Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company, 55505-55512 [2015-23120]
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Rules and Regulations
Federal Register
Vol. 80, No. 179
Wednesday, September 16, 2015
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER
contains regulatory documents having general
applicability and legal effect, most of which
are keyed to and codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations, which is published under
50 titles pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 1510.
The Code of Federal Regulations is sold by
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REGISTER issue of each week.
agency-specific addendum at 2 CFR part
3374. NEH removed and reserved its
prior regulations about administrative
requirements for Federal awards, 45
CFR part 1174, which were rendered
obsolete by the new provisions.
NEH received no comments in
response to its adoption of the interim
final rule. Therefore, 2 CFR part 3374 as
described in the interim final rule, is
adopted with no changes.
Regulatory Findings
For the regulatory findings regarding
this rulemaking, please refer to the
analysis prepared by OMB in the
interim final rule, which is incorporated
herein by reference. 79 FR at 75876.
Accordingly, the interim rule adding
2 CFR part 3374 and amending 45 CFR
part 1174, which was published at 79
FR 75871 on December 19, 2014, is
adopted as a final rule without change.
NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE
ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES
National Endowment for the
Humanities
2 CFR Part 3374
45 CFR Part 1174
RIN 3136–AA35
Uniform Administrative Requirements,
Cost Principles, and Audit
Requirements for Federal Awards
Dated: September 10, 2015.
Michael P. McDonald,
General Counsel.
National Endowment for the
Humanities, National Foundation on the
Arts and the Humanities.
ACTION: Final rule.
[FR Doc. 2015–23186 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
AGENCY:
The National Endowment for
the Humanities (NEH) has adopted as
final its interim final rule outlining
uniform administrative requirements,
cost principles, and audit requirements
for Federal awards.
DATES: This rule is effective on
September 16, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Robert Straughter, Director, Office of
Grant Management, National
Endowment for the Humanities, 400 7th
Street SW., Room, 4060, Washington,
DC 20506; (202) 606–8237,
rstraughter@neh.gov (please include
RIN 3136–AA35 in the subject line of
the message).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On
December 19, 2014, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)
published an interim final rule that
implemented for all Federal awardmaking agencies, including NEH, OMB’s
final guidance on Uniform
Administrative Requirements, Cost
Principles, and Audit Requirements for
Federal Awards. 79 FR 75871. OMB
published the uniform rules as 2 CFR
part 200. As part of that rulemaking,
NEH adopted part 200 through an
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SUMMARY:
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BILLING CODE 7536–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0126; Directorate
Identifier 2013–NM–236–AD; Amendment
39–18267; AD 2015–19–04]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes.
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves
discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include new airworthiness
limitations. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
auxiliary power unit (APU), which
could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and APU and, in case
SUMMARY:
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of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire
that could lead to structural failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21,
2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0126; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is
Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax:
425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would
apply to all The Boeing Company Model
757 airplanes. The NPRM published in
the Federal Register on March 5, 2014
(79 FR 12431). The NPRM was
prompted by reports of latently failed
fuel shutoff valves discovered during
fuel filter replacement. The NPRM
proposed to require revising the
maintenance or inspection program to
include new airworthiness limitations.
We are issuing this AD to detect and
correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine and APU, which
could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and APU and, in case
of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire
that could lead to structural failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as
NPRMs and immediately adopted rules,
it is the practice of the FAA to obtain
technical information and information
on operational and economic impacts
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from design approval holders and
aircraft operators. We discussed certain
comments addressed in this final rule in
a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of
the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this
teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments
submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found
in the rulemaking docket at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0126.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final
rule, commenters may have used the
terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel
spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the same part. In our responses
to comments, we have used the term
‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar
valve’’ is more commonly used in
airplane maintenance documentation
and, therefore, we have used that term
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
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Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. The
following presents the comments
received on the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response
to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR
12431, March 5, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that
Boeing’s internal review found that the
issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR
12431, March 5, 2014) is not a safety
concern, and that Boeing has not
recommended any interim action on
this issue. In addition, AA stated that
Boeing is addressing the issue in the
long term with a design change to the
motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator of
the fuel shutoff valve. AA also noted
that in a previous NPRM for Model 757
airplanes, it had submitted data
showing the failure of the actuator was
unlikely and that coupled with the
likelihood of an erroneous indication
occurring at the same time, the latent
hazard was even more improbable. AA
stated the same analysis applies to this
NPRM. We infer that AA is requesting
the NPRM be withdrawn.
We disagree with AA’s request to
withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014). We have determined
that an unsafe condition exists that
warrants an interim action until the
manufacturer finishes developing a
modification that will address the
identified unsafe condition. Boeing did
not formally comment on whether it
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Requests To Revise the Proposed AD
(79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) To Limit
the Applicability Specified in Certain
Figures
shutoff valve actuators on which the
identified unsafe condition exists.
DHL stated that the proposed AD (79
FR 12431, March 5, 2014) should make
it clear that airworthiness limitations
(AWL) numbers 28–AWL–ENG and 28–
AWL–APU do not apply to airplanes
that are equipped with the actuators
made by supplier V35840, having part
number (P/N) AV31–1 (Boeing P/N
S343T003–111), for the engine fuel
shutoff valve and APU fuel shutoff
valve. DHL stated that the deficiencies
identified in the NPRM are related to
potential common mode failures, which
affect integral electronic circuit boards
that commutate the brushless motor and
control the position indicating signals
on some actuators made by supplier
V73760. DHL also stated that fuel
shutoff valve P/N AV31–1 (Boeing P/N
S343T003–111) is not susceptible to the
type of deficiency described in the
NPRM because this valve uses brushes
and mechanical switches rather than
electronic circuit boards to commutate
the motor and to control position
indicating signals.
UAL stated that the proposed AD (79
FR 12431, March 5, 2014) did not
specify which MOV actuator part
number the proposed AD applies to.
UAL stated that proposed ADs were
issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and
777 airplanes to replace the MOV
actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL
also stated there are known issues with
this MOV actuator part number, and
presumes that the proposed AD is for
MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001.
We agree with the commenters’
requests to limit the applicability
specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to airplanes
with the actuators on which the
identified unsafe condition exists. Only
two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs
are susceptible to the identified unsafe
condition specified in this final rule,
and it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections
on airplanes that do not have any of the
susceptible valves installed. We have
changed the Applicability column in
figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of
this AD to clarify that the limitations
apply to Model 757 airplanes on which
fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N
MA20A2027 (Boeing P/N S343T003–56)
or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N
S343T003–66) is installed at the engine
and APU fuel shutoff valve positions.
DHL and United Airlines (UAL)
requested that we revise the proposed
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to
limit the applicability specified in figure
1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD to airplanes with fuel
Requests To Change the Initial
Compliance Time for the Operational
Check
AA and US Airways requested that
the compliance time for the initial
accomplishment of the operational
considers this issue to be an unsafe
condition. We have determined that,
without the required interim actions, a
significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed
latently in the open valve position will
occur during the affected fleet life. With
a failed fuel shutoff valve, if certain fire
conditions were to occur, or if extreme
engine or APU damage were to occur, or
if an engine separation event were to
occur during flight, the crew procedures
for such an event would not stop the
fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle
or APU. The continued flow of fuel
could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead
to a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all
transport airplanes to be fail safe with
respect to engine or APU fire events,
and the risk due to severe engine or
APU damage events be minimized.
Therefore, we require, for each flight,
sufficiently operative fire safety systems
so that fires can be detected and
contained, and fuel to the engine strut
and nacelle or APU can be shut off in
the event of an engine or APU fire or
severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards
require remotely controlled powerplant
valves to provide indications that the
valves are in the commanded position.
These indications allow the prompt
detection and correction of valve
failures. We do not allow dispatch with
a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve.
Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular
valve actuator involved, but instead
because the fuel shutoff valve actuator
can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication
feature. That failure can lead to a large
number of flights occurring on an
airplane with a fuel shutoff valve
actuator failed in the open position
without the operator being aware of the
failure. Airworthiness limitations
containing required inspections are
intended to limit the number of flights
following latent failure of the fuel
shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the
unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.
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check be extended after accomplishing
the maintenance or inspection program
revision.
AA requested that the compliance
time be revised to 60 days after
accomplishing the maintenance or
inspection program revision. AA stated
that the extended time of 60 days is for
publishing the new criteria, for
distribution of cards and manuals/
checklists, and for the initial
compliance time to be taken into
account. AA stated that the 7-day
compliance time is not justified by the
failure rates for this safety concern. AA
also stated that the compliance deadline
would therefore become unclear.
US Airways requested that the
compliance time be extended to 7 days
after the 30-day compliance time for the
maintenance or inspection program
revision. US Airways stated that
accomplishing the initial compliance
time based on completion of adding to
the maintenance program would make
the compliance deadline very difficult
to track as making program changes is
typically not a closely tracked process.
We partially agree with the
commenters’ requests to extend the
initial compliance time for the actions
specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD. We have changed the initial
compliance time for accomplishing the
actions specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to 10 days. A
compliance time of 10 days is consistent
with regulatory actions for other
affected airplane models and with the
initial compliance time in figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD. We have
determined that the initial compliance
time for the check represents an
appropriate time in which the required
actions can be performed in a timely
manner within the affected fleet, while
still maintaining an adequate level of
safety.
In developing an appropriate
compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability,
and normal maintenance schedules for
timely accomplishment of the
operational checks. The manufacturer
does not expect a large number of
latently failed fuel shutoff valve
actuators to be discovered. Existing
parts stores are expected to be sufficient,
and parts can be repositioned in time to
support the initial checks. However,
under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1)
of this AD, we might consider requests
for adjustments to the compliance time
if data are submitted to substantiate that
such an adjustment would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
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Request To Change Compliance Time
Intervals to Flight Cycles
US Airways requested that the
compliance time intervals be changed to
specify flight cycles. US Airways stated
that it has heard of no evidence
suggesting the subject condition is a
function of time and believes the
condition would likely only occur either
at engine or APU start or shutdown. US
Airways also stated that it and other
operators utilize its airplanes on longhaul trips that span many time zones.
US Airways stated that, according to a
report from the airplane manufacturer
during the fourth quarter of 2013, 68
percent of the operators had a daily
utilization rate of 3.3 flight cycles, and
95.4 percent had a daily utilization rate
of 4.7 flight cycles.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request. While the failure of the fuel
shutoff valve is likely associated with
the cycling of the valve, the purpose of
the inspections is to minimize the
exposure to flights that are initiated
with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is
latently failed in the open position.
Operators may request approval of an
AMOC in accordance with the
provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1)
of this AD to change the interval to a
cycle-based interval, provided it
includes at least one check each day for
the engine fuel shutoff valves and that
the data substantiate that the request
would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
Requests To Extend the Repetitive
Inspection Interval for the Engine Fuel
Shutoff Valves
AA and UAL requested that the daily
repetitive inspection interval for the
engine fuel spar valve be extended.
AA requested that we add a choice to
the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March
5, 2014) to allow monitoring the
disagreement light in combination with
checking the actuator itself every 100
flight hours or 50 flight cycles,
whichever occurs later. AA stated that
this means to check the indication and
physically check the closure of the
engine and APU fuel spar valve at 100
flight hours or 50 flight cycles,
whichever occurs later, as an alternative
maintenance task. AA stated that Model
767–400 series airplanes identified in
the NPRM having Directorate Identifier
2013–NM–237–AD (79 FR 12420, March
5, 2014) are allowed 10 days to inspect
the spar valve actuator arm when it is
fully closed and commanded closed. AA
stated that 10 days equates closely to
100 flight hours/50 flight cycles. AA
also stated that Model 757 and 767
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55507
airplanes have the same actuator valve
and indication, except that Model 767–
400 series airplanes do not have a
disagreement light.
UAL requested that we extend the
daily interval for AWL number 28–
AWL–ENG to 10 days. UAL stated that
Model 757–200 and –300 series
airplanes and Model 767–400 series
airplanes use the same MOV actuator.
UAL stated that the interval for Model
757–200 and –300 series airplanes is
daily while the Model 767–400 series
airplanes is 10 days.
We disagree with the commenters’
requests. For the engine fuel shutoff
valve, an interval increase from daily to
every 10 days, or to the later of 100
flight hours or 50 flight cycles, would
result in at least 10 times as many
flights at risk of an uncontrollable
engine fire. The daily check has been
deemed practical because in practice it
likely means the flightcrew will need to
watch a light just above the FUEL
CONTROL switch as they start or shut
down the engine. As AA stated, Model
767–400ER series airplanes do not have
the disagreement light, so the inspection
is more complex. As a result, we
determined it is not practical to require
this inspection on a daily basis on
Model 767–400ER airplanes. We have
not changed the inspection interval for
Model 757 airplanes addressed in this
AD.
Request for Operational Check Relief
AA requested that any recurring
interval include only the days or flight
cycles when the airplane is in revenue
service, or when an APU is in
operational status. AA stated that the
proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5,
2014) does not account for airplanes in
routine maintenance or in an out-ofservice condition. AA also proposed
that a provision for the APU on the
minimum equipment list (MEL) be
included in the proposed AD. AA stated
that once an APU is returned to service
from the MEL, the ‘‘10 day or 100 flight
hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later’’
interval would be restarted. AA stated
that any task interval in the proposed
AD should have the mechanism to
exclude the elapsed time when the
aircraft or APU is non-operational, since
the latent failure finding task is not
accumulating time toward a next
potential latent failure.
We partially agree with the
commenter’s request. We agree to limit
operational checks to days when the
airplane is in revenue service or when
an APU is in operational status because
it would be unnecessarily burdensome
to require the inspections on airplanes
that are not in operation. We have
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added a note in the Interval column of
figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of
this AD indicating that the operational
check for the engine and APU is not
required on days when the airplane is
not used in revenue service. We have
revised figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this
AD to include a note stating that the
check must be done before further flight
once the airplane is returned to revenue
service. We have also revised figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to state that the
check must be done before further flight
with an operational APU if it has been
10 or more calendar days since the last
check.
However, we disagree with restarting
the 10-day interval once an APU is
returned to service. The interval for the
operational check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve should not be extended
simply because the APU was out of
service for a time. It is likely that this
check will be done as a matter of course
whenever an APU is returned to service.
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Request To Add Requirement To
Provide Electrical Power Before the
Operational Check
UAL requested that we add a
requirement to the proposed AD (79 FR
12431, March 5, 2014) to provide
electrical power before performing the
operational check required by figure 1
and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical
power is required to perform the check
and other maintenance might be
underway, which could deactivate
required circuits.
We agree with the commenter’s
request because electrical power is
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 and
item A.2. of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of
this AD, we have added an instruction
to supply electrical power to the
airplane using standard practices when
performing the operational check.
Request To Allow Flightcrew To
Perform Certain AD Requirement
Without Principal Operations Inspector
(POI) Approval
Allegiant Air requested the proposed
verbiage that states ‘‘(unless checked by
the flightcrew in a manner approved by
the principle [sic] operations
inspector)’’ be revised to ‘‘the
operational check can be performed
either as a maintenance action or as a
flightcrew action.’’ Allegiant Air stated
that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) allows either the
flightcrew or maintenance crew to
perform the operational check. Allegiant
Air stated that section 91.403(c) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
91.403(c)) requires the affected operator
to accomplish the test provided by the
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airworthiness limitation. Allegiant Air
also stated that FAA Master Minimum
Equipment List (MMEL), Policy Letter
25, Revision 16, dated April 2, 2010
(PL–25 is designated as MMEL Global
Change GC–164) (https://fsims.faa.gov/
wdocs/policy%20letters/pl-025_
r16.htm) provides allowance for ‘‘other
personnel’’ to be qualified and
authorized to perform certain functions
that do not require the use of tools or
test equipment. Allegiant Air stated that
this change would eliminate the need
for a second approval process (via the
POI), while providing an equivalent
level of safety.
We partially agree with the
commenter’s request. We agree that the
AWL allows either the flightcrew or
maintenance crew to perform the
operational check. We consider it to be
very important that the expectations as
to what must be done to check the
operation of the fuel shutoff valve, as
defined in figures 1 and 2 to paragraph
(g) of this AD, be well understood by all
parties, and yet we want to provide the
maximum flexibility to operators.
If an operator chooses to have the
flightcrew accomplish the check, the
POI is in the best position to make sure
this check is done properly. However, it
is also acceptable for an operator to
choose to accomplish the check as a
maintenance action and record
compliance as specified in section
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) without
POI involvement. In addition, affected
operators may apply for approval of an
AMOC in accordance with the
provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1)
of this AD by submitting data
substantiating that the request would
provide an acceptable level of safety.
We have not changed the AD in this
regard.
Request for Clarification Regarding the
Use of the MEL
US Airways requested clarification on
the use of the MEL. US Airways asked
if operators may still apply the MEL and
be in compliance with the requirements
of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) if the SPAR VALVE light
becomes inoperative. US Airways stated
the maintenance action specified by the
MEL should meet the intent of the
proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5,
2014). US Airways stated that the
operational checks in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD are
predicated on the SPAR VALVE light
being operative. US Airways also stated
that MEL 28–40–2 of the FAA Boeing
B757 Master Minimum Equipment List
(MMEL), Revision 30a, dated June 9,
2014, provides relief should the
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indication be inoperative, and the
proposed AD requirements should
provide the same relief.
We disagree with providing MEL
relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff
valve indication because MEL relief
could potentially allow the fuel shutoff
valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days
of revenue operation. However, we do
agree to provide flexibility in regard to
verification that the fuel shutoff valve
actuator is operational. In figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added
item D., ‘‘Perform an Inspection to the
Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator
Position,’’ to verify the valve is closing,
which can be used when the fuel shutoff
valve indication does not function
properly.
Request To Clarify Recording
Requirements
US Airways requested that we
provide a more complete explanation of
the requirements regarding the
documentation of accomplishment of
the requirements of the proposed AD
(79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US
Airways stated that typically, ADmandated actions require
documentation of accomplishment. US
Airways stated that it should be made
clear whether logbook entries would be
required should the flightcrew perform
the required actions in an approved
manner, such as part of a procedure
checklist.
We agree that clarification is
necessary. This AD requires including
the information in figure 1 and figure 2
of paragraph (g) of the AD in the
maintenance or inspection program.
However, the AD does not require
accomplishing the actions specified in
figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of
the AD. The actions specified in the
figures in this AD are done, and remain
enforceable, as part of the airworthiness
limitations of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness. Section
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for
maintenance actions such as the
required checks. If an operator elects to
have a flightcrew member do the check
in accordance with the applicable
airworthiness limitation, that same
action would be considered an
operational task (not maintenance), and
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not
apply. In that case, operators should
follow their normal processes for
operational activities, including
necessary POI involvement. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.
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Request To Clarify Requirements for
Certain Disagreement Lights
UAL requested that we clarify certain
requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR
12431, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that,
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD, item C.5.a. and item C.6.a.
(item C.6.a. and item C.7.a.,
respectively, in this AD) instruct to
move the left and right FUEL CONTROL
switches, respectively, to the RUN
position, but do not instruct to monitor
the left and right SPAR VALVE
disagreement lights, unlike item C.5.c
and item C.6.c. of the proposed AD.
UAL stated that it presumes it is not
required to verify the left and right
SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when
the left and right FUEL CONTROL
switches are moved to the RUN
position.
We agree to provide clarification. It is
not required to verify the left and right
SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when
the left and right FUEL CONTROL
switches are moved to the RUN position
during that portion of the operational
check. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
Explanation of Error in the Published
Version of the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014)
The model designation for The Boeing
Company Model 757 airplanes is
missing from the SUMMARY section of the
NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014).
This information has been added to this
final rule.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data,
considered the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting this AD
with the changes described previously,
and minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
• Are consistent with the intent that
was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR
55509
12431, March 5, 2014) for correcting the
unsafe condition; and
• Do not add any additional burden
upon the public than was already
proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these
changes will not increase the economic
burden on any operator or increase the
scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action.
The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will
address the unsafe condition identified
in this AD. Once this modification is
developed, approved, and available, we
might consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 590
airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to
comply with this AD:
ESTIMATED COSTS
Action
Labor cost
Parts cost
Cost per
product
Cost on U.S.
operators
Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............
1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 .................
$0
$85
$50,150
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
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Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
VerDate Sep<11>2014
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
Jkt 235001
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Frm 00005
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[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2015–19–04 The Boeing Company:
Amendment 39–18267; Docket No.
FAA–2014–0126; Directorate Identifier
2013–NM–236–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing
Company Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB,
and –300 series airplanes, certificated in any
category.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 28, Fuel.
Adoption of the Amendment
PO 00000
§ 39.13
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered
during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures
of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the
engine and APU and, in case of certain fires,
an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
(f) Compliance
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection
Program
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
Within 30 days after the effective date of
this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection
program, as applicable, to add airworthiness
limitations Nos. 28–AWL–ENG and 28–
AWL–APU, by incorporating the information
specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph
(g) of this AD into the Airworthiness
Limitations Section of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness. The initial
compliance time for accomplishing the
actions specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days
after accomplishing the maintenance or
inspection program revision required by this
paragraph.
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
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28–AWL–ENG ......
VerDate Sep<11>2014
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
DAILY ................................
INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the
airplane is not used in
revenue service. The
check must be done before further flight once
the airplane is returned
to revenue service
ALL ....................................
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Only applies to airplanes
with an MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66) actuator
installed at the engine
fuel spar valve position
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
Indication Operational Check.
Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to
an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the following checks/inspection of the
fuel spar valve position (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector).
A. Operational check during engine shutdown
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position,
verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position,
verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
B. Operational check during engine start
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify
the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes
off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the RUN position, verify
the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the
quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes
off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
C. Operational check without engine operation
1. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices.
2. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead
Panel are in the OFF position.
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
55511
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
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AWL No.
Task
Interval
Applicability
Description
3. If the APU is running, open and collar the L FWD
FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on
the Main Power Distribution Panel.
4. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position.
5. Make sure L and R Engine Start Selector Switches
on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position.
6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant
control stand to stay illuminated.
b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
7. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant
control stand to stay illuminated.
b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker
was collared in step 3, remove collar and close.
D. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position
NOTE: This inspection may be most useful whenever
the SPAR VALVE light does not function properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar.
NOTE: Access is through access panel 551EBX.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any actuator that is not in the
CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar.
NOTE: Access is through access panel 651EBX.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any actuator that is not in the
CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
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13:48 Sep 15, 2015
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
ALI
Applicability
Description
10 DAYS ............................
ALL ....................................
INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the
airplane is not used in
revenue service.
Must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has
been 10 or more calendar days since last
check.
28–AWL–APU .......
Interval
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Only applies to airplanes
with an MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66) actuator
installed at the APU fuel
shutoff valve position.
APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check.
Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design
can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU
fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could
prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector).
A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication.
1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the
APU using standard practices.
2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices.
3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle
Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel
in the Left Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds.
6. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the OFF position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel
illuminates and then goes off.
8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as
required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11).
NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–
2 if APU is not required for flight.
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
(j) Related Information
After accomplishment of the maintenance
or inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
16:46 Sep 15, 2015
Jkt 235001
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
VerDate Sep<11>2014
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23120 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
PO 00000
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Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate
Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD; Amendment
39–18265; AD 2015–19–02]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes.
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves
discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include new airworthiness
limitations. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
auxiliary power unit (APU), which
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55505-55512]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23120]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0126; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-236-AD;
Amendment 39-18267; AD 2015-19-04]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection
program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to
the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural
failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0126; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 757 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12431). The NPRM was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel
shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural
failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts
[[Page 55506]]
from design approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed
certain comments addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with
Airlines for America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry.
All of the comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed
in this final rule in response to comments submitted by other
commenters. A discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking
docket at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating
Docket No. FAA-2014-0126.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 12431, March 5, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) is
not a safety concern, and that Boeing has not recommended any interim
action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing
the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated
valve (MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. AA also noted that in a
previous NPRM for Model 757 airplanes, it had submitted data showing
the failure of the actuator was unlikely and that coupled with the
likelihood of an erroneous indication occurring at the same time, the
latent hazard was even more improbable. AA stated the same analysis
applies to this NPRM. We infer that AA is requesting the NPRM be
withdrawn.
We disagree with AA's request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition exists that
warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes developing a
modification that will address the identified unsafe condition. Boeing
did not formally comment on whether it considers this issue to be an
unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the required interim
actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel shutoff valve
actuator that is failed latently in the open valve position will occur
during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if
certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme engine or APU
damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event were to occur
during flight, the crew procedures for such an event would not stop the
fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU. The continued flow of
fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion
event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe
engine or APU damage events be minimized. Therefore, we require, for
each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires
can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle
or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe
damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.
Requests To Revise the Proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) To
Limit the Applicability Specified in Certain Figures
DHL and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise the proposed
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in
figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD to airplanes
with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified unsafe
condition exists.
DHL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) should
make it clear that airworthiness limitations (AWL) numbers 28-AWL-ENG
and 28-AWL-APU do not apply to airplanes that are equipped with the
actuators made by supplier V35840, having part number (P/N) AV31-1
(Boeing P/N S343T003-111), for the engine fuel shutoff valve and APU
fuel shutoff valve. DHL stated that the deficiencies identified in the
NPRM are related to potential common mode failures, which affect
integral electronic circuit boards that commutate the brushless motor
and control the position indicating signals on some actuators made by
supplier V73760. DHL also stated that fuel shutoff valve P/N AV31-1
(Boeing P/N S343T003-111) is not susceptible to the type of deficiency
described in the NPRM because this valve uses brushes and mechanical
switches rather than electronic circuit boards to commutate the motor
and to control position indicating signals.
UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) did
not specify which MOV actuator part number the proposed AD applies to.
UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and
777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL also
stated there are known issues with this MOV actuator part number, and
presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001.
We agree with the commenters' requests to limit the applicability
specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to
airplanes with the actuators on which the identified unsafe condition
exists. Only two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs are susceptible to
the identified unsafe condition specified in this final rule, and it
would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on
airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible valves installed. We
have changed the Applicability column in figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the limitations apply to Model
757 airplanes on which fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N MA20A2027
(Boeing P/N S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003-66) is
installed at the engine and APU fuel shutoff valve positions.
Requests To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational
Check
AA and US Airways requested that the compliance time for the
initial accomplishment of the operational
[[Page 55507]]
check be extended after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
program revision.
AA requested that the compliance time be revised to 60 days after
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision. AA stated
that the extended time of 60 days is for publishing the new criteria,
for distribution of cards and manuals/checklists, and for the initial
compliance time to be taken into account. AA stated that the 7-day
compliance time is not justified by the failure rates for this safety
concern. AA also stated that the compliance deadline would therefore
become unclear.
US Airways requested that the compliance time be extended to 7 days
after the 30-day compliance time for the maintenance or inspection
program revision. US Airways stated that accomplishing the initial
compliance time based on completion of adding to the maintenance
program would make the compliance deadline very difficult to track as
making program changes is typically not a closely tracked process.
We partially agree with the commenters' requests to extend the
initial compliance time for the actions specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD. We have changed the initial compliance time
for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD to 10 days. A compliance time of 10 days is consistent with
regulatory actions for other affected airplane models and with the
initial compliance time in figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD. We
have determined that the initial compliance time for the check
represents an appropriate time in which the required actions can be
performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while still
maintaining an adequate level of safety.
In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance
schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The
manufacturer does not expect a large number of latently failed fuel
shutoff valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores are
expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to
support the initial checks. However, under the provisions of paragraph
(i)(1) of this AD, we might consider requests for adjustments to the
compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an
adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety.
Request To Change Compliance Time Intervals to Flight Cycles
US Airways requested that the compliance time intervals be changed
to specify flight cycles. US Airways stated that it has heard of no
evidence suggesting the subject condition is a function of time and
believes the condition would likely only occur either at engine or APU
start or shutdown. US Airways also stated that it and other operators
utilize its airplanes on long-haul trips that span many time zones. US
Airways stated that, according to a report from the airplane
manufacturer during the fourth quarter of 2013, 68 percent of the
operators had a daily utilization rate of 3.3 flight cycles, and 95.4
percent had a daily utilization rate of 4.7 flight cycles.
We disagree with the commenter's request. While the failure of the
fuel shutoff valve is likely associated with the cycling of the valve,
the purpose of the inspections is to minimize the exposure to flights
that are initiated with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is latently
failed in the open position. Operators may request approval of an AMOC
in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this
AD to change the interval to a cycle-based interval, provided it
includes at least one check each day for the engine fuel shutoff valves
and that the data substantiate that the request would provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Requests To Extend the Repetitive Inspection Interval for the Engine
Fuel Shutoff Valves
AA and UAL requested that the daily repetitive inspection interval
for the engine fuel spar valve be extended.
AA requested that we add a choice to the proposed AD (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) to allow monitoring the disagreement light in
combination with checking the actuator itself every 100 flight hours or
50 flight cycles, whichever occurs later. AA stated that this means to
check the indication and physically check the closure of the engine and
APU fuel spar valve at 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, whichever
occurs later, as an alternative maintenance task. AA stated that Model
767-400 series airplanes identified in the NPRM having Directorate
Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) are allowed 10
days to inspect the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and
commanded closed. AA stated that 10 days equates closely to 100 flight
hours/50 flight cycles. AA also stated that Model 757 and 767 airplanes
have the same actuator valve and indication, except that Model 767-400
series airplanes do not have a disagreement light.
UAL requested that we extend the daily interval for AWL number 28-
AWL-ENG to 10 days. UAL stated that Model 757-200 and -300 series
airplanes and Model 767-400 series airplanes use the same MOV actuator.
UAL stated that the interval for Model 757-200 and -300 series
airplanes is daily while the Model 767-400 series airplanes is 10 days.
We disagree with the commenters' requests. For the engine fuel
shutoff valve, an interval increase from daily to every 10 days, or to
the later of 100 flight hours or 50 flight cycles, would result in at
least 10 times as many flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine
fire. The daily check has been deemed practical because in practice it
likely means the flightcrew will need to watch a light just above the
FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. As AA
stated, Model 767-400ER series airplanes do not have the disagreement
light, so the inspection is more complex. As a result, we determined it
is not practical to require this inspection on a daily basis on Model
767-400ER airplanes. We have not changed the inspection interval for
Model 757 airplanes addressed in this AD.
Request for Operational Check Relief
AA requested that any recurring interval include only the days or
flight cycles when the airplane is in revenue service, or when an APU
is in operational status. AA stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014) does not account for airplanes in routine maintenance or
in an out-of-service condition. AA also proposed that a provision for
the APU on the minimum equipment list (MEL) be included in the proposed
AD. AA stated that once an APU is returned to service from the MEL, the
``10 day or 100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later''
interval would be restarted. AA stated that any task interval in the
proposed AD should have the mechanism to exclude the elapsed time when
the aircraft or APU is non-operational, since the latent failure
finding task is not accumulating time toward a next potential latent
failure.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree to limit
operational checks to days when the airplane is in revenue service or
when an APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in
operation. We have
[[Page 55508]]
added a note in the Interval column of figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD indicating that the operational check for the
engine and APU is not required on days when the airplane is not used in
revenue service. We have revised figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD
to include a note stating that the check must be done before further
flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. We have also
revised figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD to state that the check
must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has
been 10 or more calendar days since the last check.
However, we disagree with restarting the 10-day interval once an
APU is returned to service. The interval for the operational check of
the APU fuel shutoff valve should not be extended simply because the
APU was out of service for a time. It is likely that this check will be
done as a matter of course whenever an APU is returned to service.
Request To Add Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the
Operational Check
UAL requested that we add a requirement to the proposed AD (79 FR
12431, March 5, 2014) to provide electrical power before performing the
operational check required by figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of
the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to
perform the check and other maintenance might be underway, which could
deactivate required circuits.
We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 and item A.2. of figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added an instruction to supply
electrical power to the airplane using standard practices when
performing the operational check.
Request To Allow Flightcrew To Perform Certain AD Requirement Without
Principal Operations Inspector (POI) Approval
Allegiant Air requested the proposed verbiage that states ``(unless
checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principle [sic]
operations inspector)'' be revised to ``the operational check can be
performed either as a maintenance action or as a flightcrew action.''
Allegiant Air stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)
allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the
operational check. Allegiant Air stated that section 91.403(c) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) requires the affected
operator to accomplish the test provided by the airworthiness
limitation. Allegiant Air also stated that FAA Master Minimum Equipment
List (MMEL), Policy Letter 25, Revision 16, dated April 2, 2010 (PL-25
is designated as MMEL Global Change GC-164) (https://fsims.faa.gov/wdocs/policy%20letters/pl-025_r16.htm) provides allowance for ``other
personnel'' to be qualified and authorized to perform certain functions
that do not require the use of tools or test equipment. Allegiant Air
stated that this change would eliminate the need for a second approval
process (via the POI), while providing an equivalent level of safety.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree that the
AWL allows either the flightcrew or maintenance crew to perform the
operational check. We consider it to be very important that the
expectations as to what must be done to check the operation of the fuel
shutoff valve, as defined in figures 1 and 2 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, be well understood by all parties, and yet we want to provide the
maximum flexibility to operators.
If an operator chooses to have the flightcrew accomplish the check,
the POI is in the best position to make sure this check is done
properly. However, it is also acceptable for an operator to choose to
accomplish the check as a maintenance action and record compliance as
specified in section 43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14
CFR 43.11(a)) without POI involvement. In addition, affected operators
may apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data
substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not changed the AD in this regard.
Request for Clarification Regarding the Use of the MEL
US Airways requested clarification on the use of the MEL. US
Airways asked if operators may still apply the MEL and be in compliance
with the requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014)
if the SPAR VALVE light becomes inoperative. US Airways stated the
maintenance action specified by the MEL should meet the intent of the
proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US Airways stated that the
operational checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD are
predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. US Airways also
stated that MEL 28-40-2 of the FAA Boeing B757 Master Minimum Equipment
List (MMEL), Revision 30a, dated June 9, 2014, provides relief should
the indication be inoperative, and the proposed AD requirements should
provide the same relief.
We disagree with providing MEL relief for an inoperative fuel
shutoff valve indication because MEL relief could potentially allow the
fuel shutoff valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue
operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility in regard to
verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is operational. In
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added item D., ``Perform
an Inspection to the Fuel Spar Valve MOV Actuator Position,'' to verify
the valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel shutoff valve
indication does not function properly.
Request To Clarify Recording Requirements
US Airways requested that we provide a more complete explanation of
the requirements regarding the documentation of accomplishment of the
requirements of the proposed AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). US
Airways stated that typically, AD-mandated actions require
documentation of accomplishment. US Airways stated that it should be
made clear whether logbook entries would be required should the
flightcrew perform the required actions in an approved manner, such as
part of a procedure checklist.
We agree that clarification is necessary. This AD requires
including the information in figure 1 and figure 2 of paragraph (g) of
the AD in the maintenance or inspection program. However, the AD does
not require accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 and figure
2 of paragraph (g) of the AD. The actions specified in the figures in
this AD are done, and remain enforceable, as part of the airworthiness
limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as the required
checks. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do the check
in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same
action would be considered an operational task (not maintenance), and
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. In that case, operators
should follow their normal processes for operational activities,
including necessary POI involvement. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
[[Page 55509]]
Request To Clarify Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights
UAL requested that we clarify certain requirements of the proposed
AD (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that, in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD, item C.5.a. and item C.6.a. (item
C.6.a. and item C.7.a., respectively, in this AD) instruct to move the
left and right FUEL CONTROL switches, respectively, to the RUN
position, but do not instruct to monitor the left and right SPAR VALVE
disagreement lights, unlike item C.5.c and item C.6.c. of the proposed
AD. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify the left
and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right FUEL
CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position.
We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the
left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the left and right
FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position during that portion
of the operational check. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Explanation of Error in the Published Version of the NPRM (79 FR 12431,
March 5, 2014)
The model designation for The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes is
missing from the SUMMARY section of the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5,
2014). This information has been added to this final rule.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously, and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12431, March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved,
and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 590 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $50,150
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-04 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18267; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0126; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-236-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757-200, -200PF,
-200CB, and -300 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 28, Fuel.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and,
in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.
[[Page 55510]]
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitations Nos. 28-AWL-ENG and 28-AWL-APU, by
incorporating the information specified in figure 1 and figure 2 to
paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section
of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial
compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1
and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days after
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision
required by this paragraph.
Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG.................. ALI DAILY............... ALL................ Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: Not APPLICABILITY NOTE: Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
required on days Only applies to Position Indication
when the airplane airplanes with an Operational Check.
is not used in MA20A2027 Concern: The fuel spar
revenue service. (S343T003-56) or valve actuator design
The check must be MA30A1001 can result in airplanes
done before further (S343T003-66) operating with a failed
flight once the actuator installed fuel spar valve
airplane is at the engine fuel actuator that is not
returned to revenue spar valve reported. A latently
service. position. failed fuel spar valve
actuator could prevent
fuel shutoff to an
engine. In the event of
certain engine fires,
the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the
following checks/
inspection of the fuel
spar valve position
(unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector).
A. Operational check
during engine shutdown
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the CUTOFF position,
verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the CUTOFF position,
verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
B. Operational check
during engine start
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the RUN position,
verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the RUN position,
verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
C. Operational check
without engine
operation
1. Supply electrical
power to the airplane
using standard
practices.
2. Make sure all fuel
pump switches on the
Overhead Panel are in
the OFF position.
[[Page 55511]]
3. If the APU is
running, open and
collar the L FWD FUEL
BOOST PUMP (C00372)
circuit breaker on the
Main Power Distribution
Panel.
4. Make sure LEFT and
RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
on the Aft Aisle Stand
are in the NORMAL (IN)
position.
5. Make sure L and R
Engine Start Selector
Switches on the
Overhead Panel are in
the OFF position.
6. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
RUN position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
7. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
RUN position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
8. If the L FWD FUEL
BOOST PUMP circuit
breaker was collared in
step 3, remove collar
and close.
D. Perform an inspection
of the fuel spar valve
actuator position
NOTE: This inspection
may be most useful
whenever the SPAR VALVE
light does not function
properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
NOTE: Access is through
access panel 551EBX.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
NOTE: Access is through
access panel 651EBX.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 55512]]
Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-APU.................. ALI 10 DAYS............. ALL................ APU Fuel Shutoff Valve
Position Indication
Operational Check.
............. INTERVAL NOTE: Not APPLICABILITY NOTE: Concern: The APU fuel
required on days Only applies to shutoff valve actuator
when the airplane airplanes with an design can result in
is not used in MA20A2027 airplanes operating
revenue service. (S343T003-56) or with a failed APU fuel
Must be done before MA30A1001 shutoff valve actuator
further flight with (S343T003-66) that is not reported. A
an operational APU actuator installed latently failed APU
if it has been 10 at the APU fuel fuel shutoff valve
or more calendar shutoff valve actuator could prevent
days since last position. fuel shutoff to the
check.. APU. In the event of
certain APU fires, the
potential exists for an
APU fire to be
uncontrollable.
Perform the operational
check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve position
indication (unless
checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector).
A. Do an operational
check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve position
indication.
1. If the APU is
running, unload and
shut down the APU using
standard practices.
2. Supply electrical
power to the airplane
using standard
practices.
3. Make sure the APU
FIRE switch on the Aft
Aisle Stand is in the
NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at
least 700 lbs (300 kgs)
of fuel in the Left
Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector
switch on the Overhead
Panel to the ON
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
6. Move APU Selector
switch on the Overhead
Panel to the OFF
position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT
light on the Overhead
Panel illuminates and
then goes off.
8. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight
requiring APU
availability, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
25-11).
NOTE: Dispatch may be
permitted per MMEL 28-
25-2 if APU is not
required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23120 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
