Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, 69702-69705 [2015-28593]

Download as PDF 69702 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 217 / Tuesday, November 10, 2015 / Notices FY 2014–2018 Strategic Plan may be found at: https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/ 2014/nsf14043/nsf14043.pdf. Since this collection will primarily be used for accountability and evaluation purposes, including responding to queries from COVs and other scientific experts, a census rather than sampling design typically is necessary. At the individual project level funding can be adjusted based on individual project’s responses to some of the surveys. Some data collected under this collection will serve as baseline data for separate research and evaluation studies. NSF-funded contract or grantee researchers and internal or external evaluators in part may identify control, comparison, or treatment groups for NSF’s E&T portfolio using some of the descriptive data gathered through this collection to conduct well-designed, rigorous research and portfolio evaluation studies. Respondents: Individuals or households, not-for-profit institutions, business or other for profit, and Federal, State, local or tribal government. Number of Respondents: 8,184. Burden on the Public: NSF estimates that a total reporting and recordkeeping burden of 58,449 hours will result from activities to monitor EHR STEM education programs. The calculation is shown in table 1. TABLE 1—ANTICIPATED PROGRAMS THAT WILL COLLECT DATA ON PROJECT PROGRESS AND OUTCOMES ALONG WITH THE NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS AND BURDEN HOURS PER COLLECTION PER YEAR Number of respondents Collection title Advancing Informal STEM Learning (AISL) Monitoring System ................................................... Centers of Research Excellence in Science and Technology (CREST) and Historically Black Colleges and Universities Research Infrastructure for Science and Engineering (HBCU– RISE) Monitoring System. Graduate STEM Fellows in K–12 Education (GK–12) Monitoring System ................................... Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship Program (IGERT) Monitoring System. Louis Stokes Alliances for Minority Participation (LSAMP) Monitoring System ............................ Louis Stokes Alliances for Minority Participation Bridge to the Doctorate (LSAMP–BD) Monitoring System. Robert Noyce Teacher Scholarship Program (Noyce) Monitoring System ................................... Research in Disabilities Education (RDE) Monitoring System ...................................................... Scholarships in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (S–STEM) Monitoring System. Number of responses Annual hour burden 155 40 155 .............. 40 ................ 1,921 1,810 1,267 3,307 1,267 ........... 3,307 ........... 3,529 12,282 563 55 563 .............. 55 ................ 12,949 2,090 422 12 500 5,908 1,368 6,000 277 422 .............. 12 ................ 1,000 (500 respondents × 2 responses/ yr.). 277 .............. 6,648 Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics Talent Expansion Program (STEP) Monitoring System. Transforming Undergraduate Education in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (TUES) Monitoring System. Additional Collections not Specified ............................................................................................... 686 686 .............. 2,744 900 900 .............. 1,200 Total ........................................................................................................................................ 8,184 8,684 ........... 58,449 The total estimate for this collection is 58,449 annual burden hours. The average annual reporting burden is between 1.7 and 114 hours per ‘‘respondent,’’ depending on whether a respondent is a direct participant who is self-reporting or representing a project and reporting on behalf of many project participants. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is soliciting public comment on its draft Japan LessonsLearned Division Interim Staff Guidance (JLD–ISG), JLD–ISG–2012–01, Draft Revision 1, ‘‘Compliance with Order EA–12–049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-DesignBasis External Events.’’ This draft JLD– ISG revision provides guidance and clarification to assist nuclear power reactors applicants and licensees with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety functions. [NRC–2012–0068] DATES: Dated: November 5, 2015. Suzanne H. Plimpton, Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation. [FR Doc. 2015–28576 Filed 11–9–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–P asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Draft interim staff guidance; request for comment. ACTION: Mitigation Strategies for BeyondDesign-Basis External Events Nuclear Regulatory Commission. AGENCY: VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:41 Nov 09, 2015 Jkt 238001 SUMMARY: Submit comments by December 10, 2015. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received before this date. PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 You may submit comments by any of the following methods (unless this document describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject): • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2012–0068. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: OWFN–12–H08, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001. For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting comments, see ‘‘Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments’’ in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document. ADDRESSES: E:\FR\FM\10NON1.SGM 10NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 217 / Tuesday, November 10, 2015 / Notices Eric Bowman, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 0001; telephone: 301–415–2963; email: Eric.Bowman@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments A. Obtaining Information Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2012– 0068 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain publiclyavailable information related to this action by any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2012–0068. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publiclyavailable documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ 69703 adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. • The documents identified in the following table are available to interested persons through one or more of the following methods, as indicated. ADAMS Accession No. Document title Abbreviated title JLD–ISG–2012–01, ‘‘Compliance with Order EA–12–049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,’’ Draft Revision 1. See Previous Entry ..................................................................................................................... for JLD–ISG–2012–01 ................................................................................................................ Order EA–12–049, ‘‘Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events’’. V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 2 License, License No. NPF–93 ....................................... V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF–94 ....................................... Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF—95 .......................................... SECY–11–0093, ‘‘Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan’’. SECY–11–0124, ‘‘Recommended Actions to be Taken without Delay from the Near-Term Task Force Report’’. SECY–11–0137, ‘‘Prioritization of Recommended Actions to be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned’’. Commission’s staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for SECY-11-0093 .............................. SRM for SECY–11–0124 (see entry to SECY–11–0124 for full title) ........................................ SRM for SECY–11–0137 (see entry to SECY–11–0124 for full title) ........................................ Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Letter Titled, ‘‘An Integrated, Safety-Focused Approach to Expediting Implementation of Fukushima Daiichi Lessons Learned’’. SECY–12–0025, ‘‘Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami’’. SRM for SECY–12–0025 (see entry for SECY–12–0025 for full title) ....................................... Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident. NEI 12–06, ‘‘Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,’’ Revision B. NEI 12–06, Revision B1 (See Previous Entry for NEI 12–06) ................................................... ‘‘NRC Response to Public Comments, JLD–ISG–2012–01 (Docket ID NRC–2012–0068)’’ ..... NEI 12–06, Revision C (See Previous Entry for NEI 12–06) ..................................................... NEI 12–06, Draft Revision 0 (See Previous Entry for NEI 12–06) ............................................ See Previous Entry for JLD–ISG–2012–01 ................................................................................ JLD–ISG–2012–01, Draft Revision 1. ML15294A078 JLD–ISG–2012–01, Revision 0 ML12229A174 Order EA–12–049 ................... ML12054A736 n/a ........................................... n/a ........................................... n/a ........................................... SECY–11–0093 ...................... ML14100A092 ML14100A101 ML15084A170 ML11186A950 SECY–11–0124 ...................... ML11245A158 SECY–11–0137 ...................... ML11272A111 SRM–SECY–11–0093 ............ SRM–SECY–110124 .............. SRM–SECY–11–0137 ............ n/a ........................................... ML112310021 ML112911571 ML113490055 ML11353A008 SECY–12–0025 ...................... ML12039A103 SRM–SECY–12–0025 ............ 50.54(f) Letter ......................... ML120690347 ML12053A340 NEI 12–06, Revision B ........... ML12144A419 NEI 12–06, Revision B1 ......... n/a ........................................... NEI 12–06, Revision C ........... NEI 12–06, Draft Revision 0 ... JLD–ISG–2012–01, Draft Revision 0. n/a ........................................... COMSECY–14–0037 .............. ML12143A232 ML12229A253 ML121910390 ML12221A204 ML12146A014 SRM–COMSECY–14–0037 .... NEI 12–06, Revision 1 ............ NEI 12–06, Revision 1A ......... NUREG–2161 ......................... ML15089A236 ML15244B006 ML15279A425 ML14255A365 asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station’s Overall Integrate Plan ............................................. COMSECY–14–0037, ‘‘Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events and the Reevaluation (sic) of Flooding Hazards’’. SRM–COMSECY–14–0037 ........................................................................................................ NEI 12–06, Revision 1 (See Previous Entry for NEI 12–06) ..................................................... NEI 12–06, Revision 1A (See Previous Entry for NEI 12–06) ................................................... NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor’’. • The NRC may post materials related to this document, including public comments, on the Federal rulemaking Web site at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC–2012–0068. The Federal rulemaking Web site allows you to receive alerts when changes or additions occur in a docket folder. To subscribe: 1) Navigate to the docket folder (NRC–2012–0068 ); 2) click the VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:41 Nov 09, 2015 Jkt 238001 ‘‘Sign up for Email Alerts’’ link; and 3) enter your email address and select how frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or monthly). • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 ML13064A300 ML14238A616 B. Submitting Comments Please include Docket ID NRC–2012– 0068 in your comment submission. The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your comment submission. The NRC posts all comment submissions at https:// www.regulations.gov as well as entering E:\FR\FM\10NON1.SGM 10NON1 69704 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 217 / Tuesday, November 10, 2015 / Notices asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information. If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to remove such information before making the comment submissions available to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS. II. Background The NRC staff issued JLD–ISG–2012– 01 Revision 0 on August 29, 2012. The NRC staff developed JLD–ISG–2012–01 Draft Revision 1 to provide further guidance and clarification to assist nuclear power reactor applicants and licensees with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety functions. These requirements are contained in Order EA–12–049. In addition, these requirements are included in the following license conditions: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 2 License (V.C. Summer), License No. NPF–93, Condition 2.D.(13), V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF–94, Condition 2.D.(13), and Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF–95, Condition 2.D.(12)(g). The draft ISG is not a substitute for the requirements in Order EA–12–049, and compliance with the ISG is not required. This ISG revision is being issued in draft form for public comment to involve the public in development of the implementation guidance. Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant on March 11, 2011, the NRC established a senior-level agency task force referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked with conducting a systematic and methodical review of the NRC regulations and processes, and determining if the agency should make additional improvements to these programs in light of the events at Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this review, the NTTF developed a comprehensive set of recommendations, documented in SECY–11–0093, dated July 12, 2011. These recommendations were enhanced by the NRC staff following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the staff’s efforts is contained in SECY–11– VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:41 Nov 09, 2015 Jkt 238001 0124, dated September 9, 2011, and SECY–11–0137, dated October 3, 2011. As directed by the Commission’s SRM for SECY–11–0093, the NRC staff reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the context of the NRC’s existing regulatory framework and considered the various regulatory vehicles available to the NRC to implement the recommendations. SECY–11–0124 and SECY–11–0137 established the staff’s prioritization of the recommendations. After receiving the Commission’s direction in SRM–SECY–11–0124 and SRM–SECY–11–0137, the NRC staff conducted public meetings to discuss enhanced mitigation strategies intended to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities following beyonddesign-basis external events. At these meetings, the industry described its proposal for a Diverse and Flexible Mitigation Capability (FLEX), as documented in NEI’s letter, dated December 16, 2011. FLEX is proposed as a strategy to fulfill the key safety functions of core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel cooling. Stakeholder input influenced the staff to pursue a more performance-based approach to improve the safety of operating power reactors than was originally envisioned in NTTF Recommendation 4.2, SECY–11–0124, and SECY–11–0137. On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff provided SECY–12–0025 to the Commission, including the proposed order to implement the enhanced mitigation strategies. As directed by SRM–SECY–12–0025, the NRC staff issued Order EA–12–049 and, in parallel, issued as a Request for Information under 10 CFR 50.54(f) for a reevaluation of licensees’ flooding and seismic hazards. Guidance and strategies required by the order would be available if the loss of power, motive force and normal access to the ultimate heat sink to prevent fuel damage in the reactor, and SFP affected all units at a site simultaneously. The order requires a three-phase approach for mitigating beyond-design-basis external events. The initial phase requires the use of installed equipment and resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling. The transition phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment and consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be accomplished with resources brought from off site. The final phase requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain those functions indefinitely. PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 On May 4, 2012, NEI submitted document 12–06, Revision B, and on May 13, 2012, Revision B1, to provide specifications for an industry-developed methodology for the development, implementation, and maintenance of guidance and strategies in response to the mitigating strategies order. The strategies and guidance described in NEI 12–06 expand on the strategies the industry developed and implemented to address the limited set of beyonddesign-basis external events that involve the loss of a large area of the plant due to explosions and fire required pursuant to paragraph (hh)(2) of 10 CFR 50.54(f), ‘‘Conditions of licenses.’’ On May 31, 2012, the NRC staff issued a draft version of JLD–ISG–2012–01, Revision 0, and published a notice of its availability for public comment in the Federal Register (FR) (77 FR 33779; June 7, 2012), with the comment period running through July 7, 2012, 30 days from its publication. The staff received seven comments during this time, addressing the comments, as documented in ‘‘NRC Response to Public Comments, JLD–ISG–2012–01 (Docket ID NRC–2012–0068).’’ On July 3, 2012, NEI submitted Revision C to NEI 12–06, incorporating many of the exceptions and clarifications included in the draft version of this ISG. On August 3, 2012, NEI submitted Draft Revision 0 to NEI 12–06, incorporating many of the remaining exceptions and clarifications. On August 21, 2012, NEI submitted Revision 0 to NEI 12–06, making various editorial corrections. The NRC reviewed the August 21, 2012, submittal of Revision 0 of NEI 12–06 and endorsed it as a process the NRC considers acceptable for meeting the regulatory requirements with noted clarifications in revision 0 of JLD–ISG–2012–01. By February 2013, licensees of operating power reactors submitted their overall integrated plans (OIPs) under the Mitigating Strategies order describing the guidance and strategies to be developed and implemented. Because this development and implementation was to be accomplished in parallel with the reevaluation of the seismic and flooding hazards under the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter issued subsequent to SECY–12–0025, these included in their key assumptions a statement that typically read, ‘‘[f]lood and seismic reevaluations pursuant to the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter of March 12, 2012, are not completed and therefore not assumed in this submittal. As the reevaluations are completed, appropriate issues will be entered into the corrective action system and addressed on a schedule commensurate with other licensing E:\FR\FM\10NON1.SGM 10NON1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 217 / Tuesday, November 10, 2015 / Notices asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES bases changes.’’ (See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station’s OIP) In order to clarify the relationship between the Mitigating Strategies order and the hazard reevaluation, the NRC staff provided COMSECY–14–0037 to the Commission on November 21, 2014, requesting that the Commission affirm that ‘‘[l]icensees for operating nuclear power plants need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies for beyonddesign-basis external events (Order EA– 12–049 and related [Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events] MBDBE rulemaking).’’ COMSECY–14–0037 further requested affirmation that ‘‘[l]icensees for operating nuclear power plants may need to address some specific flooding scenarios that could significantly damage the power plant site by developing targeted or scenariospecific mitigating strategies, possibly including unconventional measures, to prevent fuel damage in reactor cores or spent fuel pools.’’ In SRM–COMSECY– 14–0037, the Commission affirmed these two items and noted that ‘‘it is within the staff’s authority, and is the staff’s responsibility, to determine, on a plant-specific basis, whether targeted or scenario-specific mitigating strategies, possibly including unconventional measures, are acceptable.’’ On August 25, 2015, NEI submitted Revision 1 to NEI 12–06, incorporating lessons learned in the implementation of Order EA–12–049 and alternative approaches taken by licensees for compliance to that order. Following a public webinar discussion of potential exceptions and clarifications that took place on September 21, 2015, NEI submitted Revision 1A to NEI 12–06 on October 5, 2015. III. Specific Request for Comment The NRC is seeking advice and recommendations from the public on the revision to this interim staff guidance document. We are particularly interested in comments and supporting rationale from the public on the following: Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Spray strategy: Order EA–12–049 was issued in parallel with the March 12, 2012, request for information under 10 CFR 50.54(f) for reevaluation of seismic and flooding hazards. The order and the guidance developed to support the development and implementation of the mitigating strategies were intended to address the uncertainties associated with beyonddesign-basis external events. Since March 12, 2012, the NRC has completed NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:41 Nov 09, 2015 Jkt 238001 Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,’’ which predicted an SFP liner failure likelihood of about two times in a million years and a possibility of release of radioactive materials only if that liner failure occurs during 8 percent of the operating cycle of the reference plant considered in the study. The results of the study showed that the risk of individual latent cancer fatality within 10 miles of the reference plant due to the effects of a beyond-design-basis earthquake on the SFP is several orders of magnitude below the quantitative health objectives established in the Commission’s safety goal policy, ‘‘Safety Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants,’’ 51 FR 28044, August 4, 1986, as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028, August 21, 1986. These results did not quantitatively credit the existing SFP spray strategy under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), which would be necessary for conformance with the guidance contained in this revision to JLD–ISG–2012–01 through its endorsement of NEI 12–06, Revision 1A, at Tables C–3 and D–3 for boiling-water reactors and pressurized-water reactors, respectively. The NRC seeks comment on whether continuing to require the SFP spray strategy under Order EA–12– 049 is warranted in light of the analyses performed for NUREG–2161, or whether the need for this strategy should be limited or removed. Proposed Action By this action, the NRC is requesting public comments on JLD–ISG–2012–01 Draft Revision 1. This draft JLD–ISG proposes guidance related to requirements contained in Order EA– 12–049, Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. The NRC staff will make a final determination regarding issuance of the JLD–ISG after it considers any public comments received in response to this request. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of November, 2015. For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Stewart N. Bailey, Acting Director, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2015–28593 Filed 11–9–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 69705 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 50–361, 50–362, and 72–41; NRC–2015–0023] Southern California Edison Company, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Draft environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact; request for comment. AGENCY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing for public comment a draft environmental assessment (EA) and finding of no significant impact (FONSI) related to a request to amend Facility Operating License Nos. NPF–10 and NPF–15 and Docket No. 72–41, issued to the Southern California Edison Company (SCE or ‘‘the licensee’’), for operation of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3 (hereinafter ‘‘SONGS’’ or ‘‘the facility’’), including the general-license Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), located in San Diego County, California. The requested amendment would permit licensee security personnel to use certain firearms and ammunition feeding devices not previously permitted, notwithstanding State, local and certain Federal firearms laws or regulations that otherwise prohibit such actions. DATES: Submit comments by December 10, 2015. Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received before this date. Any potential party as defined in § 2.4 of title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), who believes access to sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information (SUNSI) is necessary to respond to this notice must request document access by November 20, 2015. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods (unless this document describes a different method for submitting comments on a specific subject): • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2015–0023. Address questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration, Mail Stop: SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\10NON1.SGM 10NON1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 217 (Tuesday, November 10, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69702-69705]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-28593]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2012-0068]


Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Draft interim staff guidance; request for comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is soliciting 
public comment on its draft Japan Lessons-Learned Division Interim 
Staff Guidance (JLD-ISG), JLD-ISG-2012-01, Draft Revision 1, 
``Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard 
to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis 
External Events.'' This draft JLD-ISG revision provides guidance and 
clarification to assist nuclear power reactors applicants and licensees 
with the identification of measures needed to comply with requirements 
to mitigate challenges to key safety functions.

DATES: Submit comments by December 10, 2015. Comments received after 
this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
before this date.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods 
(unless this document describes a different method for submitting 
comments on a specific subject):
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0068. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     Mail comments to: Cindy Bladey, Office of Administration, 
Mail Stop: OWFN-12-H08, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.
    For additional direction on obtaining information and submitting 
comments, see ``Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments'' in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

[[Page 69703]]


FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric Bowman, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001; telephone: 301-415-2963; email: Eric.Bowman@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Obtaining Information and Submitting Comments

A. Obtaining Information

    Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2012-0068 when contacting the NRC 
about the availability of information for this action. You may obtain 
publicly-available information related to this action by any of the 
following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2012-0068.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
     The documents identified in the following table are 
available to interested persons through one or more of the following 
methods, as indicated.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Document title          Abbreviated title   ADAMS Accession No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
JLD-ISG-2012-01, ``Compliance   JLD-ISG-2012-01,   ML15294A078
 with Order EA-12-049, Order     Draft Revision 1.
 Modifying Licenses with
 Regard to Requirements for
 Mitigation Strategies for
 Beyond-Design-Basis External
 Events,'' Draft Revision 1.
See Previous Entry............  JLD-ISG-2012-01,   ML12229A174
for JLD-ISG-2012-01...........   Revision 0.
Order EA-12-049, ``Order        Order EA-12-049..  ML12054A736
 Modifying Licenses with
 Regard to Requirements for
 Mitigation Strategies for
 Beyond-Design-Basis External
 Events''.
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station,    n/a..............  ML14100A092
 Unit 2 License, License No.
 NPF-93.
V.C. Summer Nuclear Station,    n/a..............  ML14100A101
 Unit 3 License, License No.
 NPF-94.
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant,     n/a..............  ML15084A170
 Unit 3 License, License No.
 NPF--95.
SECY-11-0093, ``Near-Term       SECY-11-0093.....  ML11186A950
 Report and Recommendations
 for Agency Actions Following
 the Events in Japan''.
SECY-11-0124, ``Recommended     SECY-11-0124.....  ML11245A158
 Actions to be Taken without
 Delay from the Near-Term Task
 Force Report''.
SECY-11-0137, ``Prioritization  SECY-11-0137.....  ML11272A111
 of Recommended Actions to be
 Taken in Response to
 Fukushima Lessons Learned''.
Commission's staff              SRM-SECY-11-0093.  ML112310021
 requirements memorandum (SRM)
 for SECY[dash]11[dash]0093.
SRM for SECY-11-0124 (see       SRM-SECY-110124..  ML112911571
 entry to SECY-11-0124 for
 full title).
SRM for SECY-11-0137 (see       SRM-SECY-11-0137.  ML113490055
 entry to SECY-11-0124 for
 full title).
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)  n/a..............  ML11353A008
 Letter Titled, ``An
 Integrated, Safety-Focused
 Approach to Expediting
 Implementation of Fukushima
 Daiichi Lessons Learned''.
SECY-12-0025, ``Proposed        SECY-12-0025.....  ML12039A103
 Orders and Requests for
 Information in Response to
 Lessons Learned from Japan's
 March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku
 Earthquake and Tsunami''.
SRM for SECY-12-0025 (see       SRM-SECY-12-0025.  ML120690347
 entry for SECY-12-0025 for
 full title).
Request for Information         50.54(f) Letter..  ML12053A340
 Pursuant to Title 10 of the
 Code of Federal Regulations
 (10 CFR) 50.54(f) Regarding
 Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and
 9.3, of the Near-Term Task
 Force Review of Insights from
 the Fukushima Dai-ichi
 Accident.
NEI 12-06, ``Diverse and        NEI 12-06,         ML12144A419
 Flexible Coping Strategies      Revision B.
 (FLEX) Implementation
 Guide,'' Revision B.
NEI 12-06, Revision B1 (See     NEI 12-06,         ML12143A232
 Previous Entry for NEI 12-06).  Revision B1.
``NRC Response to Public        n/a..............  ML12229A253
 Comments, JLD-ISG-2012-01
 (Docket ID NRC-2012-0068)''.
NEI 12-06, Revision C (See      NEI 12-06,         ML121910390
 Previous Entry for NEI 12-06).  Revision C.
NEI 12-06, Draft Revision 0     NEI 12-06, Draft   ML12221A204
 (See Previous Entry for NEI     Revision 0.
 12-06).
See Previous Entry for JLD-ISG- JLD-ISG-2012-01,   ML12146A014
 2012-01.                        Draft Revision 0.
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power    n/a..............  ML13064A300
 Station's Overall Integrate
 Plan.
COMSECY-14-0037, ``Integration  COMSECY-14-0037..  ML14238A616
 of Mitigating Strategies for
 Beyond-Design-Basis External
 Events and the Reevaluation
 (sic) of Flooding Hazards''.
SRM-COMSECY-14-0037...........  SRM-COMSECY-14-00  ML15089A236
                                 37.
NEI 12-06, Revision 1 (See      NEI 12-06,         ML15244B006
 Previous Entry for NEI 12-06).  Revision 1.
NEI 12-06, Revision 1A (See     NEI 12-06,         ML15279A425
 Previous Entry for NEI 12-06).  Revision 1A.
NUREG-2161, ``Consequence       NUREG-2161.......  ML14255A365
 Study of a Beyond-Design-
 Basis Earthquake Affecting
 the Spent Fuel Pool for a
 U.S. Mark I Boiling Water
 Reactor''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The NRC may post materials related to this document, 
including public comments, on the Federal rulemaking Web site at https://www.regulations.gov under Docket ID NRC-2012-0068. The Federal 
rulemaking Web site allows you to receive alerts when changes or 
additions occur in a docket folder. To subscribe: 1) Navigate to the 
docket folder (NRC-2012-0068 ); 2) click the ``Sign up for Email 
Alerts'' link; and 3) enter your email address and select how 
frequently you would like to receive emails (daily, weekly, or 
monthly).
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

B. Submitting Comments

    Please include Docket ID NRC-2012-0068 in your comment submission.
    The NRC cautions you not to include identifying or contact 
information that you do not want to be publicly disclosed in your 
comment submission. The NRC posts all comment submissions at https://www.regulations.gov as well as entering

[[Page 69704]]

the comment submissions into ADAMS. The NRC does not routinely edit 
comment submissions to remove identifying or contact information.
    If you are requesting or aggregating comments from other persons 
for submission to the NRC, then you should inform those persons not to 
include identifying or contact information that they do not want to be 
publicly disclosed in their comment submission. Your request should 
state that the NRC does not routinely edit comment submissions to 
remove such information before making the comment submissions available 
to the public or entering the comment submissions into ADAMS.

II. Background

    The NRC staff issued JLD-ISG-2012-01 Revision 0 on August 29, 2012. 
The NRC staff developed JLD-ISG-2012-01 Draft Revision 1 to provide 
further guidance and clarification to assist nuclear power reactor 
applicants and licensees with the identification of measures needed to 
comply with requirements to mitigate challenges to key safety 
functions. These requirements are contained in Order EA-12-049. In 
addition, these requirements are included in the following license 
conditions: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 2 License (V.C. 
Summer), License No. NPF-93, Condition 2.D.(13), V.C. Summer Nuclear 
Station, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF-94, Condition 2.D.(13), and 
Enrico Fermi Nuclear Plant, Unit 3 License, License No. NPF-95, 
Condition 2.D.(12)(g). The draft ISG is not a substitute for the 
requirements in Order EA-12-049, and compliance with the ISG is not 
required. This ISG revision is being issued in draft form for public 
comment to involve the public in development of the implementation 
guidance.
    Following the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 
on March 11, 2011, the NRC established a senior-level agency task force 
referred to as the Near-Term Task Force (NTTF). The NTTF was tasked 
with conducting a systematic and methodical review of the NRC 
regulations and processes, and determining if the agency should make 
additional improvements to these programs in light of the events at 
Fukushima Dai-ichi. As a result of this review, the NTTF developed a 
comprehensive set of recommendations, documented in SECY-11-0093, dated 
July 12, 2011. These recommendations were enhanced by the NRC staff 
following interactions with stakeholders. Documentation of the staff's 
efforts is contained in SECY-11-0124, dated September 9, 2011, and 
SECY-11-0137, dated October 3, 2011.
    As directed by the Commission's SRM for SECY-11-0093, the NRC staff 
reviewed the NTTF recommendations within the context of the NRC's 
existing regulatory framework and considered the various regulatory 
vehicles available to the NRC to implement the recommendations. SECY-
11-0124 and SECY-11-0137 established the staff's prioritization of the 
recommendations.
    After receiving the Commission's direction in SRM-SECY-11-0124 and 
SRM-SECY-11-0137, the NRC staff conducted public meetings to discuss 
enhanced mitigation strategies intended to maintain or restore core 
cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling capabilities 
following beyond-design-basis external events. At these meetings, the 
industry described its proposal for a Diverse and Flexible Mitigation 
Capability (FLEX), as documented in NEI's letter, dated December 16, 
2011. FLEX is proposed as a strategy to fulfill the key safety 
functions of core cooling, containment integrity, and spent fuel 
cooling. Stakeholder input influenced the staff to pursue a more 
performance-based approach to improve the safety of operating power 
reactors than was originally envisioned in NTTF Recommendation 4.2, 
SECY-11-0124, and SECY-11-0137.
    On February 17, 2012, the NRC staff provided SECY-12-0025 to the 
Commission, including the proposed order to implement the enhanced 
mitigation strategies. As directed by SRM-SECY-12-0025, the NRC staff 
issued Order EA-12-049 and, in parallel, issued as a Request for 
Information under 10 CFR 50.54(f) for a reevaluation of licensees' 
flooding and seismic hazards.
    Guidance and strategies required by the order would be available if 
the loss of power, motive force and normal access to the ultimate heat 
sink to prevent fuel damage in the reactor, and SFP affected all units 
at a site simultaneously. The order requires a three-phase approach for 
mitigating beyond-design-basis external events. The initial phase 
requires the use of installed equipment and resources to maintain or 
restore core cooling, containment, and SFP cooling. The transition 
phase requires providing sufficient, portable, onsite equipment and 
consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be 
accomplished with resources brought from off site. The final phase 
requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain those 
functions indefinitely.
    On May 4, 2012, NEI submitted document 12-06, Revision B, and on 
May 13, 2012, Revision B1, to provide specifications for an industry-
developed methodology for the development, implementation, and 
maintenance of guidance and strategies in response to the mitigating 
strategies order. The strategies and guidance described in NEI 12-06 
expand on the strategies the industry developed and implemented to 
address the limited set of beyond-design-basis external events that 
involve the loss of a large area of the plant due to explosions and 
fire required pursuant to paragraph (hh)(2) of 10 CFR 50.54(f), 
``Conditions of licenses.''
    On May 31, 2012, the NRC staff issued a draft version of JLD-ISG-
2012-01, Revision 0, and published a notice of its availability for 
public comment in the Federal Register (FR) (77 FR 33779; June 7, 
2012), with the comment period running through July 7, 2012, 30 days 
from its publication. The staff received seven comments during this 
time, addressing the comments, as documented in ``NRC Response to 
Public Comments, JLD-ISG-2012-01 (Docket ID NRC-2012-0068).''
    On July 3, 2012, NEI submitted Revision C to NEI 12-06, 
incorporating many of the exceptions and clarifications included in the 
draft version of this ISG. On August 3, 2012, NEI submitted Draft 
Revision 0 to NEI 12-06, incorporating many of the remaining exceptions 
and clarifications. On August 21, 2012, NEI submitted Revision 0 to NEI 
12-06, making various editorial corrections. The NRC reviewed the 
August 21, 2012, submittal of Revision 0 of NEI 12-06 and endorsed it 
as a process the NRC considers acceptable for meeting the regulatory 
requirements with noted clarifications in revision 0 of JLD-ISG-2012-
01.
    By February 2013, licensees of operating power reactors submitted 
their overall integrated plans (OIPs) under the Mitigating Strategies 
order describing the guidance and strategies to be developed and 
implemented. Because this development and implementation was to be 
accomplished in parallel with the reevaluation of the seismic and 
flooding hazards under the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter issued subsequent to 
SECY-12-0025, these included in their key assumptions a statement that 
typically read, ``[f]lood and seismic re-evaluations pursuant to the 10 
CFR 50.54(f) letter of March 12, 2012, are not completed and therefore 
not assumed in this submittal. As the reevaluations are completed, 
appropriate issues will be entered into the corrective action system 
and addressed on a schedule commensurate with other licensing

[[Page 69705]]

bases changes.'' (See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station's 
OIP)
    In order to clarify the relationship between the Mitigating 
Strategies order and the hazard reevaluation, the NRC staff provided 
COMSECY-14-0037 to the Commission on November 21, 2014, requesting that 
the Commission affirm that ``[l]icensees for operating nuclear power 
plants need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their 
mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events (Order 
EA-12-049 and related [Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events] MBDBE 
rulemaking).'' COMSECY-14-0037 further requested affirmation that 
``[l]icensees for operating nuclear power plants may need to address 
some specific flooding scenarios that could significantly damage the 
power plant site by developing targeted or scenario-specific mitigating 
strategies, possibly including unconventional measures, to prevent fuel 
damage in reactor cores or spent fuel pools.'' In SRM-COMSECY-14-0037, 
the Commission affirmed these two items and noted that ``it is within 
the staff's authority, and is the staff's responsibility, to determine, 
on a plant-specific basis, whether targeted or scenario-specific 
mitigating strategies, possibly including unconventional measures, are 
acceptable.''
    On August 25, 2015, NEI submitted Revision 1 to NEI 12-06, 
incorporating lessons learned in the implementation of Order EA-12-049 
and alternative approaches taken by licensees for compliance to that 
order. Following a public webinar discussion of potential exceptions 
and clarifications that took place on September 21, 2015, NEI submitted 
Revision 1A to NEI 12-06 on October 5, 2015.

III. Specific Request for Comment

    The NRC is seeking advice and recommendations from the public on 
the revision to this interim staff guidance document. We are 
particularly interested in comments and supporting rationale from the 
public on the following:
    Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Spray strategy: Order EA-12-049 was issued in 
parallel with the March 12, 2012, request for information under 10 CFR 
50.54(f) for reevaluation of seismic and flooding hazards. The order 
and the guidance developed to support the development and 
implementation of the mitigating strategies were intended to address 
the uncertainties associated with beyond-design-basis external events. 
Since March 12, 2012, the NRC has completed NUREG-2161, ``Consequence 
Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool 
for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor,'' which predicted an SFP liner 
failure likelihood of about two times in a million years and a 
possibility of release of radioactive materials only if that liner 
failure occurs during 8 percent of the operating cycle of the reference 
plant considered in the study. The results of the study showed that the 
risk of individual latent cancer fatality within 10 miles of the 
reference plant due to the effects of a beyond-design-basis earthquake 
on the SFP is several orders of magnitude below the quantitative health 
objectives established in the Commission's safety goal policy, ``Safety 
Goals for the Operations of Nuclear Power Plants,'' 51 FR 28044, August 
4, 1986, as corrected and republished at 51 FR 30028, August 21, 1986. 
These results did not quantitatively credit the existing SFP spray 
strategy under 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), which would be necessary for 
conformance with the guidance contained in this revision to JLD-ISG-
2012-01 through its endorsement of NEI 12-06, Revision 1A, at Tables C-
3 and D-3 for boiling-water reactors and pressurized-water reactors, 
respectively. The NRC seeks comment on whether continuing to require 
the SFP spray strategy under Order EA-12-049 is warranted in light of 
the analyses performed for NUREG-2161, or whether the need for this 
strategy should be limited or removed.

Proposed Action

    By this action, the NRC is requesting public comments on JLD-ISG-
2012-01 Draft Revision 1. This draft JLD-ISG proposes guidance related 
to requirements contained in Order EA-12-049, Mitigation Strategies for 
Beyond-Design-Basis External Events. The NRC staff will make a final 
determination regarding issuance of the JLD-ISG after it considers any 
public comments received in response to this request.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of November, 2015.

    For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Stewart N. Bailey,
Acting Director, Japan Lessons-Learned Division, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2015-28593 Filed 11-9-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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