Letter of Recommendation for Washington State Ferries Liquefied Natural Gas Conversion; Seattle, WA, 57835-57837 [2015-24337]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 186 / Friday, September 25, 2015 / Notices streamlined years, only during the triennial comprehensive review. On September 1, 2014, the Coast Guard recertified the Cook Inlet Regional Citizen’s Advisory Council through August 31, 2015. Under the Oil Terminal and Oil Tanker Environmental Oversight Act of 1990 (33 U.S.C. 2732), the Coast Guard may certify, on an annual basis, an alternative voluntary advisory group for Cook Inlet, Alaska. This advisory group monitors the activities of terminal facilities and crude oil tankers under the Cook Inlet Program established by Congress, 33 U.S.C. 2732 (b). Recertification By letter dated August 20, 2015, the Commander, Seventeenth Coast Guard certified that the CIRCAC qualifies as an alternative voluntary advisory group under 33 U.S.C. 2732(o). This recertification terminates on August 31, 2016. Dated: August 20, 2015. D. B. Abel, Rear Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard Commander, Seventeenth Coast Guard District. [FR Doc. 2015–24335 Filed 9–24–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9110–04–P DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Background Coast Guard [Docket No. USCG–2014–0935] Letter of Recommendation for Washington State Ferries Liquefied Natural Gas Conversion; Seattle, WA Coast Guard, DHS. Notice and response to comments AGENCY: mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES ACTION: SUMMARY: On June 27, 2014, Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound received a Letter of Intent (LOI) and Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) from Washington State Ferries (WSF) for a proposal to modify existing Washington State Ferry marine terminal operations to include the handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The LNG would be transferred to and used as a marine fuel by six Issaquah Class Ferries converted to use LNG propulsion systems. In accordance with regulation and policy guidance, the Captain of the Port (COTP), Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound, in cooperation with key port stakeholders, will review and validate the information in the WSA. The COTP will then issue a Letter of Recommendation (LOR) to the State of Washington Department of Transportation that conveys the Coast VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:58 Sep 24, 2015 Jkt 235001 Guard’s recommendation on the suitability of the following waterways for LNG marine traffic as it relates to safety and security: Guemes Channel, Rosario Strait, Thatcher Pass, Harney Channel, Upright Channel, Wasp Channel, San Juan Channel, Spieden Channel, Haro Strait, Sidney Channel, Possession Sound, Admiralty Inlet, Puget Sound, Sinclair Inlet, Rich Passage, Elliot Bay, Admiralty Passage, North East Passage, and Colvos Passage. As part of this validation process, the Coast Guard, on November 12, 2014, published a ‘‘Notice and Request for Comments’’ in the Federal Register which solicited public comments to inform the COTP’s recommendation. A number of comments were received, including two outside the comment period. This document summarizes those comments, explains whether or not they are appropriate for consideration under regulation, and provides additional information to help inform the public about the various issues raised in them. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about this document ˜ call or email LT Sarah Rodino, Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound; telephone 206–217–6623, email sarah.e.rodino@ uscg.mil. In accordance with 33 CFR 127.007, the COTP, Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound, received an LOI and WSA from WSF on June 27, 2014 regarding WSF’s proposal to modify existing Washington State Ferry marine terminal operations and add the handling of LNG. The LNG would be transferred to and used as a marine fuel by six Issaquah Class Ferries converted to use LNG propulsion systems. The LOI notes that if the conversion is completed, each vessel would require fueling by truck once every 7 to 10 days. Pursuant to 33 CFR 127.009, and using the guidance set forth in reference to the Coast Guard’s Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular (NVIC) 01– 2011, ‘‘Guidance Related to Waterfront Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities,’’ the COTP is reviewing and validating WSF’s WSA in cooperation with key port stakeholders. To assist the COTP, the Coast Guard on November 12, 2014 published a ‘‘Notice and Request for Comments’’ in the Federal Register (79 FR 67179) seeking public comments on WSF’s proposal. Once the COTP finishes the review and validation of WSF’s WSA, he will develop the LOR with accompanying analysis and provide it to the State of Washington Department of Transportation as the PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 57835 agency with jurisdiction over WSF’s proposed activity. Thirteen comments were received, including two outside the comment period. This document summarizes those comments, explains whether or not they are appropriate for consideration under 33 CFR 127.009, and provides additional information to help inform the public about the various issues raised in them. Comments that fell outside the scope of the WSA but are relevant to the vessel design modifications will be forwarded on to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center (MSC) to be considered during the design review and approval process in accordance with 46 CFR 71.65–10. WSF’s LOI, WSA, and other supporting documentation can be viewed at: https://www.wsdot.wa.gov/ Ferries/Environment/LNG.htm. The public comments received by the Coast Guard can be viewed at: https://www. regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp= 100;so=DESC;sb=docId;po=0;dct=PS;D= USCG–2014–0935. A copy of NVIC 01– 2011 is available for viewing on the Coast Guard’s Web site at https://www. uscg.mil/hq/cg5/nvic/2010s.asp. The Coast Guard sincerely appreciates the comments received. Summary and Discussion of Comments Received Cost and Funding of Conversion Multiple comments expressed concern that the proposed conversion is too expensive and that the funding that would pay for the conversion should be spent in a different manner. The COTP’s role with regard to WSF’s proposal is limited to issuing an LOR to the Washington State Department of Transportation regarding the suitability of the waterway for LNG marine traffic based on the criteria listed in 33 CFR 127.009. Cost of vessel conversion issues fall outside the scope of the LOR. As such, these comments will not be considered by the COTP in issuing the LOR. Pollution Two comments expressed concern that LNG poses a pollution threat to the environment. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness, the Coast Guard will examine WSF’s Emergency and Operations Manuals as required by 33 CFR 127.019 covering the transfer system and transfer procedures. These manuals include but are not limited to LNG release response procedures, local response organizations contact E:\FR\FM\25SEN1.SGM 25SEN1 57836 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 186 / Friday, September 25, 2015 / Notices procedures, and emergency shutdown procedures. Security Several comments expressed concern that exposed LNG tanks on the proposed converted ferries pose a security risk. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness on this topic, the Coast Guard oversees a multilayered security framework under 33 CFR parts 101–105 to enhance maritime security throughout the Puget Sound region. If the WSF proposal is approved by the Washington State Department of Transportation, the marine terminal would be required to submit a facility security plan in accordance with 33 CFR part 105. Washington State Ferries is currently required to comply with 33 CFR part 104 which requires in-depth security assessments and Coast Guardapproved vessel security plans. WSF currently has Coast Guard-approved vessel security plans covering each of its vessels. These security plans would be reviewed and amended as necessary to reflect the conversion to LNG fuel. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Design of Converted Ferries Multiple comments expressed concern about the design of the proposed converted ferries and that the use of LNG poses an unnecessary risk to passengers. The COTP’s role with regards to the subject proposal is limited to issuing an LOR to the Washington State Department of Transportation regarding the suitability of the waterway for LNG marine traffic based on the items listed in 33 CFR 127.009. This comment fell outside the scope of the Waterways Suitability Assessment but is relevant to the vessel design modification and will be forwarded on to the Coast Guard MSC to be considered during the design approval process in accordance with 46 CFR 71.65–10. At this time, final plans have not been submitted by WSF to MSC. One comment stated that WSF should be required to update its Emergency Manual and include it as part of the docket. This comment fell outside the scope of the WSA but for the public’s awareness, Operations and Emergency Manuals are required under 33 CFR 127.019. As such, the Coast Guard will examine Emergency and Operation Manuals for compliance with 33 CFR 127.305 and 33 CFR 127.307. WSF will be required to submit copies of these manuals to the COTP 30 days prior to transferring LNG. The COTP may also require WSF to update other required safety plans as necessary. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:58 Sep 24, 2015 Jkt 235001 Two comments expressed concern that a seaplane or other aircraft could collide with an LNG tank onboard a converted ferry. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness on this topic, historical data shows that instances of unintentional aircraft collisions with ferries are extremely low. Malicious or intentional collisions will be considered in the security threat mitigation strategies explained previously. Two comments expressed concern that a large commercial vessel could collide with a converted ferry carrying LNG causing a tank rupture and explosion. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness on this topic, the risk of collision between large commercial vessels is mitigated significantly through a number of systems, processes, and requirements already in place today including the Coast Guard’s Vessel Traffic Service (VTS), Automated Identification System (AIS), and Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) as well as established traffic separation schemes and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) Navigation Rules governing vessel navigation. In addition, Federal and state laws require large vessels transiting within Puget Sound, including WSF ferries, to be under the direction and control of a federally licensed pilot. A federally licensed pilot is an experienced navigator with expertise specific to Puget Sound who provides significant risk mitigation in regards to collisions. Of note, VTS Puget Sound closely monitors and, as necessary, directs all large commercial vessel traffic throughout the Puget Sound including the routes transited by the Issaquah class ferries. The Issaquah class ferry routes have remained unchanged for at least 55 years and there are no proposed changes to the routes. One comment expressed the opinion that the Coast Guard should define strict criteria for conducting risk analysis and research. The Coast Guard in our role as stewards of safety and security in the maritime arena regularly integrate risk management into every aspect of our maritime governance and operations. 33 CFR part 127 and NVIC 01–2011 contain tailored requirements and guidance based on risk. In addition, the Coast Guard has commissioned studies from Sandia National Laboratories to examine the risks associated with potential LNG spills. These reports are titled ‘‘Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 Implication of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Over Water’’ (2004) and ‘‘Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills over Water from Large Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers’’ (2008). These studies are available online at: https://www.energy. ca.gov/lng/documents/2004-12_ SANDIA-DOE_RISK_ANALYSIS.PDF and https://www.lngfacts.org/resources/ SANDIA_2008_Report_-_Large_LNG_ Vessel_Sa.pdf. Further, NVIC 01–11 was written based on Risk Based Decision Making, COMDTINST M16010.3, which can be found at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/ cg5211/risk.asp. One comment expressed concern about WSF’s plan to fuel the converted ferries by parking a tank truck on the terminal transfer span, placing the vehicle on an inclined plane. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider this comment in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness, the Coast Guard will examine WSF’s Operations Manual as required by 33 CFR 127.019 covering the transfer system and transfer procedures. Regulatory Guidance One comment expressed concern that currently there are no Federal regulations regarding LNG fueled passenger vessels. The commenter is correct that there are currently no Federal regulations in place that specifically govern the installation and use of LNG as a marine fuel. This concept is new in the United States, although it is more commonly used internationally. The Coast Guard has issued vessel design and LNG bunkering policy documents that provide guidelines for facility and vessel owner operators to use in consideration of facility operations and vessel design. Those documents can be found at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/lgcncoe/ docs/Bunking%20Policy%20LTR.pdf and https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/ lgcncoe/docs/LNGF%20Policy%20 LTR.pdf. One comment expressed concern that there is not explicit guidance regarding the criteria for developing or evaluating a WSA. The requirements and guidance are located in 33 CFR 127.007 and NVIC 01–11. Problems With the WSA One comment expressed concern that the WSA referenced unverified probability calculations for tank collisions from SOLAS Chapter II–1. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness on this topic, there is a lack E:\FR\FM\25SEN1.SGM 25SEN1 mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 186 / Friday, September 25, 2015 / Notices of historical information regarding tank collision probabilities, due to a lack of previous occurrences. However, it should be noted that the current resources available for mitigating vessel collisions (previously described above) considerably reduce the probability of vessel collisions. One comment stated that the SOLAS model used for collision damage in the WSA is meant to be used on vessels designed for an ocean route and the WSF ferries were constructed for lakes, bays and sounds route. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness on this topic, DNV–GL determined that the use of this model was the best approach available because a probability model does not exist for a vessel of similar structure as the WSF ferries. One commenter stated that DNV did not utilize the correct tank volume of fuel in the risk assessment models. The correct tank volume was incorporated in Revision 03 of the WSA. One comment stated that DNV–GL used inappropriate ignition probability models when utilizing the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) Scenario 24 Floating Production, Storage, and Offloading (FPSO) Vessels Gas model. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public’s awareness on this topic, no statistically significant data exists for ignition probability models for LNG as fuel onboard passenger ferries. The model used by DNV–GL is meant to model ignition probability onboard larger scale offshore vessels and was chosen because it represents a more conservative and representative model for application to the WSF vessel design. One comment expressed concern that the societal risks identified in the WSA required that risks falling in the range between ‘‘broadly acceptable’’ and ‘‘maximum tolerable’’ be mitigated so that they are As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP) and that the WSA did not address mitigating factors to reach the ALARP mitigation. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. During the validation process, the COTP will determine if appropriate risk management strategies have been identified. One comment expressed concern that the WSA was not completed objectively and appears to be incomplete. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. As part of the LOR VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:58 Sep 24, 2015 Jkt 235001 process and in accordance with NVIC 01–2011, the COTP has been and will continue to review and validate the WSA in cooperation with key port stakeholders. This validation will determine if the WSA presents a realistic and credible analysis of the public safety and security implications of introducing LNG marine traffic into the port and waterway. This response to comments is issued under authority of 33 CFR 127.009. Dated: August 20, 2015. M. W. Raymond, Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port, Sector Puget Sound. [FR Doc. 2015–24337 Filed 9–24–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 9110–04–P DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY Federal Emergency Management Agency [Docket ID FEMA–2015–0001; Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA–B–1530] Proposed Flood Hazard Determinations Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS. ACTION: Notice. AGENCY: SUMMARY: Comments are requested on proposed flood hazard determinations, which may include additions or modifications of any Base Flood Elevation (BFE), base flood depth, Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA) boundary or zone designation, or regulatory floodway on the Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs), and where applicable, in the supporting Flood Insurance Study (FIS) reports for the communities listed in the table below. The purpose of this notice is to seek general information and comment regarding the preliminary FIRM, and where applicable, the FIS report that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has provided to the affected communities. The FIRM and FIS report are the basis of the floodplain management measures that the community is required either to adopt or to show evidence of having in effect in order to qualify or remain qualified for participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). In addition, the FIRM and FIS report, once effective, will be used by insurance agents and others to calculate appropriate flood insurance premium rates for new buildings and the contents of those buildings. PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 57837 Comments are to be submitted on or before December 24, 2015. ADDRESSES: The Preliminary FIRM, and where applicable, the FIS report for each community are available for inspection at both the online location and the respective Community Map Repository address listed in the tables below. Additionally, the current effective FIRM and FIS report for each community are accessible online through the FEMA Map Service Center at www.msc.fema.gov for comparison. You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. FEMA–B–1530, to Luis Rodriguez, Chief, Engineering Management Branch, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, FEMA, 500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646–4064, or (email) Luis.Rodriguez3@fema.dhs.gov. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Luis Rodriguez, Chief, Engineering Management Branch, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, FEMA, 500 C Street SW., Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646–4064, or (email) Luis.Rodriguez3@fema.dhs.gov; or visit the FEMA Map Information eXchange (FMIX) online at www.floodmaps.fema.gov/fhm/ fmx_main.html. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FEMA proposes to make flood hazard determinations for each community listed below, in accordance with section 110 of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 4104, and 44 CFR 67.4(a). These proposed flood hazard determinations, together with the floodplain management criteria required by 44 CFR 60.3, are the minimum that are required. They should not be construed to mean that the community must change any existing ordinances that are more stringent in their floodplain management requirements. The community may at any time enact stricter requirements of its own or pursuant to policies established by other Federal, State, or regional entities. These flood hazard determinations are used to meet the floodplain management requirements of the NFIP and also are used to calculate the appropriate flood insurance premium rates for new buildings built after the FIRM and FIS report become effective. The communities affected by the flood hazard determinations are provided in the tables below. Any request for reconsideration of the revised flood hazard information shown on the Preliminary FIRM and FIS report that satisfies the data requirements outlined in 44 CFR 67.6(b) is considered an appeal. Comments unrelated to the DATES: E:\FR\FM\25SEN1.SGM 25SEN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 186 (Friday, September 25, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57835-57837]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-24337]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Coast Guard

[Docket No. USCG-2014-0935]


Letter of Recommendation for Washington State Ferries Liquefied 
Natural Gas Conversion; Seattle, WA

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.

ACTION: Notice and response to comments

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On June 27, 2014, Coast Guard Sector Puget Sound received a 
Letter of Intent (LOI) and Waterway Suitability Assessment (WSA) from 
Washington State Ferries (WSF) for a proposal to modify existing 
Washington State Ferry marine terminal operations to include the 
handling of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The LNG would be transferred 
to and used as a marine fuel by six Issaquah Class Ferries converted to 
use LNG propulsion systems. In accordance with regulation and policy 
guidance, the Captain of the Port (COTP), Coast Guard Sector Puget 
Sound, in cooperation with key port stakeholders, will review and 
validate the information in the WSA. The COTP will then issue a Letter 
of Recommendation (LOR) to the State of Washington Department of 
Transportation that conveys the Coast Guard's recommendation on the 
suitability of the following waterways for LNG marine traffic as it 
relates to safety and security: Guemes Channel, Rosario Strait, 
Thatcher Pass, Harney Channel, Upright Channel, Wasp Channel, San Juan 
Channel, Spieden Channel, Haro Strait, Sidney Channel, Possession 
Sound, Admiralty Inlet, Puget Sound, Sinclair Inlet, Rich Passage, 
Elliot Bay, Admiralty Passage, North East Passage, and Colvos Passage.
    As part of this validation process, the Coast Guard, on November 
12, 2014, published a ``Notice and Request for Comments'' in the 
Federal Register which solicited public comments to inform the COTP's 
recommendation. A number of comments were received, including two 
outside the comment period. This document summarizes those comments, 
explains whether or not they are appropriate for consideration under 
regulation, and provides additional information to help inform the 
public about the various issues raised in them.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information about this 
document call or email LT Sarah Rodi[ntilde]o, Coast Guard Sector Puget 
Sound; telephone 206-217-6623, email sarah.e.rodino@uscg.mil.

Background

    In accordance with 33 CFR 127.007, the COTP, Coast Guard Sector 
Puget Sound, received an LOI and WSA from WSF on June 27, 2014 
regarding WSF's proposal to modify existing Washington State Ferry 
marine terminal operations and add the handling of LNG. The LNG would 
be transferred to and used as a marine fuel by six Issaquah Class 
Ferries converted to use LNG propulsion systems. The LOI notes that if 
the conversion is completed, each vessel would require fueling by truck 
once every 7 to 10 days.
    Pursuant to 33 CFR 127.009, and using the guidance set forth in 
reference to the Coast Guard's Navigation and Vessel Inspection 
Circular (NVIC) 01-2011, ``Guidance Related to Waterfront Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) Facilities,'' the COTP is reviewing and validating 
WSF's WSA in cooperation with key port stakeholders. To assist the 
COTP, the Coast Guard on November 12, 2014 published a ``Notice and 
Request for Comments'' in the Federal Register (79 FR 67179) seeking 
public comments on WSF's proposal. Once the COTP finishes the review 
and validation of WSF's WSA, he will develop the LOR with accompanying 
analysis and provide it to the State of Washington Department of 
Transportation as the agency with jurisdiction over WSF's proposed 
activity.
    Thirteen comments were received, including two outside the comment 
period. This document summarizes those comments, explains whether or 
not they are appropriate for consideration under 33 CFR 127.009, and 
provides additional information to help inform the public about the 
various issues raised in them. Comments that fell outside the scope of 
the WSA but are relevant to the vessel design modifications will be 
forwarded on to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Center (MSC) to be 
considered during the design review and approval process in accordance 
with 46 CFR 71.65-10.
    WSF's LOI, WSA, and other supporting documentation can be viewed 
at: https://www.wsdot.wa.gov/Ferries/Environment/LNG.htm. The public 
comments received by the Coast Guard can be viewed at: https://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=100;so=DESC;sb=docId;po=0;dct=PS;D=USCG-2014-0935. 
A copy of NVIC 01-2011 is available for viewing on the Coast Guard's 
Web site at https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/nvic/2010s.asp.
    The Coast Guard sincerely appreciates the comments received.

Summary and Discussion of Comments Received

Cost and Funding of Conversion

    Multiple comments expressed concern that the proposed conversion is 
too expensive and that the funding that would pay for the conversion 
should be spent in a different manner. The COTP's role with regard to 
WSF's proposal is limited to issuing an LOR to the Washington State 
Department of Transportation regarding the suitability of the waterway 
for LNG marine traffic based on the criteria listed in 33 CFR 127.009. 
Cost of vessel conversion issues fall outside the scope of the LOR. As 
such, these comments will not be considered by the COTP in issuing the 
LOR.

Pollution

    Two comments expressed concern that LNG poses a pollution threat to 
the environment. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP 
will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's 
awareness, the Coast Guard will examine WSF's Emergency and Operations 
Manuals as required by 33 CFR 127.019 covering the transfer system and 
transfer procedures. These manuals include but are not limited to LNG 
release response procedures, local response organizations contact

[[Page 57836]]

procedures, and emergency shutdown procedures.

Security

    Several comments expressed concern that exposed LNG tanks on the 
proposed converted ferries pose a security risk. As an issue relevant 
under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing 
the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic, the Coast Guard 
oversees a multilayered security framework under 33 CFR parts 101-105 
to enhance maritime security throughout the Puget Sound region. If the 
WSF proposal is approved by the Washington State Department of 
Transportation, the marine terminal would be required to submit a 
facility security plan in accordance with 33 CFR part 105. Washington 
State Ferries is currently required to comply with 33 CFR part 104 
which requires in-depth security assessments and Coast Guard-approved 
vessel security plans. WSF currently has Coast Guard-approved vessel 
security plans covering each of its vessels. These security plans would 
be reviewed and amended as necessary to reflect the conversion to LNG 
fuel.

Design of Converted Ferries

    Multiple comments expressed concern about the design of the 
proposed converted ferries and that the use of LNG poses an unnecessary 
risk to passengers. The COTP's role with regards to the subject 
proposal is limited to issuing an LOR to the Washington State 
Department of Transportation regarding the suitability of the waterway 
for LNG marine traffic based on the items listed in 33 CFR 127.009. 
This comment fell outside the scope of the Waterways Suitability 
Assessment but is relevant to the vessel design modification and will 
be forwarded on to the Coast Guard MSC to be considered during the 
design approval process in accordance with 46 CFR 71.65-10. At this 
time, final plans have not been submitted by WSF to MSC.
    One comment stated that WSF should be required to update its 
Emergency Manual and include it as part of the docket. This comment 
fell outside the scope of the WSA but for the public's awareness, 
Operations and Emergency Manuals are required under 33 CFR 127.019. As 
such, the Coast Guard will examine Emergency and Operation Manuals for 
compliance with 33 CFR 127.305 and 33 CFR 127.307. WSF will be required 
to submit copies of these manuals to the COTP 30 days prior to 
transferring LNG. The COTP may also require WSF to update other 
required safety plans as necessary.
    Two comments expressed concern that a seaplane or other aircraft 
could collide with an LNG tank onboard a converted ferry. As an issue 
relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in 
issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic, historical 
data shows that instances of unintentional aircraft collisions with 
ferries are extremely low. Malicious or intentional collisions will be 
considered in the security threat mitigation strategies explained 
previously.
    Two comments expressed concern that a large commercial vessel could 
collide with a converted ferry carrying LNG causing a tank rupture and 
explosion. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will 
consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness 
on this topic, the risk of collision between large commercial vessels 
is mitigated significantly through a number of systems, processes, and 
requirements already in place today including the Coast Guard's Vessel 
Traffic Service (VTS), Automated Identification System (AIS), and 
Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) as well as established traffic 
separation schemes and the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) Navigation Rules governing vessel 
navigation. In addition, Federal and state laws require large vessels 
transiting within Puget Sound, including WSF ferries, to be under the 
direction and control of a federally licensed pilot. A federally 
licensed pilot is an experienced navigator with expertise specific to 
Puget Sound who provides significant risk mitigation in regards to 
collisions. Of note, VTS Puget Sound closely monitors and, as 
necessary, directs all large commercial vessel traffic throughout the 
Puget Sound including the routes transited by the Issaquah class 
ferries. The Issaquah class ferry routes have remained unchanged for at 
least 55 years and there are no proposed changes to the routes.
    One comment expressed the opinion that the Coast Guard should 
define strict criteria for conducting risk analysis and research. The 
Coast Guard in our role as stewards of safety and security in the 
maritime arena regularly integrate risk management into every aspect of 
our maritime governance and operations. 33 CFR part 127 and NVIC 01-
2011 contain tailored requirements and guidance based on risk. In 
addition, the Coast Guard has commissioned studies from Sandia National 
Laboratories to examine the risks associated with potential LNG spills. 
These reports are titled ``Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety 
Implication of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Over Water'' (2004) 
and ``Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills over Water from Large 
Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers'' (2008). These studies are available 
online at: https://www.energy.ca.gov/lng/documents/2004-12_SANDIA-DOE_RISK_ANALYSIS.PDF and https://www.lngfacts.org/resources/SANDIA_2008_Report_-_Large_LNG_Vessel_Sa.pdf.
    Further, NVIC 01-11 was written based on Risk Based Decision 
Making, COMDTINST M16010.3, which can be found at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg5211/risk.asp.
    One comment expressed concern about WSF's plan to fuel the 
converted ferries by parking a tank truck on the terminal transfer 
span, placing the vehicle on an inclined plane. As an issue relevant 
under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider this comment in issuing 
the LOR. For the public's awareness, the Coast Guard will examine WSF's 
Operations Manual as required by 33 CFR 127.019 covering the transfer 
system and transfer procedures.

Regulatory Guidance

    One comment expressed concern that currently there are no Federal 
regulations regarding LNG fueled passenger vessels. The commenter is 
correct that there are currently no Federal regulations in place that 
specifically govern the installation and use of LNG as a marine fuel. 
This concept is new in the United States, although it is more commonly 
used internationally. The Coast Guard has issued vessel design and LNG 
bunkering policy documents that provide guidelines for facility and 
vessel owner operators to use in consideration of facility operations 
and vessel design. Those documents can be found at: https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/lgcncoe/docs/Bunking%20Policy%20LTR.pdf and https://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/lgcncoe/docs/LNGF%20Policy%20LTR.pdf.
    One comment expressed concern that there is not explicit guidance 
regarding the criteria for developing or evaluating a WSA. The 
requirements and guidance are located in 33 CFR 127.007 and NVIC 01-11.

Problems With the WSA

    One comment expressed concern that the WSA referenced unverified 
probability calculations for tank collisions from SOLAS Chapter II-1. 
As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those 
comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic, 
there is a lack

[[Page 57837]]

of historical information regarding tank collision probabilities, due 
to a lack of previous occurrences. However, it should be noted that the 
current resources available for mitigating vessel collisions 
(previously described above) considerably reduce the probability of 
vessel collisions.
    One comment stated that the SOLAS model used for collision damage 
in the WSA is meant to be used on vessels designed for an ocean route 
and the WSF ferries were constructed for lakes, bays and sounds route. 
As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those 
comments in issuing the LOR. For the public's awareness on this topic, 
DNV-GL determined that the use of this model was the best approach 
available because a probability model does not exist for a vessel of 
similar structure as the WSF ferries.
    One commenter stated that DNV did not utilize the correct tank 
volume of fuel in the risk assessment models. The correct tank volume 
was incorporated in Revision 03 of the WSA.
    One comment stated that DNV-GL used inappropriate ignition 
probability models when utilizing the International Association of Oil 
and Gas Producers (OGP) Scenario 24 Floating Production, Storage, and 
Offloading (FPSO) Vessels Gas model. As an issue relevant under 33 CFR 
127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. For 
the public's awareness on this topic, no statistically significant data 
exists for ignition probability models for LNG as fuel onboard 
passenger ferries. The model used by DNV-GL is meant to model ignition 
probability onboard larger scale offshore vessels and was chosen 
because it represents a more conservative and representative model for 
application to the WSF vessel design.
    One comment expressed concern that the societal risks identified in 
the WSA required that risks falling in the range between ``broadly 
acceptable'' and ``maximum tolerable'' be mitigated so that they are As 
Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP) and that the WSA did not address 
mitigating factors to reach the ALARP mitigation. As an issue relevant 
under 33 CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing 
the LOR. During the validation process, the COTP will determine if 
appropriate risk management strategies have been identified.
    One comment expressed concern that the WSA was not completed 
objectively and appears to be incomplete. As an issue relevant under 33 
CFR 127.009, the COTP will consider those comments in issuing the LOR. 
As part of the LOR process and in accordance with NVIC 01-2011, the 
COTP has been and will continue to review and validate the WSA in 
cooperation with key port stakeholders. This validation will determine 
if the WSA presents a realistic and credible analysis of the public 
safety and security implications of introducing LNG marine traffic into 
the port and waterway.
    This response to comments is issued under authority of 33 CFR 
127.009.

    Dated: August 20, 2015.
M. W. Raymond,
Captain, U.S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port, Sector Puget Sound.
[FR Doc. 2015-24337 Filed 9-24-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 9110-04-P
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