Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company, 55505-55512 [2015-23120]

Download as PDF 55505 Rules and Regulations Federal Register Vol. 80, No. 179 Wednesday, September 16, 2015 This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains regulatory documents having general applicability and legal effect, most of which are keyed to and codified in the Code of Federal Regulations, which is published under 50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510. The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by the Superintendent of Documents. Prices of new books are listed in the first FEDERAL REGISTER issue of each week. agency-specific addendum at 2 CFR part 3374. NEH removed and reserved its prior regulations about administrative requirements for Federal awards, 45 CFR part 1174, which were rendered obsolete by the new provisions. NEH received no comments in response to its adoption of the interim final rule. Therefore, 2 CFR part 3374 as described in the interim final rule, is adopted with no changes. Regulatory Findings For the regulatory findings regarding this rulemaking, please refer to the analysis prepared by OMB in the interim final rule, which is incorporated herein by reference. 79 FR at 75876. Accordingly, the interim rule adding 2 CFR part 3374 and amending 45 CFR part 1174, which was published at 79 FR 75871 on December 19, 2014, is adopted as a final rule without change. NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES National Endowment for the Humanities 2 CFR Part 3374 45 CFR Part 1174 RIN 3136–AA35 Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards Dated: September 10, 2015. Michael P. McDonald, General Counsel. National Endowment for the Humanities, National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities. ACTION: Final rule. [FR Doc. 2015–23186 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] AGENCY: The National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) has adopted as final its interim final rule outlining uniform administrative requirements, cost principles, and audit requirements for Federal awards. DATES: This rule is effective on September 16, 2015. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert Straughter, Director, Office of Grant Management, National Endowment for the Humanities, 400 7th Street SW., Room, 4060, Washington, DC 20506; (202) 606–8237, rstraughter@neh.gov (please include RIN 3136–AA35 in the subject line of the message). SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 19, 2014, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published an interim final rule that implemented for all Federal awardmaking agencies, including NEH, OMB’s final guidance on Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards. 79 FR 75871. OMB published the uniform rules as 2 CFR part 200. As part of that rulemaking, NEH adopted part 200 through an Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES SUMMARY: VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 BILLING CODE 7536–01–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2014–0126; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–236–AD; Amendment 39–18267; AD 2015–19–04] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case SUMMARY: PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure. DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015. Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 0126; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@ faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12431). The NPRM was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure. Record of Ex Parte Communication In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information and information on operational and economic impacts E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55506 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations from design approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at http:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 0126. Clarification of Certain Terminology Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have used the terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to comments, we have used the term ‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar valve’’ is more commonly used in airplane maintenance documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Comments We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response to each comment. Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing’s internal review found that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) is not a safety concern, and that Boeing has not recommended any interim action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA also noted that in a previous NPRM for Model 757 airplanes, it had submitted data showing the failure of the actuator was unlikely and that coupled with the likelihood of an erroneous indication occurring at the same time, the latent hazard was even more improbable. AA stated the same analysis applies to this NPRM. We infer that AA is requesting the NPRM be withdrawn. We disagree with AA’s request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes developing a modification that will address the identified unsafe condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 Requests To Revise the Proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) To Limit the Applicability Specified in Certain Figures shutoff valve actuators on which the identified unsafe condition exists. DHL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) should make it clear that airworthiness limitations (AWL) numbers 28–AWL–ENG and 28– AWL–APU do not apply to airplanes that are equipped with the actuators made by supplier V35840, having part number (P/N) AV31–1 (Boeing P/N S343T003–111), for the engine fuel shutoff valve and APU fuel shutoff valve. DHL stated that the deficiencies identified in the NPRM are related to potential common mode failures, which affect integral electronic circuit boards that commutate the brushless motor and control the position indicating signals on some actuators made by supplier V73760. DHL also stated that fuel shutoff valve P/N AV31–1 (Boeing P/N S343T003–111) is not susceptible to the type of deficiency described in the NPRM because this valve uses brushes and mechanical switches rather than electronic circuit boards to commutate the motor and to control position indicating signals. UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) did not specify which MOV actuator part number the proposed AD applies to. UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL also stated there are known issues with this MOV actuator part number, and presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001. We agree with the commenters’ requests to limit the applicability specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to airplanes with the actuators on which the identified unsafe condition exists. Only two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs are susceptible to the identified unsafe condition specified in this final rule, and it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible valves installed. We have changed the Applicability column in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the limitations apply to Model 757 airplanes on which fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N MA20A2027 (Boeing P/N S343T003–56) or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003–66) is installed at the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve positions. DHL and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD to airplanes with fuel Requests To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check AA and US Airways requested that the compliance time for the initial accomplishment of the operational considers this issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme engine or APU damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU. The continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event. The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe engine or APU damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe damage. The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed this final rule in this regard. PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations check be extended after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision. AA requested that the compliance time be revised to 60 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision. AA stated that the extended time of 60 days is for publishing the new criteria, for distribution of cards and manuals/ checklists, and for the initial compliance time to be taken into account. AA stated that the 7-day compliance time is not justified by the failure rates for this safety concern. AA also stated that the compliance deadline would therefore become unclear. US Airways requested that the compliance time be extended to 7 days after the 30-day compliance time for the maintenance or inspection program revision. US Airways stated that accomplishing the initial compliance time based on completion of adding to the maintenance program would make the compliance deadline very difficult to track as making program changes is typically not a closely tracked process. We partially agree with the commenters’ requests to extend the initial compliance time for the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. We have changed the initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. A compliance time of 10 days is consistent with regulatory actions for other affected airplane models and with the initial compliance time in figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD. We have determined that the initial compliance time for the check represents an appropriate time in which the required actions can be performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of safety. In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The manufacturer does not expect a large number of latently failed fuel shutoff valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to support the initial checks. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety. VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 Request To Change Compliance Time Intervals to Flight Cycles US Airways requested that the compliance time intervals be changed to specify flight cycles. US Airways stated that it has heard of no evidence suggesting the subject condition is a function of time and believes the condition would likely only occur either at engine or APU start or shutdown. US Airways also stated that it and other operators utilize its airplanes on longhaul trips that span many time zones. US Airways stated that, according to a report from the airplane manufacturer during the fourth quarter of 2013, 68 percent of the operators had a daily utilization rate of 3.3 flight cycles, and 95.4 percent had a daily utilization rate of 4.7 flight cycles. We disagree with the commenter’s request. While the failure of the fuel shutoff valve is likely associated with the cycling of the valve, the purpose of the inspections is to minimize the exposure to flights that are initiated with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is latently failed in the open position. Operators may request approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD to change the interval to a cycle-based interval, provided it includes at least one check each day for the engine fuel shutoff valves and that the data substantiate that the request would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Requests To Extend the Repetitive Inspection Interval for the Engine Fuel Shutoff Valves AA and UAL requested that the daily repetitive inspection interval for the engine fuel spar valve be extended. AA requested that we add a choice to the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to allow monitoring the disagreement light in combination with checking the actuator itself every 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, whichever occurs later. AA stated that this means to check the indication and physically check the closure of the engine and APU fuel spar valve at 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, whichever occurs later, as an alternative maintenance task. AA stated that Model 767–400 series airplanes identified in the NPRM having Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) are allowed 10 days to inspect the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and commanded closed. AA stated that 10 days equates closely to 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles. AA also stated that Model 757 and 767 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 55507 airplanes have the same actuator valve and indication, except that Model 767– 400 series airplanes do not have a disagreement light. UAL requested that we extend the daily interval for AWL number 28– AWL–ENG to 10 days. UAL stated that Model 757–200 and –300 series airplanes and Model 767–400 series airplanes use the same MOV actuator. UAL stated that the interval for Model 757–200 and –300 series airplanes is daily while the Model 767–400 series airplanes is 10 days. We disagree with the commenters’ requests. For the engine fuel shutoff valve, an interval increase from daily to every 10 days, or to the later of 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, would result in at least 10 times as many flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine fire. The daily check has been deemed practical because in practice it likely means the flightcrew will need to watch a light just above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. As AA stated, Model 767–400ER series airplanes do not have the disagreement light, so the inspection is more complex. As a result, we determined it is not practical to require this inspection on a daily basis on Model 767–400ER airplanes. We have not changed the inspection interval for Model 757 airplanes addressed in this AD. Request for Operational Check Relief AA requested that any recurring interval include only the days or flight cycles when the airplane is in revenue service, or when an APU is in operational status. AA stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) does not account for airplanes in routine maintenance or in an out-ofservice condition. AA also proposed that a provision for the APU on the minimum equipment list (MEL) be included in the proposed AD. AA stated that once an APU is returned to service from the MEL, the ‘‘10 day or 100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later’’ interval would be restarted. AA stated that any task interval in the proposed AD should have the mechanism to exclude the elapsed time when the aircraft or APU is non-operational, since the latent failure finding task is not accumulating time toward a next potential latent failure. We partially agree with the commenter’s request. We agree to limit operational checks to days when the airplane is in revenue service or when an APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in operation. We have E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55508 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations added a note in the Interval column of figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD indicating that the operational check for the engine and APU is not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. We have revised figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to include a note stating that the check must be done before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. We have also revised figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to state that the check must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has been 10 or more calendar days since the last check. However, we disagree with restarting the 10-day interval once an APU is returned to service. The interval for the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve should not be extended simply because the APU was out of service for a time. It is likely that this check will be done as a matter of course whenever an APU is returned to service. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Request To Add Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the Operational Check UAL requested that we add a requirement to the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to provide electrical power before performing the operational check required by figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to perform the check and other maintenance might be underway, which could deactivate required circuits. We agree with the commenter’s request because electrical power is required. In item C.1. of figure 1 and item A.2. of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added an instruction to supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices when performing the operational check. Request To Allow Flightcrew To Perform Certain AD Requirement Without Principal Operations Inspector (POI) Approval Allegiant Air requested the proposed verbiage that states ‘‘(unless checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principle [sic] operations inspector)’’ be revised to ‘‘the operational check can be performed either as a maintenance action or as a flightcrew action.’’ Allegiant Air stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the operational check. Allegiant Air stated that section 91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) requires the affected operator to accomplish the test provided by the VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 airworthiness limitation. Allegiant Air also stated that FAA Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), Policy Letter 25, Revision 16, dated April 2, 2010 (PL–25 is designated as MMEL Global Change GC–164) (http://fsims.faa.gov/ wdocs/policy%20letters/pl-025_ r16.htm) provides allowance for ‘‘other personnel’’ to be qualified and authorized to perform certain functions that do not require the use of tools or test equipment. Allegiant Air stated that this change would eliminate the need for a second approval process (via the POI), while providing an equivalent level of safety. We partially agree with the commenter’s request. We agree that the AWL allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the operational check. We consider it to be very important that the expectations as to what must be done to check the operation of the fuel shutoff valve, as defined in figures 1 and 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD, be well understood by all parties, and yet we want to provide the maximum flexibility to operators. If an operator chooses to have the flightcrew accomplish the check, the POI is in the best position to make sure this check is done properly. However, it is also acceptable for an operator to choose to accomplish the check as a maintenance action and record compliance as specified in section 43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) without POI involvement. In addition, affected operators may apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Request for Clarification Regarding the Use of the MEL US Airways requested clarification on the use of the MEL. US Airways asked if operators may still apply the MEL and be in compliance with the requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) if the SPAR VALVE light becomes inoperative. US Airways stated the maintenance action specified by the MEL should meet the intent of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US Airways stated that the operational checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD are predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. US Airways also stated that MEL 28–40–2 of the FAA Boeing B757 Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL), Revision 30a, dated June 9, 2014, provides relief should the PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 indication be inoperative, and the proposed AD requirements should provide the same relief. We disagree with providing MEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication because MEL relief could potentially allow the fuel shutoff valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility in regard to verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is operational. In figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added item D., ‘‘Perform an Inspection to the Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator Position,’’ to verify the valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel shutoff valve indication does not function properly. Request To Clarify Recording Requirements US Airways requested that we provide a more complete explanation of the requirements regarding the documentation of accomplishment of the requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US Airways stated that typically, ADmandated actions require documentation of accomplishment. US Airways stated that it should be made clear whether logbook entries would be required should the flightcrew perform the required actions in an approved manner, such as part of a procedure checklist. We agree that clarification is necessary. This AD requires including the information in figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of the AD in the maintenance or inspection program. However, the AD does not require accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of the AD. The actions specified in the figures in this AD are done, and remain enforceable, as part of the airworthiness limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section 43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as the required checks. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do the check in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same action would be considered an operational task (not maintenance), and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. In that case, operators should follow their normal processes for operational activities, including necessary POI involvement. We have not changed this AD in this regard. E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations Request To Clarify Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights UAL requested that we clarify certain requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that, in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, item C.5.a. and item C.6.a. (item C.6.a. and item C.7.a., respectively, in this AD) instruct to move the left and right FUEL CONTROL switches, respectively, to the RUN position, but do not instruct to monitor the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights, unlike item C.5.c and item C.6.c. of the proposed AD. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position. We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position during that portion of the operational check. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Explanation of Error in the Published Version of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) The model designation for The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes is missing from the SUMMARY section of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). This information has been added to this final rule. Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes: • Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 55509 12431, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; and • Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD. Interim Action We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, we might consider additional rulemaking. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this AD affects 590 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: ESTIMATED COSTS Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $50,150 Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Regulatory Findings This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, (2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. Frm 00005 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): ■ 2015–19–04 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39–18267; Docket No. FAA–2014–0126; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–236–AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective October 21, 2015. (b) Affected ADs None. (c) Applicability This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB, and –300 series airplanes, certificated in any category. (d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel. Adoption of the Amendment PO 00000 § 39.13 (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure. E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55510 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations (f) Compliance (g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add airworthiness limitations Nos. 28–AWL–ENG and 28– AWL–APU, by incorporating the information specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision required by this paragraph. FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK AWL No. Task Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES 28–AWL–ENG ...... VerDate Sep<11>2014 ALI Interval Applicability Description DAILY ................................ INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. The check must be done before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service ALL .................................... APPLICABILITY NOTE: Only applies to airplanes with an MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) actuator installed at the engine fuel spar valve position Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check. Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. Perform one of the following checks/inspection of the fuel spar valve position (unless checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). A. Operational check during engine shutdown 1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). B. Operational check during engine start 1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). C. Operational check without engine operation 1. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 2. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position. 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55511 FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description 3. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel. 4. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position. 5. Make sure L and R Engine Start Selector Switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position. 6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds. NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position. c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 7. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds. NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position. c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker was collared in step 3, remove collar and close. D. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position NOTE: This inspection may be most useful whenever the SPAR VALVE light does not function properly. 1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. NOTE: Access is through access panel 551EBX. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. NOTE: Access is through access panel 651EBX. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55512 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK AWL No. Task ALI Applicability Description 10 DAYS ............................ ALL .................................... INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. Must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has been 10 or more calendar days since last check. 28–AWL–APU ....... Interval APPLICABILITY NOTE: Only applies to airplanes with an MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) actuator installed at the APU fuel shutoff valve position. APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check. Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to be uncontrollable. Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve position indication (unless checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve position indication. 1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the APU using standard practices. 2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 4. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel in the Left Main Tank. 5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 6. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the OFF position. 7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel illuminates and then goes off. 8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11). NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 2 if APU is not required for flight. (h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals (j) Related Information After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. 16:46 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 (k) Material Incorporated by Reference None. (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) VerDate Sep<11>2014 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015. Jeffrey E. Duven, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2015–23120 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD; Amendment 39–18265; AD 2015–19–02] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55505-55512]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23120]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0126; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-236-AD; 
Amendment 39-18267; AD 2015-19-04]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 
Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of 
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection 
program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this 
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to 
the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the 
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of 
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural 
failure.

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0126; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket 
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company 
Model 757 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on 
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12431). The NPRM was prompted by reports of 
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or 
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are 
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel 
shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the 
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of 
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural 
failure.

Record of Ex Parte Communication

    In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted 
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information 
and information on operational and economic impacts

[[Page 55506]]

from design approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed 
certain comments addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with 
Airlines for America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. 
All of the comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed 
in this final rule in response to comments submitted by other 
commenters. A discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking 
docket at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating 
Docket No. FAA-2014-0126.

Clarification of Certain Terminology

    Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have 
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve'' 
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to 
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel 
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance 
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79 
FR 12431, March 5, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)

    American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found 
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) is 
not a safety concern, and that Boeing has not recommended any interim 
action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing 
the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated 
valve (MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA also noted that in a 
previous NPRM for Model 757 airplanes, it had submitted data showing 
the failure of the actuator was unlikely and that coupled with the 
likelihood of an erroneous indication occurring at the same time, the 
latent hazard was even more improbable. AA stated the same analysis 
applies to this NPRM. We infer that AA is requesting the NPRM be 
withdrawn.
    We disagree with AA's request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, 
March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition exists that 
warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes developing a 
modification that will address the identified unsafe condition. Boeing 
did not formally comment on whether it considers this issue to be an 
unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the required interim 
actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel shutoff valve 
actuator that is failed latently in the open valve position will occur 
during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if 
certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme engine or APU 
damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event were to occur 
during flight, the crew procedures for such an event would not stop the 
fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU. The continued flow of 
fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion 
event.
    The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe 
with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe 
engine or APU damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for 
each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires 
can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle 
or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe 
damage.
    The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled 
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the 
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and 
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known 
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the 
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the 
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel 
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the 
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a 
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff 
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being 
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required 
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following 
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the 
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed 
this final rule in this regard.

Requests To Revise the Proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) To 
Limit the Applicability Specified in Certain Figures

    DHL and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise the proposed 
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in 
figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD to airplanes 
with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified unsafe 
condition exists.
    DHL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) should 
make it clear that airworthiness limitations (AWL) numbers 28-AWL-ENG 
and 28-AWL-APU do not apply to airplanes that are equipped with the 
actuators made by supplier V35840, having part number (P/N) AV31-1 
(Boeing P/N S343T003-111), for the engine fuel shutoff valve and APU 
fuel shutoff valve. DHL stated that the deficiencies identified in the 
NPRM are related to potential common mode failures, which affect 
integral electronic circuit boards that commutate the brushless motor 
and control the position indicating signals on some actuators made by 
supplier V73760. DHL also stated that fuel shutoff valve P/N AV31-1 
(Boeing P/N S343T003-111) is not susceptible to the type of deficiency 
described in the NPRM because this valve uses brushes and mechanical 
switches rather than electronic circuit boards to commutate the motor 
and to control position indicating signals.
    UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) did 
not specify which MOV actuator part number the proposed AD applies to. 
UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 
777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL also 
stated there are known issues with this MOV actuator part number, and 
presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001.
    We agree with the commenters' requests to limit the applicability 
specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to 
airplanes with the actuators on which the identified unsafe condition 
exists. Only two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs are susceptible to 
the identified unsafe condition specified in this final rule, and it 
would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on 
airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible valves installed. We 
have changed the Applicability column in figure 1 and figure 2 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the limitations apply to Model 
757 airplanes on which fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N MA20A2027 
(Boeing P/N S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003-66) is 
installed at the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve positions.

Requests To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational 
Check

    AA and US Airways requested that the compliance time for the 
initial accomplishment of the operational

[[Page 55507]]

check be extended after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection 
program revision.
    AA requested that the compliance time be revised to 60 days after 
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision. AA stated 
that the extended time of 60 days is for publishing the new criteria, 
for distribution of cards and manuals/checklists, and for the initial 
compliance time to be taken into account. AA stated that the 7-day 
compliance time is not justified by the failure rates for this safety 
concern. AA also stated that the compliance deadline would therefore 
become unclear.
    US Airways requested that the compliance time be extended to 7 days 
after the 30-day compliance time for the maintenance or inspection 
program revision. US Airways stated that accomplishing the initial 
compliance time based on completion of adding to the maintenance 
program would make the compliance deadline very difficult to track as 
making program changes is typically not a closely tracked process.
    We partially agree with the commenters' requests to extend the 
initial compliance time for the actions specified in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD. We have changed the initial compliance time 
for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of 
this AD to 10 days. A compliance time of 10 days is consistent with 
regulatory actions for other affected airplane models and with the 
initial compliance time in figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD. We 
have determined that the initial compliance time for the check 
represents an appropriate time in which the required actions can be 
performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while still 
maintaining an adequate level of safety.
    In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the 
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance 
schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The 
manufacturer does not expect a large number of latently failed fuel 
shutoff valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores are 
expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to 
support the initial checks. However, under the provisions of paragraph 
(i)(1) of this AD, we might consider requests for adjustments to the 
compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an 
adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety.

Request To Change Compliance Time Intervals to Flight Cycles

    US Airways requested that the compliance time intervals be changed 
to specify flight cycles. US Airways stated that it has heard of no 
evidence suggesting the subject condition is a function of time and 
believes the condition would likely only occur either at engine or APU 
start or shutdown. US Airways also stated that it and other operators 
utilize its airplanes on long-haul trips that span many time zones. US 
Airways stated that, according to a report from the airplane 
manufacturer during the fourth quarter of 2013, 68 percent of the 
operators had a daily utilization rate of 3.3 flight cycles, and 95.4 
percent had a daily utilization rate of 4.7 flight cycles.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. While the failure of the 
fuel shutoff valve is likely associated with the cycling of the valve, 
the purpose of the inspections is to minimize the exposure to flights 
that are initiated with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is latently 
failed in the open position. Operators may request approval of an AMOC 
in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this 
AD to change the interval to a cycle-based interval, provided it 
includes at least one check each day for the engine fuel shutoff valves 
and that the data substantiate that the request would provide an 
acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Requests To Extend the Repetitive Inspection Interval for the Engine 
Fuel Shutoff Valves

    AA and UAL requested that the daily repetitive inspection interval 
for the engine fuel spar valve be extended.
    AA requested that we add a choice to the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, 
March 5, 2014) to allow monitoring the disagreement light in 
combination with checking the actuator itself every 100 flight hours or 
50 flight cycles, whichever occurs later. AA stated that this means to 
check the indication and physically check the closure of the engine and 
APU fuel spar valve at 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, whichever 
occurs later, as an alternative maintenance task. AA stated that Model 
767-400 series airplanes identified in the NPRM having Directorate 
Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) are allowed 10 
days to inspect the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and 
commanded closed. AA stated that 10 days equates closely to 100 flight 
hours/50 flight cycles. AA also stated that Model 757 and 767 airplanes 
have the same actuator valve and indication, except that Model 767-400 
series airplanes do not have a disagreement light.
    UAL requested that we extend the daily interval for AWL number 28-
AWL-ENG to 10 days. UAL stated that Model 757-200 and -300 series 
airplanes and Model 767-400 series airplanes use the same MOV actuator. 
UAL stated that the interval for Model 757-200 and -300 series 
airplanes is daily while the Model 767-400 series airplanes is 10 days.
    We disagree with the commenters' requests. For the engine fuel 
shutoff valve, an interval increase from daily to every 10 days, or to 
the later of 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, would result in at 
least 10 times as many flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine 
fire. The daily check has been deemed practical because in practice it 
likely means the flightcrew will need to watch a light just above the 
FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. As AA 
stated, Model 767-400ER series airplanes do not have the disagreement 
light, so the inspection is more complex. As a result, we determined it 
is not practical to require this inspection on a daily basis on Model 
767-400ER airplanes. We have not changed the inspection interval for 
Model 757 airplanes addressed in this AD.

Request for Operational Check Relief

    AA requested that any recurring interval include only the days or 
flight cycles when the airplane is in revenue service, or when an APU 
is in operational status. AA stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, 
March 5, 2014) does not account for airplanes in routine maintenance or 
in an out-of-service condition. AA also proposed that a provision for 
the APU on the minimum equipment list (MEL) be included in the proposed 
AD. AA stated that once an APU is returned to service from the MEL, the 
``10 day or 100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later'' 
interval would be restarted. AA stated that any task interval in the 
proposed AD should have the mechanism to exclude the elapsed time when 
the aircraft or APU is non-operational, since the latent failure 
finding task is not accumulating time toward a next potential latent 
failure.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree to limit 
operational checks to days when the airplane is in revenue service or 
when an APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily 
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in 
operation. We have

[[Page 55508]]

added a note in the Interval column of figure 1 and figure 2 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD indicating that the operational check for the 
engine and APU is not required on days when the airplane is not used in 
revenue service. We have revised figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD 
to include a note stating that the check must be done before further 
flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. We have also 
revised figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to state that the check 
must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has 
been 10 or more calendar days since the last check.
    However, we disagree with restarting the 10-day interval once an 
APU is returned to service. The interval for the operational check of 
the APU fuel shutoff valve should not be extended simply because the 
APU was out of service for a time. It is likely that this check will be 
done as a matter of course whenever an APU is returned to service.

Request To Add Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the 
Operational Check

    UAL requested that we add a requirement to the proposed AD (79 FR 
12431, March 5, 2014) to provide electrical power before performing the 
operational check required by figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of 
the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to 
perform the check and other maintenance might be underway, which could 
deactivate required circuits.
    We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is 
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 and item A.2. of figure 2 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added an instruction to supply 
electrical power to the airplane using standard practices when 
performing the operational check.

Request To Allow Flightcrew To Perform Certain AD Requirement Without 
Principal Operations Inspector (POI) Approval

    Allegiant Air requested the proposed verbiage that states ``(unless 
checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principle [sic] 
operations inspector)'' be revised to ``the operational check can be 
performed either as a maintenance action or as a flightcrew action.'' 
Allegiant Air stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) 
allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the 
operational check. Allegiant Air stated that section 91.403(c) of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) requires the affected 
operator to accomplish the test provided by the airworthiness 
limitation. Allegiant Air also stated that FAA Master Minimum Equipment 
List (MMEL), Policy Letter 25, Revision 16, dated April 2, 2010 (PL-25 
is designated as MMEL Global Change GC-164) (http://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/policy%20letters/pl-025_r16.htm) provides allowance for ``other 
personnel'' to be qualified and authorized to perform certain functions 
that do not require the use of tools or test equipment. Allegiant Air 
stated that this change would eliminate the need for a second approval 
process (via the POI), while providing an equivalent level of safety.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree that the 
AWL allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the 
operational check. We consider it to be very important that the 
expectations as to what must be done to check the operation of the fuel 
shutoff valve, as defined in figures 1 and 2 to paragraph (g) of this 
AD, be well understood by all parties, and yet we want to provide the 
maximum flexibility to operators.
    If an operator chooses to have the flightcrew accomplish the check, 
the POI is in the best position to make sure this check is done 
properly. However, it is also acceptable for an operator to choose to 
accomplish the check as a maintenance action and record compliance as 
specified in section 43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR 43.11(a)) without POI involvement. In addition, affected operators 
may apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions 
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data 
substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of 
safety. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request for Clarification Regarding the Use of the MEL

    US Airways requested clarification on the use of the MEL. US 
Airways asked if operators may still apply the MEL and be in compliance 
with the requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) 
if the SPAR VALVE light becomes inoperative. US Airways stated the 
maintenance action specified by the MEL should meet the intent of the 
proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US Airways stated that the 
operational checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD are 
predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. US Airways also 
stated that MEL 28-40-2 of the FAA Boeing B757 Master Minimum Equipment 
List (MMEL), Revision 30a, dated June 9, 2014, provides relief should 
the indication be inoperative, and the proposed AD requirements should 
provide the same relief.
    We disagree with providing MEL relief for an inoperative fuel 
shutoff valve indication because MEL relief could potentially allow the 
fuel shutoff valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue 
operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility in regard to 
verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is operational. In 
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added item D., ``Perform 
an Inspection to the Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator Position,'' to verify 
the valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel shutoff valve 
indication does not function properly.

Request To Clarify Recording Requirements

    US Airways requested that we provide a more complete explanation of 
the requirements regarding the documentation of accomplishment of the 
requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US 
Airways stated that typically, AD-mandated actions require 
documentation of accomplishment. US Airways stated that it should be 
made clear whether logbook entries would be required should the 
flightcrew perform the required actions in an approved manner, such as 
part of a procedure checklist.
    We agree that clarification is necessary. This AD requires 
including the information in figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of 
the AD in the maintenance or inspection program. However, the AD does 
not require accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 and figure 
2 of paragraph (g) of the AD. The actions specified in the figures in 
this AD are done, and remain enforceable, as part of the airworthiness 
limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section 
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires 
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as the required 
checks. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do the check 
in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same 
action would be considered an operational task (not maintenance), and 
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. In that case, operators 
should follow their normal processes for operational activities, 
including necessary POI involvement. We have not changed this AD in 
this regard.

[[Page 55509]]

Request To Clarify Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights

    UAL requested that we clarify certain requirements of the proposed 
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that, in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, item C.5.a. and item C.6.a. (item 
C.6.a. and item C.7.a., respectively, in this AD) instruct to move the 
left and right FUEL CONTROL switches, respectively, to the RUN 
position, but do not instruct to monitor the left and right SPAR VALVE 
disagreement lights, unlike item C.5.c and item C.6.c. of the proposed 
AD. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify the left 
and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right FUEL 
CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position.
    We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the 
left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right 
FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position during that portion 
of the operational check. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Explanation of Error in the Published Version of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, 
March 5, 2014)

    The model designation for The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes is 
missing from the SUMMARY section of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 
2014). This information has been added to this final rule.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial 
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; 
and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014).
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Interim Action

    We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently 
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition 
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, 
and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 590 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Cost per       Cost on U.S.
               Action                        Labor cost           Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness           1 work-hour x $85 per                $0              $85          $50,150
 Limitation.                           hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2015-19-04 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18267; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0126; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-236-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF, 
-200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff 
valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could 
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, 
in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 
structural failure.

[[Page 55510]]

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

    Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the 
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add 
airworthiness limitations Nos. 28-AWL-ENG and 28-AWL-APU, by 
incorporating the information specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section 
of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial 
compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 
and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days after 
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision 
required by this paragraph.

      Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
                                                Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG..................  ALI            DAILY...............  ALL................  Engine Fuel Shutoff
                                             INTERVAL NOTE: Not    APPLICABILITY NOTE:   Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
                                              required on days      Only applies to      Position Indication
                                              when the airplane     airplanes with an    Operational Check.
                                              is not used in        MA20A2027           Concern: The fuel spar
                                              revenue service.      (S343T003-56) or     valve actuator design
                                              The check must be     MA30A1001            can result in airplanes
                                              done before further   (S343T003-66)        operating with a failed
                                              flight once the       actuator installed   fuel spar valve
                                              airplane is           at the engine fuel   actuator that is not
                                              returned to revenue   spar valve           reported. A latently
                                              service.              position.            failed fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator could prevent
                                                                                         fuel shutoff to an
                                                                                         engine. In the event of
                                                                                         certain engine fires,
                                                                                         the potential exists
                                                                                         for an engine fire to
                                                                                         be uncontrollable.
                                                                                        Perform one of the
                                                                                         following checks/
                                                                                         inspection of the fuel
                                                                                         spar valve position
                                                                                         (unless checked by the
                                                                                         flightcrew in a manner
                                                                                         approved by the
                                                                                         principal operations
                                                                                         inspector).
                                                                                        A. Operational check
                                                                                         during engine shutdown
                                                                                        1. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the CUTOFF position,
                                                                                         verify the left SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        2. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the CUTOFF position,
                                                                                         verify the right SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        B. Operational check
                                                                                         during engine start
                                                                                        1. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the RUN position,
                                                                                         verify the left SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        2. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the RUN position,
                                                                                         verify the right SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        C. Operational check
                                                                                         without engine
                                                                                         operation
                                                                                        1. Supply electrical
                                                                                         power to the airplane
                                                                                         using standard
                                                                                         practices.
                                                                                        2. Make sure all fuel
                                                                                         pump switches on the
                                                                                         Overhead Panel are in
                                                                                         the OFF position.

[[Page 55511]]

 
                                                                                        3. If the APU is
                                                                                         running, open and
                                                                                         collar the L FWD FUEL
                                                                                         BOOST PUMP (C00372)
                                                                                         circuit breaker on the
                                                                                         Main Power Distribution
                                                                                         Panel.
                                                                                        4. Make sure LEFT and
                                                                                         RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
                                                                                         on the Aft Aisle Stand
                                                                                         are in the NORMAL (IN)
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        5. Make sure L and R
                                                                                         Engine Start Selector
                                                                                         Switches on the
                                                                                         Overhead Panel are in
                                                                                         the OFF position.
                                                                                        6. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. Move L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         RUN position and wait
                                                                                         approximately 10
                                                                                         seconds.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is normal under
                                                                                         this test condition for
                                                                                         the ENG VALVE
                                                                                         disagreement light on
                                                                                         the quadrant control
                                                                                         stand to stay
                                                                                         illuminated.
                                                                                        b. Move L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         CUTOFF position.
                                                                                        c. Verify the left SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        d. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        7. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. Move R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         RUN position and wait
                                                                                         approximately 10
                                                                                         seconds.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is normal under
                                                                                         this test condition for
                                                                                         the ENG VALVE
                                                                                         disagreement light on
                                                                                         the quadrant control
                                                                                         stand to stay
                                                                                         illuminated.
                                                                                        b. Move R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         CUTOFF position.
                                                                                        c. Verify the right SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        d. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        8. If the L FWD FUEL
                                                                                         BOOST PUMP circuit
                                                                                         breaker was collared in
                                                                                         step 3, remove collar
                                                                                         and close.
                                                                                        D. Perform an inspection
                                                                                         of the fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator position
                                                                                        NOTE: This inspection
                                                                                         may be most useful
                                                                                         whenever the SPAR VALVE
                                                                                         light does not function
                                                                                         properly.
                                                                                        1. Make sure the L FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                         quadrant control stand
                                                                                         is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        2. Inspect the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         left rear spar.
                                                                                        NOTE: Access is through
                                                                                         access panel 551EBX.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator is in the
                                                                                         CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        3. Make sure the R FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                         quadrant control stand
                                                                                         is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        4. Inspect the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         right rear spar.
                                                                                        NOTE: Access is through
                                                                                         access panel 651EBX.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator is in the
                                                                                         CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 55512]]


     Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication
                                                Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-APU..................  ALI            10 DAYS.............  ALL................  APU Fuel Shutoff Valve
                                                                                         Position Indication
                                                                                         Operational Check.
                              .............  INTERVAL NOTE: Not    APPLICABILITY NOTE:  Concern: The APU fuel
                                              required on days      Only applies to      shutoff valve actuator
                                              when the airplane     airplanes with an    design can result in
                                              is not used in        MA20A2027            airplanes operating
                                              revenue service.      (S343T003-56) or     with a failed APU fuel
                                             Must be done before    MA30A1001            shutoff valve actuator
                                              further flight with   (S343T003-66)        that is not reported. A
                                              an operational APU    actuator installed   latently failed APU
                                              if it has been 10     at the APU fuel      fuel shutoff valve
                                              or more calendar      shutoff valve        actuator could prevent
                                              days since last       position.            fuel shutoff to the
                                              check..                                    APU. In the event of
                                                                                         certain APU fires, the
                                                                                         potential exists for an
                                                                                         APU fire to be
                                                                                         uncontrollable.
                                                                                        Perform the operational
                                                                                         check of the APU fuel
                                                                                         shutoff valve position
                                                                                         indication (unless
                                                                                         checked by the
                                                                                         flightcrew in a manner
                                                                                         approved by the
                                                                                         principal operations
                                                                                         inspector).
                                                                                        A. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the APU fuel
                                                                                         shutoff valve position
                                                                                         indication.
                                                                                        1. If the APU is
                                                                                         running, unload and
                                                                                         shut down the APU using
                                                                                         standard practices.
                                                                                        2. Supply electrical
                                                                                         power to the airplane
                                                                                         using standard
                                                                                         practices.
                                                                                        3. Make sure the APU
                                                                                         FIRE switch on the Aft
                                                                                         Aisle Stand is in the
                                                                                         NORMAL (IN) position.
                                                                                        4. Make sure there is at
                                                                                         least 700 lbs (300 kgs)
                                                                                         of fuel in the Left
                                                                                         Main Tank.
                                                                                        5. Move APU Selector
                                                                                         switch on the Overhead
                                                                                         Panel to the ON
                                                                                         position and wait
                                                                                         approximately 10
                                                                                         seconds.
                                                                                        6. Move APU Selector
                                                                                         switch on the Overhead
                                                                                         Panel to the OFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        7. Verify the APU FAULT
                                                                                         light on the Overhead
                                                                                         Panel illuminates and
                                                                                         then goes off.
                                                                                        8. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight
                                                                                         requiring APU
                                                                                         availability, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         25-11).
                                                                                        NOTE: Dispatch may be
                                                                                         permitted per MMEL 28-
                                                                                         25-2 if APU is not
                                                                                         required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals

    After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program 
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the 
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in 
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local 
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. 
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, 
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle 
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: 
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23120 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P