Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes, 55512-55521 [2015-23119]
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FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
ALI
Applicability
Description
10 DAYS ............................
ALL ....................................
INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the
airplane is not used in
revenue service.
Must be done before further flight with an operational APU if it has
been 10 or more calendar days since last
check.
28–AWL–APU .......
Interval
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Only applies to airplanes
with an MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66) actuator
installed at the APU fuel
shutoff valve position.
APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check.
Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design
can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU
fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could
prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector).
A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication.
1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the
APU using standard practices.
2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices.
3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle
Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at least 700 lbs (300 kgs) of fuel
in the Left Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds.
6. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the OFF position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel
illuminates and then goes off.
8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as
required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–11).
NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–
2 if APU is not required for flight.
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
(j) Related Information
After accomplishment of the maintenance
or inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
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(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
16:46 Sep 15, 2015
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(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
VerDate Sep<11>2014
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23120 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0127; Directorate
Identifier 2013–NM–237–AD; Amendment
39–18265; AD 2015–19–02]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes.
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves
discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include new airworthiness
limitations. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
auxiliary power unit (APU), which
SUMMARY:
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could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and APU and, in case
of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire
that could lead to structural failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21,
2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0127; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is
Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax:
425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would
apply to all The Boeing Company Model
767 airplanes. The NPRM published in
the Federal Register on March 5, 2014
(79 FR 12420). The NPRM was
prompted by reports of latently failed
fuel shutoff valves discovered during
fuel filter replacement. The NPRM
proposed to require revising the
maintenance or inspection program to
include new airworthiness limitations.
We are issuing this AD to detect and
correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine and APU, which
could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and APU and, in case
of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire
that could lead to structural failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as
NPRMs and immediately adopted rules,
it is the practice of the FAA to obtain
technical information and information
on operational and economic impacts
from design approval holders and
aircraft operators. We discussed certain
comments addressed in this final rule in
a teleconference with Airlines for
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13:48 Sep 15, 2015
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America (A4A) and other members of
the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this
teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments
submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found
in the rulemaking docket at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0127.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final
rule, commenters may have used the
terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel
spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the same part. In our responses
to comments, we have used the term
‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar
valve’’ is more commonly used in
airplane maintenance documentation
and, therefore, we have used that term
in figure 1 and figure 2 to paragraph (g)
of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. The
following presents the comments
received on the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response
to each comment.
Requests To Withdraw the NPRM (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that
Boeing’s internal review found that the
issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014) is not a safety
concern, and Boeing has not
recommended any interim action on
this issue. In addition, AA stated that
Boeing is addressing the issue in the
long term with a design change to the
motor-operated valve (MOV) actuator of
the fuel shutoff valve.
All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated it
agrees with a statement in ‘‘767–FTD–
28–12003 issued by Boeing’’ indicating
that the combination of the events
(engine fire and spar valve failures) is
extremely improbable. ANA requested
clarification of the rationale for the
proposed intervals. ANA stated that it
has operated more than 100 Model 767
airplanes for approximately 30 years
and has never had such failure with the
MOVs.
We infer that AA and ANA requested
that the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) be withdrawn.
We disagree with the commenters’
request to withdraw the NPRM (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014). We have
determined that an unsafe condition
exists that warrants an interim action
until the manufacturer finishes
developing a modification that will
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address the identified unsafe condition.
Boeing did not formally comment on
whether it considers this issue to be an
unsafe condition. We have determined
that, without the required interim
actions, a significant number of flights
with a fuel shutoff valve actuator that is
failed latently in the open valve position
will occur during the affected fleet life.
With a failed fuel shutoff valve, if
certain fire conditions were to occur, or
if extreme engine or APU damage were
to occur, or if an engine separation
event were to occur during flight, the
crew procedures for such an event
would not stop the fuel flow to the
engine strut and nacelle or APU. The
continued flow of fuel could cause an
uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel
exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all
transport airplanes to be fail safe with
respect to engine or APU fire events,
and the risk due to severe engine or
APU damage events to be minimized.
Therefore, we require, for each flight,
sufficiently operative fire safety systems
so that fires can be detected and
contained, and fuel to the engine strut
and nacelle or APU can be shut off in
the event of an engine or APU fire or
severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards
require remotely controlled powerplant
valves to provide indications that the
valves are in the commanded position.
These indications allow the prompt
detection and correction of valve
failures. We do not allow dispatch with
a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve.
Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular
valve actuator involved, but instead
because the fuel shutoff valve actuator
can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication
feature. That failure can lead to a large
number of flights occurring on an
airplane with a fuel shutoff valve
actuator failed in the open position
without the operator being aware of the
failure. Airworthiness limitations
containing required inspections are
intended to limit the number of flights
following latent failure of the fuel
shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the
unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Applicability of
Certain Requirements
Delta Airlines (DAL) and United
Airlines (UAL) requested that we revise
the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March
5, 2014) to limit the applicability
specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure
3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
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to airplanes with fuel shutoff valve
actuators on which the identified unsafe
condition exists.
DAL stated that it would be feasible
to implement configuration control to
ensure that part number (P/N)
MA30A1001 is removed, and does not
get installed in the engine or APU fuel
shutoff valve positions in the future.
DAL stated it would replace any P/N
MA30A1001 actuators that are currently
in those locations with actuators of a
different acceptable part number, which
would, in turn, alleviate the unsafe
condition given in the NPRM (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014). DAL stated that
if an operator does not have P/N
MA30A1001 installed on any engine or
APU fuel shutoff valve positions, then
that operator would not be required to
adhere to airworthiness limitations 28–
AWL–ENG, 28–AWL–MOV, or 28–
AWL–APU.
UAL stated that the proposed AD (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) does not
specify which part number of the MOV
actuator is applicable to the proposed
AD. UAL stated that proposed ADs were
issued for Model 737NG, 757, 767, and
777 airplanes to replace the MOV
actuator with P/N MA30A1001. UAL
also stated that there are issues with the
MOV actuator part number, and
presumes that the proposed AD is for
MOV actuator P/N MA30A1001.
We agree with the commenters’
request. Only two fuel shutoff valve
actuator designs are susceptible to the
unsafe condition specified in this final
rule, and it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections
on airplanes that do not have any of the
susceptible valves installed. We have
changed the Applicability column in
figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that
the limitations apply to Model 767
airplanes having fuel shutoff valve
actuator P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003–
56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003–66)
installed at the engine or APU fuel
shutoff valve position, as appropriate.
Request To Change the Initial
Compliance Time for the Operational
Check
AA requested that the compliance
time for the initial accomplishment of
the actions specified in figure 1, figure
2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) be extended from 7 days to 60
days. AA stated that more time is
needed for publishing the new criteria
and for distribution of cards and
manuals/checklists. AA stated that the
7-day compliance time is not justified
by the failure rates for this safety
concern.
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We partially agree with the
commenter’s request. We have changed
the initial compliance time to 10 days
for accomplishing the actions specified
in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of this AD. The
compliance time of 10 days is consistent
with regulatory actions for other
affected models. We have determined
that the initial compliance time for the
inspection represents an appropriate
time in which the required actions can
be performed in a timely manner within
the affected fleet, while still maintaining
an adequate level of safety.
In developing an appropriate
compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability,
and normal maintenance schedules for
timely accomplishment of the
operational checks. The operational
check procedures and the access
procedures are simple and already
established. The check itself involves a
visual inspection of an existing
prominent design feature that is
intended to indicate the position of the
fuel shutoff valve actuator and is
described in existing maintenance
documentation. The manufacturer does
not expect a large number of latently
failed valve actuators to be discovered.
Existing parts stores are expected to be
sufficient, and parts can be repositioned
in time to support the initial
inspections. However, under the
provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD,
we might consider requests for
adjustments to the compliance time if
data are submitted to substantiate that
such an adjustment would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
Request To Change the Proposed
Requirement for the MOV Actuator
Inspection
Boeing requested that the proposed
requirement to ‘‘incorporate the MOV
actuator inspection into the
Airworthiness Limitations (AWL)
Section of the Instructions for
Continued Airworthiness of operator’s
maintenance or inspection programs’’ be
replaced with an AD requirement to
perform the MOV inspection per the
specific interval in paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014). Boeing stated that the MOV
inspection in paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD is an interim mitigation
until a redesigned MOV can be installed
in the spar valve locations. Boeing
stated that including the interval
requirement as the required AD action
would allow installation of the
redesigned MOV to be approved as an
alternative method of compliance
(AMOC) to the AD, and as a terminating
action for the repetitive inspections,
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while avoiding the need for regulatory
approval to remove the AWL from each
operator’s maintenance or inspection
program. In addition, Boeing stated the
AWLs are permanent actions that affect
operators’ planning and scheduling, and
that incorporating a temporary AWL
into the operators’ maintenance
documents or a Boeing maintenance
planning data (MPD) document will
cause confusion among operators.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request. During the development of the
NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), we
discussed the impact of an AWL
revision versus a repetitive inspection
requirement with Boeing, who, in turn,
discussed it with a sample of operators.
At that time, both Boeing and the
operators indicated that the addition of
an AWL was the preferred solution
because it would reduce the record
keeping required to document AD
compliance. Affected operators who
wish to use a repetitive inspection
requirement in place of an AWL
revision may apply for approval of an
AMOC in accordance with the
provisions specified in paragraph (i)(1)
of this AD by submitting data
substantiating that the request would
provide an acceptable level of safety.
We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request To Extend the Daily Inspection
Requirement
UAL asked whether there are any
provisions established by the FAA to
extend the daily inspection requirement
if the reliability data are captured. UAL
stated that there is no valid justification
for this short time limit that creates a
burden on airline operations.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request. Our unsafe condition
determination is primarily driven by the
potential for a common-cause failure of
the valve and its position indication—
and not by a lack of reliability. We are
aware that this failure has happened in
service, and we expect that tens of
thousands of flights will occur with this
valve failed in the open position
without indicating the failure unless
frequent inspections are made.
Fortunately, the effort required to check
the valve operation is small for most
airplanes. For Model 767–200 and –300
series airplanes, we expect that most
airlines will have the flightcrew monitor
a light near the switch they are using to
shut down the engine. The total time
needed should be less than a few
seconds. In addition, new fuel shutoff
valve actuators are being developed that
will allow removal of this requirement
once they are installed. Therefore, we
have no plans to extend the interval
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based on updated reliability data. We
have not changed this AD in this regard.
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Request for Inspection Relief
UAL noted there is no provision in
the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March
5, 2014) to allow a waiver of the daily
inspection requirements if an airplane is
out of service for any reason or in a
remote station where the daily
inspection cannot be accomplished. Air
Do asked if the daily check must be
done once a day even if the airplane
does not have a flight plan. We infer the
commenters are requesting that we
revise the proposed AD to allow
exceptions to the daily check specified
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD.
AA requested that the proposed AD
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be
clarified to specify that daily checks
only apply when the airplane is in
operational revenue service. AA also
stated to restart the interval of 10 days
or 100 flight hours/50 cycles, whichever
occurs later, once an APU is returned to
service from the minimum equipment
list.
We partially agree with the
commenters’ requests. We agree to limit
inspections to days when the airplane is
in revenue service or when the APU is
in operational status because it would
be unnecessarily burdensome to require
the inspections on airplanes that are not
in operation. In figure 1, figure 2, and
figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we
have added a note in the Interval
column to clarify that the operational
check is not required on days when the
airplane is not used in revenue service.
For figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD,
we also specify that the check of the
engine fuel shutoff valve must be done
before further flight once the airplane is
returned to revenue service. In figure 2
and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD,
we have specified that the check or
inspection must be done before further
flight if it has been 10 or more calendar
days since last check or inspection.
We disagree with restarting the 10-day
cycle once an APU is returned to service
because the APU fuel shutoff valve
check should not be extended because
the APU was out of service for a time.
For the APU, it is likely that this test
will be done as a matter of course
whenever it is returned to service.
Request To Extend the Repetitive
Interval
AA, ANA, DAL, and Japan Airlines
(JAL) requested that the repetitive
interval be extended for the actions
specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure
3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014).
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AA requested that the repetitive
inspection interval be extended to ‘‘10
days or 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles,
whichever occurs later.’’ AA requested
that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014) to add the choice
of monitoring the disagreement light to
check the indication and physically
check the closure of the valve at ‘‘100
flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs
later’’ as an alternative maintenance
task. AA stated that operators of Model
767–400 series airplanes identified in
the NPRM are allowed 10 days to
inspect the spar valve actuator arm
when it is fully closed and commanded
closed. AA stated that the 10 days
equates closely to ‘‘100 flight hours/50
cycles.’’ AA also stated that Model 767–
200, –300, and –400 series airplanes
have the same actuator valve and
indication, except that Model 767–400
series airplanes do not have a
disagreement light.
ANA stated it has reviewed the NPRM
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), and is
disappointed with the intervals of the
operational checks because the intervals
are daily for engine fuel spar valves on
Boeing Model 767–200, –300, and
–300F series airplanes, and 10 days for
APU fuel valves; the proposed intervals
will definitely affect its operations.
ANA stated that it does not have Model
767–400 airplanes, but that the
operational effect is the same. ANA
suggested a compliance time of ‘‘6,000
flight hours or 22 months whichever
comes first’’ for both engine spar valves
and APU fuel valves.
DAL stated that Model 767–300 and
–400 series airplanes contain similar
systems with respect to engine fuel
shutoff. DAL stated that Model 767–300
and –400 series airplanes are also
equipped with the same part number for
the MOV actuator. DAL stated that,
therefore, the failure modes between the
two airplane models should be
identical. DAL stated that since the FAA
considers a 10-day interval sufficient for
Model 767–400 series airplanes, and
also for the APU fuel shutoff actuator for
all Model 767 airplanes, it proposes to
change the interval in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this proposed AD to 10
days.
We disagree with the commenters’
requests. Increasing the check interval
from daily to every 10 days for the AWL
task specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of this AD would result in 10 times
as many flights at risk of an
uncontrollable engine fire; the daily
check has been deemed practical
because in practice it will mean the
flightcrew will need to watch a light just
above the FUEL CONTROL switch as
they start or shut down the engine. As
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AA stated, Model 767–400ER series
airplanes do not have the disagreement
light, so the inspection is more complex.
As a result, regardless of how desirable
a daily inspection would be, we
determined it is not practical to require
that inspection on a daily basis on
Model 767–400ER series airplanes. We
have not changed this AD in this regard.
As we discussed previously, the
reason for this final rule is not simply
a high valve failure rate in the open
position, but rather a design error that
allows a single failure within a fuel
shutoff valve actuator to affect both the
control of the valve and the indication
of the valve’s position. Currently these
failures are only discovered during fuel
filter changes, which occur every 6,000
flight hours. ANA’s proposal is to check
the system every 6,000 flight hours. A
dedicated inspection every 6,000 flight
hours would have little impact on the
number of flights at risk. Indication and
control of the fuel shutoff valve are not
independent because of the design error
in the affected valve actuators. For a
failed fuel shutoff valve, the valve
indication system erroneously reports
that the valve is opening and closing. If
no action is taken, we anticipate a
significant number of flights to occur
with a failed open fuel shutoff valve.
Without this AD, our risk assessment
and the manufacturer’s risk assessment
predict that tens of thousands of such
flights would occur in the fleet of Model
767 airplanes.
In addition to this fuel shutoff valve
design error, the affected valves have a
higher-than-typical rate of failure in
several failure modes. We have received
several reports of valves failed open
(discovered only when fuel filters were
changed), valves failed closed
(preventing engine start), and valves
that spontaneously closed in flight
(causing an engine shutdown). Boeing’s
long-term solution, a fuel shutoff valve
actuator design change, is intended to
address these issues in addition to
restoring the independence of the
actuator control and indication features.
The APU, on the other hand, presents a
much lower risk and is needed in flight
on a small number of flights. In
addition, normal APU starting
procedures include this check on every
start, so it is likely that this check is
already being done on a more frequent
basis. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
Request To Justify the Proposed
Inspection Interval
ANA requested that rationale be
provided to justify the proposed
inspection interval, including the
interval differences between the engine
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and the APU, and the interval between
Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes.
We agree to provide the requested
rationale. While the potential for the
problem is the same for Model 767 and
Model 777 airplanes, the ability to
check the system functionality is
different. Both types of airplanes
warrant a daily check, but we also
consider the practicality of an
inspection. On Model 767–200, –300,
and –300F series airplanes, the
flightcrew will need to watch the
disagreement light located just above
the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start
or shut down the engine. Model 777
airplanes, like Model 767–400ER series
airplanes, do not have a disagreement
light so the inspection is more time
consuming. As a result, regardless of
how desirable a daily inspection would
be for Model 777 airplanes, we
determined it is not practical to require
that inspection on a daily basis.
In regard to the APU, it is not run on
every flight, so a properly functioning
fuel shutoff valve is not needed for
every flight. We decided to require the
check every 10 days rather than try to
monitor APU usage. Also, it should be
noted that this check is part of a normal
APU start, so it will likely be done on
every start; this AD requires that it be
done at least every 10 days. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Provide Instructions for
Compliance With the Extended
Operations (ETOPS) Requirement
UAL requested instructions for
compliance with the ETOPS
requirement that would meet the
operational check requirements. UAL
requested that we revise the NPRM (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify
whether standardized procedures will
be established for inspectors to make
approvals for all affected operators. UAL
stated that since the affected airplanes
have ETOPS approval, the NPRM
should provide instructions for
compliance with the ETOPS
requirements. UAL asked that the FAA
provide guidance to the principal
operations inspector (POI) on required
procedures that would meet the
operational check requirements.
We agree that clarification is needed.
We infer the commenter means that
checks of the left and right engine fuel
shutoff valves are done by different
individuals due to ETOPS maintenance
requirements. Since none of the
required inspections include actions
that could contribute to an engine
shutdown, there is no common-cause
engine shutdown potential and,
therefore, no need for different
individuals to perform the inspections
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on the left and right fuel shutoff valve
actuators to meet ETOPS maintenance
requirements. No additional guidance to
the POIs is necessary.
Request To Expand Inspection To
Confirm Functionality
DAL requested we expand the
inspection at the spar for confirmation
of functionality on Model 767–300
series airplanes using the same method
of inspection and the same auxiliary
power unit position as those for the
Boeing Model 767–400 series airplanes.
DAL stated that a check of the actual
valve position every 10 days would be
a more effective inspection. DAL stated
that ‘‘FTD Article 767–FTD–28–12003’’
(Boeing Fleet Team Digest) states that,
‘‘The indication showed the valve had
closed when it had failed in the open
position.’’ DAL stated that the flight
deck indication may not accurately
reflect functionality.
We partially agree with the
commenter’s request. We agree to add
an inspection option for Model 767–300
airplanes that is similar to the
inspection for Model 767–400ER series
airplanes. Therefore, for Model 767–
200, –300, and –300F series airplanes,
we have added item D. to figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a
fourth option to perform a daily
inspection to verify the fuel shutoff
valve is closing. However, we disagree
with extending the inspection interval
to 10 days. As stated previously,
increasing the inspection interval from
every day to every 10 days for the AWL
task specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of this AD would result in 10 times
as many flights at risk of an
uncontrollable engine fire.
Request To Add a Requirement To
Provide Electrical Power Before the
Operational Check
UAL requested that we revise the
proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) to add a requirement to provide
electrical power before performing the
operational check required by figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD. UAL
stated that electrical power is required
to perform the check, and other
maintenance may be done that could
deactivate required circuits.
We agree with the commenter’s
request because electrical power is
required. In figure 1 and figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added
a requirement to supply electrical power
to the airplane using standard practices
when performing the operational check.
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Request To Clarify the Operational
Check Requirements
Air Do stated that, if the flightcrew
performed the operational check, the
maintenance record is usually not
created. The commenter questioned
whether this is acceptable, or whether
the flightcrew should record it in the
flight log.
UAL requested clarification on
whether the flightcrew will not have to
record compliance for one of the checks
and that documentation for each
inspection on every airplane need not
be made if relying on flightcrew
compliance with the proposed AD.
JAL requested that the FAA
coordinate with Boeing to include an
appropriate check procedure in the
Normal Procedure (NP) section of the
flightcrew operating manual (FCOM).
We find that clarification is necessary.
This AD requires including the
information specified in figure 1, figure
2, and figure 3 of paragraph (g) of the
AD in the maintenance or inspection
program; however, the actions specified
in the figures in this AD are
accomplished, and remain enforceable,
as part of the Airworthiness Limitations
of the Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness. Section 43.11(a) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
43.11(a)) requires maintenance record
entries for maintenance actions such as
this inspection. If an operator elects to
have a flightcrew member do an
inspection in accordance with the
applicable airworthiness limitation, that
same action would be considered an
operational task—not maintenance—
and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not
apply. Regarding JAL’s comment, an
FCOM is a Boeing document that we
neither approve nor control. We have
not changed this AD with regard to
these issues.
Request To Clarify the Requirements
for Certain Disagreement Lights
UAL requested that we clarify the
requirements in figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014). UAL stated that items
C.6.a. and C.7.a. of figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of the proposed AD instruct to move
the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches,
respectively, to the RUN position, but
do not instruct to monitor the left and
right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights,
unlike item C.6.c. and item C.7.c. UAL
stated that it presumes it is not required
to verify the left and right SPAR VALVE
disagreement lights when the L and R
FUEL CONTROL switches are moved to
the RUN position.
We agree to provide clarification. It is
not required to verify the left and right
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SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when
the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches
are moved to the RUN position during
that portion of the operational check.
We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request for Clarification on Applying a
Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Maintenance Action
First Air requested clarification of the
proposed corrective action for an
inoperative indication—specifically,
whether operators could still apply an
MEL maintenance action and meet the
intent of the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014). First Air stated that the
operational checks in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for
engine spar valves are predicated on the
SPAR VALVE light being operative.
First Air stated that MEL 28–40–02
provides relief should the indication be
inoperative.
We agree that clarification is needed.
We disagree with providing MEL relief
for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve
indication because MEL relief could
potentially allow the valve to be
inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue
operation. However, we do agree to
provide flexibility regarding verification
that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is
operational. We have added item D. to
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to
specify a fourth option to perform a
daily inspection to verify the fuel
shutoff valve is closing, which can be
used when the fuel shutoff valve
indication does not function properly.
Request for Clarification Regarding the
FUEL CONTROL Switch
UAL requested that a statement be
included in the proposed AD (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify that it
is not required to cycle the L and R
FUEL CONTROL switches, as specified
in Boeing Airplane Maintenance
Manual (AMM) 28–22–00, for the ALI
task specified in figure 2 to paragraph
(g) of the proposed AD.
We agree with the commenter’s
request. We have added a note in figure
2 to paragraph (g) of this AD stating that
it is not necessary to cycle the FUEL
CONTROL switch to do the inspection.
Request To Correct a Typographical
Error
UAL requested that a typographical
error be corrected in the NPRM (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the NPRM
states, ‘‘Item C.4 instructs to make sure
Land R ENG START selector switches
on the overhead panel are in the OFF
position.’’ UAL stated that this is a
typographical error and the selector
switches should be L and R ENG START
selector switches.
We agree and have corrected the
typographical error in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly.
Paragraph C.4. of figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of this AD, as it appeared in the
NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014),
has been re-designated as paragraph C.5.
of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
Additional Changes Made to This AD
In the Description column of figure 2
to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
removed the phrase ‘‘refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–00’’ with regard to
performing an inspection of the fuel
spar valve MOV actuator position.
In paragraph C.7.a. in the Description
column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD, and in paragraph A.5. in the
55517
Description column of figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added
wording specifying to wait
‘‘approximately’’ 10 seconds once the
FUEL CONTROL switch is in the RUN
position or the APU selector switch on
the overhead panel is in the ON
position.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data,
considered the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting this AD
with the changes described previously
and minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
• Are consistent with the intent that
was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014) for correcting the
unsafe condition; and
• Do not add any additional burden
upon the public than was already
proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these
changes will not increase the economic
burden on any operator or increase the
scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action.
The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will
address the unsafe condition identified
in this AD. Once this modification is
developed, approved, and available, we
may consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 450
airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to
comply with this AD:
ESTIMATED COSTS
Labor cost
Parts cost
Cost per
product
Cost on U.S.
operators
Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............
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Action
1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 .................
$0
$85
$38,250
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
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air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
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the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
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(4) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2015–19–02 The Boeing Company:
Amendment 39–18265; Docket No.
FAA–2014–0127; Directorate Identifier
2013–NM–237–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing
Company Model 767–200, –300, –300F, and
–400ER series airplanes, certificated in any
category.
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)
Code 28, Fuel.
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered
during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures
of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine and
auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the
engine and APU and, in case of certain fires,
an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection
Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of
this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection
program, as applicable, to add airworthiness
limitation numbers 28–AWL–ENG, 28–AWL–
MOV, and 28–AWL–APU, by incorporating
the information specified in Figure 1, Figure
2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD
into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of
the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
The initial compliance time for
accomplishing the actions specified in Figure
1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of
this AD is within 10 days after accomplishing
the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by this paragraph.
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
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28–AWL–ENG ......
VerDate Sep<11>2014
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
DAILY ................................
INTERVAL NOTE: The
operational check is not
required on days when
the airplane is not used
in revenue service.
The check must be done
before further flight once
the airplane is returned
to revenue service.
767–200, –300, and –300F
airplanes.
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Applies to airplanes with
an actuator installed at
the engine fuel spar
valve position having
part number (P/N)
MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or P/N
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66).
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
Indication Operational Check.
Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to
an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the following checks/inspection of the
fuel spar valve position (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector):
A. Operational Check during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position,
verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
airplane maintenance manual (AMM) 28–22–11).
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the CUTOFF position,
verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
B. Operational check during engine start.
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
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55519
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
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AWL No.
Task
Interval
Applicability
Description
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light
on the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved to the RUN (or RICH) position, verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant control stand illuminates and
then goes off.
b. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
C. Operational check without engine operation.
1. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices.
2. Make sure all fuel pump switches on the Overhead
Panel are in the OFF position.
3. If the auxiliary power unit (APU) is running, open
and collar the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP
(C00372) circuit breaker on the Main Power Distribution Panel.
4. Make sure LEFT and RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
on the Aft Aisle Stand are in the NORMAL (IN) position.
5. Make sure L and R ENG START Selector Switches
on the Overhead Panel, are in the OFF position.
6. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant
control stand to stay illuminated.
b. Move L FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the left SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
7. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the RUN position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL
switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector
switch on the overhead panel is in the ON position.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE disagreement light on the quadrant
control stand to stay illuminated.
b. Move R FUEL CONTROL switch on the quadrant
control stand to the CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the right SPAR VALVE disagreement light on
the quadrant control stand illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing
AMM 28–22–11).
8. If the L FWD FUEL BOOST PUMP circuit breaker
was collared in step 3, remove collar and close.
D. Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator position.
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FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
AWL No.
Task
Interval
Applicability
Description
NOTE: This inspection may be most useful whenever
the SPAR VALVE light does not function properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar.
NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM
28–22–11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar.
NOTE: The Fuel Spar Valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM
28–22–11).
FIGURE 2 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR INSPECTION
AWL No.
Task
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28–AWL–MOV ......
VerDate Sep<11>2014
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
10 DAYS ............................
INTERVAL NOTE: The inspection is not required
on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service. The inspection must be done
before further flight if it
has been 10 or more
calendar days since last
inspection.
767–400ER series airplanes.
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Applies to airplanes with
an actuator installed at
the engine fuel spar
valve position having
part number (P/N)
MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or P/N
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66).
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator
Inspection
Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to
an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator
position.
NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuators are located behind main gear doors on the rear spar.
1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM
28–22–11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing AMM
28–22–11).
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55521
FIGURE 3 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AUXILIARY POWER UNIT (APU) FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
28–AWL–APU .......
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
10 DAYS ............................
INTERVAL NOTE: The
operational check is not
required on days when
the airplane is not used
in revenue service. The
operational check must
be done before further
flight with an operational
APU if it has been 10 or
more calendar days
since last check.
ALL ....................................
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Applies to airplanes with
an actuator installed at
the APU fuel shutoff
valve position having
part number (P/N)
MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66).
APU Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication Operational Check
Concern: The APU fuel shutoff valve actuator design
can result in airplanes operating with a failed APU
fuel shutoff valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed APU fuel shutoff valve actuator could
prevent fuel shutoff to the APU. In the event of certain APU fires, the potential exists for an APU fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform the operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector).
A. Do an operational check of the APU fuel shutoff
valve position indication.
1. If the APU is running, unload and shut down the
APU using standard practices.
2. Supply electrical power to the airplane using standard practices.
3. Make sure the APU FIRE switch on the Aft Aisle
Stand is in the NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at least 1,000 lbs (500 kgs) of
fuel in the Left Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector switch on the Overhead Panel
to the ON position and wait approximately 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL switch is in the
RUN position or the APU selector switch on the
overhead panel is in the ON position.
6. Move the APU Selector switch on the Overhead
Panel to the OFF position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT light on the Overhead Panel
illuminates and then goes off.
8. If the test fails (light fails to illuminate), before further flight requiring APU availability, repair faults as
required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–25–02).
NOTE: Dispatch may be permitted per MMEL 28–25–
02 if APU is not required for flight.
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(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance
or inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
Jkt 235001
(j) Related Information
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23119 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2013–1071; Directorate
Identifier 2013–NM–204–AD; Amendment
39–18264; AD 2015–19–01]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
The Boeing Company Model 777
airplanes. This AD was prompted by
reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include a new airworthiness
limitation. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\16SER1.SGM
16SER1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55512-55521]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23119]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD;
Amendment 39-18265; AD 2015-19-02]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection
program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to
the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which
[[Page 55513]]
could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU
and, in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead
to structural failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0127; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 767 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12420). The NPRM was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel
shutoff valve to the engine and APU, which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and, in case of
certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to structural
failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2014-0127.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 and
figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Requests To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) stated that Boeing's internal review found
that the issue addressed by the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) is
not a safety concern, and Boeing has not recommended any interim action
on this issue. In addition, AA stated that Boeing is addressing the
issue in the long term with a design change to the motor-operated valve
(MOV) actuator of the fuel shutoff valve.
All Nippon Airways (ANA) stated it agrees with a statement in
``767-FTD-28-12003 issued by Boeing'' indicating that the combination
of the events (engine fire and spar valve failures) is extremely
improbable. ANA requested clarification of the rationale for the
proposed intervals. ANA stated that it has operated more than 100 Model
767 airplanes for approximately 30 years and has never had such failure
with the MOVs.
We infer that AA and ANA requested that the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) be withdrawn.
We disagree with the commenters' request to withdraw the NPRM (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014). We have determined that an unsafe condition
exists that warrants an interim action until the manufacturer finishes
developing a modification that will address the identified unsafe
condition. Boeing did not formally comment on whether it considers this
issue to be an unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the
required interim actions, a significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed latently in the open valve
position will occur during the affected fleet life. With a failed fuel
shutoff valve, if certain fire conditions were to occur, or if extreme
engine or APU damage were to occur, or if an engine separation event
were to occur during flight, the crew procedures for such an event
would not stop the fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle or APU.
The continued flow of fuel could cause an uncontrolled fire or lead to
a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine or APU fire events, and the risk due to severe
engine or APU damage events to be minimized. Therefore, we require, for
each flight, sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires
can be detected and contained, and fuel to the engine strut and nacelle
or APU can be shut off in the event of an engine or APU fire or severe
damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with the
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. Airworthiness limitations containing required
inspections are intended to limit the number of flights following
latent failure of the fuel shutoff valve. Issuance of an AD is the
appropriate method to correct the unsafe condition. We have not changed
this final rule in this regard.
Request To Revise Applicability of Certain Requirements
Delta Airlines (DAL) and United Airlines (UAL) requested that we
revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to limit the
applicability specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
[[Page 55514]]
to airplanes with fuel shutoff valve actuators on which the identified
unsafe condition exists.
DAL stated that it would be feasible to implement configuration
control to ensure that part number (P/N) MA30A1001 is removed, and does
not get installed in the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve positions in
the future. DAL stated it would replace any P/N MA30A1001 actuators
that are currently in those locations with actuators of a different
acceptable part number, which would, in turn, alleviate the unsafe
condition given in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). DAL stated
that if an operator does not have P/N MA30A1001 installed on any engine
or APU fuel shutoff valve positions, then that operator would not be
required to adhere to airworthiness limitations 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV,
or 28-AWL-APU.
UAL stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) does
not specify which part number of the MOV actuator is applicable to the
proposed AD. UAL stated that proposed ADs were issued for Model 737NG,
757, 767, and 777 airplanes to replace the MOV actuator with P/N
MA30A1001. UAL also stated that there are issues with the MOV actuator
part number, and presumes that the proposed AD is for MOV actuator P/N
MA30A1001.
We agree with the commenters' request. Only two fuel shutoff valve
actuator designs are susceptible to the unsafe condition specified in
this final rule, and it would be unnecessarily burdensome to require
the inspections on airplanes that do not have any of the susceptible
valves installed. We have changed the Applicability column in figure 1,
figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify that the
limitations apply to Model 767 airplanes having fuel shutoff valve
actuator P/N MA20A2027 (S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (S343T003-66)
installed at the engine or APU fuel shutoff valve position, as
appropriate.
Request To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check
AA requested that the compliance time for the initial
accomplishment of the actions specified in figure 1, figure 2, and
figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) be extended from 7 days to 60 days. AA stated that more time is
needed for publishing the new criteria and for distribution of cards
and manuals/checklists. AA stated that the 7-day compliance time is not
justified by the failure rates for this safety concern.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We have changed
the initial compliance time to 10 days for accomplishing the actions
specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this
AD. The compliance time of 10 days is consistent with regulatory
actions for other affected models. We have determined that the initial
compliance time for the inspection represents an appropriate time in
which the required actions can be performed in a timely manner within
the affected fleet, while still maintaining an adequate level of
safety.
In developing an appropriate compliance time, we considered the
safety implications, parts availability, and normal maintenance
schedules for timely accomplishment of the operational checks. The
operational check procedures and the access procedures are simple and
already established. The check itself involves a visual inspection of
an existing prominent design feature that is intended to indicate the
position of the fuel shutoff valve actuator and is described in
existing maintenance documentation. The manufacturer does not expect a
large number of latently failed valve actuators to be discovered.
Existing parts stores are expected to be sufficient, and parts can be
repositioned in time to support the initial inspections. However, under
the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable
level of safety.
Request To Change the Proposed Requirement for the MOV Actuator
Inspection
Boeing requested that the proposed requirement to ``incorporate the
MOV actuator inspection into the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL)
Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness of operator's
maintenance or inspection programs'' be replaced with an AD requirement
to perform the MOV inspection per the specific interval in paragraph
(g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). Boeing stated that
the MOV inspection in paragraph (g) of the proposed AD is an interim
mitigation until a redesigned MOV can be installed in the spar valve
locations. Boeing stated that including the interval requirement as the
required AD action would allow installation of the redesigned MOV to be
approved as an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) to the AD, and
as a terminating action for the repetitive inspections, while avoiding
the need for regulatory approval to remove the AWL from each operator's
maintenance or inspection program. In addition, Boeing stated the AWLs
are permanent actions that affect operators' planning and scheduling,
and that incorporating a temporary AWL into the operators' maintenance
documents or a Boeing maintenance planning data (MPD) document will
cause confusion among operators.
We disagree with the commenter's request. During the development of
the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014), we discussed the impact of an
AWL revision versus a repetitive inspection requirement with Boeing,
who, in turn, discussed it with a sample of operators. At that time,
both Boeing and the operators indicated that the addition of an AWL was
the preferred solution because it would reduce the record keeping
required to document AD compliance. Affected operators who wish to use
a repetitive inspection requirement in place of an AWL revision may
apply for approval of an AMOC in accordance with the provisions
specified in paragraph (i)(1) of this AD by submitting data
substantiating that the request would provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend the Daily Inspection Requirement
UAL asked whether there are any provisions established by the FAA
to extend the daily inspection requirement if the reliability data are
captured. UAL stated that there is no valid justification for this
short time limit that creates a burden on airline operations.
We disagree with the commenter's request. Our unsafe condition
determination is primarily driven by the potential for a common-cause
failure of the valve and its position indication--and not by a lack of
reliability. We are aware that this failure has happened in service,
and we expect that tens of thousands of flights will occur with this
valve failed in the open position without indicating the failure unless
frequent inspections are made. Fortunately, the effort required to
check the valve operation is small for most airplanes. For Model 767-
200 and -300 series airplanes, we expect that most airlines will have
the flightcrew monitor a light near the switch they are using to shut
down the engine. The total time needed should be less than a few
seconds. In addition, new fuel shutoff valve actuators are being
developed that will allow removal of this requirement once they are
installed. Therefore, we have no plans to extend the interval
[[Page 55515]]
based on updated reliability data. We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request for Inspection Relief
UAL noted there is no provision in the proposed AD (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) to allow a waiver of the daily inspection requirements
if an airplane is out of service for any reason or in a remote station
where the daily inspection cannot be accomplished. Air Do asked if the
daily check must be done once a day even if the airplane does not have
a flight plan. We infer the commenters are requesting that we revise
the proposed AD to allow exceptions to the daily check specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD.
AA requested that the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) be
clarified to specify that daily checks only apply when the airplane is
in operational revenue service. AA also stated to restart the interval
of 10 days or 100 flight hours/50 cycles, whichever occurs later, once
an APU is returned to service from the minimum equipment list.
We partially agree with the commenters' requests. We agree to limit
inspections to days when the airplane is in revenue service or when the
APU is in operational status because it would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that are not in
operation. In figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, we have added a note in the Interval column to clarify that the
operational check is not required on days when the airplane is not used
in revenue service. For figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we also
specify that the check of the engine fuel shutoff valve must be done
before further flight once the airplane is returned to revenue service.
In figure 2 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have specified
that the check or inspection must be done before further flight if it
has been 10 or more calendar days since last check or inspection.
We disagree with restarting the 10-day cycle once an APU is
returned to service because the APU fuel shutoff valve check should not
be extended because the APU was out of service for a time. For the APU,
it is likely that this test will be done as a matter of course whenever
it is returned to service.
Request To Extend the Repetitive Interval
AA, ANA, DAL, and Japan Airlines (JAL) requested that the
repetitive interval be extended for the actions specified in figure 1,
figure 2, and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR
12420, March 5, 2014).
AA requested that the repetitive inspection interval be extended to
``10 days or 100 flight hours/50 flight cycles, whichever occurs
later.'' AA requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014) to add the choice of monitoring the disagreement light
to check the indication and physically check the closure of the valve
at ``100 flight hours/50 cycles whichever occurs later'' as an
alternative maintenance task. AA stated that operators of Model 767-400
series airplanes identified in the NPRM are allowed 10 days to inspect
the spar valve actuator arm when it is fully closed and commanded
closed. AA stated that the 10 days equates closely to ``100 flight
hours/50 cycles.'' AA also stated that Model 767-200, -300, and -400
series airplanes have the same actuator valve and indication, except
that Model 767-400 series airplanes do not have a disagreement light.
ANA stated it has reviewed the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014),
and is disappointed with the intervals of the operational checks
because the intervals are daily for engine fuel spar valves on Boeing
Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, and 10 days for APU
fuel valves; the proposed intervals will definitely affect its
operations. ANA stated that it does not have Model 767-400 airplanes,
but that the operational effect is the same. ANA suggested a compliance
time of ``6,000 flight hours or 22 months whichever comes first'' for
both engine spar valves and APU fuel valves.
DAL stated that Model 767-300 and -400 series airplanes contain
similar systems with respect to engine fuel shutoff. DAL stated that
Model 767-300 and -400 series airplanes are also equipped with the same
part number for the MOV actuator. DAL stated that, therefore, the
failure modes between the two airplane models should be identical. DAL
stated that since the FAA considers a 10-day interval sufficient for
Model 767-400 series airplanes, and also for the APU fuel shutoff
actuator for all Model 767 airplanes, it proposes to change the
interval in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this proposed AD to 10 days.
We disagree with the commenters' requests. Increasing the check
interval from daily to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many
flights at risk of an uncontrollable engine fire; the daily check has
been deemed practical because in practice it will mean the flightcrew
will need to watch a light just above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they
start or shut down the engine. As AA stated, Model 767-400ER series
airplanes do not have the disagreement light, so the inspection is more
complex. As a result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection
would be, we determined it is not practical to require that inspection
on a daily basis on Model 767-400ER series airplanes. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
As we discussed previously, the reason for this final rule is not
simply a high valve failure rate in the open position, but rather a
design error that allows a single failure within a fuel shutoff valve
actuator to affect both the control of the valve and the indication of
the valve's position. Currently these failures are only discovered
during fuel filter changes, which occur every 6,000 flight hours. ANA's
proposal is to check the system every 6,000 flight hours. A dedicated
inspection every 6,000 flight hours would have little impact on the
number of flights at risk. Indication and control of the fuel shutoff
valve are not independent because of the design error in the affected
valve actuators. For a failed fuel shutoff valve, the valve indication
system erroneously reports that the valve is opening and closing. If no
action is taken, we anticipate a significant number of flights to occur
with a failed open fuel shutoff valve. Without this AD, our risk
assessment and the manufacturer's risk assessment predict that tens of
thousands of such flights would occur in the fleet of Model 767
airplanes.
In addition to this fuel shutoff valve design error, the affected
valves have a higher-than-typical rate of failure in several failure
modes. We have received several reports of valves failed open
(discovered only when fuel filters were changed), valves failed closed
(preventing engine start), and valves that spontaneously closed in
flight (causing an engine shutdown). Boeing's long-term solution, a
fuel shutoff valve actuator design change, is intended to address these
issues in addition to restoring the independence of the actuator
control and indication features. The APU, on the other hand, presents a
much lower risk and is needed in flight on a small number of flights.
In addition, normal APU starting procedures include this check on every
start, so it is likely that this check is already being done on a more
frequent basis. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Justify the Proposed Inspection Interval
ANA requested that rationale be provided to justify the proposed
inspection interval, including the interval differences between the
engine
[[Page 55516]]
and the APU, and the interval between Model 767 and Model 777
airplanes.
We agree to provide the requested rationale. While the potential
for the problem is the same for Model 767 and Model 777 airplanes, the
ability to check the system functionality is different. Both types of
airplanes warrant a daily check, but we also consider the practicality
of an inspection. On Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes,
the flightcrew will need to watch the disagreement light located just
above the FUEL CONTROL switch as they start or shut down the engine.
Model 777 airplanes, like Model 767-400ER series airplanes, do not have
a disagreement light so the inspection is more time consuming. As a
result, regardless of how desirable a daily inspection would be for
Model 777 airplanes, we determined it is not practical to require that
inspection on a daily basis.
In regard to the APU, it is not run on every flight, so a properly
functioning fuel shutoff valve is not needed for every flight. We
decided to require the check every 10 days rather than try to monitor
APU usage. Also, it should be noted that this check is part of a normal
APU start, so it will likely be done on every start; this AD requires
that it be done at least every 10 days. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
Request To Provide Instructions for Compliance With the Extended
Operations (ETOPS) Requirement
UAL requested instructions for compliance with the ETOPS
requirement that would meet the operational check requirements. UAL
requested that we revise the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to
clarify whether standardized procedures will be established for
inspectors to make approvals for all affected operators. UAL stated
that since the affected airplanes have ETOPS approval, the NPRM should
provide instructions for compliance with the ETOPS requirements. UAL
asked that the FAA provide guidance to the principal operations
inspector (POI) on required procedures that would meet the operational
check requirements.
We agree that clarification is needed. We infer the commenter means
that checks of the left and right engine fuel shutoff valves are done
by different individuals due to ETOPS maintenance requirements. Since
none of the required inspections include actions that could contribute
to an engine shutdown, there is no common-cause engine shutdown
potential and, therefore, no need for different individuals to perform
the inspections on the left and right fuel shutoff valve actuators to
meet ETOPS maintenance requirements. No additional guidance to the POIs
is necessary.
Request To Expand Inspection To Confirm Functionality
DAL requested we expand the inspection at the spar for confirmation
of functionality on Model 767-300 series airplanes using the same
method of inspection and the same auxiliary power unit position as
those for the Boeing Model 767-400 series airplanes. DAL stated that a
check of the actual valve position every 10 days would be a more
effective inspection. DAL stated that ``FTD Article 767-FTD-28-12003''
(Boeing Fleet Team Digest) states that, ``The indication showed the
valve had closed when it had failed in the open position.'' DAL stated
that the flight deck indication may not accurately reflect
functionality.
We partially agree with the commenter's request. We agree to add an
inspection option for Model 767-300 airplanes that is similar to the
inspection for Model 767-400ER series airplanes. Therefore, for Model
767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, we have added item D. to
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to
perform a daily inspection to verify the fuel shutoff valve is closing.
However, we disagree with extending the inspection interval to 10 days.
As stated previously, increasing the inspection interval from every day
to every 10 days for the AWL task specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of this AD would result in 10 times as many flights at risk of an
uncontrollable engine fire.
Request To Add a Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the
Operational Check
UAL requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5,
2014) to add a requirement to provide electrical power before
performing the operational check required by figure 3 to paragraph (g)
of the proposed AD. UAL stated that electrical power is required to
perform the check, and other maintenance may be done that could
deactivate required circuits.
We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is
required. In figure 1 and figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
added a requirement to supply electrical power to the airplane using
standard practices when performing the operational check.
Request To Clarify the Operational Check Requirements
Air Do stated that, if the flightcrew performed the operational
check, the maintenance record is usually not created. The commenter
questioned whether this is acceptable, or whether the flightcrew should
record it in the flight log.
UAL requested clarification on whether the flightcrew will not have
to record compliance for one of the checks and that documentation for
each inspection on every airplane need not be made if relying on
flightcrew compliance with the proposed AD.
JAL requested that the FAA coordinate with Boeing to include an
appropriate check procedure in the Normal Procedure (NP) section of the
flightcrew operating manual (FCOM).
We find that clarification is necessary. This AD requires including
the information specified in figure 1, figure 2, and figure 3 of
paragraph (g) of the AD in the maintenance or inspection program;
however, the actions specified in the figures in this AD are
accomplished, and remain enforceable, as part of the Airworthiness
Limitations of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. Section
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as this
inspection. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do an
inspection in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation,
that same action would be considered an operational task--not
maintenance--and therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. Regarding
JAL's comment, an FCOM is a Boeing document that we neither approve nor
control. We have not changed this AD with regard to these issues.
Request To Clarify the Requirements for Certain Disagreement Lights
UAL requested that we clarify the requirements in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL
stated that items C.6.a. and C.7.a. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD instruct to move the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches,
respectively, to the RUN position, but do not instruct to monitor the
left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights, unlike item C.6.c. and
item C.7.c. UAL stated that it presumes it is not required to verify
the left and right SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL
CONTROL switches are moved to the RUN position.
We agree to provide clarification. It is not required to verify the
left and right
[[Page 55517]]
SPAR VALVE disagreement lights when the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches
are moved to the RUN position during that portion of the operational
check. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request for Clarification on Applying a Minimum Equipment List (MEL)
Maintenance Action
First Air requested clarification of the proposed corrective action
for an inoperative indication--specifically, whether operators could
still apply an MEL maintenance action and meet the intent of the NPRM
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). First Air stated that the operational
checks in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for engine spar
valves are predicated on the SPAR VALVE light being operative. First
Air stated that MEL 28-40-02 provides relief should the indication be
inoperative.
We agree that clarification is needed. We disagree with providing
MEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication because MEL
relief could potentially allow the valve to be inoperative for up to 10
days of revenue operation. However, we do agree to provide flexibility
regarding verification that the fuel shutoff valve actuator is
operational. We have added item D. to figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this
AD to specify a fourth option to perform a daily inspection to verify
the fuel shutoff valve is closing, which can be used when the fuel
shutoff valve indication does not function properly.
Request for Clarification Regarding the FUEL CONTROL Switch
UAL requested that a statement be included in the proposed AD (79
FR 12420, March 5, 2014) to clarify that it is not required to cycle
the L and R FUEL CONTROL switches, as specified in Boeing Airplane
Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28-22-00, for the ALI task specified in figure
2 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD.
We agree with the commenter's request. We have added a note in
figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD stating that it is not necessary
to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do the inspection.
Request To Correct a Typographical Error
UAL requested that a typographical error be corrected in the NPRM
(79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014). UAL stated that figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of the NPRM states, ``Item C.4 instructs to make sure Land R ENG START
selector switches on the overhead panel are in the OFF position.'' UAL
stated that this is a typographical error and the selector switches
should be L and R ENG START selector switches.
We agree and have corrected the typographical error in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly. Paragraph C.4. of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, as it appeared in the NPRM (79 FR 12420,
March 5, 2014), has been re-designated as paragraph C.5. of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.
Additional Changes Made to This AD
In the Description column of figure 2 to paragraph (g) of this AD,
we have removed the phrase ``refer to Boeing AMM 28-22-00'' with regard
to performing an inspection of the fuel spar valve MOV actuator
position.
In paragraph C.7.a. in the Description column of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, and in paragraph A.5. in the Description
column of figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added wording
specifying to wait ``approximately'' 10 seconds once the FUEL CONTROL
switch is in the RUN position or the APU selector switch on the
overhead panel is in the ON position.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 12420, March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved,
and available, we may consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 450 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $38,250
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
[[Page 55518]]
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-02 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18265; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0127; Directorate Identifier 2013-NM-237-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 28, Fuel.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine and auxiliary power unit (APU), which could
result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and APU and,
in case of certain fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
structural failure.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitation numbers 28-AWL-ENG, 28-AWL-MOV, and 28-AWL-
APU, by incorporating the information specified in Figure 1, Figure
2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the Airworthiness
Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
The initial compliance time for accomplishing the actions specified
in Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 to paragraph (g) of this AD is
within 10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
program revision required by this paragraph.
Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-ENG.................. ALI DAILY............... 767-200, -300, and - Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: The 300F airplanes. Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
operational check APPLICABILITY NOTE: Position Indication
is not required on Applies to Operational Check.
days when the airplanes with an Concern: The fuel spar
airplane is not actuator installed valve actuator design
used in revenue at the engine fuel can result in airplanes
service.. spar valve operating with a failed
The check must be position having fuel spar valve
done before further part number (P/N) actuator that is not
flight once the MA20A2027 reported. A latently
airplane is (S343T003-56) or P/ failed fuel spar valve
returned to revenue N MA30A1001 actuator could prevent
service. (S343T003-66).. fuel shutoff to an
engine. In the event of
certain engine fires,
the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the
following checks/
inspection of the fuel
spar valve position
(unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector):
A. Operational Check
during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the CUTOFF position,
verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing
airplane maintenance
manual (AMM) 28-22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the CUTOFF position,
verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
B. Operational check
during engine start.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
[[Page 55519]]
a. As the L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the RUN (or RICH)
position, verify the
left SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand illuminates and
then goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand is moved
to the RUN (or RICH)
position, verify the
right SPAR VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand illuminates and
then goes off.
b. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
C. Operational check
without engine
operation.
1. Supply electrical
power to the airplane
using standard
practices.
2. Make sure all fuel
pump switches on the
Overhead Panel are in
the OFF position.
3. If the auxiliary
power unit (APU) is
running, open and
collar the L FWD FUEL
BOOST PUMP (C00372)
circuit breaker on the
Main Power Distribution
Panel.
4. Make sure LEFT and
RIGHT ENG FIRE switches
on the Aft Aisle Stand
are in the NORMAL (IN)
position.
5. Make sure L and R ENG
START Selector Switches
on the Overhead Panel,
are in the OFF
position.
6. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
RUN position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move L FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the left SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
7. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
RUN position and wait
approximately 10
seconds once the FUEL
CONTROL switch is in
the RUN position or the
APU selector switch on
the overhead panel is
in the ON position.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE
disagreement light on
the quadrant control
stand to stay
illuminated.
b. Move R FUEL CONTROL
switch on the quadrant
control stand to the
CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the right SPAR
VALVE disagreement
light on the quadrant
control stand
illuminates and then
goes off.
d. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
8. If the L FWD FUEL
BOOST PUMP circuit
breaker was collared in
step 3, remove collar
and close.
D. Perform an inspection
of the fuel spar valve
actuator position.
[[Page 55520]]
NOTE: This inspection
may be most useful
whenever the SPAR VALVE
light does not function
properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
NOTE: The Fuel Spar
Valve actuators are
located behind main
gear doors on the rear
spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
NOTE: The Fuel Spar
Valve actuators are
located behind main
gear doors on the rear
spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Actuator Inspection
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV.................. ALI 10 DAYS............. 767-400ER series Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: The airplanes. Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
inspection is not APPLICABILITY NOTE: Actuator Inspection
required on days Applies to Concern: The fuel spar
when the airplane airplanes with an valve actuator design
is not used in actuator installed can result in airplanes
revenue service. at the engine fuel operating with a failed
The inspection must spar valve fuel spar valve
be done before position having actuator that is not
further flight if part number (P/N) reported. A latently
it has been 10 or MA20A2027 failed fuel spar valve
more calendar days (S343T003-56) or P/ actuator would prevent
since last N MA30A1001 fuel shutoff to an
inspection.. (S343T003-66).. engine. In the event of
certain engine fires,
the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of
the fuel spar valve
actuator position.
NOTE: The fuel spar
valve actuators are
located behind main
gear doors on the rear
spar.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 55521]]
Figure 3 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Fuel Shutoff Valve Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-APU.................. ALI 10 DAYS............. ALL................ APU Fuel Shutoff Valve
INTERVAL NOTE: The APPLICABILITY NOTE: Position Indication
operational check Applies to Operational Check
is not required on airplanes with an Concern: The APU fuel
days when the actuator installed shutoff valve actuator
airplane is not at the APU fuel design can result in
used in revenue shutoff valve airplanes operating
service. The position having with a failed APU fuel
operational check part number (P/N) shutoff valve actuator
must be done before MA20A2027 that is not reported. A
further flight with (S343T003-56) or latently failed APU
an operational APU MA30A1001 fuel shutoff valve
if it has been 10 (S343T003-66).. actuator could prevent
or more calendar fuel shutoff to the
days since last APU. In the event of
check.. certain APU fires, the
potential exists for an
APU fire to be
uncontrollable.
Perform the operational
check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve position
indication (unless
checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector).
A. Do an operational
check of the APU fuel
shutoff valve position
indication.
1. If the APU is
running, unload and
shut down the APU using
standard practices.
2. Supply electrical
power to the airplane
using standard
practices.
3. Make sure the APU
FIRE switch on the Aft
Aisle Stand is in the
NORMAL (IN) position.
4. Make sure there is at
least 1,000 lbs (500
kgs) of fuel in the
Left Main Tank.
5. Move APU Selector
switch on the Overhead
Panel to the ON
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds once the FUEL
CONTROL switch is in
the RUN position or the
APU selector switch on
the overhead panel is
in the ON position.
6. Move the APU Selector
switch on the Overhead
Panel to the OFF
position.
7. Verify the APU FAULT
light on the Overhead
Panel illuminates and
then goes off.
8. If the test fails
(light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight
requiring APU
availability, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
25-02).
NOTE: Dispatch may be
permitted per MMEL 28-
25-02 if APU is not
required for flight.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23119 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
