Audits of Subway Tunnel Environments, 35715-35716 [2015-15256]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 119 / Monday, June 22, 2015 / Notices
Title: FRA Emergency Order No. 31,
Notice No. 1.
OMB Control Number: 2130–0611.
Abstract: On May 21, 2015, FRA
issued Emergency Order No. 31 (EO or
Order) to require that the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation
(Amtrak) take actions to control
passenger train speed at certain
locations on main line track in the
Northeast Corridor (as defined by 49
U.S.C. 24905(c)(1)(A)). Amtrak was
required to immediately implement
code changes to its Automatic Train
Control (ATC) System to enforce the
passenger train speed limit ahead of the
curve at Frankford Junction in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where a
fatal accident occurred on May 12, 2015.
Amtrak was also required to identify all
other curves on the Northeast Corridor
where there is a significant reduction
(more than 20 miles per hour (mph))
from the maximum authorized approach
speed to those curves for passenger
trains. Amtrak was then required to
develop and comply with an FRAapproved action plan to modify its
existing ATC System or other signal
systems (or take alternative operational
actions) to enable enforcement of
passenger train speeds at the identified
35715
curves. Amtrak also had to install
additional wayside passenger train
speed limit signage at appropriate
locations on its Northeast Corridor rightof-way. FRA is continuing this
Emergency Order in full force and
effect, and is now seeking regular
clearance for the information collection
associated with this Emergency Order.
Form Number(s): N/A.
Affected Public: Businesses.
Respondent Universe: 1 Railroad.
Frequency of Submission: On
occasion.
Reporting Burden:
Emergency Order
No. 31—Item:
Respondent universe
Total annual responses
Average time per
response
(1) Amtrak survey of Northeast Corridor (NEC)
main line track system to create list identifying
each main track curve where there is a reduction of more than 20 mph from the maximum
authorized speed to that curve.
(2) Development and submission of Amtrak Action Plan to FRA.
(3) Installation of Additional Wayside Signs
throughout NEC, particularly along curve locations, to alert engineers and conductors of
maximum authorized train speed.
—Notice by Amtrak to FRA of Installation of
Signs along NEC designated in its.
(4) Relief Petition to FRA to take action not in
Accordance with this Emergency Order.
1 Railroad .....................
1 list ..............................
32 hours .......................
32
1 Railroad .....................
1 action plan ................
80 hours .......................
80
1 Railroad .....................
186 NEC wayside signs
15.4839 minutes per
sign.
48
1 Railroad .....................
6 notices .......................
15 minutes ...................
2
1 Railroad .....................
1 petition request .........
80 hours .......................
80
Total Estimated Annual Responses:
195.
Total Estimated Annual Burden: 242.
Status: Regular Review.
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3507(a) and 5
CFR 1320.5(b), 1320.8(b)(3)(vi), FRA
informs all interested parties that it may
not conduct or sponsor, and a
respondent is not required to respond
to, a collection of information unless it
displays a currently valid OMB control
number.
Authority: 44 U.S.C. 3501–3520.
Rebecca Pennington,
Chief Financial Officer.
[FR Doc. 2015–15214 Filed 6–19–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Transit Administration
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
[Safety Advisory 15–1]
Audits of Subway Tunnel
Environments
AGENCY:
Federal Transit Administration,
DOT.
ACTION:
Notice of safety advisory.
On June 17, 2015, the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) issued
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:45 Jun 19, 2015
Jkt 235001
Safety Advisory 15–1 to advise rail fixed
guideway public transportation systems
(RFGPTS) with subway tunnel
environments of forthcoming audits to
be conducted by State Safety Oversight
Agencies (SSOAs) with oversight
jurisdiction in the assessment of tunnel
ventilation systems, emergency
procedures for fire and smoke events,
training programs to ensure compliance
with those emergency procedures, and
application of industry best standards in
maintenance and emergency
procedures. Additionally, FTA
instructed all State Safety Oversight
Agencies to conduct inspections of the
rail transit agencies’ tunnel ventilation
systems, and to audit the rail transit
agencies within their jurisdiction for the
purpose of determining the mileage and
characteristics of subway tunnels,
assessing the adequacy of the rail transit
agencies’ emergency procedures,
ensuring compliance with those
emergency procedures, and determining
compliance with industry best
standards in maintenance and
emergency procedure. The FTA issued
Safety Advisory 15–1 in response to an
urgent safety recommendation by the
National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB). The FTA Safety Advisory
15–1, ‘‘Audit All Rail Fixed Guideway
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Total annual
burden hours
Public Transportation Systems
(RFGPTS) with Subway Tunnel
Environments,’’ is available on the FTA
public Web site, https://www.fta.dot.gov/
tso.html.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For
program matters, Thomas Littleton,
Associate Administrator for Transit
Safety and Oversight, (202) 366–1738 or
Thomas.Littleton@dot.gov. For legal
matters, Scott Biehl, Senior Counsel,
(202) 366–0826 or Scott.Biehl@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On
January 12, 2015, at 3:15 p.m., Eastern
Standard Time, a southbound Yellow
Line rapid rail train number 302
operated by the Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
(WMATA) stopped after encountering
heavy smoke in a subway tunnel
between the L’Enfant Plaza station and
the Potomac River Bridge. After
stopping, the rear car of train 302 was
about 386 feet from the south end of the
L’Enfant Plaza station platform. The
operator of train 302 informed
WMATA’s Operation Control Center
(OCC) that the train had stopped due to
heavy smoke. A following Yellow Line
train, number 510, stopped about 100
feet short of the south end of the same
platform, but its cars were entirely
within the L’Enfant Plaza station. At
E:\FR\FM\22JNN1.SGM
22JNN1
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
35716
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 119 / Monday, June 22, 2015 / Notices
3:16 p.m., WMATA’s OCC activated the
under-platform fans at the L’Enfant
Plaza Green and Yellow Line platforms,
but because the fans were in exhaust
mode—not supply mode—the activation
of the fans pulled smoke toward rather
than away from both trains. Moreover,
the operator of train 302 had not shut
off the train ventilation system that
draws outside air into the train cars.
WMATA procedure required the train
operator to receive permission from the
OCC to shut off the train ventilation
system. Since both the station and vent
shaft fans were all activated in exhaust
mode—not supply mode—there was not
a supply of fresh air to help move the
smoke through the tunnel.
A post- accident inspection found that
two of the four fans had tripped an
overload circuit breaker and were nonoperational.
Police and emergency responders
assisted in the evacuation of both trains
and the L’Enfant Plaza station. A limited
number of passengers aboard train 302
were able to self-evacuate. One
passenger died and 86 others were
transported to local medical facilities for
treatment for smoke inhalation. The
WMATA incurred an estimated
$120,000 in damage to assets. During its
investigation, the NTSB determined the
cause of the smoke to have been an
electrical arcing incident, and the
source of the smoke to have been about
1,100 feet ahead (south) of train 302.
Further, as part of its investigation, the
NTSB determined that WMATA did not
have a written ventilation procedure for
smoke and fire events in a tunnel, and
that the ventilation strategy WMATA
deployed during this accident was not
consistent with best practice.
On February 11, 2015, the NTSB
issued three urgent safety
recommendations to WMATA, two
urgent safety recommendations to the
American Public Transportation
Association, and urgent safety
recommendation R–15–007 to FTA,
calling for audits for all rail transit
agencies that have subway tunnel
environments to assess the state of good
repair of their tunnel ventilation
systems, their written emergency
procedures for fire and smoke events,
and their training programs to ensure
compliance with those procedures, and
to verify that the rail transit agencies are
applying industry best standards, such
as the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) Code 130,
Standards for Fixed Guideway Transit
and Passenger Rail Systems, in their
maintenance and emergency
procedures. The FTA responded to the
NTSB safety recommendation by letter
of March 13, 2015, stating, in part, that
VerDate Sep<11>2014
17:45 Jun 19, 2015
Jkt 235001
we have identified the rail transit
agencies with operational subway
tunnel environments and will engage
the State Safety Oversight Agencies
(SSOAs) that have safety oversight
jurisdiction over these rail transit
agencies, in accordance with 49 U.S.C.
5329 and 5330 and 49 CFR part 659, for
the purpose of addressing R–15–007.
To that end, on June 17, 2015, the
FTA Office of Transit Safety and
Oversight issued Safety Advisory 15–1,
addressed to the RFGPTS that have
operational subway tunnel
environments, and a letter addressed to
the SSOAs that have safety oversight
jurisdiction over these the rail transit
agencies, with instructions to conduct
audits to (1) determine the extent of
subway tunnel mileage at each such rail
transit agency, and the characteristics of
its operational subway tunnel
environments; (2) assess each rail transit
agency’s written emergency procedures
for fire and smoke events; (3) assess
each rail transit agency’s training
programs for ensuring compliance with
those emergency procedures; and (4)
determine each rail transit agency’s
compliance with industry best
standards, such as NFPA Code 130, in
their maintenance and emergency
procedures. Additionally, the SSOAs
were instructed to complete a Tunnel
Ventilation System Inspection of each
such rail transit agency, using the audit
tools provided by FTA, and to submit
the results of their audits with
supporting documentation no later than
August 31, 2015. For additional
guidance, FTA referred the SSOAs to
the joint FTA/Federal Highway
Administration Highway and Rail
Transit Tunnel Inspection Manual, 2005
Edition, which sets forth established
industry inspection standards. The FTA
will use the data and information from
these audits by the SSOAs in
conducting a broader analysis for
responding to NTSB recommendation
R–15–007, and potentially, for future
rulemaking and guidance to the rail
transit industry. Both the FTA Safety
Advisory 15–1 and the June 17, 2015
letter addressed to the SSOAs are
available on the FTA public Web site,
https://www.fta.dot.gov/tso.html.
The FTA’s issuance of Safety
Advisory 15–1 is in accordance with
FTA’s authority to ‘‘investigate public
transportation accidents and incidents
and provide guidance to recipients
regarding prevention of accidents and
incidents.’’ 49 U.S.C. 5329(f) (5). The
requests for information and data from
the SSOAs and the rail transit agencies
within their jurisdiction are based on
FTA’s authority to request program
information pertinent to rail transit
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
safety under the State Safety Oversight
rule, 49 CFR 659.39(d).
Readers who have an interest in the
January 12, 2015, WMATA accident that
led to the urgent recommendations by
the NTSB and FTA’s issuance of Safety
Advisory 15–1 can obtain further
information about that accident in two
reports issued on June 17, 2015: A
Safety Management Inspection that FTA
conducted of WMATA from March 16 to
April 3, 2015, and a Safety Management
System gap analysis FTA performed for
WMATA from March 3 to March 5,
2015. Both documents are available on
the FTA public Web site, https://
www.fta.dot.gov/tso.html.
Therese W. McMillan,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015–15256 Filed 6–19–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration
[Docket No. NHTSA–2015–0047]
Supplemental Notice of Public Hearing
To Determine Whether Fiat Chrysler
Has Reasonably Met Its Obligations To
Remedy Recalled Vehicles and To
Notify NHTSA, Owners, and
Purchasers of Recalls
National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA), DOT.
ACTION: Supplemental notice of public
hearing.
AGENCY:
NHTSA will hold a public
hearing on whether Fiat Chrysler
Automobiles US LLC (Fiat Chrysler) has
reasonably met its obligations to remedy
recalled vehicles and to notify NHTSA,
owners, and purchasers of recalls. This
notice provides supplemental
information on the subject matter of the
hearing.
DATES: The public hearing will be held
beginning at 10 a.m. ET on July 2, 2015,
at the U.S. Department of
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. If
you wish to attend or speak at the
hearing, you must register in advance no
later than June 30, 2015 (and June 26,
2015, for non-U.S. citizens), by
following the instructions in the
Procedural Matters section of this
notice. NHTSA will consider late
registrants to the extent time and space
allows, but cannot ensure that late
registrants will be able to attend or
speak at the hearing. To ensure that
NHTSA has an opportunity to consider
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\22JNN1.SGM
22JNN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 119 (Monday, June 22, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 35715-35716]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-15256]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Transit Administration
[Safety Advisory 15-1]
Audits of Subway Tunnel Environments
AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration, DOT.
ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On June 17, 2015, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
issued Safety Advisory 15-1 to advise rail fixed guideway public
transportation systems (RFGPTS) with subway tunnel environments of
forthcoming audits to be conducted by State Safety Oversight Agencies
(SSOAs) with oversight jurisdiction in the assessment of tunnel
ventilation systems, emergency procedures for fire and smoke events,
training programs to ensure compliance with those emergency procedures,
and application of industry best standards in maintenance and emergency
procedures. Additionally, FTA instructed all State Safety Oversight
Agencies to conduct inspections of the rail transit agencies' tunnel
ventilation systems, and to audit the rail transit agencies within
their jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the mileage and
characteristics of subway tunnels, assessing the adequacy of the rail
transit agencies' emergency procedures, ensuring compliance with those
emergency procedures, and determining compliance with industry best
standards in maintenance and emergency procedure. The FTA issued Safety
Advisory 15-1 in response to an urgent safety recommendation by the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The FTA Safety Advisory
15-1, ``Audit All Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation Systems
(RFGPTS) with Subway Tunnel Environments,'' is available on the FTA
public Web site, https://www.fta.dot.gov/tso.html.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For program matters, Thomas Littleton,
Associate Administrator for Transit Safety and Oversight, (202) 366-
1738 or Thomas.Littleton@dot.gov. For legal matters, Scott Biehl,
Senior Counsel, (202) 366-0826 or Scott.Biehl@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On January 12, 2015, at 3:15 p.m., Eastern
Standard Time, a southbound Yellow Line rapid rail train number 302
operated by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA)
stopped after encountering heavy smoke in a subway tunnel between the
L'Enfant Plaza station and the Potomac River Bridge. After stopping,
the rear car of train 302 was about 386 feet from the south end of the
L'Enfant Plaza station platform. The operator of train 302 informed
WMATA's Operation Control Center (OCC) that the train had stopped due
to heavy smoke. A following Yellow Line train, number 510, stopped
about 100 feet short of the south end of the same platform, but its
cars were entirely within the L'Enfant Plaza station. At
[[Page 35716]]
3:16 p.m., WMATA's OCC activated the under-platform fans at the
L'Enfant Plaza Green and Yellow Line platforms, but because the fans
were in exhaust mode--not supply mode--the activation of the fans
pulled smoke toward rather than away from both trains. Moreover, the
operator of train 302 had not shut off the train ventilation system
that draws outside air into the train cars. WMATA procedure required
the train operator to receive permission from the OCC to shut off the
train ventilation system. Since both the station and vent shaft fans
were all activated in exhaust mode--not supply mode--there was not a
supply of fresh air to help move the smoke through the tunnel.
A post- accident inspection found that two of the four fans had
tripped an overload circuit breaker and were non-operational.
Police and emergency responders assisted in the evacuation of both
trains and the L'Enfant Plaza station. A limited number of passengers
aboard train 302 were able to self-evacuate. One passenger died and 86
others were transported to local medical facilities for treatment for
smoke inhalation. The WMATA incurred an estimated $120,000 in damage to
assets. During its investigation, the NTSB determined the cause of the
smoke to have been an electrical arcing incident, and the source of the
smoke to have been about 1,100 feet ahead (south) of train 302.
Further, as part of its investigation, the NTSB determined that WMATA
did not have a written ventilation procedure for smoke and fire events
in a tunnel, and that the ventilation strategy WMATA deployed during
this accident was not consistent with best practice.
On February 11, 2015, the NTSB issued three urgent safety
recommendations to WMATA, two urgent safety recommendations to the
American Public Transportation Association, and urgent safety
recommendation R-15-007 to FTA, calling for audits for all rail transit
agencies that have subway tunnel environments to assess the state of
good repair of their tunnel ventilation systems, their written
emergency procedures for fire and smoke events, and their training
programs to ensure compliance with those procedures, and to verify that
the rail transit agencies are applying industry best standards, such as
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Code 130, Standards for
Fixed Guideway Transit and Passenger Rail Systems, in their maintenance
and emergency procedures. The FTA responded to the NTSB safety
recommendation by letter of March 13, 2015, stating, in part, that we
have identified the rail transit agencies with operational subway
tunnel environments and will engage the State Safety Oversight Agencies
(SSOAs) that have safety oversight jurisdiction over these rail transit
agencies, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329 and 5330 and 49 CFR part
659, for the purpose of addressing R-15-007.
To that end, on June 17, 2015, the FTA Office of Transit Safety and
Oversight issued Safety Advisory 15-1, addressed to the RFGPTS that
have operational subway tunnel environments, and a letter addressed to
the SSOAs that have safety oversight jurisdiction over these the rail
transit agencies, with instructions to conduct audits to (1) determine
the extent of subway tunnel mileage at each such rail transit agency,
and the characteristics of its operational subway tunnel environments;
(2) assess each rail transit agency's written emergency procedures for
fire and smoke events; (3) assess each rail transit agency's training
programs for ensuring compliance with those emergency procedures; and
(4) determine each rail transit agency's compliance with industry best
standards, such as NFPA Code 130, in their maintenance and emergency
procedures. Additionally, the SSOAs were instructed to complete a
Tunnel Ventilation System Inspection of each such rail transit agency,
using the audit tools provided by FTA, and to submit the results of
their audits with supporting documentation no later than August 31,
2015. For additional guidance, FTA referred the SSOAs to the joint FTA/
Federal Highway Administration Highway and Rail Transit Tunnel
Inspection Manual, 2005 Edition, which sets forth established industry
inspection standards. The FTA will use the data and information from
these audits by the SSOAs in conducting a broader analysis for
responding to NTSB recommendation R-15-007, and potentially, for future
rulemaking and guidance to the rail transit industry. Both the FTA
Safety Advisory 15-1 and the June 17, 2015 letter addressed to the
SSOAs are available on the FTA public Web site, https://www.fta.dot.gov/tso.html.
The FTA's issuance of Safety Advisory 15-1 is in accordance with
FTA's authority to ``investigate public transportation accidents and
incidents and provide guidance to recipients regarding prevention of
accidents and incidents.'' 49 U.S.C. 5329(f) (5). The requests for
information and data from the SSOAs and the rail transit agencies
within their jurisdiction are based on FTA's authority to request
program information pertinent to rail transit safety under the State
Safety Oversight rule, 49 CFR 659.39(d).
Readers who have an interest in the January 12, 2015, WMATA
accident that led to the urgent recommendations by the NTSB and FTA's
issuance of Safety Advisory 15-1 can obtain further information about
that accident in two reports issued on June 17, 2015: A Safety
Management Inspection that FTA conducted of WMATA from March 16 to
April 3, 2015, and a Safety Management System gap analysis FTA
performed for WMATA from March 3 to March 5, 2015. Both documents are
available on the FTA public Web site, https://www.fta.dot.gov/tso.html.
Therese W. McMillan,
Acting Administrator.
[FR Doc. 2015-15256 Filed 6-19-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
