36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification, 31583-31586 [2015-13497]
Download as PDF
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 106 / Wednesday, June 3, 2015 / Notices
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
hardware turns a standard GBU–38
JDAM into a GBU–54 Laser JDAM. The
DSU–38 hardware is Unclassified;
technical data and other documentation
are classified up to Secret.
5. The AGM–114R Hellfire II is an airto-ground missile used against heavy
and light armored targets, thin-skinned
vehicles, urban structures, bunkers,
caves and personnel. The missile is
Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) based,
with a variable delay fuse, improved
safety and reliability. The highest level
of release for the Hellfire missile is
Secret, based upon the software. The
highest level of classified information
that could be disclosed by a proposed
sale or by testing of the end item is
Secret; the highest level that must be
disclosed for production, maintenance,
or training is Confidential. Reverse
engineering could reveal confidential
information. Vulnerability data,
countermeasures, vulnerability/
susceptibility analyses, and threat
definitions are classified Secret or
Confidential.
6. If a technologically advanced
adversary obtained knowledge of the
specific hardware and software
elements in the systems described
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31583
above, the information could be used to
develop countermeasures that might
reduce weapon system effectiveness or
be used in the development of a system
with similar or advanced capabilities.
7. A determination has been made
that Government of Israel can provide
substantially the same degree of
protection of the sensitive technology
associated with these systems as the
U.S. Government. This proposed sale is
necessary in furtherance of the U.S.
foreign policy and national security
objectives outlined in the Policy
Justification.
8. All defense articles and services
listed in this transmittal have been
authorized for release and export to the
Government of Israel.
ACTION:
[FR Doc. 2015–13478 Filed 6–2–15; 8:45 am]
Dated: May 29, 2015.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Notice.
The Department of Defense is
publishing the unclassified text of a
section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification.
This is published to fulfill the
requirements of section 155 of Public
Law 104–164 dated July 21, 1996.
SUMMARY:
Ms.
B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703) 601–
3740.
The following is a copy of a letter to
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Transmittals 15–17
with attached transmittal, policy
justification, and Sensitivity of
Technology.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
Office of the Secretary
[Transmittal Nos. 15–17]
36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification
Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, Department of Defense.
AGENCY:
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BILLING CODE 5001–06–C
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 106 / Wednesday, June 3, 2015 / Notices
Transmittal No. 15–17
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of
Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as Amended
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—MH–60R
Multi-Mission Helicopters
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi
Arabia
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment *
Other ...................................
$1.25 billion
$ .65 billion
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Total ................................. $1.90 billion
* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms
Export Control Act.
(iii) Description and Quantity or
Quantities of Articles or Services under
Consideration for Purchase: ten (10)
MH–60R multi-mission helicopters with
fourteen (14) APS–153(V) Multi-Mode
radars (10 installed, 2 spares and 2 for
testing); twenty-four T–700 GE 401 C
engines (20 installed and 4 spares);
twelve (12) APX–123 Identification
Friend or Foe transponders (10 installed
and 2 spares); fourteen (14) AN/AAS–
44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting
Systems Forward Looking Infrared
Radars (10 installed, 2 spares, and 2 for
testing); twenty-six (26) Embedded
Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation Systems with Selective
Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (20
installed and 6 spares); Link-16
capability; one-thousand (1,000) AN/
SSQ–36/53/62 Sonobuoys; thirty-eight
(38) AGM–114R Hellfire II missiles; five
(5) AGM–114 M36–E9 Captive Air
Training missiles; four (4) AGM–114Q
Hellfire Training Missiles; threehundred eighty (380) Advanced
Precision Kill Weapons System rockets;
twelve (12) M–240D crew served
weapons; and twelve (12) GAU–21 crew
served weapons. Also included are
spare engine containers; facilities study
and design; spare and repair parts;
support and test equipment;
communication equipment; aerial
refueling services; ferry support;
publications and technical
documentation; personnel training and
training equipment; U.S. Government
and contractor engineering, technical
and logistics support services; and other
related elements of logistical and
program support.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (SBU,
GBQ, TCZ) Army (HEW).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid,
Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology
Contained in the Defense Article or
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold:
See Attached Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to
Congress: 20 May 2015.
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The Government of Saudi Arabia has
requested a sale of ten (10) MH–60R
multi-mission helicopters fourteen (14)
APS–153(V) Multi-Mode radars (10
installed, 2 spares and 2 for testing);
twenty-four T–700 GE 401 C engines (20
installed and 4 spares); twelve (12)
APX–123 Identification Friend or Foe
transponders (10 installed and 2 spares);
fourteen (14) AN/AAS–44C(V) MultiSpectral Targeting Systems Forward
Looking Infrared Radars (10 installed, 2
spares, and 2 for testing); twenty-six (26)
Embedded Global Positioning System/
Inertial Navigation Systems with
Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing
Module (20 installed and 6 spares); and
Link-16 capability; one-thousand (1,000)
AN/SSQ–36/53/62 Sonobuoys; thirtyeight (38) AGM–114R Hellfire II
missiles; five (5) AGM–114 M36–E9
Captive Air Training missiles; four (4)
AGM–114Q Hellfire Training Missiles;
three-hundred eighty (380) Advanced
Precision Kill Weapons System rockets;
twelve (12) M–240D crew served
weapons; and twelve (12) GAU–21 crew
served weapons. Also included are
spare engine containers; facilities study
and design; spare and repair parts;
support and test equipment;
communication equipment; aerial
refueling services; ferry support;
publications and technical
documentation; personnel training and
training equipment; U.S. Government
and contractor engineering, technical
and logistics support services; and other
related elements of logistical and
program support. The estimated cost is
$1.9 billion.
This proposed sale will contribute to
the foreign policy and national security
of the United States by helping to
improve the security of a strategic
regional partner, which has been, and
continues to be, an important force for
political stability and economic progress
in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Saudi
Arabia’s capability to meet current and
future threats from enemy weapon
systems. The MH–60R Multi-Mission
Helicopter will provide the capability to
identify, engage, and defeat maritime
security threats along with the ability to
perform secondary missions including
vertical replenishment, search and
rescue, and communications relay.
Saudi Arabia will use the enhanced
capability as a deterrent to regional
threats and to strengthen its homeland
defense.
PO 00000
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31585
The proposed sale of this equipment
and support will not alter the basic
military balance in the region.
The principal contractors will be
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in
Stratford, Connecticut; and Lockheed
Martin Corporation in Owego, New
York. There are no known offset
agreements in connection with this
potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale
will require the assignment of
additional U.S. Government and/or
contractor representatives to Saudi
Arabia.
There will be no adverse impact on
U.S. defense readiness as a result of this
proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 15–17
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of
Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the
Arms Export Control Act, as Amended
Annex—Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology
1. The MH–60R Multi-Mission
Helicopter focuses primarily on antisubmarine and anti-surface warfare
missions. The MH–60R carries several
sensors and data links to enhance its
ability to work in a network centric
battle group and as an extension of its
home ship/main operating base. The
mission equipment subsystem consists
of the following sensors and
subsystems: An acoustics systems
consisting of a dipping sonar and
sonobuoys, Multi-Mode Radar (MMR)
with integral Identification Friend or
Foe (IFF) interrogator, Electronic
Support Measures (ESM), Integrated
Self-Defense (ISD), and Multi-Spectral
Targeting System (MTS). The aircraft
processes sensor data onboard, and
transmits data via Common Data Link
(CDL) (also referred to as Hawklink), or
Link-16. It can carry AGM–114A/B/K/R
Hellfire missiles, as well as Mk 46 or Mk
54 torpedoes to engage surface and subsurface targets. The Saudi MH–60R
platform will include provisions for
both the Mk 46 and the Mk 54 light
weight torpedo. The MH–60R weapons
system is classified up to Secret. Unless
otherwise noted below, MH–60R
hardware and support equipment, test
equipment and maintenance spares are
unclassified except when electrical
power is applied to hardware containing
volatile data storage. Technical data and
documentation for MH–60R weapons
systems (to include sub-systems and
weapons listed below) are classified up
to Secret. The sensitive technologies
include:
a. The AGM–114R HELLFIRE missile
is an air-to-surface missile with a multimission, multi-target, precision strike
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31586
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 106 / Wednesday, June 3, 2015 / Notices
capability. The HELLLFIRE can be
launched from multiple air platforms
and is the primary precision weapon for
the United States Army. The highest
level for release of the AGM–114R
HELLFIRE II is Secret, based upon the
software. The highest level of classified
information that could be disclosed by
a proposed sale or by testing of the end
item is Secret; the highest level that
must be disclosed for production,
maintenance, or training is Confidential.
Reverse engineering could reveal
Confidential information. Vulnerability
data, countermeasures, vulnerability/
susceptibility analyses, and threat
definitions are classified Secret or
Confidential.
b. Advanced Precision Kill Weapons
System (APKWS) laser guided rocket to
counter the fast attack craft and fast
inshore attack craft threat. APKWS
hardware is Unclassified.
c. Communications security devices
contain sensitive encryption algorithms
and keying material. The purchasing
country has previously been released
and utilizes COMSEC devices in
accordance with set procedures and
without issue. COMSEC devices will be
classified up to Secret when keys are
loaded.
d. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
(KIV–77) contains embedded security
devices containing sensitive encryption
algorithms and keying material. The
purchasing country will utilize
COMSEC devices in accordance with set
procedures. The AN/APX–123 is
classified up to Secret.
e. GPS/PPS/SAASM—Global
Positioning System (GPS) provides a
space-based Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) that has reliable location
and time information in all weather and
at all times and anywhere on or near the
Earth when and where there is an
unobstructed line of sight to four or
more GPS satellites. Selective
Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module
(SAASM) (AN/PSN–11) is used by
military GPS receivers to allow
decryption of precision GPS
coordinates. In addition, the GPS
Antenna System (GAS–1) provides
protection from enemy manipulation of
the GPS system. The GPS hardware is
Unclassified. When electrical power is
applied, the system is classified up to
Secret.
f. Ku-Band CDL (AN/ARQ–59; also
referred to as Hawklink) and Link-16
capability to enable network centric
capabilities, and improve data
communications leading to a Common
Operating Picture (COP). Link-16
implementation will be consistent with
capabilities already in operation with
Saudi Arabian defense forces. CDL
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Jkt 235001
implementation will utilize commercial
encryption. The AN/ARQ–59 hardware
is unclassified when COMSEC module
is not loaded with a key, when a key is
loaded it is classified up to Secret. The
Link-16 hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied it is
classified up to Secret.
g. Acoustics algorithms are used to
process dipping sonar and sonobuoy
data for target tracking and for the
Acoustics Mission Planner (AMP),
which is a tactical aid employed to
optimize the deployment of sonobuoys
and the dipping sonar. Acoustics
hardware is Unclassified. The acoustics
system is classified up to Secret when
environmental and threat databases are
loaded and/or the system is processing
acoustic data.
h. The AN/APS–153 multi-mode
radar with an integrated IFF and Inverse
Synthetic Aperture (ISAR) provides
target surveillance/detection capability.
The AN/APS–153 hardware is
unclassified. When electrical power is
applied and mission data loaded, the
AN/APS–153 is classified up to Secret.
i. The AN/ALQ–210 (ESM) system
identifies the location of an emitter. The
ability of the system to identify specific
emitters depends on the data provided
by Saudi Arabia. The AN/ALQ–210
hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied and mission
data loaded, the AN/ALQ–210 system is
classified up to Secret.
j. The AN/AAS–44C(V) Forward
Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) uses the
Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS)
that allows it to operate in day/night
and adverse weather conditions.
Imagery is provided by an Infrared
sensor, a color/monochrome DTV, and a
Low-Light TV. The AN/AAS–44C(V)
hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied, the AN/
AAS–44C(V) is classified up to Secret.
k. Ultra High Frequency/Very High
Frequency (UHF/VHF) Radios (ARC
210) contain embedded sensitive
encryption algorithms and keying
material. The purchasing country will
utilize COMSEC devices in accordance
with set procedures. The ARC–210
hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied and mission
data loaded, the ARC–210 is classified
up to Secret.
l. Satellite Communications Demand
Assigned Multiple Access (SATCOM
DAMA) and Single Channel Ground to
Air Radio Systems (SINCGARS), which
provide increased, interoperable
communications capabilities with US
forces. SATCOM DAMA and SINCGARS
hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied and mission
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Sfmt 4703
data loaded these systems are classified
up to Secret.
2. All the mission data, including
sensitive parameters, is loaded from an
off board station before each flight and
does not stay with the aircraft after
electrical power has been removed.
Sensitive technologies are protected as
defined in the program protection and
anti-tamper plans. The mission data and
off board station are classified up to
Secret.
3. If a technologically advanced
adversary were to obtain knowledge of
the specific hardware and software
elements, the information could be used
to develop countermeasures which
might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or
advanced capabilities.
4. A determination has been made
that the recipient country can provide
substantially the same degree of
protection for the sensitive technology
being released as the U.S. Government.
This sale is necessary in furtherance of
the U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives outlined in the
Policy Justification.
5. All defense articles and services
listed in this transmittal have been
authorized for release and export to
Saudi Arabia.
[FR Doc. 2015–13497 Filed 6–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Judicial Proceedings Since Fiscal Year
2012 Amendments Panel (Judicial
Proceedings Panel); Notice of Federal
Advisory Committee Meeting
Department of Defense.
Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
The Department of Defense is
publishing this notice to announce the
following Federal Advisory Committee
meeting of the Judicial Proceedings
since Fiscal Year 2012 Amendments
Panel (‘‘the Judicial Proceedings Panel’’
or ‘‘the Panel’’). The meeting is open to
the public.
DATES: A meeting of the Judicial
Proceedings Panel will be held on
Thursday, June 18, 2015. The Public
Session will begin at 9:00 a.m. and end
at 5:00 p.m.
ADDRESSES: The George Washington
University, School of Law, Faculty
Conference Center, 2000 H St. NW.,
Washington, DC 20052.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms.
Julie Carson, Judicial Proceedings Panel,
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\03JNN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 106 (Wednesday, June 3, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 31583-31586]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-13497]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
[Transmittal Nos. 15-17]
36(b)(1) Arms Sales Notification
AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense.
ACTION: Notice.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text
of a section 36(b)(1) arms sales notification. This is published to
fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104-164 dated
July 21, 1996.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ms. B. English, DSCA/DBO/CFM, (703)
601-3740.
The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Transmittals 15-17 with attached transmittal, policy
justification, and Sensitivity of Technology.
Dated: May 29, 2015.
Aaron Siegel,
Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
[[Page 31584]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN03JN15.020
BILLING CODE 5001-06-C
[[Page 31585]]
Transmittal No. 15-17
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment *............... $1.25 billion
Other................................... $ .65 billion
-------------------------------
Total................................. $1.90 billion
* as defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase: ten (10) MH-60R multi-
mission helicopters with fourteen (14) APS-153(V) Multi-Mode radars (10
installed, 2 spares and 2 for testing); twenty-four T-700 GE 401 C
engines (20 installed and 4 spares); twelve (12) APX-123 Identification
Friend or Foe transponders (10 installed and 2 spares); fourteen (14)
AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems Forward Looking Infrared
Radars (10 installed, 2 spares, and 2 for testing); twenty-six (26)
Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation Systems with
Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (20 installed and 6
spares); Link-16 capability; one-thousand (1,000) AN/SSQ-36/53/62
Sonobuoys; thirty-eight (38) AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles; five (5)
AGM-114 M36-E9 Captive Air Training missiles; four (4) AGM-114Q
Hellfire Training Missiles; three-hundred eighty (380) Advanced
Precision Kill Weapons System rockets; twelve (12) M-240D crew served
weapons; and twelve (12) GAU-21 crew served weapons. Also included are
spare engine containers; facilities study and design; spare and repair
parts; support and test equipment; communication equipment; aerial
refueling services; ferry support; publications and technical
documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S.
Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support
services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.
(iv) Military Department: Navy (SBU, GBQ, TCZ) Army (HEW).
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be
Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: 20 May 2015.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia--MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopters
The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a sale of ten (10) MH-
60R multi-mission helicopters fourteen (14) APS-153(V) Multi-Mode
radars (10 installed, 2 spares and 2 for testing); twenty-four T-700 GE
401 C engines (20 installed and 4 spares); twelve (12) APX-123
Identification Friend or Foe transponders (10 installed and 2 spares);
fourteen (14) AN/AAS-44C(V) Multi-Spectral Targeting Systems Forward
Looking Infrared Radars (10 installed, 2 spares, and 2 for testing);
twenty-six (26) Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial Navigation
Systems with Selective Availability/Anti-Spoofing Module (20 installed
and 6 spares); and Link-16 capability; one-thousand (1,000) AN/SSQ-36/
53/62 Sonobuoys; thirty-eight (38) AGM-114R Hellfire II missiles; five
(5) AGM-114 M36-E9 Captive Air Training missiles; four (4) AGM-114Q
Hellfire Training Missiles; three-hundred eighty (380) Advanced
Precision Kill Weapons System rockets; twelve (12) M-240D crew served
weapons; and twelve (12) GAU-21 crew served weapons. Also included are
spare engine containers; facilities study and design; spare and repair
parts; support and test equipment; communication equipment; aerial
refueling services; ferry support; publications and technical
documentation; personnel training and training equipment; U.S.
Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support
services; and other related elements of logistical and program support.
The estimated cost is $1.9 billion.
This proposed sale will contribute to the foreign policy and
national security of the United States by helping to improve the
security of a strategic regional partner, which has been, and continues
to be, an important force for political stability and economic progress
in the Middle East.
The proposed sale will improve Saudi Arabia's capability to meet
current and future threats from enemy weapon systems. The MH-60R Multi-
Mission Helicopter will provide the capability to identify, engage, and
defeat maritime security threats along with the ability to perform
secondary missions including vertical replenishment, search and rescue,
and communications relay. Saudi Arabia will use the enhanced capability
as a deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen its homeland
defense.
The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the
basic military balance in the region.
The principal contractors will be Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation in
Stratford, Connecticut; and Lockheed Martin Corporation in Owego, New
York. There are no known offset agreements in connection with this
potential sale.
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of
additional U.S. Government and/or contractor representatives to Saudi
Arabia.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a
result of this proposed sale.
Transmittal No. 15-17
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section
36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as Amended
Annex--Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology
1. The MH-60R Multi-Mission Helicopter focuses primarily on anti-
submarine and anti-surface warfare missions. The MH-60R carries several
sensors and data links to enhance its ability to work in a network
centric battle group and as an extension of its home ship/main
operating base. The mission equipment subsystem consists of the
following sensors and subsystems: An acoustics systems consisting of a
dipping sonar and sonobuoys, Multi-Mode Radar (MMR) with integral
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) interrogator, Electronic Support
Measures (ESM), Integrated Self-Defense (ISD), and Multi-Spectral
Targeting System (MTS). The aircraft processes sensor data onboard, and
transmits data via Common Data Link (CDL) (also referred to as
Hawklink), or Link-16. It can carry AGM-114A/B/K/R Hellfire missiles,
as well as Mk 46 or Mk 54 torpedoes to engage surface and sub-surface
targets. The Saudi MH-60R platform will include provisions for both the
Mk 46 and the Mk 54 light weight torpedo. The MH-60R weapons system is
classified up to Secret. Unless otherwise noted below, MH-60R hardware
and support equipment, test equipment and maintenance spares are
unclassified except when electrical power is applied to hardware
containing volatile data storage. Technical data and documentation for
MH-60R weapons systems (to include sub-systems and weapons listed
below) are classified up to Secret. The sensitive technologies include:
a. The AGM-114R HELLFIRE missile is an air-to-surface missile with
a multi-mission, multi-target, precision strike
[[Page 31586]]
capability. The HELLLFIRE can be launched from multiple air platforms
and is the primary precision weapon for the United States Army. The
highest level for release of the AGM-114R HELLFIRE II is Secret, based
upon the software. The highest level of classified information that
could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the end item is
Secret; the highest level that must be disclosed for production,
maintenance, or training is Confidential. Reverse engineering could
reveal Confidential information. Vulnerability data, countermeasures,
vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are
classified Secret or Confidential.
b. Advanced Precision Kill Weapons System (APKWS) laser guided
rocket to counter the fast attack craft and fast inshore attack craft
threat. APKWS hardware is Unclassified.
c. Communications security devices contain sensitive encryption
algorithms and keying material. The purchasing country has previously
been released and utilizes COMSEC devices in accordance with set
procedures and without issue. COMSEC devices will be classified up to
Secret when keys are loaded.
d. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) (KIV-77) contains embedded
security devices containing sensitive encryption algorithms and keying
material. The purchasing country will utilize COMSEC devices in
accordance with set procedures. The AN/APX-123 is classified up to
Secret.
e. GPS/PPS/SAASM--Global Positioning System (GPS) provides a space-
based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) that has reliable
location and time information in all weather and at all times and
anywhere on or near the Earth when and where there is an unobstructed
line of sight to four or more GPS satellites. Selective Availability/
Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) (AN/PSN-11) is used by military GPS
receivers to allow decryption of precision GPS coordinates. In
addition, the GPS Antenna System (GAS-1) provides protection from enemy
manipulation of the GPS system. The GPS hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied, the system is classified up to Secret.
f. Ku-Band CDL (AN/ARQ-59; also referred to as Hawklink) and Link-
16 capability to enable network centric capabilities, and improve data
communications leading to a Common Operating Picture (COP). Link-16
implementation will be consistent with capabilities already in
operation with Saudi Arabian defense forces. CDL implementation will
utilize commercial encryption. The AN/ARQ-59 hardware is unclassified
when COMSEC module is not loaded with a key, when a key is loaded it is
classified up to Secret. The Link-16 hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied it is classified up to Secret.
g. Acoustics algorithms are used to process dipping sonar and
sonobuoy data for target tracking and for the Acoustics Mission Planner
(AMP), which is a tactical aid employed to optimize the deployment of
sonobuoys and the dipping sonar. Acoustics hardware is Unclassified.
The acoustics system is classified up to Secret when environmental and
threat databases are loaded and/or the system is processing acoustic
data.
h. The AN/APS-153 multi-mode radar with an integrated IFF and
Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISAR) provides target surveillance/
detection capability. The AN/APS-153 hardware is unclassified. When
electrical power is applied and mission data loaded, the AN/APS-153 is
classified up to Secret.
i. The AN/ALQ-210 (ESM) system identifies the location of an
emitter. The ability of the system to identify specific emitters
depends on the data provided by Saudi Arabia. The AN/ALQ-210 hardware
is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied and mission data
loaded, the AN/ALQ-210 system is classified up to Secret.
j. The AN/AAS-44C(V) Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) uses the
Multi-spectral Targeting System (MTS) that allows it to operate in day/
night and adverse weather conditions. Imagery is provided by an
Infrared sensor, a color/monochrome DTV, and a Low-Light TV. The AN/
AAS-44C(V) hardware is Unclassified. When electrical power is applied,
the AN/AAS-44C(V) is classified up to Secret.
k. Ultra High Frequency/Very High Frequency (UHF/VHF) Radios (ARC
210) contain embedded sensitive encryption algorithms and keying
material. The purchasing country will utilize COMSEC devices in
accordance with set procedures. The ARC-210 hardware is Unclassified.
When electrical power is applied and mission data loaded, the ARC-210
is classified up to Secret.
l. Satellite Communications Demand Assigned Multiple Access (SATCOM
DAMA) and Single Channel Ground to Air Radio Systems (SINCGARS), which
provide increased, interoperable communications capabilities with US
forces. SATCOM DAMA and SINCGARS hardware is Unclassified. When
electrical power is applied and mission data loaded these systems are
classified up to Secret.
2. All the mission data, including sensitive parameters, is loaded
from an off board station before each flight and does not stay with the
aircraft after electrical power has been removed. Sensitive
technologies are protected as defined in the program protection and
anti-tamper plans. The mission data and off board station are
classified up to Secret.
3. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge
of the specific hardware and software elements, the information could
be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapon system
effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or
advanced capabilities.
4. A determination has been made that the recipient country can
provide substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale is
necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national
security objectives outlined in the Policy Justification.
5. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal
have been authorized for release and export to Saudi Arabia.
[FR Doc. 2015-13497 Filed 6-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P