Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes, 55512-55521 [2015-23119]

Download as PDF 55512 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK AWL No. Task ALI Applicability Description 10 DAYS ............................ ALL .................................... INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. Must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has been 10 or more calendar days since last check. 28–AWL–APU ....... Interval APPLICABILITY NOTE: Only applies to airplanes with an MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) actuator installed at the APU fuel shutoff valve position. APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check. Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to be uncontrollable. Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve position indication (unless checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve position indication. 1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the APU using standard practices. 2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 4. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel in the Left Main Tank. 5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds. 6. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the OFF position. 7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel illuminates and then goes off. 8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11). NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 2 if APU is not required for flight. (h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals (j) Related Information After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. 16:46 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 (k) Material Incorporated by Reference None. (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) VerDate Sep<11>2014 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015. Jeffrey E. Duven, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2015–23120 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD; Amendment 39–18265; AD 2015–19–02] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure. DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015. Examining the AD Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 0127; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@ faa.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Discussion We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12420). The NPRM was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure. Record of Ex Parte Communication In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information and information on operational and economic impacts from design approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at http:// www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014– 0127. Clarification of Certain Terminology Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have used the terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to comments, we have used the term ‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar valve’’ is more commonly used in airplane maintenance documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD. Comments We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response to each comment. Requests To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing’s internal review found that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) is not a safety concern, and Boeing has not recommended any interim action on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing the issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve. All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated it agrees with a statement in ‘‘767–FTD– 28–12003 issued by Boeing’’ indicating that the combination of the events (engine fire and spar valve failures) is extremely improbable. ANA requested clarification of the rationale for the proposed intervals. ANA stated that it has operated more than 100 Model 767 airplanes for approximately 30 years and has never had such failure with the MOVs. We infer that AA and ANA requested that the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be withdrawn. We disagree with the commenters’ request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes developing a modification that will PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 55513 address the identified unsafe condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it considers this issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme engine or APU damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU. The continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event. The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe engine or APU damage events to be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe damage. The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed this final rule in this regard. Request To Revise Applicability of Certain Requirements Delta Airlines (DAL) and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55514 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES to airplanes with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified unsafe condition exists. DAL stated that it would be feasible to implement configuration control to ensure that part number (P/N) MA30A1001 is removed, and does not get installed in the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve positions in the future. DAL stated it would replace any P/N MA30A1001 actuators that are currently in those locations with actuators of a different acceptable part number, which would, in turn, alleviate the unsafe condition given in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). DAL stated that if an operator does not have P/N MA30A1001 installed on any engine or APU fuel shutoff valve positions, then that operator would not be required to adhere to airworthiness limitations 28– AWL–ENG, 28–AWL–MOV, or 28– AWL–APU. UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) does not specify which part number of the MOV actuator is applicable to the proposed AD. UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and 777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL also stated that there are issues with the MOV actuator part number, and presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001. We agree with the commenters’ request. Only two fuel shutoff valve actuator designs are susceptible to the unsafe condition specified in this final rule, and it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible valves installed. We have changed the Applicability column in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the limitations apply to Model 767 airplanes having fuel shutoff valve actuator P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003– 56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66) installed at the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve position, as appropriate. Request To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check AA requested that the compliance time for the initial accomplishment of the actions specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be extended from 7 days to 60 days. AA stated that more time is needed for publishing the new criteria and for distribution of cards and manuals/checklists. AA stated that the 7-day compliance time is not justified by the failure rates for this safety concern. VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 We partially agree with the commenter’s request. We have changed the initial compliance time to 10 days for accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD. The compliance time of 10 days is consistent with regulatory actions for other affected models. We have determined that the initial compliance time for the inspection represents an appropriate time in which the required actions can be performed in a timely manner within the affected fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of safety. In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The operational check procedures and the access procedures are simple and already established. The check itself involves a visual inspection of an existing prominent design feature that is intended to indicate the position of the fuel shutoff valve actuator and is described in existing maintenance documentation. The manufacturer does not expect a large number of latently failed valve actuators to be discovered. Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be repositioned in time to support the initial inspections. However, under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable level of safety. Request To Change the Proposed Requirement for the MOV Actuator Inspection Boeing requested that the proposed requirement to ‘‘incorporate the MOV actuator inspection into the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of operator’s maintenance or inspection programs’’ be replaced with an AD requirement to perform the MOV inspection per the specific interval in paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). Boeing stated that the MOV inspection in paragraph (g) of the proposed AD is an interim mitigation until a redesigned MOV can be installed in the spar valve locations. Boeing stated that including the interval requirement as the required AD action would allow installation of the redesigned MOV to be approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and as a terminating action for the repetitive inspections, PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 while avoiding the need for regulatory approval to remove the AWL from each operator’s maintenance or inspection program. In addition, Boeing stated the AWLs are permanent actions that affect operators’ planning and scheduling, and that incorporating a temporary AWL into the operators’ maintenance documents or a Boeing maintenance planning data (MPD) document will cause confusion among operators. We disagree with the commenter’s request. During the development of the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), we discussed the impact of an AWL revision versus a repetitive inspection requirement with Boeing, who, in turn, discussed it with a sample of operators. At that time, both Boeing and the operators indicated that the addition of an AWL was the preferred solution because it would reduce the record keeping required to document AD compliance. Affected operators who wish to use a repetitive inspection requirement in place of an AWL revision may apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Request To Extend the Daily Inspection Requirement UAL asked whether there are any provisions established by the FAA to extend the daily inspection requirement if the reliability data are captured. UAL stated that there is no valid justification for this short time limit that creates a burden on airline operations. We disagree with the commenter’s request. Our unsafe condition determination is primarily driven by the potential for a common-cause failure of the valve and its position indication— and not by a lack of reliability. We are aware that this failure has happened in service, and we expect that tens of thousands of flights will occur with this valve failed in the open position without indicating the failure unless frequent inspections are made. Fortunately, the effort required to check the valve operation is small for most airplanes. For Model 767–200 and –300 series airplanes, we expect that most airlines will have the flightcrew monitor a light near the switch they are using to shut down the engine. The total time needed should be less than a few seconds. In addition, new fuel shutoff valve actuators are being developed that will allow removal of this requirement once they are installed. Therefore, we have no plans to extend the interval E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations based on updated reliability data. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Request for Inspection Relief UAL noted there is no provision in the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to allow a waiver of the daily inspection requirements if an airplane is out of service for any reason or in a remote station where the daily inspection cannot be accomplished. Air Do asked if the daily check must be done once a day even if the airplane does not have a flight plan. We infer the commenters are requesting that we revise the proposed AD to allow exceptions to the daily check specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. AA requested that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be clarified to specify that daily checks only apply when the airplane is in operational revenue service. AA also stated to restart the interval of 10 days or 100 flight hours/50 cycles, whichever occurs later, once an APU is returned to service from the minimum equipment list. We partially agree with the commenters’ requests. We agree to limit inspections to days when the airplane is in revenue service or when the APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in operation. In figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added a note in the Interval column to clarify that the operational check is not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. For figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we also specify that the check of the engine fuel shutoff valve must be done before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. In figure 2 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have specified that the check or inspection must be done before further flight if it has been 10 or more calendar days since last check or inspection. We disagree with restarting the 10-day cycle once an APU is returned to service because the APU fuel shutoff valve check should not be extended because the APU was out of service for a time. For the APU, it is likely that this test will be done as a matter of course whenever it is returned to service. Request To Extend the Repetitive Interval AA, ANA, DAL, and Japan Airlines (JAL) requested that the repetitive interval be extended for the actions specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 AA requested that the repetitive inspection interval be extended to ‘‘10 days or 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles, whichever occurs later.’’ AA requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to add the choice of monitoring the disagreement light to check the indication and physically check the closure of the valve at ‘‘100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later’’ as an alternative maintenance task. AA stated that operators of Model 767–400 series airplanes identified in the NPRM are allowed 10 days to inspect the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and commanded closed. AA stated that the 10 days equates closely to ‘‘100 flight hours/50 cycles.’’ AA also stated that Model 767– 200, –300, and –400 series airplanes have the same actuator valve and indication, except that Model 767–400 series airplanes do not have a disagreement light. ANA stated it has reviewed the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), and is disappointed with the intervals of the operational checks because the intervals are daily for engine fuel spar valves on Boeing Model 767–200, –300, and –300F series airplanes, and 10 days for APU fuel valves; the proposed intervals will definitely affect its operations. ANA stated that it does not have Model 767–400 airplanes, but that the operational effect is the same. ANA suggested a compliance time of ‘‘6,000 flight hours or 22 months whichever comes first’’ for both engine spar valves and APU fuel valves. DAL stated that Model 767–300 and –400 series airplanes contain similar systems with respect to engine fuel shutoff. DAL stated that Model 767–300 and –400 series airplanes are also equipped with the same part number for the MOV actuator. DAL stated that, therefore, the failure modes between the two airplane models should be identical. DAL stated that since the FAA considers a 10-day interval sufficient for Model 767–400 series airplanes, and also for the APU fuel shutoff actuator for all Model 767 airplanes, it proposes to change the interval in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this proposed AD to 10 days. We disagree with the commenters’ requests. Increasing the check interval from daily to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine fire; the daily check has been deemed practical because in practice it will mean the flightcrew will need to watch a light just above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. As PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 55515 AA stated, Model 767–400ER series airplanes do not have the disagreement light, so the inspection is more complex. As a result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection would be, we determined it is not practical to require that inspection on a daily basis on Model 767–400ER series airplanes. We have not changed this AD in this regard. As we discussed previously, the reason for this final rule is not simply a high valve failure rate in the open position, but rather a design error that allows a single failure within a fuel shutoff valve actuator to affect both the control of the valve and the indication of the valve’s position. Currently these failures are only discovered during fuel filter changes, which occur every 6,000 flight hours. ANA’s proposal is to check the system every 6,000 flight hours. A dedicated inspection every 6,000 flight hours would have little impact on the number of flights at risk. Indication and control of the fuel shutoff valve are not independent because of the design error in the affected valve actuators. For a failed fuel shutoff valve, the valve indication system erroneously reports that the valve is opening and closing. If no action is taken, we anticipate a significant number of flights to occur with a failed open fuel shutoff valve. Without this AD, our risk assessment and the manufacturer’s risk assessment predict that tens of thousands of such flights would occur in the fleet of Model 767 airplanes. In addition to this fuel shutoff valve design error, the affected valves have a higher-than-typical rate of failure in several failure modes. We have received several reports of valves failed open (discovered only when fuel filters were changed), valves failed closed (preventing engine start), and valves that spontaneously closed in flight (causing an engine shutdown). Boeing’s long-term solution, a fuel shutoff valve actuator design change, is intended to address these issues in addition to restoring the independence of the actuator control and indication features. The APU, on the other hand, presents a much lower risk and is needed in flight on a small number of flights. In addition, normal APU starting procedures include this check on every start, so it is likely that this check is already being done on a more frequent basis. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Request To Justify the Proposed Inspection Interval ANA requested that rationale be provided to justify the proposed inspection interval, including the interval differences between the engine E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55516 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES and the APU, and the interval between Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes. We agree to provide the requested rationale. While the potential for the problem is the same for Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes, the ability to check the system functionality is different. Both types of airplanes warrant a daily check, but we also consider the practicality of an inspection. On Model 767–200, –300, and –300F series airplanes, the flightcrew will need to watch the disagreement light located just above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. Model 777 airplanes, like Model 767–400ER series airplanes, do not have a disagreement light so the inspection is more time consuming. As a result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection would be for Model 777 airplanes, we determined it is not practical to require that inspection on a daily basis. In regard to the APU, it is not run on every flight, so a properly functioning fuel shutoff valve is not needed for every flight. We decided to require the check every 10 days rather than try to monitor APU usage. Also, it should be noted that this check is part of a normal APU start, so it will likely be done on every start; this AD requires that it be done at least every 10 days. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Request To Provide Instructions for Compliance With the Extended Operations (ETOPS) Requirement UAL requested instructions for compliance with the ETOPS requirement that would meet the operational check requirements. UAL requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify whether standardized procedures will be established for inspectors to make approvals for all affected operators. UAL stated that since the affected airplanes have ETOPS approval, the NPRM should provide instructions for compliance with the ETOPS requirements. UAL asked that the FAA provide guidance to the principal operations inspector (POI) on required procedures that would meet the operational check requirements. We agree that clarification is needed. We infer the commenter means that checks of the left and right engine fuel shutoff valves are done by different individuals due to ETOPS maintenance requirements. Since none of the required inspections include actions that could contribute to an engine shutdown, there is no common-cause engine shutdown potential and, therefore, no need for different individuals to perform the inspections VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 on the left and right fuel shutoff valve actuators to meet ETOPS maintenance requirements. No additional guidance to the POIs is necessary. Request To Expand Inspection To Confirm Functionality DAL requested we expand the inspection at the spar for confirmation of functionality on Model 767–300 series airplanes using the same method of inspection and the same auxiliary power unit position as those for the Boeing Model 767–400 series airplanes. DAL stated that a check of the actual valve position every 10 days would be a more effective inspection. DAL stated that ‘‘FTD Article 767–FTD–28–12003’’ (Boeing Fleet Team Digest) states that, ‘‘The indication showed the valve had closed when it had failed in the open position.’’ DAL stated that the flight deck indication may not accurately reflect functionality. We partially agree with the commenter’s request. We agree to add an inspection option for Model 767–300 airplanes that is similar to the inspection for Model 767–400ER series airplanes. Therefore, for Model 767– 200, –300, and –300F series airplanes, we have added item D. to figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to perform a daily inspection to verify the fuel shutoff valve is closing. However, we disagree with extending the inspection interval to 10 days. As stated previously, increasing the inspection interval from every day to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine fire. Request To Add a Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the Operational Check UAL requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to add a requirement to provide electrical power before performing the operational check required by figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to perform the check, and other maintenance may be done that could deactivate required circuits. We agree with the commenter’s request because electrical power is required. In figure 1 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added a requirement to supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices when performing the operational check. PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Request To Clarify the Operational Check Requirements Air Do stated that, if the flightcrew performed the operational check, the maintenance record is usually not created. The commenter questioned whether this is acceptable, or whether the flightcrew should record it in the flight log. UAL requested clarification on whether the flightcrew will not have to record compliance for one of the checks and that documentation for each inspection on every airplane need not be made if relying on flightcrew compliance with the proposed AD. JAL requested that the FAA coordinate with Boeing to include an appropriate check procedure in the Normal Procedure (NP) section of the flightcrew operating manual (FCOM). We find that clarification is necessary. This AD requires including the information specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 of paragraph (g) of the AD in the maintenance or inspection program; however, the actions specified in the figures in this AD are accomplished, and remain enforceable, as part of the Airworthiness Limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section 43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as this inspection. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do an inspection in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same action would be considered an operational task—not maintenance— and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. Regarding JAL’s comment, an FCOM is a Boeing document that we neither approve nor control. We have not changed this AD with regard to these issues. Request To Clarify the Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights UAL requested that we clarify the requirements in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that items C.6.a. and C.7.a. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD instruct to move the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, respectively, to the RUN position, but do not instruct to monitor the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights, unlike item C.6.c. and item C.7.c. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position. We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the left and right E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position during that portion of the operational check. We have not changed this AD in this regard. Request for Clarification on Applying a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) Maintenance Action First Air requested clarification of the proposed corrective action for an inoperative indication—specifically, whether operators could still apply an MEL maintenance action and meet the intent of the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). First Air stated that the operational checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for engine spar valves are predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. First Air stated that MEL 28–40–02 provides relief should the indication be inoperative. We agree that clarification is needed. We disagree with providing MEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication because MEL relief could potentially allow the valve to be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility regarding verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is operational. We have added item D. to figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to perform a daily inspection to verify the fuel shutoff valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel shutoff valve indication does not function properly. Request for Clarification Regarding the FUEL CONTROL Switch UAL requested that a statement be included in the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify that it is not required to cycle the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, as specified in Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–00, for the ALI task specified in figure 2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. We agree with the commenter’s request. We have added a note in figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD stating that it is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do the inspection. Request To Correct a Typographical Error UAL requested that a typographical error be corrected in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the NPRM states, ‘‘Item C.4 instructs to make sure Land R ENG START selector switches on the overhead panel are in the OFF position.’’ UAL stated that this is a typographical error and the selector switches should be L and R ENG START selector switches. We agree and have corrected the typographical error in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly. Paragraph C.4. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, as it appeared in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), has been re-designated as paragraph C.5. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD. Additional Changes Made to This AD In the Description column of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have removed the phrase ‘‘refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–00’’ with regard to performing an inspection of the fuel spar valve MOV actuator position. In paragraph C.7.a. in the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, and in paragraph A.5. in the 55517 Description column of figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added wording specifying to wait ‘‘approximately’’ 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector switch on the overhead panel is in the ON position. Conclusion We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes: • Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; and • Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD. Interim Action We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, we may consider additional rulemaking. Costs of Compliance We estimate that this AD affects 450 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD: ESTIMATED COSTS Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product Cost on U.S. operators Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............ Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES Action 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. $0 $85 $38,250 Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866, (2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55518 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): ■ 2015–19–02 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39–18265; Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD. (a) Effective Date This AD is effective October 21, 2015. (b) Affected ADs None. Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: (c) Applicability This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and –400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category. PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES (d) Subject Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 28, Fuel. 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: ■ Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. (e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural failure. (f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add airworthiness limitation numbers 28–AWL–ENG, 28–AWL– MOV, and 28–AWL–APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD is within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program revision required by this paragraph. FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK AWL No. Task Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES 28–AWL–ENG ...... VerDate Sep<11>2014 ALI Interval Applicability Description DAILY ................................ INTERVAL NOTE: The operational check is not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. The check must be done before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. 767–200, –300, and –300F airplanes. APPLICABILITY NOTE: Applies to airplanes with an actuator installed at the engine fuel spar valve position having part number (P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66). Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check. Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. Perform one of the following checks/inspection of the fuel spar valve position (unless checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector): A. Operational Check during engine shutdown. 1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing airplane maintenance manual (AMM) 28–22–11). 2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). B. Operational check during engine start. 1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55519 FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). C. Operational check without engine operation. 1. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 2. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead Panel are in the OFF position. 3. If the auxiliary power unit (APU) is running, open and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP (C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel. 4. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position. 5. Make sure L and R ENG START Selector Switches on the Overhead Panel, are in the OFF position. 6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds. NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position. c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 7. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel spar valve actuator. a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector switch on the overhead panel is in the ON position. NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand to stay illuminated. b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand to the CUTOFF position. c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then goes off. d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker was collared in step 3, remove collar and close. D. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position. VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 55520 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description NOTE: This inspection may be most useful whenever the SPAR VALVE light does not function properly. 1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR INSPECTION AWL No. Task Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES 28–AWL–MOV ...... VerDate Sep<11>2014 ALI Interval Applicability Description 10 DAYS ............................ INTERVAL NOTE: The inspection is not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. The inspection must be done before further flight if it has been 10 or more calendar days since last inspection. 767–400ER series airplanes. APPLICABILITY NOTE: Applies to airplanes with an actuator installed at the engine fuel spar valve position having part number (P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66). Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Inspection Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position. NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar. 1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position. NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection. 4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar. a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position. b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11). 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations 55521 FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION OPERATIONAL CHECK AWL No. Task 28–AWL–APU ....... ALI Interval Applicability Description 10 DAYS ............................ INTERVAL NOTE: The operational check is not required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. The operational check must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has been 10 or more calendar days since last check. ALL .................................... APPLICABILITY NOTE: Applies to airplanes with an actuator installed at the APU fuel shutoff valve position having part number (P/N) MA20A2027 (S343T003–56) or MA30A1001 (S343T003–66). APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to be uncontrollable. Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve position indication (unless checked by the flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector). A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff valve position indication. 1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the APU using standard practices. 2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices. 3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position. 4. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of fuel in the Left Main Tank. 5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector switch on the overhead panel is in the ON position. 6. Move the APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel to the OFF position. 7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel illuminates and then goes off. 8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02). NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25– 02 if APU is not required for flight. Lhorne on DSK5TPTVN1PROD with RULES (h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD. (i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov. (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/ certificate holding district office. VerDate Sep<11>2014 13:48 Sep 15, 2015 Jkt 235001 (j) Related Information DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov. (k) Material Incorporated by Reference None. Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015. Jeffrey E. Duven, Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. 2015–23119 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2013–1071; Directorate Identifier 2013–NM–204–AD; Amendment 39–18264; AD 2015–19–01] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include a new airworthiness limitation. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM 16SER1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55512-55521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23119]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD; 
Amendment 39-18265; AD 2015-19-02]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The 
Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of 
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection 
program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this 
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to 
the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which

[[Page 55513]]

could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU 
and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead 
to structural failure.

DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0127; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket 
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and 
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification 
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company 
Model 767 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on 
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12420). The NPRM was prompted by reports of 
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter 
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or 
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are 
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel 
shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the 
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of 
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural 
failure.

Record of Ex Parte Communication

    In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted 
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information 
and information on operational and economic impacts from design 
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments 
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for 
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the 
comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this 
final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A 
discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at 
http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. 
FAA-2014-0127.

Clarification of Certain Terminology

    Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have 
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve'' 
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to 
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel 
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance 
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 and 
figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79 
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.

Requests To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014)

    American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found 
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) is 
not a safety concern, and Boeing has not recommended any interim action 
on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing the 
issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated valve 
(MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve.
    All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated it agrees with a statement in 
``767-FTD-28-12003 issued by Boeing'' indicating that the combination 
of the events (engine fire and spar valve failures) is extremely 
improbable. ANA requested clarification of the rationale for the 
proposed intervals. ANA stated that it has operated more than 100 Model 
767 airplanes for approximately 30 years and has never had such failure 
with the MOVs.
    We infer that AA and ANA requested that the NPRM (79 FR 12420, 
March 5, 2014) be withdrawn.
    We disagree with the commenters' request to withdraw the NPRM (79 
FR 12420, March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition 
exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes 
developing a modification that will address the identified unsafe 
condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it considers this 
issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the 
required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel 
shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve 
position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel 
shutoff valve, if certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme 
engine or APU damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event 
were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event 
would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU. 
The continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to 
a fuel exhaustion event.
    The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe 
with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe 
engine or APU damage events to be minimized. Therefore, we require, for 
each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires 
can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle 
or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe 
damage.
    The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled 
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the 
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and 
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known 
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the 
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the 
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel 
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the 
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a 
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff 
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being 
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required 
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following 
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the 
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed 
this final rule in this regard.

Request To Revise Applicability of Certain Requirements

    Delta Airlines (DAL) and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we 
revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to limit the 
applicability specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to 
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD

[[Page 55514]]

to airplanes with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified 
unsafe condition exists.
    DAL stated that it would be feasible to implement configuration 
control to ensure that part number (P/N) MA30A1001 is removed, and does 
not get installed in the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve positions in 
the future. DAL stated it would replace any P/N MA30A1001 actuators 
that are currently in those locations with actuators of a different 
acceptable part number, which would, in turn, alleviate the unsafe 
condition given in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). DAL stated 
that if an operator does not have P/N MA30A1001 installed on any engine 
or APU fuel shutoff valve positions, then that operator would not be 
required to adhere to airworthiness limitations 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV, 
or 28-AWL-APU.
    UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) does 
not specify which part number of the MOV actuator is applicable to the 
proposed AD. UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG, 
757, 767, and 777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N 
MA30A1001. UAL also stated that there are issues with the MOV actuator 
part number, and presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N 
MA30A1001.
    We agree with the commenters' request. Only two fuel shutoff valve 
actuator designs are susceptible to the unsafe condition specified in 
this final rule, and it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require 
the inspections on airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible 
valves installed. We have changed the Applicability column in figure 1, 
figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the 
limitations apply to Model 767 airplanes having fuel shutoff valve 
actuator P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66) 
installed at the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve position, as 
appropriate.

Request To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check

    AA requested that the compliance time for the initial 
accomplishment of the actions specified in figure 1, figure 2, and 
figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 
2014) be extended from 7 days to 60 days. AA stated that more time is 
needed for publishing the new criteria and for distribution of cards 
and manuals/checklists. AA stated that the 7-day compliance time is not 
justified by the failure rates for this safety concern.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We have changed 
the initial compliance time to 10 days for accomplishing the actions 
specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this 
AD. The compliance time of 10 days is consistent with regulatory 
actions for other affected models. We have determined that the initial 
compliance time for the inspection represents an appropriate time in 
which the required actions can be performed in a timely manner within 
the affected fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of 
safety.
    In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the 
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance 
schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The 
operational check procedures and the access procedures are simple and 
already established. The check itself involves a visual inspection of 
an existing prominent design feature that is intended to indicate the 
position of the fuel shutoff valve actuator and is described in 
existing maintenance documentation. The manufacturer does not expect a 
large number of latently failed valve actuators to be discovered. 
Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be 
repositioned in time to support the initial inspections. However, under 
the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider 
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted 
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable 
level of safety.

Request To Change the Proposed Requirement for the MOV Actuator 
Inspection

    Boeing requested that the proposed requirement to ``incorporate the 
MOV actuator inspection into the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) 
Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of operator's 
maintenance or inspection programs'' be replaced with an AD requirement 
to perform the MOV inspection per the specific interval in paragraph 
(g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). Boeing stated that 
the MOV inspection in paragraph (g) of the proposed AD is an interim 
mitigation until a redesigned MOV can be installed in the spar valve 
locations. Boeing stated that including the interval requirement as the 
required AD action would allow installation of the redesigned MOV to be 
approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and 
as a terminating action for the repetitive inspections, while avoiding 
the need for regulatory approval to remove the AWL from each operator's 
maintenance or inspection program. In addition, Boeing stated the AWLs 
are permanent actions that affect operators' planning and scheduling, 
and that incorporating a temporary AWL into the operators' maintenance 
documents or a Boeing maintenance planning data (MPD) document will 
cause confusion among operators.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. During the development of 
the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), we discussed the impact of an 
AWL revision versus a repetitive inspection requirement with Boeing, 
who, in turn, discussed it with a sample of operators. At that time, 
both Boeing and the operators indicated that the addition of an AWL was 
the preferred solution because it would reduce the record keeping 
required to document AD compliance. Affected operators who wish to use 
a repetitive inspection requirement in place of an AWL revision may 
apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions 
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data 
substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of 
safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Extend the Daily Inspection Requirement

    UAL asked whether there are any provisions established by the FAA 
to extend the daily inspection requirement if the reliability data are 
captured. UAL stated that there is no valid justification for this 
short time limit that creates a burden on airline operations.
    We disagree with the commenter's request. Our unsafe condition 
determination is primarily driven by the potential for a common-cause 
failure of the valve and its position indication--and not by a lack of 
reliability. We are aware that this failure has happened in service, 
and we expect that tens of thousands of flights will occur with this 
valve failed in the open position without indicating the failure unless 
frequent inspections are made. Fortunately, the effort required to 
check the valve operation is small for most airplanes. For Model 767-
200 and -300 series airplanes, we expect that most airlines will have 
the flightcrew monitor a light near the switch they are using to shut 
down the engine. The total time needed should be less than a few 
seconds. In addition, new fuel shutoff valve actuators are being 
developed that will allow removal of this requirement once they are 
installed. Therefore, we have no plans to extend the interval

[[Page 55515]]

based on updated reliability data. We have not changed this AD in this 
regard.

Request for Inspection Relief

    UAL noted there is no provision in the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, 
March 5, 2014) to allow a waiver of the daily inspection requirements 
if an airplane is out of service for any reason or in a remote station 
where the daily inspection cannot be accomplished. Air Do asked if the 
daily check must be done once a day even if the airplane does not have 
a flight plan. We infer the commenters are requesting that we revise 
the proposed AD to allow exceptions to the daily check specified in 
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD.
    AA requested that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be 
clarified to specify that daily checks only apply when the airplane is 
in operational revenue service. AA also stated to restart the interval 
of 10 days or 100 flight hours/50 cycles, whichever occurs later, once 
an APU is returned to service from the minimum equipment list.
    We partially agree with the commenters' requests. We agree to limit 
inspections to days when the airplane is in revenue service or when the 
APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily 
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in 
operation. In figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this 
AD, we have added a note in the Interval column to clarify that the 
operational check is not required on days when the airplane is not used 
in revenue service. For figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we also 
specify that the check of the engine fuel shutoff valve must be done 
before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service. 
In figure 2 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have specified 
that the check or inspection must be done before further flight if it 
has been 10 or more calendar days since last check or inspection.
    We disagree with restarting the 10-day cycle once an APU is 
returned to service because the APU fuel shutoff valve check should not 
be extended because the APU was out of service for a time. For the APU, 
it is likely that this test will be done as a matter of course whenever 
it is returned to service.

Request To Extend the Repetitive Interval

    AA, ANA, DAL, and Japan Airlines (JAL) requested that the 
repetitive interval be extended for the actions specified in figure 1, 
figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 
12420, March 5, 2014).
    AA requested that the repetitive inspection interval be extended to 
``10 days or 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles, whichever occurs 
later.'' AA requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, 
March 5, 2014) to add the choice of monitoring the disagreement light 
to check the indication and physically check the closure of the valve 
at ``100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later'' as an 
alternative maintenance task. AA stated that operators of Model 767-400 
series airplanes identified in the NPRM are allowed 10 days to inspect 
the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and commanded 
closed. AA stated that the 10 days equates closely to ``100 flight 
hours/50 cycles.'' AA also stated that Model 767-200, -300, and -400 
series airplanes have the same actuator valve and indication, except 
that Model 767-400 series airplanes do not have a disagreement light.
    ANA stated it has reviewed the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), 
and is disappointed with the intervals of the operational checks 
because the intervals are daily for engine fuel spar valves on Boeing 
Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, and 10 days for APU 
fuel valves; the proposed intervals will definitely affect its 
operations. ANA stated that it does not have Model 767-400 airplanes, 
but that the operational effect is the same. ANA suggested a compliance 
time of ``6,000 flight hours or 22 months whichever comes first'' for 
both engine spar valves and APU fuel valves.
    DAL stated that Model 767-300 and -400 series airplanes contain 
similar systems with respect to engine fuel shutoff. DAL stated that 
Model 767-300 and -400 series airplanes are also equipped with the same 
part number for the MOV actuator. DAL stated that, therefore, the 
failure modes between the two airplane models should be identical. DAL 
stated that since the FAA considers a 10-day interval sufficient for 
Model 767-400 series airplanes, and also for the APU fuel shutoff 
actuator for all Model 767 airplanes, it proposes to change the 
interval in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this proposed AD to 10 days.
    We disagree with the commenters' requests. Increasing the check 
interval from daily to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in 
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many 
flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine fire; the daily check has 
been deemed practical because in practice it will mean the flightcrew 
will need to watch a light just above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they 
start or shut down the engine. As AA stated, Model 767-400ER series 
airplanes do not have the disagreement light, so the inspection is more 
complex. As a result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection 
would be, we determined it is not practical to require that inspection 
on a daily basis on Model 767-400ER series airplanes. We have not 
changed this AD in this regard.
    As we discussed previously, the reason for this final rule is not 
simply a high valve failure rate in the open position, but rather a 
design error that allows a single failure within a fuel shutoff valve 
actuator to affect both the control of the valve and the indication of 
the valve's position. Currently these failures are only discovered 
during fuel filter changes, which occur every 6,000 flight hours. ANA's 
proposal is to check the system every 6,000 flight hours. A dedicated 
inspection every 6,000 flight hours would have little impact on the 
number of flights at risk. Indication and control of the fuel shutoff 
valve are not independent because of the design error in the affected 
valve actuators. For a failed fuel shutoff valve, the valve indication 
system erroneously reports that the valve is opening and closing. If no 
action is taken, we anticipate a significant number of flights to occur 
with a failed open fuel shutoff valve. Without this AD, our risk 
assessment and the manufacturer's risk assessment predict that tens of 
thousands of such flights would occur in the fleet of Model 767 
airplanes.
    In addition to this fuel shutoff valve design error, the affected 
valves have a higher-than-typical rate of failure in several failure 
modes. We have received several reports of valves failed open 
(discovered only when fuel filters were changed), valves failed closed 
(preventing engine start), and valves that spontaneously closed in 
flight (causing an engine shutdown). Boeing's long-term solution, a 
fuel shutoff valve actuator design change, is intended to address these 
issues in addition to restoring the independence of the actuator 
control and indication features. The APU, on the other hand, presents a 
much lower risk and is needed in flight on a small number of flights. 
In addition, normal APU starting procedures include this check on every 
start, so it is likely that this check is already being done on a more 
frequent basis. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request To Justify the Proposed Inspection Interval

    ANA requested that rationale be provided to justify the proposed 
inspection interval, including the interval differences between the 
engine

[[Page 55516]]

and the APU, and the interval between Model 767 and Model 777 
airplanes.
    We agree to provide the requested rationale. While the potential 
for the problem is the same for Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes, the 
ability to check the system functionality is different. Both types of 
airplanes warrant a daily check, but we also consider the practicality 
of an inspection. On Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, 
the flightcrew will need to watch the disagreement light located just 
above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine. 
Model 777 airplanes, like Model 767-400ER series airplanes, do not have 
a disagreement light so the inspection is more time consuming. As a 
result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection would be for 
Model 777 airplanes, we determined it is not practical to require that 
inspection on a daily basis.
    In regard to the APU, it is not run on every flight, so a properly 
functioning fuel shutoff valve is not needed for every flight. We 
decided to require the check every 10 days rather than try to monitor 
APU usage. Also, it should be noted that this check is part of a normal 
APU start, so it will likely be done on every start; this AD requires 
that it be done at least every 10 days. We have not changed this AD in 
this regard.

Request To Provide Instructions for Compliance With the Extended 
Operations (ETOPS) Requirement

    UAL requested instructions for compliance with the ETOPS 
requirement that would meet the operational check requirements. UAL 
requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to 
clarify whether standardized procedures will be established for 
inspectors to make approvals for all affected operators. UAL stated 
that since the affected airplanes have ETOPS approval, the NPRM should 
provide instructions for compliance with the ETOPS requirements. UAL 
asked that the FAA provide guidance to the principal operations 
inspector (POI) on required procedures that would meet the operational 
check requirements.
    We agree that clarification is needed. We infer the commenter means 
that checks of the left and right engine fuel shutoff valves are done 
by different individuals due to ETOPS maintenance requirements. Since 
none of the required inspections include actions that could contribute 
to an engine shutdown, there is no common-cause engine shutdown 
potential and, therefore, no need for different individuals to perform 
the inspections on the left and right fuel shutoff valve actuators to 
meet ETOPS maintenance requirements. No additional guidance to the POIs 
is necessary.

Request To Expand Inspection To Confirm Functionality

    DAL requested we expand the inspection at the spar for confirmation 
of functionality on Model 767-300 series airplanes using the same 
method of inspection and the same auxiliary power unit position as 
those for the Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes. DAL stated that a 
check of the actual valve position every 10 days would be a more 
effective inspection. DAL stated that ``FTD Article 767-FTD-28-12003'' 
(Boeing Fleet Team Digest) states that, ``The indication showed the 
valve had closed when it had failed in the open position.'' DAL stated 
that the flight deck indication may not accurately reflect 
functionality.
    We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree to add an 
inspection option for Model 767-300 airplanes that is similar to the 
inspection for Model 767-400ER series airplanes. Therefore, for Model 
767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, we have added item D. to 
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to 
perform a daily inspection to verify the fuel shutoff valve is closing. 
However, we disagree with extending the inspection interval to 10 days. 
As stated previously, increasing the inspection interval from every day 
to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in figure 1 to paragraph 
(g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many flights at risk of an 
uncontrollable engine fire.

Request To Add a Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the 
Operational Check

    UAL requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 
2014) to add a requirement to provide electrical power before 
performing the operational check required by figure 3 to paragraph (g) 
of the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to 
perform the check, and other maintenance may be done that could 
deactivate required circuits.
    We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is 
required. In figure 1 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have 
added a requirement to supply electrical power to the airplane using 
standard practices when performing the operational check.

Request To Clarify the Operational Check Requirements

    Air Do stated that, if the flightcrew performed the operational 
check, the maintenance record is usually not created. The commenter 
questioned whether this is acceptable, or whether the flightcrew should 
record it in the flight log.
    UAL requested clarification on whether the flightcrew will not have 
to record compliance for one of the checks and that documentation for 
each inspection on every airplane need not be made if relying on 
flightcrew compliance with the proposed AD.
    JAL requested that the FAA coordinate with Boeing to include an 
appropriate check procedure in the Normal Procedure (NP) section of the 
flightcrew operating manual (FCOM).
    We find that clarification is necessary. This AD requires including 
the information specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 of 
paragraph (g) of the AD in the maintenance or inspection program; 
however, the actions specified in the figures in this AD are 
accomplished, and remain enforceable, as part of the Airworthiness 
Limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section 
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires 
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as this 
inspection. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do an 
inspection in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, 
that same action would be considered an operational task--not 
maintenance--and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. Regarding 
JAL's comment, an FCOM is a Boeing document that we neither approve nor 
control. We have not changed this AD with regard to these issues.

Request To Clarify the Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights

    UAL requested that we clarify the requirements in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL 
stated that items C.6.a. and C.7.a. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the 
proposed AD instruct to move the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, 
respectively, to the RUN position, but do not instruct to monitor the 
left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights, unlike item C.6.c. and 
item C.7.c. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify 
the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL 
CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position.
    We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the 
left and right

[[Page 55517]]

SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches 
are moved to the RUN position during that portion of the operational 
check. We have not changed this AD in this regard.

Request for Clarification on Applying a Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 
Maintenance Action

    First Air requested clarification of the proposed corrective action 
for an inoperative indication--specifically, whether operators could 
still apply an MEL maintenance action and meet the intent of the NPRM 
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). First Air stated that the operational 
checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for engine spar 
valves are predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. First 
Air stated that MEL 28-40-02 provides relief should the indication be 
inoperative.
    We agree that clarification is needed. We disagree with providing 
MEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication because MEL 
relief could potentially allow the valve to be inoperative for up to 10 
days of revenue operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility 
regarding verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is 
operational. We have added item D. to figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this 
AD to specify a fourth option to perform a daily inspection to verify 
the fuel shutoff valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel 
shutoff valve indication does not function properly.

Request for Clarification Regarding the FUEL CONTROL Switch

    UAL requested that a statement be included in the proposed AD (79 
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify that it is not required to cycle 
the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, as specified in Boeing Airplane 
Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28-22-00, for the ALI task specified in figure 
2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD.
    We agree with the commenter's request. We have added a note in 
figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD stating that it is not necessary 
to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do the inspection.

Request To Correct a Typographical Error

    UAL requested that a typographical error be corrected in the NPRM 
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that figure 1 to paragraph (g) 
of the NPRM states, ``Item C.4 instructs to make sure Land R ENG START 
selector switches on the overhead panel are in the OFF position.'' UAL 
stated that this is a typographical error and the selector switches 
should be L and R ENG START selector switches.
    We agree and have corrected the typographical error in figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly. Paragraph C.4. of figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD, as it appeared in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, 
March 5, 2014), has been re-designated as paragraph C.5. of figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD.

Additional Changes Made to This AD

    In the Description column of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD, 
we have removed the phrase ``refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-00'' with regard 
to performing an inspection of the fuel spar valve MOV actuator 
position.
    In paragraph C.7.a. in the Description column of figure 1 to 
paragraph (g) of this AD, and in paragraph A.5. in the Description 
column of figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added wording 
specifying to wait ``approximately'' 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL 
switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector switch on the 
overhead panel is in the ON position.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial 
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
     Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the 
NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition; 
and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014).
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Interim Action

    We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently 
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition 
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, 
and available, we may consider additional rulemaking.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 450 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                    Cost per       Cost on U.S.
               Action                        Labor cost           Parts cost        product         operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness           1 work-hour x $85 per                $0              $85          $38,250
 Limitation.                           hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

[[Page 55518]]

    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2015-19-02 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18265; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective October 21, 2015.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 28, Fuel.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff 
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing 
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff 
valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could 
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, 
in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to 
structural failure.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program

    Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the 
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add 
airworthiness limitation numbers 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV, and 28-AWL-
APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1, Figure 
2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness 
Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. 
The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified 
in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD is 
within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection 
program revision required by this paragraph.

      Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
                                                Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG..................  ALI            DAILY...............  767-200, -300, and - Engine Fuel Shutoff
                                             INTERVAL NOTE: The     300F airplanes.      Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
                                              operational check    APPLICABILITY NOTE:   Position Indication
                                              is not required on    Applies to           Operational Check.
                                              days when the         airplanes with an   Concern: The fuel spar
                                              airplane is not       actuator installed   valve actuator design
                                              used in revenue       at the engine fuel   can result in airplanes
                                              service..             spar valve           operating with a failed
                                             The check must be      position having      fuel spar valve
                                              done before further   part number (P/N)    actuator that is not
                                              flight once the       MA20A2027            reported. A latently
                                              airplane is           (S343T003-56) or P/  failed fuel spar valve
                                              returned to revenue   N MA30A1001          actuator could prevent
                                              service.              (S343T003-66)..      fuel shutoff to an
                                                                                         engine. In the event of
                                                                                         certain engine fires,
                                                                                         the potential exists
                                                                                         for an engine fire to
                                                                                         be uncontrollable.
                                                                                        Perform one of the
                                                                                         following checks/
                                                                                         inspection of the fuel
                                                                                         spar valve position
                                                                                         (unless checked by the
                                                                                         flightcrew in a manner
                                                                                         approved by the
                                                                                         principal operations
                                                                                         inspector):
                                                                                        A. Operational Check
                                                                                         during engine shutdown.
                                                                                        1. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the CUTOFF position,
                                                                                         verify the left SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing
                                                                                         airplane maintenance
                                                                                         manual (AMM) 28-22-11).
                                                                                        2. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the CUTOFF position,
                                                                                         verify the right SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        B. Operational check
                                                                                         during engine start.
                                                                                        1. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.

[[Page 55519]]

 
                                                                                        a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the RUN (or RICH)
                                                                                         position, verify the
                                                                                         left SPAR VALVE
                                                                                         disagreement light on
                                                                                         the quadrant control
                                                                                         stand illuminates and
                                                                                         then goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        2. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand is moved
                                                                                         to the RUN (or RICH)
                                                                                         position, verify the
                                                                                         right SPAR VALVE
                                                                                         disagreement light on
                                                                                         the quadrant control
                                                                                         stand illuminates and
                                                                                         then goes off.
                                                                                        b. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        C. Operational check
                                                                                         without engine
                                                                                         operation.
                                                                                        1. Supply electrical
                                                                                         power to the airplane
                                                                                         using standard
                                                                                         practices.
                                                                                        2. Make sure all fuel
                                                                                         pump switches on the
                                                                                         Overhead Panel are in
                                                                                         the OFF position.
                                                                                        3. If the auxiliary
                                                                                         power unit (APU) is
                                                                                         running, open and
                                                                                         collar the L FWD FUEL
                                                                                         BOOST PUMP (C00372)
                                                                                         circuit breaker on the
                                                                                         Main Power Distribution
                                                                                         Panel.
                                                                                        4. Make sure LEFT and
                                                                                         RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
                                                                                         on the Aft Aisle Stand
                                                                                         are in the NORMAL (IN)
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        5. Make sure L and R ENG
                                                                                         START Selector Switches
                                                                                         on the Overhead Panel,
                                                                                         are in the OFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        6. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. Move L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         RUN position and wait
                                                                                         approximately 10
                                                                                         seconds.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is normal under
                                                                                         this test condition for
                                                                                         the ENG VALVE
                                                                                         disagreement light on
                                                                                         the quadrant control
                                                                                         stand to stay
                                                                                         illuminated.
                                                                                        b. Move L FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         CUTOFF position.
                                                                                        c. Verify the left SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        d. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        7. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator.
                                                                                        a. Move R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         RUN position and wait
                                                                                         approximately 10
                                                                                         seconds once the FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch is in
                                                                                         the RUN position or the
                                                                                         APU selector switch on
                                                                                         the overhead panel is
                                                                                         in the ON position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is normal under
                                                                                         this test condition for
                                                                                         the ENG VALVE
                                                                                         disagreement light on
                                                                                         the quadrant control
                                                                                         stand to stay
                                                                                         illuminated.
                                                                                        b. Move R FUEL CONTROL
                                                                                         switch on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand to the
                                                                                         CUTOFF position.
                                                                                        c. Verify the right SPAR
                                                                                         VALVE disagreement
                                                                                         light on the quadrant
                                                                                         control stand
                                                                                         illuminates and then
                                                                                         goes off.
                                                                                        d. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        8. If the L FWD FUEL
                                                                                         BOOST PUMP circuit
                                                                                         breaker was collared in
                                                                                         step 3, remove collar
                                                                                         and close.
                                                                                        D. Perform an inspection
                                                                                         of the fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator position.

[[Page 55520]]

 
                                                                                        NOTE: This inspection
                                                                                         may be most useful
                                                                                         whenever the SPAR VALVE
                                                                                         light does not function
                                                                                         properly.
                                                                                        1. Make sure the L FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                         quadrant control stand
                                                                                         is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        2. Inspect the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         left rear spar.
                                                                                        NOTE: The Fuel Spar
                                                                                         Valve actuators are
                                                                                         located behind main
                                                                                         gear doors on the rear
                                                                                         spar.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator is in the
                                                                                         CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        3. Make sure the R FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                         quadrant control stand
                                                                                         is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        4. Inspect the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         right rear spar.
                                                                                        NOTE: The Fuel Spar
                                                                                         Valve actuators are
                                                                                         located behind main
                                                                                         gear doors on the rear
                                                                                         spar.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator is in the
                                                                                         CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


      Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Inspection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV..................  ALI            10 DAYS.............  767-400ER series     Engine Fuel Shutoff
                                             INTERVAL NOTE: The     airplanes.           Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
                                              inspection is not    APPLICABILITY NOTE:   Actuator Inspection
                                              required on days      Applies to          Concern: The fuel spar
                                              when the airplane     airplanes with an    valve actuator design
                                              is not used in        actuator installed   can result in airplanes
                                              revenue service.      at the engine fuel   operating with a failed
                                              The inspection must   spar valve           fuel spar valve
                                              be done before        position having      actuator that is not
                                              further flight if     part number (P/N)    reported. A latently
                                              it has been 10 or     MA20A2027            failed fuel spar valve
                                              more calendar days    (S343T003-56) or P/  actuator would prevent
                                              since last            N MA30A1001          fuel shutoff to an
                                              inspection..          (S343T003-66)..      engine. In the event of
                                                                                         certain engine fires,
                                                                                         the potential exists
                                                                                         for an engine fire to
                                                                                         be uncontrollable.
                                                                                        Perform an inspection of
                                                                                         the fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator position.
                                                                                        NOTE: The fuel spar
                                                                                         valve actuators are
                                                                                         located behind main
                                                                                         gear doors on the rear
                                                                                         spar.
                                                                                        1. Make sure the L FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                         quadrant control stand
                                                                                         is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        2. Inspect the left
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         left rear spar.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator is in the
                                                                                         CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
                                                                                        3. Make sure the R FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch on the
                                                                                         quadrant control stand
                                                                                         is in the CUTOFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        NOTE: It is not
                                                                                         necessary to cycle the
                                                                                         FUEL CONTROL switch to
                                                                                         do this inspection.
                                                                                        4. Inspect the right
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator located in the
                                                                                         right rear spar.
                                                                                        a. Verify the manual
                                                                                         override handle on the
                                                                                         engine fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator is in the
                                                                                         CLOSED position.
                                                                                        b. Repair or replace any
                                                                                         fuel spar valve
                                                                                         actuator that is not in
                                                                                         the CLOSED position
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 55521]]


     Figure 3 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication
                                                Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           AWL No.                 Task            Interval           Applicability            Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-APU..................  ALI            10 DAYS.............  ALL................  APU Fuel Shutoff Valve
                                             INTERVAL NOTE: The    APPLICABILITY NOTE:   Position Indication
                                              operational check     Applies to           Operational Check
                                              is not required on    airplanes with an   Concern: The APU fuel
                                              days when the         actuator installed   shutoff valve actuator
                                              airplane is not       at the APU fuel      design can result in
                                              used in revenue       shutoff valve        airplanes operating
                                              service. The          position having      with a failed APU fuel
                                              operational check     part number (P/N)    shutoff valve actuator
                                              must be done before   MA20A2027            that is not reported. A
                                              further flight with   (S343T003-56) or     latently failed APU
                                              an operational APU    MA30A1001            fuel shutoff valve
                                              if it has been 10     (S343T003-66)..      actuator could prevent
                                              or more calendar                           fuel shutoff to the
                                              days since last                            APU. In the event of
                                              check..                                    certain APU fires, the
                                                                                         potential exists for an
                                                                                         APU fire to be
                                                                                         uncontrollable.
                                                                                        Perform the operational
                                                                                         check of the APU fuel
                                                                                         shutoff valve position
                                                                                         indication (unless
                                                                                         checked by the
                                                                                         flightcrew in a manner
                                                                                         approved by the
                                                                                         principal operations
                                                                                         inspector).
                                                                                        A. Do an operational
                                                                                         check of the APU fuel
                                                                                         shutoff valve position
                                                                                         indication.
                                                                                        1. If the APU is
                                                                                         running, unload and
                                                                                         shut down the APU using
                                                                                         standard practices.
                                                                                        2. Supply electrical
                                                                                         power to the airplane
                                                                                         using standard
                                                                                         practices.
                                                                                        3. Make sure the APU
                                                                                         FIRE switch on the Aft
                                                                                         Aisle Stand is in the
                                                                                         NORMAL (IN) position.
                                                                                        4. Make sure there is at
                                                                                         least 1,000 lbs (500
                                                                                         kgs) of fuel in the
                                                                                         Left Main Tank.
                                                                                        5. Move APU Selector
                                                                                         switch on the Overhead
                                                                                         Panel to the ON
                                                                                         position and wait
                                                                                         approximately 10
                                                                                         seconds once the FUEL
                                                                                         CONTROL switch is in
                                                                                         the RUN position or the
                                                                                         APU selector switch on
                                                                                         the overhead panel is
                                                                                         in the ON position.
                                                                                        6. Move the APU Selector
                                                                                         switch on the Overhead
                                                                                         Panel to the OFF
                                                                                         position.
                                                                                        7. Verify the APU FAULT
                                                                                         light on the Overhead
                                                                                         Panel illuminates and
                                                                                         then goes off.
                                                                                        8. If the test fails
                                                                                         (light fails to
                                                                                         illuminate), before
                                                                                         further flight
                                                                                         requiring APU
                                                                                         availability, repair
                                                                                         faults as required
                                                                                         (refer to Boeing AMM 28-
                                                                                         25-02).
                                                                                        NOTE: Dispatch may be
                                                                                         permitted per MMEL 28-
                                                                                         25-02 if APU is not
                                                                                         required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals

    After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program 
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative 
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the 
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of 
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in 
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local 
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. 
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols, 
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle 
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: 
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    None.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23119 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 4910-13-P