List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Holtec HI-STORM Flood/Wind System; Certificate of Compliance No. 1032, Amendment No. 1, Revision 1, 30924-30928 [2015-13081]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 104 (Monday, June 1, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 30924-30928]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-13081]



[[Page 30924]]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 72

[NRC-2014-0275]
RIN 3150-AJ52


List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: Holtec HI-STORM Flood/
Wind System; Certificate of Compliance No. 1032, Amendment No. 1, 
Revision 1

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Direct final rule; confirmation of effective date.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is confirming the 
effective date of June 2, 2015, for the direct final rule that was 
published in the Federal Register on March 19, 2015. This direct final 
rule amended the NRC's spent fuel storage regulations by revising the 
Holtec International, Inc. (Holtec), HI-STORM Flood/Wind (FW) System 
listing within the ``List of approved spent fuel storage casks'' to add 
Amendment No. 1, Revision 1, to Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 
1032. Amendment No. 1, Revision 1, allows these casks to accept 14X14B 
fuel assemblies with minor changes in the internal diameter of the fuel 
cladding, diameter of the fuel pellet, and spacing between the fuel 
pins. The amendment also updates testing requirements for the 
fabrication of Metamic HT neutron-absorbing structural material.

DATES: Effective date: The effective date of June 2, 2015, for the 
direct final rule published March 19, 2015 (80 FR 14291), is confirmed.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0275 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information for this action. You may 
obtain publicly-available information related to this action by any of 
the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0275. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O-1F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert D. MacDougall, Office of 
Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-5175; email: 
Robert.MacDougall@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Discussion

    On March 19, 2015 (80 FR 14291), the NRC published a direct final 
rule amending its regulations in Sec.  72.214 of Title 10 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) by revising the Holtec HI-STORM FW 
System listing within the ``List of approved spent fuel storage casks'' 
to add Amendment No. 1, Revision 1, to CoC No. 1032. Amendment No. 1, 
Revision 1, allows these casks to accept 14X14B fuel assemblies with 
minor changes in the internal diameter of the fuel cladding, diameter 
of the fuel pellet, and spacing between the fuel pins. The amendment 
also updates testing requirements for the fabrication of Metamic HT 
neutron-absorbing structural material.

II. Public Comments on the Companion Proposed Rule

    In the direct final rule, the NRC stated that if no significant 
adverse comments were received, the direct final rule would become 
effective on June 2, 2015. The NRC received eight public comments from 
private citizens on the companion proposed rule (80 FR 14332). 
Electronic copies of these comments can be obtained from the Federal 
rulemaking Web site, https://www.regulations.gov, by searching for 
Docket ID NRC-2014-0275. The comments also are available in ADAMS under 
Accession Nos. ML15113B266, ML15113B275, ML15141A021, ML15119A201, 
ML15119A206, ML15119A210, ML15119A214, and ML15119A230. For the reasons 
discussed in more detail in Section III, ``Public Comment Analysis,'' 
of this document, none of the comments received are considered 
significant adverse comments.

III. Public Comment Analysis

    The NRC received eight comments from private citizens on the 
proposed rule, many raising multiple and overlapping issues. As 
explained in the March 19, 2015, direct final rule, the NRC would 
withdraw the direct final rule only if it received a ``significant 
adverse comment.'' This is a comment where the commenter explains why 
the rule would be inappropriate, including challenges to the rule's 
underlying premise or approach, or would be ineffective or unacceptable 
without a change. A comment is adverse and significant if:
    (1) The comment opposes the rule and provides a reason sufficient 
to require a substantive response in a notice-and-comment process. For 
example, a substantive response is required when:
    (a) The comment causes the NRC staff to reevaluate (or reconsider) 
its position or conduct additional analysis;
    (b) The comment raises an issue serious enough to warrant a 
substantive response to clarify or complete the record; or
    (c) The comment raises a relevant issue that was not previously 
addressed or considered by the NRC staff.
    (2) The comment proposes a change or an addition to the rule, and 
it is apparent that the rule would be ineffective or unacceptable 
without incorporation of the change or addition.
    (3) The comment causes the NRC staff to make a change (other than 
editorial) to the rule, CoC, or technical specifications (TSs).
    The NRC determined that none of the comments submitted on this 
direct final rule met any of these criteria. The comments either were 
already addressed by the NRC staff's safety evaluation report (SER) 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML14276A620), were beyond the scope of this 
rulemaking, or failed to provide a reason sufficient to require a 
substantive response in a notice-and-comment rulemaking. The NRC has 
not made any changes to the direct final rule as a result of the public 
comments. However, the NRC is taking this opportunity to respond to the 
individual comments to clarify information about the CoC rulemaking 
process.
    For rulemakings amending or revising a CoC, the scope of the 
rulemaking is limited to the specific changes requested by the 
applicant in the request for the amendment or amendment revision. 
Therefore, comments about the system, or spent fuel storage in general, 
that are not applicable to the changes requested by the applicant are 
outside the scope of

[[Page 30925]]

this rulemaking. Comments about details of the particular system that 
is the subject of the rulemaking, but that are not being addressed by 
the specific changes requested, have already been resolved in prior 
rulemakings. Persons who have questions or concerns about prior 
rulemakings and the resulting final rules may consider the NRC's 
process for petitions for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802. Additionally, 
safety concerns about any NRC-regulated activity may be reported to the 
NRC in accordance with the guidance posted on the NRC's public Web site 
at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/allegations/safety-concern.html. This Web site provides information on how to notify the 
NRC of emergency or non-emergency issues.
    The NRC identified 12 overall issues raised in the comments, and 
the NRC's responses to these issues follow.

Issue 1: Stress Corrosion Cracking

    Multiple commenters raised the issue of the potential for premature 
failure of the multi-purpose canisters (MPCs) containing spent fuel 
within Holtec casks due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the MPC's 
stainless steel walls. One commenter cited evidence that similar Holtec 
canisters at Diablo Canyon have already shown conditions for chloride-
induced SCC after having been loaded with fuel for only 2 years. 
Another commenter noted that thin-walled canisters like the Holtec 
design do not have American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
certification and do not meet ASME standards. Another commenter asked 
whether the NRC's seismic analysis assumes that the MPC's \1/2\ inch-
thick walls remain intact. Still another commenter asked the NRC to 
specify the extent of cracking from SCC that would require replacement 
of an MPC to ensure that the spent fuel inside would remain protected 
in a large earthquake or tsunami and associated mud flooding event. 
Another commenter alleged that although there is no seismic rating for 
cracked spent fuel storage canisters, the NRC plans to allow up to a 75 
percent crack in these canisters.
NRC Response
    These comments are not within the scope of this specific 
rulemaking. This rulemaking makes no changes to this system other than 
those identified in the revisions previously described. Other aspects 
of this system not identified in the revisions are not considered part 
of this rulemaking activity. These other aspects of the system were 
previously evaluated by the NRC as part of the original certification 
of the HI-STORM FW System dated March 28, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML103020151). The NRC's evaluation and approval of the certification of 
the original HI-STORM FW System included an evaluation of the 
susceptibility to, and effects of, stress corrosion cracking and other 
corrosion mechanisms on safety-significant systems for spent nuclear 
fuel (SNF) dry cask storage (DCS) systems during an initial 20-year 
certification period. As indicated in the supporting SER for the 
original certification, the NRC staff determined that the HI-STORM FW 
System, when used within the requirements of the proposed CoC, will 
safely store SNF and prevent radiation releases and exposure in 
compliance with regulatory requirements. None of the revisions being 
made by this rule have any impact on the NRC staff's prior analysis in 
this area.
    Regarding the ASME certification issue, the NRC's regulations in 10 
CFR part 72 do not require DCS system canisters to be ASME-certified. 
However, the ASME Code requirements are often contained within the TSs 
that a general licensee is required to follow. As for the assertions 
that the NRC's ``plans to allow up to a 75 percent crack in these 
canisters,'' and that there is evidence of potential cracking or 
failing of canisters at Diablo Canyon, the NRC has no such plan and is 
unaware of any such evidence. Importantly, general licensees (10 CFR 
part 50 licensees that store spent fuel under a general 10 CFR part 72 
license) are required to have programs in place to monitor and address 
any such issues should they arise. For example, 10 CFR 72.122(h)(4) 
requires storage confinement systems to have the capability for 
continuous monitoring in a manner such that the licensee will be able 
to determine when corrective action needs to be taken to maintain safe 
storage conditions.

Issue 2: Inspection Challenges and Inspection Access

    Several commenters questioned the ability of the HI-STORM FW System 
to be adequately inspected and repaired if necessary during the initial 
certification period of 20 years, especially if the system is used in a 
coastal environment where SCC could be an issue.
    On the issue of available methods for inspecting SCC, one commenter 
asserted that no technology exists to inspect adequately the exterior 
of thin welded canisters for cracks or other corrosion. The commenter 
said that the NRC is allowing vendors 5 years to develop an inspection 
method, but it will be limited, and the NRC plans to require inspection 
of only one canister per plant after 25 years and then the same 
canister at 5 years intervals. The commenter referred to an unnamed 
independent July 2010 report on the challenges and limitations of 
inspecting for SCC in stainless steel components other than loaded 
spent fuel dry storage canisters. The commenter asserted that no 
inspection method currently exists for loaded spent fuel dry storage 
canisters, and that the method recommended in the report as the most 
reliable is not possible with such canisters. Another commenter noted 
that if removal of the canister is the only way to inspect the bottom 
of a canister that has been in contact with the bottom of the concrete 
well, it will be unlikely that each canister will be inspected for 
corrosion between the canister and its concrete well, if current NRC 
inspection schedules for dry storage casks are followed.
    Concerned about the frequency and extent of inspections, a 
commenter noted the limited number of dry storage canisters that have 
been inspected to date, and expressed concern that there will be very 
few canister inspections, and probably only one, performed at each 
installation site, with the first inspection occurring 20 years after 
deployment. The commenter suggested that sites prone to ground water 
intrusion should have annual visual inspections of the bottom of each 
canister.
NRC Response
    These comments are not within the scope of this specific 
rulemaking. This rulemaking is limited to the revisions previously 
described. Furthermore, the NRC has evaluated the design of the HI-
STORM FW System in the initial certification of this system and 
determined that the design is robust, and contains numbers of layers of 
acceptable confinement systems in compliance with 10 CFR part 72 
requirements. In making this finding, the NRC staff evaluated the HI-
STORM FW System to the specific overall requirements of 10 CFR 72.122. 
Additionally, the two canisters used in the HI-STORM FW System are the 
same as those used in the HI-STORM Underground Maximum Capacity (UMAX) 
Canister Storage System previously approved by the NRC (see 80 FR 
12073, dated March 6, 2015). Therefore, a detailed evaluation of this 
MPC system is also documented in the NRC staff's SER for the HI-STORM 
UMAX System (ADAMS Accession No. ML14122A441). In that review, the NRC 
staff noted that the current technology does provide options for 
inspection if necessary.

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Issue 3: Unavailability of Hot Cells or Spent Fuel Pools To Transfer or 
Store Spent Fuel From a Damaged Canister

    One commenter noted that no spent fuel storage cask has ever been 
opened and examined. Another pointed out that no ``hot cells'' (dry 
transfer systems) exist in the United States that are large enough to 
transfer spent fuel between canisters. Another asked how Holtec would 
handle the failure of a hypothetical 50 canisters after a major 
earthquake.
    Yet another commenter expressed concern that the spent fuel pools 
at the decommissioning San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) 
will be demolished once the reactors' spent fuel is in dry casks. 
Demolition of the spent fuel pools, the commenter wrote, would 
essentially negate the chances of repackaging any casks leaking 
radionuclides without another major construction effort to build a new 
storage pool. Another commenter wrote that a spent fuel storage pool is 
required to replace canisters and casks at any reactor site with spent 
fuel in dry storage, and that transporting cracked canisters to another 
facility with a pool presents numerous safety risks.
NRC Response
    These comments are not within the scope of this specific 
rulemaking. This rulemaking is limited to the specific revisions to 
Amendment No. 1 of the HI-STORM FW System. This rulemaking does not 
propose any change in the standards for approval of a CoC, or the 
requirements that govern use of the CoC by a general licensee. In 10 
CFR parts 50 and 72, the NRC places the responsibility for providing 
facilities necessary to perform spent fuel transfers between canisters, 
and store spent fuel removed from a damaged or defective MPC, with the 
10 CFR part 50 licensee, not the canister system manufacturer. 
Moreover, in its March 28, 2011, SER for the CoC for the original HI-
STORM FW System, the NRC staff evaluated and found acceptable a key 
subsystem of the applicant's storage system, the HI-TRAC Variable 
Weight (VW) transfer cask, for its operability with hot cells. In the 
March 28, 2011, SER, the NRC staff stated that ``[t]he HI-TRAC VW 
transfer cask also allows dry loading (or unloading) of SNF into the 
MPC in a hot cell.''
    Finally, the NRC has not approved the demolition of the spent 
storage pools at SONGS. The decommissioning of the SONGS facility will 
be conducted pursuant to the NRC's decommissioning regulations which 
include opportunities for public involvement. (See 10 CFR part 20, 
subpart E; 10 CFR 50.75 and 50.82; 10 CFR 51.53 and 51.95). More 
information about the SONGS decommissioning activities can be found on 
the NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/songs/decommissioning-plans.html.

Issue 4: Seismic Protection

    Several comments raised concerns regarding the ability of this CoC 
system to withstand seismic events, particularly if the system were to 
be used at specific sites with known seismic activity, such as SONGS. 
There is also a question of whether the Holtec casks at issue have been 
fully tested to handle all United States seismic conditions, 
particularly those in California. One commenter contended that the NRC 
lacks information to support a sound determination on whether the casks 
could withstand the vertical and horizontal ground acceleration and 
significant ground displacement from a sizable earthquake on one of 
California's known faults. Another commenter expressed a belief that 
the NRC has not adequately responded to concerns the U.S. Geological 
Survey pointed out in comments on the ``Fukushima Lessons Learned'' 
process.
NRC Response
    These comments are not within the scope of this specific 
rulemaking. This rulemaking is limited to the specific revisions to 
Amendment No. 1 of the HI-STORM FW System. Additionally, as explained 
when the NRC addressed a similar comment about the ability of HI-STORM 
casks to withstand seismic events during the UMAX System certification 
rulemaking, the certification provided by approval of the HI-STORM FW 
System does not, in and of itself, authorize use of this system at any 
specific site. Under 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5), before applying the changes 
authorized by an amended CoC and loading a cask, a general licensee 
wishing to use this cask system must perform written evaluations to 
establish, among other things, that:
     Cask storage pads and areas have been designed to 
adequately support the static and dynamic loads of the stored casks, 
considering potential amplification of earthquakes through soil-
structure interaction, and soil liquefaction potential or other soil 
instability due to vibratory ground motion; and
     The independent spent fuel storage installation at the 
reactor site where the casks will be located will meet the requirements 
of 10 CFR 72.104 to ensure that radiation doses beyond the reactor's 
controlled area do not exceed 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) to the whole body, 
0.75 mSv (75 mrem) to the thyroid and 0.25 mSv (25 mrem) to any other 
critical organ, and are further to controlled to a level as low as is 
reasonably achievable.
    In addition, under 10 CFR 72.212(b)(6), before using the general 
license, the reactor licensee must review the Safety Analysis Report 
(SAR) referenced in the CoC or amended CoC and the NRC's SER evaluating 
the SAR to determine whether the reactor site parameters, including 
analyses of earthquake intensity and tornado missiles, are enveloped by 
the cask design bases considered in these reports.
    The seismic design levels of the HI-STORM FW System as provided in 
Amendment No. 1, Revision 1, of this CoC are acceptable for most areas 
in the continental United States. For locations with potential for 
seismic activity beyond those analyzed for this system, additional NRC 
evaluations and certifications may be required before the system may be 
used in those locations. The NRC is currently evaluating another HI-
STORM UMAX System amendment request that provides additional analysis 
intended to ensure the system's integrity during an earthquake with 
higher seismic demands.

Issue 5: Unacceptable Definition of ``Undamaged''

    One commenter said that corrosion, pitting, and cracks cannot be 
considered undamaged.
NRC Response
    This comment is not within the scope of this specific rulemaking. 
This rulemaking is limited to the specific revisions to Amendment No. 1 
of the HI-STORM FW System. To the extent that the comment is intended 
to raise safety concerns with the change in the definition of damaged 
fuel, the definition would not be affected by this rulemaking and is 
therefore not within its scope. The purpose of the definition of 
damaged fuel is to identify conditions under which additional 
engineering measures are required to confine and secure the spent fuel 
before it can be loaded into a DCS system. The requirement to use these 
measures, which include isolating the affected spent fuel assembly in 
an additional container before loading it into an MPC, apply to all 
fuel assemblies, although the definition of ``damaged'' fuel may be 
revised to address calculated strengths or known weaknesses in a given 
assembly design. The NRC staff evaluated and found acceptable a 
proposed change in the definition of damaged fuel in the SER to CoC No.

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1032, Amendment No. 1, dated December 17, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML14351A475). The NRC staff evaluated the safety of this revision to 
CoC No. 1032, Amendment No. 1, in the SER dated March 13, 2015 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML14276A620). No information is provided that would cause 
the NRC to change its conclusion regarding the safety of this change in 
the definition of damaged fuel as documented in the SER.

Issue 6: How will casks be removed from service?

    One commenter pointed out that for any cask placed into service 
during the final renewal term of a CoC, or during the remaining term of 
a CoC that was not renewed, the general license for that cask must 
terminate after a storage period not to exceed the term specified by 
the cask's CoC, generally 20 years. The commenter further noted that 
when the general license expires, all casks subject to it must be 
removed from service. The commenter asked how a cask can be removed 
from service after its licensed service life of 20 years if the cask 
contains still-hot radioactive waste, given the fact that, according to 
Holtec's chief executive officer, its canisters are not capable of 
being repackaged.
NRC Response
    This comment is not within the scope of this specific rulemaking. 
This rulemaking is limited to the specific revisions to Amendment No. 1 
of the HI-STORM FW System. The regulations governing the length of the 
CoC term, the standards for approval of a CoC, or the requirements that 
govern use of the CoC by a general licensee, are not within the changes 
proposed by this rule.
    As to the specific comments, the NRC cannot verify the basis for 
comments attributed to Holtec's chief executive officer. Importantly, 
however, the NRC's regulations require that the systems be designed to 
allow for retrieval of spent fuel, and that the waste is packaged in a 
manner that allows handling and retrievability without the release of 
radioactive material above regulatory limits. (See 10 CFR 72.122(h)(5) 
and (l)). The HI-STORM FW System is designed to meet this requirement, 
and the NRC staff approved this design in its SER dated March 28, 2011 
(ADAMS Package Accession No. ML103020135).

Issue 7: Inadequate Tsunami Analysis

    One commenter expressed concern about the NRC's process for 
certifying that the Holtec cask system will operate as designed after a 
tsunami. The commenter requested a detailed tsunami recovery procedure 
that should include a means to ensure that muds, salts, and other 
chemicals within the infiltrating tsunami water have not damaged the 
stainless steel canister or reduced the DCS's longevity.
NRC Response
    This comment is not within the scope of this specific rulemaking. 
This rulemaking is limited to the specific revisions to Amendment No. 1 
of the HI-STORM FW System. The NRC staff previously evaluated the 
impacts of flooding during the review of the initial certification for 
the HI-STORM FW System.
    In its March 28, 2011, SER (see Sections 4.8.2 and 7.3.1) for the 
initial certification of the HI-STORM FW System, the NRC staff 
considered both full and partial flooding for both the vertical and 
horizontal positions for the MPC. The NRC staff found that the fully 
flooded condition would produce the highest reactivity in the spent 
fuel, and that the fully flooded model for safety evaluations ``is 
acceptable and applicable to all of the assembly configurations that 
are to be stored in the HISTORM FW MPC Storage system,'' including 
damaged fuel configurations.
    In its March 28, 2011, SER, the NRC staff also noted the system's 
design measures to limit the rise in fuel cladding temperature under 
the most adverse flood event (one with a water level just high enough 
to block the MPC overpack's air convection inlet duct). The changes 
requested in this revision do not affect the NRC's prior flooding 
evaluation for the initial certification of this system.

Issue 8: High Burnup Fuel

    One commenter said that no vendor has addressed how a cask will 
handle high burnup fuel (HBF) cladding that may degrade shortly after 
dry storage. This commenter noted that HBF burns longer in the reactor, 
resulting in spent fuel more than twice as radioactive, hotter, and 
unpredictable in storage and transport. The commenter further asserted 
that HBF requires more years to cool in a reactor's spent fuel storage 
pool before it can be transported. This raises questions about the 
long-term acceptability of extended storage of HBF, according to the 
commenter.
NRC Response
    The comment is not within the scope of this specific rulemaking. 
This rulemaking is limited to the specific revisions in Amendment No. 1 
to the HISTORM FW System. In its March 28, 2011, SER for the original 
certification for the HI-STORM FW System, the NRC previously evaluated 
the acceptability of storing HBF during the system's initial 20-year 
certification term. The revision authorized by this direct final rule 
does not affect that original evaluation. Storage beyond the initial 
term of 20 years will require the applicant to submit a license renewal 
application. The application for that CoC renewal must include, among 
other things, a description of the Aging Management Programs for 
management of issues associated with aging that could adversely affect 
structures, systems, and components important to safety. (See 10 CFR 
72.240(c)(3)).

Issue 9: Need for New Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)

    One commenter asked that the NRC do a full EIS evaluating the 
Holtec cask as one alternative, a German cask as another, and a French 
cask as a third, with possibly an additional alternative.
NRC Response
    This comment does not present information that would result in a 
determination that this revision requires an EIS, rather than an 
Environmental Assessment (EA). According to the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) and the NRC's regulations in 10 CFR part 51, an EIS 
is only required if the action involves a major federal action 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. The NRC`s 
regulations in 10 CFR part 51 identify actions that require an EIS (see 
10 CFR 51.20). Certificate of compliance rulemakings are not one of 
those actions. Instead, for CoC rulemakings, the NRC performs an EA to 
determine whether the action will result in a significant environmental 
impact. If an EA determines that the action will result in a 
significant impact, the agency prepares an EIS. However, if the EA 
concludes with a ``finding of no significant impact'' (FONSI), an EIS 
does not need to be prepared.
    As explained in the March 19, 2015, direct final rule, the EA 
regarding the revision to Amendment No. 1 of HI-STORM FW System, 
concluded with a FONSI and therefore, an EIS is not required for this 
action. This comment presents no new information or analysis that would 
justify reconsidering the agency's FONSI determination.

Issue 10: Metamic Fabrication Testing Requirements

    One commenter objected that Amendment No. 1, Revision 1, of the HI-
STORM FW System CoC would remove fabrication testing requirements for 
the thermal expansion coefficient

[[Page 30928]]

and thermal conductivity of Metamic HT neutron-absorbing structural 
material. The commenter noted that the justification for this change is 
that these properties have little variability when Metamic HT is 
fabricated according to the manufacturer's manual. The commenter asked 
the NRC what it thinks testing is for if not to verify that the product 
has been made according to the specifications in the manufacturer's 
manual.
NRC Response
    This issue was addressed by the NRC staff in its SER, and the 
commenters do not raise any additional information that would alter the 
staff's determination that the HI-STORM FW System, Amendment No. 1, 
Revision 1, casks, when used within the requirements of the proposed 
CoC, will safely store SNF. In its March 19, 2015, SER (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML14276A620), the NRC staff concluded that this was acceptable for 
this specific application. For a detailed discussion regarding the NRC 
staff's evaluation, see Section 4 of the SER.

Issue 11: Exemptions

    One commenter contended that a general licensee seeking to load 
spent nuclear fuel into the Holtec HI-STORM FW System in accordance 
with the changes described in this rulemaking would have to request an 
exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 72.214. Another 
commenter asserted that once Holtec has been given its original CoC, 
there should be no ``exemptions.''
NRC Response
    The revisions to Amendment No. 1 of CoC 1032 for the HI-STORM FW 
System is to provide changes to the cask system so that general 
licensees do not need to request an exemption from any requirements of 
10 CFR 72.212 or 10 CFR 72.214. Like all other proposed CoC amendments 
or revisions, the general licensee under 10 CFR 72.212(b)(5) will have 
to perform written evaluations which establish that the cask will 
conform to the terms, conditions, and specifications of a CoC or an 
amended CoC listed in Sec.  72.214.

Issue 12: Reduced Circulation of Air for Cooling

    Two commenters objected that the proposed change in the HI-STORM FW 
System CoC would restrict the circulation of air for cooling spent fuel 
within the MPC or cask.
NRC Response
    The NRC staff evaluated this issue as part of its SER and concluded 
that there is no significant reduction in the cooling capacity of the 
HI-STORM FW System as a result of the revisions requested by the 
applicant. The NRC staff's SER determined that CoC 1032, Amendment No. 
1, Revision 1, casks, when used within the requirements of the CoC, 
will safely store SNF. The comment presents no information that the NRC 
has not already considered, or that would cause the NRC to change its 
analysis.
    The purpose of the revision is to permit the more compact spent 
fuel assemblies now in some reactors' spent fuel storage pools to be 
loaded into the HI-STORM FW System for dry storage. In its March 19, 
2015, SER (ADAMS Accession No. ML14276A620), the NRC staff found that 
approval of the application would permit a volumetric increase of 0.6 
percent of the fuel and a reduction of 0.13 percent of the original 
flow area of the 14-rod-by-14-rod fuel assembly previously approved for 
use in this cask system. The NRC staff also found, however, that the 
reduced flow area through the 14x14B fuel assembly ``is still larger 
than the 17x17 assembly flow area used as the bounding scenario in the 
thermal analysis. As a result, the flow resistance factor is still less 
restrictive than the one used in the bounding scenario, and the passive 
decay heat removal of the proposed 14x14B assembly is still 
conservative.'' The NRC staff also found that the spent fuel cladding 
``continues to be protected against degradation leading to gross 
ruptures under long-term storage by maintaining cladding temperatures 
below 752 [deg]F (400 [deg]C),'' and ``continues to be protected 
against degradation leading to gross ruptures under off-normal and 
accident conditions by maintaining cladding temperatures below 1058 
[deg]F (570 [deg]C). Protection of the cladding against degradation is 
expected to allow ready retrieval of spent fuel for further processing 
or disposal.''
    Therefore, the NRC staff has concluded that the comments received 
on the companion proposed rule for the HI-STORM FW System, Amendment 
No. 1, Revision 1, are not significant adverse comments as defined in 
NUREG-BR-0053, Revision 6, ``United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Regulations Handbook'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML052720461). 
Therefore, this rule will become effective as scheduled.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of May, 2015.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Leslie Terry,
Acting Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch, Division of 
Administrative Services, Office of Administration.
[FR Doc. 2015-13081 Filed 5-29-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P