Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes, 55527-55535 [2015-23117]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
55527
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—AWL FOR ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) ACTUATOR
INSPECTION
AWL No.
Task
28–AWL–MOV ......
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
10 days ..............................
INTERVAL NOTE: Not required on days when the
airplane is not used in
revenue service.
Must be done before further flight if it has been
10 or more calendar
days since last inspection.
Airplanes with AIMS–1
system.
Airplanes with AIMS–2
BlockPoint (BP) v 16
and earlier software.
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Only applies to airplanes
with a fuel spar valve actuator having part number MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66) installed
at the engine fuel spar
valve position.
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) MOV Actuator Inspection.
Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
fuel spar valve actuator would prevent fuel shutoff to
an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform an inspection of the fuel spar valve actuator.
NOTE: The fuel spar valve actuator is located behind
latch panel 551 DB (left engine) and latch panel 651
DB (right engine).
1. Make sure both Engine Control Switches are in the
CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the left engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance).
3. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the right engine fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any fuel spar valve actuator that
is not in the CLOSED position (refer to Boeing Airplane Maintenance Manual, 28–22–02, for guidance).
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
(j) Related Information
After accomplishing the maintenance or
inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
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(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
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(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0194; Directorate
Identifier 2014–NM–022–AD; Amendment
39–18266; AD 2015–19–03]
RIN 2120–AA64
None.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
VerDate Sep<11>2014
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23121 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing
Company Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 737–600, –700,
–700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series
airplanes. This AD was prompted by
reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter
replacement. This AD requires revising
the maintenance or inspection program
to include new airworthiness
limitations. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct latent failures of the
fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain
engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that
could lead to wing failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21,
2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0194; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the
Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is
Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA,
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057–3356; phone: 425–917–6509; fax:
425–917–6590; email: rebel.nichols@
faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would
apply to all The Boeing Company Model
737–600, –700, –700C, –800, –900, and
–900ER series airplanes. The NPRM
published in the Federal Register on
April 14, 2014 (79 FR 20834). The
NPRM was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves
discovered during fuel filter
replacement. The NPRM proposed to
require revising the maintenance or
inspection program to include new
airworthiness limitations. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct
latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve
to the engine, which could result in the
inability to shut off fuel to the engine
and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to
wing failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as
NPRMs and immediately adopted rules,
it is the practice of the FAA to obtain
technical information and information
on operational and economic impacts
from design approval holders and
aircraft operators. We discussed certain
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13:48 Sep 15, 2015
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comments addressed in this final rule in
a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of
the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this
teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments
submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found
in the rulemaking docket at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0194.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final
rule, commenters may have used the
terms ‘‘fuel shutoff valve’’ and ‘‘fuel
spar valve’’ interchangeably. Both terms
refer to the same part. In our responses
to comments, we have used the term
‘‘fuel shutoff valve.’’ The term ‘‘fuel spar
valve’’ is more commonly used in
airplane maintenance documentation
and, therefore, we have used that term
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. The
following presents the comments
received on the NPRM (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) and the FAA’s response
to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) requested
that no further regulatory action be
taken. AA stated that it has experienced
only a small number of fuel shutoff
valve actuator failures. AA stated that
the combination of failures necessary to
produce the catastrophic event
described in the NPRM (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) includes fuel shutoff
valve actuator failure, an erroneous
position indication, and a fire in the
engine compartment. AA also stated
that risk analysis shows the probability
of this combination occurring is in the
improbable range of ‘‘10E–11 to 10E–
16.’’
We disagree with commenter’s
request. We have determined that an
unsafe condition exists that warrants an
interim action until the manufacturer
finishes developing a modification that
will address the identified unsafe
condition. We have determined that,
without the required interim action, a
significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed in
the open valve position will occur
during the affected fleet life. If certain
engine fire conditions were to occur, or
if extreme engine damage were to occur,
or if an engine separation event were to
occur during flight, the crew procedures
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for such an event would not stop the
fuel flow to the engine strut and nacelle.
The continued flow of fuel could cause
an uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel
exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all
transport airplanes to be fail safe with
respect to engine fire events, and the
risk due to severe engine damage events
to be minimized. Therefore, we require,
for each flight, sufficiently operative fire
safety systems so that fires can be
detected and contained, and that fuel to
the engine strut and nacelle can be shut
off in the event of an engine fire or
severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards
require remotely controlled powerplant
valves to provide indications that the
valves are in the commanded position.
These indications allow the prompt
detection and correction of valve
failures. We do not allow dispatch with
a known inoperative fuel shutoff valve.
Therefore, we are proceeding with this
final rule—not because of the higherthan-typical failure rate of the particular
valve actuator involved, but instead
because the fuel shutoff valve actuator
can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication
feature. That failure can lead to a large
number of flights occurring on an
airplane with a fuel shutoff valve
actuator failed in the open position
without the operator being aware of the
failure. An airworthiness limitation
containing required inspections is
intended to limit the number of flights
following latent failure of the fuel
shutoff valve. We have not changed this
AD in this regard.
Request for Inspection Relief
AirDo, AA, All Nippon Airlines
(ANA), Delta Airlines (DAL), Southwest
Airlines (SWA), Transavia, and United
Airlines (UAL) requested clarification of
the daily check requirement. The
commenters stated that the check
applies to airplanes that are in
operational revenue status. The
commenters stated that the proposed
AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) does
not account for airplanes in routine
maintenance or for an out-of-service
condition.
We infer the commenters are
requesting inspection relief for airplanes
that are not in service. We agree with
the commenters’ request. It would be
unnecessarily burdensome to require
the inspections on airplanes that are not
being used. We agree with limiting
inspections to days when the airplane is
in revenue service. In the Interval
column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD, we have added a note to clarify
that the operational check is not
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We have added item D. to figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a
fourth option to perform daily
inspections to verify that the fuel
shutoff valve is closing.
Request To Limit the Applicability
UAL requested that we revise the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14,
2014) to limit the applicability specified
in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD to airplanes with the valve
actuators that have the identified unsafe
condition. UAL stated the applicability
applies to valve actuators having part
number (P/N) MA30A1001. UAL stated
that the problem does not apply to other
existing actuator designs, and will not
apply to future designs.
We agree with the commenter’s
request. It would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections
on airplanes that do not have any of the
susceptible valves installed. We have
added a note to the Applicability
column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD to clarify that the limitations
apply to Model 737–600, –700, –700C,
–800, –900, and –900ER airplanes
having actuator P/N MA20A2027
(Boeing P/N S343T003–56) or P/N
MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003–66)
installed at the engine fuel spar valve
positions.
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required on days when the airplane is
not used in revenue service, but that the
check must be done before further flight
once the airplane is returned to revenue
service.
Request To Clarify Recording
Requirements
Air Do, Ryanair, SWA, Transavia,
UAL, and Darryl Voss requested that the
FAA provide a more complete
explanation of the requirements with
regard to recording compliance.
Air Do stated that if the flightcrew
performed the operational check, a
maintenance record is usually not
created. The commenter questioned
whether this is acceptable, or whether
the flightcrew should record it in the
flight log.
Ryanair requested that the FAA
explicitly state in the AD that the
proposed actions may be performed by
maintenance and/or flight operations
checklists, and that the AD will not
require the retention of maintenance or
flight operations records to show
compliance. Ryanair stated that due to
the high frequency of the actions in the
NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)
and the large number of affected
airplanes in its fleet (approximately
300), the creation, retention, and
reforecasting of individual records for
this activity is not practical.
Because of the high frequency of
checks resulting from the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014),
compounded with the creation,
distribution, and retention of the
documentation of the checks, SWA
requested that the FAA specifically state
in the AD that when the daily check is
performed successfully by flightcrews,
no documentation is required. SWA also
requested that the FAA specifically state
in the AD that documentation (i.e.,
logbook entry or other type of defect
report) is required only when a failure
is detected by the flightcrew, or when
the check is performed by maintenance
personnel.
Transavia requested that, if the daily
check remains, we revise the proposed
AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to
state that the inclusion of the daily
check requirement into a checklist is
sufficient to show AD compliance and
prevent unwanted paperwork, and that
the daily check can be performed by
either maintenance personnel or the
flightcrew.
UAL asked whether the flightcrews
will be required to record compliance of
the operational checks and document
each inspection. Darryl Voss requested
that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) to remove the
option to allow flightcrews to perform
Request To Follow the Master
Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) in
Lieu of the Daily Check
AA and Qantas Airways stated that if
the master minimum equipment list
(MMEL) is being used, then the daily
check should be not required.
AA stated that the Boeing Model 737
MMEL item 28–22, ‘‘Fuel/Spar Valve
Closed Lights,’’ allows for the lights to
be inoperative, provided the associated
valve is verified to operate normally and
the crossfeed VALVE OPEN light
operates normally. AA stated that this
item allows the lights to be inoperative
for up to 10 days, and it requested that
a provision be added to state that if this
MMEL is being used, the daily check is
not required.
Qantas Airways stated that if an
airplane is dispatched under the MMEL
for inoperative SPAR VALVE CLOSED
light(s), then it is not possible to
accomplish the proposed checks.
We partially agree with the
commenters’ request. We disagree with
providing MMEL relief for an
inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication
because such relief could potentially
allow the fuel shutoff valve to be
inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue
operation. However, we do agree to
provide flexibility regarding verification
that the fuel shutoff valve is operational.
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55529
operational checks for maintenance. Mr.
Voss stated that showing compliance
with ADs is almost exclusively a
maintenance function and should
remain a maintenance function to
provide compliance continuity.
We agree that clarification is
necessary. This AD requires including
the information in figure 1 of paragraph
(g) of this AD in the maintenance or
inspection program. However, this AD
does not require accomplishing the
actions specified in figure 1 of
paragraph (g) of this AD. The actions
specified in the figure in this AD are
done, and remain enforceable, as part of
the airworthiness limitations of the
instructions for continued airworthiness
(ICA). Section 14 CFR 43.11(a) of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
43.11(a)) requires maintenance record
entries for maintenance actions such as
the required checks. If an operator elects
to have a flightcrew member do the
check in accordance with the applicable
airworthiness limitation, that same
action would be considered an
operational task (not maintenance), and
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not
apply. In that case, operators should
follow their normal processes for
operational activities, including
necessary Principal Operations
Inspector (POI) involvement. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Inspection
Procedures for Operational Checks
Boeing requested to add a flightcrew
inspection procedure during engine
start and engine shutdown. Boeing
stated that this will provide common
flight procedures and eliminate each
operator creating its own test.
DAL requested that the preamble of
the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)
be revised to match the rest of the
requirements in the NPRM. DAL stated
that if POI approval is required for
flightcrews to accomplish operational
checks, then the preamble should
identify that flightcrews can only
accomplish operational checks
approved by the inspector. DAL stated
that the preamble should not associate
the operational check without engine
start to only maintenance crews, and the
operational checks while starting the
engine or shutting down the engine to
only flightcrews.
UAL requested that standardized
procedures be established by the FAA
aircraft certification office for the POI to
approve on behalf of all affected
operators.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request to add to this AD a method
describing how maintenance actions
and operations actions should be
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coordinated. The operational
requirements are specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD; how these
requirements are captured in the
operations processes to ensure that the
maintenance action has been completed
is likely different for each operator. As
the commenter stated, flightcrews can
only accomplish operational checks
approved by the inspector. No change
has been made to the final rule in this
regard.
Request To Provide an Alternative to
the Maintenance or Inspection Program
Revision in Operational Documents
DAL requested that the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be revised
to provide an option for revising the
Boeing Model 737 ‘‘Airplane Normal
Checklist’’ to specify accomplishment of
one of the required operational checks
(operational check during engine start,
operational check during engine
shutdown, or operational check without
engine operations) as a ‘‘FIRST FLIGHT
OF THE DAY’’ requirement as an
alternative to the maintenance or
inspection program revision specified in
paragraph (g) of the proposed rule. DAL
stated that this option would ensure that
operational aircraft are inspected daily,
provide clear responsibility to the
flightcrew to accomplish the operational
checks, and remove concern for
accomplishing the actions during times
when the airplane is not in service. DAL
stated that incorporating this change to
the ‘‘Airplane Normal Checklist’’ will
simplify compliance procedures while
satisfying the requirements of the
proposed rule.
JAL requested that the FAA
coordinate with Boeing to revise the
flightcrew operations manual (FCOM) to
provide the check of the fuel spar valve
as a normal procedure. JAL stated that
if an operational check by the flightcrew
is allowed, the FCOM should be revised
to provide the normal procedure to
perform the fuel spar valve check during
engine start or shutdown.
Qantas Airways suggested that a
revision to the Boeing Model 737
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section
1 ‘‘Certificate Limitations,’’ or Section 3
‘‘Normal Procedures,’’ might be a more
appropriate location to allow the
flightcrew to monitor valve operations
during engine start and/or engine
shutdown.
We find that clarification is necessary.
Changing these documents presupposes
that every operator will have flightcrews
perform this task. It is not our intention
to require flightcrews to perform this
task. Individual operators can modify
their normal operating procedures to
add this requirement.
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Request To Clarify the Operational
Check During Engine Start
Qantas stated that it does not believe
that paragraph B. of the Description
column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April
14, 2014), which specifies to do an
operational check during engine start,
achieves the desired failure detection.
Qantas stated that if the test fails (i.e.,
bright light fails to illuminate), the valve
has failed to open; this is different than
a valve that has failed to close. Qantas
stated that the test should identify the
failed actuator in the failure mode,
which results in an unsafe condition.
We infer that Qantas is requesting we
clarify the operational check during
engine start. We find that clarification is
necessary. The check procedure is
designed to make sure the fuel shutoff
valve actuator moves to the open
position from the closed position.
However, if the fuel shutoff valve
actuator had previously failed open, the
actuator would not move the valve and
this check would fail. If this check fails,
the fuel shutoff valve actuator is either
failed in the closed position or has
failed previously in the open position.
Either way, the failed fuel shutoff valve
actuator must be replaced. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Add Requirement To
Provide Electrical Power Before the
Maintenance Check
UAL requested we add a requirement
to provide electrical power before
accomplishment of the maintenance
check specified by the proposed AD (79
FR 20834, April 14, 2014).
We agree with the commenter’s
request because electrical power is
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added
an instruction to supply electrical
power to the airplane using standard
practices when performing the
operational check.
Request To Reference the Fault
Isolation Manual
Boeing requested that figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) be revised in
order to reference the Fault Isolation
Manual (FIM), instead of the Boeing
Model 737 Aircraft Maintenance
Manual (AMM), should the operational
check fail. Boeing stated that the faults
are isolated to failed components using
the FIM. The AMM provides
instructions for removing and replacing
identified failed components. Boeing
stated that the light could fail to
illuminate for reasons other than
actuator failure.
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We disagree with the commenter’s
request to reference the FIM instead of
the AMM. If an operational check fails,
the failed component must be replaced.
As Boeing stated, the AMM provides
instructions for replacing failed
components. The FIM also refers to the
AMM for replacement of the fuel shutoff
valve actuator after doing some
preliminary testing. Operators may
consult the FIM for guidance in
troubleshooting other reasons the light
could fail to illuminate. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend the Repetitive
Interval for the Operational Checks
ANA requested that the repetitive
interval be revised from daily to 15,000
flight hours or 6,000 flight hours, or a
weekly interval. ANA stated that Boeing
has included these repetitive intervals
in certain maintenance documents.
ANA commented that it has 38
airplanes in operation and it has never
experienced a latent failure of the MOV
actuator. ANA also stated that the
possibility of the unsafe condition
happening is very low. ANA stated that
a daily interval is a burden to operators.
DAL requested that the operational
checks be required at intervals not to
exceed 90 days or 1,400 flight cycles or
1,800 flight hours; DAL stated that this
is similar to what is proposed by the
original equipment manufacturer. DAL
stated that Airworthiness Limitation
Task 28–AWL–MOV, ‘‘Engine Fuel
Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
Position Indication Operational Check,’’
which was introduced by the proposed
AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014),
would require daily operational checks
of the engine fuel shutoff valve. DAL
stated that it finds this will be an
onerous operational requirement as it
does not have maintenance personnel in
all locations where the affected
airplanes are operated. DAL stated that
for this reason, it will be necessary for
its flightcrews to accomplish the
operational checks in order to comply
with the daily requirement specified by
the proposed AD.
DAL also stated that the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) does not
provide significant information as to
how the daily check requirement was
determined or why it differs so
significantly from the compliance
recommendation established by Boeing.
DAL stated that lacking specific details
of the methodology used by the FAA
and the assumptions made to arrive at
a daily check interval hinders the
operator’s ability to provide comments
on the appropriateness of this interval.
DAL stated that Boeing has indicated
that its numeric safety analysis supports
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a compliance period of 3,000 flight
hours for the operational checks. DAL
also stated that based on current DAL
utilization, accomplishment of daily
checks equates to accomplishing the
check approximately 300 times more
frequently than the interval supported
by the Boeing safety analysis.
JAL requested that the FAA extend
the inspection interval to a heavy
maintenance opportunity. For Model
737–800 airplanes, JAL stated to set the
heavy maintenance opportunity (such as
‘‘C-Check’’ and ‘‘K-Check’’) at
approximately 2-year intervals to
efficiently accomplish the maintenance
program.
Qantas Airways requested an interval
that can be effectively scheduled in
aircraft maintenance control programs,
such as a 7-day interval.
Jim Way requested a monthly interval
for the operational checks. Mr. Way
stated that a daily check is too
restrictive.
Bradley Most requested that the daily
inspection interval be revised to every 2
calendar days to accommodate
‘‘international operations, out of station,
overnight, etc.’’ Mr. Most stated that the
interval of daily lacks a clear definition.
We disagree with the requests to
extend the inspection interval. An
increase in the inspection interval from
daily to every other day, to weekly, or
to 90 days, would result in 2, 7, or 90
times as many flights at risk in the event
of an engine fire. The daily inspection
has been deemed practical because, in
practice, it will mean the flightcrew will
need to watch a light as they start or
shut down the engine using normal
procedures. An increased interval to
6,000 flight hours would have no real
effect on the unsafe condition since the
fuel filter replacement currently detects
the problem every 6,000 flight hours. In
addition, an increased interval of 15,000
flight hours, or 24 months, would
similarly not improve safety. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise the Proposed
Compliance Time for Revising the
Maintenance or Inspection Program
Mr. Most requested that the
compliance time to revise the
maintenance or inspection program be
changed to 120 days after the effective
date of this AD. Mr. Most stated that
FAA offices are typically requesting 60
days to review an airplane maintenance
or inspection program revision that is
submitted for approval and, in many
cases, are taking longer. Mr. Most stated
that the current inspection interval
would not allow operators enough time
to revise the airplane maintenance or
inspection program, submit it to FAA
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55531
for approval, and implement the revised
airplane maintenance or inspection
program within 30 days of the effective
date.
Jim Way requested that operators be
given 90 days after the effective date of
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April
14, 2014) to incorporate the actions
specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
the proposed AD into the maintenance
program. Mr. Way stated that single
aircraft operators use a vendor to
provide support for the inspection
program revisions. Mr. Way stated that
a 30-day compliance time after the
effective date of the proposed AD is not
enough time to properly make and
submit the changes to the FAA’s
principal maintenance inspector for
approval and implementation.
We do not agree to revise the
compliance time for revising the
maintenance or inspection program
beyond 30 days. The 30-day compliance
time specified in paragraph (g) of this
AD is consistent with other regulatory
actions for other affected models in
similar ADs. However, under the
provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD,
we might consider requests for
adjustments to the compliance time if
data are submitted to substantiate that
such an adjustment would provide an
acceptable level of safety.
clear who must accomplish the action in
this paragraph. DAL stated that
operators do not control the AWL
section of the ICA and, therefore, could
not comply with the requirement. DAL
stated that on Boeing Model 737NG
airplanes, the AWLs are incorporated
into Section 9 of the Maintenance
Planning Document (MPD) by Boeing.
DAL stated that the action in the NPRM
would be one for the original equipment
manufacturer to accomplish with a
revision to the MPD, which would then
be incorporated by the operators. DAL
also stated that operators have control of
their continuous airworthiness
maintenance program (CAMP). DAL
stated that in the NPRM, it is the intent
of the operators to incorporate the AWL
into their CAMP.
We find that clarification is necessary.
The requirement in paragraph (g) of this
AD is to change the Airworthiness
Limitations of the ICA for each affected
airplane. Once that change is complete,
operators will be compelled to change
their maintenance program to include
the new requirements of the revised
Airworthiness Limitations. For Part 121
operators, changes to the CAMP will
become necessary; but for other
operators, the maintenance program
may take a different form. We have not
changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Change the Initial
Compliance Time for the Operational
Check
AA requested that 30 days be
provided for the initial operational
check after the airworthiness limitation
(AWL) has been incorporated into its
maintenance program. AA stated that
this will allow for publishing the new
criteria.
We partially agree with AA’s request
concerning the compliance time for the
initial operational check. We have
changed the initial compliance time
specified in paragraph (g) of this AD for
accomplishing the actions specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD from
7 to 10 days. The compliance time of 10
days is consistent with other regulatory
actions for other affected models in
similar ADs. We have determined that
10 days for the initial inspection
represents an appropriate time in which
the required actions can be performed in
a timely manner within the affected
fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety.
Request To Clarify Who Must
Accomplish the Maintenance or
Inspection Program Revision
DAL requested that paragraph (g) of
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April
14, 2014) be revised because it is not
Request To Remove Redundant
Language
DAL requested that certain language
be removed from the proposed AD (79
FR 20834, April 14, 2014) because it is
redundant. DAL stated that paragraph
(h) of the proposed AD can be excluded
because it states that no alternative
actions or intervals can be used unless
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with
the procedures specified in paragraph
(i)(1) of the proposed AD. (Paragraph (i)
of the proposed AD specifies the
procedures and requirements for an
AMOC.)
We disagree with the commenter’s
request. It is necessary to include
paragraph (h) of this AD (‘‘No
Alternative Actions or Intervals’’)
because it ensures that changes made
after accomplishment of the
maintenance or inspection program
revision, e.g., using new versions of the
maintenance or inspection program, are
done only when approval of an AMOC
is obtained from the FAA. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise the Costs of
Compliance Paragraph
DAL stated that the cost estimate
provided in the NPRM (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) is inaccurate. DAL
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
stated that the cost reflected in the
NPRM is for incorporating the proposed
program change into the operator’s
program only as a revision of the
maintenance or inspection program.’’
DAL stated the cost estimate presented
is flawed in two aspects: It does not
properly account for the cost operators
will take on in implementing the
program changes, and it does not
account for the cost of actually
performing the inspections specified by
the proposed maintenance or inspection
program changes.
We infer that DAL is requesting we
revise the Costs of Compliance
paragraph. We acknowledge the
commenter’s concern. In this AD, the
required action is to revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to include a new
airworthiness limitation. The added
airworthiness limitation requires an
inspection of the position of the MOV
actuator daily. However, these repetitive
inspections, which are expected to take
a few seconds to complete, are required
by section 91.403(c) of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c))
once incorporated into the maintenance
or inspection program.
The cost analysis in AD rulemaking
actions typically includes only the costs
associated with complying with the AD.
In this AD, the required action is the
maintenance or inspection program
revision, as applicable, to include the
new airworthiness limitation.
Accomplishing repetitive actions that
are specified in the airworthiness
limitation are not directly required by
this AD. The FAA, as a matter of
practice, does not include a cost
estimate for these repetitive actions in
an AD because these actions are
required as part of the operating rules.
Therefore, we have made no change to
this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Wording for
Operational Check Without Engine
Operation
UAL requested we revise the wording
of the operational check without engine
operation. UAL stated that in item C.3.a.
and item C.4.a. in the Description
column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of
this AD, either a tolerance should be
added to the wording, or the word
‘‘approximately’’ should be added
before the phrase ‘‘10 seconds.’’
We agree with the commenter’s
request. In item C.4.a. and item C.5.a.
(which correspond to items C.3.a. and
C.4.a. of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April
14, 2014)) in the Description column of
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we
have added wording that indicates to
wait ‘‘approximately’’ 10 seconds after
moving the ENG 1 and ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL STAND to the
IDLE position. We find that this change
will allow flexibility during the
operational check, while still
maintaining an adequate level of safety.
Request To Correct Typographical
Errors
Boeing and DAL requested that we
correct a typographical error in the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14,
2014). Boeing and DAL stated that item
A.1. in the Description column of figure
1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD,
which states to ‘‘do all operational
checks . . .,’’ the word ‘‘all’’ should be
removed because the operational check
is a singular check.
We agree with the commenters’
request. We have revised item A.1. in
the Description column of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD accordingly.
Boeing also requested that certain
other typographical errors in the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14,
2014) be corrected to reduce the
possibility of confusion regarding the
requirements. Boeing stated that the
Description column in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
should be revised as follows:
• Step B.2. has been skipped, and
needs to be renumbered.
• In step B.1.a., the text ‘‘START
LEVEL STAND’’ should be changed to
‘‘START LEVER ON CONTROL
STAND.’’
• Steps C.2. and C.3. should be
combined and renumbered.
• In step C.5.a., the text ‘‘ENG @’’
should be changed to ‘‘ENG 2.’’
We disagree with the comment. The
stated typographical errors for step
B.1.a., step B.2., and step C.5.a., do not
exist in the regulatory text of the NPRM
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), as
published. We disagree with combining
steps C.2. and C.3 because the engine
fire switches represent separate actions
for the aft electronic panel and the
forward overhead panel. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Effect of Winglets on This AD
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that
the installation of winglets per
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC)
ST00830SE (https://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgstc.nsf/0/
3ed73703f205e3b386257e2f0064f3b1/
$FILE/ST00830SE.pdf) does not affect
the accomplishment of the
manufacturer’s service instructions.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data,
considered the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting this AD
with the changes described previously
and minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
• Are consistent with the intent that
was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) for correcting the
unsafe condition; and
• Do not add any additional burden
upon the public than was already
proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014).
We also determined that these
changes will not increase the economic
burden on any operator or increase the
scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action.
The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will
address the unsafe condition identified
in this AD. Once this modification is
developed, approved, and available, we
might consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 1,244
airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to
comply with this AD:
ESTIMATED COSTS
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Action
Labor cost
Parts cost
Cost per
product
Cost on
U.S. operators
Incorporating Airworthiness Limitation ............
1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 .................
$0
$85
$105,740
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
(c) Applicability
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
This AD was prompted by reports of
latently failed fuel shutoff valves discovered
during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures
of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
could result in the inability to shut off fuel
to the engine and, in case of certain engine
fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
wing failure.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
§ 39.13
This AD applies to all The Boeing
Company Model 737–600, –700, –700C,
–800, –900, and –900ER series airplanes,
certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)
Code 2823, Fuel Selector/Shutoff Valve.
(e) Unsafe Condition
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
This AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on
the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the
distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
55533
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2015–19–03 The Boeing Company:
Amendment 39–18266; Docket No.
FAA–2014–0194; Directorate Identifier
2014–NM–022–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection
Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of
this AD, revise the maintenance or inspection
program, as applicable, to add airworthiness
limitation number 28–AWL–MOV, ‘‘Engine
Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
Indication Operational Check,’’ by
incorporating the information specified in
figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD into the
Airworthiness Limitations Section of the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness.
The initial compliance time for
accomplishing the actions specified in 28–
AWL–MOV is within 10 days after
accomplishing the maintenance or inspection
program revision required by this paragraph.
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK
AWL No.
Task
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28–AWL–MOV ......
VerDate Sep<11>2014
ALI
Interval
Applicability
Description
DAILY ................................
INTERVAL NOTE: The
operational check is not
required on days when
the airplane is not used
in revenue service. The
check must be done before further flight once
the airplane is returned
to revenue service.
737–600, –700, –700C,
–800, –900, and –900ER
series airplanes.
APPLICABILITY NOTE:
Only applies to airplanes
with a fuel spar valve actuator having part number MA20A2027
(S343T003–56) or
MA30A1001
(S343T003–66) installed
at the engine fuel spar
valve positions.
Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
Indication Operational Check.
Concern: The fuel spar valve actuator design can result in airplanes operating with a failed fuel spar
valve actuator that is not reported. A latently failed
fuel spar valve actuator could prevent fuel shutoff to
an engine. In the event of certain engine fires, the
potential exists for an engine fire to be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the following checks of the engine fuel
spar valve position (unless checked by the
flightcrew in a manner approved by the principal operations inspector):
A. Operational Check during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.1 Engine changes from
OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) 28–22–11).
13:48 Sep 15, 2015
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55534
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
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AWL No.
Task
Interval
Applicability
Description
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the CUTOFF position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine changes from
OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
B. Operational check during engine start.
1. Do an operational check of the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the IDLE position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 1 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
2. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the IDLE position, verify the
SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
C. Operational check without engine operation.
1. Supply electrical power to airplane using standard
practices.
2. Make sure No. 1 and No. 2 Engine FIRE switches
on the Aft Electronic Panel are in the NORMAL (IN)
position.
3. Make sure No. 1 and No. 2 Engine Start Switches
on the Forward Overhead Panel are in the OFF or
AUTO position.
4. Do an operational check to the left engine fuel spar
valve actuator.
a. Move ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE position and wait approximately
10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE CLOSED indication light on the OVERHEAD PANEL to transition from DIM to BRIGHT
and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 1 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF position.
c. Verify the SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 1 Engine
changes from OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
5. Do an operational check of the right engine fuel
spar valve actuator.
a. Move ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE position and wait approximately
10 seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under this test condition for the
ENG VALVE CLOSED indication light on the OVERHEAD PANEL to transition from DIM to BRIGHT
and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 2 START LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF position.
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 179 / Wednesday, September 16, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
55535
FIGURE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (g) OF THIS AD—ENGINE FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE (FUEL SPAR VALVE) POSITION INDICATION
OPERATIONAL CHECK—Continued
AWL No.
Task
Interval
Applicability
Description
c. Verify the SPAR VALVE CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL for No. 2 Engine
changes from OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails (bright light fails to illuminate), before
further flight, repair faults as required (refer to Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
D. Perform an inspection of the engine fuel spar valve
actuator position.
NOTE: This inspection may be used whenever the
SPAR VALVE light does not function properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the left rear spar.
NOTE: The left engine fuel spar valve actuator is on
the left wing front spar outboard of the engine strut.
Access is through access panel 521BB on the left
wing leading edge.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any engine fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to
Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand is in the CUTOFF position.
NOTE: It is not necessary to cycle the FUEL CONTROL switch to do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right engine fuel spar valve actuator located in the right rear spar.
NOTE: The right engine fuel spar valve actuator is on
the right wing front spar outboard of the engine
strut. Access is through access panel 621BB on the
right wing leading edge.
a. Verify the manual override handle on the engine
fuel spar valve actuator is in the CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any engine fuel spar valve actuator that is not in the CLOSED position (refer to
Boeing AMM 28–22–11).
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(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance
or inspection program revision required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be
used unless the actions or intervals are
approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of
this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO) FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
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or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD,
contact Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
phone: 425–917–6509; fax: 425–917–6590;
email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–23117 Filed 9–15–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 95
[Docket No. 31039; Amdt. No. 522]
IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous
Amendments
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule
AGENCY:
This amendment adopts
miscellaneous amendments to the
required IFR (instrument flight rules)
altitudes and changeover points for
certain Federal airways, jet routes, or
direct routes for which a minimum or
maximum en route authorized IFR
altitude is prescribed. This regulatory
action is needed because of changes
occurring in the National Airspace
System. These changes are designed to
SUMMARY:
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 179 (Wednesday, September 16, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 55527-55535]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-23117]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0194; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-022-AD;
Amendment 39-18266; AD 2015-19-03]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The
Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER
series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed
fuel shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. This AD
requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new
airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct
latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which
[[Page 55528]]
could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in
case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to
wing failure.
DATES: This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0194; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The address for the Docket Office (phone: 800-647-
5527) is Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rebel Nichols, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-
6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email: rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all The Boeing Company
Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes.
The NPRM published in the Federal Register on April 14, 2014 (79 FR
20834). The NPRM was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel
shutoff valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. The NPRM
proposed to require revising the maintenance or inspection program to
include new airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to detect
and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine,
which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and,
in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead
to wing failure.
Record of Ex Parte Communication
In preparation of AD actions such as NPRMs and immediately adopted
rules, it is the practice of the FAA to obtain technical information
and information on operational and economic impacts from design
approval holders and aircraft operators. We discussed certain comments
addressed in this final rule in a teleconference with Airlines for
America (A4A) and other members of the aviation industry. All of the
comments discussed during this teleconference are addressed in this
final rule in response to comments submitted by other commenters. A
discussion of this contact can be found in the rulemaking docket at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2014-0194.
Clarification of Certain Terminology
Throughout the preamble of this final rule, commenters may have
used the terms ``fuel shutoff valve'' and ``fuel spar valve''
interchangeably. Both terms refer to the same part. In our responses to
comments, we have used the term ``fuel shutoff valve.'' The term ``fuel
spar valve'' is more commonly used in airplane maintenance
documentation and, therefore, we have used that term in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM (79
FR 20834, April 14, 2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)
American Airlines (AA) requested that no further regulatory action
be taken. AA stated that it has experienced only a small number of fuel
shutoff valve actuator failures. AA stated that the combination of
failures necessary to produce the catastrophic event described in the
NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) includes fuel shutoff valve actuator
failure, an erroneous position indication, and a fire in the engine
compartment. AA also stated that risk analysis shows the probability of
this combination occurring is in the improbable range of ``10E-11 to
10E-16.''
We disagree with commenter's request. We have determined that an
unsafe condition exists that warrants an interim action until the
manufacturer finishes developing a modification that will address the
identified unsafe condition. We have determined that, without the
required interim action, a significant number of flights with a fuel
shutoff valve actuator that is failed in the open valve position will
occur during the affected fleet life. If certain engine fire conditions
were to occur, or if extreme engine damage were to occur, or if an
engine separation event were to occur during flight, the crew
procedures for such an event would not stop the fuel flow to the engine
strut and nacelle. The continued flow of fuel could cause an
uncontrolled fire or lead to a fuel exhaustion event.
The FAA regulations require all transport airplanes to be fail safe
with respect to engine fire events, and the risk due to severe engine
damage events to be minimized. Therefore, we require, for each flight,
sufficiently operative fire safety systems so that fires can be
detected and contained, and that fuel to the engine strut and nacelle
can be shut off in the event of an engine fire or severe damage.
The FAA airworthiness standards require remotely controlled
powerplant valves to provide indications that the valves are in the
commanded position. These indications allow the prompt detection and
correction of valve failures. We do not allow dispatch with a known
inoperative fuel shutoff valve. Therefore, we are proceeding with this
final rule--not because of the higher-than-typical failure rate of the
particular valve actuator involved, but instead because the fuel
shutoff valve actuator can fail in a manner that also defeats the
required valve position indication feature. That failure can lead to a
large number of flights occurring on an airplane with a fuel shutoff
valve actuator failed in the open position without the operator being
aware of the failure. An airworthiness limitation containing required
inspections is intended to limit the number of flights following latent
failure of the fuel shutoff valve. We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
Request for Inspection Relief
AirDo, AA, All Nippon Airlines (ANA), Delta Airlines (DAL),
Southwest Airlines (SWA), Transavia, and United Airlines (UAL)
requested clarification of the daily check requirement. The commenters
stated that the check applies to airplanes that are in operational
revenue status. The commenters stated that the proposed AD (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) does not account for airplanes in routine
maintenance or for an out-of-service condition.
We infer the commenters are requesting inspection relief for
airplanes that are not in service. We agree with the commenters'
request. It would be unnecessarily burdensome to require the
inspections on airplanes that are not being used. We agree with
limiting inspections to days when the airplane is in revenue service.
In the Interval column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
added a note to clarify that the operational check is not
[[Page 55529]]
required on days when the airplane is not used in revenue service, but
that the check must be done before further flight once the airplane is
returned to revenue service.
Request To Limit the Applicability
UAL requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April
14, 2014) to limit the applicability specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(g) of the proposed AD to airplanes with the valve actuators that have
the identified unsafe condition. UAL stated the applicability applies
to valve actuators having part number (P/N) MA30A1001. UAL stated that
the problem does not apply to other existing actuator designs, and will
not apply to future designs.
We agree with the commenter's request. It would be unnecessarily
burdensome to require the inspections on airplanes that do not have any
of the susceptible valves installed. We have added a note to the
Applicability column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD to clarify
that the limitations apply to Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900,
and -900ER airplanes having actuator P/N MA20A2027 (Boeing P/N
S343T003-56) or P/N MA30A1001 (Boeing P/N S343T003-66) installed at the
engine fuel spar valve positions.
Request To Follow the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) in Lieu of
the Daily Check
AA and Qantas Airways stated that if the master minimum equipment
list (MMEL) is being used, then the daily check should be not required.
AA stated that the Boeing Model 737 MMEL item 28-22, ``Fuel/Spar
Valve Closed Lights,'' allows for the lights to be inoperative,
provided the associated valve is verified to operate normally and the
crossfeed VALVE OPEN light operates normally. AA stated that this item
allows the lights to be inoperative for up to 10 days, and it requested
that a provision be added to state that if this MMEL is being used, the
daily check is not required.
Qantas Airways stated that if an airplane is dispatched under the
MMEL for inoperative SPAR VALVE CLOSED light(s), then it is not
possible to accomplish the proposed checks.
We partially agree with the commenters' request. We disagree with
providing MMEL relief for an inoperative fuel shutoff valve indication
because such relief could potentially allow the fuel shutoff valve to
be inoperative for up to 10 days of revenue operation. However, we do
agree to provide flexibility regarding verification that the fuel
shutoff valve is operational. We have added item D. to figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD to specify a fourth option to perform daily
inspections to verify that the fuel shutoff valve is closing.
Request To Clarify Recording Requirements
Air Do, Ryanair, SWA, Transavia, UAL, and Darryl Voss requested
that the FAA provide a more complete explanation of the requirements
with regard to recording compliance.
Air Do stated that if the flightcrew performed the operational
check, a maintenance record is usually not created. The commenter
questioned whether this is acceptable, or whether the flightcrew should
record it in the flight log.
Ryanair requested that the FAA explicitly state in the AD that the
proposed actions may be performed by maintenance and/or flight
operations checklists, and that the AD will not require the retention
of maintenance or flight operations records to show compliance. Ryanair
stated that due to the high frequency of the actions in the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) and the large number of affected airplanes in
its fleet (approximately 300), the creation, retention, and
reforecasting of individual records for this activity is not practical.
Because of the high frequency of checks resulting from the proposed
AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), compounded with the creation,
distribution, and retention of the documentation of the checks, SWA
requested that the FAA specifically state in the AD that when the daily
check is performed successfully by flightcrews, no documentation is
required. SWA also requested that the FAA specifically state in the AD
that documentation (i.e., logbook entry or other type of defect report)
is required only when a failure is detected by the flightcrew, or when
the check is performed by maintenance personnel.
Transavia requested that, if the daily check remains, we revise the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to state that the inclusion
of the daily check requirement into a checklist is sufficient to show
AD compliance and prevent unwanted paperwork, and that the daily check
can be performed by either maintenance personnel or the flightcrew.
UAL asked whether the flightcrews will be required to record
compliance of the operational checks and document each inspection.
Darryl Voss requested that we revise the proposed AD (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) to remove the option to allow flightcrews to perform
operational checks for maintenance. Mr. Voss stated that showing
compliance with ADs is almost exclusively a maintenance function and
should remain a maintenance function to provide compliance continuity.
We agree that clarification is necessary. This AD requires
including the information in figure 1 of paragraph (g) of this AD in
the maintenance or inspection program. However, this AD does not
require accomplishing the actions specified in figure 1 of paragraph
(g) of this AD. The actions specified in the figure in this AD are
done, and remain enforceable, as part of the airworthiness limitations
of the instructions for continued airworthiness (ICA). Section 14 CFR
43.11(a) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 43.11(a)) requires
maintenance record entries for maintenance actions such as the required
checks. If an operator elects to have a flightcrew member do the check
in accordance with the applicable airworthiness limitation, that same
action would be considered an operational task (not maintenance), and
therefore 14 CFR 43.11(a) would not apply. In that case, operators
should follow their normal processes for operational activities,
including necessary Principal Operations Inspector (POI) involvement.
We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Inspection Procedures for Operational Checks
Boeing requested to add a flightcrew inspection procedure during
engine start and engine shutdown. Boeing stated that this will provide
common flight procedures and eliminate each operator creating its own
test.
DAL requested that the preamble of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14,
2014) be revised to match the rest of the requirements in the NPRM. DAL
stated that if POI approval is required for flightcrews to accomplish
operational checks, then the preamble should identify that flightcrews
can only accomplish operational checks approved by the inspector. DAL
stated that the preamble should not associate the operational check
without engine start to only maintenance crews, and the operational
checks while starting the engine or shutting down the engine to only
flightcrews.
UAL requested that standardized procedures be established by the
FAA aircraft certification office for the POI to approve on behalf of
all affected operators.
We disagree with the commenter's request to add to this AD a method
describing how maintenance actions and operations actions should be
[[Page 55530]]
coordinated. The operational requirements are specified in figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD; how these requirements are captured in the
operations processes to ensure that the maintenance action has been
completed is likely different for each operator. As the commenter
stated, flightcrews can only accomplish operational checks approved by
the inspector. No change has been made to the final rule in this
regard.
Request To Provide an Alternative to the Maintenance or Inspection
Program Revision in Operational Documents
DAL requested that the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be
revised to provide an option for revising the Boeing Model 737
``Airplane Normal Checklist'' to specify accomplishment of one of the
required operational checks (operational check during engine start,
operational check during engine shutdown, or operational check without
engine operations) as a ``FIRST FLIGHT OF THE DAY'' requirement as an
alternative to the maintenance or inspection program revision specified
in paragraph (g) of the proposed rule. DAL stated that this option
would ensure that operational aircraft are inspected daily, provide
clear responsibility to the flightcrew to accomplish the operational
checks, and remove concern for accomplishing the actions during times
when the airplane is not in service. DAL stated that incorporating this
change to the ``Airplane Normal Checklist'' will simplify compliance
procedures while satisfying the requirements of the proposed rule.
JAL requested that the FAA coordinate with Boeing to revise the
flightcrew operations manual (FCOM) to provide the check of the fuel
spar valve as a normal procedure. JAL stated that if an operational
check by the flightcrew is allowed, the FCOM should be revised to
provide the normal procedure to perform the fuel spar valve check
during engine start or shutdown.
Qantas Airways suggested that a revision to the Boeing Model 737
Airplane Flight Manual (AFM), Section 1 ``Certificate Limitations,'' or
Section 3 ``Normal Procedures,'' might be a more appropriate location
to allow the flightcrew to monitor valve operations during engine start
and/or engine shutdown.
We find that clarification is necessary. Changing these documents
presupposes that every operator will have flightcrews perform this
task. It is not our intention to require flightcrews to perform this
task. Individual operators can modify their normal operating procedures
to add this requirement.
Request To Clarify the Operational Check During Engine Start
Qantas stated that it does not believe that paragraph B. of the
Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79
FR 20834, April 14, 2014), which specifies to do an operational check
during engine start, achieves the desired failure detection. Qantas
stated that if the test fails (i.e., bright light fails to illuminate),
the valve has failed to open; this is different than a valve that has
failed to close. Qantas stated that the test should identify the failed
actuator in the failure mode, which results in an unsafe condition.
We infer that Qantas is requesting we clarify the operational check
during engine start. We find that clarification is necessary. The check
procedure is designed to make sure the fuel shutoff valve actuator
moves to the open position from the closed position. However, if the
fuel shutoff valve actuator had previously failed open, the actuator
would not move the valve and this check would fail. If this check
fails, the fuel shutoff valve actuator is either failed in the closed
position or has failed previously in the open position. Either way, the
failed fuel shutoff valve actuator must be replaced. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Add Requirement To Provide Electrical Power Before the
Maintenance Check
UAL requested we add a requirement to provide electrical power
before accomplishment of the maintenance check specified by the
proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014).
We agree with the commenter's request because electrical power is
required. In item C.1. of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD, we have
added an instruction to supply electrical power to the airplane using
standard practices when performing the operational check.
Request To Reference the Fault Isolation Manual
Boeing requested that figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be revised in order to reference the
Fault Isolation Manual (FIM), instead of the Boeing Model 737 Aircraft
Maintenance Manual (AMM), should the operational check fail. Boeing
stated that the faults are isolated to failed components using the FIM.
The AMM provides instructions for removing and replacing identified
failed components. Boeing stated that the light could fail to
illuminate for reasons other than actuator failure.
We disagree with the commenter's request to reference the FIM
instead of the AMM. If an operational check fails, the failed component
must be replaced. As Boeing stated, the AMM provides instructions for
replacing failed components. The FIM also refers to the AMM for
replacement of the fuel shutoff valve actuator after doing some
preliminary testing. Operators may consult the FIM for guidance in
troubleshooting other reasons the light could fail to illuminate. We
have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend the Repetitive Interval for the Operational Checks
ANA requested that the repetitive interval be revised from daily to
15,000 flight hours or 6,000 flight hours, or a weekly interval. ANA
stated that Boeing has included these repetitive intervals in certain
maintenance documents. ANA commented that it has 38 airplanes in
operation and it has never experienced a latent failure of the MOV
actuator. ANA also stated that the possibility of the unsafe condition
happening is very low. ANA stated that a daily interval is a burden to
operators.
DAL requested that the operational checks be required at intervals
not to exceed 90 days or 1,400 flight cycles or 1,800 flight hours; DAL
stated that this is similar to what is proposed by the original
equipment manufacturer. DAL stated that Airworthiness Limitation Task
28-AWL-MOV, ``Engine Fuel Shut-Off Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position
Indication Operational Check,'' which was introduced by the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), would require daily operational checks
of the engine fuel shutoff valve. DAL stated that it finds this will be
an onerous operational requirement as it does not have maintenance
personnel in all locations where the affected airplanes are operated.
DAL stated that for this reason, it will be necessary for its
flightcrews to accomplish the operational checks in order to comply
with the daily requirement specified by the proposed AD.
DAL also stated that the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014)
does not provide significant information as to how the daily check
requirement was determined or why it differs so significantly from the
compliance recommendation established by Boeing. DAL stated that
lacking specific details of the methodology used by the FAA and the
assumptions made to arrive at a daily check interval hinders the
operator's ability to provide comments on the appropriateness of this
interval. DAL stated that Boeing has indicated that its numeric safety
analysis supports
[[Page 55531]]
a compliance period of 3,000 flight hours for the operational checks.
DAL also stated that based on current DAL utilization, accomplishment
of daily checks equates to accomplishing the check approximately 300
times more frequently than the interval supported by the Boeing safety
analysis.
JAL requested that the FAA extend the inspection interval to a
heavy maintenance opportunity. For Model 737-800 airplanes, JAL stated
to set the heavy maintenance opportunity (such as ``C-Check'' and ``K-
Check'') at approximately 2-year intervals to efficiently accomplish
the maintenance program.
Qantas Airways requested an interval that can be effectively
scheduled in aircraft maintenance control programs, such as a 7-day
interval.
Jim Way requested a monthly interval for the operational checks.
Mr. Way stated that a daily check is too restrictive.
Bradley Most requested that the daily inspection interval be
revised to every 2 calendar days to accommodate ``international
operations, out of station, overnight, etc.'' Mr. Most stated that the
interval of daily lacks a clear definition.
We disagree with the requests to extend the inspection interval. An
increase in the inspection interval from daily to every other day, to
weekly, or to 90 days, would result in 2, 7, or 90 times as many
flights at risk in the event of an engine fire. The daily inspection
has been deemed practical because, in practice, it will mean the
flightcrew will need to watch a light as they start or shut down the
engine using normal procedures. An increased interval to 6,000 flight
hours would have no real effect on the unsafe condition since the fuel
filter replacement currently detects the problem every 6,000 flight
hours. In addition, an increased interval of 15,000 flight hours, or 24
months, would similarly not improve safety. We have not changed this AD
in this regard.
Request To Revise the Proposed Compliance Time for Revising the
Maintenance or Inspection Program
Mr. Most requested that the compliance time to revise the
maintenance or inspection program be changed to 120 days after the
effective date of this AD. Mr. Most stated that FAA offices are
typically requesting 60 days to review an airplane maintenance or
inspection program revision that is submitted for approval and, in many
cases, are taking longer. Mr. Most stated that the current inspection
interval would not allow operators enough time to revise the airplane
maintenance or inspection program, submit it to FAA for approval, and
implement the revised airplane maintenance or inspection program within
30 days of the effective date.
Jim Way requested that operators be given 90 days after the
effective date of the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) to
incorporate the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD into the maintenance program. Mr. Way stated that single
aircraft operators use a vendor to provide support for the inspection
program revisions. Mr. Way stated that a 30-day compliance time after
the effective date of the proposed AD is not enough time to properly
make and submit the changes to the FAA's principal maintenance
inspector for approval and implementation.
We do not agree to revise the compliance time for revising the
maintenance or inspection program beyond 30 days. The 30-day compliance
time specified in paragraph (g) of this AD is consistent with other
regulatory actions for other affected models in similar ADs. However,
under the provisions of paragraph (i)(1) of this AD, we might consider
requests for adjustments to the compliance time if data are submitted
to substantiate that such an adjustment would provide an acceptable
level of safety.
Request To Change the Initial Compliance Time for the Operational Check
AA requested that 30 days be provided for the initial operational
check after the airworthiness limitation (AWL) has been incorporated
into its maintenance program. AA stated that this will allow for
publishing the new criteria.
We partially agree with AA's request concerning the compliance time
for the initial operational check. We have changed the initial
compliance time specified in paragraph (g) of this AD for accomplishing
the actions specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD from 7 to
10 days. The compliance time of 10 days is consistent with other
regulatory actions for other affected models in similar ADs. We have
determined that 10 days for the initial inspection represents an
appropriate time in which the required actions can be performed in a
timely manner within the affected fleet, while still maintaining an
adequate level of safety.
Request To Clarify Who Must Accomplish the Maintenance or Inspection
Program Revision
DAL requested that paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (79 FR 20834,
April 14, 2014) be revised because it is not clear who must accomplish
the action in this paragraph. DAL stated that operators do not control
the AWL section of the ICA and, therefore, could not comply with the
requirement. DAL stated that on Boeing Model 737NG airplanes, the AWLs
are incorporated into Section 9 of the Maintenance Planning Document
(MPD) by Boeing. DAL stated that the action in the NPRM would be one
for the original equipment manufacturer to accomplish with a revision
to the MPD, which would then be incorporated by the operators. DAL also
stated that operators have control of their continuous airworthiness
maintenance program (CAMP). DAL stated that in the NPRM, it is the
intent of the operators to incorporate the AWL into their CAMP.
We find that clarification is necessary. The requirement in
paragraph (g) of this AD is to change the Airworthiness Limitations of
the ICA for each affected airplane. Once that change is complete,
operators will be compelled to change their maintenance program to
include the new requirements of the revised Airworthiness Limitations.
For Part 121 operators, changes to the CAMP will become necessary; but
for other operators, the maintenance program may take a different form.
We have not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Remove Redundant Language
DAL requested that certain language be removed from the proposed AD
(79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) because it is redundant. DAL stated that
paragraph (h) of the proposed AD can be excluded because it states that
no alternative actions or intervals can be used unless approved as an
alternative method of compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i)(1) of the proposed AD. (Paragraph
(i) of the proposed AD specifies the procedures and requirements for an
AMOC.)
We disagree with the commenter's request. It is necessary to
include paragraph (h) of this AD (``No Alternative Actions or
Intervals'') because it ensures that changes made after accomplishment
of the maintenance or inspection program revision, e.g., using new
versions of the maintenance or inspection program, are done only when
approval of an AMOC is obtained from the FAA. We have not changed this
AD in this regard.
Request To Revise the Costs of Compliance Paragraph
DAL stated that the cost estimate provided in the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014) is inaccurate. DAL
[[Page 55532]]
stated that the cost reflected in the NPRM is for incorporating the
proposed program change into the operator's program only as a revision
of the maintenance or inspection program.'' DAL stated the cost
estimate presented is flawed in two aspects: It does not properly
account for the cost operators will take on in implementing the program
changes, and it does not account for the cost of actually performing
the inspections specified by the proposed maintenance or inspection
program changes.
We infer that DAL is requesting we revise the Costs of Compliance
paragraph. We acknowledge the commenter's concern. In this AD, the
required action is to revise the maintenance or inspection program, as
applicable, to include a new airworthiness limitation. The added
airworthiness limitation requires an inspection of the position of the
MOV actuator daily. However, these repetitive inspections, which are
expected to take a few seconds to complete, are required by section
91.403(c) of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 91.403(c)) once
incorporated into the maintenance or inspection program.
The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions typically includes only
the costs associated with complying with the AD. In this AD, the
required action is the maintenance or inspection program revision, as
applicable, to include the new airworthiness limitation. Accomplishing
repetitive actions that are specified in the airworthiness limitation
are not directly required by this AD. The FAA, as a matter of practice,
does not include a cost estimate for these repetitive actions in an AD
because these actions are required as part of the operating rules.
Therefore, we have made no change to this AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Wording for Operational Check Without Engine
Operation
UAL requested we revise the wording of the operational check
without engine operation. UAL stated that in item C.3.a. and item
C.4.a. in the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this
AD, either a tolerance should be added to the wording, or the word
``approximately'' should be added before the phrase ``10 seconds.''
We agree with the commenter's request. In item C.4.a. and item
C.5.a. (which correspond to items C.3.a. and C.4.a. of the NPRM (79 FR
20834, April 14, 2014)) in the Description column of figure 1 to
paragraph (g) of this AD, we have added wording that indicates to wait
``approximately'' 10 seconds after moving the ENG 1 and ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL STAND to the IDLE position. We find that this
change will allow flexibility during the operational check, while still
maintaining an adequate level of safety.
Request To Correct Typographical Errors
Boeing and DAL requested that we correct a typographical error in
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014). Boeing and DAL stated
that item A.1. in the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of the proposed AD, which states to ``do all operational checks . .
.,'' the word ``all'' should be removed because the operational check
is a singular check.
We agree with the commenters' request. We have revised item A.1. in
the Description column of figure 1 to paragraph (g) of this AD
accordingly.
Boeing also requested that certain other typographical errors in
the proposed AD (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) be corrected to reduce
the possibility of confusion regarding the requirements. Boeing stated
that the Description column in figure 1 to paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD should be revised as follows:
Step B.2. has been skipped, and needs to be renumbered.
In step B.1.a., the text ``START LEVEL STAND'' should be
changed to ``START LEVER ON CONTROL STAND.''
Steps C.2. and C.3. should be combined and renumbered.
In step C.5.a., the text ``ENG @'' should be changed to
``ENG 2.''
We disagree with the comment. The stated typographical errors for
step B.1.a., step B.2., and step C.5.a., do not exist in the regulatory
text of the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014), as published. We
disagree with combining steps C.2. and C.3 because the engine fire
switches represent separate actions for the aft electronic panel and
the forward overhead panel. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Effect of Winglets on This AD
Aviation Partners Boeing stated that the installation of winglets
per Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00830SE (https://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgstc.nsf/0/
3ed73703f205e3b386257e2f0064f3b1/$FILE/ST00830SE.pdf) does not affect
the accomplishment of the manufacturer's service instructions.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 20834, April 14, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
developing a modification that will address the unsafe condition
identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved,
and available, we might consider additional rulemaking.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 1,244 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incorporating Airworthiness 1 work-hour x $85 per $0 $85 $105,740
Limitation. hour = $85.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 55533]]
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-19-03 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-18266; Docket No. FAA-
2014-0194; Directorate Identifier 2014-NM-022-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective October 21, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -
700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes, certificated in any
category.
(d) Subject
Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC) Code 2823, Fuel Selector/
Shutoff Valve.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of latently failed fuel shutoff
valves discovered during fuel filter replacement. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff
valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off
fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an
uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Revision of Maintenance or Inspection Program
Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, revise the
maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to add
airworthiness limitation number 28-AWL-MOV, ``Engine Fuel Shutoff
Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication Operational Check,'' by
incorporating the information specified in figure 1 to paragraph (g)
of this AD into the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the
Instructions for Continued Airworthiness. The initial compliance
time for accomplishing the actions specified in 28-AWL-MOV is within
10 days after accomplishing the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by this paragraph.
Figure 1 to Paragraph (g) of This AD--Engine Fuel Shutoff Valve (Fuel Spar Valve) Position Indication
Operational Check
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AWL No. Task Interval Applicability Description
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
28-AWL-MOV.................. ALI DAILY............... 737-600, -700, - Engine Fuel Shutoff
INTERVAL NOTE: The 700C, -800, -900, Valve (Fuel Spar Valve)
operational check and -900ER series Position Indication
is not required on airplanes. Operational Check.
days when the APPLICABILITY NOTE: Concern: The fuel spar
airplane is not Only applies to valve actuator design
used in revenue airplanes with a can result in airplanes
service. The check fuel spar valve operating with a failed
must be done before actuator having fuel spar valve
further flight once part number actuator that is not
the airplane is MA20A2027 reported. A latently
returned to revenue (S343T003-56) or failed fuel spar valve
service.. MA30A1001 actuator could prevent
(S343T003-66) fuel shutoff to an
installed at the engine. In the event of
engine fuel spar certain engine fires,
valve positions.. the potential exists
for an engine fire to
be uncontrollable.
Perform one of the
following checks of the
engine fuel spar valve
position (unless
checked by the
flightcrew in a manner
approved by the
principal operations
inspector):
A. Operational Check
during engine shutdown.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
CUTOFF position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.1
Engine changes from OFF
to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing
Aircraft Maintenance
Manual (AMM) 28-22-11).
[[Page 55534]]
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
CUTOFF position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.
2 Engine changes from
OFF to BRIGHT then DIM.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
B. Operational check
during engine start.
1. Do an operational
check of the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
IDLE position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.
1 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
2. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. As the ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND is moved to the
IDLE position, verify
the SPAR VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL for No.
2 Engine changes from
DIM to BRIGHT then OFF.
b. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
C. Operational check
without engine
operation.
1. Supply electrical
power to airplane using
standard practices.
2. Make sure No. 1 and
No. 2 Engine FIRE
switches on the Aft
Electronic Panel are in
the NORMAL (IN)
position.
3. Make sure No. 1 and
No. 2 Engine Start
Switches on the Forward
Overhead Panel are in
the OFF or AUTO
position.
4. Do an operational
check to the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL to
transition from DIM to
BRIGHT and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 1 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF
position.
c. Verify the SPAR VALVE
CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL
for No. 1 Engine
changes from OFF to
BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
5. Do an operational
check of the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator.
a. Move ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the IDLE
position and wait
approximately 10
seconds.
NOTE: It is normal under
this test condition for
the ENG VALVE CLOSED
indication light on the
OVERHEAD PANEL to
transition from DIM to
BRIGHT and stay BRIGHT.
b. Move ENG 2 START
LEVER on the CONTROL
STAND to the CUTOFF
position.
[[Page 55535]]
c. Verify the SPAR VALVE
CLOSED indication light
on the OVERHEAD PANEL
for No. 2 Engine
changes from OFF to
BRIGHT then DIM.
d. If the test fails
(bright light fails to
illuminate), before
further flight, repair
faults as required
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
D. Perform an inspection
of the engine fuel spar
valve actuator
position.
NOTE: This inspection
may be used whenever
the SPAR VALVE light
does not function
properly.
1. Make sure the L FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
2. Inspect the left
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
left rear spar.
NOTE: The left engine
fuel spar valve
actuator is on the left
wing front spar
outboard of the engine
strut. Access is
through access panel
521BB on the left wing
leading edge.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
engine fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
3. Make sure the R FUEL
CONTROL switch on the
quadrant control stand
is in the CUTOFF
position.
NOTE: It is not
necessary to cycle the
FUEL CONTROL switch to
do this inspection.
4. Inspect the right
engine fuel spar valve
actuator located in the
right rear spar.
NOTE: The right engine
fuel spar valve
actuator is on the
right wing front spar
outboard of the engine
strut. Access is
through access panel
621BB on the right wing
leading edge.
a. Verify the manual
override handle on the
engine fuel spar valve
actuator is in the
CLOSED position.
b. Repair or replace any
engine fuel spar valve
actuator that is not in
the CLOSED position
(refer to Boeing AMM 28-
22-11).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(h) No Alternative Actions or Intervals
After accomplishment of the maintenance or inspection program
revision required by paragraph (g) of this AD, no alternative
actions (e.g., inspections) or intervals may be used unless the
actions or intervals are approved as an alternative method of
compliance (AMOC) in accordance with the procedures specified in
paragraph (i)(1) of this AD.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO)
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding
district office.
(j) Related Information
For more information about this AD, contact Rebel Nichols,
Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6509; fax: 425-917-6590; email:
rebel.nichols@faa.gov.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
None.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 7, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-23117 Filed 9-15-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
