Improving 911 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, 60548-60552 [2015-25459]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 194 (Wednesday, October 7, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 60548-60552]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-25459]



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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 12

[PS Docket No. 13-75; PS Docket No. 11-60; FCC 15-95]


Improving 911 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of 
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission) clarifies annual reliability certification requirements 
for Covered 911 Service Providers in response to a Petition for 
Reconsideration. Specifically, the Commission clarifies that Covered 
911 Service Providers may implement and certify an alternative measure 
for any of the elements specified in the certification as long as they 
provide an explanation of how such alternative measures are reasonably 
sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure. This clarification provides 
flexibility for Covered 911 Service Providers, including those with 
Internet protocol (IP)-based networks, to certify alternative measures 
in lieu of diversity audits and tagging of critical 911 circuits as 
long as they explain how such alternatives will mitigate risk at least 
to a comparable extent as the measures specified in the Commission's 
rules.

DATES: Effective November 6, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Eric P. Schmidt, Attorney Advisor, 
Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1214 or 
eric.schmidt@fcc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Order 
on Reconsideration in PS Docket No. 13-75 and PS Docket No. 11-60, 
released on July 30, 2015. The full text of this document is available 
for public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC 
Reference Center, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street SW., Washington, DC 
20554, or online at https://www.fcc.gov/document/911-reliability-certification-order-reconsideration.

Synopsis of Order on Reconsideration

I. Introduction

    1. In December 2013, the Commission adopted rules requiring 911 
communications providers to take reasonable measures to provide 
reliable service, as evidenced by an annual certification.\1\ Covered 
entities must certify whether they have implemented specified best 
practices or reasonable alternative measures with respect to critical 
911 circuit diversity, central office backup power, and diverse network 
monitoring. These rules responded to significant, but avoidable, 
vulnerabilities in 911 network architecture, maintenance, and operation 
revealed during a June 2012 derecho storm that left 3.6 million people 
in six states without 911 service for several hours to several days. In 
light of these preventable failures, the Commission determined that the 
discharge of its statutory responsibility for promoting the safety of 
life and property no longer justifies relying solely on the 
implementation of key best practices on a voluntary basis. The 
Commission added, however, that its adoption of a mandatory 
certification process seeks to maximize flexibility and account for 
differences in network architectures without sacrificing 911 service 
reliability.
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    \1\ Improving 911 Reliability; Reliability and Continuity of 
Communications Networks, Including Broadband Technologies, PS Docket 
Nos. 13-75, 11-60, Report and Order, 28 FCC Rcd 17476 (2013), 
available at https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db1212/FCC-13-158A1.pdf (911 Reliability Order).
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    2. In this Order on Reconsideration, the Commission revises its 
rules to clarify certain 911 reliability certification requirements in 
response to a ``Motion for Clarification or, in the Alternative, 
Petition for Partial Reconsideration'' filed by Intrado, Inc.\2\ In so 
doing, we rely on two guiding principles from the 911 Reliability 
Order. First, ensuring reliability of 911 service is a critical aspect 
of our statutory mandate to act for the purpose of promoting safety of 
life and property. Second, while all Americans have an expectation of 
reliable 911 service, appropriate actions to improve and maintain 
reliability may vary by service provider and location.
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    \2\ Intrado, Inc., Motion for Clarification or, in the 
Alternative, Petition for Partial Reconsideration, PS Docket Nos. 
13-75, 11-60 (Feb. 18, 2014) (Intrado Petition).
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    3. Specifically, we clarify that under section 12.4 of the 
Commission's rules, Covered 911 Service Providers may implement and 
certify an alternative measure for any of the specific certification 
elements, as long as they provide an explanation of how such 
alternative measures are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of 
failure. We believe that this should include an explanation of how the 
alternative will mitigate such risk at least to a comparable extent as 
the measures specified in our rules. While it may be possible that an 
alternative measure that cannot be shown to be comparable in reducing 
the risk of failure could be deemed reasonably sufficient in a 
particular case, a provider advancing such an alternative measure will 
face a heavy burden in demonstrating why comparability cannot be 
achieved, how the risk of failure has been reduced, and why, given the 
level to which the risk has been reduced, the measure taken to achieve 
this result should be regarded as reasonably sufficient to address the 
vulnerabilities at issue. Accordingly, we revise our rules to eliminate 
ambiguities arising from the instructions in sections 12.4(c)(1)(ii) 
and 12.4(c)(3)(ii) for making the alternative certification for the 
circuit auditing and network monitoring requirements, respectively.

II. Background

A. 911 Reliability Order

    4. The 911 Reliability Order adopted section 12.4 of our rules, 
which defines the scope of Covered 911 Service Providers and sets forth 
the elements for an annual certification requirement with respect to 
circuit auditing, backup power, and network monitoring. As pertinent 
here, under the circuit auditing portion of the certification, the 
elements specified by the rules require Covered 911 Service Providers 
to certify annually whether they have (1) audited the physical 
diversity of critical 911 circuits or equivalent data paths to any 
public safety answering point (PSAP) served, (2) tagged such circuits 
to reduce the probability of inadvertent loss of diversity between 
audits, and (3) eliminated all single points of failure in critical 911 
circuits or equivalent data paths serving each PSAP. If a Covered 911 
Service Provider has not implemented the third element (i.e., the 
elimination of all single points of failure), it must certify whether 
it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk of critical 911 
circuits that are not physically diverse or is taking steps to 
remediate any issues that it has identified with respect to 911 service 
to the PSAP. Respondents also may certify that the circuit auditing 
requirement is not applicable because they do not operate any critical 
911 circuits. The network monitoring portion of the overarching 
certification requirement contains a similar approach with respect to 
its elements (i.e., conducting audits of aggregation points for 
gathering network monitoring data, conducting audits of monitoring 
links, and implementing physically diverse aggregation points and 
links). The backup power portion of the certification--which is not at 
issue here--requires Covered 911 Service

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Providers to indicate whether they provide at least 24 hours of backup 
power at any central office that directly serves a PSAP or at least 72 
hours at any central office that hosts a selective router, and whether 
they have implemented certain design and testing procedures for backup 
power equipment.
    5. The elements that comprise these certification requirements are 
designed to reinforce the core responsibility imposed by section 
12.4(b) of our rules, which is to take reasonable measures to provide 
reliable 911 service with respect to circuit diversity, central-office 
backup power, and diverse network monitoring. Section 12.4(b) provides, 
however, that ``[i]f a Covered 911 Service Provider cannot certify that 
it has performed a given element, the Commission may determine that 
such provider nevertheless satisfies the requirements of this 
subsection (b) based upon a showing in accordance with subsection (c) 
that it is taking alternative measures with respect to that element 
that are reasonably sufficient to mitigate the risk of failure, or that 
one or more certification elements are not applicable to its network.'' 
The Commission intended this certification approach to be more flexible 
than uniform standards, while providing assurance to PSAPs and the 
public that known vulnerabilities in 911 networks will be identified 
and corrected promptly.

B. Intrado Petition

    6. The Intrado Petition seeks clarification or reconsideration of 
certification requirements under sections 12.4(c)(1) and 12.4(c)(3) to 
the extent that they would require all Covered 911 Service Providers to 
audit and tag 911 circuits, and audit network monitoring links, without 
the option of certifying reasonable alternative measures in lieu 
thereof. Intrado, which provides services such as call routing and 
location information over an Internet protocol (IP)-based network, 
argues that ``[a]uditing and tagging are concepts derived from the 
traditional 911 architecture of the [incumbent local exchange carriers 
(ILECs)], where the ILEC 911 service provider presumably controls the 
physical path of the circuit from the selective router to the serving 
wire center and knows whether it is diverse at any given moment.'' 
Intrado's network, by contrast, ``disperses critical functions into 
geographically diverse and redundant locations and uses dual paths and 
different network providers to transmit its Critical 911 Circuits.''
    7. Intrado observes that the structure and numbering of section 
12.4(c) can be interpreted to require that all Covered 911 Service 
Providers must audit and tag critical 911 circuits and audit network 
monitoring links, and may rely on alternative measures only with 
respect to eliminating single points of failure in those facilities. 
Read in isolation, certain statements in the 911 Reliability Order may 
also suggest that the option of certifying alternative measures applies 
only to remedial actions--i.e., how to cure an absence of complete 
physical diversity identified through audits and tagging. Intrado 
argues that this interpretation would appear inconsistent with section 
12.4(b), which provides that if a Covered 911 Service Provider ``cannot 
certify that it has performed a given element,'' it may nevertheless 
satisfy the ``reasonable measures'' requirement through a certification 
of alternative measures.
    8. Intrado argues that two issues may prevent it and other IP-based 
providers from being able to audit and certify the precise path of 
their circuits or equivalent data paths for 911 call traffic at any 
given time. First, ``the underlying carriers could conflate their 
respective physical paths so that they are combined on one of their 
networks or on the network of a third-party carrier for one or more 
segments,'' in which case ``Intrado has no way of ensuring that the 
underlying provider informs Intrado if such conflation occurs.'' 
Second, ``a significant portion of Intrado's facilities rely on 
multiprotocol label switching (MPLS) technology, which does not permit 
the underlying provider--let alone Intrado--to track its circuit path 
at any given moment.''
    9. Intrado cites the apparent conflict between sections 12.4(b) and 
12.4(c) as a basis for requesting clarification of those rules such 
that ``[p]roviders may take reasonable alternative measures to meet the 
Commission's standards in lieu of implementing any of the best 
practices adopted by the Order.'' It adds that ``[t]his would include 
confirming that Providers may take reasonable alternative measures 
instead of conducting Diversity Audits, tagging Critical 911 Circuits, 
or auditing Monitoring Links.'' Intrado argues that ``a narrow 
interpretation of the rules could require Providers to focus on form 
over substance and divert resources away from implementing innovative 
alternative measures that improve network reliability to focus on 
complying with a `one-size-fits-all' certification obligation.''

C. Comments

    10. In response, the Commission received one comment and one reply 
comment, both in support of Intrado's position. Texas 911 Entities 
``support[s] the Commission . . . providing additional clarification or 
interpretation regarding the Order in the context of more modern 9-1-1 
network designs,'' including MPLS networks and situations ``where the 
network provided by a subcontractor or commercial vendor may be one 
component of a larger governmental entity solution.'' AT&T ``fully 
supports the Intrado Petition as a broad request for clarification and 
reconsideration of the 911 Reliability Order and accompanying proposed 
rules'' but argues that any relief should extend to ``all Covered 911 
Service Providers,'' not just to IP-based providers similarly situated 
to Intrado.

III. Discussion

A. Network Reliability During the Transition to Next Generation 911 
(NG911)

    11. We first clarify that the certification framework adopted in 
the 911 Reliability Order was intended to allow flexibility for all 
Covered 911 Service Providers to rely on reasonable alternative 
measures in lieu of any given element of the certification set forth in 
section 12.4(c). The overarching purpose of the certification, 
including the attestation of a responsible corporate officer, is to 
hold service providers accountable for decisions affecting 911 
reliability. We agree with Intrado that ``[t]he Commission did not 
intend the certification process to be prescriptive, but adopted a 
certification mechanism that provides Covered 911 Service Providers 
with flexibility and a means of demonstrating that they are taking 
reasonable measures to ensure the reliability of their 911 service.'' 
Inflexible insistence on specified actions as part of each 
certification despite technical considerations that show those actions 
may not be appropriate in all cases would undermine this principle of 
flexibility without advancing the Commission's goal of improving 911 
reliability.
    12. Moreover, flexibility is essential to support and encourage the 
transition to NG911. In the 911 Reliability Order, the Commission 
stated that ``we intend today's rules to apply to current 911 networks, 
as well as NG911 networks to the extent they provide functionally 
equivalent capabilities to PSAPs.'' At that time, the Commission was 
``not persuaded that NG911 technologies have evolved to the point that 
reliability certification rules should apply to entities beyond those 
that offer core services functionally equivalent to current 911 and 
E911 capabilities'' but it noted that it may ``revisit this

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distinction in the future as technology evolves.'' Accordingly, the 911 
Reliability Order contemplated a review of the certification rules in 
five years, noting that such a review should ``include consideration of 
whether [the rules] should be revised or expanded to cover new best 
practices or additional entities that provide NG911 capabilities, or in 
light of our understanding about how NG911 networks may differ from 
legacy 911 service.''
    13. Events since the adoption of the 911 Reliability Order have 
underscored that the NG911 transition is well underway in many parts of 
the Nation.\3\ In recognition of this transition, the Commission 
intended its 911 reliability rules to be technology-neutral and made 
clear that functionally equivalent 911 capabilities should be treated 
consistently for purposes of the certification. We reaffirm that 
principle here. Accordingly, we do not intend to create disparate 
certification standards for IP-based providers, or to discourage the 
implementation of NG911 by imposing certification requirements that 
would not be appropriate for IP-based networks. Rather, we clarify that 
the certification framework adopted in the 911 Reliability Order allows 
flexibility for all Covered 911 Service Providers--legacy and IP-
based--to certify reasonable alternative measures to mitigate the risk 
of failure in lieu of specified certification elements, and we amend 
our rules to eliminate any ambiguity on this point. In keeping with the 
Commission's statement in the 911 Reliability Order that reliability 
certification requirements should be ``consistent with current best 
practices but also flexible enough to account for differences in 911 
and NG911 networks,'' we believe that our implementation of the 
certification should be guided by these same principles.
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    \3\ See 911 Governance and Accountability; Improving 911 
Reliability, PS Docket Nos. 14-193 and 13-75, Policy Statement and 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29 FCC Rcd 14208 (2014), available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-14-186A1.pdf (911 
Governance NPRM). Among other things, the 911 Governance NPRM 
proposed to adopt additional certification requirements for NG911 
providers regarding software and database configuration and testing, 
as well as situational awareness and information sharing. We do not 
address those proposals here and emphasize that our response to the 
Intrado Petition is limited to clarification of existing 
certification obligations adopted in the 911 Reliability Order.
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    14. To be clear, this flexibility is limited by the substantive 
standard in Section 12.4(b) of requiring ``reasonable measures'' to 
provide reliable 911 service, and is not an invitation for any Covered 
911 Service Provider to avoid certification obligations. As provided in 
the 911 Reliability Order, if a Covered 911 Service Provider certifies 
that it has taken alternative measures to mitigate the risk of failure, 
or that a certification element is not applicable to its network, its 
certification is subject to a more detailed Bureau review. If the 
Bureau's review indicates that a provider's alternative measures are 
not reasonably sufficient to ensure reliable 911 service, the Bureau 
should first engage with the provider and other interested stakeholders 
(e.g., affected PSAPs) to address any shortcomings. To the extent that 
such a collaborative process does not yield satisfactory results, the 
Bureau may order remedial action consistent with its delegated 
authority. We intend this process to allow flexibility to employ 
alternative--but reliable--network designs and technologies, not to 
create an exception that would swallow the rule.

B. Clarification of Certification Requirements

1. Circuit Auditing
    15. We clarify that Covered 911 Service Providers responding to the 
circuit auditing portion of the certification under section 12.4(c)(1) 
may certify their implementation of reasonable alternative measures in 
lieu of auditing and tagging critical 911 circuits, provided that they 
include an explanation of such alternative measures and why they are 
reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, we amend section 
12.4(c)(1)(ii) to make clear that this option applies to all of the 
elements of section 12.4(c)(1)(i) and not just subsection 
12.4(c)(1)(i)(C).
    16. The circuit auditing requirement adopted in the 911 Reliability 
Order was based upon a CSRIC best practice urging network operators to 
``periodically audit the physical and logical diversity called for by 
network design of their network segment(s) and take appropriate 
measures as needed.'' As Intrado argues, however, appropriate measures 
to preserve physical and logical diversity may differ between circuit-
switched time division multiplexing (TDM) and IP-based networks because 
IP-based routing and, in the event of an outage, re-routing can occur 
dynamically over many possible paths. Further, as the Texas 911 
Entities observe, ``the ability of an underlying MPLS technology 
provider to track its circuit paths at any given moment may not be 
technically feasible, or what the Commission intended in the context of 
that technology.'' As discussed above, the certification process is 
intended to be flexible to account for these types of technical 
considerations and to allow for alternative measures where appropriate. 
Our assessment of whether such measures are reasonably sufficient to 
mitigate the risk of failure may be informed by, but not limited to, 
the question whether the measures specified in our rules are 
technically feasible.
    17. As the Intrado Petition acknowledges, the option to certify 
alternative measures allows the Commission to ``maintain oversight 
because Providers would still be required to disclose to the agency 
what steps were taken to accomplish these reliability goals.'' Such 
information will help demonstrate whether the alternative measures 
chosen by the Covered 911 Service Provider constitute a reasonable 
approach for addressing the risks that the circuit auditing and tagging 
elements are designed to ameliorate. While technical infeasibility is 
not a prerequisite to the use of alternative measures, explanations of 
alternative measures with respect to circuit audits and tagging should 
nevertheless include an assessment of the technical feasibility of 
circuit audits and tagging in light of the respondent's network 
architecture. We also expect such explanations to describe affirmative 
steps in lieu of audits and tagging to mitigate the risk of a service 
disruption due to a lack of physical diversity; we will not consider it 
sufficient or reasonable to respond that no circuit diversity measures 
are necessary under the circumstances. Technology transitions have 
already resulted in a variety of hybrid 911 network architectures in 
which some functions are provided over legacy TDM circuits and others 
are provided over IP-based infrastructure. In such cases, our rules as 
revised will permit the provider to certify reasonable alternative 
measures with respect to either portion of the network.
    18. The Intrado Petition also reflects a shift in 911 network 
architecture from facilities owned and operated by a single provider to 
a combination of network transport and data processing elements that 
may be provided by multiple entities. Intrado states that ``in contrast 
to legacy ILEC providers that own and control the transport facilities 
over which 911 calls and data are transported, Intrado procures 
transport services for the delivery of 911 calls and for ALI/ANI from 
third party transport providers.'' Our rules as revised in this Order 
on Reconsideration will account for such arrangements while preserving 
accountability for reliable service. The 911 Reliability Order briefly 
addressed auditing of critical 911 circuits leased

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from third parties, stating that ``[i]n cases where a party provides 
911 services directly to a PSAP (pursuant to contract or tariff) over 
leased facilities, the auditing obligation would apply to that party, 
and not to the facilities lessor.'' The Commission also suggested that 
Covered 911 Service Providers could contract with facilities lessors, 
if necessary, to audit and tag leased circuits, but that the entity 
providing 911 service under a direct contractual relationship with each 
PSAP would remain responsible for certifying compliance with those 
requirements. We reaffirm those principles here, but clarify that 
Covered 911 Service Providers (i.e., the entities with direct 
contractual relationships with PSAPs) that rely on such contracts may 
implement and certify reasonable alternative measures as set forth 
above. We emphasize, however, that the contracting out of certain 
functions, or the determination of a PSAP to contract with more than 
one entity for various aspects of 911 service, does not absolve 
individual entities of their respective obligations for reliable 911 
service. While respondents may certify reasonable alternative measures 
to mitigate the risk of failure due to insufficient physical diversity 
of leased circuits, we will not consider it reasonable or sufficient to 
indicate that such circuits are not a Covered 911 Service Provider's 
responsibility because they belong to a third party.
    19. Where Covered 911 Service Providers are leasing or 
subcontracting for critical 911 circuits, the Commission's assessment 
of whether alternative measures in lieu of circuit audits or tagging 
are reasonable under the circumstances will be informed, in part, by 
certification responses identifying the parties involved, as well as 
details about the contractual provisions--or lack thereof--governing 
such relationships. For example, do IP-based Covered 911 Service 
Providers increase the diversity of their networks by dividing traffic 
among two different MPLS service providers? In cases where a PSAP 
depends on IP network access for its 911 services, Covered 911 Service 
Providers might also promote reliability of each PSAP's IP network 
access by ordering redundant access for the PSAP from multiple 
providers (such as ILEC, cable, and wireless providers). In addition, 
for cases where MPLS is used to provide 911 services, MPLS service 
level agreements, reliability objectives, and remedies specified for 
failure to meet such requirements and/or objectives may also ensure 
accountability for reliable service. We will expect Covered 911 Service 
Providers that provide critical 911 circuits to PSAPs in partnership 
with other service providers or that share responsibility for circuit 
diversity with another service provider to include a description of 
such arrangements and the identity of such third parties as part of 
their explanation of alternative measures. Descriptions of alternative 
measures may also include references to any services provided under 
contract where circuit diversity is not expressly defined, but is 
instead achieved through a service level agreement providing comparable 
assurances of resiliency. These and other affirmative steps, in lieu of 
circuit audits and tagging, may demonstrate reasonable measures to 
provide reliable service, depending on individual circumstances, while 
improving the Commission's situational awareness regarding NG911 
deployment and resiliency. Explanations submitted through the annual 
certification process will have the added benefit of providing the 
Commission with up-to-date, empirical information about the transition 
to NG911 throughout the Nation.
2. Network Monitoring
    20. Finally, and for the reasons discussed above, we clarify that 
Covered 911 Service Providers responding to the network monitoring 
portion of the certification under section 12.4(c)(3) may certify their 
implementation of reasonable alternative measures in lieu of conducting 
diversity audits of monitoring links and aggregation points for network 
monitoring data, provided that they include an explanation of such 
alternative measures and why they are reasonable under the 
circumstances. Accordingly, we amend the text of section 12.4(c)(3)(ii) 
to make clear that this option applies to all of the elements of 
section 12.4(c)(3)(i) and not just subsection 12.4(c)(3)(i)(C).
    21. Intrado argues that ``[b]ased on the text of the [911 
Reliability Order], it appears that the Commission intended to permit 
Providers either to implement . . . best practices or take reasonable 
alternative measures with respect to . . . network monitoring elements, 
just as Providers may do for backup power.'' We agree. As the 
Commission observed in the 911 Reliability Order, ``it is a sound 
engineering practice to design network monitoring architectures with 
visibility into the network through physically diverse aggregation 
points and monitoring links interconnecting to [network operations 
centers (NOCs)] to help avoid single points of failure.'' This 
requirement was based, however, on a CSRIC best practice recommending 
more generally that network operators ``should monitor their network to 
enable quick response to network issues.'' Intrado argues that ``it 
would be exceedingly difficult and may not be possible in all cases'' 
for an IP-based service provider to ``audit its Monitoring Links as 
those functions are defined in the Commission's rules'' without the 
option of certifying reasonable alternative measures. At least one 
other commenter in the 911 reliability proceeding indicated plans to 
route network monitoring traffic on a more resilient IP-enabled 
network, suggesting that many of the same technical limitations on 
circuit auditing discussed above with respect to critical 911 circuits 
may also extend to network monitoring facilities. We therefore amend 
our rules to clarify that the certification framework allows 
flexibility for Covered 911 Service Providers to implement and certify 
alternative measures, as long as they demonstrate that those 
alternative measures are reasonably sufficient under the circumstances 
to mitigate the risk of a network monitoring failure as set forth 
above.

IV. Procedural Matters

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

    22. This document contains a non-substantive and non-material 
modification of information collection requirements that were 
previously reviewed and approved by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) under OMB Control No. 3060-1202. In addition, we note that 
pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 
107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought specific 
comment on how the Commission might further reduce the information 
collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25 
employees.
    23. In this present document, we have assessed the effects of 
various requirements adopted in the 911 Reliability Order and clarified 
the effect of certain recordkeeping, retention, and reporting 
requirements for Covered 911 Service Providers. We find that these 
actions are in the public interest because they reduce the burdens of 
these recordkeeping, retention, and reporting requirements without 
undermining the goals and objectives behind the requirements. The 
amendments we adopt today will reduce the burden on businesses with 
fewer than 25 employees.

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B. Supplemental Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

    24. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA), 
the Commission has prepared the following Supplemental Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) relating to this Order on Reconsideration. 
As discussed in the initial FRFA in this proceeding, the Commission 
sought comment on alternatives for small entities including: (1) The 
establishment of different compliance and reporting requirements; (2) 
clarification, consolidation, or simplification of compliance or 
reporting requirements for small entities; (3) the use of performance, 
rather than design, standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of 
the rule, or any part thereof, for small entities. As the Commission 
stated in the FRFA, ``[w]hile we acknowledge that small or rural 
service providers may have limited resources or operate in remote 
areas, 911 is no less a critical public service in any part of the 
nation, and we decline to establish two tiers of 911 reliability based 
on economics or geography.'' Accordingly, we intend our 911 reliability 
certification requirements--including the clarifications set forth in 
this Order on Reconsideration--to apply to all Covered 911 Service 
Providers without exceptions based on size or location, and we also 
decline to create a specific waiver procedure for entities to seek 
exemption from the rules.
    25. That said, the Commission's certification approach to 911 
reliability continues to ``allow[ ] flexibility for small or rural 
providers to comply with our rules in the manner most appropriate for 
their networks, and certain requirements will, by their nature, only 
apply to larger providers.'' In contrast to more prescriptive 
reliability requirements, the option to certify reasonable alternative 
measures in lieu of specified best practices minimizes regulatory 
burdens on small entities by recognizing a variety of acceptable 
approaches to providing reliable 911 service. If anything, the 
clarifications provided above offer additional flexibility to small 
entities by making clear that they may certify reasonable alternative 
measures in lieu of circuit audits and tagging depending on their 
individual circumstances and network architecture. Thus, the rules as 
clarified in this Order on Reconsideration continue to take into 
account the unique interests of small entities as required by the RFA.

C. Congressional Review Act

    26. The Commission will send a copy of this Order on 
Reconsideration to Congress and the Government Accountability Office 
pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

V. Ordering Clauses

    27. Accordingly, it is ordered, pursuant to sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 
4(o), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 
309(a), 316, 332, 403, 405, 615a-1, and 615c of the Communications Act 
of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)-(j) & (o), 201(b), 214(d), 
218, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 316, 332, 
403, 405, 615a-1, and 615c, and sections 1.108 and 1.429 of the 
Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.1, 1.429, that this Order on 
Reconsideration is adopted.
    28. It is further ordered that Part 12 of the Commission's rules, 
47 CFR part 12, is amended as set forth in the Appendix, and that such 
rule amendments shall be effective 30 days after publication in the 
Federal Register.
    29. It is further ordered that the Motion for Clarification or, in 
the Alternative, Petition for Partial Reconsideration of Intrado, Inc., 
is granted to the extent described herein.
    30. It is further ordered that the Commission shall send a copy of 
this Order on Reconsideration to Congress and to the Government 
Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 
U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).
    31. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and 
Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, shall send a 
copy of this Order on Reconsideration, including the Supplemental Final 
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of 
the Small Business Administration.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary.

List of Subjects in 47 CFR part 12

    Resiliency, Redundancy and Reliability of Communications.

Final Rules

    For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal 
Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 12 as follows:

PART 12--RESILIENCY, REDUNDANCY, AND RELIABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS

0
1. The authority citation for part 12 is revised to read as follows:

    Authority:  Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 5(c), 201(b), 214(d), 
218, 219, 251(e)(3), 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 
309(a), 316, 332, 403, 405, 615a-1, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of 
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 
154 (j), 154 (o), 155(c), 201(b), 214(d), 218, 219, 251(e)(3), 301, 
303(b), 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 307, 309(a), 316, 332, 403, 405, 
615a-1, 615c, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) unless otherwise noted.


0
2. Amend Sec.  12.4 by revising paragraphs (c)(1)(ii) introductory text 
and (c)(3)(ii) introductory text to read as follows:


Sec.  12.4  Reliability of covered 911 service providers.

* * * * *
    (c) * * *
    (1) * * *
    (ii) If a Covered 911 Service Provider does not conform with all of 
the elements in paragraph (c)(1)(i) of this section with respect to the 
911 service provided to one or more PSAPs, it must certify with respect 
to each such PSAP:
* * * * *
    (3) * * *
    (ii) If a Covered 911 Service Provider does not conform with all of 
the elements in paragraph (c)(3)(i) of this section, it must certify 
with respect to each such 911 Service Area:
* * * * *
[FR Doc. 2015-25459 Filed 10-6-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6712-01-P