Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes, 55521-55527 [2015-23121]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
55521
FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
28–AWL–APU .......
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
10 DAYS ............................
INTERVAL NOTE: The
operational check is not
required on days when
the airplane is not used
in revenue service. The
operational check must
be done before further
flight with an operational
APU if it has been 10 or
more calendar days
since last check.
ALL ....................................
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Applies to airplanes with
an actuator installed at
the APU fuel shutoff
valve position having
part number (P/N)
MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66).
APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check
Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design
can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU
fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could
prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector).
A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication.
1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the
APU using standard practices.
2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices.
3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle
Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of
fuel in the Left Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the
RUN position or the APU selector switch on the
overhead panel is in the ON position.
6. Move the APU Selector switch on the Overhead
Panel to the OFF position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel
illuminates and then goes off.
8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as
required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02).
NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–
02 if APU is not required for flight.
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(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance
or inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
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(j) Related Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23119 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2013–1071; Directorate
Identifier 2013–NM–204–AD; Amendment
39–18264; AD 2015–19–01]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 777
airplanes. This AD was prompted by
reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include a new airworthiness
limitation. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain
engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that
could lead to wing failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21,
2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2013–
1071; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is
Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax:
425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would
apply to all The Boeing Company Model
777 airplanes. The NPRM published in
the Federal Register on January 10,
2014 (79 FR 1772). The NPRM was
prompted by reports of latently failed
fuel shutoff valves discovered during
fuel filter replacement. The NPRM
proposed to require revising the
maintenance or inspection program to
include a new airworthiness limitation.
We are issuing this AD to detect and
correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine, which could result
in the inability to shut off fuel to the
engine and, in case of certain engine
fires, an uncontrollable fire that could
lead to wing failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as
NPRMs and immediately adopted rules,
it is the practice of the FAA to obtain
technical information and information
on operational and economic impacts
from design approval holders and
aircraft operators. We discussed certain
comments addressed in this final rule in
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a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of
the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this
teleconference that are relevant to this
final rule are addressed in this final rule
in response to comments submitted by
other commenters. A discussion of this
contact can be found in the rulemaking
docket at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA–2013–1071.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final
rule, commenters may have used the
terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel
spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the same part. In our responses
to comments, we have used the term
‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar
valve’’ is more commonly used in
airplane maintenance documentation
and, therefore, we have used that term
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. The
following presents the comments
received on the NPRM (79 FR 1772,
January 10, 2014) and the FAA’s
response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR
1772, January 10, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that
Boeing’s internal review found that the
issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR
1772, January 10, 2014) is not a safety
concern, and that Boeing has not
recommended any interim action on
this issue. In addition, AA stated that
Boeing is addressing the issue in the
long term with a design change to the
motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator.
We infer AA is requesting that the
NPRM be withdrawn.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR
1772, January 10, 2014). We have
determined that an unsafe condition
exists that warrants an interim action
until the manufacturer finishes
developing a modification that will
address the identified unsafe condition.
Boeing did not formally comment on
whether it considers this issue to be an
unsafe condition. We have determined
that, without the required interim
actions, a significant number of flights
with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is
failed latently in the open valve position
will occur during the affected fleet life.
With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if
certain engine fire conditions were to
occur, or if extreme engine damage were
to occur, or if an engine separation
event were to occur during flight, the
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crew procedures for such an event
would not stop the fuel flow to the
engine strut and nacelle. The continued
flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled
fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all
transport airplanes to be fail safe with
respect to engine fire events, and the
risk due to severe engine damage events
be minimized. Therefore, we require, for
each flight, sufficiently operative fire
safety systems so that fires can be
detected and contained, and fuel to the
engine strut and nacelle can be shut off
in the event of an engine fire or severe
damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards
require remotely controlled powerplant
valves to provide indications that the
valves are in the commanded position.
These indications allow the prompt
detection and correction of valve
failures. We do not allow dispatch with
a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve.
Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular
valve actuator involved, but instead
because the fuel shutoff valve actuator
can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication
feature. That failure can lead to a large
number of flights occurring on an
airplane with a fuel shutoff valve
actuator failed in the open position
without the operator being aware of the
failure. An airworthiness limitation
containing required inspections is
intended to limit the number of flights
following latent failure of the fuel
shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the
unsafe condition. We have not changed
this AD in this regard.
Request To Provide Further
Clarification of the Purpose of the
NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014)
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Union, requested that we revise the
NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) to
add more details on the frequency of
valve failure findings, and the
associated root cause driving the
proposed weekly inspection interval
versus the existing maintenance
planning data (MPD) document check
interval of 18,000 flight hours.
We agree with EASA’s request to
provide further clarification. As we
mentioned in a previous comment
response, the reason for this final rule
is not simply a high fuel shutoff valve
failure rate, but is rather a design error
that allows a single failure within a fuel
shutoff valve to affect both the control
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of the valve and the indication of the
valve’s position.
The 18,000-hour check in the MPD
document was recommended based on
the assumption that the indication of
the fuel shutoff valve position would
not be affected by failures that affect the
control of the valve. With the intended
design, there was not a potential for a
significant number of flights to occur
with a fuel shutoff valve failed open
(even if the valve was never checked),
because the indication system was to
provide real-time indication of the
valve’s response to commands.
With the design error that exists in the
affected fuel shutoff valve actuators,
indication and control of the valve are
not independent, and if no action is
taken, we anticipate a significant
number of flights to occur with a fuel
shutoff valve failed open. Without the
issuance of this final rule, our risk
assessment and the manufacturer’s risk
assessment predict that thousands of
flights of Model 777 airplanes would be
conducted with latent fuel shutoff valve
failures.
In addition to the design error
described previously, the affected fuel
shutoff valves have a higher-thantypical rate of failure in several failure
modes. We have received several reports
of valves failed open (discovered only
when fuel filters were changed), of
valves failed closed (preventing engine
start), and of valves that spontaneously
closed in flight (causing an engine
shutdown). Boeing’s long-term solution
to provide a redesigned MOV actuator is
intended to address these issues in
addition to restoring the independence
of the actuator control and indication
features. We have not changed this final
rule in this regard.
Request To Postpone the NPRM (79 FR
1772, January 10, 2014)
Singapore Airlines (SIA) requested
that the FAA consider delaying the
release of the final rule until after the
Boeing service information is issued and
sufficient model kits are made available.
SIA also requested that Boeing provide
warranty coverage for the post-modified
part replacement and warranty coverage
for the man-hours incurred.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request to postpone releasing the final
rule. Because this unsafe condition
could exist or develop on Model 777
airplanes, an airworthiness limitation
containing repetitive inspections as an
interim action is necessary to ensure the
safety of the fleet. Issuance of an AD is
the appropriate method to correct the
unsafe condition.
In addition, the manufacturer does
not expect a large number of latently
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failed valve actuators to be discovered.
Existing parts stores are expected to be
sufficient, and parts can be repositioned
in time to support the initial
inspections. A functioning fuel shutoff
valve is required at dispatch. This
position is consistent with the original
determination in developing the master
minimum equipment list (MMEL) that
dispatch relief is not allowed for firesafety-related flammable fluid shutoff
valves (other than in a locked, closed
position for non-required equipment).
However, under the provisions of
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might
consider requests for an adjustment to
the compliance time if data are
submitted to substantiate that such an
adjustment would provide an acceptable
level of safety. In regard to providing
warranty coverage, we cannot comment
on Boeing’s behalf on this issue. We
have not changed the final rule in this
regard.
Request for Clarification of Other
Affected Airplane Models
EASA requested clarification on
whether similar designs on other
airplanes could exist. EASA stated that
this would be the basis for a design
review of parts of similar design.
We agree to provide clarification for
the commenter. This AD is applicable to
certain Model 777 series airplanes only.
Similar AD action is planned for Model
737NG, 757, 767, and 787 series
airplanes. At this time, our
understanding is that no other
manufacturer’s airplanes are affected by
this specific design problem. We have
not changed the final rule in this regard.
Request To Add Estimated Costs for the
Proposed Repetitive Inspections
AA requested that we revise the
NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) to
include the estimated costs for the
repetitive inspections of the MOV
actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA
stated that the cost included in the
NPRM does not account for the cost of
the ongoing inspections. AA stated that
the NPRM reflects only the first
inspection. AA also stated that the
annual cost of compliance will be 52
times greater, or $839,800, if the
inspection is accomplished weekly. AA
stated that these costs should be
included for operator planning
purposes.
We acknowledge the commenter’s
concern. In this AD, the required action
is to revise the maintenance or
inspection program, as applicable, to
include a new airworthiness limitation.
The added airworthiness limitation
requires an inspection of the position of
the MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff
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55523
valve every 10 days. However, these
repetitive inspections, which are
expected to take less than an hour to
complete, are required by section
91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) once
incorporated into the maintenance or
inspection program.
The cost analysis in AD rulemaking
actions typically includes only the costs
associated with complying with an AD.
In this AD, the required action is the
maintenance or inspection program
revision, as applicable, to include the
new airworthiness limitation, and
accomplishing repetitive actions that are
specified in the airworthiness limitation
are not directly required by this AD. The
FAA, as a matter of practice, does not
include a cost estimate for these
repetitive actions in an AD because
these actions are required as part of the
operating rules. Therefore, we have
made no change to this final rule in this
regard.
Requests To Limit the Applicability
Air France, AA, Boeing, and KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) requested
that the proposed applicability be
changed to include only Model 777
airplanes having line numbers 1 through
1164 inclusive.
Air France and KLM stated that
Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777–FTD–28–
12002, dated January 10, 2014,
indicated that airplanes delivered
December 2013 or later incorporate
AIMS–2 BlockPoint (BP) v 17, which
has a new function that avoids latently
failed fuel shutoff valves.
Boeing stated that, beginning with
line number 1165, all new production
airplanes will be delivered with AIMS–
2 BP v 17 or later software. Boeing also
stated that starting with AIMS–2 BP v
17, all AIMS–2 software versions will
include changes to ensure that the
correct fuel shutoff valve position is
displayed in the flight deck, and that the
software will monitor both the valve
transition and the end state to ensure
the correct position indication.
Boeing also requested that the
proposed applicability be limited to
Model 777 airplanes with part number
(P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/
N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) actuators
installed at the ‘‘engine fuel spar valve
locations.’’ Boeing stated that the failure
mode exists only in actuators having
these part numbers. Boeing stated that
actuators having P/N MA20A1001–1
(S343T003–39) might be installed in the
‘‘fuel spar valve location,’’ and that
actuators having P/N MA20A1001–1
(S343T003–39) are not susceptible to
the latent failure addressed by the
NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014),
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and would not benefit from an interval
inspection.
We agree that the applicability of this
AD should be limited. We have changed
paragraph (c) of this AD to include only
Model 777 airplanes having line
numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive. In
addition, in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD, we have changed the
Applicability column for Airworthiness
Limitation (AWL) 28–AWL–MOV to
clarify that the limitation applies to
airplanes with the AIMS–1 system
having an actuator with P/N
MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/N
MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) installed at
the engine fuel spar valve position; and
airplanes with AIMS–2 BP v 16 and
earlier software having an actuator with
P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/N
MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) installed at
the engine fuel spar valve position.
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Request for Clarification of the
Proposed Terminating Action
AA requested clarification of the
proposed terminating action. AA stated
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10,
2014) is an interim action, and no
information is provided regarding the
terminating action. AA stated that, if
issued, the final rule should contain
sufficient documentation to clearly
establish the effectivity of Model 777
airplanes subject to the rule, and to
terminate the inspection program on the
subject airplanes. AA stated that Boeing
Fleet Team Digest 777–FTD–28–12002,
dated January 10, 2014, among others,
addresses the corrective action plan that
is in progress.
We agree to provide clarification
regarding the modification referenced in
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10,
2014). Since the issuance of the NPRM,
the manufacturer has developed a
modification that addresses the unsafe
condition identified in this final rule.
However, the service information is not
available at this time. Since we have
limited the applicability of this AD to
exclude all new production airplanes
that are delivered with AIMS–2 BP v 17
or later software, as explained
previously, we find that no further
change to this AD is necessary in this
regard.
For the affected airplanes, there will
likely be two possible terminating
options—one to replace the fuel shutoff
valve actuator, and another to upgrade
airplanes with AIMS–2 systems to BP v
17 to address the unsafe condition.
Because service information for these
modifications is still being developed,
we have not changed this final rule in
this regard.
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Request To Replace the AWL Revision
Requirement With MOV Actuator
Inspections Requirement
Boeing requested that the proposed
requirement to incorporate the MOV
actuator inspection into the AWL
Section of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness of the
operator’s maintenance or inspection
program be replaced with an AD
requirement to ‘‘perform the MOV
inspection every 10 days.’’ Boeing stated
that the MOV inspection is an interim
mitigation and is required only until a
redesigned MOV can be installed in the
spar valve locations. Boeing stated that
including the 10-day test requirement as
the required AD action would allow
installation of the redesigned MOV to be
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and as
a terminating action for the repetitive
inspections, while avoiding the need for
regulatory approval to remove the AWL
from each operator’s maintenance or
inspection program. In addition, Boeing
stated the AWLs are permanent actions
that affect operators’ planning and
scheduling, and that incorporating a
temporary AWL into the operators’
maintenance documents or a Boeing
MPD document will cause confusion
among operators.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request. During the development of the
NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014),
we discussed the impact of an AWL
revision versus a repetitive inspection
requirement with Boeing, who, in turn,
discussed it with a sample of operators.
At that time, both Boeing and the
operators indicated that the addition of
an AWL revision was the preferred
solution because it would reduce the
record keeping required to document
AD compliance. Affected operators who
wish to use a repetitive inspection
requirement in place of an AWL may
apply for approval of an AMOC in
accordance with the provisions
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD,
by submitting data substantiating that
the request would provide an acceptable
level of safety. We have not changed
this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend the Proposed
Compliance Time Grace Period
AA requested that we extend the
grace period for performing the initial
inspection required by the new AWLs.
AA stated that it is a complicated
logistical matter to establish a new line
maintenance task at stations throughout
the world, and that there is a ‘‘learning
curve to acclimate the line maintenance
organizations to the new task.’’ In
addition, AA stated that the existing
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inventory of actuators at maintenance
stations may be insufficient to replace
any failed valves discovered through the
inspections, resulting in grounded
airplanes, and that ordering new valves
from the vendor generally takes at least
30 days.
We partially agree with the
commenter’s request. We retained the
30-day compliance time for revising the
maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to include the new AWL. In
addition, we have changed the initial
compliance time for accomplishing the
actions specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. The
compliance time of 10 days is consistent
with other regulatory actions on other
affected airplane models.
We have determined that the initial
compliance time for the inspection
represents an appropriate time in which
the required actions can be performed in
a timely manner within the affected
fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety. In developing
an appropriate compliance time, we
considered the safety implications, parts
availability, and normal maintenance
schedules for timely accomplishment of
the checks.
The check itself involves a visual
inspection of an existing prominent
design feature that is intended to
indicate the position of the fuel shutoff
valve actuator. This check is also
described in existing maintenance
documentation. The manufacturer does
not expect a large number of latently
failed valve actuators to be discovered.
Existing parts stores are expected to be
sufficient, and we expect that parts can
be repositioned in time to support the
initial inspections. However, under the
provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD,
we might consider requests for
adjustments to the compliance time if
data are submitted to substantiate that
such an adjustment would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
Requests To Extend the Interval for the
MOV Actuator Inspection
Aerologic GmbH, Air France, All
Nippon Airways (ANA), AA, Boeing,
FedEx, Japan Airlines Company Ltd.
(JAL), KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM),
Lufthansa Technik AG (LTK), and
Lufthansa Cargo AG (LUB) requested
that we change the interval for the MOV
actuator inspection of the engine fuel
shutoff valve.
Aerologic GmbH, Air France,
Lufthansa LTK, Lufthansa LUB, and
KLM stated that the interval should be
25 flight cycles based on a typical
utilization in flight cycles that
corresponds to a one-week interval. The
operators stated that the actuator failure
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mode is associated with the cycling of
the valve, and the interval should,
therefore, be based on flight cycles.
AA stated that the ‘‘weekly’’ interval
is not defined sufficiently, and that it is
not clear whether this means once every
seven days, one time each calendar
week, or some other interpretation. AA
stated that, for its airline and for many
other international carriers, this
presents a problem when the airplane
continually crosses the International
Date Line. AA also stated that the
interval does not address occurrences
where the airplane is out of service for
an extended period of time, such as a
week or longer. AA stated that it has
strong concerns that the proposed
interval may impede the airline’s ability
to function on its current published
schedule. AA stated that many
established flight routings occur on a
four-day cycle, and not all stations can
be set up to perform the inspection for
logistical, personnel, and contractual
reasons; therefore, the weekly interval
makes it very difficult to achieve the
inspection at available stations. AA
stated that the inspection, if mandated,
should be on a flight-cycle interval
rather than a calendar schedule, and
suggested a 25-flight-cycle interval to
alleviate the ‘‘weekly’’ term
interpretation issue, and to address the
adverse impact to airline operations.
JAL and ANA requested that the
inspection interval be ‘‘25 flight cycles
or more, or weekly or more, whichever
occurs later.’’ JAL stated that the FAAproposed inspection interval of
‘‘weekly’’ is without detailed
information such as the number of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves, failure
rates, and so forth. JAL stated that it
understands that it is preferable to
control inspection intervals in flight
cycles for international flights. JAL and
ANA also stated that an average flight
cycle for a Model 777 airplane might be
2.5 flight cycles per day, but that their
domestic Model 777 flight cycle average
is 6 flight cycles per day; therefore, it is
a burden to inspect the MOV actuators
at per-flight-cycle-related intervals.
ANA stated that it prefers a compliance
time of 18,000 flight cycles, which is
stated in the MPD document. ANA
stated that they currently perform the
proposed inspection at 2,000-flight-hour
intervals, and while it has experienced
several fuel valve actuator failures, it
has not detected any latently failed open
fuel valve actuators.
SIA requested that the proposed
inspection interval be extended to 2,000
flight hours. SIA stated that the
inspections are disruptive, laborious,
and costly to operations, and would
require SIA to inspect at least three to
VerDate Sep<11>2014
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
Jkt 235001
four airplanes daily. SIA also stated that
frequent opening and closing of panels
to inspect the MOV actuator may
inadvertently disrupt other airplane
systems and result in unintended
defects. SIA stated that, if operators are
unable to inspect the airplane within
the mandated intervals, or if the
inspection findings require extensive
rectification, Boeing or the FAA should
consider granting operators a ‘‘no
technical objection’’ or an AMOC to
allow the airplane to be released to
service for a restricted period of time.
SIA also stated that it understands
Boeing is working on a modified MOV
actuator part number that would resolve
the reliability issue associated with it.
Boeing requested that the interval be
changed to 10 days. Boeing stated that
it understood the term ‘‘weekly’’ to
mean 10 days.
We partially agree with the
commenters’ request. We agree with
extending the inspection interval to 10
days. Some operators’ route structures
and maintenance intervals do not align
with a 7-day interval. Also, several of
the operators routinely cross the
International Date Line, potentially
creating confusion over the application
of an interval when expressed as
‘‘weekly.’’ The 10-day interval will
provide more operational flexibility and
will not significantly increase the
number of at-risk flights. We have
changed paragraph (g) of this AD and
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD
accordingly.
We also added a note to the Interval
column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD to specify that the inspection is
not required on days when the airplane
is not used in revenue service, and that
the inspection must be done before
further flight if it has been 10 or more
calendar days since the last inspection.
However, we disagree with changing
the interval basis to flight cycles. While
the failure of the fuel shutoff valve is
likely associated with the cycling of the
valve, the purpose of the inspections is
to minimize the exposure to flights that
are initiated with a valve actuator that
is latently failed in the open position.
To determine the appropriate actions
and intervals to minimize this exposure,
we considered the actions necessary to
detect the latent failure on each affected
airplane model, and then, based on
those identified actions, determined a
minimum practical interval for
performing the actions.
On other Boeing airplane models with
designs that allow a check to be
performed using available indications,
we determined that a daily check is
appropriate. That interval is similar to
the check interval required for fire
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
55525
detection systems. For the affected
Model 777 airplanes identified in this
final rule, the fuel shutoff valve position
cannot be checked using available
indications, and a physical inspection of
the valve actuator itself is necessary to
detect the latent failure. Because of the
work necessary to perform this
inspection, we determined that a daily
interval would be overly burdensome
and that the 10-day interval would be a
more appropriate balance of the risk and
the burden of performing the inspection.
However, affected operators may apply
for approval of an AMOC in accordance
with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting
data substantiating that the request
would provide an acceptable level of
safety.
We also disagree that the performance
of these inspections is likely to cause
defects in other systems. While
additional defects due to unrelated
causes might be discovered during the
visual inspection, the opening of the
access door and visual inspection of the
fuel shutoff valve position is not
expected to cause other system failures.
Request To Allow Use of Parts From
Less Critical Locations
FedEx requested that a provision be
added to the proposed AD (79 FR 1772,
January 10, 2014) to allow the removal
of a working MOV actuator from a less
critical fuel system valve location and
installation in the engine fuel shutoff
valve. FedEx stated that this will reduce
the immediate impact of any actuator
failures discovered by the required
inspection.
We disagree with the request. This
situation is not unique to the MOV
actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. It is
not our intent in this AD to change
operational practices used in performing
maintenance and alterations, or to
change relief provided by the minimum
equipment list (MEL). The removal of a
fully functional part from a less critical
location and its replacement with a nonfunctioning part is considered an
alteration and, as such, must meet the
airworthiness regulations, which is not
possible in this case. However, if a
failure occurs at a less critical location,
operation in the same exact
configuration may be allowed for a
limited time under the MEL. The
decision to allow this type of
maintenance action remains with the
local Flight Standards organization.
Also, it should be noted that the
installation of certain MOV actuators is
prohibited by FAA AD 2013–05–03,
Amendment 39–17375 (78 FR 17290,
March 21, 2013). We have not changed
this AD in this regard.
E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM
16SER1
55526
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
Additional Change Made to This AD
In the ‘‘Description’’ column of figure
1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
removed the phrase ‘‘refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–00’’ for performing an
inspection of the MOV actuator of the
fuel spar valve (i.e., the fuel shutoff
valve).
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data,
considered the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting this AD
with the changes described previously,
and minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
• Are consistent with the intent that
was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 1772,
January 10, 2014) for correcting the
unsafe condition; and
• Do not add any additional burden
upon the public than was already
proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 1772,
January 10, 2014).
We also determined that these
changes will not increase the economic
burden on any operator or increase the
scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action.
The manufacturer has developed a
modification that addresses the unsafe
condition for some of the airplanes
identified in this AD. Once the service
information for the modification is
developed, approved, and available, we
might consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 190
airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to
comply with this AD:
ESTIMATED COSTS
Action
Labor cost
Parts cost
Cost per
product
Cost on
U.S. operators
Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............
1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 .................
$0
$85
$16,150
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
Regulatory Findings
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
(c) Applicability
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
(e) Unsafe Condition
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Jkt 235001
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2015–19–01 The Boeing Company:
Amendment 39–18264; Docket No.
FAA–2013–1071; Directorate Identifier
2013–NM–204–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
This AD applies to The Boeing Company
Model 777–200, –200LR, –300, –300ER, and
777F series airplanes, certificated in any
category, line numbers 1 through 1164
inclusive.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 28, Fuel.
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered
during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures
of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
could result in the inability to shut off fuel
to the engine and, in case of certain engine
fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
wing failure.
(f) Compliance
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
This AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
VerDate Sep<11>2014
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection
Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of
this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection
program, as applicable, to add Airworthiness
Limitation (AWL) 28–AWL–MOV by
incorporating the information specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the
Airworthiness Limitations Section of the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
The initial compliance time for
accomplishing the actions specified in figure
1 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10
days after accomplishing the maintenance or
inspection program revision required by this
paragraph.
E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM
16SER1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
55527
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AWL FOR ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR
INSPECTION
AWL No.
Task
28–AWL–MOV ......
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
10 days ..............................
INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the
airplane is not used in
revenue service.
Must be done before further flight if it has been
10 or more calendar
days since last inspection.
Airplanes with AIMS–1
system.
Airplanes with AIMS–2
BlockPoint (BP) v 16
and earlier software.
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Only applies to airplanes
with a fuel spar valve actuator having part number MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66) installed
at the engine fuel spar
valve position.
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection.
Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to
an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator.
NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuator is located behind
latch panel 551 DB (left engine) and latch panel 651
DB (right engine).
1. Make sure both Engine Control Switches are in the
CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the left engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance).
3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the right engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance).
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
(j) Related Information
After accomplishing the maintenance or
inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
Jkt 235001
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0194; Directorate
Identifier 2014–NM–022–AD; Amendment
39–18266; AD 2015–19–03]
RIN 2120–AA64
None.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
VerDate Sep<11>2014
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23121 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
PO 00000
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Fmt 4700
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Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700,
–700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series
airplanes. This AD was prompted by
reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include new airworthiness
limitations. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM
16SER1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55521-55527]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23121]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2013-1071; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-204-AD;
Amendment 39-18264; AD 2015-19-01]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports
of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection
program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the
[[Page 55522]]
fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability
to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2013-
1071; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 777 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
January 10, 2014 (79 FR 1772). The NPRM was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel
shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to
shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this teleconference that are relevant to this
final rule are addressed in this final rule in response to comments
submitted by other commenters. A discussion of this contact can be
found in the rulemaking docket at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2013-1071.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 1772, January 10, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) is
not a safety concern, and that Boeing has not recommended any interim
action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing
the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated
valve (MOV) actuator. We infer AA is requesting that the NPRM be
withdrawn.
We disagree with the commenter's request to withdraw the NPRM (79
FR 1772, January 10, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition
exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes
developing a modification that will address the identified unsafe
condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it considers this
issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the
required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve
position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel
shutoff valve, if certain engine fire conditions were to occur, or if
extreme engine damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event
were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event
would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle. The
continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a
fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine fire events, and the risk due to severe engine
damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight,
sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be
detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle can be
shut off in the event of an engine fire or severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. An airworthiness limitation containing required
inspections is intended to limit the number of flights following latent
failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the appropriate
method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
Request To Provide Further Clarification of the Purpose of the NPRM (79
FR 1772, January 10, 2014)
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Union, requested that we
revise the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) to add more details on
the frequency of valve failure findings, and the associated root cause
driving the proposed weekly inspection interval versus the existing
maintenance planning data (MPD) document check interval of 18,000
flight hours.
We agree with EASA's request to provide further clarification. As
we mentioned in a previous comment response, the reason for this final
rule is not simply a high fuel shutoff valve failure rate, but is
rather a design error that allows a single failure within a fuel
shutoff valve to affect both the control
[[Page 55523]]
of the valve and the indication of the valve's position.
The 18,000-hour check in the MPD document was recommended based on
the assumption that the indication of the fuel shutoff valve position
would not be affected by failures that affect the control of the valve.
With the intended design, there was not a potential for a significant
number of flights to occur with a fuel shutoff valve failed open (even
if the valve was never checked), because the indication system was to
provide real-time indication of the valve's response to commands.
With the design error that exists in the affected fuel shutoff
valve actuators, indication and control of the valve are not
independent, and if no action is taken, we anticipate a significant
number of flights to occur with a fuel shutoff valve failed open.
Without the issuance of this final rule, our risk assessment and the
manufacturer's risk assessment predict that thousands of flights of
Model 777 airplanes would be conducted with latent fuel shutoff valve
failures.
In addition to the design error described previously, the affected
fuel shutoff valves have a higher-than-typical rate of failure in
several failure modes. We have received several reports of valves
failed open (discovered only when fuel filters were changed), of valves
failed closed (preventing engine start), and of valves that
spontaneously closed in flight (causing an engine shutdown). Boeing's
long-term solution to provide a redesigned MOV actuator is intended to
address these issues in addition to restoring the independence of the
actuator control and indication features. We have not changed this
final rule in this regard.
Request To Postpone the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014)
Singapore Airlines (SIA) requested that the FAA consider delaying
the release of the final rule until after the Boeing service
information is issued and sufficient model kits are made available. SIA
also requested that Boeing provide warranty coverage for the post-
modified part replacement and warranty coverage for the man-hours
incurred.
We disagree with the commenter's request to postpone releasing the
final rule. Because this unsafe condition could exist or develop on
Model 777 airplanes, an airworthiness limitation containing repetitive
inspections as an interim action is necessary to ensure the safety of
the fleet. Issuance of an AD is the appropriate method to correct the
unsafe condition.
In addition, the manufacturer does not expect a large number of
latently failed valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores
are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to
support the initial inspections. A functioning fuel shutoff valve is
required at dispatch. This position is consistent with the original
determination in developing the master minimum equipment list (MMEL)
that dispatch relief is not allowed for fire-safety-related flammable
fluid shutoff valves (other than in a locked, closed position for non-
required equipment). However, under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1)
of this AD, we might consider requests for an adjustment to the
compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an
adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety. In regard to
providing warranty coverage, we cannot comment on Boeing's behalf on
this issue. We have not changed the final rule in this regard.
Request for Clarification of Other Affected Airplane Models
EASA requested clarification on whether similar designs on other
airplanes could exist. EASA stated that this would be the basis for a
design review of parts of similar design.
We agree to provide clarification for the commenter. This AD is
applicable to certain Model 777 series airplanes only. Similar AD
action is planned for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 787 series airplanes.
At this time, our understanding is that no other manufacturer's
airplanes are affected by this specific design problem. We have not
changed the final rule in this regard.
Request To Add Estimated Costs for the Proposed Repetitive Inspections
AA requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014)
to include the estimated costs for the repetitive inspections of the
MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA stated that the cost
included in the NPRM does not account for the cost of the ongoing
inspections. AA stated that the NPRM reflects only the first
inspection. AA also stated that the annual cost of compliance will be
52 times greater, or $839,800, if the inspection is accomplished
weekly. AA stated that these costs should be included for operator
planning purposes.
We acknowledge the commenter's concern. In this AD, the required
action is to revise the maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to include a new airworthiness limitation. The added
airworthiness limitation requires an inspection of the position of the
MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff valve every 10 days. However, these
repetitive inspections, which are expected to take less than an hour to
complete, are required by section 91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) once incorporated into the maintenance
or inspection program.
The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions typically includes only
the costs associated with complying with an AD. In this AD, the
required action is the maintenance or inspection program revision, as
applicable, to include the new airworthiness limitation, and
accomplishing repetitive actions that are specified in the
airworthiness limitation are not directly required by this AD. The FAA,
as a matter of practice, does not include a cost estimate for these
repetitive actions in an AD because these actions are required as part
of the operating rules. Therefore, we have made no change to this final
rule in this regard.
Requests To Limit the Applicability
Air France, AA, Boeing, and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM)
requested that the proposed applicability be changed to include only
Model 777 airplanes having line numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive.
Air France and KLM stated that Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777-FTD-28-
12002, dated January 10, 2014, indicated that airplanes delivered
December 2013 or later incorporate AIMS-2 BlockPoint (BP) v 17, which
has a new function that avoids latently failed fuel shutoff valves.
Boeing stated that, beginning with line number 1165, all new
production airplanes will be delivered with AIMS-2 BP v 17 or later
software. Boeing also stated that starting with AIMS-2 BP v 17, all
AIMS-2 software versions will include changes to ensure that the
correct fuel shutoff valve position is displayed in the flight deck,
and that the software will monitor both the valve transition and the
end state to ensure the correct position indication.
Boeing also requested that the proposed applicability be limited to
Model 777 airplanes with part number (P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or
P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) actuators installed at the ``engine fuel
spar valve locations.'' Boeing stated that the failure mode exists only
in actuators having these part numbers. Boeing stated that actuators
having P/N MA20A1001-1 (S343T003-39) might be installed in the ``fuel
spar valve location,'' and that actuators having P/N MA20A1001-1
(S343T003-39) are not susceptible to the latent failure addressed by
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014),
[[Page 55524]]
and would not benefit from an interval inspection.
We agree that the applicability of this AD should be limited. We
have changed paragraph (c) of this AD to include only Model 777
airplanes having line numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive. In addition, in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have changed the Applicability
column for Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) 28-AWL-MOV to clarify that
the limitation applies to airplanes with the AIMS-1 system having an
actuator with P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-
66) installed at the engine fuel spar valve position; and airplanes
with AIMS-2 BP v 16 and earlier software having an actuator with P/N
MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) installed at the
engine fuel spar valve position.
Request for Clarification of the Proposed Terminating Action
AA requested clarification of the proposed terminating action. AA
stated the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) is an interim action,
and no information is provided regarding the terminating action. AA
stated that, if issued, the final rule should contain sufficient
documentation to clearly establish the effectivity of Model 777
airplanes subject to the rule, and to terminate the inspection program
on the subject airplanes. AA stated that Boeing Fleet Team Digest 777-
FTD-28-12002, dated January 10, 2014, among others, addresses the
corrective action plan that is in progress.
We agree to provide clarification regarding the modification
referenced in the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014). Since the
issuance of the NPRM, the manufacturer has developed a modification
that addresses the unsafe condition identified in this final rule.
However, the service information is not available at this time. Since
we have limited the applicability of this AD to exclude all new
production airplanes that are delivered with AIMS-2 BP v 17 or later
software, as explained previously, we find that no further change to
this AD is necessary in this regard.
For the affected airplanes, there will likely be two possible
terminating options--one to replace the fuel shutoff valve actuator,
and another to upgrade airplanes with AIMS-2 systems to BP v 17 to
address the unsafe condition. Because service information for these
modifications is still being developed, we have not changed this final
rule in this regard.
Request To Replace the AWL Revision Requirement With MOV Actuator
Inspections Requirement
Boeing requested that the proposed requirement to incorporate the
MOV actuator inspection into the AWL Section of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness of the operator's maintenance or inspection
program be replaced with an AD requirement to ``perform the MOV
inspection every 10 days.'' Boeing stated that the MOV inspection is an
interim mitigation and is required only until a redesigned MOV can be
installed in the spar valve locations. Boeing stated that including the
10-day test requirement as the required AD action would allow
installation of the redesigned MOV to be approved as an alternative
method of compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and as a terminating action for
the repetitive inspections, while avoiding the need for regulatory
approval to remove the AWL from each operator's maintenance or
inspection program. In addition, Boeing stated the AWLs are permanent
actions that affect operators' planning and scheduling, and that
incorporating a temporary AWL into the operators' maintenance documents
or a Boeing MPD document will cause confusion among operators.
We disagree with the commenter's request. During the development of
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014), we discussed the impact of an
AWL revision versus a repetitive inspection requirement with Boeing,
who, in turn, discussed it with a sample of operators. At that time,
both Boeing and the operators indicated that the addition of an AWL
revision was the preferred solution because it would reduce the record
keeping required to document AD compliance. Affected operators who wish
to use a repetitive inspection requirement in place of an AWL may apply
for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, by submitting data substantiating that the
request would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend the Proposed Compliance Time Grace Period
AA requested that we extend the grace period for performing the
initial inspection required by the new AWLs. AA stated that it is a
complicated logistical matter to establish a new line maintenance task
at stations throughout the world, and that there is a ``learning curve
to acclimate the line maintenance organizations to the new task.'' In
addition, AA stated that the existing inventory of actuators at
maintenance stations may be insufficient to replace any failed valves
discovered through the inspections, resulting in grounded airplanes,
and that ordering new valves from the vendor generally takes at least
30 days.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We retained the
30-day compliance time for revising the maintenance or inspection
program, as applicable, to include the new AWL. In addition, we have
changed the initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions
specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. The
compliance time of 10 days is consistent with other regulatory actions
on other affected airplane models.
We have determined that the initial compliance time for the
inspection represents an appropriate time in which the required actions
can be performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while
still maintaining an adequate level of safety. In developing an
appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications,
parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely
accomplishment of the checks.
The check itself involves a visual inspection of an existing
prominent design feature that is intended to indicate the position of
the fuel shutoff valve actuator. This check is also described in
existing maintenance documentation. The manufacturer does not expect a
large number of latently failed valve actuators to be discovered.
Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and we expect that
parts can be repositioned in time to support the initial inspections.
However, under the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, we might
consider requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are
submitted to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
Requests To Extend the Interval for the MOV Actuator Inspection
Aerologic GmbH, Air France, All Nippon Airways (ANA), AA, Boeing,
FedEx, Japan Airlines Company Ltd. (JAL), KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
(KLM), Lufthansa Technik AG (LTK), and Lufthansa Cargo AG (LUB)
requested that we change the interval for the MOV actuator inspection
of the engine fuel shutoff valve.
Aerologic GmbH, Air France, Lufthansa LTK, Lufthansa LUB, and KLM
stated that the interval should be 25 flight cycles based on a typical
utilization in flight cycles that corresponds to a one-week interval.
The operators stated that the actuator failure
[[Page 55525]]
mode is associated with the cycling of the valve, and the interval
should, therefore, be based on flight cycles.
AA stated that the ``weekly'' interval is not defined sufficiently,
and that it is not clear whether this means once every seven days, one
time each calendar week, or some other interpretation. AA stated that,
for its airline and for many other international carriers, this
presents a problem when the airplane continually crosses the
International Date Line. AA also stated that the interval does not
address occurrences where the airplane is out of service for an
extended period of time, such as a week or longer. AA stated that it
has strong concerns that the proposed interval may impede the airline's
ability to function on its current published schedule. AA stated that
many established flight routings occur on a four-day cycle, and not all
stations can be set up to perform the inspection for logistical,
personnel, and contractual reasons; therefore, the weekly interval
makes it very difficult to achieve the inspection at available
stations. AA stated that the inspection, if mandated, should be on a
flight-cycle interval rather than a calendar schedule, and suggested a
25-flight-cycle interval to alleviate the ``weekly'' term
interpretation issue, and to address the adverse impact to airline
operations.
JAL and ANA requested that the inspection interval be ``25 flight
cycles or more, or weekly or more, whichever occurs later.'' JAL stated
that the FAA-proposed inspection interval of ``weekly'' is without
detailed information such as the number of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves, failure rates, and so forth. JAL stated that it understands
that it is preferable to control inspection intervals in flight cycles
for international flights. JAL and ANA also stated that an average
flight cycle for a Model 777 airplane might be 2.5 flight cycles per
day, but that their domestic Model 777 flight cycle average is 6 flight
cycles per day; therefore, it is a burden to inspect the MOV actuators
at per-flight-cycle-related intervals. ANA stated that it prefers a
compliance time of 18,000 flight cycles, which is stated in the MPD
document. ANA stated that they currently perform the proposed
inspection at 2,000-flight-hour intervals, and while it has experienced
several fuel valve actuator failures, it has not detected any latently
failed open fuel valve actuators.
SIA requested that the proposed inspection interval be extended to
2,000 flight hours. SIA stated that the inspections are disruptive,
laborious, and costly to operations, and would require SIA to inspect
at least three to four airplanes daily. SIA also stated that frequent
opening and closing of panels to inspect the MOV actuator may
inadvertently disrupt other airplane systems and result in unintended
defects. SIA stated that, if operators are unable to inspect the
airplane within the mandated intervals, or if the inspection findings
require extensive rectification, Boeing or the FAA should consider
granting operators a ``no technical objection'' or an AMOC to allow the
airplane to be released to service for a restricted period of time. SIA
also stated that it understands Boeing is working on a modified MOV
actuator part number that would resolve the reliability issue
associated with it.
Boeing requested that the interval be changed to 10 days. Boeing
stated that it understood the term ``weekly'' to mean 10 days.
We partially agree with the commenters' request. We agree with
extending the inspection interval to 10 days. Some operators' route
structures and maintenance intervals do not align with a 7-day
interval. Also, several of the operators routinely cross the
International Date Line, potentially creating confusion over the
application of an interval when expressed as ``weekly.'' The 10-day
interval will provide more operational flexibility and will not
significantly increase the number of at-risk flights. We have changed
paragraph (g) of this AD and figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD
accordingly.
We also added a note to the Interval column of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to specify that the inspection is not required
on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service, and that the
inspection must be done before further flight if it has been 10 or more
calendar days since the last inspection.
However, we disagree with changing the interval basis to flight
cycles. While the failure of the fuel shutoff valve is likely
associated with the cycling of the valve, the purpose of the
inspections is to minimize the exposure to flights that are initiated
with a valve actuator that is latently failed in the open position.
To determine the appropriate actions and intervals to minimize this
exposure, we considered the actions necessary to detect the latent
failure on each affected airplane model, and then, based on those
identified actions, determined a minimum practical interval for
performing the actions.
On other Boeing airplane models with designs that allow a check to
be performed using available indications, we determined that a daily
check is appropriate. That interval is similar to the check interval
required for fire detection systems. For the affected Model 777
airplanes identified in this final rule, the fuel shutoff valve
position cannot be checked using available indications, and a physical
inspection of the valve actuator itself is necessary to detect the
latent failure. Because of the work necessary to perform this
inspection, we determined that a daily interval would be overly
burdensome and that the 10-day interval would be a more appropriate
balance of the risk and the burden of performing the inspection.
However, affected operators may apply for approval of an AMOC in
accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD
by submitting data substantiating that the request would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
We also disagree that the performance of these inspections is
likely to cause defects in other systems. While additional defects due
to unrelated causes might be discovered during the visual inspection,
the opening of the access door and visual inspection of the fuel
shutoff valve position is not expected to cause other system failures.
Request To Allow Use of Parts From Less Critical Locations
FedEx requested that a provision be added to the proposed AD (79 FR
1772, January 10, 2014) to allow the removal of a working MOV actuator
from a less critical fuel system valve location and installation in the
engine fuel shutoff valve. FedEx stated that this will reduce the
immediate impact of any actuator failures discovered by the required
inspection.
We disagree with the request. This situation is not unique to the
MOV actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. It is not our intent in this AD
to change operational practices used in performing maintenance and
alterations, or to change relief provided by the minimum equipment list
(MEL). The removal of a fully functional part from a less critical
location and its replacement with a non-functioning part is considered
an alteration and, as such, must meet the airworthiness regulations,
which is not possible in this case. However, if a failure occurs at a
less critical location, operation in the same exact configuration may
be allowed for a limited time under the MEL. The decision to allow this
type of maintenance action remains with the local Flight Standards
organization. Also, it should be noted that the installation of certain
MOV actuators is prohibited by FAA AD 2013-05-03, Amendment 39-17375
(78 FR 17290, March 21, 2013). We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
[[Page 55526]]
Additional Change Made to This AD
In the ``Description'' column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, we have removed the phrase ``refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-00'' for
performing an inspection of the MOV actuator of the fuel spar valve
(i.e., the fuel shutoff valve).
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
[Agr]re consistent with the intent that was proposed in
the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014) for correcting the unsafe
condition; and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 1772, January 10, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer has developed
a modification that addresses the unsafe condition for some of the
airplanes identified in this AD. Once the service information for the
modification is developed, approved, and available, we might consider
additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 190 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $16,150
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-01 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18264; Docket No. FAA-
2013-1071; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-204-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -
300, -300ER, and 777F series airplanes, certificated in any
category, line numbers 1 through 1164 inclusive.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) 28-AWL-MOV by incorporating the
information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into
the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance time for
accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD is within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or
inspection program revision required by this paragraph.
[[Page 55527]]
Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--AWL for Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Inspection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV.................. ALI 10 days............. Airplanes with AIMS- Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: Not 1 system. Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
required on days Airplanes with AIMS- MOV Actuator
when the airplane 2 BlockPoint (BP) Inspection.
is not used in v 16 and earlier Concern: The fuel spar
revenue service.. software.. valve actuator design
Must be done before APPLICABILITY NOTE: can result in airplanes
further flight if Only applies to operating with a failed
it has been 10 or airplanes with a fuel spar valve
more calendar days fuel spar valve actuator that is not
since last actuator having reported. A latently
inspection.. part number failed fuel spar valve
MA20A2027 actuator would prevent
(S343T003-56) or fuel shutoff to an
MA30A1001 engine. In the event of
(S343T003-66) certain engine fires,
installed at the the potential exists
engine fuel spar for an engine fire to
valve position.. be uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of
the fuel spar valve
actuator.
NOTE: The fuel spar
valve actuator is
located behind latch
panel 551 DB (left
engine) and latch panel
651 DB (right engine).
1. Make sure both Engine
Control Switches are in
the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
left engine fuel spar
valve actuator is in
the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing
Airplane Maintenance
Manual, 28-22-02, for
guidance).
3. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
right engine fuel spar
valve actuator is in
the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing
Airplane Maintenance
Manual, 28-22-02, for
guidance).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23121 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
