Duke Energy Florida, Inc.; Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3, 26100-26104 [2015-10494]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 87 (Wednesday, May 6, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 26100-26104]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10494]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. 50-302; NRC-2015-0115]


Duke Energy Florida, Inc.; Crystal River Nuclear Generating 
Plant, Unit 3

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an 
exemption from certain power reactor liability insurance requirements 
in response to a request from Duke Energy Florida, Inc. (DEF or the 
licensee) dated February 25, 2014, as supplemented by letter dated May 
7, 2014. This exemption would permit the licensee to reduce its primary 
offsite liability insurance and withdraw from participation in the 
secondary retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges.

DATES: May 6, 2015.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2015-0115 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2015-0115. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/

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adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it available in 
ADAMS) is provided the first time that a document is referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O-1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael D. Orenak, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, telephone: 301-415-3229, email: 
Michael.Orenak@nrc.gov, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
DC 20555-0001.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant, Unit 3 (CR-3), is a 
decommissioning power reactor located at Red Level, Florida in Citrus 
County, about 5 miles south of Levy County. The site is 7.5 miles 
northwest of Crystal River, Florida, and 90 miles north of St. 
Petersburg, Florida. The CR-3 is situated on the Gulf of Mexico within 
the Crystal River Energy Complex. The DEF is the holder of the CR-3 
Facility Operating License No. DPR-72. The license provides, among 
other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, 
and orders of the NRC now or hereafter in effect.
    The CR-3 has been shut down since September 26, 2009, and the final 
removal of fuel from its reactor vessel was completed on May 28, 2011. 
By letter dated February 20, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A005), 
DEF submitted a certification to the NRC of permanent cessation of 
power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. 
As a permanently shutdown and defueled facility, and in accordance with 
section 50.82(a)(2) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 
CFR), CR-3 is no longer authorized to operate the reactor or emplace 
nuclear fuel into the reactor vessel. The licensee is still authorized 
to possess and store irradiated nuclear fuel. Irradiated fuel is 
currently being stored onsite in a spent fuel pool (SFP).

II. Request/Action

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, ``Specific exemptions,'' DEF has 
requested an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) by letter dated 
February 25, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14063A502), as supplemented by 
letter dated May 7, 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14139A007). The May 7, 
2014, exemption request submittal superseded, in its entirety, the 
request dated February 25, 2014. The exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) 
would permit the licensee to reduce the required level of primary 
offsite liability insurance from $375 million to $100 million, and 
would allow DEF to withdraw from participation in the secondary 
financial protection (also known as the secondary retrospective rating 
pool for deferred premium charges).
    The regulation in 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires each licensee to 
have and maintain financial protection. For a single unit reactor site, 
which has a rated capacity of 100,000 kilowatts electric or more, 10 
CFR 140.11(a)(4) requires the licensee to maintain $375 million in 
primary financial protection. In addition, the licensee is required to 
participate in a secondary retrospective rating pool (secondary 
financial protection) that commits each licensee to additional 
indemnification for damages that may exceed primary insurance coverage. 
Participation in the secondary retrospective rating pool could 
potentially subject DEF to deferred premium charges up to a maximum 
total deferred premium of $121,255,000 with respect to any nuclear 
incident at any operating nuclear power plant, and up to a maximum 
annual deferred premium of $18,963,000 per incident.
    The licensee states that the risk of an offsite radiological 
release is significantly lower at a nuclear power reactor that has 
permanently shut down and defueled, when compared to an operating power 
reactor. Similarly, the associated risk of offsite liability damages 
that require insurance indemnification is commensurately lower. 
Therefore, DEF is requesting an exemption from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4), to 
permit a reduction in primary offsite liability insurance and to 
withdraw from participation in the secondary financial protection pool.

III. Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 140.8, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR part 140, when the exemptions are authorized 
by law and are otherwise in the public interest.
    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) were 
established to require a licensee to maintain sufficient insurance to 
satisfy liability claims by members of the public for personal injury, 
property damage, or the legal cost associated with lawsuits as the 
result of a nuclear accident. The insurance levels established by this 
regulation were derived from the risks and potential consequences of an 
accident at an operating reactor with a rated capacity of 100,000 
kilowatts electric (or greater). During normal power reactor 
operations, the forced flow of water through the reactor coolant system 
(RCS) removes heat generated by the reactor. The RCS, operating at high 
temperatures and pressures, transfers this heat through the steam 
generator tubes converting non-radioactive feedwater to steam, which 
then flows to the main turbine generator to produce electricity. Many 
of the accident scenarios postulated for operating power reactors 
involve failures or malfunctions of systems that could affect the fuel 
in the reactor core, which in the most severe postulated accidents, 
would involve the release of large quantities of fission products. With 
the permanent cessation of reactor operations at CR-3, and the 
permanent removal of the fuel from the reactor core, such accidents are 
no longer possible. The reactor, RCS, and supporting systems no longer 
operate and have no function related to the storage of the irradiated 
fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction 
of the reactor, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
    During reactor decommissioning, the principal radiological risks 
are associated with the storage of spent fuel onsite. In its September 
26, 2013, exemption request regarding offsite emergency plans (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML13274A584), DEF discusses both design-basis and beyond 
design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. The 
licensee states that there are no possible design-basis events at CR-3 
that could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the 
limits established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's early-
phase Protective Action Guidelines of 1 rem (roentgen equivalent man) 
at the exclusion area boundary. The only accident that might lead to a 
significant radiological release at a decommissioning reactor is a 
zirconium fire. The zirconium fire scenario is a postulated, but highly 
unlikely, beyond design-basis accident scenario that involves loss of 
water inventory from the SFP, resulting in a significant heat-up of the 
spent fuel, and culminating in substantial zirconium cladding

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oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire scenario 
is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. 
Therefore, the risks from a zirconium fire scenario continue to 
decrease as a function of the time that CR-3 has been permanently shut 
down.
    The licensee provided a detailed analysis of the events that could 
result in an offsite radiological release at CR-3 in its September 26, 
2013, submittal. One of these beyond design-basis accidents involves a 
complete loss of SFP water inventory, where cooling of the spent fuel 
would be primarily accomplished by natural circulation of air through 
the uncovered spent fuel assemblies. The licensee's analysis of this 
accident shows that as of September 26, 2013, air-cooling of the spent 
fuel assemblies is sufficient to keep the fuel within a safe 
temperature range indefinitely without fuel damage or offsite 
radiological release. This is important because the Commission has 
previously authorized a lesser amount of liability insurance coverage, 
based on an analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In SECY-93-127, 
``Financial Protection Required of Licensees of Large Nuclear Power 
Plants During Decommissioning,'' dated May 10, 1993 (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML12257A628), the staff outlined a policy for reducing required 
liability insurance coverage for decommissioning reactors. The 
discussions in SECY-93-127 centered primarily on the public health and 
safety risks associated with storing fuel in spent fuel pools. In its 
Staff Requirements Memorandum dated July 13, 1993 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML003760936), the Commission approved a policy that would permit 
reductions in commercial liability insurance coverage when a licensee 
was able to demonstrate that the spent fuel could be air-cooled if the 
SFP was drained of water. Upon demonstration of this technical 
criterion, the Commission policy allowed decommissioning licensees to 
withdraw from participation in the secondary insurance protection 
layer, and permitted reductions in the required amount of commercial 
liability insurance coverage to $100 million. The staff has used this 
technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to other 
decommissioning reactor licensees (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power 
Station, published in the Federal Register on January 19, 1999 (64 FR 
2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the Federal Register on 
December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700), and Kewaunee Power Station, published 
in the Federal Register on March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638)). Additional 
discussions of other decommissioning reactor licensees that have 
received exemptions to reduce their primary insurance level to $100 
million are provided in SECY-96-256, ``Changes to the Financial 
Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power 
Reactors, 10 CFR 50.54(W) and 10 CFR 140.11,'' dated December 17, 1996 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML15062A483). These prior exemptions were based on 
the licensee demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent 
with the technical criterion discussed above.
    In SECY-00-0145, ``Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power 
Plant Decommissioning,'' dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, 
``Policy Issues Related to Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency 
Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants 
Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools,'' dated June 4, 2001 (ADAMS Accession 
Nos. ML003721626 and ML011450420, respectively), the staff discussed 
additional information concerning SFP zirconium fire risks at 
decommissioning reactors and associated implications for offsite 
insurance. Analyzing when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is capable 
of air-cooling is one measure that demonstrates when the probability of 
a zirconium fire would be exceedingly low. However, the staff has more 
recently used an additional analysis that would bound an incomplete 
drain-down of the SFP water inventory or some other catastrophic event, 
such as a complete drainage of the SFP with rearrangement of spent fuel 
rack geometry and/or the addition of rubble to the SFP. The analysis 
postulates that decay heat transfer from the spent fuel via conduction, 
convection, or radiation would be impeded. This analysis is often 
referred to as an adiabatic heat-up.
    The licensee's analyses referenced in its exemption request 
demonstrates that under conditions where the SFP water inventory has 
drained and only air-cooling of the stored irradiated fuel is 
available, there is reasonable assurance as of September 26, 2013, that 
the CR-3 spent fuel will remain at temperatures far below those 
associated with a significant radiological release. In addition, the 
licensee's adiabatic heat-up analyses demonstrate that as of September 
26, 2103, there would be at least 10 hours after the loss of all means 
of cooling (both air and/or water), before the spent fuel cladding 
would reach a temperature where the potential for a significant offsite 
radiological release could occur. The licensee states that for this 
loss of all cooling scenario, 10 hours is sufficient time for personnel 
to respond with additional resources, equipment, and capability to 
restore cooling to the SFP, even after a non-credible, catastrophic 
event. As provided in a separate DEF letter dated May 7, 2014 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML14139A006), the licensee reaffirmed the continuation of 
its makeup strategies in the event of a loss of SFP coolant inventory. 
The multiple strategies for providing makeup to the SFP include using 
existing plant systems for inventory makeup, supplying water through 
hoses to connections to the existing SFP piping using the diesel-driven 
fire service pump, and using a diesel-driven portable pump to take 
suction from CR-3 intake and discharge canals. These strategies will be 
maintained by a license condition. The licensee also stated that, 
considering the very low-probability of beyond design-basis accidents 
affecting the SFP, these diverse strategies provide defense-in-depth 
and time to mitigate and prevent a zirconium fire, using makeup or 
spray into the SFP before the onset of zirconium cladding rapid 
oxidation.
    In the NRC safety evaluation of the licensee's request for 
exemptions from certain emergency planning requirements dated March 30, 
2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15058A906), the NRC staff assessed the DEF 
accident analyses associated with the radiological risks from a 
zirconium fire at the permanently shutdown and defueled CR-3 site. The 
NRC staff confirmed that under conditions where cooling airflow can 
develop, suitably conservative calculations indicate that as of 
September 2013, the fuel would remain at temperatures where the 
cladding would be undamaged for an unlimited period. For the very 
unlikely beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant 
inventory is lost in such a manner that all methods of heat removal 
from the spent fuel are no longer available, there will be a minimum of 
10 hours from the initiation of the accident until the cladding reaches 
a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The staff 
finds that 10 hours is sufficient time to support deployment of 
mitigation equipment, consistent with plant conditions, to prevent the 
zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid oxidation.
    The staff has determined that the licensee's proposed reduction in 
primary offsite liability coverage to a level of $100 million, and the 
licensee's proposed withdrawal from participation in the secondary 
insurance pool for offsite financial protection, are consistent with 
the policy established in

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SECY-93-127 and subsequent insurance considerations resulting from 
additional zirconium fire risks, as discussed in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-
01-0100. In addition, the NRC staff noted that there is a well-
established precedent of granting a similar exemption to other 
permanently shutdown and defueled power reactors upon demonstration 
that the criterion of the zirconium fire risks from the irradiated fuel 
stored in the SFP is of negligible concern.

A. Authorized by Law

    In accordance with 10 CFR 140.8, the Commission may grant 
exemptions from the regulations in 10 CFR part 140 as the Commission 
determines are authorized by law. The NRC staff has determined that 
granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a 
violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 170, or other laws, 
as amended, which require licensees to maintain adequate financial 
protection. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.

B. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 140.11 were established 
to require licensees to maintain sufficient offsite liability insurance 
to ensure adequate funding for offsite liability claims, following an 
accident at an operating reactor. However, the regulation does not 
consider the reduced potential for and consequence of nuclear incidents 
at permanently shutdown and decommissioning reactors.
    SECY-93-127, SECY-00-0145, and SECY-01-0100 provide a basis for 
allowing licensees of decommissioning plants to reduce their primary 
offsite liability insurance and to withdraw from participation in the 
retrospective rating pool for deferred premium charges. As discussed in 
these documents, once the zirconium fire concern is determined to be 
negligible, possible accident scenario risks at permanently shutdown 
and defueled reactors are greatly reduced when compared to operating 
reactors, and the associated potential for offsite financial 
liabilities from an accident are commensurately less. The licensee has 
analyzed, and the NRC staff has confirmed, that the possible accidents 
that could result in an offsite radiological risk are minimal, thereby 
justifying the proposed reductions in offsite liability insurance and 
withdrawal from participation in the secondary retrospective rating 
pool for deferred premium charges.
    Additionally, participation in the secondary retrospective rating 
pool could be problematic for DEF because the licensee would incur 
financial liability if an extraordinary nuclear incident occurred at 
another nuclear power plant. Because CR-3 is permanently shut down, it 
does not produce revenue from electricity generation sales to cover 
such a liability. Therefore, such liability, if incurred, could 
significantly affect the financial resources available to the facility 
to conduct and complete radiological decontamination and 
decommissioning activities. Furthermore, the shared financial risk 
exposure to DEF is greatly disproportionate to the radiological risk 
posed by CR-3 when compared to operating reactors.
    The reduced overall risk to the public at decommissioning power 
plants does not warrant DEF to carry full operating reactor insurance 
coverage after the requisite spent fuel-cooling period has elapsed, 
following final reactor shutdown. The licensee's proposed financial 
protection limits will maintain a level of liability insurance coverage 
commensurate with the risk to the public. These changes are consistent 
with previous NRC policy and exemptions approved for other 
decommissioning reactors. Thus, the underlying purpose of the 
regulations will not be adversely affected by the reductions in 
insurance coverage.
    Accordingly, the NRC staff concludes that granting the exemption 
from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) is in the public interest.

C. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC approval of the exemption to insurance or indemnity 
requirements belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by 
rule or regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after 
first finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically, the exemption is categorically excluded from further 
analysis in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that i) there is no significant hazards 
consideration; ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure; iv) there is 
no significant construction impact; v) there is no significant increase 
in the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and 
vi) the requirements from which an exemption is sought involve surety, 
insurance, or indemnity requirements.
    The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the 
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
because reducing a licensee's offsite liability requirements at CR-3 
does not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is 
unrelated to the operation of CR-3. Accordingly, there is no 
significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts 
of any effluents that may be released offsite, and no significant 
increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation 
exposure. The exempted regulation is not associated with construction, 
so there is no significant construction impact. The exempted regulation 
does not concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of radiation 
in an accident) or mitigation. Therefore, there is no significant 
increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological 
accident. In addition, there would be no significant impacts to biota, 
water resources, historic properties, cultural resources, or 
socioeconomic conditions in the region. The requirement for offsite 
liability insurance may be viewed as involving surety, insurance, or 
indemnity matters.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
140.8, the exemption is authorized by law, and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEF exemption 
from the requirements of 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) to permit the licensee to 
reduce primary offsite liability insurance to $100 million, accompanied 
by withdrawal from participation in the secondary insurance pool for 
offsite liability insurance.
    The exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of April, 2015.


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    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
A. Louise Lund,
Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2015-10494 Filed 5-5-15; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P