Southern California Edison Company; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, 33558-33569 [2015-14423]

Download as PDF 33558 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices Total Estimated Annual Time Burden: 1,668 hours. Total Estimated Annual Other Costs Burden: $26,898. Dated: June 5, 2015. Michel Smyth, Departmental Clearance Officer. [FR Doc. 2015–14382 Filed 6–11–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4510–29–P NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES National Endowment for the Arts Arts Advisory Panel Meetings National Endowment for the Arts, National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. ACTION: Notice of meeting. AGENCY: Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92–463), as amended, notice is hereby given that 20 meetings of the Arts Advisory Panel to the National Council on the Arts will be held by teleconference from the National Endowment for the Arts, Constitution Center, 400 7th St. SW., Washington, DC 20506 as follows (all meetings are Eastern time and ending times are approximate): SUMMARY: mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES DATES: Visual Arts (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 1, 2015; 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Visual Arts (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 1, 2015; 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Theater and Musical Theater (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 1, 2015; 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Theater and Musical Theater (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 1, 2015; 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Theater and Musical Theater (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 9, 2015; 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Arts Education (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 9, 2015; 12:45 p.m. to 3:00 p.m. Music (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 14, 2015; 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 Music (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 14, 2015; 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Media Arts (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 15, 2015; 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Media Arts (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 15, 2015; 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Arts Education (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 16, 2015; 1:45 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Museums (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 16, 2015; 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Music (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 16, 2015; 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Music (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 16, 2015; 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Presenting and Multidisciplinary Works (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 16, 2015; 12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Museums (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 17, 2015; 11:30 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. Museums (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 17, 2015; 2:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Music (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 21, 2015; 3:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Arts Education (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 23, 2015; 1:45 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. Arts Education (review of applications): This meeting will be closed. Dates: July 24, 2015; 1:45 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Further information with reference to these meetings can be obtained from Ms. Kathy Plowitz-Worden, Office of Guidelines & Panel Operations, National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, DC 20506; plowitzk@arts.gov, or call 202/682–5691. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The closed portions of meetings are for the purpose of Panel review, discussion, evaluation, and recommendations on PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 financial assistance under the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities Act of 1965, as amended, including information given in confidence to the agency. In accordance with the determination of the Chairman of February 15, 2012, these sessions will be closed to the public pursuant to subsection (c)(6) of section 552b of title 5, United States Code. Dated: June 9, 2015. Kathy Plowitz-Worden, Panel Coordinator, National Endowment for the Arts. [FR Doc. 2015–14420 Filed 6–11–15; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7537–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 50–206, 50–361, 50–362, and 72–41; NRC–2015–0093] Southern California Edison Company; San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Exemption; issuance. AGENCY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting exemptions in response to a request from Southern California Edison Company (SCE or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP) requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and reduce the scope of the onsite EP activities at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Units 1, 2, and 3, and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), based on the reduced risks of accidents that could result in an offsite radiological release at the decommissioning nuclear power reactors. Provisions would still exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions, using a comprehensive emergency management plan to protect public health and safety, if protective actions were needed in the event of a very unlikely accident that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel. ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC–2015–0093 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly-available information related to this document using any of the following methods: • Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC–2015–0093. Address SUMMARY: E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301–415–3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ adams.html. To begin the search, select ‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC’s Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced. • NRC’s PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Wengert, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– 4037; email: Thomas.Wengert@nrc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES I. Background The SONGS Units 1, 2, and 3, are decommissioning power reactors located in San Diego County, California. The licensee, SCE, is the holder of SONGS Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–13, NPF–10, and NPF–15. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect. SONGS Unit 1 was permanently shut down in 1993. On June 12, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML131640201), the licensee provided the certifications that SONGS Units 2 and 3, had permanently ceased power operations. On June 28 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13183A391), and July 22, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13204A304), the licensee provided certifications that all fuel had been permanently removed from the SONGS Units 3 and 2, reactors, respectively. As a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and pursuant to section 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), SCE is no longer authorized to operate the reactors or emplace fuel into the reactor vessels, but is still VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 authorized to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently stored onsite at SONGS in spent fuel pools (SFPs) and in the ISFSI dry casks. During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures, transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents, would involve the release of some fission products into the environment. With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at SONGS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor vessels, such accidents are no longer possible. The reactors, RCS, and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable. The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ‘‘Emergency plans,’’ and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ‘‘Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities,’’ continue to apply to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is permanently shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are no longer necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, SCE must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then can SCE modify the SONGS emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of SONGS . II. Request/Action By letter dated March 31, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A332), ‘‘Emergency Planning Exemption Request,’’ SCE requested exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for SONGS. More specifically, SCE requested exemptions from certain PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 33559 planning standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for nuclear power reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) that require establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power reactors; and from certain requirements in 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, which establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency plans. In letters dated September 9, October 2, October 7, October 27, November 3, and December 15, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14258A003, ML14280A265, ML14287A228, ML14303A257, ML14309A195, and ML14351A078, respectively), SCE provided responses to the NRC staff’s requests for additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In addition, SCE submitted a letter dated October 6, 2014, which contains security-related information, and is therefore withheld from public disclosure. The December 15, 2014, letter is a redacted, publiclyavailable version of this letter. The information provided by SCE included justifications for each exemption requested. The exemptions requested by SCE would eliminate the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under the requirements of 44 CFR part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite EP activities. The SCE stated that application of all of the standards and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response capability, based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological consequences of accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown and defueled facility as compared to an operating facility. If offsite protective actions were needed for a very unlikely accident that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at SONGS, provisions exist for offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in FEMA’s Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ‘‘Developing and Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.’’ Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local EP in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the fundamentals of E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 33560 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES risk-informed planning and decisionmaking and helps planners at all levels of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, all-hazards, allthreats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ‘‘all-hazards planning.’’ III. Discussion In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ‘‘Specific exemptions,’’ the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. The reduced risk is largely the result of the low frequency of credible events that could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced decay heat and reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay. The NRC’s NUREG/CR–6451, ‘‘A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated August 31, 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098) and NUREG–1738, ‘‘Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants,’’ dated February VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 28, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of offsite radiological release is significantly less than that for an operating power reactor. In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by SCE, have been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled status. Specifically, for previous permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors, the basis for the NRC staff’s approval of the exemptions from certain EP requirements was based on the licensee’s demonstration that: (1) The radiological consequences of designbasis accidents would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public. Based on precedent exemptions, the site-specific analysis should show that there is sufficient time following a loss of SFP coolant inventory until the onset of fuel damage to implement onsite mitigation of the loss of SFP coolant inventory and if necessary, to implement offsite protective actions. To meet this criterion, the staff accepted in precedent exemptions that the time should exceed 10 hours from the loss of coolant until the fuel temperature reaches 900 degrees Celsius (°C), assuming no air cooling. The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s justification for the requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of the SCE EP exemptions is described in SECY–14–0144, ‘‘Request by Southern California Edison for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning,’’ dated December 17, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14251A554). The Commission approved the NRC PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 staff’s recommendation to grant the exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY–14–0144, dated March 2, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15061A521). Descriptions of the specific exemptions requested by SCE and the NRC staff’s basis for granting each exemption are provided in SECY– 14–0144 and summarized in a table at the end of this document. The staff’s detailed review and technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions, requested by SCE, are provided in the NRC staff’s safety evaluation dated June 4, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A204). A. Authorized by Law The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, which would allow SCE to revise the SONGS Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station. As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the licensee’s proposed exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the NRC’s regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by law. B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety As stated previously, SCE provided analyses that show the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 50 are no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the exclusion area boundary, based on the radiological consequences of designbasis accidents still possible at SONGS. Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis accident that might result in significant offsite radiological releases. However, NUREG– 1738 confirms that the risk of beyonddesign-basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled reactors. The NRC staff’s analyses in NUREG–1738 concludes that the event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to operating power reactors, where typically a large number E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices of different sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per NUREG–1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under 10 CFR part 50, a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in risk. The report further concludes that the change in risk due to relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in likelihood to have a significant impact on risk. Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security The requested exemptions by SCE only involve EP requirements under 10 CFR part 50 and will allow SCE to revise the SONGS Emergency Plan to reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the facility. Physical security measures at SONGS are not affected by the requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite EP activities at SONGS will not adversely affect SCE’s ability to physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common defense and security. D. Special Circumstances Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, are to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these regulations were developed by VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 considering the risks associated with operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite radiological dose consequences. As discussed previously in Section III of this document, because SONGS Units 1, 2, and 3 are permanently shutdown and defueled, there is no longer a risk of offsite radiological release from a design-basis accident and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to the risk at an operating power reactor. In a letter dated March 31, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A332), the licensee provided analyses to demonstrate that the radiological consequences of design-basis accidents at SONGS will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at SONGS by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in NUREG–1738 to sitespecific conditions at SONGS; and has determined that the risk values in NUREG–1738 bound the risks presented by SONGS. In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides that has occurred since the January 2012 shutdown provides assurance in other ways. As indicated by the results of research conducted for NUREG–1738 and more recently, for NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence Study of a BeyondDesign-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark I Boiling Water Reactor’’ (ADAMS Accession No. ML15255A365), while other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements were relaxed. The SCE’s analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel handling building air exchange with the environment and air cooling of the stored fuel is available, shows that by August 31, 2014, air cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep the fuel within a safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel cladding damage or offsite radiological release. The only analyzed beyond-designbasis accident scenario that progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might occur, involves the very unlikely event where the SFP drains in such a way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heatup of the spent fuel. The SCE’s analysis of this PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 33561 beyond-design-basis accident shows that as of October 12, 2014, more than 17 hours would be available between the time the fuel is initially uncovered (at which time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit (°F) (900 ßC), which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all cooling means are lost. The NRC staff has verified SCE’s analyses and its calculations. The analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested exemptions to SCE, there is no designbasis accident that will result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat removal via all modes of heat transfer, there will be well over 10 hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release were projected to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the health and safety of the public. Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours are available following a loss of SFP coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the SCErequested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours are available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors. Additionally, in its letters to the NRC dated October 6, 2014, and December 15, 2014, SCE described the SFP makeup strategies that could be used in E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 33562 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices the event of a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple strategies for providing makeup water to the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on installed fire water pumps and service water or fire water storage tanks; or an external strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate makeup flow into the SFPs through a seismic standpipe and standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs or to a spray nozzle. These strategies will continue to be required as a license condition. Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth and time to provide additional makeup or spray water to the SFP before the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release. For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff concludes that application of certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, as summarized in the table at the end of this document, is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of these regulations and, therefore, satisfies the special circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). The staff further concludes that the exemptions granted by this action will maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness at SONGS and provide reasonable assurance that adequate offsite protective measures, if needed, can and will be taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP approach, in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at the SONGS facility. Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination of the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and the reduction in the scope of the onsite EP activities at SONGS, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist. E. Environmental Considerations In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined that the granting of these exemptions will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC staff’s Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact published on April 17, 2015 (80 FR 21271). IV. Conclusions Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that SCE’s request for exemptions from certain EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants SCE exemptions from certain EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the staff’s safety evaluation dated June 4, 2015. The exemptions are effective as of June 4, 2015. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of June, 2015. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. A. Louise Lund, Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON (SCE) NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR 50.47(b). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require offsite emergency response plans. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR 50.47 In the Statement of Considerations (SOC) for the final rule for emergency planning (EP) requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSIs) and for monitor retrievable storage (MRS) facilities (60 FR 32430; June 22, 1995), the Commission responded to comments concerning offsite EP for ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded that, ‘‘the offsite consequences of potential accidents at an ISFSI or an MRS would not warrant establishing Emergency Planning Zones.’’ In a nuclear power reactor’s permanently defueled state, the accident risks are more similar to an ISFSI or an MRS than an operating nuclear power plant. The EP program would be similar to that required for an ISFSI under Section 72.32(a) of 10 CFR when fuel stored in the spent fuel pool (SFP) has more than 5 years of decay time and would not change substantially when all the fuel is transferred from the SFP to an onsite ISFSI. Exemptions from offsite EP requirements have previously been approved when the site-specific analyses show that at least 10 hours is available from a partial draindown event where cooling of the spent fuel is not effective until the hottest fuel assembly reaches the zirconium ignition temperature of 900 degrees Celsius (°C). The technical basis that underlies the approval of the exemption request is based partly on the analysis of a time period in which spent fuel stored in the SFP is unlikely to reach the zirconium ignition temperature in less than 10 hours. This time period is based on a heat-up calculation which uses several simplifying assumptions. Some of these assumptions are conservative (adiabatic conditions), while others are non-conservative (no oxidation below 900 °C). Weighing the conservatisms and non-conservatisms, the staff judges that this calculation reasonably represents conditions that may occur in the event of an SFP accident. The staff concluded that if 10 hours were available to initiate mitigative actions, or if needed, offsite protective actions using a comprehensive emergency management plan (CEMP), formal offsite radiological emergency plans are not necessary for these permanently defueled nuclear power reactor licensees. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices 33563 TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON (SCE)—Continued 10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the need for Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs). 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the need for an emergency operations facility (EOF). mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require reference to formal offsite radiological emergency response plans. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00089 Fmt 4703 As supported by the licensee’s SFP analysis, the staff believes an exemption from the requirements for formal offsite radiological emergency plans is justified for a zirconium fire scenario considering the low likelihood of this event together with time available to take mitigative or protective actions between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire. The SCE analysis has demonstrated that the radiological consequences of design-basis-accidents (DBAs) will not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at the exclusion area boundary. These analyses also show that as of October 12, 2014, in the unlikely event of a beyond DBA where the hottest fuel assembly adiabatic heat-up occurs, 17.8 hours is available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP from the time the fuel is uncovered until it reaches the auto-ignition temperature of 900 °C. SCE furnished information to supplement its exemption request concerning its SFP inventory makeup strategies. The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include: using existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that relies on installed fire water pumps (two motor-driven and one diesel-driven) and service and firewater storage tanks; or an external strategy that uses portable pumps to initiate make-up flow into the pools through a seismic standpipe and standard fire water hoses routed either over the pools’ edges or to spray nozzles. SCE further provides that designated on-shift staff is trained to implement such strategies and they have plans in place to mitigate the consequences of an event involving a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory concurrently from both San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), Units 2 and 3 SFPs. It is estimated that it would take approximately 55 minutes to deliver flow to one pool, with an additional 35 minutes to provide water to the second pool without having to relocate the trailer-mounted pump. Relocation of the trailer-mounted pump, if required, would take approximately 30 additional minutes. The SCE will maintain its Mitigating Strategies License Conditions for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). These license conditions require SONGS to maintain its SFP inventory makeup strategies as discussed above. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Decommissioning power reactors present a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a radiological release together with the time available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, an EOF would not be required. The ‘‘nuclear island,’’ control room, or other onsite location can provide for the communication and coordination with offsite organizations for the level of support required. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Decommissioning power reactors present a low likelihood of any credible accident resulting in a radiological release together with the time available to take mitigative or, if needed, offsite protective actions using a CEMP between the initiating event and before the onset of a postulated fire. As such, formal offsite radiological emergency response plans are not required. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document NEI 99–01, ‘‘Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors’’ (Revision 6), was found to be an acceptable method for development of emergency action levels (EALs) and was endorsed by the NRC in a letter dated March 28, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12346A463). NEI 99–01 provides EALs for non-passive operating nuclear power reactors, permanently defueled reactors and ISFSIs. The SCE requested a license amendment to revise its EAL scheme to NEI 99–01, Revision 6 in a letter dated March 31, 2014, ‘‘Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation’’ (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A249). Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 33564 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices TABLE OF EXEMPTIONS GRANTED TO SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON (SCE)—Continued 10 CFR 50.47 NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require early notification of the public and a means to provide instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require prompt communications with the public. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require information to be made available to the public on a periodic basis about how they will be notified and what their initial protective actions should be. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the capability for monitoring offsite consequences. 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would reduce the range of protective actions developed for emergency workers and the public. Consideration of evacuation, sheltering, or the use of potassium iodide will no longer be necessary. Evacuation time estimates (ETEs) will no longer need to be developed or updated. Protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ will not need to be developed. 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the establishment of a 10-mile radius plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50-mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ.. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). In the unlikely event of an SFP accident, the iodine isotopes, which contribute to an offsite dose from an operating reactor accident, are not present, so potassium iodide distribution would no longer serve as an effective or necessary supplemental protective action. In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to comments concerning site-specific EP that includes evacuation of surrounding population for an ISFSI not at a reactor site, and concluded, ‘‘The Commission does not agree that as a general matter emergency plans for an ISFSI must include evacuation planning.’’ Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require onsite protective actions during hostile action. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV The EP rule published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011) amended certain requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. Among the changes, the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ was added as an act directed toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel. This definition is based on the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ provided in NRC Bulletin 2005–02, ‘‘Emergency Preparedness and Response Actions for Security-Based Events,’’ dated July 18, 2005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML051740058). NRC Bulletin 2005–02 is not applicable to nuclear power reactors that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been removed from the reactor vessel. SCE certified that it had permanently ceased operations at SONGS Units 2 and 3 and that all fuel at those units had been removed from the reactor vessels. Therefore, the enhancements for hostile actions required by the 2011 EP Final Rule are not necessary for SONGS in its permanently shut down and defueled status. Additionally, the NRC excluded non-power reactors from the definition of ‘‘hostile action’’ at the time of the 2011 rulemaking because, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-power reactor is not considered a nuclear power reactor and a regulatory basis had not been developed to support the inclusion of non-power reactors in the definition of ‘‘hostile action.’’ Similarly, a decommissioning power reactor or ISFSI is not a ‘‘nuclear reactor’’ as defined in the NRC’s regulations. Like a non-power reactor, a decommissioning power reactor also has a lower likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures than does an operating reactor. Although this analysis provides a justification for exempting SONGS from ‘‘hostile action’’ related requirements, some EP requirements for security-based events are maintained. The classification of securitybased events, notification of offsite authorities and coordination with offsite agencies under a CEMP concept are still required. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language concerning the evacuation time analyses within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for the licensee’s initial application. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.3. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require use of NRC-approved ETEs and updates to State and local governments when developing protective action strategies. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00090 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.4. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require licensees to update ETEs based on the most recent census data and submit the ETE analysis to the NRC prior to providing it to State and local governments for developing protective action. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.5. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require licensees to estimate the EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year between decennial censuses. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.6. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to submit an updated ETE analysis to the NRC based on changes in the resident population that result in exceeding specific evacuation time increase criteria. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.1. The NRC is granting exemption from the word ‘‘operating’’ in the requirement to describe the normal plant organization. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.3. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement to describe the licensee’s headquarters personnel sent to the site to augment the onsite emergency response organization. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.4. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to identify a position and function within its organization, which will carry the responsibility for making offsite dose projections. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.5. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to identify individuals with special qualifications, both licensee employees and non-employees, for coping with emergencies. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.7. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require a description of the assistance expected from State, local, and Federal agencies for coping with a hostile action. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.8. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement to identify the State and local officials for ordering protective actions and evacuations.. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.A.9. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to provide an analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent performance of their assigned emergency plan functions. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00091 33565 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor, a decommissioning reactor is not authorized to operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a). Because the licensee cannot operate the reactors, the licensee does not have a ‘‘plant operating organization.’’ The number of staff at decommissioning sites is generally small but is commensurate with the need to safely store spent fuel at the facility in a manner that is protective of public health and safety. Decommissioning sites typically have a level of emergency response that does not require response by the licensee’s headquarters personnel. Although the likelihood of events that would result in doses in excess of the EPA PAGs to the public beyond the exclusion area boundary based on the permanently shut down and defueled status of the reactor is extremely low, the licensee is still required to determine if a radiological release is occurring. If a release is occurring, then the licensee staff should promptly communicate that information to offsite authorities for their consideration. The offsite organizations are responsible for deciding what, if any, protective actions should be taken based on a CEMP. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). SONGS has performed an on-shift staffing analysis, addressing SFP mitigating strategies, including review of collateral duties. The specific event scenario utilized for the staffing analysis involves a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory in one SFP. In addition to the scenario described above, SONGS performed a separate case study to validate that the minimum on-shift staff can perform mitigation efforts in the event that the second SFP is also affected by a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. Offsite emergency measures are limited to support provided by local police, fire departments, and ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, protective actions such as evacuation should not be required, but could be implemented at the discretion of offsite authorities using a CEMP. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The duties of the on-shift personnel at a decommissioning reactor facility are not as complicated and diverse as those for an operating power reactor. Responsibilities should be well defined in the emergency plan and procedures, regularly tested through drills and exercises audited and inspected by the licensee and the NRC. The staff considered the similarity between the staffing levels at a permanently shut down and defueled reactor and staffing levels at an operating power reactor site. The minimal systems and equipment needed to maintain the spent nuclear fuel in the SFP or in a dry cask storage system in a safe condition require minimal personnel and is governed by Technical Specifications. In the EP final rule published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (76 FR 72560; November 23, 2011), the NRC concluded that the staffing analysis requirement was not necessary for non-power reactor licensees due to the small staffing levels required to operate the facility. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 33566 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.B.1. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require offsite EALs and offsite protective measures and associate offsite monitoring for the emergency conditions. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require EALs based on hostile action. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.1. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require EALs based on operating reactor concerns, such as offsite radiation monitoring, pressure in containment, and the response of the emergency core cooling system. In addition, the NRC is striking language that would otherwise require offsite EALs of a site area emergency and a general emergency. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.C.2. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 4703 The staff also examined the actions required to mitigate the very low probability beyond-design-basis events for the SFP. In a letter dated October 1, 2014, ‘‘Docket Nos. 50–361 and 50–362 Supplement 1 to Amendment Applications 266 and 251 Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3’’ (ADAMS Accession No. ML14280A264), SCE withdrew the proposed changes to the Mitigating Strategies License Condition for Units 2 and 3 (2.C(26) for Unit 2 and 2.C(27) for Unit 3). This license condition requires SONGS to maintain its SFP inventory makeup strategies as discussed above. SONGS has performed an on-shift staffing analysis, addressing SFP mitigating strategies, including review of collateral duties. The specific event scenario utilized for the staffing analysis involves a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory in one SFP. In addition to the scenario described above, SONGS performed a separate case study to validate that the minimum on-shift staff can perform mitigation efforts in the event that the second SFP is also affected by a catastrophic loss-of-water inventory. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. NEI 99–01 was found to be an acceptable method for development of EALs. No offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required, which is consistent with ISFSI facilities. As discussed previously, SCE requested a license amendment to revise its EAL scheme to NEI 99–01, Revision 6 in a letter dated March 31, 2014, ‘‘Permanently Defueled Emergency Action Level Scheme, San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation’’ (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A249). Before SCE can amend its EAL scheme to reflect the risk commensurate with power reactors that have been permanently shut down and defueled, SCE needs an exemption from the requirement for the site area emergency and general emergency classifications. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1. Containment parameters do not provide an indication of the conditions at a defueled facility and emergency core cooling systems are no longer required. Other indications, such as SFP level or temperature, can be used at sites where there is spent fuel in the SFPs. In the SOC for the final rule for EP requirements for ISFSIs and for MRS facilities (60 FR 32430), the Commission responded to comments concerning a general emergency at an ISFSI and MRS, and concluded that, ‘‘. . . an essential element of a General Emergency is that a release can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA PAGs exposure levels off site for more than the immediate site area.’’ The probability of a condition at a defueled facility causing a release of radioactive material offsite necessitating a declaration of a site area or general emergency is very low. In the event of an accident at a defueled facility that meets the conditions for exemption from formal EP requirements, there will be available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP. NEI 99–01 was found to be an acceptable method for development of EALs. No offsite protective actions are anticipated to be necessary, so classification above the alert level is no longer required. In the EP rule published in the November 23, 2011, FEDERAL REGISTER (76 FR 72560), nuclear power reactor licensees were required to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. Non-power reactors do not have the same potential impact on public health and safety as do power reactors, and as such, non-power reactor licensees do not require complex offsite emergency response activities and are not required to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. An SFP and an ISFSI are also not nuclear power reactors as defined in the NRC’s regulations and do not have the same potential impact on public health and safety as do power reactors. A decommissioning power reactor has a low likelihood of a credible accident resulting in radiological releases requiring offsite protective measures. For these reasons, the staff concludes that a decommissioning power reactor should not be required to assess, classify and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to reach agreement with local, State, and Federal officials and agencies for prompt notification of protective measures or evacuations. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption from identifying the associated titles of officials to be notified for each agency within the EPZs. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.2. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to annually disseminate general information on EP and evacuations within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption for the need for signage or other measures to address transient populations in the event of an accident. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have the capability to make notifications to State and local government agencies within 15 minutes of declaring an emergency. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.4. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement for the licensee to obtain U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approval of its backup alert and notification capability. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(i). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have an onsite technical support center (TSC) and EOF. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.a.(ii). The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have an onsite operational support center (OSC). 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.b. and subpart Sections IV.E.8.b.(1)–E.8.b.(5). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements related to an offsite EOF location, space and size, communications capability, access to plant data and radiological information, and access to coping and office supplies. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV E.8.c. and Sections IV E.8.c.(1)–E.8.c.(3). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to have an EOF with the capabilities to obtain and display plant data and radiological information; the capability to analyze technical information and provide briefings; and the capability to support events occurring at more than one site (if the emergency operations center supports more than one site). VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00093 33567 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.1. While the capability needs to exist for the notification of offsite government agencies within a specified time period, previous exemptions have allowed for extending the State and local government agencies’ notification time up to 60 minutes based on the site-specific justification provided. SCE’s license amendment request to approve its Permanently Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP) dated March 31, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A314), provides that SONGS will make notifications to the State of California, the local counties (Orange and San Diego), and Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton within 60 minutes of declaration of an event. Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis events affecting the SFP, and with the time available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant conditions or, if needed, for offsite authorities to implement appropriate protective measures using a CEMP (all-hazards) approach between the loss of both water and air cooling to the spent fuel and the onset of a postulated zirconium cladding fire, formal offsite radiological response plans are not needed. Therefore, decommissioning reactors are not required to notify State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes. For similar reasons, the requirement for alerting and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ using an alert and notification system is not required. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 regarding the alert and notification system requirements. Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs at the site boundary, the available time for event mitigation at a decommissioning power reactor and, if needed, to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP, an EOF would not be required to support offsite agency response. In addition, an onsite TSC with Part 50, Appendix E requirements would not be needed. SCE proposes in its PDEP that onsite actions would be directed from the Command Center. NUREG–0696, ‘‘Functional Criteria for Emergency Response Facilities,’’ provides that the OSC is an onsite area separate from the control room and the TSC where licensee operations support personnel will assemble in an emergency. For a decommissioning power reactor, an OSC is no longer required to meet its original purpose of an assembly area for plant logistical support during an emergency. The OSC function can be incorporated into the Command Center, as proposed by SCE. Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 33568 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV E.8.d. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to have an alternate facility that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.e. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirement regarding the need for the licensee to comply with paragraph 8.b of this section. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.a. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to have communications with contiguous State and local governments that are within the plume exposure pathway EPZ (which is no longer required by the exemption granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)). 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.c. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements for communication and testing provisions between the control room, the onsite TSC, State/local emergency operations centers, and field assessment teams. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.9.d. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require provisions for communications from the control room, onsite TSC, and EOF with NRC Headquarters and appropriate Regional Operations Center. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1. and Section IV F.1.viii. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to provide training and drills for the licensee’s headquarters personnel, Civil Defense personnel, or local news media. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require testing of a public alert and notification system. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. and Sections IV.F.2.a.(i) through IV.F.2.a.(iii). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements for full participation exercises and the submittal of the associated exercise scenarios to the NRC. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.b. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to submit scenarios for its biennial exercises of its onsite emergency plan. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that requires assessment of offsite releases, protective action decision making, and references to the TSC, OSC, and EOF. VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 PO 00000 Frm 00094 Fmt 4703 Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The State and the local governments in which the nuclear facility is located need to be informed of events and emergencies, so lines of communication are required to be maintained. Because of the low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the EPA PAGs and the available time for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, there is no need for the TSC, EOF, or offsite field assessment teams. Also refer to justification for 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). Communication with State and local emergency operations centers is maintained to coordinate assistance on site if required. The functions of the control room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be combined into one or more locations at a permanently shutdown and defueled facility due to its smaller facility staff and the greatly reduced required interaction with State and local emergency response facilities, as compared to an operating reactor. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Decommissioning power reactor sites typically have a level of emergency response that does not require additional response by the licensee’s headquarters personnel. Therefore, the staff considers exempting licensee’s headquarters personnel from training requirements to be reasonable. Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, offsite emergency measures are limited to support provided by local police, fire departments, and ambulance and hospital services, as appropriate. Local news media personnel no longer need radiological orientation training since they will not be called upon to support the formal Joint Information Center. The term ‘‘Civil Defense’’ is no longer commonly used; references to this term in the examples provided in the regulation are, therefore, not needed. Because of the low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs and the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, offsite protective actions from a CEMP, the public alert and notification system will not be used and, therefore, requires no testing. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR 50.47(b). Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would be expected to exceed the limits of EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, no formal offsite radiological response plans are required. Therefore, the need for the licensee to exercise onsite and offsite plans with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan is not required. The intent of submitting exercise scenarios at an operating power reactor site is to check that licensees utilize different scenarios in order to prevent the preconditioning of responders at power reactors. For decommissioning power reactor sites, there are limited events that could occur and, as such, the previously routine progression to general emergency in an operating power reactor site scenario is not applicable. The licensee would be exempt from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)–(iii) because the licensee would be exempt from the umbrella provision of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. The low probability of DBAs or other credible events that would exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if necessary, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, render a TSC, OSC, and EOF unnecessary. The principal functions required by regulation can be performed at an onsite location that does not meet the requirements of the TSC, OSC or EOF. Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 113 / Friday, June 12, 2015 / Notices 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV NRC staff basis for exemption 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.c. and Sections IV F.2.c.(1) through F.2.c.(5). The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee to exercise offsite plans biennially with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan. The NRC is also granting exemptions from the conditions for conducting these exercises (including hostile action exercises) if two different licensees have facilities on the same site or on adjacent, contiguous sites, or share most of the elements defining co-located licensees. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.d. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements to obtain State participation in an ingestion pathway exercise and a hostile action exercise, with each State that has responsibilities, at least once per exercise cycle. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.e. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to allow participation exercise in licensee drills by any State and local government in the plume exposure pathway EPZ when requested. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.f. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require FEMA to consult with the NRC on remedial exercises. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that discuss the extent of State and local participation in remedial exercises. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.i. The NRC is granting exemption from portions of the rule language that would otherwise require the licensee to drill and exercise scenarios that include a wide spectrum of radiological release events and hostile action. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.j. The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee’s emergency response organization to demonstrate proficiency in key skills in the principal functional areas of emergency response.. In addition, the NRC is granting exemption during an eight calendar year exercise cycle, from demonstrating proficiency in the key skills necessary to respond to such scenarios as hostile actions, unplanned minimal radiological release, and scenarios involving rapid escalation to a site area emergency or general emergency. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.I The NRC is granting exemption from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee to develop a range of protective actions for onsite personnel during hostile actions. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.2. FEMA is responsible for evaluating the adequacy of offsite response during an exercise. Because the NRC is granting exemptions from the requirements regarding the need for the licensee to exercise onsite and offsite plans with full participation by each offsite authority having a role under the radiological response plan, FEMA will no longer evaluate adequacy of offsite response during remedial or other exercises. No action is expected from State or local government organizations in response to an event at a decommissioning power reactor site other than firefighting, law enforcement and ambulance/medical services support. A memorandum of understanding should be in place for those services. Offsite response organizations will continue to take actions on a comprehensive EP basis to protect the health and safety of the public as they would at any other industrial site. Due to the low probability of DBAs or other credible events to exceed the EPA PAGs, the available time for event mitigation and, if needed, implementation of offsite protective actions using a CEMP, the previously routine progression to general emergency in power reactor site scenarios is not applicable to a decommissioning site. Therefore, the licensee is not expected to demonstrate response to a wide spectrum of events. Also refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.1 regarding hostile action. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.2. Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.E.8.d. Thursday, June 25, 2015 Public and Closed. [FR Doc. 2015–14423 Filed 6–11–15; 8:45 am] STATUS: BILLING CODE 7590–01–P Week of June 15, 2015 There are no meetings scheduled for the week of June 15, 2015. mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Week of June 22, 2015—Tentative [NRC–2015–0001] Sunshine Act Meeting Notice DATE: June 15, 22, 29, July 6, 13, 20, 2015. Commissioners’ Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. PLACE: VerDate Sep<11>2014 19:05 Jun 11, 2015 Jkt 235001 Tuesday, June 23 9:00 a.m. Briefing on Human Capital and Equal Employment Opportunity (Public Meeting) (Contact: Dafna Silberfeld, 301–287– 0737) This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—https://www.nrc.gov/. PO 00000 33569 Frm 00095 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 9:00 a.m. Briefing on Proposed Revisions to Part 10 CFR part 61 and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (Public Meeting) (Contact: Gregory Suber, 301–415– 8087) This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address—https://www.nrc.gov/. Week of June 29, 2015—Tentative There are no meetings scheduled for the week of June 29, 2015. E:\FR\FM\12JNN1.SGM 12JNN1

Agencies

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 113 (Friday, June 12, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 33558-33569]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-14423]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361, 50-362, and 72-41; NRC-2015-0093]


Southern California Edison Company; San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, and Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is granting 
exemptions in response to a request from Southern California Edison 
Company (SCE or the licensee) regarding certain emergency planning (EP) 
requirements. The exemptions will eliminate the requirements to 
maintain formal offsite radiological emergency plans and reduce the 
scope of the onsite EP activities at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating 
Station (SONGS), Units 1, 2, and 3, and the Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation (ISFSI), based on the reduced risks of accidents 
that could result in an offsite radiological release at the 
decommissioning nuclear power reactors. Provisions would still exist 
for offsite agencies to take protective actions, using a comprehensive 
emergency management plan to protect public health and safety, if 
protective actions were needed in the event of a very unlikely accident 
that could challenge the safe storage of spent fuel.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0093 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0093. Address

[[Page 33559]]

questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if that document 
is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is 
referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Wengert, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-4037; email: Thomas.Wengert@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    The SONGS Units 1, 2, and 3, are decommissioning power reactors 
located in San Diego County, California. The licensee, SCE, is the 
holder of SONGS Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-13, NPF-10, and 
NPF-15. The licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is 
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or 
hereafter in effect.
    SONGS Unit 1 was permanently shut down in 1993. On June 12, 2013 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML131640201), the licensee provided the 
certifications that SONGS Units 2 and 3, had permanently ceased power 
operations. On June 28 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13183A391), and July 22, 
2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13204A304), the licensee provided 
certifications that all fuel had been permanently removed from the 
SONGS Units 3 and 2, reactors, respectively. As a permanently shutdown 
and defueled facility, and pursuant to section 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), SCE is no longer 
authorized to operate the reactors or emplace fuel into the reactor 
vessels, but is still authorized to possess and store irradiated 
nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is currently stored onsite at SONGS in 
spent fuel pools (SFPs) and in the ISFSI dry casks.
    During normal power reactor operations, the forced flow of water 
through the reactor coolant system (RCS) removes heat generated by the 
reactor. The RCS, operating at high temperatures and pressures, 
transfers this heat through the steam generator tubes converting non-
radioactive feedwater to steam, which then flows to the main turbine 
generator to produce electricity. Many of the accident scenarios 
postulated in the updated safety analysis reports (USARs) for operating 
power reactors involve failures or malfunctions of systems that could 
affect the fuel in the reactor core, which in the most severe 
postulated accidents, would involve the release of some fission 
products into the environment. With the permanent cessation of reactor 
operations at SONGS and the permanent removal of the fuel from the 
reactor vessels, such accidents are no longer possible. The reactors, 
RCS, and supporting systems are no longer in operation and have no 
function related to the storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, 
postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of the reactors, 
RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    The EP requirements of 10 CFR 50.47, ``Emergency plans,'' and 
appendix E to 10 CFR part 50, ``Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' continue to apply to nuclear 
power reactors that have permanently ceased operation and have removed 
all fuel from the reactor vessel. There are no explicit regulatory 
provisions distinguishing EP requirements for a power reactor that is 
permanently shut down and defueled from those for a reactor that is 
authorized to operate. To reduce or eliminate EP requirements that are 
no longer necessary due to the decommissioning status of the facility, 
SCE must obtain exemptions from those EP regulations. Only then can SCE 
modify the SONGS emergency plan to reflect the reduced risk associated 
with the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of SONGS .

II. Request/Action

    By letter dated March 31, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A332), 
``Emergency Planning Exemption Request,'' SCE requested exemptions from 
certain EP requirements of 10 CFR part 50 for SONGS. More specifically, 
SCE requested exemptions from certain planning standards in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) regarding onsite and offsite radiological emergency plans for 
nuclear power reactors; from certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) 
that require establishment of plume exposure and ingestion pathway 
emergency planning zones for nuclear power reactors; and from certain 
requirements in 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, which 
establishes the elements that make up the content of emergency plans. 
In letters dated September 9, October 2, October 7, October 27, 
November 3, and December 15, 2014 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML14258A003, 
ML14280A265, ML14287A228, ML14303A257, ML14309A195, and ML14351A078, 
respectively), SCE provided responses to the NRC staff's requests for 
additional information (RAI) concerning the proposed exemptions. In 
addition, SCE submitted a letter dated October 6, 2014, which contains 
security-related information, and is therefore withheld from public 
disclosure. The December 15, 2014, letter is a redacted, publicly-
available version of this letter.
    The information provided by SCE included justifications for each 
exemption requested. The exemptions requested by SCE would eliminate 
the requirements to maintain formal offsite radiological emergency 
plans, reviewed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) under 
the requirements of 44 CFR part 350, and reduce the scope of onsite EP 
activities. The SCE stated that application of all of the standards and 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c), and 10 CFR part 50, 
appendix E is not needed for adequate emergency response capability, 
based on the substantially lower onsite and offsite radiological 
consequences of accidents still possible at the permanently shutdown 
and defueled facility as compared to an operating facility. If offsite 
protective actions were needed for a very unlikely accident that could 
challenge the safe storage of spent fuel at SONGS, provisions exist for 
offsite agencies to take protective actions using a comprehensive 
emergency management plan (CEMP) under the National Preparedness System 
to protect the health and safety of the public. A CEMP in this context, 
also referred to as an emergency operations plan (EOP), is addressed in 
FEMA's Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101, ``Developing and 
Maintaining Emergency Operations Plans.'' Comprehensive Preparedness 
Guide 101 is the foundation for State, territorial, Tribal, and local 
EP in the United States. It promotes a common understanding of the 
fundamentals of

[[Page 33560]]

risk-informed planning and decision-making and helps planners at all 
levels of government in their efforts to develop and maintain viable, 
all-hazards, all-threats emergency plans. An EOP is flexible enough for 
use in all emergencies. It describes how people and property will be 
protected; details who is responsible for carrying out specific 
actions; identifies the personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and 
other resources available; and outlines how all actions will be 
coordinated. A CEMP is often referred to as a synonym for ``all-hazards 
planning.''

III. Discussion

    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its 
own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 
50 when: (1) The exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an 
undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the 
common defense and security; and (2) any of the special circumstances 
listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present. These special circumstances 
include, among other things, that the application of the regulation in 
the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of 
the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule.
    As noted previously, the current EP regulations contained in 10 CFR 
50.47(b) and appendix E to 10 CFR part 50 apply to both operating and 
shutdown power reactors. The NRC has consistently acknowledged that the 
risk of an offsite radiological release at a power reactor that has 
permanently ceased operations and removed fuel from the reactor vessel 
is significantly lower, and the types of possible accidents are 
significantly fewer, than at an operating power reactor. However, 
current EP regulations do not recognize that once a power reactor 
permanently ceases operation, the risk of a large radiological release 
from a credible emergency accident scenario is reduced. The reduced 
risk is largely the result of the low frequency of credible events that 
could challenge the SFP structure, and the reduced decay heat and 
reduced short-lived radionuclide inventory due to decay. The NRC's 
NUREG/CR-6451, ``A Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR and 
PWR Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated August 31, 1997 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML082260098) and NUREG-1738, ``Technical Study of 
Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' dated February 28, 2001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML010430066), 
confirmed that for permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors 
bounded by the assumptions and conditions in the reports, the risk of 
offsite radiological release is significantly less than that for an 
operating power reactor.
    In the past, EP exemptions similar to those requested by SCE, have 
been granted to licensees of permanently shutdown and defueled power 
reactors. However, the exemptions did not relieve the licensees of all 
EP requirements. Rather, the exemptions allowed the licensees to modify 
their emergency plans commensurate with the credible site-specific 
risks that were consistent with a permanently shutdown and defueled 
status. Specifically, for previous permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors, the basis for the NRC staff's approval of the 
exemptions from certain EP requirements was based on the licensee's 
demonstration that: (1) The radiological consequences of design-basis 
accidents would not exceed the limits of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency's (EPA) Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) at the 
exclusion area boundary, and (2) in the unlikely event of a beyond-
design-basis accident resulting in a loss of all modes of heat transfer 
from the fuel stored in the SFP, there is sufficient time to initiate 
appropriate mitigating actions, and if needed, for offsite authorities 
to implement offsite protective actions using a CEMP approach to 
protect the health and safety of the public. Based on precedent 
exemptions, the site-specific analysis should show that there is 
sufficient time following a loss of SFP coolant inventory until the 
onset of fuel damage to implement onsite mitigation of the loss of SFP 
coolant inventory and if necessary, to implement offsite protective 
actions. To meet this criterion, the staff accepted in precedent 
exemptions that the time should exceed 10 hours from the loss of 
coolant until the fuel temperature reaches 900 degrees Celsius 
([deg]C), assuming no air cooling.
    The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's justification for the 
requested exemptions against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) and 
determined, as described below, that the criteria in 10 CFR 50.12(a) 
are met, and that the exemptions should be granted. An assessment of 
the SCE EP exemptions is described in SECY-14-0144, ``Request by 
Southern California Edison for Exemptions from Certain Emergency 
Planning,'' dated December 17, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14251A554). 
The Commission approved the NRC staff's recommendation to grant the 
exemptions in the staff requirements memorandum to SECY-14-0144, dated 
March 2, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15061A521). Descriptions of the 
specific exemptions requested by SCE and the NRC staff's basis for 
granting each exemption are provided in SECY-14-0144 and summarized in 
a table at the end of this document. The staff's detailed review and 
technical basis for the approval of the specific EP exemptions, 
requested by SCE, are provided in the NRC staff's safety evaluation 
dated June 4, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15082A204).

A. Authorized by Law

    The licensee has proposed exemptions from certain EP requirements 
in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, 
Section IV, which would allow SCE to revise the SONGS Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the station. 
As stated above, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, 
upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, 
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50. The NRC staff 
has determined that granting of the licensee's proposed exemptions will 
not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 
or the NRC's regulations. Therefore, the exemptions are authorized by 
law.

B. No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety

    As stated previously, SCE provided analyses that show the 
radiological consequences of design-basis accidents will not exceed the 
limits of the EPA PAGs at the exclusion area boundary. Therefore, 
formal offsite radiological emergency plans required under 10 CFR part 
50 are no longer needed for protection of the public beyond the 
exclusion area boundary, based on the radiological consequences of 
design-basis accidents still possible at SONGS.
    Although very unlikely, there is one postulated beyond-design-basis 
accident that might result in significant offsite radiological 
releases. However, NUREG-1738 confirms that the risk of beyond-design-
basis accidents is greatly reduced at permanently shutdown and defueled 
reactors. The NRC staff's analyses in NUREG-1738 concludes that the 
event sequences important to risk at permanently shutdown and defueled 
power reactors are limited to large earthquakes and cask drop events. 
For EP assessments, this is an important difference relative to 
operating power reactors, where typically a large number

[[Page 33561]]

of different sequences make significant contributions to risk. Per 
NUREG-1738, relaxation of offsite EP requirements, under 10 CFR part 
50, a few months after shutdown resulted in only a small change in 
risk. The report further concludes that the change in risk due to 
relaxation of offsite EP requirements is small because the overall risk 
is low, and because even under current EP requirements for operating 
power reactors, EP was judged to have marginal impact on evacuation 
effectiveness in the severe earthquakes that dominate SFP risk. All 
other sequences including cask drops (for which offsite radiological 
emergency plans are expected to be more effective) are too low in 
likelihood to have a significant impact on risk.
    Therefore, granting exemptions to eliminate the requirements of 10 
CFR part 50 to maintain offsite radiological emergency plans and to 
reduce the scope of onsite EP activities will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety.

C. Consistent With the Common Defense and Security

    The requested exemptions by SCE only involve EP requirements under 
10 CFR part 50 and will allow SCE to revise the SONGS Emergency Plan to 
reflect the permanently shutdown and defueled condition of the 
facility. Physical security measures at SONGS are not affected by the 
requested EP exemptions. The discontinuation of formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in scope of the onsite 
EP activities at SONGS will not adversely affect SCE's ability to 
physically secure the site or protect special nuclear material. 
Therefore, the proposed exemptions are consistent with the common 
defense and security.

D. Special Circumstances

    Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), 
are present whenever application of the regulation in the particular 
circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the 
rule. The underlying purposes of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), 
and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, Section IV, are to provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in 
the event of a radiological emergency, to establish plume exposure and 
ingestion pathway emergency planning zones for nuclear power plants, 
and to ensure that licensees maintain effective offsite and onsite 
radiological emergency plans. The standards and requirements in these 
regulations were developed by considering the risks associated with 
operation of a power reactor at its licensed full-power level. These 
risks include the potential for a reactor accident with offsite 
radiological dose consequences.
    As discussed previously in Section III of this document, because 
SONGS Units 1, 2, and 3 are permanently shutdown and defueled, there is 
no longer a risk of offsite radiological release from a design-basis 
accident and the risk of a significant offsite radiological release 
from a beyond-design-basis accident is greatly reduced when compared to 
the risk at an operating power reactor. In a letter dated March 31, 
2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14092A332), the licensee provided analyses 
to demonstrate that the radiological consequences of design-basis 
accidents at SONGS will not exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. The NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks 
at SONGS by comparing the generic risk assumptions in the analyses in 
NUREG-1738 to site-specific conditions at SONGS; and has determined 
that the risk values in NUREG-1738 bound the risks presented by SONGS. 
In addition, the significant decay of short-lived radionuclides that 
has occurred since the January 2012 shutdown provides assurance in 
other ways. As indicated by the results of research conducted for 
NUREG-1738 and more recently, for NUREG-2161, ``Consequence Study of a 
Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. 
Mark I Boiling Water Reactor'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML15255A365), while 
other consequences can be extensive, accidents from SFPs with 
significant decay time have little potential to cause offsite early 
fatalities, even if the formal offsite radiological EP requirements 
were relaxed. The SCE's analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident 
involving a complete loss of SFP water inventory, where adequate fuel 
handling building air exchange with the environment and air cooling of 
the stored fuel is available, shows that by August 31, 2014, air 
cooling of the spent fuel assemblies was sufficient to keep the fuel 
within a safe temperature range, indefinitely, without fuel cladding 
damage or offsite radiological release.
    The only analyzed beyond-design-basis accident scenario that 
progresses to a condition where a significant offsite release might 
occur, involves the very unlikely event where the SFP drains in such a 
way that all modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed to be 
unavailable, which is postulated to result in an adiabatic heatup of 
the spent fuel. The SCE's analysis of this beyond-design-basis accident 
shows that as of October 12, 2014, more than 17 hours would be 
available between the time the fuel is initially uncovered (at which 
time adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed to begin), until the 
fuel cladding reaches a temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F) 
(900 [ordm]C), which is the temperature associated with rapid cladding 
oxidation and the potential for a significant radiological release. 
This analysis conservatively does not include the period of time from 
the initiating event causing a loss of SFP water inventory until all 
cooling means are lost.
    The NRC staff has verified SCE's analyses and its calculations. The 
analyses provide reasonable assurance that in granting the requested 
exemptions to SCE, there is no design-basis accident that will result 
in an offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA PAGs at the 
exclusion area boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond-design-basis 
accident affecting the SFP that results in a complete loss of heat 
removal via all modes of heat transfer, there will be well over 10 
hours available before an offsite release might occur and, therefore, 
at least 10 hours to initiate appropriate mitigating actions to restore 
a means of heat removal to the spent fuel. If a radiological release 
were projected to occur under this unlikely scenario, a minimum of 10 
hours is considered sufficient time for offsite authorities to 
implement protective actions using a CEMP approach to protect the 
health and safety of the public.
    Exemptions from the offsite EP requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have 
previously been approved by the NRC when the site-specific analyses 
show that at least 10 hours are available following a loss of SFP 
coolant inventory accident with no air cooling (or other methods of 
removing decay heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel assembly 
reaches the zirconium rapid oxidation temperature. The NRC staff 
concluded in its previously granted exemptions, as it does with the 
SCE-requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum of 10 hours are 
available to initiate mitigative actions consistent with plant 
conditions, or if needed, for offsite authorities to implement 
protective actions using a CEMP approach, then formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not 
necessary at permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors.
    Additionally, in its letters to the NRC dated October 6, 2014, and 
December 15, 2014, SCE described the SFP makeup strategies that could 
be used in

[[Page 33562]]

the event of a catastrophic loss of SFP inventory. The multiple 
strategies for providing makeup water to the SFP include: using 
existing plant systems for inventory makeup; an internal strategy that 
relies on installed fire water pumps and service water or fire water 
storage tanks; or an external strategy that uses portable pumps to 
initiate makeup flow into the SFPs through a seismic standpipe and 
standard fire hoses routed to the SFPs or to a spray nozzle. These 
strategies will continue to be required as a license condition. 
Considering the very low probability of beyond-design-basis accidents 
affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth 
and time to provide additional makeup or spray water to the SFP before 
the onset of any postulated offsite radiological release.
    For all the reasons stated above, the NRC staff concludes that 
application of certain requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 
50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E, as summarized in the table 
at the end of this document, is not necessary to achieve the underlying 
purpose of these regulations and, therefore, satisfies the special 
circumstances in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii). The staff further concludes 
that the exemptions granted by this action will maintain an acceptable 
level of emergency preparedness at SONGS and provide reasonable 
assurance that adequate offsite protective measures, if needed, can and 
will be taken by State and local government agencies using a CEMP 
approach, in the unlikely event of a radiological emergency at the 
SONGS facility. Since the underlying purposes of the rules, as 
exempted, would continue to be achieved, even with the elimination of 
the requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to maintain formal offsite 
radiological emergency plans and the reduction in the scope of the 
onsite EP activities at SONGS, the special circumstances required by 10 
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.

E. Environmental Considerations

    In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the Commission has determined 
that the granting of these exemptions will not have a significant 
effect on the quality of the human environment, as discussed in the NRC 
staff's Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact 
published on April 17, 2015 (80 FR 21271).

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), that SCE's request for exemptions from certain EP 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, Section IV, and as summarized in the table at the end 
of this document, are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk 
to the public health and safety, and are consistent with the common 
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present. 
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants SCE exemptions from certain EP 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 
50, appendix E, Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in detail in the 
staff's safety evaluation dated June 4, 2015. The exemptions are 
effective as of June 4, 2015.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of June, 2015.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
A. Louise Lund,
Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

     Table of Exemptions Granted to Southern California Edison (SCE)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
              10 CFR 50.47                NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR 50.47(b). The NRC is granting     In the Statement of
 exemption from portions of the rule      Considerations (SOC) for the
 language that would otherwise require    final rule for emergency
 offsite emergency response plans.        planning (EP) requirements for
                                          independent spent fuel storage
                                          installations (ISFSIs) and for
                                          monitor retrievable storage
                                          (MRS) facilities (60 FR 32430;
                                          June 22, 1995), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning offsite EP for
                                          ISFSIs or an MRS and concluded
                                          that, ``the offsite
                                          consequences of potential
                                          accidents at an ISFSI or an
                                          MRS would not warrant
                                          establishing Emergency
                                          Planning Zones.''
                                         In a nuclear power reactor's
                                          permanently defueled state,
                                          the accident risks are more
                                          similar to an ISFSI or an MRS
                                          than an operating nuclear
                                          power plant. The EP program
                                          would be similar to that
                                          required for an ISFSI under
                                          Section 72.32(a) of 10 CFR
                                          when fuel stored in the spent
                                          fuel pool (SFP) has more than
                                          5 years of decay time and
                                          would not change substantially
                                          when all the fuel is
                                          transferred from the SFP to an
                                          onsite ISFSI. Exemptions from
                                          offsite EP requirements have
                                          previously been approved when
                                          the site-specific analyses
                                          show that at least 10 hours is
                                          available from a partial drain-
                                          down event where cooling of
                                          the spent fuel is not
                                          effective until the hottest
                                          fuel assembly reaches the
                                          zirconium ignition temperature
                                          of 900 degrees Celsius
                                          ([deg]C). The technical basis
                                          that underlies the approval of
                                          the exemption request is based
                                          partly on the analysis of a
                                          time period in which spent
                                          fuel stored in the SFP is
                                          unlikely to reach the
                                          zirconium ignition temperature
                                          in less than 10 hours. This
                                          time period is based on a heat-
                                          up calculation which uses
                                          several simplifying
                                          assumptions. Some of these
                                          assumptions are conservative
                                          (adiabatic conditions), while
                                          others are non-conservative
                                          (no oxidation below 900
                                          [deg]C). Weighing the
                                          conservatisms and non-
                                          conservatisms, the staff
                                          judges that this calculation
                                          reasonably represents
                                          conditions that may occur in
                                          the event of an SFP accident.
                                         The staff concluded that if 10
                                          hours were available to
                                          initiate mitigative actions,
                                          or if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          comprehensive emergency
                                          management plan (CEMP), formal
                                          offsite radiological emergency
                                          plans are not necessary for
                                          these permanently defueled
                                          nuclear power reactor
                                          licensees.

[[Page 33563]]

 
                                         As supported by the licensee's
                                          SFP analysis, the staff
                                          believes an exemption from the
                                          requirements for formal
                                          offsite radiological emergency
                                          plans is justified for a
                                          zirconium fire scenario
                                          considering the low likelihood
                                          of this event together with
                                          time available to take
                                          mitigative or protective
                                          actions between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire.
                                         The SCE analysis has
                                          demonstrated that the
                                          radiological consequences of
                                          design-basis-accidents (DBAs)
                                          will not exceed the limits of
                                          the U.S. Environmental
                                          Protection Agency's (EPA's)
                                          Protective Action Guides
                                          (PAGs) at the exclusion area
                                          boundary. These analyses also
                                          show that as of October 12,
                                          2014, in the unlikely event of
                                          a beyond DBA where the hottest
                                          fuel assembly adiabatic heat-
                                          up occurs, 17.8 hours is
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP from the time the fuel is
                                          uncovered until it reaches the
                                          auto-ignition temperature of
                                          900 [deg]C.
                                         SCE furnished information to
                                          supplement its exemption
                                          request concerning its SFP
                                          inventory makeup strategies.
                                          The multiple strategies for
                                          providing makeup to the SFP
                                          include: using existing plant
                                          systems for inventory makeup;
                                          an internal strategy that
                                          relies on installed fire water
                                          pumps (two motor-driven and
                                          one diesel-driven) and service
                                          and firewater storage tanks;
                                          or an external strategy that
                                          uses portable pumps to
                                          initiate make-up flow into the
                                          pools through a seismic
                                          standpipe and standard fire
                                          water hoses routed either over
                                          the pools' edges or to spray
                                          nozzles. SCE further provides
                                          that designated on-shift staff
                                          is trained to implement such
                                          strategies and they have plans
                                          in place to mitigate the
                                          consequences of an event
                                          involving a catastrophic loss-
                                          of-water inventory
                                          concurrently from both San
                                          Onofre Nuclear Generating
                                          Station (SONGS), Units 2 and 3
                                          SFPs. It is estimated that it
                                          would take approximately 55
                                          minutes to deliver flow to one
                                          pool, with an additional 35
                                          minutes to provide water to
                                          the second pool without having
                                          to relocate the trailer-
                                          mounted pump. Relocation of
                                          the trailer-mounted pump, if
                                          required, would take
                                          approximately 30 additional
                                          minutes. The SCE will maintain
                                          its Mitigating Strategies
                                          License Conditions for Units 2
                                          and 3 (2.C(26) for Unit 2 and
                                          2.C(27) for Unit 3). These
                                          license conditions require
                                          SONGS to maintain its SFP
                                          inventory makeup strategies as
                                          discussed above.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(1). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 the need for Emergency Planning Zones
 (EPZs).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(3). The NRC is granting  Decommissioning power reactors
 exemption from portions of the rule      present a low likelihood of
 language that would otherwise require    any credible accident
 the need for an emergency operations     resulting in a radiological
 facility (EOF).                          release together with the time
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire. As such, an
                                          EOF would not be required. The
                                          ``nuclear island,'' control
                                          room, or other onsite location
                                          can provide for the
                                          communication and coordination
                                          with offsite organizations for
                                          the level of support required.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The NRC is granting  Decommissioning power reactors
 exemption from portions of the rule      present a low likelihood of
 language that would otherwise require    any credible accident
 reference to formal offsite              resulting in a radiological
 radiological emergency response plans.   release together with the time
                                          available to take mitigative
                                          or, if needed, offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP between the initiating
                                          event and before the onset of
                                          a postulated fire. As such,
                                          formal offsite radiological
                                          emergency response plans are
                                          not required.
                                         The Nuclear Energy Institute
                                          (NEI) document NEI 99-01,
                                          ``Development of Emergency
                                          Action Levels for Non-Passive
                                          Reactors'' (Revision 6), was
                                          found to be an acceptable
                                          method for development of
                                          emergency action levels (EALs)
                                          and was endorsed by the NRC in
                                          a letter dated March 28, 2013
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML12346A463). NEI 99-01
                                          provides EALs for non-passive
                                          operating nuclear power
                                          reactors, permanently defueled
                                          reactors and ISFSIs.
                                         The SCE requested a license
                                          amendment to revise its EAL
                                          scheme to NEI 99-01, Revision
                                          6 in a letter dated March 31,
                                          2014, ``Permanently Defueled
                                          Emergency Action Level Scheme,
                                          San Onofre Nuclear Generating
                                          Station, Units 1, 2, and 3,
                                          Respectively, and Independent
                                          Spent Fuel Storage
                                          Installation'' (ADAMS
                                          Accession No. ML14092A249).
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).

[[Page 33564]]

 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(5). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 early notification of the public and a
 means to provide instructions to the
 public within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(6). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 prompt communications with the public.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(7). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 information to be made available to
 the public on a periodic basis about
 how they will be notified and what
 their initial protective actions
 should be.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(9). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b).
 language that would otherwise require
 the capability for monitoring offsite
 consequences.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The NRC is          In the unlikely event of an SFP
 granting exemption from portions of      accident, the iodine isotopes,
 the rule language that would reduce      which contribute to an offsite
 the range of protective actions          dose from an operating reactor
 developed for emergency workers and      accident, are not present, so
 the public. Consideration of             potassium iodide distribution
 evacuation, sheltering, or the use of    would no longer serve as an
 potassium iodide will no longer be       effective or necessary
 necessary. Evacuation time estimates     supplemental protective
 (ETEs) will no longer need to be         action.
 developed or updated. Protective        In the SOC for the final rule
 actions for the ingestion exposure       for EP requirements for ISFSIs
 pathway EPZ will not need to be          and for MRS facilities (60 FR
 developed.                               32430), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning site-specific EP
                                          that includes evacuation of
                                          surrounding population for an
                                          ISFSI not at a reactor site,
                                          and concluded, ``The
                                          Commission does not agree that
                                          as a general matter emergency
                                          plans for an ISFSI must
                                          include evacuation planning.''
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR 50.47(c)(2). The NRC is granting  Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b)(10).
 language that would otherwise require
 the establishment of a 10-mile radius
 plume exposure pathway EPZ and a 50-
 mile radius ingestion pathway EPZ..
------------------------------------------------------------------------


------------------------------------------------------------------------
 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV   NRC staff basis for exemption
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      The EP rule published in the
 IV.1. The NRC is granting exemption      Federal Register (76 FR 72560;
 from portions of the rule language       November 23, 2011) amended
 that would otherwise require onsite      certain requirements in 10 CFR
 protective actions during hostile        Part 50.
 action.                                 Among the changes, the
                                          definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' was added as an act
                                          directed toward a nuclear
                                          power plant or its personnel.
                                          This definition is based on
                                          the definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' provided in NRC
                                          Bulletin 2005-02, ``Emergency
                                          Preparedness and Response
                                          Actions for Security-Based
                                          Events,'' dated July 18, 2005
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML051740058). NRC Bulletin
                                          2005-02 is not applicable to
                                          nuclear power reactors that
                                          have permanently ceased
                                          operations and have certified
                                          that fuel has been removed
                                          from the reactor vessel. SCE
                                          certified that it had
                                          permanently ceased operations
                                          at SONGS Units 2 and 3 and
                                          that all fuel at those units
                                          had been removed from the
                                          reactor vessels. Therefore,
                                          the enhancements for hostile
                                          actions required by the 2011
                                          EP Final Rule are not
                                          necessary for SONGS in its
                                          permanently shut down and
                                          defueled status.
                                         Additionally, the NRC excluded
                                          non-power reactors from the
                                          definition of ``hostile
                                          action'' at the time of the
                                          2011 rulemaking because, as
                                          defined in 10 CFR 50.2, a non-
                                          power reactor is not
                                          considered a nuclear power
                                          reactor and a regulatory basis
                                          had not been developed to
                                          support the inclusion of non-
                                          power reactors in the
                                          definition of ``hostile
                                          action.'' Similarly, a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          or ISFSI is not a ``nuclear
                                          reactor'' as defined in the
                                          NRC's regulations. Like a non-
                                          power reactor, a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          also has a lower likelihood of
                                          a credible accident resulting
                                          in radiological releases
                                          requiring offsite protective
                                          measures than does an
                                          operating reactor.
                                         Although this analysis provides
                                          a justification for exempting
                                          SONGS from ``hostile action''
                                          related requirements, some EP
                                          requirements for security-
                                          based events are maintained.
                                          The classification of security-
                                          based events, notification of
                                          offsite authorities and
                                          coordination with offsite
                                          agencies under a CEMP concept
                                          are still required.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.2. The NRC is granting exemption      50.47(b)(10).
 from portions of the rule language
 concerning the evacuation time
 analyses within the plume exposure
 pathway EPZ for the licensee's initial
 application.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.3. The NRC is granting exemption      50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require use of
 NRC-approved ETEs and updates to State
 and local governments when developing
 protective action strategies.

[[Page 33565]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.4. The NRC is granting exemption      50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require licensees
 to update ETEs based on the most
 recent census data and submit the ETE
 analysis to the NRC prior to providing
 it to State and local governments for
 developing protective action.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.5. The NRC is granting exemption      50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require licensees
 to estimate the EPZ permanent resident
 population changes once a year between
 decennial censuses.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.6. The NRC is granting exemption      50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require the
 licensee to submit an updated ETE
 analysis to the NRC based on changes
 in the resident population that result
 in exceeding specific evacuation time
 increase criteria.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Based on the permanently shut
 IV.A.1. The NRC is granting exemption    down and defueled status of
 from the word ``operating'' in the       the reactor, a decommissioning
 requirement to describe the normal       reactor is not authorized to
 plant organization.                      operate under 10 CFR 50.82(a).
                                          Because the licensee cannot
                                          operate the reactors, the
                                          licensee does not have a
                                          ``plant operating
                                          organization.''
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      The number of staff at
 IV.A.3. The NRC is granting exemption    decommissioning sites is
 from the requirement to describe the     generally small but is
 licensee's headquarters personnel sent   commensurate with the need to
 to the site to augment the onsite        safely store spent fuel at the
 emergency response organization.         facility in a manner that is
                                          protective of public health
                                          and safety. Decommissioning
                                          sites typically have a level
                                          of emergency response that
                                          does not require response by
                                          the licensee's headquarters
                                          personnel.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Although the likelihood of
 IV.A.4. The NRC is granting exemption    events that would result in
 from portions of the rule language       doses in excess of the EPA
 that would otherwise require the         PAGs to the public beyond the
 licensee to identify a position and      exclusion area boundary based
 function within its organization,        on the permanently shut down
 which will carry the responsibility      and defueled status of the
 for making offsite dose projections.     reactor is extremely low, the
                                          licensee is still required to
                                          determine if a radiological
                                          release is occurring. If a
                                          release is occurring, then the
                                          licensee staff should promptly
                                          communicate that information
                                          to offsite authorities for
                                          their consideration. The
                                          offsite organizations are
                                          responsible for deciding what,
                                          if any, protective actions
                                          should be taken based on a
                                          CEMP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      SONGS has performed an on-shift
 IV.A.5. The NRC is granting exemption    staffing analysis, addressing
 from the requirement for the licensee    SFP mitigating strategies,
 to identify individuals with special     including review of collateral
 qualifications, both licensee            duties. The specific event
 employees and non-employees, for         scenario utilized for the
 coping with emergencies.                 staffing analysis involves a
                                          catastrophic loss-of-water
                                          inventory in one SFP.
                                         In addition to the scenario
                                          described above, SONGS
                                          performed a separate case
                                          study to validate that the
                                          minimum on-shift staff can
                                          perform mitigation efforts in
                                          the event that the second SFP
                                          is also affected by a
                                          catastrophic loss-of-water
                                          inventory.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.A.7. The NRC is granting exemption    50, Appendix E, Section IV.1.
 from portions of the rule language
 that would otherwise require a
 description of the assistance expected
 from State, local, and Federal
 agencies for coping with a hostile
 action.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Offsite emergency measures are
 IV.A.8. The NRC is granting exemption    limited to support provided by
 from the requirement to identify the     local police, fire
 State and local officials for ordering   departments, and ambulance and
 protective actions and evacuations..     hospital services, as
                                          appropriate. Due to the low
                                          probability of DBAs or other
                                          credible events to exceed the
                                          EPA PAGs, protective actions
                                          such as evacuation should not
                                          be required, but could be
                                          implemented at the discretion
                                          of offsite authorities using a
                                          CEMP.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      The duties of the on-shift
 IV.A.9. The NRC is granting exemption    personnel at a decommissioning
 from the requirement for the licensee    reactor facility are not as
 to provide an analysis demonstrating     complicated and diverse as
 that on-shift personnel are not          those for an operating power
 assigned responsibilities that would     reactor. Responsibilities
 prevent performance of their assigned    should be well defined in the
 emergency plan functions.                emergency plan and procedures,
                                          regularly tested through
                                          drills and exercises audited
                                          and inspected by the licensee
                                          and the NRC.
                                         The staff considered the
                                          similarity between the
                                          staffing levels at a
                                          permanently shut down and
                                          defueled reactor and staffing
                                          levels at an operating power
                                          reactor site. The minimal
                                          systems and equipment needed
                                          to maintain the spent nuclear
                                          fuel in the SFP or in a dry
                                          cask storage system in a safe
                                          condition require minimal
                                          personnel and is governed by
                                          Technical Specifications. In
                                          the EP final rule published in
                                          the Federal Register (76 FR
                                          72560; November 23, 2011), the
                                          NRC concluded that the
                                          staffing analysis requirement
                                          was not necessary for non-
                                          power reactor licensees due to
                                          the small staffing levels
                                          required to operate the
                                          facility.

[[Page 33566]]

 
                                         The staff also examined the
                                          actions required to mitigate
                                          the very low probability
                                          beyond-design-basis events for
                                          the SFP. In a letter dated
                                          October 1, 2014, ``Docket Nos.
                                          50-361 and 50-362 Supplement 1
                                          to Amendment Applications 266
                                          and 251 Permanently Defueled
                                          Technical Specifications San
                                          Onofre Nuclear Generating
                                          Station, Units 2 and 3''
                                          (ADAMS Accession No.
                                          ML14280A264), SCE withdrew the
                                          proposed changes to the
                                          Mitigating Strategies License
                                          Condition for Units 2 and 3
                                          (2.C(26) for Unit 2 and
                                          2.C(27) for Unit 3). This
                                          license condition requires
                                          SONGS to maintain its SFP
                                          inventory makeup strategies as
                                          discussed above.
                                         SONGS has performed an on-shift
                                          staffing analysis, addressing
                                          SFP mitigating strategies,
                                          including review of collateral
                                          duties. The specific event
                                          scenario utilized for the
                                          staffing analysis involves a
                                          catastrophic loss-of-water
                                          inventory in one SFP.
                                         In addition to the scenario
                                          described above, SONGS
                                          performed a separate case
                                          study to validate that the
                                          minimum on-shift staff can
                                          perform mitigation efforts in
                                          the event that the second SFP
                                          is also affected by a
                                          catastrophic loss-of-water
                                          inventory.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          Part 50, Appendix E, Section
                                          IV.1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      NEI 99-01 was found to be an
 IV.B.1. The NRC is granting exemption    acceptable method for
 from portions of the rule language       development of EALs. No
 that would otherwise require offsite     offsite protective actions are
 EALs and offsite protective measures     anticipated to be necessary,
 and associate offsite monitoring for     so classification above the
 the emergency conditions.                alert level is no longer
In addition, the NRC is granting          required, which is consistent
 exemption from portions of the rule      with ISFSI facilities.
 language that would otherwise require   As discussed previously, SCE
 EALs based on hostile action.            requested a license amendment
                                          to revise its EAL scheme to
                                          NEI 99-01, Revision 6 in a
                                          letter dated March 31, 2014,
                                          ``Permanently Defueled
                                          Emergency Action Level Scheme,
                                          San Onofre Nuclear Generating
                                          Station, Units 1, 2, and 3,
                                          respectively, and Independent
                                          Spent Fuel Storage
                                          Installation'' (ADAMS
                                          Accession No. ML14092A249).
                                          Before SCE can amend its EAL
                                          scheme to reflect the risk
                                          commensurate with power
                                          reactors that have been
                                          permanently shut down and
                                          defueled, SCE needs an
                                          exemption from the requirement
                                          for the site area emergency
                                          and general emergency
                                          classifications.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          Part 50, Appendix E, Section
                                          IV.1.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Containment parameters do not
 IV.C.1. The NRC is granting exemption    provide an indication of the
 from portions of the rule language       conditions at a defueled
 that would otherwise require EALs        facility and emergency core
 based on operating reactor concerns,     cooling systems are no longer
 such as offsite radiation monitoring,    required. Other indications,
 pressure in containment, and the         such as SFP level or
 response of the emergency core cooling   temperature, can be used at
 system.                                  sites where there is spent
In addition, the NRC is striking          fuel in the SFPs.
 language that would otherwise require   In the SOC for the final rule
 offsite EALs of a site area emergency    for EP requirements for ISFSIs
 and a general emergency.                 and for MRS facilities (60 FR
                                          32430), the Commission
                                          responded to comments
                                          concerning a general emergency
                                          at an ISFSI and MRS, and
                                          concluded that, ``. . . an
                                          essential element of a General
                                          Emergency is that a release
                                          can be reasonably expected to
                                          exceed EPA PAGs exposure
                                          levels off site for more than
                                          the immediate site area.''
                                         The probability of a condition
                                          at a defueled facility causing
                                          a release of radioactive
                                          material offsite necessitating
                                          a declaration of a site area
                                          or general emergency is very
                                          low. In the event of an
                                          accident at a defueled
                                          facility that meets the
                                          conditions for exemption from
                                          formal EP requirements, there
                                          will be available time for
                                          event mitigation and, if
                                          necessary, implementation of
                                          offsite protective actions
                                          using a CEMP.
                                         NEI 99-01 was found to be an
                                          acceptable method for
                                          development of EALs. No
                                          offsite protective actions are
                                          anticipated to be necessary,
                                          so classification above the
                                          alert level is no longer
                                          required.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      In the EP rule published in the
 IV.C.2. The NRC is granting exemption    November 23, 2011, Federal
 from portions of the rule language       Register (76 FR 72560),
 that would otherwise require the         nuclear power reactor
 licensee to assess, classify, and        licensees were required to
 declare an emergency condition within    assess, classify and declare
 15 minutes.                              an emergency condition within
                                          15 minutes. Non-power reactors
                                          do not have the same potential
                                          impact on public health and
                                          safety as do power reactors,
                                          and as such, non-power reactor
                                          licensees do not require
                                          complex offsite emergency
                                          response activities and are
                                          not required to assess,
                                          classify and declare an
                                          emergency condition within 15
                                          minutes. An SFP and an ISFSI
                                          are also not nuclear power
                                          reactors as defined in the
                                          NRC's regulations and do not
                                          have the same potential impact
                                          on public health and safety as
                                          do power reactors. A
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          has a low likelihood of a
                                          credible accident resulting in
                                          radiological releases
                                          requiring offsite protective
                                          measures. For these reasons,
                                          the staff concludes that a
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          should not be required to
                                          assess, classify and declare
                                          an emergency condition within
                                          15 minutes.

[[Page 33567]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.D.1. The NRC is granting exemption    50.47(b) and 10 CFR
 from portions of the rule language       50.47(b)(10).
 that would otherwise require the
 licensee to reach agreement with
 local, State, and Federal officials
 and agencies for prompt notification
 of protective measures or evacuations.
In addition, the NRC is granting
 exemption from identifying the
 associated titles of officials to be
 notified for each agency within the
 EPZs.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.D.2. The NRC is granting exemption    50, Appendix E, Section
 from the requirement for the licensee    IV.D.1.
 to annually disseminate general
 information on EP and evacuations
 within the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
In addition, the NRC is granting
 exemption for the need for signage or
 other measures to address transient
 populations in the event of an
 accident.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      While the capability needs to
 IV.D.3. The NRC is granting exemption    exist for the notification of
 from portions of the rule language       offsite government agencies
 that would otherwise require the         within a specified time
 licensee to have the capability to       period, previous exemptions
 make notifications to State and local    have allowed for extending the
 government agencies within 15 minutes    State and local government
 of declaring an emergency.               agencies' notification time up
                                          to 60 minutes based on the
                                          site-specific justification
                                          provided.
                                         SCE's license amendment request
                                          to approve its Permanently
                                          Defueled Emergency Plan (PDEP)
                                          dated March 31, 2014 (ADAMS
                                          Accession No. ML14092A314),
                                          provides that SONGS will make
                                          notifications to the State of
                                          California, the local counties
                                          (Orange and San Diego), and
                                          Marine Corps Base Camp
                                          Pendleton within 60 minutes of
                                          declaration of an event.
                                          Considering the very low
                                          probability of beyond-design-
                                          basis events affecting the
                                          SFP, and with the time
                                          available to initiate
                                          mitigative actions consistent
                                          with plant conditions or, if
                                          needed, for offsite
                                          authorities to implement
                                          appropriate protective
                                          measures using a CEMP (all-
                                          hazards) approach between the
                                          loss of both water and air
                                          cooling to the spent fuel and
                                          the onset of a postulated
                                          zirconium cladding fire,
                                          formal offsite radiological
                                          response plans are not needed.
                                          Therefore, decommissioning
                                          reactors are not required to
                                          notify State and local
                                          governmental agencies within
                                          15 minutes. For similar
                                          reasons, the requirement for
                                          alerting and providing prompt
                                          instructions to the public
                                          within the plume exposure
                                          pathway EPZ using an alert and
                                          notification system is not
                                          required.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b) and 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b)(10).
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.D.4. The NRC is granting exemption    50, Appendix E, Section IV.D.3
 from the requirement for the licensee    regarding the alert and
 to obtain U.S. Federal Emergency         notification system
 Management Agency (FEMA) approval of     requirements.
 its backup alert and notification
 capability.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Due to the low probability of
 IV.E.8.a.(i). The NRC is granting        DBAs or other credible events
 exemption from portions of the rule      to exceed the EPA PAGs at the
 language that would otherwise require    site boundary, the available
 the licensee to have an onsite           time for event mitigation at a
 technical support center (TSC) and EOF.  decommissioning power reactor
                                          and, if needed, to implement
                                          offsite protective actions
                                          using a CEMP, an EOF would not
                                          be required to support offsite
                                          agency response. In addition,
                                          an onsite TSC with Part 50,
                                          Appendix E requirements would
                                          not be needed. SCE proposes in
                                          its PDEP that onsite actions
                                          would be directed from the
                                          Command Center.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      NUREG-0696, ``Functional
 IV.E.8.a.(ii). The NRC is granting       Criteria for Emergency
 exemption from portions of the rule      Response Facilities,''
 language that would otherwise require    provides that the OSC is an
 the licensee to have an onsite           onsite area separate from the
 operational support center (OSC).        control room and the TSC where
                                          licensee operations support
                                          personnel will assemble in an
                                          emergency. For a
                                          decommissioning power reactor,
                                          an OSC is no longer required
                                          to meet its original purpose
                                          of an assembly area for plant
                                          logistical support during an
                                          emergency. The OSC function
                                          can be incorporated into the
                                          Command Center, as proposed by
                                          SCE.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.E.8.b. and subpart Sections           50.47(b)(3).
 IV.E.8.b.(1)-E.8.b.(5). The NRC is
 granting exemption from the
 requirements related to an offsite EOF
 location, space and size,
 communications capability, access to
 plant data and radiological
 information, and access to coping and
 office supplies.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV   Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 E.8.c. and Sections IV E.8.c.(1)-        50.47(b)(3).
 E.8.c.(3). The NRC is granting
 exemption from the requirements to
 have an EOF with the capabilities to
 obtain and display plant data and
 radiological information; the
 capability to analyze technical
 information and provide briefings; and
 the capability to support events
 occurring at more than one site (if
 the emergency operations center
 supports more than one site).

[[Page 33568]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV   Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 E.8.d. The NRC is granting exemption     50, Appendix E, Section IV.1
 from the requirements to have an         regarding hostile action.
 alternate facility that would be
 accessible even if the site is under
 threat of or experiencing hostile
 action, to function as a staging area
 for augmentation of emergency response
 staff.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.E.8.e. The NRC is granting            50.47(b)(3).
 exemption from the requirement
 regarding the need for the licensee to
 comply with paragraph 8.b of this
 section.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR
 IV.E.9.a. The NRC is granting            50.47(b) and 10 CFR
 exemption from portions of the rule      50.47(b)(10).
 language that would otherwise require   The State and the local
 the licensee to have communications      governments in which the
 with contiguous State and local          nuclear facility is located
 governments that are within the plume    need to be informed of events
 exposure pathway EPZ (which is no        and emergencies, so lines of
 longer required by the exemption         communication are required to
 granted to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10)).         be maintained.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Because of the low probability
 IV.E.9.c. The NRC is granting            of DBAs or other credible
 exemption from the requirements for      events that would be expected
 communication and testing provisions     to exceed the EPA PAGs and the
 between the control room, the onsite     available time for event
 TSC, State/local emergency operations    mitigation and, if needed,
 centers, and field assessment teams.     implementation of offsite
                                          protective actions using a
                                          CEMP, there is no need for the
                                          TSC, EOF, or offsite field
                                          assessment teams.
                                         Also refer to justification for
                                          10 CFR 50.47(b)(3).
                                          Communication with State and
                                          local emergency operations
                                          centers is maintained to
                                          coordinate assistance on site
                                          if required.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      The functions of the control
 IV.E.9.d. The NRC is granting            room, EOF, TSC, and OSC may be
 exemption from portions of the rule      combined into one or more
 language that would otherwise require    locations at a permanently
 provisions for communications from the   shutdown and defueled facility
 control room, onsite TSC, and EOF with   due to its smaller facility
 NRC Headquarters and appropriate         staff and the greatly reduced
 Regional Operations Center.              required interaction with
                                          State and local emergency
                                          response facilities, as
                                          compared to an operating
                                          reactor.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Decommissioning power reactor
 IV.F.1. and Section IV F.1.viii. The     sites typically have a level
 NRC is granting exemption from           of emergency response that
 portions of the rule language that       does not require additional
 would otherwise require the licensee     response by the licensee's
 to provide training and drills for the   headquarters personnel.
 licensee's headquarters personnel,       Therefore, the staff considers
 Civil Defense personnel, or local news   exempting licensee's
 media.                                   headquarters personnel from
                                          training requirements to be
                                          reasonable.
                                         Due to the low probability of
                                          DBAs or other credible events
                                          to exceed the EPA PAGs,
                                          offsite emergency measures are
                                          limited to support provided by
                                          local police, fire
                                          departments, and ambulance and
                                          hospital services, as
                                          appropriate. Local news media
                                          personnel no longer need
                                          radiological orientation
                                          training since they will not
                                          be called upon to support the
                                          formal Joint Information
                                          Center. The term ``Civil
                                          Defense'' is no longer
                                          commonly used; references to
                                          this term in the examples
                                          provided in the regulation
                                          are, therefore, not needed.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Because of the low probability
 IV.F.2. The NRC is granting exemption    of DBAs or other credible
 from portions of the rule language       events that would be expected
 that would otherwise require testing     to exceed the limits of EPA
 of a public alert and notification       PAGs and the available time
 system.                                  for event mitigation and, if
                                          necessary, offsite protective
                                          actions from a CEMP, the
                                          public alert and notification
                                          system will not be used and,
                                          therefore, requires no
                                          testing.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          50.47(b).
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Due to the low probability of
 IV.F.2.a. and Sections IV.F.2.a.(i)      DBAs or other credible events
 through IV.F.2.a.(iii). The NRC is       that would be expected to
 granting exemption from the              exceed the limits of EPA PAGs,
 requirements for full participation      the available time for event
 exercises and the submittal of the       mitigation and, if necessary,
 associated exercise scenarios to the     implementation of offsite
 NRC.                                     protective actions using a
                                          CEMP, no formal offsite
                                          radiological response plans
                                          are required. Therefore, the
                                          need for the licensee to
                                          exercise onsite and offsite
                                          plans with full participation
                                          by each offsite authority
                                          having a role under the
                                          radiological response plan is
                                          not required.
                                         The intent of submitting
                                          exercise scenarios at an
                                          operating power reactor site
                                          is to check that licensees
                                          utilize different scenarios in
                                          order to prevent the
                                          preconditioning of responders
                                          at power reactors. For
                                          decommissioning power reactor
                                          sites, there are limited
                                          events that could occur and,
                                          as such, the previously
                                          routine progression to general
                                          emergency in an operating
                                          power reactor site scenario is
                                          not applicable.
                                         The licensee would be exempt
                                          from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
                                          E, Section IV.F.2.a.(i)-(iii)
                                          because the licensee would be
                                          exempt from the umbrella
                                          provision of 10 CFR Part 50,
                                          Appendix E, Section IV.F.2.a.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.F.2.b. The NRC is granting            50, Appendix E, Section
 exemption from portions of the rule      IV.F.2.a.
 language that would otherwise require   The low probability of DBAs or
 the licensee to submit scenarios for     other credible events that
 its biennial exercises of its onsite     would exceed the EPA PAGs, the
 emergency plan. In addition, the NRC     available time for event
 is granting exemption from portions of   mitigation and, if necessary,
 the rule language that requires          implementation of offsite
 assessment of offsite releases,          protective actions using a
 protective action decision making, and   CEMP, render a TSC, OSC, and
 references to the TSC, OSC, and EOF.     EOF unnecessary. The principal
                                          functions required by
                                          regulation can be performed at
                                          an onsite location that does
                                          not meet the requirements of
                                          the TSC, OSC or EOF.

[[Page 33569]]

 
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.F.2.c. and Sections IV F.2.c.(1)      50, Appendix E, Section
 through F.2.c.(5). The NRC is granting   IV.F.2.a.
 exemption from the requirements
 regarding the need for the licensee to
 exercise offsite plans biennially with
 full participation by each offsite
 authority having a role under the
 radiological response plan. The NRC is
 also granting exemptions from the
 conditions for conducting these
 exercises (including hostile action
 exercises) if two different licensees
 have facilities on the same site or on
 adjacent, contiguous sites, or share
 most of the elements defining co-
 located licensees.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.F.2.d. The NRC is granting            50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 exemption from the requirements to
 obtain State participation in an
 ingestion pathway exercise and a
 hostile action exercise, with each
 State that has responsibilities, at
 least once per exercise cycle.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.F.2.e. The NRC is granting            50, Appendix E, Section IV.2.
 exemption from portions of the rule
 language that would otherwise require
 the licensee to allow participation
 exercise in licensee drills by any
 State and local government in the
 plume exposure pathway EPZ when
 requested.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      FEMA is responsible for
 IV.F.2.f. The NRC is granting            evaluating the adequacy of
 exemption from portions of the rule      offsite response during an
 language that would otherwise require    exercise. Because the NRC is
 FEMA to consult with the NRC on          granting exemptions from the
 remedial exercises. The NRC is           requirements regarding the
 granting exemption from portions of      need for the licensee to
 the rule language that discuss the       exercise onsite and offsite
 extent of State and local                plans with full participation
 participation in remedial exercises.     by each offsite authority
                                          having a role under the
                                          radiological response plan,
                                          FEMA will no longer evaluate
                                          adequacy of offsite response
                                          during remedial or other
                                          exercises.
                                         No action is expected from
                                          State or local government
                                          organizations in response to
                                          an event at a decommissioning
                                          power reactor site other than
                                          firefighting, law enforcement
                                          and ambulance/medical services
                                          support. A memorandum of
                                          understanding should be in
                                          place for those services.
                                          Offsite response organizations
                                          will continue to take actions
                                          on a comprehensive EP basis to
                                          protect the health and safety
                                          of the public as they would at
                                          any other industrial site.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Due to the low probability of
 IV.F.2.i. The NRC is granting            DBAs or other credible events
 exemption from portions of the rule      to exceed the EPA PAGs, the
 language that would otherwise require    available time for event
 the licensee to drill and exercise       mitigation and, if needed,
 scenarios that include a wide spectrum   implementation of offsite
 of radiological release events and       protective actions using a
 hostile action.                          CEMP, the previously routine
                                          progression to general
                                          emergency in power reactor
                                          site scenarios is not
                                          applicable to a
                                          decommissioning site.
                                          Therefore, the licensee is not
                                          expected to demonstrate
                                          response to a wide spectrum of
                                          events.
                                         Also refer to basis for 10 CFR
                                          Part 50, Appendix E, Section
                                          IV.1 regarding hostile action.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.F.2.j. The NRC is granting            50, Appendix E, Section
 exemption from the requirements          IV.F.2.
 regarding the need for the licensee's
 emergency response organization to
 demonstrate proficiency in key skills
 in the principal functional areas of
 emergency response..
In addition, the NRC is granting
 exemption during an eight calendar
 year exercise cycle, from
 demonstrating proficiency in the key
 skills necessary to respond to such
 scenarios as hostile actions,
 unplanned minimal radiological
 release, and scenarios involving rapid
 escalation to a site area emergency or
 general emergency.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section      Refer to basis for 10 CFR Part
 IV.I The NRC is granting exemption       50, Appendix E, Section
 from the requirements regarding the      IV.E.8.d.
 need for the licensee to develop a
 range of protective actions for onsite
 personnel during hostile actions.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[FR Doc. 2015-14423 Filed 6-11-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

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