Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes, 27077-27081 [2015-10181]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2015–09–05 The Boeing Company:
Amendment 39–18151; Docket No.
FAA–2014–0429; Directorate Identifier
2014–NM–039–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD is effective June 16, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company
Model 747–400 and 747–400F airplanes,
certificated in any category, as identified in
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–25A3640,
dated January 8, 2014.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 25, Equipment/Furnishings.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of
cracking in the main equipment center (MEC)
drip shield and exhaust plenum. We are
issuing this AD to prevent water penetration
into the MEC, which could result in an
electrical short and potential loss of several
functions essential for safe flight.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
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(g) Installation
Within 24 months after the effective date
of this AD, install a fiberglass reinforcing
overcoat on the MEC drip shield, in
accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
747–25A3640, dated January 8, 2014.
(h) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19,
send your request to your principal inspector
or local Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the manager of the ACO, send it to the
attention of the person identified in
paragraph (i) of this AD. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOCRequests@faa.gov.
(2) Before using any approved AMOC,
notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager
of the local flight standards district office/
certificate holding district office.
(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable
level of safety may be used for any repair
required by this AD if it is approved by the
Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization
Designation Authorization (ODA) that has
been authorized by the Manager, Seattle
ACO, to make those findings. For a repair
method to be approved, the repair must meet
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the certification basis of the airplane, and the
approval must specifically refer to this AD.
(4) If any service information contains
steps that are identified as RC (Required for
Compliance), those steps must be done to
comply with this AD; any steps that are not
labeled as RC are recommended. Those steps
that are not labeled as RC may be deviated
from using accepted methods in accordance
with the operator’s maintenance or
inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the steps
labeled as RC can be done and the airplane
can be put back in a serviceable condition.
Any substitutions or changes to steps labeled
as RC require approval of an AMOC.
(i) Related Information
For more information about this AD,
contact Francis Smith, Aerospace Engineer,
Cabin Safety and Environmental Systems
Branch, ANM–150S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue SW.,
Renton, WA 98057–3356; telephone: 425–
917–6596; fax: 425–917–6590; email:
Francis.Smith@faa.gov.
(j) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747–
25A3640, dated January 8, 2014.
(ii) Reserved.
(3) For Boeing service information
identified in this AD, contact Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data &
Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC
2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone
206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206–766–
5680; Internet https://
www.myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane
Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
WA. For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.
(5) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call
202–741–6030, or go to: https://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 17,
2015.
Victor Wicklund,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–10069 Filed 5–11–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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27077
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2012–0636; Directorate
Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD; Amendment
39–18154; AD 2015–09–08]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Airbus Model A300 B4–601, B4–603,
and B4–605R airplanes; Model A300
F4–605R airplanes; Model A300 C4–
605R Variant F airplanes; and Model
A310–204 and –304 airplanes; powered
by General Electric (GE) Model CF6–
80C2 series engines. This AD was
prompted by reports of two singleengine flameout events during
inclement weather. This AD requires
installing a shunt of the rotary selector
(introducing an auto-relight function);
and, for certain airplanes, a wiring
modification to a certain circuit breaker
panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent
a long engine restart sequence after a
non-selection of continuous relight by
the crew and a flameout event of both
engines, which could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane, especially
at low altitude.
DATES: This AD becomes effective June
16, 2015.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain publications listed in this AD
as of June 16, 2015.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636; or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC.
For service information identified in
this AD, contact Airbus SAS,
Airworthiness Office—EAW, 1 Rond
Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac
Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36
96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email
account.airworth-eas@airbus.com;
Internet https://www.airbus.com. You
may view this referenced service
information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
SW., Renton, WA. For information on
the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 425–227–1221. It is also
available on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2012–
0636.
Dan
Rodina, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA
98057–3356; telephone 425–227–2125;
fax 425–227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Discussion
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We issued a supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to
amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD
that would apply to certain Airbus
Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–
605R airplanes; Model A300 F4–605R
airplanes; Model A300 C4–605R Variant
F airplanes; and Model A310–204 and
–304 airplanes; powered by GE Model
CF6–80C2 series engines. The SNPRM
published in the Federal Register on
March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12424). We
preceded the SNPRM with a notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that
published in the Federal Register on
June 18, 2012 (77 FR 36211).
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Union, has issued EASA Airworthiness
Directive 2014–0156, dated July 3, 2014
(referred to after this as the Mandatory
Continuing Airworthiness Information,
or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe
condition on Airbus Model A300 B4–
601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes;
Model A300 F4–605R airplanes; Model
A300 C4–605R Variant F airplanes; and
Model A310–204 and –304 airplanes;
powered by GE Model CF6–80C2 series
engines. The MCAI states:
Two single flame-out events, attributed to
inclement weather, occurred on Airbus Wide
Body (WB) aeroplanes powered with GE
CF6–80C2 engines.
In the original design of Airbus WB
aeroplanes, no auto-relight function is
embodied. This means that, in case where the
flight crew does not select continuous relight
and a flame-out event occurs, a long engine
restart sequence is necessary.
This condition, if not corrected (if both
engines have flamed out simultaneously),
could possibly result in significantly reduced
control of the aeroplane, especially at low
altitude.
To address this potentially unsafe
condition, Airbus designed a modification by
introducing auto-relight function for
aeroplanes powered by GE CF6–80C2 engines
and EASA issued AD 2011–0113 to require
installation of that auto-relight function to
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increase restart capability without flight crew
action.
Since that [EASA] AD was issued,
erroneous instructions have been identified
in various revisions of related Airbus Service
Bulletins (SB) A310–74–2003, SB A300–74–
6003 and SB A300–74–9001, which meant
that some of the instructions could not be
accomplished and resulted in additional
work for aeroplanes already modified.
For the reason described above, this
[EASA] AD retains the requirements of EASA
AD 2011–0113, which is superseded, allows
additional compliance time and requires the
modification of the aeroplanes in accordance
with the instructions of the latest applicable
Airbus SB revision.
For aeroplanes that have already been
partially modified by an earlier (incorrect)
issue of an SB, as applicable, this [EASA] AD
requires additional work.
You may examine the MCAI in the
AD docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;
D=FAA-2012-0636-0002.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. We
have considered the comments received.
The following presents the comments
received on the SNPRM (79 FR 12424,
March 5, 2014) and the FAA’s response
to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the SNPRM (79
FR 12424, March 5, 2014) Based on the
Rarity of Flameout Events
FedEx stated that data presented by
GE showed that since January 2008, a
total of seven engine flameouts
attributed to inclement weather have
been reported across the entire global
population of all GE Model CF6–80C2
and CF6–80El series engines. FedEx
pointed out that this corresponds to
around 30 million flight hours and over
7 million flight departures. FedEx stated
that the last event affecting an Airbus
airplane was reported in 2006 and
involved a power management
controlled (PMC) engine. FedEx asserted
that there has never been an inclementweather-related engine flameout on a
full authority digital engine control
(FADEC) CF6–80C2-powered Airbus
airplane reported to GE. FedEx stated
that, in the text of the SNPRM (79 FR
12424, March 5, 2014), the FAA cites
the occurrence of two single-engine
flameout events. FedEx stated that,
while it cannot be certain which events
the FAA is referring to, it can
confidently assert that those events did
not occur on a FedEx-operated airplane.
FedEx remarked that, if an event has
occurred within the last eight years and
involved a FADEC-controlled engine,
GE is unaware of it. FedEx asked that
the FAA consider, based on this
experience, the extreme unlikelihood of
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such a rare event occurring on a GEpowered Airbus airplane
simultaneously with the non-selection
of continuous relight by well-trained
crew members.
From these statements, we infer that
FedEx is requesting that we withdraw
the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5,
2014) based on the rarity of engine
flameout events. We disagree with this
request. EASA’s determination for
corrective action in the MCAI is based
on a risk assessment of the worldwide
fleet, and not limited to the experience
of the commenter’s operations. While
these events might not have happened
on the commenter’s airplanes,
inclement weather is likely to occur
during any flight, and at any altitude.
Both the PMC-controlled and FADECcontrolled engines remain susceptible to
flameout during inclement weather
without corrective actions to address the
unsafe condition. While we frequently
utilize flightcrew procedures as interim
actions to address an unsafe condition,
when available we consider a design
solution to mitigate the unsafe condition
to be more effective than relying on
flightcrew procedures alone. We have
determined that it is necessary to
proceed with issuing this AD to
adequately address the identified unsafe
condition. Affected operators, however,
may request approval of an alternative
method of compliance (AMOC), as
specified in paragraph (j)(1) of this AD
(designated as paragraph (i)(1) of the
SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014),
by submitting data substantiating that
the AMOC would provide an acceptable
level of safety. We have not changed
this AD in this regard.
Request To Withdraw the SNPRM (79
FR 12424, March 5, 2014) Based on
Unreasonable Risk Factor
FedEx stated that one of the primary
justifications the FAA is using to
establish the need for the SNPRM (79
FR 12424, March 5, 2014) is the concern
that a long engine restart sequence
could result in reduced controllability
of the airplane ‘‘especially at low
altitude.’’ FedEx agreed that an inability
to achieve timely relight at low altitude
would present a greater risk of an unsafe
condition occurring and would perhaps
provide ample justification for the
subject modification. However, FedEx
asserted that all data provided by GE
indicate that this phenomenon does not
occur at low altitudes. FedEx also stated
that analysis of the primary root cause
for the engine flameouts suggests that
the flight envelope of concern is
between approximately 10,000 feet
above sea level (ASL) and 35,000 feet
ASL during idle descent. FedEx
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
remarked that the average altitude at
which these events have historically
occurred is 22,000 feet ASL, with the
lowest recorded altitude for a multiengine event being 17,500 feet ASL.
FedEx stated that in every recorded
event, the flameout engines were
restarted and continued to operate
normally. FedEx concluded that, based
on all the empirical data collected to
date regarding the altitude at which
these events occur, the momentary
delay in restart time that is intended to
be corrected by the modification does
not seem to be significant enough to
qualify as a reasonable risk factor.
From these statements, we infer that
FedEx is requesting that we withdraw
the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5,
2014) based on data showing that the
events do not indicate a reasonable risk
factor. We disagree with the request.
Any delay in the ability to restart
engines could result in an unsafe
condition regardless of the altitude
where the flameout occurs. Inclement
weather may exist below 10,000 feet
ASL and the possibility of terrain could
also reduce altitude available to allow
an engine restart. As we stated
previously, we consider a design
solution to be a more effective
mitigating action to address an unsafe
condition rather than relying on
flightcrew procedures alone and the
past experience of flightcrews having
difficulty restarting engines following
flameout. We have not changed this AD
in this regard.
Request To Reduce the Proposed
Applicability
FedEx requested that the FAA
consider reducing the applicability
stated in the SNPRM (79 FR 12424,
March 5, 2014) to include only the
(relatively) higher-risk PMC-powered
airplanes. FedEx stated that a factor
specific to its operation addresses a
point raised by the FAA, which is the
small size of its non-FADEC fleet of
Airbus airplanes. FedEx highlighted that
data suggest that, since the
implementation of the FADEC software,
improvements of the rate of flameout
events on all FADEC-controlled engines
has dropped significantly and is well
below corresponding rates on PMCcontrolled Model CF6–80C2 series
engines. FedEx stated that there are no
recorded instances of a dual-engine
flameout in inclement weather on any
FADEC-controlled Model CF6–80C2
series engine installed on Airbus
airplanes. FedEx also stated that it
operates a much larger GE-powered
Airbus fleet with FADEC-controlled
engines than with PMC-controlled
engines. FedEx agreed with the FAA
statement that ‘‘not all affected airplanes
have FADEC-controlled engines
installed,’’ and that FedEx’s exposure in
this area is very limited.
We disagree with the commenter’s
request to reduce the applicability of
this AD. The identified unsafe condition
addressed in this AD applies to both
types of GE Model CF6–80C2 series
engines. The comparatively better inflight shutdown rate of FADECcontrolled engines to PMC-controlled
engines is inconsequential to the
vulnerability in both engine designs due
to flameout from icing conditions. Icing
conditions are anticipated to occur, and
no mitigating actions have been offered
to address icing vulnerability in both
engine designs. As we stated previously,
a design solution is more effective than
reliance on flightcrew procedures alone.
We have not changed this AD in this
regard.
Actions Since SNPRM (79 FR 12424,
March 5, 2014) was Issued
Since the SNPRM (79 FR 12424,
March 5, 2014) was issued, EASA has
issued AD 2014–0156, dated July 3,
2014, which supersedes EASA AD
2011–0113, dated June 17, 2011. EASA
AD 2014–0156 adds revised service
information (Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014, and Airbus Service
Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06,
dated January 27, 2014). The revised
service information includes actions for
previously modified airplanes. We have
changed paragraph (g) of this AD to
reference the revised service
information. We also added a new
paragraph (h) to this AD to specify
actions for previously modified
airplanes. We have re-designated
subsequent paragraphs accordingly.
The revised service information also
reduces a certain compliance time to 12
months. However, for that action, this
27079
AD retains the compliance time
proposed in the SNPRM: Within 2,200
flight hours or 30 months after the
effective date of this AD, whichever
occurs later. We have determined that
this compliance time adequately
addresses the identified unsafe
condition. We have determined that the
compliance time, as proposed,
represents the maximum interval of
time allowable for the affected airplanes
to continue to safely operate before the
modification is done.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data,
considered the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting this AD
with the changes described previously
and minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
• Are consistent with the intent that
was proposed in the SNPRM (79 FR
12424, March 5, 2014) for correcting the
unsafe condition; and
• Do not add any additional burden
upon the public than was already
proposed in the SNPRM (79 FR 12424,
March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these
changes will not increase the economic
burden on any operator or increase the
scope of this AD.
Related Service Information Under 1
CFR Part 51
Airbus has issued Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014, and Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014. The service
information describes installing a shunt
of the rotary selector; and, for certain
airplanes, a wiring modification to a
certain circuit breaker panel. This
service information is reasonably
available at https://www.regulations.gov
by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA–2015–0636. Or see ADDRESSES for
other ways to access this service
information.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 47
airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to
comply with this AD:
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ESTIMATED COSTS
Action
Labor cost
Parts cost
Cost per
product
Cost on U.S.
operators
Modification ...............................................................
Up to 98 work-hours ×
$85 per hour = $8,330.
Up to $18,417 .................
$26,747
$1,257,109
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701:
General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not
have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in
Alaska; and
4. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov/
#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636; or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this
AD, the regulatory evaluation, any
comments received, and other
information. The street address for the
Docket Operations office (telephone
800–647–5527) is in the ADDRESSES
section.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
■
2015–09–08 Airbus: Amendment 39–18154.
Docket No. FAA–2012–0636; Directorate
Identifier 2012–NM–037–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD becomes effective June 16, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 B4–
601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; Model
A300 F4–605R airplanes; Model A300 C4–
605R Variant F airplanes; and Model A310–
204 and –304 airplanes; certificated in any
category; all serial numbers, powered by
General Electric (GE) Model CF6–80C2 series
engines.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of
America Code 74, Ignition.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by reports of two
single-engine flameout events during
inclement weather. We are issuing this AD to
prevent a long engine restart sequence after
a non-selection of continuous relight by the
crew and a flameout event of both engines,
which could result in reduced controllability
of the airplane, especially at low altitude.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the
compliance times specified, unless already
done.
(g) Modification
Within 6,000 flight hours or 30 months
after the effective date of this AD, whichever
occurs later: Modify the airplane by installing
a shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an
auto-relight function), in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Airbus
Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06,
dated January 27, 2014 (for Model A300 B4–
601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes; Model
A300 F4–605R airplanes; and Model A300
C4–605R Variant F airplanes); or Airbus
Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06,
dated January 27, 2014 (for Model A310–204
and –304 airplanes).
(h) Actions for Previously Modified
Airplanes
For airplanes which have already been
modified in accordance with the
requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD
before the effective date of this AD: Within
2,200 flight hours or 30 months after the
effective date of this AD, whichever occurs
later, accomplish the work tasks, in
accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of the service information
specified in Table 1 to this paragraph of this
AD.
TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (h) OF THIS AD—WORK TASKS
Previously modified using—
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For Model—
A300 B4–601, B4–603, and
A300 F4–605R airplanes,
Variant F airplanes.
A300 B4–601, B4–603, and
A300 F4–605R airplanes,
Variant F airplanes.
A300 B4–601, B4–603, and
A300 F4–605R airplanes,
Variant F airplanes.
B4–605R airplanes, Model
and Model A300 C4–605R
B4–605R airplanes, Model
and Model A300 C4–605R
B4–605R airplanes, Model
and Model A300 C4–605R
A300 B4–601, B4–603, and B4–605R airplanes, Model
A300 F4–605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R
Variant F airplanes.
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Accomplish the identified work tasks in accordance with
the instructions of—
Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, dated
July 2, 2010.
Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, Revision
01, dated April 1, 2011.
Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, Revision
02, dated February 9,
2012.
Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, Revision
03, dated May 10, 2012.
Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus
Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus
Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus
Service Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
Frm 00012
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Work Task 831–803001 using Airbus Service Bulletin
A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated January 27,
2014.
E:\FR\FM\12MYR1.SGM
12MYR1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 91 / Tuesday, May 12, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
27081
TABLE 1 TO PARAGRAPH (h) OF THIS AD—WORK TASKS—Continued
For Model—
Previously modified using—
Accomplish the identified work tasks in accordance with
the instructions of—
A310–204 and –304 airplanes .........................................
Airbus Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, dated
July 2, 2010.
Airbus Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, Revision
01, dated April 1, 2011.
Airbus Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, Revision
02, dated February 9,
2012.
Airbus Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, Revision
03, dated May 10, 2012.
Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus
Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus
Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
Work Tasks 831–802001 and 831–803001 using Airbus
Service Bulletin A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
A310–204 and –304 airplanes .........................................
A310–204 and –304 airplanes .........................................
A310–204 and –304 airplanes .........................................
mstockstill on DSK4VPTVN1PROD with RULES
(i) Credit for Previous Actions
(1) This paragraph provides credit for the
actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD,
if those actions were performed before the
effective date of this AD using the applicable
service information specified in paragraphs
(i)(1)(i) and (i)(2)(ii) of this AD, and provided
that the additional work in Airbus Service
Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014; or Airbus Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, Revision 06, dated January
27, 2014; is done, as required by paragraph
(g) of this AD.
(i) For Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and
B4–605R airplanes, Model A300 F4–605R
airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R Variant
F airplanes: Airbus Mandatory Service
Bulletin A300–74–6003, Revision 04, dated
January 9, 2013, which is not incorporated by
reference in this AD.
(ii) For Model A310–204 and –304
airplanes: Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin
A310–74–2003, Revision 04, dated January 9,
2013, which is not incorporated by reference
in this AD.
(2) This paragraph provides credit for the
actions required by paragraph (g) of this AD,
if those actions were performed before the
effective date of this AD using the applicable
service information specified in paragraphs
(i)(2)(i) and (i)(2)(ii) of this AD.
(i) For Model A300 B4–601, B4–603, and
B4–605R airplanes, Model A300 F4–605R
airplanes, and Model A300 C4–605R Variant
F airplanes: Airbus Service Bulletin A300–
74–6003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013,
which is not incorporated by reference in this
AD.
(ii) For Model A310–204 and –304
airplanes: Airbus Service Bulletin A310–74–
2003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013,
which is not incorporated by reference in this
AD.
(j) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this
AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, International
Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane
Directorate, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your
request to your principal inspector or local
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:43 May 11, 2015
Jkt 235001
Work Task 831–803001 using Airbus Service Bulletin
A310–74 2003, Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014.
Flight Standards District Office, as
appropriate. If sending information directly
to the International Branch, send it to ATTN:
Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116, Transport
Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind
Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057–3356;
telephone 425–227–2125; fax 425–227–1149.
Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-116AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using
any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate
principal inspector, or lacking a principal
inspector, the manager of the local flight
standards district office/certificate holding
district office. The AMOC approval letter
must specifically reference this AD.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any
requirement in this AD to obtain corrective
actions from a manufacturer, the action must
be accomplished using a method approved
by the Manager, International Branch, ANM–
116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA; or
the European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA); or Airbus’s EASA Design
Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by
the DOA, the approval must include the
DOA-authorized signature.
(k) Related Information
(1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing
Airworthiness Information (MCAI) EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2014–0156, dated
July 3, 2014, for related information. This
MCAI may be found in the AD docket on the
Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636-0002.
(2) Service information identified in this
AD that is not incorporated by reference may
be viewed at the addresses specified in
paragraphs (l)(3) and (l)(4) of this AD.
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Airbus Service Bulletin A300–74–6003,
Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014.
(ii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310–74–2003,
Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014.
(3) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Office—EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice
Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France;
telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61
93 44 51; email account.airworth-eas@
airbus.com; Internet https://www.airbus.com.
(4) You may view this service information
at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221.
(5) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call
202–741–6030, or go to: https://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 10,
2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–10181 Filed 5–11–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2012–1107; Directorate
Identifier 2011–NM–216–AD; Amendment
39–18143; AD 2015–08–07]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Zodiac
Aerotechnics (Formerly Intertechnique
Aircraft Systems) Oxygen Mask
Regulators
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Zodiac Aerotechnics (formerly
Intertechnique Aircraft Systems) oxygen
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\12MYR1.SGM
12MYR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 91 (Tuesday, May 12, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 27077-27081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10181]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2012-0636; Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-037-AD;
Amendment 39-18154; AD 2015-09-08]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Airbus Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R airplanes; Model A300 F4-
605R airplanes; Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes; and Model A310-
204 and -304 airplanes; powered by General Electric (GE) Model CF6-80C2
series engines. This AD was prompted by reports of two single-engine
flameout events during inclement weather. This AD requires installing a
shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an auto-relight function);
and, for certain airplanes, a wiring modification to a certain circuit
breaker panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent a long engine restart
sequence after a non-selection of continuous relight by the crew and a
flameout event of both engines, which could result in reduced
controllability of the airplane, especially at low altitude.
DATES: This AD becomes effective June 16, 2015.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of June 16,
2015.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636; or in person at the
Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New
Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Airbus SAS,
Airworthiness Office--EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac
Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51;
email account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; Internet https://www.airbus.com.
You may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue
[[Page 27078]]
SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this material
at the FAA, call 425-227-1221. It is also available on the Internet at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No.
FAA-2012-0636.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Rodina, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-3356; telephone 425-227-2125;
fax 425-227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) to
amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus
Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R airplanes; Model A300 F4-605R
airplanes; Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes; and Model A310-204
and -304 airplanes; powered by GE Model CF6-80C2 series engines. The
SNPRM published in the Federal Register on March 5, 2014 (79 FR 12424).
We preceded the SNPRM with a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that
published in the Federal Register on June 18, 2012 (77 FR 36211).
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical
Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2014-0156, dated July 3, 2014 (referred to
after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or
``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe condition on Airbus Model A300 B4-
601, B4-603, and B4-605R airplanes; Model A300 F4-605R airplanes; Model
A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes; and Model A310-204 and -304
airplanes; powered by GE Model CF6-80C2 series engines. The MCAI
states:
Two single flame-out events, attributed to inclement weather,
occurred on Airbus Wide Body (WB) aeroplanes powered with GE CF6-
80C2 engines.
In the original design of Airbus WB aeroplanes, no auto-relight
function is embodied. This means that, in case where the flight crew
does not select continuous relight and a flame-out event occurs, a
long engine restart sequence is necessary.
This condition, if not corrected (if both engines have flamed
out simultaneously), could possibly result in significantly reduced
control of the aeroplane, especially at low altitude.
To address this potentially unsafe condition, Airbus designed a
modification by introducing auto-relight function for aeroplanes
powered by GE CF6-80C2 engines and EASA issued AD 2011-0113 to
require installation of that auto-relight function to increase
restart capability without flight crew action.
Since that [EASA] AD was issued, erroneous instructions have
been identified in various revisions of related Airbus Service
Bulletins (SB) A310-74-2003, SB A300-74-6003 and SB A300-74-9001,
which meant that some of the instructions could not be accomplished
and resulted in additional work for aeroplanes already modified.
For the reason described above, this [EASA] AD retains the
requirements of EASA AD 2011-0113, which is superseded, allows
additional compliance time and requires the modification of the
aeroplanes in accordance with the instructions of the latest
applicable Airbus SB revision.
For aeroplanes that have already been partially modified by an
earlier (incorrect) issue of an SB, as applicable, this [EASA] AD
requires additional work.
You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636-0002.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. We have considered the comments received. The following
presents the comments received on the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5,
2014) and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Withdraw the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) Based on the
Rarity of Flameout Events
FedEx stated that data presented by GE showed that since January
2008, a total of seven engine flameouts attributed to inclement weather
have been reported across the entire global population of all GE Model
CF6-80C2 and CF6-80El series engines. FedEx pointed out that this
corresponds to around 30 million flight hours and over 7 million flight
departures. FedEx stated that the last event affecting an Airbus
airplane was reported in 2006 and involved a power management
controlled (PMC) engine. FedEx asserted that there has never been an
inclement-weather-related engine flameout on a full authority digital
engine control (FADEC) CF6-80C2-powered Airbus airplane reported to GE.
FedEx stated that, in the text of the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5,
2014), the FAA cites the occurrence of two single-engine flameout
events. FedEx stated that, while it cannot be certain which events the
FAA is referring to, it can confidently assert that those events did
not occur on a FedEx-operated airplane. FedEx remarked that, if an
event has occurred within the last eight years and involved a FADEC-
controlled engine, GE is unaware of it. FedEx asked that the FAA
consider, based on this experience, the extreme unlikelihood of such a
rare event occurring on a GE-powered Airbus airplane simultaneously
with the non-selection of continuous relight by well-trained crew
members.
From these statements, we infer that FedEx is requesting that we
withdraw the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) based on the rarity of
engine flameout events. We disagree with this request. EASA's
determination for corrective action in the MCAI is based on a risk
assessment of the worldwide fleet, and not limited to the experience of
the commenter's operations. While these events might not have happened
on the commenter's airplanes, inclement weather is likely to occur
during any flight, and at any altitude. Both the PMC-controlled and
FADEC-controlled engines remain susceptible to flameout during
inclement weather without corrective actions to address the unsafe
condition. While we frequently utilize flightcrew procedures as interim
actions to address an unsafe condition, when available we consider a
design solution to mitigate the unsafe condition to be more effective
than relying on flightcrew procedures alone. We have determined that it
is necessary to proceed with issuing this AD to adequately address the
identified unsafe condition. Affected operators, however, may request
approval of an alternative method of compliance (AMOC), as specified in
paragraph (j)(1) of this AD (designated as paragraph (i)(1) of the
SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014), by submitting data substantiating
that the AMOC would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Withdraw the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) Based on
Unreasonable Risk Factor
FedEx stated that one of the primary justifications the FAA is
using to establish the need for the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014)
is the concern that a long engine restart sequence could result in
reduced controllability of the airplane ``especially at low altitude.''
FedEx agreed that an inability to achieve timely relight at low
altitude would present a greater risk of an unsafe condition occurring
and would perhaps provide ample justification for the subject
modification. However, FedEx asserted that all data provided by GE
indicate that this phenomenon does not occur at low altitudes. FedEx
also stated that analysis of the primary root cause for the engine
flameouts suggests that the flight envelope of concern is between
approximately 10,000 feet above sea level (ASL) and 35,000 feet ASL
during idle descent. FedEx
[[Page 27079]]
remarked that the average altitude at which these events have
historically occurred is 22,000 feet ASL, with the lowest recorded
altitude for a multi-engine event being 17,500 feet ASL. FedEx stated
that in every recorded event, the flameout engines were restarted and
continued to operate normally. FedEx concluded that, based on all the
empirical data collected to date regarding the altitude at which these
events occur, the momentary delay in restart time that is intended to
be corrected by the modification does not seem to be significant enough
to qualify as a reasonable risk factor.
From these statements, we infer that FedEx is requesting that we
withdraw the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) based on data showing
that the events do not indicate a reasonable risk factor. We disagree
with the request. Any delay in the ability to restart engines could
result in an unsafe condition regardless of the altitude where the
flameout occurs. Inclement weather may exist below 10,000 feet ASL and
the possibility of terrain could also reduce altitude available to
allow an engine restart. As we stated previously, we consider a design
solution to be a more effective mitigating action to address an unsafe
condition rather than relying on flightcrew procedures alone and the
past experience of flightcrews having difficulty restarting engines
following flameout. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Reduce the Proposed Applicability
FedEx requested that the FAA consider reducing the applicability
stated in the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) to include only the
(relatively) higher-risk PMC-powered airplanes. FedEx stated that a
factor specific to its operation addresses a point raised by the FAA,
which is the small size of its non-FADEC fleet of Airbus airplanes.
FedEx highlighted that data suggest that, since the implementation of
the FADEC software, improvements of the rate of flameout events on all
FADEC-controlled engines has dropped significantly and is well below
corresponding rates on PMC-controlled Model CF6-80C2 series engines.
FedEx stated that there are no recorded instances of a dual-engine
flameout in inclement weather on any FADEC-controlled Model CF6-80C2
series engine installed on Airbus airplanes. FedEx also stated that it
operates a much larger GE-powered Airbus fleet with FADEC-controlled
engines than with PMC-controlled engines. FedEx agreed with the FAA
statement that ``not all affected airplanes have FADEC-controlled
engines installed,'' and that FedEx's exposure in this area is very
limited.
We disagree with the commenter's request to reduce the
applicability of this AD. The identified unsafe condition addressed in
this AD applies to both types of GE Model CF6-80C2 series engines. The
comparatively better in-flight shutdown rate of FADEC-controlled
engines to PMC-controlled engines is inconsequential to the
vulnerability in both engine designs due to flameout from icing
conditions. Icing conditions are anticipated to occur, and no
mitigating actions have been offered to address icing vulnerability in
both engine designs. As we stated previously, a design solution is more
effective than reliance on flightcrew procedures alone. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Actions Since SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) was Issued
Since the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) was issued, EASA has
issued AD 2014-0156, dated July 3, 2014, which supersedes EASA AD 2011-
0113, dated June 17, 2011. EASA AD 2014-0156 adds revised service
information (Airbus Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014, and Airbus Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision
06, dated January 27, 2014). The revised service information includes
actions for previously modified airplanes. We have changed paragraph
(g) of this AD to reference the revised service information. We also
added a new paragraph (h) to this AD to specify actions for previously
modified airplanes. We have re-designated subsequent paragraphs
accordingly.
The revised service information also reduces a certain compliance
time to 12 months. However, for that action, this AD retains the
compliance time proposed in the SNPRM: Within 2,200 flight hours or 30
months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later. We
have determined that this compliance time adequately addresses the
identified unsafe condition. We have determined that the compliance
time, as proposed, represents the maximum interval of time allowable
for the affected airplanes to continue to safely operate before the
modification is done.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014) for correcting the unsafe condition;
and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the SNPRM (79 FR 12424, March 5, 2014).
We also determined that these changes will not increase the
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.
Related Service Information Under 1 CFR Part 51
Airbus has issued Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014, and Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014. The service information describes installing a shunt
of the rotary selector; and, for certain airplanes, a wiring
modification to a certain circuit breaker panel. This service
information is reasonably available at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2015-0636. Or see ADDRESSES
for other ways to access this service information.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD affects 47 airplanes of U.S. registry.
We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modification..................... Up to 98 work-hours Up to $18,417...... $26,747 $1,257,109
x $85 per hour =
$8,330.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 27080]]
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);
3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska; and
4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FAA-2012-0636; or in person at the
Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments received, and other information.
The street address for the Docket Operations office (telephone 800-647-
5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive (AD):
2015-09-08 Airbus: Amendment 39-18154. Docket No. FAA-2012-0636;
Directorate Identifier 2012-NM-037-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This AD becomes effective June 16, 2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Airbus Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R
airplanes; Model A300 F4-605R airplanes; Model A300 C4-605R Variant
F airplanes; and Model A310-204 and -304 airplanes; certificated in
any category; all serial numbers, powered by General Electric (GE)
Model CF6-80C2 series engines.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 74, Ignition.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by reports of two single-engine flameout
events during inclement weather. We are issuing this AD to prevent a
long engine restart sequence after a non-selection of continuous
relight by the crew and a flameout event of both engines, which
could result in reduced controllability of the airplane, especially
at low altitude.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Modification
Within 6,000 flight hours or 30 months after the effective date
of this AD, whichever occurs later: Modify the airplane by
installing a shunt of the rotary selector (introducing an auto-
relight function), in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Airbus Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 06,
dated January 27, 2014 (for Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R
airplanes; Model A300 F4-605R airplanes; and Model A300 C4-605R
Variant F airplanes); or Airbus Service Bulletin A310-74-2003,
Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014 (for Model A310-204 and -304
airplanes).
(h) Actions for Previously Modified Airplanes
For airplanes which have already been modified in accordance
with the requirements of paragraph (g) of this AD before the
effective date of this AD: Within 2,200 flight hours or 30 months
after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later,
accomplish the work tasks, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of the service information specified in Table 1 to this
paragraph of this AD.
Table 1 to Paragraph (h) of This AD--Work Tasks
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accomplish the
Previously identified work tasks
For Model-- modified using-- in accordance with
the instructions of--
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4- Airbus Service Work Tasks 831-802001
605R airplanes, Model A300 F4- Bulletin A300-74- and 831-803001 using
605R airplanes, and Model 6003, dated July Airbus Service
A300 C4-605R Variant F 2, 2010. Bulletin A300-74-
airplanes. 6003, Revision 06,
dated January 27,
2014.
A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4- Airbus Service Work Tasks 831-802001
605R airplanes, Model A300 F4- Bulletin A300-74- and 831-803001 using
605R airplanes, and Model 6003, Revision Airbus Service
A300 C4-605R Variant F 01, dated April Bulletin A300-74-
airplanes. 1, 2011. 6003, Revision 06,
dated January 27,
2014.
A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4- Airbus Service Work Tasks 831-802001
605R airplanes, Model A300 F4- Bulletin A300-74- and 831-803001 using
605R airplanes, and Model 6003, Revision Airbus Service
A300 C4-605R Variant F 02, dated Bulletin A300-74-
airplanes. February 9, 2012. 6003, Revision 06,
dated January 27,
2014.
A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4- Airbus Service Work Task 831-803001
605R airplanes, Model A300 F4- Bulletin A300-74- using Airbus Service
605R airplanes, and Model 6003, Revision Bulletin A300-74-
A300 C4-605R Variant F 03, dated May 6003, Revision 06,
airplanes. 10, 2012. dated January 27,
2014.
[[Page 27081]]
A310-204 and -304 airplanes... Airbus Service Work Tasks 831-802001
Bulletin A310-74- and 831-803001 using
2003, dated July Airbus Service
2, 2010. Bulletin A310-74-
2003, Revision 06,
dated January 27,
2014.
A310-204 and -304 airplanes... Airbus Service Work Tasks 831-802001
Bulletin A310-74- and 831-803001 using
2003, Revision Airbus Service
01, dated April Bulletin A310-74-
1, 2011. 2003, Revision 06,
dated January 27,
2014.
A310-204 and -304 airplanes... Airbus Service Work Tasks 831-802001
Bulletin A310-74- and 831-803001 using
2003, Revision Airbus Service
02, dated Bulletin A310-74-
February 9, 2012. 2003, Revision 06,
dated January 27,
2014.
A310-204 and -304 airplanes... Airbus Service Work Task 831-803001
Bulletin A310-74- using Airbus Service
2003, Revision Bulletin A310-74
03, dated May 2003, Revision 06,
10, 2012. dated January 27,
2014.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Credit for Previous Actions
(1) This paragraph provides credit for the actions required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the
effective date of this AD using the applicable service information
specified in paragraphs (i)(1)(i) and (i)(2)(ii) of this AD, and
provided that the additional work in Airbus Service Bulletin A300-
74-6003, Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014; or Airbus Service
Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 06, dated January 27, 2014; is done,
as required by paragraph (g) of this AD.
(i) For Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R airplanes, Model
A300 F4-605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes:
Airbus Mandatory Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 04, dated
January 9, 2013, which is not incorporated by reference in this AD.
(ii) For Model A310-204 and -304 airplanes: Airbus Mandatory
Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 04, dated January 9, 2013,
which is not incorporated by reference in this AD.
(2) This paragraph provides credit for the actions required by
paragraph (g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the
effective date of this AD using the applicable service information
specified in paragraphs (i)(2)(i) and (i)(2)(ii) of this AD.
(i) For Model A300 B4-601, B4-603, and B4-605R airplanes, Model
A300 F4-605R airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes:
Airbus Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 05, dated May 23,
2013, which is not incorporated by reference in this AD.
(ii) For Model A310-204 and -304 airplanes: Airbus Service
Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 05, dated May 23, 2013, which is not
incorporated by reference in this AD.
(j) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
International Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR
39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight
Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information
directly to the International Branch, send it to ATTN: Dan Rodina,
Aerospace Engineer, International Branch, ANM-116, Transport
Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-
3356; telephone 425-227-2125; fax 425-227-1149. Information may be
emailed to: 9-ANM-116-AMOC-REQUESTS@faa.gov. Before using any
approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or
lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight
standards district office/certificate holding district office. The
AMOC approval letter must specifically reference this AD.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD
to obtain corrective actions from a manufacturer, the action must be
accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, International
Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA; or the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA); or Airbus's EASA Design
Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by the DOA, the approval
must include the DOA-authorized signature.
(k) Related Information
(1) Refer to Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information
(MCAI) EASA Airworthiness Directive 2014-0156, dated July 3, 2014,
for related information. This MCAI may be found in the AD docket on
the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-
2012-0636-0002.
(2) Service information identified in this AD that is not
incorporated by reference may be viewed at the addresses specified
in paragraphs (l)(3) and (l)(4) of this AD.
(l) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Airbus Service Bulletin A300-74-6003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
(ii) Airbus Service Bulletin A310-74-2003, Revision 06, dated
January 27, 2014.
(3) For service information identified in this AD, contact
Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office--EAW, 1 Rond Point Maurice
Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96;
fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email account.airworth-eas@airbus.com;
Internet https://www.airbus.com.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
425-227-1221.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 10, 2015.
Jeffrey E. Duven,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-10181 Filed 5-11-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
