H. had used 
four different pharmacies. Id. at 185-86. However, R.E.H.'s patient 
file includes progress notes only for visits on October 10 and November 
11. Id. at 116-119. Notably, each of the prescriptions listed on the 
first page of the report has check marks and Respondent's initial/
signature \17\ is on the page, thus establishing that Respondent 
reviewed the document. Id. at 185.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \17\ This initial/signature is the same as that used on the 
numerous prescriptions contained in the record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Mitchell testified that the report would indicate ``[g]reat 
concern for what's going on'' to a doctor acting in the usual course of 
medical practice as it showed that R.E.H. was ``[o]btaining hundreds of 
tablets of methadone.'' Tr. 291. The report also showed that R.E.H. had 
obtained other controlled substances (alprazolam and hydrocodone) from 
two additional pharmacies during these two months. GX 8, at 185-86. 
Thus, R.E.H. had used a total of six pharmacies. Id.; Tr. 291-92.
    The evidence also showed that Respondent was prescribing methadone 
and other controlled substances (alprazolam and hydrocodone) to R.S.H., 
who was R.E.H.'s wife, and that he obtained a MAPS report on her only 
minutes after obtaining the MAPS report on R.E.H. GX 13, at 161-68. The 
MAPS report showed that between October 11, 2011 and November 28, 2011, 
R.S.H. filled seven prescriptions for 120 methadone 10, four 
prescriptions for 90 alprazolam (in either .5 or 1 mg dose), and 
prescriptions for 90 and 120 hydrocodone 7.5. Id. at 161-63. Notably, 
the MAPS reports listed the same address for R.S.H. and R.E.H. Compare 
GX 13, at 161; with GX 8, at 185.
    Regarding this information, Dr. Mitchell testified that ``the 
concerns speak[ ] for itself [sic]. There's something very troublesome 
and potentially life threatening going on here with multitudes of 
refills, repeated incidents,'' given ``there's some indication that 
they're cohabiting together and have the same last name.'' Tr. 294-95. 
Dr. Mitchell then testified that it was not within the usual course of 
professional practice to continue writing methadone and other 
controlled substance prescriptions given these circumstances. Id. at 
295. However, Respondent did not stop issuing methadone and other 
controlled substance prescriptions to R.E.H. after he learned of this. 
Id. at 295. Instead, on both December 21 and 22, 2011, Respondent 
issued R.E.H. two more prescriptions for 120 methadone 10, and he 
continued issuing methadone prescriptions to R.E.H. for another 15 
months. GX 15, at 87-90, 155-56.
    Moreover, on February 29, 2012, Respondent's office received a 
phone call from a pharmacy, which reported that R.E.H. was using his 
father's birthdate to fill the prescriptions. GX 8, at 43. The pharmacy 
also reported that it had called R.E.H.'s father who stated that ``he 
doesn't receive [sic] this script.'' Id. As Dr. Mitchell testified, 
this was evidence that R.E.H. was forging prescriptions. Tr. 296; see 
also 21 U.S.C. 843(a)(3) (rendering it unlawful to ``knowingly or 
intentionally . . . acquire . . . a controlled substance by 
misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge''). Asked 
whether it was appropriate for Respondent to continue to issue 
controlled substance prescriptions to R.E.H., Dr. Mitchell answered: 
``[a]bsolutely no.'' Tr. 297. Yet, on March 6, 2012, Respondent issued 
another prescription to R.E.H. for 120 methadone 10.\18\ GX 15, at 107.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ There is, however, no progress note for this visit. See GX 
8, at 113-14 (notes for visits of Mar. 22 and Feb. 28, 2012 but not 
for Mar. 6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On July 12, 2012 (in the interim, Respondent had continued issuing 
prescriptions for 120 methadone 10 to R.E.H., several of which were 
early \19\), Respondent obtained another MAPS report showing the 
controlled substance prescriptions filled by R.E.H. GX 8, at 204-12. 
The report includes the handwritten notation of ``was not seen on this 
day'' in 14 separate entries for methadone prescriptions which list 
Respondent as the authorizing practitioner.\20\ See id. at 204-09. The 
report also bears Respondent's signature on the first page. Id. at 204. 
Dr. Mitchell explained that these entries ``typically mean[ ]'' either 
that Respondent was issuing the prescriptions without seeing R.E.H. or 
that R.E.H. had stolen a prescription pad. Tr. 299. Yet Respondent 
issued R.E.H. still more prescriptions for 120 methadone 10 on July 24, 
August 15, September 18, and October 8, 2012, as well as a prescription 
for 60 methadone 10 on September 4; each of the last four prescriptions 
was early. GX 15, at 125-36.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ The prescriptions were issued on March 22, April 19, May 
15, June 6, and June 26. GX 15, at 109-24. Each of the prescriptions 
was for a 30-day supply, and thus the March 22, June 6, and June 26 
prescriptions were early.
    \20\ The ``was not seen on this day'' notations are also written 
in entries for an alprazolam prescription (filled on 1/3/12) and for 
two hydrocodone prescriptions (filled on 12/30/11 and 11/19/11). GX 
8, at 207, 209.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence further shows that even when Respondent's nurse noted 
in R.E.H.'s file that R.E.H. was seeking an early refill, Respondent 
nonetheless issued a post-dated prescription to him. As found above, 
the evidence shows that on October 8, 2012, Respondent

[[Page 8230]]

issued R.E.H. a prescription for 120 methadone 10.\21\ GX 8, at 32. 
However, a progress note for an October 29, 2012 visit includes a 
nurse's note stating: ``med refills--Ibuprophen--asked for methadone, 
last refill 10/8/12.'' Id. at 100. Also, a note in a log dated October 
30, 2012 states: ``Pt requests a refill on methadone--and last refill 
was 10/8/12--not time yet.'' Id. at 15. A MAPS report obtained by the 
Government shows that R.E.H. filled two methadone prescriptions with an 
issue date of October 8, 2012--one on October 8th, the other on October 
30th. GX 20, at 14; see also GX 15, at 135-36 (Rx filled on Oct. 8); 
id. at 137-38 (Rx filled on Oct. 30). Not only was the second 
prescription post-dated--a violation of 21 CFR 1306.05(a) which 
requires that ``[a]ll prescriptions for controlled substances shall be 
dated as of, and signed on, the day when issued''--it was also another 
early refill which should not have been filled. Tr. 301 (testimony of 
Dr. Mitchell).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \21\ Here again, there is no progress note for this visit. See 
GX 8, at 100-101 (progress noted for visits on Oct. 3 and 29, 2012). 
However, a copy of the prescription is in R.E.H.'s patient file.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On December 12, 2012, R.E.H. was admitted to a hospital after he 
overdosed on Seroquel. GX 8, at 158. While in the hospital, R.E.H. 
provided a urine drug test which was positive for cocaine. Id. He also 
was diagnosed as ``polysubstance dependen[t].'' Id. at 159. A copy of 
the hospital report was provided to Respondent and bears his signature. 
Id. at 158.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that upon learning that R.E.H. was using 
cocaine, the appropriate response was to refer him to inpatient drug 
rehabilitation as R.E.H. ``obviously'' had ``a life threatening illness 
manifested by his addicting behavior'' as well as to cease prescribing 
controlled substances to him. Tr. 303. Asked by the Government whether 
there ever was a point at which Respondent should have stopped writing 
controlled substance prescriptions to R.E.H., Dr. Mitchell testified:

    The short answer is yes. But the whole format of the care is so 
appalling that he never had a drug contract in the beginning and 
it's just one infraction after another.
    So if you had started from the very beginning, the patient 
already told you that he has a history of heroin abuse. So if you 
were to make the decision to treat his . . . back pain . . . there 
has to be documentation.
    Discussing with the patient about concerns regarding his 
illness, contract agreed upon and . . . random urine samples as well 
as MAPS surveys being pulled.
    In my opinion, in this case, after the second early refill, he'd 
be discharged from the practice. With the option to go to 
rehabilitation.
    You can't just let him go off and not have some kind of 
aftercare. I mean--he's a very sick individual . . . regarding his 
addictive illness.
Id. at 303-04. Yet even after the December 12, 2012 hospitalization, 
Respondent continued to issue more methadone prescriptions to R.E.H. 
See GX 15, at 143 (Rx of 12/27/12); 145 (Rx of 1/22/13); 149 (Rx 2/19/
13); 155 (Rx 3/13/13). Moreover, on February 19, 2013, Respondent 
issued R.E.H. a prescription for 90 Xanax with six refills.\22\ GX 15, 
at 151.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \22\ However, the pharmacy apparently caught the fact that 
Respondent had provided too many refills, and noted that only five 
refills were authorized. GX 15, at 152.

    Following Dr. Mitchell's testimony, Respondent testified on his own 
behalf. After acknowledging that he had listened to all of Dr. 
Mitchell's testimony, Respondent was asked by his counsel if Dr. 
Mitchell is ``right or wrong about you ignoring the red flags about 
patients who are or could be abusing or diverting drugs?'' Tr. 484. 
Respondent answered: ``He's right.'' Id. Subsequently, the ALJ asked 
Respondent if he (the ALJ) was ``correct in understanding that you've 
read the order to show cause?'' Id. 535. Respondent answered: ``I 
did.'' Id. The ALJ then asked Respondent: ``Do you agree that the facts 
that they allege there are all true?'' Respondent answered: ``I did.'' 
Id. The ALJ followed up by asking: ``Your answer was yes you do?'' Id. 
Respondent answered: ``Yes.'' Id.
    I find (as did the ALJ) that Dr. Mitchell provided credible 
testimony that Respondent ignored multiple red flags that R.E.H. was 
abusing and diverting controlled substances and that Respondent lacked 
a legitimate medical purpose and acted outside of the usual course of 
professional practice when he continued to prescribe methadone and 
other drugs in the face of the red flags. While this alone constitutes 
substantial evidence to support a finding that Respondent violated 21 
CFR 1306.04(a) and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) in prescribing to J.E.H., this 
conclusion is buttressed by Respondent's testimony that Dr. Mitchell 
was ``right'' when he testified that Respondent ignored multiple red 
flags.

J.W.

The Allegations
    The Show Cause Order alleged that from December 23, 2010 through 
January 4, 2012, Respondent ``repeatedly prescribed controlled 
substances after [he] came to know that J.W. was engaged in the abuse 
and/or diversion of controlled substances.'' ALJ Ex. 1, at 3. 
Specifically, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent repeatedly 
prescribed controlled substances to J.W. notwithstanding numerous red 
flags of diversion and/or abuse. Id. These included that:
     J.W. repeatedly sought early refills;
     the Michigan Medicaid program notified Respondent that 
J.W. was doctor-shopping;
     a pharmacy also notified Respondent that J.W. was doctor-
shopping;
     J.W. was incarcerated;
     J.W. exhibited withdrawal symptoms; and
     a MAPS report obtained by Respondent in October of 2011 
showed that J.W. was engaged in a persistent pattern of doctor and 
pharmacy shopping.

Id.

    The Show Cause Order also alleged that J.W.'s patient file and the 
prescriptions issued to him show that Respondent:
     Prescribed Adderall, a schedule II stimulant, to J.W. on 
his first visit without diagnosing him with Attention Deficit Disorder 
(ADD), and that he prescribed other controlled substances without 
taking actions typical of medical professionals such as conducting and 
documenting a complete medical history and physical examination, or 
creating a written treatment plan;
     prescribed numerous controlled substances to J.W. without 
conducting a MAPS search ``that a typical Michigan doctor would have 
conducted,'' and that such a search would have shown that J.W. was 
engaged in ``a dangerous pattern of doctor and pharmacy shopping 
(through which J.W. obtained 11 monthly prescriptions for Adderall 
within the first six months of 2011)'';
     prescribed methadone to J.W. with a PRN (take as needed) 
dosing instruction ``within a week of meeting him and repeatedly 
thereafter'';
     ``never subjected J.W. to any drug tests''; and
     ``took no action to enforce the pain management contract 
that J.W. signed on his first visit, in which [J.W.] committed (among 
other things) to obtain controlled medications from only one provider 
(Respondent), fill them at one pharmacy, and take them at the 
prescribed dosages.''

Id. at 3-4.

The Evidence

    J.W. first saw Respondent on December 23, 2010. GX 9, at 42.

[[Page 8231]]

According to a nurse's notation on the progress note, J.W. was seeking 
treatment for pain. Id. Respondent prescribed to J.W. 60 tablets of 
Adderall 20, with a dosing instruction of BID or one tablet to be taken 
twice a day. GX 16, at 1. One week later, J.W. returned to Respondent, 
who wrote him a prescription for 90 tablets of methadone 5, with a 
dosing of TID and PRN. Id. at 3.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that neither prescription was issued in the 
usual course of professional practice. Tr. 308. As for the Adderall 
prescription, Dr. Mitchell explained that the drug is ``typically'' 
prescribed to treat ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder) or ADHD (Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder). Id. Dr. Mitchell explained that 
neither J.W.'s chief complaint nor history ``would indicate an 
appropriate diagnosis for the prescribing of Adderall.'' Id. Dr. 
Mitchell also observed that Respondent's assessment and plan also 
contained ``no indication of any appropriate diagnosis for'' Adderall. 
Id. Reviewing the notes for the first visit, Dr. Mitchell also 
questioned whether Respondent had performed a physical exam, as in the 
space on the progress note for listing the exam findings, Respondent 
had scribbled ``an S.'' GX 9, at 42. Regarding the notation, Dr. 
Mitchell testified that ``I don't know what that signifies.'' Id. at 
309. While Dr. Mitchell also noted that the margin of the progress note 
included a listing of various areas with boxes in which Respondent 
wrote either plus or minus signs, he further testified that he was 
``not sure what they're trying to communicate.'' Id.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that it was inappropriate for Respondent to 
issue the methadone prescription at J.W.'s second visit. Id. Asked to 
explain why, Dr. Mitchell testified that:

    There's no documentation that the patient is having any findings 
based on physical examination that would serve as a foundation for 
prescribing [me]thadone. Even though the records are reviewed, I 
don't see any documentation where it states the patient had 
previously taken [m]ethadone or was on any analgesics whatsoever.
    And then there's some notation that's very hard to make out, it 
says something Vicodin. I can't really read it, but it's in the 
middle of the HPI box.
    I'm not really sure what it's trying to communicate. Whether 
it's regarding prior Vicodin prescription or what. So it's really 
not legible.

Id. at 309-10. As he testified regarding Respondent's prescribing to 
R.E.H., Dr. Mitchell re-iterated that it was not appropriate to 
prescribe methadone for pain on a PRN basis. Id.

    J.W.'s file includes a fax of a ``Notice of Prior Authorization 
Determination,'' which Respondent received from the Michigan Medicaid 
program on or about January 21, 2011. GX 9, at 69. The form noted that 
a prior authorization request had been received and provided the name 
of another physician (Dr. M.) who had prescribed Adderall to J.W.; it 
also listed a pharmacy other than the one which J.W. had listed on the 
Pain Management Agreement he entered into at his first visit with 
Respondent. Compare GX 9, at 69; with id. at 70. As Dr. Mitchell 
explained, this is ``evidence that . . . J.W. [wa]s multi-sourcing for 
amphetamine from another physician.'' Tr. 311. However, in the Pain 
Management Agreement, J.W. had agreed that he would ``not attempt to 
obtain controlled medicine, including . . . stimulants . . . from any 
other doctor, provider or facility.'' GX 9, at 70; see also Tr. 312. 
While the Pain Management Agreement also stated that if J.W. broke the 
agreement, Respondent would stop prescribing controlled substances and 
discharge him, Respondent did not do so. See GX 9, at 70.
    Dr. Mitchell further explained that upon learning that J.W. was 
obtaining Adderall from another doctor, Respondent should have engaged 
J.W. and obtained an explanation for why he was obtaining prescriptions 
from two different doctors and documented the encounter. Tr. 313. 
Respondent, however, did not do this. Id. at 314 (GX 9, at 39). 
Instead, he issued J.W. another prescription for 60 Adderall. Tr. 314; 
ALJ Ex. 50, at 2; GX 16, at 7-8. Asked whether Respondent's issuance of 
the prescription was within the usual course of professional practice, 
Dr. Mitchell answered ``no'' and added that ``[t]he whole beginning for 
the prescriptions of Adderall were not issued in the course of 
legitimate methods of practice.'' Tr. 314-15.
    On February 16, 2011 (22 days later), J.W. again saw Respondent. GX 
9, at 38. Respondent wrote J.W. a new prescription for 60 Adderall even 
though he was eight days early. Tr. 315. Respondent also wrote J.W. a 
prescription for 120 methadone 10. GX 16, at 11.
    However, only two days later (Feb. 18), Respondent's office 
received a phone call from a pharmacy reporting that insurance would 
not cover J.W.'s methadone prescriptions and that he was seeing Dr. M. 
who was prescribing Suboxone to him--Dr. M. being the same doctor 
listed as the medical provider on the prior authorization request form 
Respondent had received from the Michigan Medicaid program. Compare GX 
9, at 4; with id. at 69. Thus, J.W. was simultaneously obtaining 
prescriptions for both methadone and Suboxone, which according to Dr. 
Mitchell ``is not done.'' Tr. 316.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that in response to this information, the 
appropriate course would be to discharge the patient and recommend that 
he go to inpatient drug rehabilitation. Id. at 316. Dr. Mitchell 
testified that he would ``have called the other physician'' to tell 
him/her that J.W. was engaged in ``potentially . . . life threatening'' 
behavior. Id. Yet there is no evidence in J.W.'s file that Respondent 
did this. Id.
    On both March 16 and April 6, 2011, Respondent wrote J.W. 
additional prescriptions for 60 Adderall. GX 16, at 21-22; id.at 25-26. 
According to Dr. Mitchell, J.W. was a week early when he received the 
April 6 prescription.\23\ Tr. 317. Dr. Mitchell explained that J.W.'s 
early refills and doctor shopping was ``a continued obvious flag to the 
physician that there's something going on here that can potentially put 
the patient's life at risk.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \23\ Actually, he was nine days early.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence also shows that in the first six months of 2011, 
Respondent wrote J.W. six prescriptions for 60 Adderall.\24\ GX 21, at 
19-25. Dr. Mitchell testified that these prescriptions were not issued 
in the usual course of professional practice. Tr. 317-18.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \24\ While Dr. Mitchell testified that 10 prescriptions were 
issued to J.W. in this period, three of them were issued by Dr. M., 
the other by a Dr. R. GX 21, at 19-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence further shows that Respondent issued to J.W. 
prescriptions for 60 Adderall 30 (BID) and 120 Klonopin (QID) on both 
July 6 and 26. GX 16, at 41-52. According to Dr. Mitchell, both of the 
July 26 prescriptions were ``approximately a week early'' (actually, 
they were 10 days early), and there was no justification in the patient 
file for issuing the prescription when Respondent did. Tr. 318.
    On October 25, 2011, Respondent received a fax from the Medical 
Department of the Lapeer County Jail. The fax stated that J.W. was an 
inmate and requested information as to his prescriptions and diagnosis. 
GX 9, at 47. Respondent reported that J.W. was on methadone for chronic 
pain and Adderall for EDS and ADD. Id. at 47.
    The same day, Respondent obtained a MAPS report on J.W. GX 9, at 
48-51; 79-83. The report showed that J.W. was still obtaining 
controlled substance prescriptions for Suboxone and Adderall from Dr. 
M., while also

[[Page 8232]]

obtaining prescriptions for methadone, hydrocodone and Adderall from 
Respondent. See id. As found above, while J.W. was incarcerated, his 
niece contacted Respondent and told him that J.W. had ``nearly died 
from withdrawal'' and that he was selling his medications; she also 
asked him to stop prescribing controlled substances to J.W. Tr. 128-29. 
Dr. Mitchell explained that under these circumstances, he would 
confront the patient regarding whatever the family reported and ``let 
the patient react and respond.'' Tr. 323.
    J.W. did not see Respondent again until December 21, 2011. GX 9, at 
25. Regarding the progress note for the visit, Dr. Mitchell testified 
that ``the physical exam is really nothing, it says awake and stable.'' 
Tr. 324. As for J.W.'s chief complaint, Dr. Mitchell testified that 
Respondent's writing was illegible. Id.; see also GX 9, at 25. 
Respondent did not issue any prescriptions to J.W. on this day.\25\ ALJ 
Ex 50, at 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \25\ However, on October 18, 2011, J.W. had filled an Adderall 
prescription which Respondent had written for him on the same day. 
GX 16, at 57-58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    J.W. returned on January 4, 2012. On the progress note, Respondent 
lined through a box next to the words stating ``substance abuse +, 
reviewed w/patie[nt].'' GX 9, at 24. However, the progress note is 
otherwise illegible. See id. Also, Respondent resumed prescribing 
controlled substances to J.W., issuing him prescriptions for 30 tablets 
of Valium 10 mg and 120 tablets of Tylenol with Codeine No. 4. ALJ Ex 
50, at 3.
    On January 19, 2012, J.W. made his final visit to Respondent and 
obtained a prescription for 120 tablets of methadone 10 with a dosing 
instruction of QID and PRN. Tr. 325; GX 16, at 59-60. Asked whether the 
prescription was issued in the usual course of professional practice, 
Dr. Mitchell answered ``no.'' Tr. 325. Asked ``why not,'' Dr. Mitchell 
explained: ``[w]ell again, the same basis. Where is the justification, 
based on the patient['s] clinical complaints, a detailed examination, a 
clear diagnosis that [m]ethadone was justified.'' Id. As for at what 
point during his treatment of J.W. Respondent should have refused to 
prescribe controlled substance and discharged him, Dr. Mitchell 
answered:

    Again, it would be early on with the early refills. The behavior 
that is an obvious flag by the patient for addiction illness. Which 
he has a history of. History of drug abuse is documented in the 
chart.

Id. at 326.

    As found above, Respondent testified that he had listened to all of 
Dr. Mitchell's testimony. Respondent was then asked by his counsel if 
Dr. Mitchell is ``right or wrong about you ignoring the red flags about 
patients who are or could be abusing or diverting drugs?'' Tr. 484. 
Respondent answered: ``He's right.'' Id.
    Based on Dr. Mitchell's credible testimony, I find that the 
controlled substance prescriptions Respondent provided to J.W. lacked a 
legitimate medical purpose and were issued outside of the usual course 
of professional practice and violated the CSA. 21 CFR 1306.04(a); 21 
U.S.C. 841(a)(1). This finding is buttressed by Respondent's admission 
that Dr. Mitchell was correct in his criticism that he ignored red 
flags.

R.K.

The Allegations
    The Show Cause Order alleged that from January 27, 2011 through 
July 17, 2012, Respondent repeatedly prescribed controlled substances 
to R.K. after Respondent knew that R.K. was engaged in the abuse and/or 
diversion of controlled substances. ALJ Ex. 1, at 4. The Show Cause 
Order specifically alleged that Respondent repeatedly prescribed to 
R.K. controlled substances despite the numerous red flags of diversion 
and/or abuse R.K. presented. Id. These included that:
     R.K. repeatedly sought early refills;
     Respondent was notified by the Michigan Department of 
Community Health Drug Utilization Review that R.K. was doctor shopping;
     a pharmacist contacted [his] office reporting suspicious 
conduct by R.K.; and
     two consecutive drug tests on April 10, 2012 and May 8, 
2012 showed that R.K. was not taking the methadone that Respondent had 
prescribed to him.

Id.
    The Show Cause Order also alleged that R.K.'s patient file and the 
prescriptions issued to him show that Respondent:
     Prescribed controlled substances to R.K. on his first 
visit without taking actions typical of medical professionals, such as 
conducting and documenting a complete medical history and physical 
examination, or creating a written treatment plan;
     never required R.K. to sign a pain management contract or 
ran a MAPS report on him;
     engaged in a pattern of issuing Xanax prescriptions to 
R.K. on a near monthly basis that authorized multiple refills, and that 
while the dosing instructions directed R.K. to take 690 tablets in the 
10-month period preceding his death, the prescriptions allowed R.K. to 
obtain up to 2,250 tablets of Xanax;
     issued a prescription for Xanax to be refilled six times, 
in violation of state and federal law; and
     stopped testing R.K. to determine if he was taking the 
methadone Respondent prescribed after R.K. tested negative on two 
consecutive monthly drug tests.

Id. at 4-5.

The Evidence

    At the beginning of the Government's examination of Dr. Mitchell 
about Respondent's prescribing to R.K., the ALJ raised his ``concern 
about evidence that becomes cumulative at some point in a preceding 
[sic].'' \26\ Tr. 326. The Government thus did not ask Dr. Mitchell 
about the prescriptions Respondent issued to R.K. from his first visit 
(January 27, 2011), through and

[[Page 8233]]

including R.K.'s visit of October 4, 2011. See id. at 330-36; GX 10, at 
52-65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \26\ According to the ALJ, ``[t]hat can happen in two ways in 
this particular preceding [sic]. And one way is that you [the 
Government] present evidence of many patients and the other way is 
to present evidence of many forms of failure to treat in a manner 
that's required in the ordinary course of medical practice.'' Tr. 
326-27. Continuing, the ALJ explained that:
    So far I've heard more than one instance. In fact, multiple 
instances of prescribing [m]ethadone on a PRN basis, which the 
witness has told me is inconsistent with medical practice.
    Not having a complete medical history, not having a physical 
examination noted in the file, not writing a treatment plan, 
diagnosing controlled substances without sufficient support in the 
medical record through objected[sic] testing, imagining [sic] or 
other data, prescribing controlled substances prematurely before the 
expiration of the prior prescription, concurrent prescriptions from 
more than one prescribing source, filling those prescriptions in 
more than one pharmacy, failure to properly utilize the MAPS data in 
the record, failure to discharge and failure to enforce the pain 
medication treatment plan and contract.
    Id. The ALJ then announced that ``[t]o the extent that proposed 
testimony is redundant in these fields, I will be sensitive to an 
objection that the evidence does not have an informative role and 
becomes less useful to me as it is cumulative at that point.'' Id. 
The ALJ thus directed the Government to ``tailor your questions 
appropriately'' and advised Respondent's counsel that ``I will be 
listening to you for your concern as well.'' Id. at 328.
    Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, the Government was entitled 
to put on evidence regarding each and every allegation it had raised 
in the Order to Show Cause and its pre-hearing statements. That the 
Government had previously shown that Respondent failed to obtain a 
complete history and conduct an adequate physical exam, or that he 
failed to address red flags such as repeated early refill requests 
or ignored evidence of doctor shopping and the use of multiple 
pharmacies, etc., with respect to patients R.E.H. and J.W., does not 
render evidence as to whether he acted in the same manner with 
respect to the other three patients redundant. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding that evidence of a single act of diversion can, in 
appropriate circumstances, support an order of revocation, it is for 
the Government to decide, in the exercise of its prosecutorial 
discretion, on the number of patients (and prescriptions) that are 
necessary to prove its case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On October 20, 2011, Respondent issued R.K. a prescription for 60 
tablets of Xanax .5 mg, with a dosing instruction of BID or PRN. ALJ 
Ex. 50, at 3; Tr. 330. The prescription authorized three refills, ALJ 
Ex. 50, at 3; and based on the dosing instruction, the prescription 
provided R.K. with a four-month supply of the drug. However, Dr. 
Mitchell testified that there was nothing in the progress note for this 
visit which justified providing R.K. with a four-month supply of the 
drug. Tr. 330.
    Yet, not even six weeks later on November 29, 2011, Respondent 
issued R.K. an additional prescription for 60 Xanax .5 mg (BID or PRN), 
with three refills. ALJ Ex. 50, at 3; Tr. 330. Here again, Dr. Mitchell 
testified that there was no medical justification in the visit's 
progress note for providing R.K. with another four-month supply of 
Xanax. Tr. 330-31.
    On January 17, 2012, Respondent provided R.K. with another 
prescription for 60 Xanax (BID and PRN), with three refills. ALJ Ex. 
50, at 3. Moreover, Respondent increased the strength of the drug to 1 
mg. Id. While this prescription alone again provided R.K. with a four-
month supply, on February 15, 2012, Respondent provided R.K. with 
another prescription for 60 Xanax 1(BID and PRN) with three refills. 
Id.
    On April 10, 2012, Respondent provided R.K. with another 
prescription for Xanax 1, increasing the quantity to 90 tablets and the 
dosing to TID (and PRN). Id. Moreover, Respondent authorized six 
refills, this being a separate violation of the Controlled Substances 
Act, which, with respect to a schedule IV drug, prohibits refilling a 
prescription ``more than five times'' unless the practitioner renews 
the prescription. See 21 U.S.C. 829(b).
    Notwithstanding the numerous refills R.K. had remaining on both the 
February 15 and April 10 prescriptions (not to mention the supply R.K. 
had likely obtained from the earlier prescriptions), Respondent 
provided him with new prescriptions for 90 Xanax 1 (TID or PRN) on May 
8 and May 30, 2012. ALJ Ex. 50, at 4. While these two prescriptions did 
not authorize any refills, on June 21, 2012, Respondent provided R.K. 
with another prescription for 90 Xanax 1(TID or PRN), which authorized 
three refills. Id. Finally, at R.K.'s last visit, Respondent provided 
him with another prescription for 90 Xanax 1 (TID or PRN). Id.
    According to Dr. Mitchell, from October 20, 2011 through July 17, 
2012, R.K. ``obtained 1950 tablets of alprazolam,'' an amount far in 
excess (by more than 1,000 pills) of what was necessary based on 
Respondent's dosing instructions.\27\ Tr. 331. Dr. Mitchell further 
testified that Respondent pattern of issuing multi-month prescriptions 
on top of one another is ``not a customary, legitimate medical practice 
behavior.'' Id. at 332.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \27\ A review of the MAPS data suggests that the actual figure 
was 1890 tablets, as one dispensing which occurred on January 15, 
2012 is listed twice. GX 22, at 11. Either way, the amount of 
alprazolam R.K. was able to obtain based on Respondent's 
prescriptions far exceeded what was necessary based on the dosing 
instructions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Government also questioned Dr. Mitchell about Respondent's 
prescribing of methadone to R.K. On March 13, 2012, Respondent first 
prescribed 90 methadone 5 mg (TID + PRN), a 30-day supply, to R.K. GX 
17, at 45-46. However, on April 10, 2012, R.K. tested negative for 
methadone. GX 10, at 31. A note in the entry states: ``ran out week 
ago.'' Id.
    Regarding this incident, Dr. Mitchell testified that ``[i]f a 
patient was truly taking [m]ethadone . . . and they abruptly ran out, 
they would go through significant medical withdrawal.'' Tr. 333. Dr. 
Mitchell further explained that a physician ``would engage the patient, 
are you taking, what's the problem here? Find out why the chaotic 
pattern in your lab results, when you are prescribing the medication 
for them and give them a chance to respond.'' Id. Dr. Mitchell also 
stated that even if he believed in giving the benefit of the doubt to 
the patient he would still ask the patient why the patient ``never 
bothered to contact'' him and would also express his ``concern[ ] about 
what's going on with [the patient's] behavior.'' Id. at 334.
    At the April 10 visit, Respondent issued R.K. a new prescription 
for 90 methadone 10 mg (TID), which was double the strength of what he 
had previously prescribed. GX 17, at 47-48. Moreover, while Respondent 
subjected R.K. to another drug test during his next visit (May 8, 
2012), R.K. again tested negative for methadone claiming that he had 
run out several days earlier.\28\ GX 10, at 31. Yet here again, 
Respondent issued R.K. a new prescription for 90 methadone 10 TID. GX 
17, at 51-52.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \28\ The actual notation in R.K. drug screening record states: 
``last pill Saturday.'' GX 10, at 31. In May 2012, May 8 was a 
Tuesday.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Dr. Mitchell testified that ``[t]here is no legitimate foundation 
for'' the prescription. Tr. 335. And when asked what the appropriate 
response was to R.K.'s having provided a second negative urine test for 
methadone, Dr. Mitchell answered: ``[d]ischarge.'' Id.
    On May 30, 2012, R.K. again saw Respondent, who provided him with a 
new prescription for 90 methadone 10. GX 10, at 6, 43; GX 17, at 55-56. 
Notwithstanding that R.K. had provided negative urine samples on his 
two previous visits, there is no evidence that Respondent required R.K. 
to provide a new urine sample. Tr. 335. And while Respondent put a 
slash mark through the box next to the entry ``Substance Abuse +, 
reviewed w/patient,'' GX 10, at 43; as Dr. Mitchell explained: 
``There's no detail, it's just merely a swipe of the pen.'' Tr. 336. 
Continuing, Dr. Mitchell noted that there is ``[n]o documentation of, I 
discussed with the patient two negative urines samples, so forth and so 
. . . my plan was so forth and so on.'' Id.
    Asked by the Government whether there was ever a point when 
Respondent should have discharged R.K., Dr. Mitchell answered 
``[y]es.'' Id. While Dr. Mitchell explained that he would give the 
patient the benefit of the doubt, after the second negative urine test, 
``he would definitely be discharged.'' Id. Dr. Mitchell further agreed 
that every controlled substance prescription Respondent issued to 
R.K.'s after the second negative urine test was issued outside of the 
usual course of professional practice. Id. at 336-37.
    During cross examination, Dr. Mitchell agreed that by referring 
R.K. to a physical therapist to treat the patient's back pain, 
Respondent was employing a multifaceted treatment plan. Id. at 446. 
However, Dr. Mitchell found that there was no medical evidence to 
support Respondent's prescribing of methadone, and there was no 
evidence that Respondent ever tested R.K. to determine if he was using 
the medication as prescribed. Id. at 335.
    Based on the above, I find that all of the controlled substance 
prescriptions issued by Respondent to R.K. on and after October 20, 
2011 lacked a legitimate medical purpose and were issued outside of the 
usual course of professional practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a).

R.J.H.

The Allegations
    The Show Cause Order alleged that from March 10, 2011 through 
November 30, 2011, Respondent repeatedly prescribed controlled 
substances to R.J.H. after he knew that R.J.H. was engaged in the abuse 
and/or diversion of controlled substances. Id. at 5. Specifically, the 
Government alleged that Respondent prescribed controlled substances to 
R.J.H., notwithstanding numerous red flags of diversion and/or abuse, 
including:

[[Page 8234]]

     R.J.H. repeatedly sought early refills;
     R.J.H. repeatedly reported lost or stolen prescriptions;
     another patient reported that R.J.H. was selling his 
prescription of methadone and taking his girlfriend's prescription as 
his own; and
     R.J.H. was requesting controlled substances by name.

Id. at 5.
    The Government also alleged that R.J.H.'s patient file and the 
prescriptions issued to him show that Respondent:
     Prescribed controlled substances to R.J.H. on his initial 
visit without taking actions typical of medical professionals such as 
conducting and documenting a complete medical history and physical 
examination, requiring that R.J.H. (a self-identified addict) sign a 
pain management contract or submit to a drug test, running a MAPS 
search on R.J.H., and creating a written treatment plan, which was 
periodically re-evaluated;
     never subjected R.J.H. to drug tests;
     never ran a MAPS report on R.J.H.;
     never required R.J.H. to sign a pain management agreement; 
and
     repeatedly prescribed methadone to R.J.H. to be taken 
``PRN.''

Id. at 5.

The Evidence

    The Government's presentation with respect to R.J.H. focused 
primarily on the manner in which Respondent escalated the amount of 
methadone he prescribed and ignored various red flags. R.J.H. first saw 
Respondent on March 10, 2011, at which time Respondent documented that 
R.J.H. had a history of narcotic abuse. GX 11, at 3, 57; see also Tr. 
341. At the visit, Respondent issued to R.J.H. a prescription for 30 
tablets of methadone 5 to be taken twice a day, providing a 15-day 
supply. GX 18, at 1-2; ALJ Ex. 50, at 4. Thereafter, on a March 24, 
2011, Respondent issued to R.J.H. a prescription for 90 tablets of 
methadone TID, providing a 30-day supply, and on April 5, 2011, he 
issued to R.J.H. a prescription for 40 tablets of methadone 10 (QID and 
PRN). GX 18, at 5-6, 9-10; ALJ Ex. 50, at 4. Moreover, on April 19, 
2011, Respondent issued to R.J.H. a prescription for 120 tablets of 
Methadone 10 (QID and PRN). GX 18, at 11-12; ALJ Ex. 50, at 4. Thus, 
between the March 10 and April 19 prescriptions, Respondent had 
quadrupled R.J.H.'s daily methadone dose from 10 to 40 milligrams.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that this was ``a significant escalation 
in'' the total ``24 hour dose'' of R.J.H.'s methadone regimen. Tr. 338. 
Dr. Mitchell further explained there was ``no'' justification for 
Respondent's having quadrupled R.J.H.'s daily dose. Id.
    Progress notes in R.J.H.'s file show that R.J.H. had appointments 
with Respondent on both May 18 and May 26, 2011. GX 11, at 52-53. 
Moreover, on May 17, 2011, Respondent wrote R.J.H. a new prescription 
for 120 tablets of methadone 10 QID and PRN), and on May 26, 2011, he 
wrote R.J.H. another prescription for 120 tablets of methadone 10 (QID 
and PRN). GX 18, at 15-16, 19-20. Attempting to interpret Respondent's 
handwriting on the May 26 progress note, Dr. Mitchell thought that 
R.J.H had reported ``that the prescription was stolen,'' Tr. 339, and 
according to a notation on the May 26 prescription, R.J.H. told the 
pharmacist that ``he was beat[en] up and his meds were stolen.'' GX 18, 
at 20. A further notation on the prescription states: ``Early refill 
Ok'd by Dr. Ataya Police Report on file. Per Christina @Dr. Ataya's.'' 
Id.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that when a patient claims that his 
medication has been stolen, ``there needs to be some action on the 
patient['s]'' part. Tr. 339. According Dr. Mitchell, ``part of the 
opioid contract [is] that if medications are stolen, you have to make a 
police report.'' Id. There is, however, no police report in R.J.H.'s 
file. See generally GX 11. Nor is there an opioid contract. See also 
generally id.; Tr. 341.
    On June 8, R.J.H. again saw Respondent. GX 11, at 51. A nurse's 
note on the progress note states: ``meds (stolen).'' Id. Dr. Mitchell 
testified that the appropriate response to this information would be to 
discharge the patient. Tr. 340-41. Dr. Mitchell subsequently explained 
that the point at which Respondent should have discharged R.J.H. was 
``after the second report of medications being stolen'' without 
verification ``of that event happening.'' Id. at 342. Dr. Mitchell 
further noted that while Respondent documented that R.J.H. ``has a 
history of narcotic abuse,'' there is no evidence that Respondent 
required him to sign a pain management contract. Id. at 341. Dr. 
Mitchell also found no evidence that Respondent conducted any drug 
tests on R.J.H. and there were no MAPS reports in R.J.H.'s file. Id. at 
341-42.
    The evidence also shows that on June 7, 2011, an employee of 
Respondent documented that he/she ``was told by another patient that 
[R.J.H.] was selling his prescription of methadone, and taking his 
girlfriend[']s prescription as his own.'' GX 11, at 9. While Respondent 
did not prescribe methadone to R.J.H. at the June 8 visit,\29\ on June 
15, 2011, he issued R.J.H. another prescription for 60 tablets of 
methadone 5 to be taken twice a day or PRN. GX 18, at 21-24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \29\ Rather, he prescribed 30 tablets of Tylenol with Codeine 
No. 3 (``Tylenol 3'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While this prescription should have lasted R.J.H. for 30 days, only 
six days later on June 21, 2011, Respondent issued to R.J.H. a 
prescription for 60 tablets of methadone 10, thereby doubling the daily 
dose. Id. at 25-26. Thus, this refill was early by 24 days.
    Moreover, Respondent continued to provide R.J.H. with additional 
early refills. Specifically, only 15 days later on July 6, Respondent 
issued to R.J.H. a prescription for 60 methadone 10 (BID/PRN). Id. at 
27-28. Even ignoring the June 15 prescription, this refill was early by 
15 days.
    Only 13 days later on July 19, 2011, Respondent issued to R.J.H. a 
prescription for 120 of methadone 10 (QID, or four times a day), 
thereby doubling the daily dose and quantity. Id. at 29-30. And on 
August 11, 2011, he issued to R.J.H. another prescription for 120 
tablets of methadone 10 to be taken four times a day or PRN. Id. at 31-
32. Even ignoring the prescriptions prior to July 19, this prescription 
was still one week early.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \30\ Thereafter, Respondent issued additional methadone 
prescriptions to R.J.H. on an approximately monthly basis up until 
January 3, 2012, the same day he overdosed on heroin and was 
hospitalized. GX 23, at 6-8. As found above, R.J.H. died of an 
overdose on or about January 5, 2012. GX 5, at 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As Dr. Mitchell testified, there was no justification for 
Respondent's rapid escalation of R.J.H.'s daily dose. Also, Respondent 
ignored red flags such as R.J.H.'s claim on two occasions that his 
prescription had been stolen, the report that he was selling his 
methadone and using his girlfriend's, and R.J.H.'s repeated seeking of 
early refills, some of which were weeks early. Moreover, while 
Respondent knew that R.J.H. had a history of narcotic abuse he did not 
require him to sign a pain contract, never conducted a drug test on 
him, and never obtained a MAPS report. Based on the above, I find that 
Respondent lacked a legitimate medical purpose and acted outside of the 
usual course of professional practice when prescribed methadone to 
R.J.H. 21 CFR 1306.04(a).

J.H.

The Allegations
    The Show Cause Order alleged that from June 10, 2010 through August 
12, 2012, Respondent repeatedly prescribed controlled substances to 
J.H. even after he knew that she was engaged in the

[[Page 8235]]

abuse and/or diversion of controlled substances. ALJ Ex. 1, at 5. 
Specifically, the Government alleged that Respondent repeatedly 
prescribed controlled substances to her notwithstanding numerous red 
flags of diversion and/or abuse, including that:
     J.H. repeatedly sought early refills;
     J.H. requested controlled medications by name;
     J.H. was in frequent contact with Respondent's office 
regarding her pain medications;
     J.H. tested negative for controlled substances that 
Respondent had prescribed to her;
     Respondent diagnosed J.H. as narcotic dependent;
     hospital records in Respondent's file show that J.H. 
tested positive for illegal drugs; and
     J.H. exhibited symptoms of withdrawal.

Id. at 5-6.

    The Show Cause Order also alleged that J.H.'s patient files and the 
prescriptions Respondent issued to her show that he:
     Issued controlled substance prescriptions to J.H. on her 
initial visit without taking actions typical of medical professionals 
such as conducting and documenting a complete medical history and 
physical examination, and creating a written treatment plan;
     diagnosed J.H. as being narcotic dependent but took no 
actions such as referring her to rehabilitation or a specialist, or 
even minimal precautionary steps such as requiring her to sign a pain 
management contract, subjecting her to comprehensive drug tests, or 
even running MAPS reports on her, and that MAPS reports would have 
shown that she was engaged in doctor and pharmacy shopping;
     prescribed two different benzodiazepines--Klonopin and 
Xanax--to J.H. even after she reported that she would not be using 
Xanax but using Klonopin instead;
     repeatedly prescribed methadone to J.H. to be taken 
``PRN''; and
     prescribed Adderall to J.H. without any basis for doing 
so, continued to prescribe Adderall after drug tests showed that she 
was not taking the drug, stopped conducting drug tests to determine if 
J.H. was taking the Adderall he prescribed, and only stopped 
prescribing the drug when the Michigan Medicaid program asked him to 
substantiate his prescriptions.

Id. at 6.

The Evidence

    The progress note for J.H.'s November 10, 2010 visit shows that on 
that date, Respondent diagnosed J.H. as ``narcotic dependent.'' GX 12, 
at 125; Tr. 343. While Dr. Mitchell stated that he did not know if 
Respondent was ``trying to indicate a history of abuse by that 
statement or he wasn't familiar with the definitions of addiction 
versus dependence,'' he explained that the decision to start a patient 
on methadone ``depends on the history you gleaned from the patient and 
what the old medical records showed,'' because ``you're essentially 
becoming their addictionologist and beginning treatment for them.'' Id. 
at 346. However, according to Dr. Mitchell, when a physician determines 
that a patient is narcotic dependent, it is not appropriate to 
prescribe methadone without requiring the patient to sign an opioid 
agreement, conduct drug tests, and obtain a prescription monitoring 
program report. Id. at 346-47.
    There is, however, no evidence that Respondent required J.H. to 
enter an opioid agreement. Tr. 347; see also GX 12 (J.H.'s patient 
file). Moreover, while Respondent did eventually obtain a MAPS report, 
he did not do so until November 30, 2012, more than two years after he 
diagnosed her as narcotic dependent.\31\ See GX 12, at 8-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \31\ The report shows prescriptions beginning only on August 31, 
2011. GX 12, at 8-13. The report shows several instances in which 
J.H. obtained small amounts of hydrocodone and acetaminophen with 
codeine from a dentist in the May 2012 time period, and a further 
prescription for a small amount of hydrocodone from another dentist 
on September 14, 2011. GX 12, at 8, 13. However, every other 
prescription listed in this report was issued by Respondent.
    Of note, the Government also submitted a MAPS report it obtained 
showing J.H.'s prescriptions from January 8, 2010 through February 
2013. However, the questioning regarding the MAPS reports was 
interrupted by telephonic interference seven times and is not clear 
what the precise questions were and which of the MAPS reports the 
Government was referring to in its questions. Tr. 348-49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence shows that on November 26, 2010, Respondent issued to 
J.H. a prescription for 90 methadone 5 (TID), a 30-day supply. GX 19, 
at 21-22. Yet, according to J.H.'s file, on December 1, 2010, she was 
suffering from narcotic withdrawal. Tr. 349. Dr. Mitchell testified 
that when confronted with this situation, the appropriate response of a 
physician acting within the bounds of professional practice is to send 
the patient ``to the hospital.'' Id. When then asked if it was an 
appropriate response to continue to issue controlled substance 
medication to the patient, Dr. Mitchell testified ``absolutely not.'' 
\32\ Id. at 349-50. At this point, the ALJ declared the line of 
questioning ``redundant'' and no further clarification was obtained as 
to whether Dr. Mitchell was referring to prescribing or administering. 
Yet the evidence shows that Respondent continued to prescribe methadone 
and other controlled substances to her. GX 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \32\ A DEA regulation, however, expressly authorizes a physician 
to administer (but not prescribe) a ``narcotic drug[ ] to a person 
for the purpose of relieving acute withdrawal symptoms when 
necessary while arrangements are being made for referral for 
treatment.'' 21 CFR 1306.07(b). This is so even when the physician 
``is not specifically registered to conduct a narcotic treatment 
program.'' Id. However, the physician may not administer ``more than 
one day's medication'' at a time and may not do this for ``more than 
three days.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence further shows that on September 8, 2010, J.H. called 
Respondent's office ``and stated that she stopped Xanax \33\ and went 
back to Klonopin b/c she didn't like the way it made her feel.'' GX 12, 
at 7. Respondent provided J.H. with prescriptions for 60 clonazepam on 
September 15, October 13, November 10, and a prescription for 30 
tablets on November 30, 2010. GX 24, at 5-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \33\ Respondent had prescribed 30 alprazolam .25 mg to J.H. on 
August 31, 2010. GX 24, at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, on December 1, 2010, he issued J.H. a prescription for 60 
alprazolam 1.\34\ Id. at 8. Moreover, only one week later on December 
8, Respondent issued J.H. a prescription for 90 clonazepam. Id. While 
on January 4, 2011, Respondent issued her another prescription for 90 
clonazepam, on January 13, he issued her a prescription for 30 
alprazolam 1. Id. In the ensuing months, Respondent continued to 
provide J.H. with both clonazepam and alprazolam prescriptions, even 
though both drugs are benzodiazepines.\35\ According to Dr. Mitchell, 
there was ``[n]o'' medical reason for Respondent to prescribe both 
drugs after J.H. stated that she did not like how the alprazolam made 
her feel. Tr. 351.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \34\ J.H. filled the Nov. 30 clonazepam prescription and the 
December 1 alprazolam prescription on the days they were they were 
issued.
    \35\ The evidence shows that during 2011, Respondent issued J.H. 
prescriptions for 90 clonazepam on Feb. 2, Mar. 1, April 5, May 3, 
June 1, June 28, July 26, August 25 (with three refills which were 
filled on Sept. 21, Oct. 15, and Nov. 10), and Dec. 13. GX 24, at 9-
12. During 2011, he also issued J.H. prescriptions for 90 alprazolam 
1 on Mar. 15, for 30 alprazolam .5 on April 20, and for 30 
alprazolam .25 on June 21. Id. at 9-11.
     During 2012, Respondent issued J.H. a prescription for 90 
clonazepam on Jan. 5, with three refills that were filled on Feb. 1, 
Feb. 19, and Mar. 10; a prescription for 90 clonazepam on Mar. 28; a 
prescription for 120 clonazepam on April 25, with three refills, two 
of which were filled on May 15 and June 6; a second prescription for 
120 clonazepam on April 25, which was filled on July 4; and two 
prescriptions for 90 clonazepam on August 14, one of which was 
filled the same date, the other being filled on December 8. Id. at 
14-17. Respondent also issued her a prescription for 15 alprazolam 
.5 on May 22, 2012. Id. at 15-16.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence also shows that on August 3, 2011, Respondent issued 
J.H.

[[Page 8236]]

a prescription for 30 Adderall 10, with a dosing instruction to take 
one tablet daily. GX 19, at 71-72. However, at J.H.'s August 31, 2011 
appointment, J.H. tested negative for the drug; a note on the drug 
screening results sheet states: ``last Adderall 2 days ago.'' GX 12, at 
61. Respondent, however, issued her a new prescription for 30 Adderall 
10 at the visit. GX 19, at 77-78.
    Dr. Mitchell testified that J.H.'s clean urine tests raised the 
same concerns (i.e., that the patient was either abusing or diverting 
the drug to others) as he testified to when asked about the 
significance of a negative test for methadone. Tr. 352. He also 
testified that Respondent's issuance of a new Adderall prescription 
after the negative test result raised the same concern that the 
prescription was ``outside the typical practice of medicine.'' Id.
    Finally, the Government questioned Dr. Mitchell as to whether there 
was a point at which Respondent should have stopped prescribing 
controlled substances to J.H. Id. at 355. According to Dr. Mitchell, 
``in the face of [J.H.'s] history of drug abuse . . . [a]fter the 
second negative urine that would be a [sic] unavoidable, irrevocable 
sign to discharge her from the practice.'' Id. However, while the 
Patient Drug Screening Results form states that J.H. was negative for 
amphetamine on October 11, 2011 and includes the notation ``Ran out 8 
days ago,'' GX 12, at 61; on the date of this test, Respondent had last 
issued her an Adderall prescription on August 31, 2011, and that 
prescription provided her with a 30-day supply.\36\ As there is no 
evidence as to how long amphetamines would still be present in a 
patient's urine after the last use, no weight can be given to this 
testimony. What is notable, however, is that over the entire course of 
Respondent's prescribing to J.H., which lasted from June 10, 2010 
through August 12, 2012, Respondent conducted only three urine tests, 
with the last one being done on November 15, 2011. GX 12, at 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \36\ According to the ALJ, the parties stipulated that 
Respondent issued a prescription for 60 Adderall 10 on October 1, 
2011. ALJ Ex. 50, at 5. However, the patient file does not contain a 
prescription for this date (as opposed to October 11, 2011) and the 
MAPS report which the Government obtained does not list any 
Adderall/amphetamine prescription as having been issued between 
August 31 and October 11, 2011. GX 24, at 12-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notwithstanding that no weight can be given to Dr. Mitchell's 
testimony regarding the October 11, 2011 drug tests, I find that the 
evidence otherwise supports a finding that Respondent provided J.H. 
with controlled substance prescriptions which lacked a legitimate 
medical purpose and were issued outside of the usual course of 
professional practice. 21 CFR 1306.04(a). As the evidence shows, while 
Respondent knew that J.H. was dependent on narcotics, he: (1) Did not 
require her to sign an opioid agreement; (2) did not obtain a MAPS 
report on her until two years after he determined that she was 
dependent; (3) conducted only three drug tests over the course of the 
26 months that he prescribed to her; (4), did not refer her to 
treatment when she was suffering from withdrawal even though he had 
given her a 30-day methadone prescription only five days earlier and 
continued to prescribe methadone to her; and (5) repeatedly prescribed 
both alprazolam and clonazepam to her, even after she had told him that 
she did not like the way the Xanax (alprazolam) made her feel.
    Concluding its direct examination, the Government asked Dr. 
Mitchell: ``Of the prescriptions that we have discussed today, are 
there any that you've found to be legitimate, issued for [a] legitimate 
purpose or within the usual practice of medicine?'' Tr. 356. Dr. 
Mitchell answered: ``Not for the controlled substances.''Id.

Respondent's Testimony

    Respondent testified on his own behalf. According to Respondent, he 
graduated from medical school in Damascus, Syria in 1993, and after 
moving to the United States, he did an internal medicine residency 
which he completed in 2002. Tr. 469. Thereafter, Respondent started 
practicing at nursing homes and assisted living facilities and also 
worked as an urgent care and ER physician. Id.; see also RX J. 
Respondent did this until 2009 when he purchased a ``very small 
practice'' of 120 patients in Davidson, Michigan from a retired 
physician. Tr. 470. Respondent testified that in the meantime he 
studied hospice and palliative medicine and became board certified in 
2012. Id. at 469. On some date which Respondent did not specify, 
Respondent also began working at a medical practice in Lapeer, 
Michigan, which had 150 patients. Id. at 471.
    According to Respondent, when he started his internal medicine 
practice, he ``did not expect this influx of chronic pain patient[s], 
and . . . was not planning to have a clinic for chronic pain 
patients.'' Id. at 482. While addressing the DI's testimony regarding 
the statements he made in the 2013 interview, Respondent offered 
various statements regarding the ``general'' ``way'' in which he 
practices medicine. Id. at 484. Specifically, he testified that in 2011 
and 2012, ``we start to do it [i.e., obtain MAPS reports] more often, 
but definitely not in every visit.'' Id. at 482. He further asserted 
that ``we do referral [of] patients for diagnostic, for another 
specialty, depends on their need.'' Id. He also asserted that he 
attempts to control his patients' symptoms, while ``try[ing] to taper 
them off the medication, if possible, while they are getting another 
treatment like the physical therapy or going to the pain management, 
some going to counseling.'' Id. at 484.
    As found above, Respondent acknowledged that he had ``listened to 
all of'' Dr. Mitchell's testimony. Id. Respondent then testified that 
Dr. Mitchell was ``right'' about his having ignored the red flags that 
the five patients were diverting or abusing drugs. Id.
    Respondent further testified that he had reviewed multiple online 
Continuing Medical Education courses,\37\ and that the week before the 
hearing, he attended a three-day ``course about prescribing medication 
and dealing with the addicted patients.'' Id. at 486, 495. He also 
stated that he was referring his patients who have chronic pain to 
``pain management.'' Id. at 496. However, he then testified that it 
takes six to twelve weeks for a patient to obtain an appointment with 
pain management in the Lapeer, Michigan area and that in the meantime, 
he has ``to continue the patient's treatment.'' \38\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \37\ However, it is unclear the extent to which these courses 
actually addressed the prescribing of controlled substances and the 
monitoring of patients for abuse and diversion. While Respondent 
also testified that he has subscribed to Audio Digest, a CME program 
which provides lessons on a CD with a questionnaire, he then 
acknowledged that this program ``[h]as nothing to do with'' his 
prescribing practices and involves ``medical education in general 
internal medicine.'' Tr. 504-05.
    \38\ Following his testimony regarding his referring his chronic 
pain patients to pain management, Respondent's counsel asked him if 
he had also employed ``some outside help to do criminal background 
checks of [his] existing patients, look at your current policies and 
procedures as they relate to pharmaceuticals that,'' at which point 
the transmission cut out. Tr. 497-98. When, however, the 
transmission was re-established, Respondent's counsel asked only: 
``Did you make any efforts to hire outside consultants to come and 
make some recommendations regarding your office?'' Id. at 498.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Respondent further asserted that ``[s]ince the interview on the 
show cause, it came to [his] attention some wrong way in doing and 
dealing with patients'' and he ``went back and review[ed] what he's 
been doing and inquire[d].'' Id. at 495. He also testified that he had 
invested in electronic medical records because with three offices, it 
was a ``major problem . . . following the patients.'' Id. He also

[[Page 8237]]

hired a consultancy to review his practice's policies and procedures 
which met with his employees and discussed issues such as 
``communicat[ing] with the patients, keeping their records, follow[ing] 
their records, referring the patients, and talking to the families and 
patients.'' \39\ Id. at 499. Finally, Respondent bought a safe. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ This, however, did not occur until mid-September 2014. Tr. 
509.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On cross-examination, Respondent further asserted that after being 
served with the Show Cause Order, he started doing more frequent drug 
screening ``to identify any problematic patients.'' Id. at 512. 
However, he also explained that ``before we tried to do drug screening 
but it was very expensive for the patient because [it was] not 
covered'' by a local insurance plan. Id. Moreover, he offered no 
further detail as to how frequent the screenings were.
    Asked whether, in the period 2010-2012, he believed that doctors 
should not prescribe controlled substances to patients who are abusing 
or diverting them, Respondent testified: ``If it is a proof they are 
abusing or diverting, yes.'' Id. at 520. Asked to explain what he meant 
by proof of abuse and diversion, Respondent answered:

    Well, counseling the patient in the room and talking to them 
about their pain and their using their pain medication and the way, 
and what is their answer, for me I will take whatever the patient 
tell me.
    If they said no, they are not abusing the medication, they are 
not diverting the medication, and I am entitled to treat their 
symptoms and make sure they are not going in withdrawal and take 
care of the patient.

Id. at 521. Asked whether he believed this today as much as he did in 
the 2010-2012 period, Respondent answered: ``[y]es.'' Id.

    The Government then asked Respondent whether he ``believe[s] that 
doctors should detect when patients are abusing or diverting controlled 
substances?'' Id. Respondent's counsel objected, on the ground that it 
was outside the scope of his direct examination and the ALJ sustained 
the objection.\40\ Id. at 522. So too, when the Government asked 
Respondent if ``[d]octors should respond to red flags of abuse and 
diversion of controlled substances,'' Tr. 526, Respondent objected, and 
the ALJ sustained the objection. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ When the Government attempted to re-ask the question, 
Respondent's counsel again objected on the ground that because 
Respondent has testified that Dr. Mitchell was correct in his 
criticism of his practice, ``how much stronger can we say that we 
adopt Dr. Mitchell's testimony as to us ignoring those red flags and 
prescribing in the face of those.'' Tr. 524. The ALJ against 
sustained the objection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Next, the Government asked Respondent: ``[w]hat are the signs for 
abuse and diversion of controlled substances?'' Id. Respondent's 
counsel objected. After the ALJ overruled the objection, Respondent 
testified: ``[w]hat do you mean diversion exactly?'' Id. This prompted 
the ALJ to instruct Respondent that ``if you don't know how to answer 
the question, just tell me that you don't know.'' Id. Respondent 
answered: ``I do not.'' Id.
    The Government then asked Respondent what signs he looks for to see 
if a patient is abusing medication. Id. at 527-28. Respondent answered:

    Well, if they're using, now a patient if he is taking the pain 
medication and they have extra pain and taking medication, extra 
pill or extra two, this is a view that what you intend that it is 
abusing, well, it's still a pain medication they are using to 
control their symptoms. I don't understand what exactly what answer 
you want for that.
    I'm telling you exactly what I think. If the patient using the 
pain medication instructed to control their pain medication, now if 
they come earlier to take medication that's if they have a chronic 
problem and they need it, somebody can call them abusing, some 
people calling them they are controlling their pain symptoms.

Id.

    After again admitting that he ``did not pay attention too much to 
this [sic] signs with the red flags and things,'' id., Respondent 
asserted that in determining whether patients are abusing controlled 
substances, ``[w]e do the drug screen'' and ``[w]e run a MAP with the 
electronic medical records if they are taking the medication the right 
way and taking the other alternative medications.'' Id. at 529. Asked 
by the ALJ how he is now treating pain management patients, Respondent 
explained that if patients ``ask for more medication or [to] change to 
a specific medication and . . . looking in the drugs screen, if they 
are utilizing the medication.'' Id. After apparently more telephonic 
interference, Respondent added that when patients ask for an early 
refill or a different medication or to increase their pain medication, 
``to confirm we'll do the drug screen and we'll run the MAP.'' Id. at 
531.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \41\ The Government then asked Respondent what steps ``a doctor 
should and could take in response to any signs that a patient is 
abusing their controlled substance medications?'' Id. at 531-32. The 
ALJ sustained Respondent's objection stating that he had ``a record 
of that.'' Id. at 532.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After confirming that Respondent was adhering to his earlier 
testimony that Dr. Mitchell was correct that he had ignored red flags 
of abuse and diversion, the Government asked Respondent whether he also 
agreed with Dr. Mitchell's testimony that he had ``issued prescriptions 
outside of the usual course of practice or for nonlegitimate medical 
purposes?'' Id. at 534. Respondent's counsel objected, asserting that 
``[w]e've said everything Dr. Mitchell has said about prescribing in 
the face of red flags is correct.'' Id. at 535. The ALJ did not, 
however, rule on the objection. See id. Instead, the ALJ asked 
Respondent if he had read the Show Cause Order, and after Respondent 
acknowledged that he had, the ALJ asked if he ``agree[d] that the facts 
that they allege there are all true?'' Id. Respondent answered 
``[y]es.'' Id.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \42\ Subsequently, during a colloquy with the ALJ as to whether 
it could cross-examine Respondent regarding the specific 
prescriptions discussed by Dr. Mitchell and whether he agreed with 
Dr. Mitchell's testimony that the prescriptions ``were issued 
illegitimately and outside of the usual course,'' the Government 
observed that Respondent was shaking his head; the Government thus 
argued ``that there is some ambiguity as to whether or not he's 
really admitting that he has actually issued those unlawfully.'' Tr. 
538-39. The ALJ explained: ``[n]ot according to my record'' and that 
he had seen ``the shaking of the head.'' Id. at 539. The record does 
not, however, reflect the manner in which Respondent shook his head, 
and notwithstanding the tenor of the Government's statement, I am 
not free to speculate as to whether Respondent was disputing or 
acknowledging that he acted unlawfully.
    Notably, in his Post-Hearing Brief, Respondent states that Dr. 
Mitchell's testimony establishes that he ``wrote a substantial 
number of prescriptions . . . without a legitimate medical purpose 
and/or in the usual course of a practitioner's professional practice 
and/or in the face of paradigmatic `red flags' of diversion or abuse 
such as repeated requests for early refills, facially-evident 
documentation of doctor shopping, and testing results inconsistent 
with use of the prescribed controlled substances.'' Resp. Post-Hrng 
Br. at 12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion

    As noted above, both parties filed exceptions to the ALJ's 
Recommended Decision. Having reviewed their briefs, I conclude that 
some of their exceptions are best addressed prior to discussing whether 
the Government is entitled to prevail under the public interest 
standard. These include Respondent's contention that the ALJ committed 
prejudicial error when he barred him from cross-examining the Diversion 
Investigator regarding the use of confidential informants. See Resp. 
Exceptions, at 9-12. As for the Government, it argues that the ALJ 
erred when he allowed Respondent to present his case by VTC. Gov. 
Exceptions, at 3-9.

Respondent's Exception to the ALJ's Ruling Limiting Cross-Examination

    As found above, at the hearing, a DEA Diversion Investigator 
testified regarding the investigation she

[[Page 8238]]

conducted of Respondent's prescribing practices. On cross-examination, 
Respondent's counsel attempted to question the DI about two undercover 
agents who, according to the proffer, went to Respondent, and while 
posing as patients, attempted to entice him to prescribe controlled 
substances in exchange for cash. Tr. 222. The Government objected to 
this line of questioning, arguing that the evidence ``was not offered 
as part of the basis for the order to show cause.'' Id.
    In response to the objection, Respondent argued that the Agency 
``is required to consider not just the evidence that [the Government] 
brought in on the direct, but evidence that we can bring out on cross 
examination.'' Id. Respondent then proffered that Respondent told the 
undercover agents that ``he would not'' prescribe to them. Id. 
Respondent argues that this ``is exculpatory'' because Respondent ``had 
no idea who he was talking to'' and this evidence ``would be very 
relevant to [assessing] his state of mind.'' Id. at 222-23.
    The ALJ sustained the objection, on the ground that Respondent had 
failed to disclose in advance of the hearing that he ``wanted to cover 
this subject.'' Id. at 223. Continuing, the ALJ explained that ``[i]f 
you knew about these things, and you wanted me to consider them, then 
you had a duty and the opportunity to come forward and tell me. And I 
saw nothing like that in your pre-hearing statements, or that of prior 
counsel.'' Id. at 223-24.
    Respondent then argued that his counsel had not had ``the time that 
the Government had to prepare'' for the hearing and that there was no 
prejudice to the Government, because ``these are their witnesses.'' Id. 
at 224-25. The ALJ rejected the contention, explaining that ``you had 
knowledge of this undercover operation. If you wanted to bring it to my 
attention, you clearly had it for a while.'' Id. at 226.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \43\ The record shows that Respondent became aware that two 
undercover officers had visited Respondent from the return of the 
state search warrant which listed the two officers' files as being 
among the items seized. Resp. Ex. A, at 7. However, the return was 
executed on March 27, 2013, id. at 6; which was well in advance of 
the hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Even assuming that the Government's direct examination of the DI as 
to what steps she took in investigating Respondent opened the door to 
this line of inquiry, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in 
sustaining the Government's objection. See Gunderson v. Department of 
Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing ALJ's exclusion of evidence); Walter 
A. Yoder & Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing ALJ's decision to 
limit cross-examination). Moreover, the warrant return listed the 
actual names (as well as the undercover names) of both undercover 
officers. Thus, Respondent had ample opportunity to present this 
evidence either through calling the undercover officers to testify or 
by introducing any documentation he placed in their respective patient 
files regarding the incidents. See Randall L. Wolff, 77 FR 5106, 5120 
n.23 (2012).
    To be sure, DEA has recognized that in some instances, evidence of 
``prior good acts'' can refute evidence that a registrant knowingly or 
intentionally diverted controlled substances. See Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 
74 FR 459, 462 n.6 (2009). Here, however, the Government put forward 
extensive evidence to show that Respondent acted with the requisite 
knowledge to support the conclusion that he lacked a legitimate medical 
purpose and acted outside of the usual course of professional practice 
and thereby violated the CSA on some 100 occasions when he prescribed 
to the five patients. See 21 CFR 1306.04(a); see also 21 U.S.C. 
841(a)(1). Moreover, even if Respondent's testimony regarding Dr. 
Mitchell's criticism of his prescribing practices was ambiguous as to 
whether he was also admitting that he violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a), his 
post-hearing brief has resolved the issue. Accordingly, even if I had 
found that the ALJ abused his discretion in not permitting Respondent 
to cross-examine the DI about the two undercover visits, I would still 
conclude that this does not rise to the level of prejudicial error. See 
Gunderson, 601 F.3d at 1021(``An error is prejudicial only `if it can 
be reasonably concluded that with . . . such evidence, there would have 
been a contrary result.' '') (quoting Sanjuan v. IBP, Inc., 160 F.3d 
1291, 1296 (10th Cir. 1998)); see also Air Canada v. Department of 
Trans., 148 F.3d 1142, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (``As incorporated into 
the APA, the harmless error rule requires the party asserting error to 
demonstrate prejudice from the error.'') (citing 5 U.S.C. 706).
    In his Exceptions, Respondent further notes that the ALJ ``frames 
this issue as one `regarding arguably exculpatory evidence that has 
been withheld by the Government.' '' Exceptions, at 9 (citing R.D. at 
60-62). He then states that he adopts and incorporates by reference the 
ALJ's view, and requests that I consider it as a separate argument.
    Therein, the ALJ noted that the Agency has not adopted ``[t]he rule 
from Brady v. Maryland,'' 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), which requires the 
prosecution in a criminal case to disclose material exculpatory 
evidence to the defendant. R.D. at 61. Citing MacKay v. DEA, 664 F.3d 
808, 819 (10th Cir. 2011), the ALJ correctly noted that ``even if Brady 
did apply in this case, the excluded evidence would have no outcome 
[sic] on my final recommendation.'' R.D. at 62. The ALJ nonetheless 
proceeded to discuss several cases in which other ALJs had either: (1) 
Ordered the Government to review its files for exculpatory evidence, or 
(2) suggested that DEA should provide for disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence because three other federal agencies provide for such 
disclosure. Id. The ALJ noted that the Agency has held that there is 
```an ongoing duty to ensure that material evidence and argument made 
to a fact-finder is not knowingly contradicted by other material 
evidence in the Government's possession, but not otherwise disclosed.'' 
Id. (quoting Randall L. Wolff, 77 FR 5106, 5124 (2012)). However, based 
on an earlier case in which the Agency held that an ALJ did not have 
authority to require the Government to ``disclose any exculpatory 
information in its possession when such information is timely requested 
by a respondent,'' see Nicholas A. Sychak, 65 FR 75959, 75960-61 
(2000), the ALJ opined ``that the DEA's view of releasing exculpatory 
evidence is `just trust me.' '' R.D. at 62.
    Unacknowledged by the ALJ is that several federal appeals courts 
have held that Brady does not apply to administrative proceedings. See 
Mister Discount Stockbrokers, Inc. v. SEC, 768 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 
1985); NLRB v. Nueva Eng. Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 969 (4th Cir. 1985). Cf. 
Echostar Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 749, 755-56 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting litigant's claim that ``the Agency's decision to deny it 
discovery . . . denied it due process''); Silverman v. CFTC, 549 F.2d 
28, 33 (7th Cir. 1977) (``There is no basic constitutional right to 
pretrial discovery in administrative proceedings.'') (citations 
omitted).
    Instead, this Agency follows the holding of McClelland v. Andrus, 
606 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Therein, the D.C. Circuit held that 
``discovery must be granted [in an administrative proceeding] if in the 
particular situation a refusal to do so would so prejudice a party as 
to deny him due process.'' Id. at 1285-86; see also Margy Temponeras, 
77 FR 45675, 45676 n.4 (2012); Beau Boshers, 76 FR 19401, 19403-04 
(2011). However, ``the party seeking discovery must rely on more than 
speculation and must show that the evidence is relevant, material, and 
that the denial of access to the [evidence] is prejudicial.'' Boshers,

[[Page 8239]]

76 FR at 19403 (citing Echostar, 292 F. 3d at 756; Silverman v. CFTC, 
549 F.2d 28, 34 (7th Cir. 1977)). As explained previously, while 
evidence that Respondent refused to prescribe controlled substances to 
the undercover officers is relevant and material in assessing his 
experience as a dispenser of controlled substances, in light of his 
concession that he knowingly diverted controlled substances some 100 
times to the five patients, he cannot show prejudice.\44\ I thus reject 
the exception.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ It is noted that Respondent requested that the ALJ provide 
him with a copy of the Agency's investigative files on him; the ALJ 
correctly held that he had no power to compel the Agency to provide 
Respondent with its investigative files. ALJ Ex. 3, at 5.
    \45\ I have considered the Government's Exception regarding the 
ALJ's decision to allow Respondent to present his case by Video 
Teleconferencing technology. While I acknowledge that technical 
difficulties caused a number of interruptions during the hearing in 
this matter, the record nonetheless contains overwhelming evidence 
supporting my Decision and Order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discussion

    Section 304(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) provides that 
a registration to ``dispense a controlled substance . . . may be 
suspended or revoked by the Attorney General upon a finding that the 
registrant . . . has committed such acts as would render his 
registration under section 823 of this title inconsistent with the 
public interest as determined under such section.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4) 
(emphasis added). With respect to a practitioner, the Act requires the 
consideration of the following factors in making the public interest 
determination:

    (1) The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing board 
or professional disciplinary authority.
    (2) The applicant's experience in dispensing . . . controlled 
substances.
    (3) The applicant's conviction record under Federal or State 
laws relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.
    (4) Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local laws 
relating to controlled substances.
    (5) Such other conduct which may threaten the public health and 
safety.

Id. 823(f).\46\

    \46\ Section 304(a) also provides that a registration to 
``dispense a controlled substance . . . may be suspended or revoked 
by the Attorney General upon a finding that the registrant . . . has 
had his State license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied 
by competent state authority and is no longer authorized by State 
law to engage in the manufacturing, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled substances.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3). Likewise, the CSA 
defines ``[t]he term `practitioner' [to] mean[ ] a physician . . . 
licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States 
or the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . to distribute, 
dispense, [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course 
of professional practice.'' 21 U.S.C. 802(21). See also id. Sec.  
823(f) (``The Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . to 
dispense . . . controlled substances in schedule II, III, IV, or V . 
. . if the applicant is authorized to dispense controlled substances 
under the laws of the State in which he practices.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``[T]hese factors are . . . considered in the disjunctive.'' Robert 
A. Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003). It is well settled that I 
``may rely on any one or a combination of factors, and may give each 
factor the weight [I] deem[ ] appropriate in determining whether a 
registration should be revoked.'' Id.; see also MacKay v. DEA, 664 F.3d 
808, 816 (10th Cir. 2011); Volkman v. DEA, 567 F.3d 215, 222 (6th Cir. 
2009); Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005). Moreover, while 
I am required to consider each of the factors, I ``need not make 
explicit findings as to each one.'' MacKay, 664 F.3d at 816 (quoting 
Volkman, 567 F.3d at 222 (quoting Hoxie, 419 F.3d at 482)).\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \47\ In short, this is not a contest in which score is kept; the 
Agency is not required to mechanically count up the factors and 
determine how many favor the Government and how many favor the 
registrant. Rather, it is an inquiry which focuses on protecting the 
public interest; what matters is the seriousness of the registrant's 
misconduct. Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 459, 462 (2009). Accordingly, 
as the Tenth Circuit has recognized, findings under a single factor 
can support the revocation of a registration. MacKay, 664 F.3d at 
821.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Government has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the requirements for revocation or suspension pursuant 
to 21 U.S.C. 824(a) are met. 21 CFR 1301.44(e). However, ``once the 
[G]overnment establishes a prima facie case showing a practitioner has 
committed acts which render his registration inconsistent with the 
public interest, the burden shifts to the practitioner to show why his 
continued registration would be consistent with the public interest.'' 
MacKay, 664 F.3d at 817 (citing Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR 
364, 387 (2008) (citing cases)).
    In this matter, the Government's evidence focused on factors two, 
four, and five. Having reviewed the record in its entirety and having 
considered all of the factors, I find that the Government's evidence 
with respect to factors two and four satisfies its prima facie burden 
of showing that Respondent has committed acts ``which render his 
registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 
824(a)(4).

Factors Two and Four--Respondent's Experience in Dispensing Controlled 
Substances and Compliance With Applicable Laws Related to Controlled 
Substances

    Under a longstanding DEA regulation, a prescription for a 
controlled substance is not ``effective'' unless it is ``issued for a 
legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the 
usual course of his professional practice.'' 21 CFR 1306.04(a). 
Continuing, the regulation provides that ``an order purporting to be a 
prescription issued not in the usual course of professional treatment . 
. . is not a prescription within the meaning and intent of [21 U.S.C. 
829] and . . . the person issuing it, shall be subject to the penalties 
provided for violations of the provisions of law relating to controlled 
substances.'' Id.
    As the Supreme Court has explained, ``the prescription requirement 
. . . ensures patients use controlled substances under the supervision 
of a doctor so as to prevent addiction and recreational abuse. As a 
corollary, [it] also bars doctors from peddling to patients who crave 
the drugs for those prohibited uses.'' Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243, 274 (2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 135, 143 
(1975)).
    Both this Agency and the federal courts have held that establishing 
a violation of the prescription requirement ``requires proof that the 
practitioner's conduct went `beyond the bounds of any legitimate 
medical practice, including that which would constitute civil 
negligence.' '' Laurence T. McKinney, 73 FR 43260, 43266 (2008) 
(quoting United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 559 (4th Cir. 2006)). 
See also United States v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001, 1010 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(``[T]he Moore Court based its decision not merely on the fact that the 
doctor had committed malpractice, or even intentional malpractice, but 
rather on the fact that his actions completely betrayed any semblance 
of legitimate medical treatment.'').
    Thus, in Moore, the Supreme Court reinstated the conviction of a 
physician under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and what is now 21 CFR 1306.04(a) 
for prescribing controlled substances outside of the usual course of 
professional practice. 423 U.S. at 139-43. The Court explained:

    The evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the jury to 
find that respondent's conduct exceeded the bounds of ``professional 
practice.'' As detailed above, he gave inadequate physical 
examinations or none at all. He ignored the results of the tests

[[Page 8240]]

he did make. He did not give methadone at the clinic and took no 
precautions against its misuse and diversion. He did not regulate 
the dosage at all, prescribing as much and as frequently as the 
patients demanded. . . . In practical effect, he acted as a large 
scale ``pusher''--not as a physician.

Id. at 142-43.

    Under the CSA, it is fundamental that a practitioner must establish 
a bona fide doctor-patient relationship in order to act ``in the usual 
course of . . . professional practice'' and to issue a prescription for 
a ``legitimate medical purpose.'' See, e.g., Moore, 423 U.S. at 142-43; 
United States v. Lovern, 590 F.3d 1095, 1100-01 (10th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639, 657 (8th Cir. 2009); Jack A. 
Danton, 76 FR 60900, 60904 (2011) (finding violations of 21 CFR 
1306.04(a) ``where a physician has utterly failed to comply with 
multiple requirements of state law for evaluating her patients and 
determining whether controlled substances are medically indicated and 
thus has ` ``completely betrayed any semblance of legitimate medical 
treatment'' ' '') (quoting McKinney, 73 FR at 43266 (quoting Feingold, 
454 F.3d at 1010)).
    However, while the Government frequently relies on a physician's 
failure to establish a bona-fide doctor-patient relationship to prove a 
violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a), no ``specific set of facts ha[s] to be 
present in order to find that a physician stepped outside of his role 
and issued prescriptions without a legitimate medical purpose.'' United 
States v. McKay, 715 F.3d 807, 823 (10th Cir. 2013). Thus, as the Tenth 
Circuit explained, the question is whether sufficient evidence 
``exist[s] for a fact finder to affirmatively determine that the 
physician issued the drugs for an improper purpose.'' Id.
    As found above, Dr. Mitchell offered extensive and uncontested 
testimony that included identifying specific acts and omissions by 
Respondent, which support the conclusion that Respondent acted outside 
of the usual course of professional practice and without a legitimate 
medical purpose when he prescribed controlled substances to each of the 
five patients. He also opined that none of the prescriptions he 
discussed complied with 21 CFR 1306.04(a). Tr. 356.
    In his post-hearing brief, Respondent states that Dr. Mitchell's 
testimony establishes that he ``wrote a substantial number of 
prescriptions . . . without a legitimate medical purpose and/or in the 
usual course of a practitioner's professional practice and/or in the 
face of paradigmatic `red flags' of diversion or abuse such as repeated 
requests for early refills, facially-evident documentation of doctor 
shopping, and testing results inconsistent with use of the prescribed 
controlled substances.'' Resp. Proposed Recommended Rulings, Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at 12. Respondent, however, also 
attempts to portray himself as a soft touch, suggesting that it is 
``culturally ingrained'' that he could ``not say no'' to patients, and 
that he prescribed ``with some naivety and perhaps even full-blown 
gullibility,'' which was ``laid bare when the size of his practice grew 
exponentially faster than he and his staff'' were capable of managing. 
Respondent's Post-Hrng. Submission, at 1-2. See also id. (``These 
proceedings have also opened [his] eyes to the fact that his knowledge 
and experience as a medical practitioner contained gaps that proved 
easy to exploit.'').
    The ALJ embraced this argument. See R.D. at 43 (quoting Resp. Post-
Hrng. Submission, at 2) (Respondent's ``lack of knowledge, experience, 
and familiarity with accepted protocols for prescribing controlled 
substances, combined with some naivety and perhaps full-blown 
gullibility, where laid bare when the size of his practice great 
exponentially faster. . . .''); see also id. at 43-44 (``Here, it 
appeared [Respondent] became a very popular weak link used by those 
seeking to circumvent [controlled substance prescribing] protocols.''). 
The ALJ also stated his agreement ``with the proposition appearing in 
[his] post-hearing brief that `his practice did not consist of a ``pill 
mill''' and that however misguided, he was nevertheless treating his 
patients, not merely processing their prescriptions in furtherance of a 
larger criminal enterprise.'' R.D. 47 (quoting Resp. Prop. Recommended 
Rulings, etc., at 12) (first emphasis added; second emphasis in 
original). See also id. at 44 (``I found no evidence to suggest the 
failures in his practice were the results of avarice or greed . . . 
.'').
    Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, the Government was not 
required to prove that Respondent was motivated by avarice or greed to 
establish a violation of 21 CFR 1306.04(a) and 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Nor 
did the ALJ reconcile the inconsistency between his findings that that 
Respondent violated 21 CFR 1306.04(a) with respect to each of the 
patients--findings which establish that he knowingly diverted drugs--
with his embrace of Respondent's claim that he was merely na[iuml]ve 
and gullible. Indeed, Respondent offered no testimony to support the 
claims made in his brief that he prescribed out of naivety or 
gullibility, or that his inability to say no was ``culturally 
ingrained.''
    As for the ALJ's embrace of Respondent's claim that he was not 
running a pill mill and was treating his patients, to be sure, there is 
some evidence that Respondent referred patients for MRIs, a sleep 
study, and alternative treatments such a chiropractor and physical 
therapy. However, the overwhelming weight of the evidence shows that 
Respondent issued the prescriptions knowing that the patients were 
either abusing or diverting the drugs.
    With respect to R.E.H., Dr. Mitchell found Respondent's initial 
evaluation to be inadequate based on Respondent's failure to adequately 
develop his substance abuse history and how much methadone he was 
currently taking. He further found that Respondent did not perform an 
adequate physical examination. He therefore concluded that Respondent 
acted outside of the usual course of professional practice in issuing 
the initial methadone prescriptions. Based on this testimony, I find 
that Respondent did not establish a bona fide doctor-patient 
relationship and I further conclude that at no point in the course of 
his treatment of R.E.H. did Respondent do so.
    Dr. Mitchell further described a plethora of instances in which 
Respondent provided R.E.H. with early refills and failed to document 
that he had engaged R.E.H. as to why he needed the early refills. Dr. 
Mitchell pointed out that Respondent failed to enforce his medication 
contract which required R.E.H. to use his medicine only at the 
prescribed rate. He also pointed out that Respondent continued to 
prescribe without obtaining urine samples, and only rarely obtained a 
MAPS report. Moreover, even when he did obtain and review a MAPS 
report, the MAPS report showed that R.E.H. had filled the same 
prescriptions at different pharmacies, and yet Respondent failed to 
even address R.E.H.'s behavior and continued to prescribe methadone to 
him. So too, Respondent was notified on multiple occasions that R.E.H. 
was trying to fill multiple prescriptions and presenting forged 
prescriptions, and yet did nothing to address this obvious drug-seeking 
behavior and continued to prescribe to him. Finally, even after he 
received a report that R.E.H. had tested positive for cocaine and was 
diagnosed as polysubstance dependent, he continued to prescribe to 
R.E.H. In short, given the numerous times that R.E.H. sought early 
refills, coupled with the information Respondent obtained from MAPS 
reports, pharmacies and the hospital, Respondent cannot credibly

[[Page 8241]]

argue that he was merely gullible or na[iuml]ve. Rather, Respondent 
knowingly diverted controlled substances to R.E.H.
    The same holds true with respect to Respondent's prescribings to 
J.W. Here too, Dr. Mitchell testified that there was no clinical basis 
to diagnose J.W. with a condition that would support prescribing both 
Adderall and methadone. He also testified that it was inappropriate to 
prescribe methadone on a PRN basis. Moreover, Respondent ignored 
evidence that J.W. was obtaining Adderall from another physician, in 
violation of the medication contract, as well as that J.W. was 
obtaining Suboxone from the other physician. J.W. also sought early 
refills on multiple occasions, yet Respondent continued to prescribe to 
him.
    Also, the same day that Respondent was informed that J.W. was in 
the county jail, Respondent obtained a MAPS report which showed that 
J.W. had continued to obtain controlled substances for Suboxone and 
Adderall from another doctor at the same time he was obtaining 
prescriptions from Respondent. Moreover, Respondent was notified by 
J.W.'s niece that her uncle was selling his medications. Yet 
notwithstanding this information, after J.W. was released from jail, 
Respondent eventually resumed prescribing controlled substances to him. 
Here again, the evidence amply refutes the contention that Respondent 
was merely gullible or na[iuml]ve.
    With respect to R.K., the evidence showed that Respondent issued 
multiple prescriptions for Xanax, which frequently authorized multiple 
refills, resulting in R.K. obtaining, in a nine-month period, 
approximately 1,000 pills more than were necessary based on 
Respondent's dosing instructions. Given that R.K.'s chart contained 
copies of the prescriptions, Respondent cannot credibly argue that he 
was duped by R.K. into issuing the excessive prescriptions. Also, while 
Respondent prescribed methadone to R.K., on two occasions, R.K. tested 
negative for the drug, stating after the first test that he had run out 
a week earlier, and after the second, stating that he had run out 
several days earlier. Yet there was no documentation that R.K. had 
undergone withdrawal, this being a clear indication that R.K. was 
diverting the drug. Respondent continued to prescribe the drug to R.K. 
(going so far as to double the strength after the first negative test) 
and did not subject him to any more drug tests after the second test. 
The evidence thus shows that Respondent was willfully blind to what 
R.K. was doing with the drugs. Moreover, Dr. Mitchell testified that 
there was no medical evidence to support the methadone prescriptions. 
Here again, the evidence amply refutes the contention that Respondent 
issued the prescriptions because he was gullible or na[iuml]ve.
    Respondent knew that R.J.H. had a history of drug abuse. Yet over 
the course of just six weeks, Respondent quadrupled R.J.H.'s daily 
dosage of methadone with no medical justification. Moreover, within 
three months of R.J.H.'s seeing Respondent, R.J.H. had twice claimed 
that his prescriptions were stolen, and the day before the second such 
incident, Respondent's office had been told by another patient that 
R.J.H. was selling his prescription and using his girlfriend's 
medication. Yet Respondent issued him another prescription and 
continued to prescribe methadone to him, even though R.J.H. sought 
early refills. Here again, the evidence refutes Respondent's contention 
that he issued the prescriptions because he was gullible or na[iuml]ve.
    So too, the evidence with respect to J.H. refutes Respondent's 
claim that he was gullible or na[iuml]ve. Here the evidence shows that 
only five days after Respondent issued her a prescription for a 30-day 
supply of methadone, she was suffering from narcotic withdrawal. Yet, 
instead of sending her for treatment, Respondent continuing prescribing 
controlled substances to her. Moreover, over the course of his 
treatment of J.H., on multiple occasions, Respondent prescribed either 
alprazolam or clonazepam to her, both being benzodiazepines, even 
though he had recently prescribed the other drug to her. Also, even 
after J.H. reported that she did not like how alprazolam made her feel, 
he still issued her more prescriptions for the drug. So too, even after 
J.H. tested negative for Adderall, he issued her a new prescription for 
the drug. Finally, over the course of the 26 months Respondent treated 
her, he only drug tested her three times, with all three tests 
occurring in a three-month period. I thus conclude that Respondent knew 
or was willfully blind to the fact that J.H. was either abusing or 
diverting her drugs to others.
    In addition to his issuance of numerous unlawful prescriptions, 
Respondent also violated federal law by writing a methadone 
prescription for R.E.H. which he dated as having been issued on 
November 8, 2012, when he likely issued it on October 30, 2012. 
Notably, the evidence shows that on October 8, 2012, Respondent issued 
R.E.H. a methadone prescription, which R.E.H. filled the same day. GX 
15, at 135-36. The evidence also shows that on October 30, R.E.H. was 
seeking more methadone and his medical record states that it was not 
time yet and includes a copy of a prescription bearing an issue date of 
November 8, 2012. GX 8, at 15; id. at 31. The evidence further shows 
that a second prescription with an issue date of October 8, 2012 (which 
appears to have been altered) was filled on October 30, 2012. GX 15, at 
137-38; GX 20, at 14. Moreover, there are no notes corresponding to a 
visit by R.E.H. on November 8, 2012, and the MAPS data contains no 
entry for a methadone prescription with an issue date of November 8, 
2012. See GX 8, at 15; id. at 99-100; see also GX 20.
    Under a DEA regulation, ``[a]ll prescriptions for controlled 
substances shall be dated as of, and signed on, the day when issued.'' 
21 CFR 1306.05(a). Based on Respondent's failure to address the DI's 
testimony regarding this prescription and there being no evidence that 
R.E.H. saw Respondent on November 8, 2012, I find that Respondent 
violated this regulation when he post-dated the prescription.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Even if it was R.E.H. who altered the date to ``10/08/12,'' 
if Respondent's intent was to provide R.E.H. with a prescription 
that he could not fill until November 8, than he should have written 
on the prescription ``the earliest date on which a pharmacy'' could 
fill it. 21 CFR 1306.12(b)(ii). In any event, Respondent was still 
required to date the prescription as of the date he issued it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence also shows that Respondent repeatedly failed to 
include the patients' addresses on their prescriptions. See, e.g., GX 
8, at 21, 23, 27-38, 40-42, 52, 54-57, 64, 233, 240, 248-49, 253-54 
(Pt. R.E.H.); see also GX 9, at 5-6, 45, 54, 57-59, 61-63, 68 (Pt. 
J.W.). This too is a violation of 21 CFR 1306.05(a).
    Finally, the evidence shows that on several occasions, Respondent 
issued prescriptions that authorized six refills. GX 8, at 23 (Xanax Rx 
issued to R.E.H.); GX 17, at 49 (Xanax Rx issued to R.K.); GX 19, at 
117 (Klonopin Rx issued to J.H.). Respondent violated DEA regulations 
when he issued the prescriptions because, with respect to schedule III 
and IV controlled substances, a prescription may not ``refilled more 
than five times.'' 21 CFR 1306.22(a).
    Accordingly, I find that the Government's evidence with respect to 
Factors Two and Four conclusively establishes that Respondent has 
committed such acts as to render his registrations ``inconsistent with 
the public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4); see also id. Sec.  823(f). 
I further conclude that his misconduct is especially egregious and 
supports the revocation of his

[[Page 8242]]

existing registrations and the denial of his pending applications.
    Moreover, while the Government put on no evidence as to Factor 
One--the recommendation of the state licensing board--in response to my 
November 10, 2015 order, the Parties have acknowledged that on October 
30, 2015, the Michigan Board of Medicine revoked Respondent's medical 
license and that he is longer legally authorized to dispense controlled 
substances in the State in which he is registered and seeks additional 
registrations.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \49\ No evidence was presented regarding Factor Three--
Respondent's conviction record for offenses related to the 
manufacture, distribution or dispensing of controlled substances. 
However, the Agency has held that the absence of a conviction is not 
dispositive of the public interest inquiry. Dewey C. MacKay, 75 FR 
49956, 49973 (2010), pet. for rev. denied, MacKay v. DEA, 664 F.3d 
808 (10th Cir. 2011). As for Factor Five, as explained above, the 
Government did not take exception to the ALJ's findings regarding 
the allegation that Respondent made various false statements in the 
interview.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sanction

    Under Agency precedent, where, as here, ``the Government has proved 
that a registrant has committed acts inconsistent with the public 
interest, a registrant must `` `present sufficient mitigating evidence 
to assure the Administrator that [he] can be entrusted with the 
responsibility carried by such a registration.'' ' '' Medicine Shoppe-
Jonesborough, 73 FR 364, 387 (2008) (quoting Samuel S. Jackson, 72 FR 
23848, 23853 (2007) (quoting Leo R. Miller, 53 FR 21931, 21932 
(1988))). ``Moreover, because `past performance is the best predictor 
of future performance,' ALRA Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th 
Cir.1995), [DEA] has repeatedly held that where a registrant has 
committed acts inconsistent with the public interest, the registrant 
must accept responsibility for [his] actions and demonstrate that [he] 
will not engage in future misconduct.'' Medicine Shoppe, 73 FR at 387; 
see also Jackson, 72 FR at 23853; John H. Kennedy, 71 FR 35705, 35709 
(2006); Prince George Daniels, 60 FR 62884, 62887 (1995). See also 
Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d at 483 (``admitting fault'' is ``properly 
consider[ed] '' by DEA to be an ``important factor[ ]'' in the public 
interest determination).\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ However, while a registrant must accept responsibility and 
demonstrate that he will not engage in future misconduct in order to 
establish that his/her continued registration is consistent with the 
public interest, DEA has repeatedly held these are not the only 
factors that are relevant in determining the appropriate sanction. 
See, e.g., Joseph Gaudio, 74 FR 10083, 10094 (2009); Southwood 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 72 FR 36487, 36504 (2007). Obviously, the 
egregiousness and extent of a registrant's misconduct are 
significant factors in determining the appropriate sanction. See 
Jacobo Dreszer, 76 FR 19386, 19387-88 (2011) (explaining that a 
respondent can ``argue that even though the Government has made out 
a prima facie case, his conduct was not so egregious as to warrant 
revocation''); Paul H. Volkman, 73 FR 30630, 30644 (2008); see also 
Paul Weir Battershell, 76 FR 44359, 44369 (2011) (imposing six-month 
suspension, noting that the evidence was not limited to security and 
recordkeeping violations found at first inspection and ``manifested 
a disturbing pattern of indifference on the part of [r]espondent to 
his obligations as a registrant''); Gregory D. Owens, 74 FR 36751, 
36757 n.22 (2009).
    The Agency has also held that `` `[n]either Jackson, nor any 
other agency decision, holds . . . that the Agency cannot consider 
the deterrent value of a sanction in deciding whether a registration 
should be [suspended or] revoked.' '' Gaudio, 74 FR at 10094 
(quoting Southwood, 72 FR at 36504); see also Robert Raymond Reppy, 
76 FR 61154, 61158 (2011); Michael S. Moore, 76 FR 45867, 45868 
(2011). This is so, both with respect to the respondent in a 
particular case and the community of registrants. See Gaudio, 74 FR 
at 10095 (quoting Southwood, 71 FR at 36503). Cf. McCarthy v. SEC, 
406 F.3d 179, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding SEC's express 
adoptions of ``deterrence, both specific and general, as a component 
in analyzing the remedial efficacy of sanctions'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The ALJ found that Respondent ``failed to take the full and 
unconditional acceptance of responsibility required by'' the Agency's 
case law. R.D. at 55. As support for this conclusion, the ALJ noted 
that during his cross-examination of Dr. Mitchell, Respondent 
``challenged multiple aspects of the Government's evidence regarding 
[his] treatment of the patients that were fundamental to the 
Government's case against him.'' Id. The ALJ also found that 
``Respondent's repeated and persistent pre-hearing assertions that his 
prescription practice was within the usual course of medical practice 
stand as compelling evidence that [he] had not accepted responsibility 
for his actions under the high standard established by the'' Agency. 
Id. Thus, the ALJ declined to credit Respondent's testimony that he did 
not dispute Dr. Mitchell's criticism of his prescribing practices with 
respect to the five patients, notwithstanding that he characterized 
Respondent's testimony as ``unequivocally stat[ing]'' as much. Id. The 
ALJ did not, however, reconcile his finding with his statement during 
the hearing that ``right now I have fairly compelling evidence that 
[Respondent] has accepted responsibility, even though he didn't tell me 
he did so or he was going to do so in his prehearing statement.'' Tr. 
491. Moreover, as discussed previously, because Respondent did not 
provide notice in his pre-hearing statements that he intended to admit 
to the truth of the Government's allegations, the ALJ granted the 
Government's motion to bar him from introducing evidence of his 
remedial measures.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \51\ As found above, Respondent did offer extensive testimony of 
his remedial measures. However, Respondent was barred from 
introducing testimony by a third party on the issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Respondent takes exception to the ALJ's finding that he did not 
accept responsibility for his misconduct. Resp. Exceptions, at 2-9. He 
argues that the ALJ misapplied Agency precedent, ``in effect 
penaliz[ing] him for his failure to immediately confess wrongdoing in 
response to naked allegations.'' Id. at 4-5 n.11. Alternatively, he 
argues that:

[i]f the applicable precedent really provides that the gateway to 
presentation of mitigation evidence requires [him to] demonstrate 
penitence in the form of ``accepting responsibility for'' conduct in 
which he did not engage . . . and/or to admit to counterfactual 
matters, e.g., that some of the prescriptions at issue were written 
outside of a legitimate[] physician patient relationship, then that 
precedent is inconsistent with procedural due process.

Id. at 4; see also id. at 5 n.11 (``to the extent that the Agency 
concludes the [ALJ's] application was proper, however, the precedent is 
inconsistent with procedural due process''). Respondent thus seeks ``a 
functional remand to allow the parties to fully develop [his] 
remediation evidence and to allow'' for the consideration of ``that 
evidence in assessing the appropriate sanction.'' Id. at 9.

    While I find some of Respondent's arguments well taken, I reject 
his exception. As for the ALJ's pre-hearing ruling barring Respondent 
from eliciting the testimony of Ms. Richards, (who would have testified 
regarding a risk assessment audit and the training she provided to 
Respondent's staff), in his Recommended Decision, the ALJ asserted that 
he would have allowed Ms. Richards to testify if Respondent had 
``informed the Government in its prehearing statements that he 
acknowledged the noncompliance of his prescription practice.'' R.D. at 
60. However, while not mentioned in the Recommended Decision, the ALJ 
granted the Government's motion based also on Respondent's failure to 
describe Ms. Richard's testimony ``with sufficient particularity.'' Tr. 
39 (Nov. 3, 2014). This was an independent and adequate ground to bar 
her testimony, and yet, Respondent does not challenge the ALJ's ruling 
on this basis.
    Had the ALJ's ruling barring Ms. Richard's testimony been based 
solely on Respondent's failure to state in his pre-hearing statements 
that he was acknowledging his misconduct, I would agree with 
Respondent. Contrary to the ALJ's understanding, although the Agency 
has held that proof of remedial measures is rendered irrelevant where a 
respondent fails to accept responsibility

[[Page 8243]]

for his knowing or intentional misconduct, none of the cases cited by 
the Government or the ALJ have held that a respondent, as a condition 
of being able to offer evidence of his remedial measures, is required 
to admit to the allegations before he even has the opportunity to 
challenge the Government's evidence and the Agency has never held as 
much. Indeed, while the Agency frequently places dispositive weight on 
a respondent's failure to fully acknowledge his misconduct, in each of 
the cases cited by the ALJ, the Agency discussed the respondent's 
failure to acknowledge his/her/its misconduct only after discussing the 
evidence put forward by the Government and determining which 
allegations had been proved. See, e.g., Joe Morgan, 78 FR 61961, 61963 
(2013) (``where the Government has proved that a respondent has 
knowingly or intentionally diverted controlled substances, a 
registrant's acceptance of responsibility is an essential showing for 
rebutting the Governments prima facie case)'' (emphasis added); 
Medicine Shoppe-Jonesborough, 73 FR at 387.
    Notwithstanding that the Government provided, in its prehearing 
statements, notice of the evidence it intended to rely on in supporting 
the allegations of the Show Cause Order, Respondent was entitled to 
challenge the reliability of that evidence at the hearing and to show 
that the allegations were untrue. However, I decline to decide the 
question of whether it was consistent with principles of due process to 
require Respondent, as a condition of being able to subsequently 
present evidence of his remedial measures, to admit to his misconduct 
before it had even been proven on the record.\52\ Notably, while 
Respondent suggests that if the ALJ's reading of the Agency's precedent 
was correct--as explained above, it was not--``the precedent is 
inconsistent with procedural due process,'' and the ALJ reasoned that 
Respondent's ``concern regarding due process is not wholly unfounded,'' 
R.D. at 56, neither Respondent nor the ALJ offered anything more than 
these conclusory assertions. Moreover, as explained previously, the 
ALJ's original ruling barring Respondent from putting on Ms. Richard's 
testimony was also supported by the independent basis that Respondent 
failed to adequately disclose the nature of her proposed testimony with 
sufficient particularity.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ The constitutional question presented by this scenario can 
be avoided by waiting until the hearing itself and moving to bar or 
strike the testimony and evidence of remedial measures when the 
Respondent fails to acknowledge the misconduct proven by the 
Government. However, where, as here, a respondent fails to provide 
an adequate disclosure of its proposed evidence of its remedial 
measures, the Government can still move to bar the admission of the 
evidence prior to the hearing.
    \53\ In his Exceptions, Respondent ``incorporates as if fully 
set out herein the [ALJ's] additional observations as to recent 
Agency precedent's misapplication of Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477 (6th 
Cir. 2005).'' Resp. Exceptions, at 4 n.11 (citing R.D. at 58). 
According to the ALJ, the Agency has been misreading the Sixth 
Circuit's Hoxie decision because ``while admitting fault is an 
important factor, it is not the sole factor.'' R.D. 58. The ALJ 
criticized the Agency's decisions in two cases, which he viewed as 
being ``representative of the coercive pressure to either fully 
accept responsibility or contest all possible allegations.'' R.D. 56 
(discussing Jeri Hassman, M.D., 75 FR 8194 (2010), and George 
Mathew, M.D., 75 FR 66138 (2010)). According to the ALJ, his 
discussion was ``intended to present the argument that the DEA is 
holding registrants to an unfair standard. Although accepting 
responsibility for one's actions is an important factor to consider 
once the Government proves its prima facie case, there is much more 
to determining what constitutes the public interest than this one 
criterion.'' R.D. at 58. However, the ALJ then noted that in 
Respondent's case, ``the outcome would arguably not be different if 
[he] had been allowed to present additional rehabilitation 
witnesses. His admitted misconduct while treating patients and his 
lackluster efforts of rehabilitation require that result.'' R.D. 58-
59.
    I respectfully disagree with the ALJ's assertion that the Agency 
``is holding registrants to an unfair standard.'' On the contrary, 
given the harm to public safety caused by the diversion of 
controlled substances, the Agency's policy of requiring those 
respondents, who have been shown to have engaged in knowing or 
intentional misconduct to acknowledge their misconduct, is fully 
within the Agency's discretion. Hoxie is not to the contrary. As the 
Tenth Circuit explained in MacKay, a case which received barely a 
mention by the ALJ:
    When faced with evidence that a doctor has a history of 
distributing controlled substances unlawfully, it is reasonable for 
the . . . Administrator to consider whether that doctor will change 
his or her behavior in the future. And that consideration is vital 
to whether [his] continued registration is in the public interest. 
Without Dr. MacKay's testimony, the . . . Administrator had no 
evidence that Dr. MacKay recognized the extent of his misconduct and 
was prepared to remedy his prescribing practices.
    664 F.3d at 820. Absent evidence that a registrant acknowledges 
his misconduct in intentionally or knowingly diverting controlled 
substances, there is no basis to conclude that the registrant is 
prepared to remedy his prescribing practices and allowing the 
registrant to maintain his registration ``is inconsistent with the 
public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). As for the ALJ's further 
contention that there is ``more to determining what constitute the 
public interest than this one criterion,'' R.D. 58, the Agency 
considers other factors including the egregiousness of the proven 
misconduct. Thus, in cases of less egregious misconduct, the Agency 
has frequently imposed sanctions less than a denial or revocation 
notwithstanding that a respondent failed to fully acknowledge his 
misconduct. However, the intentional or knowing diversion of 
controlled substances strikes at the CSA's core purpose of 
preventing drug abuse and diversion.
    As for the ALJ's reliance on Hassman and Mathew, neither of 
these cases supports his assertion that the Agency is imposing an 
unfair standard on registrants. As for Hassman, the ALJ's 
characterization of the Agency's decision as having ``found that the 
respondent had issued several prescriptions not for a legitimate 
medical purpose for several of her patients,'' R.D. at 56, is a 
gross understatement of the Agency's findings in the case, which 
established that the respondent had issued hundreds of unlawful 
prescriptions to some 15 patients, and continued to deny material 
facts even when there was conclusive proof to the contrary. See, 
e.g., 75 FR at 8200-237. And his reliance on Mathew is especially 
remarkable given that Dr. Mathew was implicated in prescribing 
controlled substances for two separate internet prescribing rings 
and did not testify in the proceeding.
    Of further note, while both physicians sought judicial review of 
the respective agency decision, in each case, the Court of Appeals 
denied their petitions in an unpublished decision. See Hassman v. 
DEA, 515 Fed. App'x. 667 (9th Cir. 2013) (Holding that ``[n]one of 
her proffered statements amount to an admission of wrongdoing; they 
are nothing more than further denials and claims that she was the 
unwitting victim of cunning patients. While Hassman offered some 
evidence of corrective measures, the DEA was entitled to give 
greater weight to the evidence indicating that Hassman has not 
learned from or improved upon her past misconduct.''); Mathew v. 
DEA, 472 Fed Appx. 453 (9th Cir. 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nor was Respondent the only party displeased with the ALJ's ruling 
on the issue of the adequacy of his acceptance of responsibility. 
Indeed, the Government argues that the ALJ obstructed its cross-
examination of Respondent on this very issue. Gov. Exceptions, at 9-18. 
The Government sets forth various instances in which the ALJ precluded 
it from conducting a meaningful inquiry into the sincerity of 
Respondent's acceptance of responsibility and the scope of his present 
understanding of lawfully appropriate prescribing practices. See id. at 
10-11; 17-18.
    The Government further points to various incongruities in the ALJ's 
decision, including his conclusion that Respondent `` `failed to take 
the full and unconditional acceptance of responsibility,' '' while 
later in the same paragraph, finding that Respondent `` `unequivocally 
stated that he did not dispute the evidence brought against him.' '' 
Gov. Exceptions, at 12 (quoting R.D. 55). To similar effect, the 
Government argues that notwithstanding the various instances in which 
the ALJ cut off its cross-examination of Respondent, the ALJ later 
explained that he could not evaluate Respondent's contention that he 
should be able to continue to prescribe controlled substances subject 
to various restrictions, `` `without first providing the Government a 
full and fair opportunity to first thoroughly test the depth of 
[Respondent's] acknowledgment of noncompliance.' '' Gov. Exceptions, at 
12 (quoting R.D. 63).
    The Government also argues that ``[t]he ALJ's decisions make it 
difficult for the Administrator to know if Respondent would have 
`acknowledg[ed] that his conduct violated the law' at hearing.'' Gov.

[[Page 8244]]

Exceptions, at 13 (citing Morgan, 78 FR 61961, 61980 (2013)). I agree, 
and while Respondent bore the burden of production on the issue, given 
the ALJ's on-the-record statement that ``right now I have fairly 
compelling evidence that [Respondent] has accepted responsibility, even 
though he didn't tell me he did so or he was going to do so in his 
prehearing statement,'' Tr. 491, it was not unreasonable for 
Respondent's counsel to conclude that it was not necessary to further 
develop the record on this issue.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ While Respondent's counsel raised numerous objections to 
the Government's attempts to cross-examine him as to the sincerity 
of his acceptance of responsibility, Respondent's counsel was 
obliged to zealously defend his client. Thus, the state of the 
record is primarily attributable to the ALJ's undue limitation of 
the Government's cross-examination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    I conclude, however, that a remand is unwarranted for multiple 
reasons. As explained above, see supra n.53, while a registrant must 
accept responsibility and demonstrate that he will not engage in future 
misconduct in order to establish that his/her continued registration is 
consistent with the public interest, the Agency has repeatedly held 
that it is entitled to consider the egregiousness and extent of a 
registrant's misconduct in determining the appropriate sanction. See 
Dreszer, 76 FR at 19387-88; Volkman, 73 FR at 30644. Indeed, while 
proceedings under 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824 are remedial in nature, there 
are cases in which, notwithstanding a finding that a registrant has 
credibly accepted responsibility, the misconduct is so egregious and 
extensive that the protection of the public interest nonetheless 
warrants the revocation of a registration or the denial of an 
application. See Fred Samimi, 79 FR 18698, 18714 (2014) (denying 
recommendation to grant restricted registration, explaining that ``even 
assuming . . . that Respondent has credibly accepted responsibility for 
his misconduct, this is a case where actions speak louder than 
words'').
    Here, the evidence shows that Respondent is an egregious violator 
of the CSA in that he ignored countless red flags presented by the 
patients that they were either abusing or diverting (or both) the 
controlled substances he prescribed for them. And with respect to 
Patients J.H. and R.E.H., the evidence shows that this went on for 
several years. Given the egregiousness of his misconduct, the Agency's 
interest in protecting the public by both preventing him from being 
able to dispense controlled substances as well as by deterring 
misconduct by others is substantial. I thus conclude that continuing 
Respondent's existing registrations and granting his applications for 
the additional registrations would be ``inconsistent with the public 
interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(f), 824(a)(4).
    There is further reason to conclude that a remand is unwarranted. 
As found above, the State of Michigan has now revoked Respondent's 
medical license, thus rendering him without authority to dispense 
controlled substances in the State in which he holds his registrations 
and seeks the additional registrations. Thus, Respondent no longer 
meets the CSA's prerequisite for obtaining and maintaining a 
registration. See 21 U.S.C. 802(21) (defining ``the term `practitioner' 
[to] mean[ ] a . . . physician . . . or other person licensed, 
registered or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which 
he practices . . . to distribute, dispense, [or] administer . . . a 
controlled substance in the course of professional practice''); see 
also id. Sec.  823(f) (``The Attorney General shall register 
practitioners . . . to dispense . . . controlled substances . . . if 
the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances 
under the laws of the State in which he practices.'').
    Thus, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is also 
authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under section 
823, ``upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State 
license or registration suspended [or] revoked . . . by competent State 
authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . 
. dispensing of controlled substances.'' Because Congress has clearly 
mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be 
deemed a practitioner under the Act, DEA has long held that the 
revocation of a practitioner's registration is the appropriate sanction 
whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances 
under the laws of the State in which he practices medicine. See James 
L. Hooper, 76 FR 71371 (2011), pet. for rev. denied, 481 Fed. Appx . 
826 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Maynard v. DEA, 117 Fed. Appx. 941, 945 
(5th Cir. 2004); Sheran Arden Yeates, M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006); 
Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR 51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, 53 FR 11919, 
11920 (1988).
    The Government nonetheless argues that because this issue was 
``never raised in the Order to Show Cause,'' a decision on this ground 
``could arguably upend basic protections afforded to DEA registrants 
and would surely diminish the perceived fairness of the . . . 
administrative process.'' Govt's Resp. to Admin. Order, at 11. The 
Government acknowledges that it ``is certainly empowered to issue an 
Order to Show Cause (or an Amended Order to Show Cause) alleging this 
factual basis and legal ground for revocation or denial'' and to submit 
evidence. Id. However, it then contends that to impose a sanction 
``based on events that occurred outside of the administrative 
litigation process . . . runs up against `one of the fundamental tenets 
of Due Process,' '' this being that the `` `Agency must provide a 
Respondent with notice of those acts which the Agency intends to rely 
on in seeking . . . revocation . . . so as to provide a full and fair 
opportunity to challenge the factual and legal basis for the Agency's 
action.' '' Id. at 11-12. (quoting Farmacia Yani, 80 FR 29053, 29059 
(2015)).
    For his part, Respondent does not dispute that the Michigan Board 
has revoked his medical license and that he ``no longer has any legal 
authority to dispense controlled substances.'' Respondent's Resp. to 
Admin. Order, at 1. However, he then states that as a procedural 
matter, he agrees with the Government that ``simply skipping ahead to a 
21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) revocation that the parties never litigated would 
likely be inconsistent with due process.'' Id. at 4. Respondent 
acknowledges that ``it might well be within the Administrator's purview 
. . . to invite the Government to issue an Amended Order to Show Cause 
seeking revocation [under section] 824(a)(3) grounds because of [his] 
loss of his license.'' Id. at 4-5.
    I reject both parties' contention that I cannot rely on 
Respondent's loss of his state authority absent the Government's 
submission of an amended show cause order. Because the possession of 
state authority is a prerequisite for obtaining a registration and for 
maintaining a registration, the issue can be raised sua sponte even at 
this stage of the proceeding.\55\ Indeed, under the Government's 
position, had I rejected the Government's case, I would be required to 
grant Respondent's applications even though he does not meet a 
statutory requirement for obtaining a registration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \55\ Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), an agency 
``may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding--
even in the final decision.'' U.S. Dept. of Justice, Attorney 
General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. 
W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Notably, the Government's position is fundamentally inconsistent 
with the position it has taken in numerous cases where it has issued an 
Order to Show Cause based on public interest grounds only to 
subsequently move for summary disposition upon learning that the

[[Page 8245]]

applicable state board had taken action which rendered the practitioner 
without state authority. See, e.g., Morgan, 78 FR at 61973-74 
(upholding ALJ's granting of government motion for summary disposition 
based on physician's loss of state authority which occurred post-
hearing and holding that due process did not require amending the show 
cause order; motion for summary disposition provided adequate notice); 
Roy E. Berkowitz, 74 FR 36758, 36759-60 (2009) (rejecting argument that 
revocation based on loss of state authority was improper based on board 
action not alleged in the Show Cause Order; ``The rules governing DEA 
hearings do not require the formality of amending a show cause order to 
comply with the evidence. The Government's failure to file an amended 
Show Cause Order alleging that Respondent's state CDS license had 
expired does not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair.''). See 
also Kamal Tiwari, et al., 76 FR 71604 (2011); Silviu Ziscovici, 76 FR 
71370 (2011); Deanwood Pharmacy, 68 FR 41662 (2003); Michael D. 
Jackson, 68 FR 24760; Robert P. Doughton, 65 FR 30614 (2000); Michael 
G. Dolin, 65 FR 5661 (2000).
    Here, by virtue of my order directing the parties to address the 
issues of: (1) Whether Respondent currently possesses authority to 
dispense controlled substances, and (2) if Respondent does not possess 
such authority, what consequence attaches for this proceeding, 
Respondent was provided with a meaningful opportunity to show that he 
retains his state authority. Of consequence, Respondent does not 
dispute that he no longer holds authority to dispense controlled 
substances under Michigan law, this being the only material fact that 
must be adjudicated in determining whether Respondent's registrations 
can be revoked and his applications denied under 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 
824(a)(3) as well as the Agency's precedent. That there are no 
dispositive legal arguments to preclude my reliance on this basis as an 
additional ground to revoke Respondent's registrations and to deny his 
applications is not the result of constitutionally inadequate notice. 
Rather, it is the result of the statute itself, which makes the 
possession of state authority mandatory for obtaining and maintaining a 
registration and renders irrelevant the issues of acceptance of 
responsibility and the adequacy of remedial measures. Accordingly, I 
will order that Respondent's registrations be revoked and that his 
pending applications be denied.

Order

    Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a) and 28 
CFR 0.100(b), I order that DEA Certificates of Registration BA7776353 
and FA2278201 issued to Hatem M. Ataya, M.D., be, and they hereby are, 
revoked. Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(f) and 
28 CFR 0.100(b), I order that all pending applications submitted by 
Hatem M. Ataya, M.D. be, and they hereby are, denied. This Order is 
effective immediately.\56\
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    \56\ Based on the extensive findings of egregious misconduct by 
Respondent, I conclude that the public interest necessitates that 
this Order be effective immediately.

    Dated: February 10, 2016.
Chuck Rosenberg,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2016-03359 Filed 2-17-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4410-09-P