Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 25782-25796 [2015-10516]
Download as PDF
25782
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 86 / Tuesday, May 5, 2015 / Notices
(www.treasury.gov/ofac) or via facsimile
through a 24-hour fax-on demand
service at (202) 622–0077.
Background
On October 21, 1995, the President,
invoking the authority, inter alia, of the
International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701–1706)
(IEEPA), issued Executive Order 12978
(60 FR 54579, October 24, 1995) (the
Order). In the Order, the President
declared a national emergency to deal
with the threat posed by significant
foreign narcotics traffickers centered in
Colombia and the harm that they cause
in the United States and abroad.
Section 1 of the Order blocks, with
certain exceptions, all property and
interests in property that are in the
United States, or that hereafter come
within the United States or that are or
hereafter come within the possession or
control of United States persons, of: (1)
The foreign persons listed in an Annex
to the Order; (2) any foreign person
determined by the Secretary of
Treasury, in consultation with the
Attorney General and the Secretary of
State: (a) To play a significant role in
international narcotics trafficking
centered in Colombia; or (b) to
materially assist in, or provide financial
or technological support for or goods or
services in support of, the narcotics
trafficking activities of persons
designated in or pursuant to the Order;
and (3) persons determined by the
Secretary of the Treasury, in
consultation with the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State, to be owned
or controlled by, or to act for or on
behalf of, persons designated pursuant
to the Order.
On April 28, 2015, the Associate
Director of the Office of Global
Targeting removed from the SDN List
the individuals and entities listed
below, whose property and interests in
property were blocked pursuant to the
Order:
c/o GEOPLASTICOS S.A., Cali,
Colombia; c/o J. FREDDY MAFLA Y CIA.
S.C.S., Cali, Colombia; POB Cali, Valle,
Colombia; Cedula No. 16689935
(Colombia); Passport 16689935
(Colombia) (individual) [SDNT].
3. MORENO FERNANDEZ, Monica, c/o RUIZ
DE ALARCON 12 S.L., Madrid, Spain;
Spain; DOB 20 Apr 1963; nationality
Colombia; citizen Colombia; Cedula No.
31903968 (Colombia); Passport
AG744728 (Colombia); alt. Passport
AE613367 (Colombia); National Foreign
ID Number X3881333Z (Spain)
(individual) [SDNT].
4. MARIN ZAMORA, Jaime Alberto (a.k.a.
‘‘BETO MARIN’’), c/o PLASTEC LTDA.,
Colombia; Carrera 13A No. 1A–139,
Armenia, Quindio, Colombia; Avenida
San Martin 4–46, Bocagrande, Cartagena,
Colombia; DOB 22 Jul 1964; POB
Quimbaya, Quindio, Colombia; citizen
Colombia; Cedula No. 7544228
(Colombia); Passport AF595263
(Colombia); alt. Passport AD380146
(Colombia) (individual) [SDNT].
5. ANDRADE QUINTERO, Ancizar, c/o
INMOBILIARIA BOLIVAR LTDA., Cali,
Colombia; c/o INMOBILIARIA U.M.V.
S.A., Cali, Colombia; c/o SERVICIOS
INMOBILIARIAS LTDA., Cali, Colombia;
DOB 23 Jan 1962; Cedula No. 16672464
(Colombia) (individual) [SDNT].
Entities
1. J. FREDDY MAFLA Y CIA. S.C.S., Carrera
4 No. 11–45 Ofc. 503, Cali, Colombia;
NIT #800020482–4 (Colombia) [SDNT].
2. PLASTEC LTDA., Km. 1 Via Jardines,
Armenia, Quindio, Colombia; NIT
#801000358–7 (Colombia) [SDNT].
3. GAVIRIA MOR Y CIA. LTDA., Calle 16 No.
11–82 Ofc. 302, Girardot, Colombia; NIT
#800212771–2 (Colombia) [SDNT].
Additionally, on April 28, 2015, the
Associate Director of the Office of
Global Targeting updated the SDN
record for the individual listed below,
whose property and interests in
property continue to be blocked
pursuant to Executive Order 12978:
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Individuals
Individual
1. ESPITIA PINILLA, Ricardo, Bogota,
Colombia; DOB 26 Apr 1962; POB
Colombia; nationality Colombia; citizen
Colombia; Cedula No. 19483017
(Colombia); Passport AI264250
(Colombia) (individual) [SDNT].
2. MAFLA POLO, Jose Freddy, Carrera 4 No.
11–45 Ofc. 503, Cali, Colombia; Calle
52N No. 5B–111, Cali, Colombia; Carrera
11 No. 46–24 Apt. 201, Cali, Colombia;
Carrera 11 No. 46–26, Cali, Colombia; c/
o COMPANIA DE FOMENTO
MERCANTIL S.A., Cali, Colombia; c/o
PARQUE INDUSTRIAL PROGRESO S.A.,
Yumbo, Colombia; c/o
CONSTRUCCIONES PROGRESO DEL
PUERTO S.A., Puerto Tejada, Colombia;
1. MALDONADO ESCOBAR, Fernando; DOB
16 May 1961; POB Bogota, Colombia;
Cedula No. 19445721 (Colombia);
Passport AH330349 (Colombia)
(individual) [SDNT] (Linked To:
AUDITORES ESPECIALIZADOS LTDA.;
Linked To: AQUAMARINA ISLAND
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION).
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Dated: April 28, 2015.
Gregory T. Gatjanis,
Associate Director, Office of Global Targeting,
Office of Foreign Assets Control.
[FR Doc. 2015–10455 Filed 5–4–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AL–P
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UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION
Sentencing Guidelines for United
States Courts
United States Sentencing
Commission.
AGENCY:
Notice of submission to
Congress of amendments to the
sentencing guidelines effective
November 1, 2015.
ACTION:
Pursuant to its authority
under 28 U.S.C. 994(p), the Commission
has promulgated amendments to the
sentencing guidelines, policy
statements, commentary, and statutory
index. This notice sets forth the
amendments and the reason for each
amendment.
SUMMARY:
The Commission has specified
an effective date of November 1, 2015,
for the amendments set forth in this
notice.
DATES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jeanne Doherty, Public Affairs Officer,
(202) 502–4502, jdoherty@ussc.gov. The
amendments set forth in this notice also
may be accessed through the
Commission’s Web site at
www.ussc.gov.
The
United States Sentencing Commission is
an independent agency in the judicial
branch of the United States
Government. The Commission
promulgates sentencing guidelines and
policy statements for federal sentencing
courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a). The
Commission also periodically reviews
and revises previously promulgated
guidelines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o)
and generally submits guideline
amendments to Congress pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 994(p) not later than the first day
of May each year. Absent action of
Congress to the contrary, submitted
amendments become effective by
operation of law on the date specified
by the Commission (generally November
1 of the year in which the amendments
are submitted to Congress).
Notice of proposed amendments was
published in the Federal Register on
January 16, 2015 (see 80 FR 2569
through 2590). The Commission held a
public hearing on the proposed
amendments in Washington, DC, on
March 12, 2015. On April 30, 2015, the
Commission submitted these
amendments to Congress and specified
an effective date of November 1, 2015.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Authority: 28 U.S.C. 994(a), (o), and (p);
USSC Rules of Practice and Procedure 4.1.
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Patti B. Saris,
Chair.
1. Amendment: Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)
is amended by striking ‘‘all reasonably
foreseeable acts and omissions of others
in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity,’’ and inserting the
following:
‘‘all acts and omissions of others that
were—
(i) within the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity,
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal
activity, and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity;’’.
The Commentary to § 1B1.3 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended by
striking Note 2 as follows:
‘‘2. A ‘jointly undertaken criminal
activity’ is a criminal plan, scheme,
endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by
the defendant in concert with others,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy.
In the case of a jointly undertaken
criminal activity, subsection (a)(1)(B)
provides that a defendant is accountable
for the conduct (acts and omissions) of
others that was both:
(A) In furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity; and
(B) reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.
Because a count may be worded
broadly and include the conduct of
many participants over a period of time,
the scope of the criminal activity jointly
undertaken by the defendant (the
‘jointly undertaken criminal activity’) is
not necessarily the same as the scope of
the entire conspiracy, and hence
relevant conduct is not necessarily the
same for every participant. In order to
determine the defendant’s
accountability for the conduct of others
under subsection (a)(1)(B), the court
must first determine the scope of the
criminal activity the particular
defendant agreed to jointly undertake
(i.e., the scope of the specific conduct
and objectives embraced by the
defendant’s agreement). The conduct of
others that was both in furtherance of,
and reasonably foreseeable in
connection with, the criminal activity
jointly undertaken by the defendant is
relevant conduct under this provision.
The conduct of others that was not in
furtherance of the criminal activity
jointly undertaken by the defendant, or
was not reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity,
is not relevant conduct under this
provision.
In determining the scope of the
criminal activity that the particular
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defendant agreed to jointly undertake
(i.e., the scope of the specific conduct
and objectives embraced by the
defendant’s agreement), the court may
consider any explicit agreement or
implicit agreement fairly inferred from
the conduct of the defendant and others.
Note that the criminal activity that the
defendant agreed to jointly undertake,
and the reasonably foreseeable conduct
of others in furtherance of that criminal
activity, are not necessarily identical.
For example, two defendants agree to
commit a robbery and, during the course
of that robbery, the first defendant
assaults and injures a victim. The
second defendant is accountable for the
assault and injury to the victim (even if
the second defendant had not agreed to
the assault and had cautioned the first
defendant to be careful not to hurt
anyone) because the assaultive conduct
was in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the
robbery) and was reasonably foreseeable
in connection with that criminal activity
(given the nature of the offense).
With respect to offenses involving
contraband (including controlled
substances), the defendant is
accountable for all quantities of
contraband with which he was directly
involved and, in the case of a jointly
undertaken criminal activity, all
reasonably foreseeable quantities of
contraband that were within the scope
of the criminal activity that he jointly
undertook.
The requirement of reasonable
foreseeability applies only in respect to
the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of
others under subsection (a)(1)(B). It does
not apply to conduct that the defendant
personally undertakes, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, procures,
or willfully causes; such conduct is
addressed under subsection (a)(1)(A).
A defendant’s relevant conduct does
not include the conduct of members of
a conspiracy prior to the defendant
joining the conspiracy, even if the
defendant knows of that conduct (e.g.,
in the case of a defendant who joins an
ongoing drug distribution conspiracy
knowing that it had been selling two
kilograms of cocaine per week, the
cocaine sold prior to the defendant
joining the conspiracy is not included as
relevant conduct in determining the
defendant’s offense level). The
Commission does not foreclose the
possibility that there may be some
unusual set of circumstances in which
the exclusion of such conduct may not
adequately reflect the defendant’s
culpability; in such a case, an upward
departure may be warranted.
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25783
Illustrations of Conduct for Which the
Defendant Is Accountable
(a) Acts and Omissions Aided or
Abetted by the Defendant
(1) Defendant A is one of ten persons
hired by Defendant B to off-load a ship
containing marihuana. The off-loading
of the ship is interrupted by law
enforcement officers and one ton of
marihuana is seized (the amount on the
ship as well as the amount off-loaded).
Defendant A and the other off-loaders
are arrested and convicted of
importation of marihuana. Regardless of
the number of bales he personally
unloaded, Defendant A is accountable
for the entire one-ton quantity of
marihuana. Defendant A aided and
abetted the off-loading of the entire
shipment of marihuana by directly
participating in the off-loading of that
shipment (i.e., the specific objective of
the criminal activity he joined was the
off-loading of the entire shipment).
Therefore, he is accountable for the
entire shipment under subsection
(a)(1)(A) without regard to the issue of
reasonable foreseeability. This is
conceptually similar to the case of a
defendant who transports a suitcase
knowing that it contains a controlled
substance and, therefore, is accountable
for the controlled substance in the
suitcase regardless of his knowledge or
lack of knowledge of the actual type or
amount of that controlled substance.
In certain cases, a defendant may be
accountable for particular conduct
under more than one subsection of this
guideline. As noted in the preceding
paragraph, Defendant A is accountable
for the entire one-ton shipment of
marihuana under subsection (a)(1)(A).
Defendant A also is accountable for the
entire one-ton shipment of marihuana
on the basis of subsection
(a)(1)(B)(applying to a jointly
undertaken criminal activity).
Defendant A engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the scope
of which was the importation of the
shipment of marihuana). A finding that
the one-ton quantity of marihuana was
reasonably foreseeable is warranted
from the nature of the undertaking itself
(the importation of marihuana by ship
typically involves very large quantities
of marihuana). The specific
circumstances of the case (the defendant
was one of ten persons off-loading the
marihuana in bales) also support this
finding. In an actual case, of course, if
a defendant’s accountability for
particular conduct is established under
one provision of this guideline, it is not
necessary to review alternative
provisions under which such
accountability might be established.
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(b) Acts and Omissions Aided or
Abetted by the Defendant; Requirement
That the Conduct of Others Be in
Furtherance of the Jointly Undertaken
Criminal Activity and Reasonably
Foreseeable
(1) Defendant C is the getaway driver
in an armed bank robbery in which
$15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted
and injured. Defendant C is accountable
for the money taken under subsection
(a)(1)(A) because he aided and abetted
the act of taking the money (the taking
of money was the specific objective of
the offense he joined). Defendant C is
accountable for the injury to the teller
under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the
assault on the teller was in furtherance
of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity (the robbery) and was
reasonably foreseeable in connection
with that criminal activity (given the
nature of the offense).
As noted earlier, a defendant may be
accountable for particular conduct
under more than one subsection. In this
example, Defendant C also is
accountable for the money taken on the
basis of subsection (a)(1)(B) because the
taking of money was in furtherance of
the jointly undertaken criminal activity
(the robbery) and was reasonably
foreseeable (as noted, the taking of
money was the specific objective of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity).
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(c) Requirement That the Conduct of
Others Be in Furtherance of the Jointly
Undertaken Criminal Activity and
Reasonably Foreseeable; Scope of the
Criminal Activity
(1) Defendant D pays Defendant E a
small amount to forge an endorsement
on an $800 stolen government check.
Unknown to Defendant E, Defendant D
then uses that check as a down payment
in a scheme to fraudulently obtain
$15,000 worth of merchandise.
Defendant E is convicted of forging the
$800 check and is accountable for the
forgery of this check under subsection
(a)(1)(A). Defendant E is not accountable
for the $15,000 because the fraudulent
scheme to obtain $15,000 was not in
furtherance of the criminal activity he
jointly undertook with Defendant D (i.e.,
the forgery of the $800 check).
(2) Defendants F and G, working
together, design and execute a scheme
to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone.
Defendant F fraudulently obtains
$20,000. Defendant G fraudulently
obtains $35,000. Each is convicted of
mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are
accountable for the entire amount
($55,000). Each defendant is
accountable for the amount he
personally obtained under subsection
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(a)(1)(A). Each defendant is accountable
for the amount obtained by his
accomplice under subsection (a)(1)(B)
because the conduct of each was in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity and was reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.
(3) Defendants H and I engaged in an
ongoing marihuana importation
conspiracy in which Defendant J was
hired only to help off-load a single
shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are
included in a single count charging
conspiracy to import marihuana.
Defendant J is accountable for the entire
single shipment of marihuana he helped
import under subsection (a)(1)(A) and
any acts and omissions in furtherance of
the importation of that shipment that
were reasonably foreseeable (see the
discussion in example (a)(1) above). He
is not accountable for prior or
subsequent shipments of marihuana
imported by Defendants H or I because
those acts were not in furtherance of his
jointly undertaken criminal activity (the
importation of the single shipment of
marihuana).
(4) Defendant K is a wholesale
distributor of child pornography.
Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who
purchases child pornography from
Defendant K and resells it, but
otherwise operates independently of
Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is
a retail-level dealer who purchases child
pornography from Defendant K and
resells it, but otherwise operates
independently of Defendant K.
Defendants L and M are aware of each
other’s criminal activity but operate
independently. Defendant N is
Defendant K’s assistant who recruits
customers for Defendant K and
frequently supervises the deliveries to
Defendant K’s customers. Each
defendant is convicted of a count
charging conspiracy to distribute child
pornography. Defendant K is
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A)
for the entire quantity of child
pornography sold to Defendants L and
M. Defendant N also is accountable for
the entire quantity sold to those
defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B)
because the entire quantity was within
the scope of his jointly undertaken
criminal activity and reasonably
foreseeable. Defendant L is accountable
under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the
quantity of child pornography that he
purchased from Defendant K because
the scope of his jointly undertaken
criminal activity is limited to that
amount. For the same reason, Defendant
M is accountable under subsection
(a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child
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pornography that he purchased from
Defendant K.
(5) Defendant O knows about her
boyfriend’s ongoing drug-trafficking
activity, but agrees to participate on
only one occasion by making a delivery
for him at his request when he was ill.
Defendant O is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(A) for the drug
quantity involved on that one occasion.
Defendant O is not accountable for the
other drug sales made by her boyfriend
because those sales were not in
furtherance of her jointly undertaken
criminal activity (i.e., the one delivery).
(6) Defendant P is a street-level drug
dealer who knows of other street-level
drug dealers in the same geographic area
who sell the same type of drug as he
sells. Defendant P and the other dealers
share a common source of supply, but
otherwise operate independently.
Defendant P is not accountable for the
quantities of drugs sold by the other
street-level drug dealers because he is
not engaged in a jointly undertaken
criminal activity with them. In contrast,
Defendant Q, another street-level drug
dealer, pools his resources and profits
with four other street-level drug dealers.
Defendant Q is engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity and,
therefore, he is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of
drugs sold by the four other dealers
during the course of his joint
undertaking with them because those
sales were in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity and
reasonably foreseeable in connection
with that criminal activity.
(7) Defendant R recruits Defendant S
to distribute 500 grams of cocaine.
Defendant S knows that Defendant R is
the prime figure in a conspiracy
involved in importing much larger
quantities of cocaine. As long as
Defendant S’s agreement and conduct is
limited to the distribution of the 500
grams, Defendant S is accountable only
for that 500 gram amount (under
subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the
much larger quantity imported by
Defendant R.
(8) Defendants T, U, V, and W are
hired by a supplier to backpack a
quantity of marihuana across the border
from Mexico into the United States.
Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their
individual shipments from the supplier
at the same time and coordinate their
importation efforts by walking across
the border together for mutual
assistance and protection. Each
defendant is accountable for the
aggregate quantity of marihuana
transported by the four defendants. The
four defendants engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity, the object
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of which was the importation of the four
backpacks containing marihuana
(subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and
abetted each other’s actions (subsection
(a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly
undertaken criminal activity. In
contrast, if Defendants T, U, V, and W
were hired individually, transported
their individual shipments at different
times, and otherwise operated
independently, each defendant would
be accountable only for the quantity of
marihuana he personally transported
(subsection (a)(1)(A)). As this example
illustrates, in cases involving
contraband (including controlled
substances), the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (and thus
the accountability of the defendant for
the contraband that was the object of
that jointly undertaken activity) may
depend upon whether, in the particular
circumstances, the nature of the offense
is more appropriately viewed as one
jointly undertaken criminal activity or
as a number of separate criminal
activities.’’;
by redesignating Notes 3 through 10 as
Notes 5 through 12, respectively, and
inserting the following new Notes 2, 3,
and 4:
‘‘2. Accountability Under More Than
One Provision.—In certain cases, a
defendant may be accountable for
particular conduct under more than one
subsection of this guideline. If a
defendant’s accountability for particular
conduct is established under one
provision of this guideline, it is not
necessary to review alternative
provisions under which such
accountability might be established.
3. Jointly Undertaken Criminal
Activity (Subsection (a)(1)(B)).—
(A) In General.—A ‘jointly undertaken
criminal activity’ is a criminal plan,
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in concert
with others, whether or not charged as
a conspiracy.
In the case of a jointly undertaken
criminal activity, subsection (a)(1)(B)
provides that a defendant is accountable
for the conduct (acts and omissions) of
others that was:
(i) Within the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity;
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal
activity; and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.
The conduct of others that meets all
three criteria set forth in subdivisions (i)
through (iii) (i.e., ‘within the scope,’ ‘in
furtherance,’ and ‘reasonably
foreseeable’) is relevant conduct under
this provision. However, when the
conduct of others does not meet any one
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of the criteria set forth in subdivisions
(i) through (iii), the conduct is not
relevant conduct under this provision.
(B) Scope.—Because a count may be
worded broadly and include the
conduct of many participants over a
period of time, the scope of the ‘jointly
undertaken criminal activity’ is not
necessarily the same as the scope of the
entire conspiracy, and hence relevant
conduct is not necessarily the same for
every participant. In order to determine
the defendant’s accountability for the
conduct of others under subsection
(a)(1)(B), the court must first determine
the scope of the criminal activity the
particular defendant agreed to jointly
undertake (i.e., the scope of the specific
conduct and objectives embraced by the
defendant’s agreement). In doing so, the
court may consider any explicit
agreement or implicit agreement fairly
inferred from the conduct of the
defendant and others. Accordingly, the
accountability of the defendant for the
acts of others is limited by the scope of
his or her agreement to jointly
undertake the particular criminal
activity. Acts of others that were not
within the scope of the defendant’s
agreement, even if those acts were
known or reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant, are not relevant conduct
under subsection (a)(1)(B).
In cases involving contraband
(including controlled substances), the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity (and thus the accountability of
the defendant for the contraband that
was the object of that jointly undertaken
activity) may depend upon whether, in
the particular circumstances, the nature
of the offense is more appropriately
viewed as one jointly undertaken
criminal activity or as a number of
separate criminal activities.
A defendant’s relevant conduct does
not include the conduct of members of
a conspiracy prior to the defendant
joining the conspiracy, even if the
defendant knows of that conduct (e.g.,
in the case of a defendant who joins an
ongoing drug distribution conspiracy
knowing that it had been selling two
kilograms of cocaine per week, the
cocaine sold prior to the defendant
joining the conspiracy is not included as
relevant conduct in determining the
defendant’s offense level). The
Commission does not foreclose the
possibility that there may be some
unusual set of circumstances in which
the exclusion of such conduct may not
adequately reflect the defendant’s
culpability; in such a case, an upward
departure may be warranted.
(C) In Furtherance.—The court must
determine if the conduct (acts and
omissions) of others was in furtherance
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25785
of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity.
(D) Reasonably Foreseeable.—The
court must then determine if the
conduct (acts and omissions) of others
that was within the scope of, and in
furtherance of, the jointly undertaken
criminal activity was reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.
Note that the criminal activity that the
defendant agreed to jointly undertake,
and the reasonably foreseeable conduct
of others in furtherance of that criminal
activity, are not necessarily identical.
For example, two defendants agree to
commit a robbery and, during the course
of that robbery, the first defendant
assaults and injures a victim. The
second defendant is accountable for the
assault and injury to the victim (even if
the second defendant had not agreed to
the assault and had cautioned the first
defendant to be careful not to hurt
anyone) because the assaultive conduct
was within the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the
robbery), was in furtherance of that
criminal activity (the robbery), and was
reasonably foreseeable in connection
with that criminal activity (given the
nature of the offense).
With respect to offenses involving
contraband (including controlled
substances), the defendant is
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A)
for all quantities of contraband with
which he was directly involved and, in
the case of a jointly undertaken criminal
activity under subsection (a)(1)(B), all
quantities of contraband that were
involved in transactions carried out by
other participants, if those transactions
were within the scope of, and in
furtherance of, the jointly undertaken
criminal activity and were reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.
The requirement of reasonable
foreseeability applies only in respect to
the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of
others under subsection (a)(1)(B). It does
not apply to conduct that the defendant
personally undertakes, aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces, procures,
or willfully causes; such conduct is
addressed under subsection (a)(1)(A).
4. Illustrations of Conduct for Which
the Defendant is Accountable under
Subsections (a)(1)(A) and (B).—
(A) Acts and omissions aided or
abetted by the defendant.—
(i) Defendant A is one of ten persons
hired by Defendant B to off-load a ship
containing marihuana. The off-loading
of the ship is interrupted by law
enforcement officers and one ton of
marihuana is seized (the amount on the
ship as well as the amount off-loaded).
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Defendant A and the other off-loaders
are arrested and convicted of
importation of marihuana. Regardless of
the number of bales he personally
unloaded, Defendant A is accountable
for the entire one-ton quantity of
marihuana. Defendant A aided and
abetted the off-loading of the entire
shipment of marihuana by directly
participating in the off-loading of that
shipment (i.e., the specific objective of
the criminal activity he joined was the
off-loading of the entire shipment).
Therefore, he is accountable for the
entire shipment under subsection
(a)(1)(A) without regard to the issue of
reasonable foreseeability. This is
conceptually similar to the case of a
defendant who transports a suitcase
knowing that it contains a controlled
substance and, therefore, is accountable
for the controlled substance in the
suitcase regardless of his knowledge or
lack of knowledge of the actual type or
amount of that controlled substance.
In certain cases, a defendant may be
accountable for particular conduct
under more than one subsection of this
guideline. As noted in the preceding
paragraph, Defendant A is accountable
for the entire one-ton shipment of
marihuana under subsection (a)(1)(A).
Defendant A also is accountable for the
entire one-ton shipment of marihuana
on the basis of subsection (a)(1)(B)
(applying to a jointly undertaken
criminal activity). Defendant A engaged
in a jointly undertaken criminal activity
and all three criteria of subsection
(a)(1)(B) are met. First, the conduct was
within the scope of the criminal activity
(the importation of the shipment of
marihuana). Second, the off-loading of
the shipment of marihuana was in
furtherance of the criminal activity, as
described above. And third, a finding
that the one-ton quantity of marihuana
was reasonably foreseeable is warranted
from the nature of the undertaking itself
(the importation of marihuana by ship
typically involves very large quantities
of marihuana). The specific
circumstances of the case (the defendant
was one of ten persons off-loading the
marihuana in bales) also support this
finding. In an actual case, of course, if
a defendant’s accountability for
particular conduct is established under
one provision of this guideline, it is not
necessary to review alternative
provisions under which such
accountability might be established. See
Application Note 2.
(B) Acts and omissions aided or
abetted by the defendant; acts and
omissions in a jointly undertaken
criminal activity.—
(i) Defendant C is the getaway driver
in an armed bank robbery in which
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17:18 May 04, 2015
Jkt 235001
$15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted
and injured. Defendant C is accountable
for the money taken under subsection
(a)(1)(A) because he aided and abetted
the act of taking the money (the taking
of money was the specific objective of
the offense he joined). Defendant C is
accountable for the injury to the teller
under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the
assault on the teller was within the
scope and in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the
robbery), and was reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity (given the nature of the
offense).
As noted earlier, a defendant may be
accountable for particular conduct
under more than one subsection. In this
example, Defendant C also is
accountable for the money taken on the
basis of subsection (a)(1)(B) because the
taking of money was within the scope
and in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the
robbery), and was reasonably
foreseeable (as noted, the taking of
money was the specific objective of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity).
(C) Requirements that the conduct of
others be within the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity, in
furtherance of that criminal activity,
and reasonably foreseeable.—
(i) Defendant D pays Defendant E a
small amount to forge an endorsement
on an $800 stolen government check.
Unknown to Defendant E, Defendant D
then uses that check as a down payment
in a scheme to fraudulently obtain
$15,000 worth of merchandise.
Defendant E is convicted of forging the
$800 check and is accountable for the
forgery of this check under subsection
(a)(1)(A). Defendant E is not accountable
for the $15,000 because the fraudulent
scheme to obtain $15,000 was not
within the scope of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the
forgery of the $800 check).
(ii) Defendants F and G, working
together, design and execute a scheme
to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone.
Defendant F fraudulently obtains
$20,000. Defendant G fraudulently
obtains $35,000. Each is convicted of
mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are
accountable for the entire amount
($55,000). Each defendant is
accountable for the amount he
personally obtained under subsection
(a)(1)(A). Each defendant is accountable
for the amount obtained by his
accomplice under subsection (a)(1)(B)
because the conduct of each was within
the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity (the scheme to sell
fraudulent stocks), was in furtherance of
that criminal activity, and was
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Frm 00127
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
reasonably foreseeable in connection
with that criminal activity.
(iii) Defendants H and I engaged in an
ongoing marihuana importation
conspiracy in which Defendant J was
hired only to help off-load a single
shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are
included in a single count charging
conspiracy to import marihuana.
Defendant J is accountable for the entire
single shipment of marihuana he helped
import under subsection (a)(1)(A) and
any acts and omissions of others related
to the importation of that shipment on
the basis of subsection (a)(1)(B) (see the
discussion in example (A)(i) above). He
is not accountable for prior or
subsequent shipments of marihuana
imported by Defendants H or I because
those acts were not within the scope of
his jointly undertaken criminal activity
(the importation of the single shipment
of marihuana).
(iv) Defendant K is a wholesale
distributor of child pornography.
Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who
purchases child pornography from
Defendant K and resells it, but
otherwise operates independently of
Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is
a retail-level dealer who purchases child
pornography from Defendant K and
resells it, but otherwise operates
independently of Defendant K.
Defendants L and M are aware of each
other’s criminal activity but operate
independently. Defendant N is
Defendant K’s assistant who recruits
customers for Defendant K and
frequently supervises the deliveries to
Defendant K’s customers. Each
defendant is convicted of a count
charging conspiracy to distribute child
pornography. Defendant K is
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A)
for the entire quantity of child
pornography sold to Defendants L and
M. Defendant N also is accountable for
the entire quantity sold to those
defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B)
because the entire quantity was within
the scope of his jointly undertaken
criminal activity (to distribute child
pornography with Defendant K), in
furtherance of that criminal activity, and
reasonably foreseeable. Defendant L is
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A)
only for the quantity of child
pornography that he purchased from
Defendant K because he is not engaged
in a jointly undertaken criminal activity
with the other defendants. For the same
reason, Defendant M is accountable
under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the
quantity of child pornography that he
purchased from Defendant K.
(v) Defendant O knows about her
boyfriend’s ongoing drug-trafficking
activity, but agrees to participate on
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only one occasion by making a delivery
for him at his request when he was ill.
Defendant O is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(A) for the drug
quantity involved on that one occasion.
Defendant O is not accountable for the
other drug sales made by her boyfriend
because those sales were not within the
scope of her jointly undertaken criminal
activity (i.e., the one delivery).
(vi) Defendant P is a street-level drug
dealer who knows of other street-level
drug dealers in the same geographic area
who sell the same type of drug as he
sells. Defendant P and the other dealers
share a common source of supply, but
otherwise operate independently.
Defendant P is not accountable for the
quantities of drugs sold by the other
street-level drug dealers because he is
not engaged in a jointly undertaken
criminal activity with them. In contrast,
Defendant Q, another street-level drug
dealer, pools his resources and profits
with four other street-level drug dealers.
Defendant Q is engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity and,
therefore, he is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of
drugs sold by the four other dealers
during the course of his joint
undertaking with them because those
sales were within the scope of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity, in
furtherance of that criminal activity, and
reasonably foreseeable in connection
with that criminal activity.
(vii) Defendant R recruits Defendant S
to distribute 500 grams of cocaine.
Defendant S knows that Defendant R is
the prime figure in a conspiracy
involved in importing much larger
quantities of cocaine. As long as
Defendant S’s agreement and conduct is
limited to the distribution of the 500
grams, Defendant S is accountable only
for that 500 gram amount (under
subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the
much larger quantity imported by
Defendant R. Defendant S is not
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(B)
for the other quantities imported by
Defendant R because those quantities
were not within the scope of his jointly
undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the
500 grams).
(viii) Defendants T, U, V, and W are
hired by a supplier to backpack a
quantity of marihuana across the border
from Mexico into the United States.
Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their
individual shipments from the supplier
at the same time and coordinate their
importation efforts by walking across
the border together for mutual
assistance and protection. Each
defendant is accountable for the
aggregate quantity of marihuana
transported by the four defendants. The
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Jkt 235001
four defendants engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity, the object
of which was the importation of the four
backpacks containing marihuana
(subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and
abetted each other’s actions (subsection
(a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (which
under subsection (a)(1)(B) were also in
furtherance of, and reasonably
foreseeable in connection with, the
criminal activity). In contrast, if
Defendants T, U, V, and W were hired
individually, transported their
individual shipments at different times,
and otherwise operated independently,
each defendant would be accountable
only for the quantity of marihuana he
personally transported (subsection
(a)(1)(A)). As this example illustrates,
the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity may depend upon
whether, in the particular
circumstances, the nature of the offense
is more appropriately viewed as one
jointly undertaken criminal activity or
as a number of separate criminal
activities. See Application Note 3(B).’’.
The Commentary to § 2K2.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 14(E) by striking ‘‘Application
Note 9’’ both places such term appears
and inserting ‘‘Application Note 11’’.
The Commentary to § 2X3.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by striking ‘‘Application Note
10’’ and inserting ‘‘Application Note
12’’.
The Commentary to § 2X4.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by striking ‘‘Application Note
10’’ and inserting ‘‘Application Note
12’’.
Reason for Amendment: This
amendment is a result of the
Commission’s effort to clarify the use of
relevant conduct in offenses involving
multiple participants.
The amendment makes clarifying
revisions to § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct
(Factors that Determine the Guideline
Range)). It restructures the guideline
and its commentary to set out more
clearly the three-step analysis the court
applies in determining whether a
defendant is accountable for the
conduct of others in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity under
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The three-step analysis
requires that the court (1) identify the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity; (2) determine whether the
conduct of others in the jointly
undertaken criminal activity was in
furtherance of that criminal activity; and
(3) determine whether the conduct of
others was reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.
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Sfmt 4703
25787
Prior to this amendment, the ‘‘scope’’
element of the three-step analysis was
identified in the commentary to § 1B1.3
but was not included in the text of the
guideline itself. This amendment makes
clear that, under the ‘‘jointly undertaken
criminal activity’’ provision, a
defendant is accountable for the
conduct of others in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity if the
conduct meets all three criteria of the
three-step analysis. This amendment is
not intended as a substantive change in
policy.
2. Amendment: Section 2B1.1(b) is
amended by striking paragraph (1) as
follows:
‘‘(1) If the loss exceeded $5,000,
increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (apply the greatest)
(A) $5,000 or less .................
(B) More than $5,000 ............
(C) More than $10,000 .........
(D) More than $30,000 .........
(E) More than $70,000 ..........
(F) More than $120,000 ........
(G) More than $200,000 .......
(H) More than $400,000 .......
(I) More than $1,000,000 ......
(J) More than $2,500,000 .....
(K) More than $7,000,000 .....
(L) More than $20,000,000 ...
(M) More than $50,000,000 ..
(N) More than $100,000,000
(O) More than $200,000,000
(P) More than $400,000,000
Increase in
level
no increase
add 2
add 4
add 6
add 8
add 10
add 12
add 14
add 16
add 18
add 20
add 22
add 24
add 26
add 28
add 30.’’;
and inserting the following:
‘‘(1) If the loss exceeded $6,500,
increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (apply the greatest)
(A) $6,500 or less .................
(B) More than $6,500 ............
(C) More than $15,000 .........
(D) More than $40,000 .........
(E) More than $95,000 ..........
(F) More than $150,000 ........
(G) More than $250,000 .......
(H) More than $550,000 .......
(I) More than $1,500,000 ......
(J) More than $3,500,000 .....
(K) More than $9,500,000 .....
(L) More than $25,000,000 ...
(M) More than $65,000,000 ..
(N) More than $150,000,000
(O) More than $250,000,000
(P) More than $550,000,000
Increase in
level
no increase
add 2
add 4
add 6
add 8
add 10
add 12
add 14
add 16
add 18
add 20
add 22
add 24
add 26
add 28
add 30.’’.
Section 2B1.4(b)(1) is amended by
striking ‘‘$5,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$6,500’’.
Section 2B1.5(b)(1) is amended by
striking ‘‘$2,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$2,500’’; and by striking ‘‘$5,000’’ both
places such term appears and inserting
‘‘$6,500’’.
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Section 2B2.1(b) is amended by
striking paragraph (2) as follows:
‘‘(2) If the loss exceeded $2,500,
increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (apply the greatest)
(A) $2,500 or less .................
(B) More than $2,500 ............
(C) More than $10,000 .........
(D) More than $50,000 .........
(E) More than $250,000 ........
(F) More than $800,000 ........
(G) More than $1,500,000 ....
(H) More than $2,500,000 ....
(I) More than $5,000,000 ......
Increase in
level
no increase
add 1
add 2
add 3
add 4
add 5
add 6
add 7
add 8.’’;
and inserting the following:
‘‘(2) If the loss exceeded $5,000,
increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (apply the greatest)
(A) $5,000 or less .................
(B) More than $5,000 ............
(C) More than $20,000 .........
(D) More than $95,000 .........
(E) More than $500,000 ........
(F) More than $1,500,000 .....
(G) More than $3,000,000 ....
(H) More than $5,000,000 ....
(I) More than $9,500,000 ......
Increase in
level
no increase
add 1
add 2
add 3
add 4
add 5
add 6
add 7
add 8.’’.
Volume of commerce
(apply the greatest)
Section 2B2.3(b)(3) is amended by
striking ‘‘$2,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$2,500’’; and by striking ‘‘$5,000’’ both
places such term appears and inserting
‘‘$6,500’’.
Section 2B3.1(b) is amended by
striking paragraph (7) as follows:
‘‘(7) If the loss exceeded $10,000,
increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (apply the greatest)
(A) $10,000 or less ...............
(B) More than $10,000 ..........
(C) More than $50,000 .........
(D) More than $250,000 .......
(E) More than $800,000 ........
(F) More than $1,500,000 .....
(G) More than $2,500,000 ....
(H) More than $5,000,000 ....
Increase in
level
no increase
add 1
add 2
add 3
add 4
add 5
add 6
add 7.’’;
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(A) $20,000 or less ...............
(B) More than $20,000 ..........
(C) More than $95,000 .........
(D) More than $500,000 .......
(E) More than $1,500,000 .....
(F) More than $3,000,000 .....
(G) More than $5,000,000 ....
(H) More than $9,500,000 ....
VerDate Sep<11>2014
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Increase in
level
no increase.
add 1
add 2
add 3
add 4
add 5
add 6
add 7.’’.
Jkt 235001
(A) More than $1,000,000 .....
(B) More than $10,000,000 ...
(C) More than $40,000,000 ..
(D) More than $100,000,000
(E) More than $250,000,000
(F) More than $500,000,000
(G) More than
$1,000,000,000.
(H) More than
$1,500,000,000.
Adjustment to
offense level
add
add
add
add
add
add
add
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
add 16.’’;
and inserting the following:
‘‘(2) If the volume of commerce
attributable to the defendant was more
than $1,000,000, adjust the offense level
as follows:
Volume of commerce
(apply the greatest)
(A) More than $1,000,000 .....
(B) More than $10,000,000 ...
(C) More than $50,000,000 ..
(D) More than $100,000,000
(E) More than $300,000,000
(F) More than $600,000,000
(G) More than
$1,200,000,000.
(H) More than
$1,850,000,000.
and inserting the following:
‘‘(7) If the loss exceeded $20,000,
increase the offense level as follows:
Loss (apply the greatest)
Section 2B3.2(b)(2) is amended by
striking ‘‘$10,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$20,000’’.
Sections 2B3.3(b)(1), 2B4.1(b)(1),
2B5.1(b)(1), 2B5.3(b)(1), and 2B6.1(b)(1)
are each amended by striking ‘‘$2,000’’
and inserting ‘‘$2,500’’; and by striking
‘‘$5,000’’ both places such term appears
and inserting ‘‘$6,500’’.
Sections 2C1.1(b)(2), 2C1.2(b)(2), and
2C1.8(b)(1) are each amended by
striking ‘‘$5,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$6,500’’.
Sections 2E5.1(b)(2) and 2Q2.1(b)(3)
are each amended by striking ‘‘$2,000’’
and inserting ‘‘$2,500’’; and by striking
‘‘$5,000’’ both places such term appears
and inserting ‘‘$6,500’’.
Section 2R1.1(b) is amended by
striking paragraph (2) as follows:
‘‘(2) If the volume of commerce
attributable to the defendant was more
than $1,000,000, adjust the offense level
as follows:
add
add
add
add
add
add
add
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
(A) $2,000 or less .................
Fmt 4703
‘‘Tax loss
(apply the greatest)
(A) $2,500 or less .................
(B) More than $2,500 ............
(C) More than $6,500 ...........
(D) More than $15,000 .........
(E) More than $40,000 ..........
(F) More than $100,000 ........
(G) More than $250,000 .......
(H) More than $550,000 .......
(I) More than $1,500,000 ......
(J) More than $3,500,000 .....
(K) More than $9,500,000 .....
(L) More than $25,000,000 ...
(M) More than $65,000,000 ..
(N) More than $150,000,000
(O) More than $250,000,000
(P) More than $550,000,000
Offense level
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36.’’;
‘‘FINE TABLE
Offense
level
A minimum
6
and inserting the following:
Sfmt 4703
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36.’’;
Section 5E1.2 is amended in
subsection (c)(3) by striking the
following:
3 and
below .....
4–5 ............
6–7 ............
8–9 ............
10–11 ........
12–13 ........
14–15 ........
16–17 ........
18–19 ........
20–22 ........
23–25 ........
26–28 ........
29–31 ........
32–34 ........
35–37 ........
38 and
above ....
add 16.’’.
Offense level
and inserting the following:
Offense level
‘‘Tax loss
(apply the greatest)
Frm 00129
(B) More than $2,000 ............
(C) More than $5,000 ...........
(D) More than $12,500 .........
(E) More than $30,000 ..........
(F) More than $80,000 ..........
(G) More than $200,000 .......
(H) More than $400,000 .......
(I) More than $1,000,000 ......
(J) More than $2,500,000 .....
(K) More than $7,000,000 .....
(L) More than $20,000,000 ...
(M) More than $50,000,000 ..
(N) More than $100,000,000
(O) More than $200,000,000
(P) More than $400,000,000
Adjustment to
offense level
Section 2T3.1(a) is amended by
striking ‘‘$1,000’’ both places such term
appears and inserting ‘‘$1,500’’; and by
striking ‘‘$100’’ both places such term
appears and inserting ‘‘$200’’.
Section 2T4.1 is amended by striking
the following:
PO 00000
‘‘Tax loss
(apply the greatest)
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05MYN1
B maximum
$100
250
500
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,500
10,000
12,500
15,000
17,500
20,000
$5,000
5,000
5,000
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
75,000
100,000
125,000
150,000
175,000
200,000
25,000
250,000.’’,
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 86 / Tuesday, May 5, 2015 / Notices
‘‘FINE TABLE
Offense
level
A minimum
3 and
below .....
4–5 ............
6–7 ............
8–9 ............
10–11 ........
12–13 ........
14–15 ........
16–17 ........
18–19 ........
20–22 ........
23–25 ........
26–28 ........
29–31 ........
32–34 ........
35–37 ........
38 and
above ....
‘‘OFFENSE LEVEL FINE TABLE—
Continued
B maximum
$200
500
1,000
2,000
4,000
5,500
7,500
10,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
$9,500
9,500
9,500
20,000
40,000
55,000
75,000
95,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
400,000
50,000
500,000.’’;
in subsection (c)(4) by striking
‘‘$250,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$500,000’’;
and by inserting after subsection (g)
the following new subsection (h):
‘‘(h) Special Instruction
(1) For offenses committed prior to
November 1, 2015, use the applicable
fine guideline range that was set forth in
the version of § 5E1.2(c) that was in
effect on November 1, 2014, rather than
the applicable fine guideline range set
forth in subsection (c) above.’’.
Section 8C2.4 is amended in
subsection (d) by striking the following:
‘‘OFFENSE LEVEL FINE TABLE
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Offense level
6 or less ............................
7 ........................................
8 ........................................
9 ........................................
10 ......................................
11 ......................................
12 ......................................
13 ......................................
14 ......................................
15 ......................................
16 ......................................
17 ......................................
18 ......................................
19 ......................................
20 ......................................
21 ......................................
22 ......................................
23 ......................................
24 ......................................
25 ......................................
26 ......................................
27 ......................................
28 ......................................
29 ......................................
30 ......................................
31 ......................................
32 ......................................
33 ......................................
34 ......................................
35 ......................................
36 ......................................
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Amount
$5,000
7,500
10,000
15,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
60,000
85,000
125,000
175,000
250,000
350,000
500,000
650,000
910,000
1,200,000
1,600,000
2,100,000
2,800,000
3,700,000
4,800,000
6,300,000
8,100,000
10,500,000
13,500,000
17,500,000
22,000,000
28,500,000
36,000,000
45,500,000
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Offense level
Amount
37 ......................................
38 ......................................
57,500,000
or more
72,500,000.’’,
and inserting the following:
‘‘OFFENSE LEVEL FINE TABLE
Offense level
Amount
6 or less ...............................
7 ...........................................
8 ...........................................
9 ...........................................
10 .........................................
11 .........................................
12 .........................................
13 .........................................
14 .........................................
15 .........................................
16 .........................................
17 .........................................
18 .........................................
19 .........................................
20 .........................................
21 .........................................
22 .........................................
23 .........................................
24 .........................................
25 .........................................
26 .........................................
27 .........................................
28 .........................................
29 .........................................
30 .........................................
31 .........................................
32 .........................................
33 .........................................
34 .........................................
35 .........................................
36 .........................................
37 .........................................
38 or more ............................
$8,500
15,000
15,000
25,000
35,000
50,000
70,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
300,000
450,000
600,000
850,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
5,000,000
6,500,000
8,500,000
10,000,000
15,000,000
20,000,000
25,000,000
30,000,000
40,000,000
50,000,000
65,000,000
80,000,000
100,000,000
150,000,000.’’
and by inserting after subsection (d) the
following new subsection (e):
‘‘(e) Special Instruction
(1) For offenses committed prior to
November 1, 2015, use the offense level
fine table that was set forth in the
version of § 8C2.4(d) that was in effect
on November 1, 2014, rather than the
offense level fine table set forth in
subsection (d) above.’’.
Reason for Amendment: This
amendment makes adjustments to the
monetary tables in §§ 2B1.1 (Theft,
Property, Destruction, and Fraud), 2B2.1
(Burglary), 2B3.1 (Robbery), 2R1.1 (BidRigging, Price-Fixing or MarketAllocation Agreements Among
Competitors), 2T4.1 (Tax Table), 5E1.2
(Fines for Individual Defendants), and
8C2.4 (Base Fine) to account for
inflation. The amendment adjusts the
amounts in each of the seven monetary
tables using a specific multiplier
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25789
derived from the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), and then rounds—
• Amounts greater than $100,000,000
to the nearest multiple of $50,000,000;
• amounts greater than $10,000,000 to
the nearest multiple of $5,000,000;
• amounts greater than $1,000,000 to
the nearest multiple of $500,000;
• amounts greater than $100,000 to
the nearest multiple of $50,000;
• amounts greater than $10,000 to the
nearest multiple of $5,000;
• amounts greater than $1,000 to the
nearest multiple of $500; and
• amounts of $1,000 or less to the
nearest multiple of $50.
In addition, the amendment includes
conforming changes to other Chapter
Two guidelines that refer to the
monetary tables.
Congress has generally mandated that
agencies in the executive branch adjust
the civil monetary penalties they
impose to account for inflation using the
CPI. See 28 U.S.C. 2461 note (Federal
Civil Penalties Inflationary Adjustment
Act of 1990). Although the
Commission’s work does not involve
civil monetary penalties, it does
establish appropriate criminal sentences
for categories of offenses and offenders,
including appropriate amounts for
criminal fines. While some of the
monetary values in the Chapter Two
guidelines have been revised since they
were originally established in 1987,
none of the tables has been specifically
revised to account for inflation.
Due to inflationary changes, there has
been a gradual decrease in the value of
the dollar over time. As a result,
monetary losses in current offenses
reflect, to some degree, a lower degree
of harm and culpability than did
equivalent amounts when the monetary
tables were established or last
substantively amended. Similarly, the
fine levels recommended by the
guidelines are lower in value than when
they were last adjusted, and therefore,
do not have the same sentencing impact
as a similar fine in the past. Based on
its analysis and widespread support for
inflationary adjustments expressed in
public comment, the Commission
concluded that aligning the above
monetary tables with modern dollar
values is an appropriate step at this
time.
The amendment adjusts each table
based on inflationary changes since the
year each monetary table was last
substantially amended:
• Loss table in § 2B1.1 and tax table
in § 2T4.1: adjusting for inflation from
2001 ($1.00 in 2001 = $1.34 in 2014);
• Loss tables in §§ 2B2.1 and 2B3.1
and fine table for individual defendants
at § 5E1.2(c)(3): adjusting for inflation
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from 1989 ($1.00 in 1989 = $1.91 in
2014);
• Volume of Commerce table in
§ 2R1.1: adjusting for inflation from
2005 ($1.00 in 2005 = $1.22 in 2014);
and
• Fine table for organizational
defendants at § 8C2.4(d): adjusting for
inflation from 1991 ($1.00 in 1991 =
$1.74 in 2014).
Adjusting from the last substantive
amendment year appropriately accounts
for the Commission’s previous work in
revising these tables at various times.
Although not specifically focused on
inflationary issues, previous
Commissions engaged in careful
examination (and at times, a wholesale
rewriting) of the monetary tables and
ultimately included monetary and
enhancement levels that it considered
appropriate at that time. The
Commission estimates that this
amendment would result in the Bureau
of Prisons having approximately 224
additional prison beds available at the
end of the first year after
implementation, and approximately 956
additional prison beds available at the
end of its fifth year of implementation.
Finally, the amendment adds a
special instruction to both §§ 5E1.2 and
8C2.4 providing that, for offenses
committed prior to November 1, 2015,
the court shall use the fine provisions
that were in effect on November 1, 2014,
rather than the fine provisions as
amended for inflation. This addition
responds to concerns expressed in
public comment that changes to the fine
tables might create ex post facto
problems. It ensures that an offender
whose offense level is calculated under
the current Guidelines Manual is not
subject to the inflated fine provisions if
his or her offense was committed prior
to November 1, 2015. Such guidance is
similar to that provided in the
commentary to § 5E1.3 (Special
Assessment) relating to the amount of
the special assessment to be imposed in
a given case.
3. Amendment: Section 2B1.1 is
amended in subsection (b)(2) by striking
the following:
‘‘(Apply the greatest) If the offense—
(A) (i) involved 10 or more victims; or
(ii) was committed through massmarketing, increase by 2 levels;
(B) involved 50 or more victims,
increase by 4 levels; or
(C) involved 250 or more victims,
increase by 6 levels.’’,
and inserting the following:
‘‘(Apply the greatest) If the offense—
(A) (i) involved 10 or more victims;
(ii) was committed through massmarketing; or (iii) resulted in substantial
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financial hardship to one or more
victims, increase by 2 levels;
(B) resulted in substantial financial
hardship to five or more victims,
increase by 4 levels; or
(C) resulted in substantial financial
hardship to 25 or more victims, increase
by 6 levels.’’;
in subsection (b)(10)(C) by inserting
after ‘‘the offense otherwise involved
sophisticated means’’ the following:
‘‘and the defendant intentionally
engaged in or caused the conduct
constituting sophisticated means’’;
and in subsection (b)(16)(B) by
inserting ‘‘or’’ at the end of subdivision
(i), and by striking ‘‘; or (iii)
substantially endangered the solvency
or financial security of 100 or more
victims’’.
The Commentary to § 2B1.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 3(A)(ii) by striking ‘‘(I) means the
pecuniary harm that was intended to
result from the offense; and’’ and
inserting ‘‘(I) means the pecuniary harm
that the defendant purposely sought to
inflict; and’’;
in Note 3(F)(ix) by striking ‘‘there
shall be a rebuttable presumption that
the actual loss attributable to the change
in value of the security or commodity is
the amount determined by—’’ and
inserting ‘‘the court in determining loss
may use any method that is appropriate
and practicable under the
circumstances. One such method the
court may consider is a method under
which the actual loss attributable to the
change in value of the security or
commodity is the amount determined
by—’’;
in Note 4 by striking ‘‘50 victims’’ and
inserting ‘‘10 victims’’ at subdivision
(C)(ii); and by inserting at the end the
following new subdivision (F):
‘‘(F) Substantial Financial
Hardship.—In determining whether the
offense resulted in substantial financial
hardship to a victim, the court shall
consider, among other factors, whether
the offense resulted in the victim—
(i) becoming insolvent;
(ii) filing for bankruptcy under the
Bankruptcy Code (title 11, United States
Code);
(iii) suffering substantial loss of a
retirement, education, or other savings
or investment fund;
(iv) making substantial changes to his
or her employment, such as postponing
his or her retirement plans;
(v) making substantial changes to his
or her living arrangements, such as
relocating to a less expensive home; and
(vi) suffering substantial harm to his
or her ability to obtain credit.’’;
in Note 9 by striking ‘‘Sophisticated
Means Enhancement under’’ in the
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heading and inserting ‘‘Application of’’;
and by inserting at the end of the
heading of subdivision (B) the
following: ‘‘under Subsection
(b)(10)(C)’’;
and in Note 20(A)(vi) by striking both
‘‘or credit record’’ and ‘‘or a damaged
credit record’’.
Reason for Amendment: This
amendment makes several changes to
the guideline applicable to economic
crimes, § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property
Destruction, and Fraud), to better
account for harm to victims, individual
culpability, and the offender’s intent.
This amendment is a result of the
Commission’s multi-year study of
§ 2B1.1 and related guidelines, and
follows extensive data collection and
analysis relating to economic offenses
and offenders. Using this Commission
data, combined with legal analysis and
public comment, the Commission
identified a number of specific areas
where changes were appropriate.
Victims Table
First, the amendment revises the
victims table in § 2B1.1(b)(2) to
specifically incorporate substantial
financial hardship to victims as a factor
in sentencing economic crime offenders.
As amended, the first tier of the victims
table provides for a 2-level enhancement
where the offense involved 10 or more
victims or mass-marketing, or if the
offense resulted in substantial financial
hardship to one or more victims. The 4level enhancement applies if the offense
resulted in substantial financial
hardship to five or more victims, and
the 6-level enhancement applies if the
offense resulted in substantial financial
hardship to 25 or more victims. As a
conforming change, the special rule in
Application Note 4(C)(ii)(I), pertaining
to theft of undelivered mail, is also
revised to refer to 10 rather than 50
victims.
In addition, the amendment adds a
non-exhaustive list of factors for courts
to consider in determining whether the
offense caused substantial financial
hardship. These factors include:
becoming insolvent; filing for
bankruptcy; suffering substantial loss of
a retirement, education, or other savings
or investment fund; making substantial
changes to employment; making
substantial changes to living
arrangements; or suffering substantial
harm to the victim’s ability to obtain
credit. Two conforming changes are also
included. First, one factor—substantial
harm to ability to obtain credit—was
previously included in Application
Note 20(A)(vi) as a potential departure
consideration. The amendment removes
this language from the Application
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Note. Second, the amendment deletes
subsection (b)(16)(B)(iii), which
provided for an enhancement where an
offense substantially endangered the
solvency or financial security of 100 or
more victims.
The Commission continues to believe
that the number of victims is a
meaningful measure of the harm and
scope of an offense and can be
indicative of its seriousness. It is for this
reason that the amended victims table
maintains the 2-level enhancement for
offenses that involve 10 or more victims
or mass marketing. However, the
revisions to the victims table also reflect
the Commission’s conclusion that the
guideline should place greater emphasis
on the extent of harm that particular
victims suffer as a result of the offense.
Consistent with the Commission’s
overall goal of focusing more on victim
harm, the revised victims table ensures
that an offense that results in even one
victim suffering substantial financial
harm receives increased punishment,
while also lessening the cumulative
impact of loss and the number of
victims, particularly in high-loss cases.
Intended Loss
Second, the amendment revises the
commentary at § 2B1.1, Application
Note 3(A)(ii), which has defined
intended loss as ‘‘pecuniary harm that
was intended to result from the
offense.’’ In interpreting this provision,
courts have expressed some
disagreement as to whether a subjective
or an objective inquiry is required.
Compare United States v. Manatau, 647
F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that
a subjective inquiry is required), United
States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d 147, 151 (3d
Cir. 2013) (‘‘To make this determination,
we look to the defendant’s subjective
expectation, not to the risk of loss to
which he may have exposed his
victims.’’), United States v. Confredo,
528 F.3d 143, 152 (2d Cir. 2008)
(remanding for consideration of whether
defendant had ‘‘proven a subjective
intent to cause a loss of less than the
aggregate amount’’ of fraudulent loans),
and United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d
511, 527 (5th Cir. 2003) (‘‘our case law
requires the government prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant had the subjective intent to
cause the loss that is used to calculate
his offense level’’), with United States v.
Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286, 291 (1st Cir.
2008) (‘‘we focus our loss inquiry for
purposes of determining a defendant’s
offense level on the objectively
reasonable expectation of a person in
his position at the time he perpetrated
the fraud, not on his subjective
intentions or hopes’’) and United States
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v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 590 (7th Cir.
2003) (‘‘The determination of intended
loss under the Sentencing Guidelines
therefore focuses on the conduct of the
defendant and the objective financial
risk to victims caused by that conduct’’).
The amendment adopts the approach
taken by the Tenth Circuit by revising
the commentary in Application Note
3(A)(ii) to provide that intended loss
means the pecuniary harm that ‘‘the
defendant purposely sought to inflict.’’
The amendment reflects the
Commission’s continued belief that
intended loss is an important factor in
economic crime offenses, but also
recognizes that sentencing
enhancements predicated on intended
loss, rather than losses that have
actually accrued, should focus more
specifically on the defendant’s
culpability.
Sophisticated Means
Third, the amendment narrows the
focus of the specific offense
characteristic at § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) to
cases in which the defendant
intentionally engaged in or caused
conduct constituting sophisticated
means. Prior to the amendment, the
enhancement applied if ‘‘the offense
otherwise involved sophisticated
means.’’ Based on this language, courts
had applied this enhancement on the
basis of the sophistication of the overall
scheme without a determination of
whether the defendant’s own conduct
was ‘‘sophisticated.’’ See, e.g., United
States v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 576 (7th
Cir. 2011); United States v. BishopOyedepo, 480 Fed. App’x 431, 433–34
(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. JenkinsWatt, 574 F.3d 950, 965 (8th Cir. 2009).
The Commission concluded that basing
the enhancement on the defendant’s
own intentional conduct better reflects
the defendant’s culpability and will
appropriately minimize application of
this enhancement to less culpable
offenders.
Fraud on the Market
Finally, the amendment revises the
special rule at Application Note 3(F)(ix)
relating to the calculation of loss in
cases involving the fraudulent inflation
or deflation in the value of a publicly
traded security or commodity. When
this special rule was added to the
guidelines, it established a rebuttable
presumption that the specified loss
calculation methodology provides a
reasonable estimate of the actual loss in
such cases. As amended, the method
provided in the special rule is no longer
the presumed starting point for
calculating loss in these cases. Instead,
the revised special rule states that the
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25791
provided method is one method that
courts may consider, but that courts, in
determining loss, are free to use any
method that is appropriate and
practicable under the circumstances.
This amendment reflects the
Commission’s view that the most
appropriate method to determine a
reasonable estimate of loss will often
vary in these highly complex and factintensive cases.
This amendment, in combination
with related revisions to the mitigating
role guideline at § 3B1.2 (Mitigating
Role), reflects the Commission’s overall
goal of focusing the economic crime
guideline more on qualitative harm to
victims and individual offender
culpability.
4. Amendment: Section 2D1.1(c) is
amended in each of subdivisions (5), (6),
(7), (8), and (9) by striking the lines
referenced to Schedule III Hydrocodone;
and in each of subdivisions (10), (11),
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), and (17) by
striking the lines referenced to Schedule
III Hydrocodone, and in the lines
referenced to Schedule III substances
(except Ketamine or Hydrocodone) by
striking ‘‘or Hydrocodone’’.
The annotation to § 2D1.1(c)
captioned ‘‘Notes to Drug Quantity
Table’’ is amended in Note (B) in the
last paragraph by striking ‘‘The term
‘Oxycodone (actual)’ refers’’ and
inserting ‘‘The terms ‘Hydrocodone
(actual)’ and ‘Oxycodone (actual)’
refer’’.
The Commentary to § 2D1.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 8(D), under the heading relating to
Schedule I or II Opiates, by striking the
line referenced to Hydrocodone/
Dihydrocodeinone and inserting the
following:
‘‘1 gm of Hydrocodone (actual) = 6700
gm of marihuana’’;
in the heading relating to Schedule III
Substances (except ketamine and
hydrocodone) by striking ‘‘and
hydrocodone’’ both places such term
appears;
and in the heading relating to Schedule
III Hydrocodone by striking the heading
and subsequent paragraphs as follows:
‘‘Schedule III Hydrocodone ****
1 unit of Schedule III hydrocodone = 1
gm of marihuana
**** Provided, that the combined
equivalent weight of all Schedule III
substances (except ketamine), Schedule
IV substances (except flunitrazepam),
and Schedule V substances shall not
exceed 2,999.99 kilograms of
marihuana.’’;
and in Note 27(C) by inserting after
‘‘methamphetamine,’’ the following:
‘‘hydrocodone,’’.
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Reason for Amendment: This
amendment changes the way the
primary drug trafficking guideline
calculates a defendant’s drug quantity in
cases involving hydrocodone in
response to recent administrative
actions by the Food and Drug
Administration and the Drug
Enforcement Administration. The
amendment adopts a marihuana
equivalency for hydrocodone (1 gram
equals 6700 grams of marihuana) based
on the weight of the hydrocodone alone.
In 2013 and 2014, the Food and Drug
Administration approved several new
pharmaceuticals containing
hydrocodone which can contain up to
twelve times as much hydrocodone in a
single pill than was previously
available. Separately, in October 2014,
the Drug Enforcement Administration
moved certain commonly-prescribed
pharmaceuticals containing
hydrocodone from the less-restricted
Schedule III to the more-restricted
Schedule II. Among other things, the
scheduling doubled the statutory
maximum term of imprisonment
available for trafficking in the
pharmaceuticals that were previously
controlled under Schedule III from 10
years to 20 years. The change also
rendered obsolete the entries in the
Drug Quantity Table and Drug
Equivalency Table in § 2D1.1 (Unlawful
Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or
Trafficking (Including Possession with
Intent to Commit These Offenses);
Attempt or Conspiracy) that set a
marihuana equivalency for the
pharmaceuticals that were previously
controlled under Schedule III.
As a result of these administrative
actions, all pharmaceuticals that include
hydrocodone are now subject to the
same statutory penalties. There is wide
variation in the amount of hydrocodone
available in these pharmaceuticals and
in the amount of other ingredients (such
as binders, coloring, acetaminophen,
etc.) they contain. This variation raises
significant proportionality issues within
§ 2D1.1, where drug quantity for
hydrocodone offenses has previously
been calculated based on the weight of
the entire substance that contains
hydrocodone or on the number of pills.
Neither of these calculations directly
took into account the amount of actual
hydrocodone in the pills.
The amendment addresses these
changed circumstances by setting a new
marihuana equivalency for hydrocodone
based on the weight of the hydrocodone
alone. Without this change, defendants
with less actual hydrocodone could
have received a higher guideline range
than those with more hydrocodone
because pills with less hydrocodone can
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sometimes contain more nonhydrocodone ingredients, leading the
lower-dose pills to weigh more.
In setting the marihuana equivalency,
the Commission considered: Potency of
the drug, medical use of the drug, and
patterns of abuse and trafficking, such
as prevalence of abuse, consequences of
misuse including death or serious
bodily injury from use, and incidence of
violence associated with its trafficking.
The Commission noted that the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s
rescheduling decision relied in part on
the close relationship between
hydrocodone and oxycodone, a similar
and commonly-prescribed drug that was
already controlled under Schedule II.
Scientific literature, public comment,
and testimony supported the conclusion
that the potency, medical use, and
patterns of abuse and trafficking of
hydrocodone are very similar to
oxycodone. In particular, the
Commission heard testimony from
abuse liability specialists and reviewed
scientific literature indicating that, in
studies conducted under standards
established by the Food and Drug
Administration for determining the
abuse liability of a particular drug, the
potencies of hydrocodone and
oxycodone when abused are virtually
identical, even though some physicians
who prescribe the two drugs in a
clinical setting might not prescribe them
in equal doses. Public comment
indicated that both hydrocodone and
oxycodone are among the top ten drugs
most frequently encountered by law
enforcement and that their methods of
diversion and rates of diversion per
kilogram of available drug are similar.
Public comment and review of the
scientific literature also indicated that
the users of the two drugs share similar
characteristics, and that some users may
use them interchangeably, a situation
which may become more common as
the more powerful pharmaceuticals
recently approved by the Food and Drug
Administration become available.
Based on proportionality
considerations and the Commission’s
assessment that, for purposes of the
drug guideline, hydrocodone and
oxycodone should be treated
equivalently, the amendment adopts a
marihuana equivalency for hydrocodone
(actual) that is the same as the existing
equivalency for oxycodone (actual): 1
gram equals 6,700 grams of marihuana.
5. Amendment: The Commentary to
§ 3B1.2 captioned ‘‘Application Notes’’
is amended in Note 3(A) by inserting
after ‘‘that makes him substantially less
culpable than the average participant’’
the following: ‘‘in the criminal activity’’,
by striking ‘‘concerted’’ and inserting
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‘‘the’’, by striking ‘‘is not precluded
from consideration for’’ each place such
term appears and inserting ‘‘may
receive’’, by striking ‘‘role’’ both places
such term appears and inserting
‘‘participation’’, and by striking
‘‘personal gain from a fraud offense and
who had limited knowledge’’ and
inserting ‘‘personal gain from a fraud
offense or who had limited knowledge’’;
in Note 3(C) by inserting at the end the
following new paragraphs:
‘‘In determining whether to apply
subsection (a) or (b), or an intermediate
adjustment, the court should consider
the following non-exhaustive list of
factors:
(i) the degree to which the defendant
understood the scope and structure of
the criminal activity;
(ii) the degree to which the defendant
participated in planning or organizing
the criminal activity;
(iii) the degree to which the defendant
exercised decision-making authority or
influenced the exercise of decisionmaking authority;
(iv) the nature and extent of the
defendant’s participation in the
commission of the criminal activity,
including the acts the defendant
performed and the responsibility and
discretion the defendant had in
performing those acts;
(v) the degree to which the defendant
stood to benefit from the criminal
activity.
For example, a defendant who does
not have a proprietary interest in the
criminal activity and who is simply
being paid to perform certain tasks
should be considered for an adjustment
under this guideline.
The fact that a defendant performs an
essential or indispensable role in the
criminal activity is not determinative.
Such a defendant may receive an
adjustment under this guideline if he or
she is substantially less culpable than
the average participant in the criminal
activity.’’;
in Note 4 by striking ‘‘concerted’’ and
inserting ‘‘the criminal’’;
and in Note 5 by inserting after ‘‘than
most other participants’’ the following:
‘‘in the criminal activity’’.
Reason for Amendment: This
amendment is a result of the
Commission’s study of § 3B1.2
(Mitigating Role). The Commission
conducted a review of cases involving
low-level offenders, analyzed case law,
and considered public comment and
testimony. Overall, the study found that
mitigating role is applied inconsistently
and more sparingly than the
Commission intended. In drug cases, the
Commission’s study confirmed that
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mitigating role is applied inconsistently
to drug defendants who performed
similar low-level functions (and that
rates of application vary widely from
district to district). For example,
application of mitigating role varies
along the southwest border, with a low
of 14.3 percent of couriers and mules
receiving the mitigating role adjustment
in one district compared to a high of
97.2 percent in another. Moreover,
among drug defendants who do receive
mitigating role, there are differences
from district to district in application
rates of the 2-, 3-, and 4-level
adjustments. In economic crime cases,
the study found that the adjustment was
often applied in a limited fashion. For
example, the study found that courts
often deny mitigating role to otherwise
eligible defendants if the defendant was
considered ‘‘integral’’ to the successful
commission of the offense.
This amendment provides additional
guidance to sentencing courts in
determining whether a mitigating role
adjustment applies. Specifically, it
addresses a circuit conflict and other
case law that may be discouraging
courts from applying the adjustment in
otherwise appropriate circumstances. It
also provides a non-exhaustive list of
factors for the court to consider in
determining whether an adjustment
applies and, if so, the amount of the
adjustment.
Section 3B1.2 provides an adjustment
of 2, 3, or 4 levels for a defendant who
plays a part in committing the offense
that makes him or her ‘‘substantially
less culpable than the average
participant.’’ However, there are
differences among the circuits about
what determining the ‘‘average
participant’’ requires. The Seventh and
Ninth Circuits have concluded that the
‘‘average participant’’ means only those
persons who actually participated in the
criminal activity at issue in the
defendant’s case, so that the defendant’s
relative culpability is determined only
by reference to his or her co-participants
in the case at hand. See, e.g., United
States v. Benitez, 34 F.3d 1489, 1498
(9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Cantrell, 433 F.3d 1269, 1283 (9th Cir.
2006); United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d
1201, 1214 (7th Cir. 1993). The First and
Second Circuits have concluded that the
‘‘average participant’’ also includes ‘‘the
universe of persons participating in
similar crimes.’’ See United States v.
Santos, 357 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir.
2004); see also United States v.
Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 159 (2d Cir.
1999). Under this latter approach, courts
will ordinarily consider the defendant’s
culpability relative both to his coparticipants and to the typical offender.
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The amendment generally adopts the
approach of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, revising the commentary to
specify that, when determining
mitigating role, the defendant is to be
compared with the other participants
‘‘in the criminal activity.’’ Focusing the
court’s attention on the individual
defendant and the other participants is
more consistent with the other
provisions of Chapter Three, Part B. See,
e.g., § 3B1.2 (the adjustment is based on
‘‘the defendant’s role in the offense’’);
§ 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(C)) (a
determination about mitigating role ‘‘is
heavily dependent upon the facts of the
particular case’’); Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro.
comment. (the determination about
mitigating role ‘‘is to be made on the
basis of all conduct within the scope of
§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)’’).
Next, the amendment addresses cases
in which the defendant was ‘‘integral’’
or ‘‘indispensable’’ to the commission of
the offense. Public comment suggested,
and a review of case law confirmed, that
in some cases a defendant may be
denied a mitigating role adjustment
solely because he or she was ‘‘integral’’
or ‘‘indispensable’’ to the commission of
the offense. See, e.g., United States v.
Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783–84 (6th Cir.
2012) (a ‘‘defendant who plays a lesser
role in a criminal scheme may
nonetheless fail to qualify as a minor
participant if his role was indispensible
or critical to the success of the
scheme’’); United States v. PanaiguaVerdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 725 (7th Cir.
2008) (defendant ‘‘played an integral
part in the transactions and therefore
did not deserve a minor participant
reduction’’); United States v. Deans, 590
F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2010)
(‘‘Numerous decisions have upheld the
denial of minor role adjustments to
defendants who . . . play a critical
role’’); United States v. Carter, 971 F.2d
597, 600 (10th Cir. 1992) (because
defendant was ‘‘indispensible to the
completion of the criminal activity . . .
to debate which one is less culpable
than the others . . . is akin to the old
argument over which leg of a threelegged stool is the most important leg.’’).
However, a finding that the defendant
was essential to the offense does not
alter the requirement, expressed in Note
3(A), that the court must assess the
defendant’s culpability relative to the
average participant in the offense.
Accordingly, the amendment revises the
commentary to emphasize that ‘‘the fact
that a defendant performs an essential
or indispensable role in the criminal
activity is not determinative’’ and that
such a defendant may receive a
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mitigating role adjustment, if he or she
is otherwise eligible.
The amendment also revises two
paragraphs in Note 3(A) that illustrate
how mitigating role interacts with
relevant conduct principles in § 1B1.3.
Specifically, the illustrations provide
that certain types of defendants are ‘‘not
precluded from consideration for’’ a
mitigating role adjustment. The
amendment revises these paragraphs to
state that these types of defendants
‘‘may receive’’ a mitigating role
adjustment. The Commission
determined that the double-negative
tone (‘‘not precluded’’) may have had
the unintended effect of discouraging
courts from applying the mitigating role
adjustment in otherwise appropriate
circumstances.
Finally, the amendment provides a
non-exhaustive list of factors for the
court to consider in determining
whether to apply a mitigating role
adjustment and, if so, the amount of the
adjustment. The factors direct the court
to consider the degree to which the
defendant understood the scope and
structure of the criminal activity,
participated in planning or organizing
the criminal activity, and exercised
decision-making authority, as well as
the acts the defendant performed and
the degree to which he or she stood to
benefit from the criminal activity. The
Commission was persuaded by public
comment and a detailed review of cases
involving low-level offenders,
particularly in fraud cases, that
providing a list of factors will give the
courts a common framework for
determining whether to apply a
mitigating role adjustment (and, if so,
the amount of the adjustment) and will
help promote consistency.
The amendment further provides, as
an example, that a defendant who does
not have a proprietary interest in the
criminal activity and who is simply
being paid to perform certain tasks
should be considered for a mitigating
role adjustment.
6. Amendment: The Commentary to
§ 2L1.2 captioned ‘‘Application Notes’’
is amended in Note 4(B) by striking ‘‘not
counted as a single sentence’’ and
inserting ‘‘not treated as a single
sentence’’.
Section 4A1.1(e) is amended by
striking ‘‘such sentence was counted as
a single sentence’’ and inserting ‘‘such
sentence was treated as a single
sentence’’.
The Commentary to § 4A1.1 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 5 by striking ‘‘are counted as a
single sentence’’ and inserting ‘‘are
treated as a single sentence’’; and by
striking ‘‘are counted as a single prior
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sentence’’ and inserting ‘‘are treated as
a single prior sentence’’.
Section 4A1.2(a)(2) is amended by
striking ‘‘those sentences are counted
separately or as a single sentence’’ and
inserting ‘‘those sentences are counted
separately or treated as a single
sentence’’; by striking ‘‘Count any prior
sentence’’ and inserting ‘‘Treat any prior
sentence’’; and by striking ‘‘if prior
sentences are counted as a single
sentence’’ and inserting ‘‘if prior
sentences are treated as a single
sentence’’.
The Commentary to § 4A1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 3 by redesignating Note 3 as Note
3(B), and by inserting at the beginning
the following:
‘‘ Application of ‘Single Sentence’
Rule (Subsection (a)(2)).—
(A) Predicate Offenses.—In some
cases, multiple prior sentences are
treated as a single sentence for purposes
of calculating the criminal history score
under § 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c). However,
for purposes of determining predicate
offenses, a prior sentence included in
the single sentence should be treated as
if it received criminal history points, if
it independently would have received
criminal history points. Therefore, an
individual prior sentence may serve as
a predicate under the career offender
guideline (see § 4B1.2(c)) or other
guidelines with predicate offenses, if it
independently would have received
criminal history points. However,
because predicate offenses may be used
only if they are counted ‘‘separately’’
from each other (see § 4B1.2(c)), no
more than one prior sentence in a given
single sentence may be used as a
predicate offense.
For example, a defendant’s criminal
history includes one robbery conviction
and one theft conviction. The sentences
for these offenses were imposed on the
same day, eight years ago, and are
treated as a single sentence under
§ 4A1.2(a)(2). If the defendant received
a one-year sentence of imprisonment for
the robbery and a two-year sentence of
imprisonment for the theft, to be served
concurrently, a total of 3 points is added
under § 4A1.1(a). Because this particular
robbery met the definition of a felony
crime of violence and independently
would have received 2 criminal history
points under § 4A1.1(b), it may serve as
a predicate under the career offender
guideline.
Note, however, that if the sentences in
the example above were imposed
thirteen years ago, the robbery
independently would have received no
criminal history points under
§ 4A1.1(b), because it was not imposed
within ten years of the defendant’s
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commencement of the instant offense.
See § 4A1.2(e)(2). Accordingly, it may
not serve as a predicate under the career
offender guideline.’’;
and in Note 3(B) (as so redesignated)
by striking ‘‘Counting multiple prior
sentences as a single sentence’’ and
inserting ‘‘Treating multiple prior
sentences as a single sentence’’; and by
striking ‘‘and the resulting sentences
were counted as a single sentence’’ and
inserting ‘‘and the resulting sentences
were treated as a single sentence’’.
The Commentary to § 4B1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by striking ‘‘the sentences for the
two prior convictions will be counted as
a single sentence’’ and inserting ‘‘the
sentences for the two prior convictions
will be treated as a single sentence’’.
Reason for Amendment: This
amendment responds to a circuit
conflict regarding the meaning of the
‘‘single sentence’’ rule, set forth in
subsection (a)(2) of § 4A1.2 (Definitions
and Instructions for Computing
Criminal History), and its implications
for the career offender guideline and
other guidelines that provide sentencing
enhancements for predicate offenses.
When the defendant’s criminal
history includes two or more prior
sentences that meet certain criteria
specified in § 4A1.2(a)(2), those prior
sentences are counted as a ‘‘single
sentence’’ rather than separately.
Generally, this operates to reduce the
cumulative impact of prior sentences in
determining a defendant’s criminal
history score. Courts, however, are
divided over whether this ‘‘single
sentence’’ rule also causes certain prior
convictions that ordinarily would
qualify as predicate offenses under the
career offender guideline to be
disqualified from serving as predicate
offenses. See § 4B1.2 (Definitions of
Terms Used in Section 4B1.1),
comment. (n.3).
In 2010, in King v. United States, the
Eighth Circuit held that when two or
more prior sentences are treated as a
single sentence under the guidelines, all
the criminal history points attributable
to the single sentence are assigned to
only one of the prior sentences—
specifically, the one that was the
longest. King, 595 F.3d 844, 852 (8th Cir.
2010). Accordingly, only that prior
sentence may be considered a predicate
offense for purposes of the career
offender guideline. Id. at 849, 852.
In 2014, in United States v. Williams,
a panel of the Sixth Circuit considered
and rejected King, because it permitted
the defendant to ‘‘evade career offender
status because he committed more
crimes.’’ Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 639
(6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original).
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See also United States v. Cornog, 945
F.2d 1504, 1506 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (‘‘It
would be illogical . . . to ignore a
conviction for a violent felony just
because it happened to be coupled with
a nonviolent felony conviction having a
longer sentence.’’).
After the Williams decision, a
different panel of the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s analysis
but was not in a position to overrule the
earlier panel’s decision in King. See
Donnell v. United States, 765 F.3d 817,
820 (8th Cir. 2014). The Eighth Circuit
has applied the analysis from King to a
case involving the firearms guideline
and to a case in which the prior
sentences were consecutive rather than
concurrent. See, e.g., Pierce v. United
States, 686 F.3d 529, 533 n.3 (8th Cir.
2012) (firearms); United States v.
Parker, 762 F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir. 2014)
(consecutive sentences). This issue has
also been addressed by other courts,
some which have followed the Sixth
Circuit’s approach in Williams. See, e.g.,
United States v. Carr, 2013 WL 4855341
(N.D. Ga. 2013); United States v. Agurs,
2014 WL 3735584 (W.D. Pa., July 28,
2014). Other decisions have been
consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s
approach in King. See, e.g., United
States v. Santiago, 387 F. App’x 223 (3d
Cir. 2010); United States v. McQueen,
2014 WL 3749215 (E.D. Wash., July 28,
2014).
The amendment generally follows the
Sixth Circuit’s approach in Williams. It
amends the commentary to § 4A1.2 to
provide that, for purposes of
determining predicate offenses, a prior
sentence included in a single sentence
should be treated as if it received
criminal history points if it
independently would have received
criminal history points. It also provides
examples, including an example to
illustrate the potential impact of the
applicable time periods prescribed in
§ 4A1.2(e). Finally, §§ 4A1.1 (Criminal
History Category) and 4A1.2 are revised
stylistically so that sentences ‘‘counted’’
as a single sentence are referred to
instead as sentences ‘‘treated’’ as a
single sentence.
The amendment ensures that those
defendants who have committed more
crimes, in addition to a predicate
offense, remain subject to enhanced
penalties under certain guidelines such
as the career offender guideline.
Conversely, by clarifying how the single
sentence rule interacts with the time
limits set forth in § 4A1.2(e), the
amendment provides that when a prior
sentence was so remote in time that it
does not independently receive criminal
history points, it cannot serve as a
predicate offense.
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7. Amendment: The Commentary to
§ 1B1.11 captioned ‘‘Background’’ is
amended by striking ‘‘144 S. Ct.’’ and
inserting ‘‘133 S. Ct.’’.
The Commentary to § 2B4.1 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘41 U.S.C. 53, 54’’ and inserting
‘‘41 U.S.C. 8702, 8707’’.
The Commentary to § 2B4.1 captioned
‘‘Background’’ is amended by striking
‘‘41 U.S.C. 51, 53–54’’ and inserting ‘‘41
U.S.C. 8702, 8707’’.
The Commentary to § 2C1.8 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘2 U.S.C.’’ and all that follows
through ‘‘441k;’’ and after ‘‘18 U.S.C.
607’’ inserting ‘‘; 52 U.S.C. 30109(d),
30114, 30116, 30117, 30118, 30119,
30120, 30121, 30122, 30123, 30124(a),
30125, 30126’’; and by striking
‘‘Statutory Index (Appendix A)’’ and
inserting ‘‘Appendix A (Statutory
Index)’’.
The Commentary to § 2C1.8 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 1 by striking ‘‘2 U.S.C. 441e(b)’’
and inserting ‘‘52 U.S.C. 30121(b)’’; by
striking ‘‘2 U.S.C. 431 et seq’’ and
inserting ‘‘52 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.’’; and
by striking ‘‘(2 U.S.C. 431(8) and (9))’’
and inserting ‘‘(52 U.S.C. 30101(8) and
(9))’’.
Section 2D1.11(e)(7) is amended in
the line referenced to
Norpseudoephedrine by striking ‘‘400’’
and inserting ‘‘400 G’’.
The Commentary to § 2H2.1 captioned
‘‘Statutory Provisions’’ is amended by
striking ‘‘42 U.S.C. 1973i, 1973j(a), (b)’’
and inserting ‘‘52 U.S.C. 10307,
10308(a), (b)’’.
The Commentary to § 2H4.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 2 by striking ‘‘et. seq.’’ and
inserting ‘‘et seq.’’.
The Commentary to § 2M3.9 is
amended by striking ‘‘§ 421’’ each place
such term appears and inserting
‘‘§ 3121’’; and by striking ‘‘§ 421(d)’’ and
inserting ‘‘§ 3121(d)’’.
The Commentary following § 3D1.5
captioned ‘‘Illustrations of the
Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules’’
is amended by striking the heading as
follows:
‘‘Illustrations of the Operation of the
Multiple-Count Rules’’,
and inserting the following new
heading:
‘‘Concluding Commentary to Part D of
Chapter Three
Illustrations of the Operation of the
Multiple-Count Rules’’;
in Example 1 by striking ‘‘convicted
on’’ and inserting ‘‘convicted of’’; and
by striking ‘‘$12,000’’ and inserting
‘‘$21,000’’;
in Example 2 by striking ‘‘Defendant
C’’ and inserting ‘‘Defendant B’’; by
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striking ‘‘convicted on’’ and inserting
‘‘convicted of’’; and by striking ‘‘offense
level for bribery (22)’’ and inserting
‘‘offense level for bribery (20)’’;
and in Example 3 by striking
‘‘Defendant D’’ and inserting
‘‘Defendant C’’; by striking ‘‘$27,000’’,
‘‘$12,000’’, ‘‘$15,000’’, and ‘‘$20,000’’
and inserting ‘‘$1,000’’ in each place
such terms appear; by striking
‘‘$74,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$4,000’’; and
by striking ‘‘16’’ both places such term
appears and inserting ‘‘9’’.
The Commentary to § 5E1.2 captioned
‘‘Application Notes’’ is amended in
Note 5 by striking ‘‘2 U.S.C.
437g(d)(1)(D)’’ and inserting ‘‘52 U.S.C.
30109(d)(1)(D)’’; and by striking ‘‘2
U.S.C. 441f’’ and inserting ‘‘52 U.S.C.
30122’’.
Appendix A (Statutory Index) is
amended by striking the following line
references:
‘‘2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 439a 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441a
2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441a–1 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441b 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441c 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441d 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441e 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441f 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441g 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441h(a) 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441i 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. § 441k 2C1.8’’,
and inserting at the end the following
new line references:
‘‘52 U.S.C. § 30109(d) 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30114 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30116 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30117 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30118 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30119 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30120 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30121 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30122 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30123 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30124(a) 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30125 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. § 30126 2C1.8’’;
by striking the following line
references:
‘‘42 U.S.C. § 1973i(c) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973i(d) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973j(a) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973j(b) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973j(c) 2X1.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa–1 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa–1a 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973aa–3 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973bb 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–10 2H2.1’’,
and inserting after the line referenced
to 50 U.S.C. App. § 2410 the following
new line references:
‘‘52 U.S.C. § 10307(c) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10307(d) 2H2.1
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52 U.S.C. § 10307(e) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10308(a) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10308(b) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10308(c) 2X1.1
52 U.S.C. § 10501 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10502 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10503 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10505 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 10701 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. § 20511 2H2.1’’;
and by striking the line referenced to
50 U.S.C. 421 and inserting after the line
referenced to 50 U.S.C. 1705 the
following new line reference:
‘‘50 U.S.C. § 3121
2M3.9’’.
Reason for Amendment: This
amendment makes certain technical
changes to the Guidelines Manual.
First, the amendment sets forth
technical changes to reflect the editorial
reclassification of certain sections in the
United States Code. Effective February
2014, the Office of the Law Revision
Counsel transferred provisions relating
to voting and elections from titles 2 and
42 to a new title 52. It also transferred
provisions of the National Security Act
of 1947 from one place to another in
title 50. To reflect the new section
numbers of the reclassified provisions,
changes are made to—
(1) the Commentary to § 2C1.8
(Making, Receiving, or Failing to Report
a Contribution, Donation, or
Expenditure in Violation of the Federal
Election Campaign Act; Fraudulently
Misrepresenting Campaign Authority;
Soliciting or Receiving a Donation in
Connection with an Election While on
Certain Federal Property);
(2) the Commentary to § 2H2.1
(Obstructing an Election or
Registration);
(3) the Commentary to § 2M3.9
(Disclosure of Information Identifying a
Covert Agent);
(4) Application Note 5 to § 5E1.2
(Fines for Individual Defendants); and
(5) Appendix A (Statutory Index).
Second, it makes stylistic and
technical changes to the Commentary
following § 3D1.5 (Determining the
Total Punishment) captioned
‘‘Illustrations of the Operation of the
Multiple-Count Rules’’ to better reflect
its purpose as a concluding commentary
to Part D of Chapter Three.
Finally, it makes clerical changes to—
(1) the Background Commentary to
§ 1B1.11 (Use of Guidelines Manual in
Effect on Date of Sentencing (Policy
Statement)), to correct a typographical
error in a U.S. Reports citation;
(2) the Commentary to § 2B4.1
(Bribery in Procurement of Bank Loan
and Other Commercial Bribery), to
correct certain United States Code
citations to correspond with their
respective references in Appendix A
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that were revised by Amendment 769
(effective November 1, 2012);
(3) subsection (e)(7) to § 2D1.11
(Unlawfully Distributing, Importing,
Exporting or Possessing a Listed
Chemical; Attempt or Conspiracy), to
add a missing measurement unit to the
line referencing Norpseudoephedrine;
and
(4) Application Note 2 to § 2H4.2
(Willful Violations of the Migrant and
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection
Act), to correct a typographical error in
an abbreviation.
[FR Doc. 2015–10516 Filed 5–4–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 2210–40–P
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
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[OMB Control No. 2900–0165]
Agency Information Collection
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Under OMB Review
The Office of Management,
Department of Veterans Affairs.
ACTION: Notice.
AGENCY:
In compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501–3521), this notice
announces that The Office of
Management, Department of Veterans
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information abstracted below to the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review and comment. The
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the information collection and its
expected cost and burden; it includes
the actual data collection instrument.
DATES: Comments must be submitted on
or before June 4, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Submit written comments
on the collection of information through
www.Regulations.gov, or to Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, Attn:
VA Desk Officer; 725 17th St. NW.,
Washington, DC 20503 or sent through
electronic mail to oira_submission@
omb.eop.gov. Please refer to ‘‘OMB
Control No. 2900–0165’’ in any
correspondence. During the comment
period, comments may be viewed online
through the FDMS.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Crystal Rennie, Enterprise Records
Service (005R1B), Department of
Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Avenue
NW., Washington, DC 20420, (202) 632–
7492 or email crystal.rennie@va.gov.
Please refer to ‘‘OMB Control No. 2900–
0165’’ in any correspondence.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Title: Financial Status Report.
OMB Control Number: 2900–0165.
PO 00000
Frm 00137
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 9990
Type of Review: Revision of a
currently approved collection.
Abstract: Claimants complete VA
Form 5655 to report their financial
status. VA uses the data collected to
determine the claimant’s eligibility for a
waiver of collection, setup a payment
plan or for the acceptance of a
compromise offer on their VA benefit
debt.
An agency may not conduct or
sponsor, and a person is not required to
respond to a collection of information
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number. The Federal Register
Notice with a 60-day comment period
soliciting comments on this collection
of information was published at 80 FR
7529 on February 10, 2015.
Affected Public: Individuals and
Households.
Estimated Annual Burden: 95,570
hours.
Estimated Average Burden per
Respondent: 1 hour.
Frequency of Response: Annually.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
95,570.
By direction of the Secretary.
Crystal Rennie,
VA Clearance Officer, Department of Veterans
Affairs.
[FR Doc. 2015–10461 Filed 5–4–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8320–01–P
E:\FR\FM\05MYN1.SGM
05MYN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 86 (Tuesday, May 5, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 25782-25796]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-10516]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts
AGENCY: United States Sentencing Commission.
ACTION: Notice of submission to Congress of amendments to the
sentencing guidelines effective November 1, 2015.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: Pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. 994(p), the
Commission has promulgated amendments to the sentencing guidelines,
policy statements, commentary, and statutory index. This notice sets
forth the amendments and the reason for each amendment.
DATES: The Commission has specified an effective date of November 1,
2015, for the amendments set forth in this notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeanne Doherty, Public Affairs
Officer, (202) 502-4502, jdoherty@ussc.gov. The amendments set forth in
this notice also may be accessed through the Commission's Web site at
www.ussc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The United States Sentencing Commission is
an independent agency in the judicial branch of the United States
Government. The Commission promulgates sentencing guidelines and policy
statements for federal sentencing courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a).
The Commission also periodically reviews and revises previously
promulgated guidelines pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) and generally
submits guideline amendments to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(p)
not later than the first day of May each year. Absent action of
Congress to the contrary, submitted amendments become effective by
operation of law on the date specified by the Commission (generally
November 1 of the year in which the amendments are submitted to
Congress).
Notice of proposed amendments was published in the Federal Register
on January 16, 2015 (see 80 FR 2569 through 2590). The Commission held
a public hearing on the proposed amendments in Washington, DC, on March
12, 2015. On April 30, 2015, the Commission submitted these amendments
to Congress and specified an effective date of November 1, 2015.
[[Page 25783]]
Authority: 28 U.S.C. 994(a), (o), and (p); USSC Rules of
Practice and Procedure 4.1.
Patti B. Saris,
Chair.
1. Amendment: Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) is amended by striking ``all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of
the jointly undertaken criminal activity,'' and inserting the
following:
``all acts and omissions of others that were--
(i) within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity;''.
The Commentary to Sec. 1B1.3 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended by striking Note 2 as follows:
``2. A `jointly undertaken criminal activity' is a criminal plan,
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert
with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy.
In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection
(a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct
(acts and omissions) of others that was both:
(A) In furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and
(B) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity.
Because a count may be worded broadly and include the conduct of
many participants over a period of time, the scope of the criminal
activity jointly undertaken by the defendant (the `jointly undertaken
criminal activity') is not necessarily the same as the scope of the
entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the
same for every participant. In order to determine the defendant's
accountability for the conduct of others under subsection (a)(1)(B),
the court must first determine the scope of the criminal activity the
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of
the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's
agreement). The conduct of others that was both in furtherance of, and
reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the criminal activity
jointly undertaken by the defendant is relevant conduct under this
provision. The conduct of others that was not in furtherance of the
criminal activity jointly undertaken by the defendant, or was not
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity, is
not relevant conduct under this provision.
In determining the scope of the criminal activity that the
particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e., the scope of
the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the defendant's
agreement), the court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit
agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.
Note that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to
jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in
furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily identical.
For example, two defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the
course of that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a
victim. The second defendant is accountable for the assault and injury
to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed to the
assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt
anyone) because the assaultive conduct was in furtherance of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature
of the offense).
With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled
substances), the defendant is accountable for all quantities of
contraband with which he was directly involved and, in the case of a
jointly undertaken criminal activity, all reasonably foreseeable
quantities of contraband that were within the scope of the criminal
activity that he jointly undertook.
The requirement of reasonable foreseeability applies only in
respect to the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of others under
subsection (a)(1)(B). It does not apply to conduct that the defendant
personally undertakes, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
procures, or willfully causes; such conduct is addressed under
subsection (a)(1)(A).
A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of
members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy,
even if the defendant knows of that conduct (e.g., in the case of a
defendant who joins an ongoing drug distribution conspiracy knowing
that it had been selling two kilograms of cocaine per week, the cocaine
sold prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy is not included as
relevant conduct in determining the defendant's offense level). The
Commission does not foreclose the possibility that there may be some
unusual set of circumstances in which the exclusion of such conduct may
not adequately reflect the defendant's culpability; in such a case, an
upward departure may be warranted.
Illustrations of Conduct for Which the Defendant Is Accountable
(a) Acts and Omissions Aided or Abetted by the Defendant
(1) Defendant A is one of ten persons hired by Defendant B to off-
load a ship containing marihuana. The off-loading of the ship is
interrupted by law enforcement officers and one ton of marihuana is
seized (the amount on the ship as well as the amount off-loaded).
Defendant A and the other off-loaders are arrested and convicted of
importation of marihuana. Regardless of the number of bales he
personally unloaded, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-ton
quantity of marihuana. Defendant A aided and abetted the off-loading of
the entire shipment of marihuana by directly participating in the off-
loading of that shipment (i.e., the specific objective of the criminal
activity he joined was the off-loading of the entire shipment).
Therefore, he is accountable for the entire shipment under subsection
(a)(1)(A) without regard to the issue of reasonable foreseeability.
This is conceptually similar to the case of a defendant who transports
a suitcase knowing that it contains a controlled substance and,
therefore, is accountable for the controlled substance in the suitcase
regardless of his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the actual type or
amount of that controlled substance.
In certain cases, a defendant may be accountable for particular
conduct under more than one subsection of this guideline. As noted in
the preceding paragraph, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-
ton shipment of marihuana under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant A also
is accountable for the entire one-ton shipment of marihuana on the
basis of subsection (a)(1)(B)(applying to a jointly undertaken criminal
activity). Defendant A engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal
activity (the scope of which was the importation of the shipment of
marihuana). A finding that the one-ton quantity of marihuana was
reasonably foreseeable is warranted from the nature of the undertaking
itself (the importation of marihuana by ship typically involves very
large quantities of marihuana). The specific circumstances of the case
(the defendant was one of ten persons off-loading the marihuana in
bales) also support this finding. In an actual case, of course, if a
defendant's accountability for particular conduct is established under
one provision of this guideline, it is not necessary to review
alternative provisions under which such accountability might be
established.
[[Page 25784]]
(b) Acts and Omissions Aided or Abetted by the Defendant; Requirement
That the Conduct of Others Be in Furtherance of the Jointly Undertaken
Criminal Activity and Reasonably Foreseeable
(1) Defendant C is the getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in
which $15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted and injured. Defendant
C is accountable for the money taken under subsection (a)(1)(A) because
he aided and abetted the act of taking the money (the taking of money
was the specific objective of the offense he joined). Defendant C is
accountable for the injury to the teller under subsection (a)(1)(B)
because the assault on the teller was in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably
foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature
of the offense).
As noted earlier, a defendant may be accountable for particular
conduct under more than one subsection. In this example, Defendant C
also is accountable for the money taken on the basis of subsection
(a)(1)(B) because the taking of money was in furtherance of the jointly
undertaken criminal activity (the robbery) and was reasonably
foreseeable (as noted, the taking of money was the specific objective
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity).
(c) Requirement That the Conduct of Others Be in Furtherance of the
Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity and Reasonably Foreseeable; Scope
of the Criminal Activity
(1) Defendant D pays Defendant E a small amount to forge an
endorsement on an $800 stolen government check. Unknown to Defendant E,
Defendant D then uses that check as a down payment in a scheme to
fraudulently obtain $15,000 worth of merchandise. Defendant E is
convicted of forging the $800 check and is accountable for the forgery
of this check under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant E is not
accountable for the $15,000 because the fraudulent scheme to obtain
$15,000 was not in furtherance of the criminal activity he jointly
undertook with Defendant D (i.e., the forgery of the $800 check).
(2) Defendants F and G, working together, design and execute a
scheme to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone. Defendant F fraudulently
obtains $20,000. Defendant G fraudulently obtains $35,000. Each is
convicted of mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are accountable for
the entire amount ($55,000). Each defendant is accountable for the
amount he personally obtained under subsection (a)(1)(A). Each
defendant is accountable for the amount obtained by his accomplice
under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the conduct of each was in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity and was
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
(3) Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marihuana importation
conspiracy in which Defendant J was hired only to help off-load a
single shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are included in a single count
charging conspiracy to import marihuana. Defendant J is accountable for
the entire single shipment of marihuana he helped import under
subsection (a)(1)(A) and any acts and omissions in furtherance of the
importation of that shipment that were reasonably foreseeable (see the
discussion in example (a)(1) above). He is not accountable for prior or
subsequent shipments of marihuana imported by Defendants H or I because
those acts were not in furtherance of his jointly undertaken criminal
activity (the importation of the single shipment of marihuana).
(4) Defendant K is a wholesale distributor of child pornography.
Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who purchases child pornography
from Defendant K and resells it, but otherwise operates independently
of Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is a retail-level dealer who
purchases child pornography from Defendant K and resells it, but
otherwise operates independently of Defendant K. Defendants L and M are
aware of each other's criminal activity but operate independently.
Defendant N is Defendant K's assistant who recruits customers for
Defendant K and frequently supervises the deliveries to Defendant K's
customers. Each defendant is convicted of a count charging conspiracy
to distribute child pornography. Defendant K is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(A) for the entire quantity of child pornography sold
to Defendants L and M. Defendant N also is accountable for the entire
quantity sold to those defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B) because
the entire quantity was within the scope of his jointly undertaken
criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable. Defendant L is
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child
pornography that he purchased from Defendant K because the scope of his
jointly undertaken criminal activity is limited to that amount. For the
same reason, Defendant M is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only
for the quantity of child pornography that he purchased from Defendant
K.
(5) Defendant O knows about her boyfriend's ongoing drug-
trafficking activity, but agrees to participate on only one occasion by
making a delivery for him at his request when he was ill. Defendant O
is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for the drug quantity
involved on that one occasion. Defendant O is not accountable for the
other drug sales made by her boyfriend because those sales were not in
furtherance of her jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the one
delivery).
(6) Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who knows of other
street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell the same
type of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other dealers share a
common source of supply, but otherwise operate independently. Defendant
P is not accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other
street-level drug dealers because he is not engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity with them. In contrast, Defendant Q,
another street-level drug dealer, pools his resources and profits with
four other street-level drug dealers. Defendant Q is engaged in a
jointly undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he is accountable
under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of drugs sold by the four
other dealers during the course of his joint undertaking with them
because those sales were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity and reasonably foreseeable in connection with that
criminal activity.
(7) Defendant R recruits Defendant S to distribute 500 grams of
cocaine. Defendant S knows that Defendant R is the prime figure in a
conspiracy involved in importing much larger quantities of cocaine. As
long as Defendant S's agreement and conduct is limited to the
distribution of the 500 grams, Defendant S is accountable only for that
500 gram amount (under subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the much
larger quantity imported by Defendant R.
(8) Defendants T, U, V, and W are hired by a supplier to backpack a
quantity of marihuana across the border from Mexico into the United
States. Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their individual shipments
from the supplier at the same time and coordinate their importation
efforts by walking across the border together for mutual assistance and
protection. Each defendant is accountable for the aggregate quantity of
marihuana transported by the four defendants. The four defendants
engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, the object
[[Page 25785]]
of which was the importation of the four backpacks containing marihuana
(subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and abetted each other's actions
(subsection (a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly undertaken criminal
activity. In contrast, if Defendants T, U, V, and W were hired
individually, transported their individual shipments at different
times, and otherwise operated independently, each defendant would be
accountable only for the quantity of marihuana he personally
transported (subsection (a)(1)(A)). As this example illustrates, in
cases involving contraband (including controlled substances), the scope
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (and thus the
accountability of the defendant for the contraband that was the object
of that jointly undertaken activity) may depend upon whether, in the
particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is more
appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity or as
a number of separate criminal activities.'';
by redesignating Notes 3 through 10 as Notes 5 through 12,
respectively, and inserting the following new Notes 2, 3, and 4:
``2. Accountability Under More Than One Provision.--In certain
cases, a defendant may be accountable for particular conduct under more
than one subsection of this guideline. If a defendant's accountability
for particular conduct is established under one provision of this
guideline, it is not necessary to review alternative provisions under
which such accountability might be established.
3. Jointly Undertaken Criminal Activity (Subsection (a)(1)(B)).--
(A) In General.--A `jointly undertaken criminal activity' is a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy.
In the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity, subsection
(a)(1)(B) provides that a defendant is accountable for the conduct
(acts and omissions) of others that was:
(i) Within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity;
(ii) in furtherance of that criminal activity; and
(iii) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity.
The conduct of others that meets all three criteria set forth in
subdivisions (i) through (iii) (i.e., `within the scope,' `in
furtherance,' and `reasonably foreseeable') is relevant conduct under
this provision. However, when the conduct of others does not meet any
one of the criteria set forth in subdivisions (i) through (iii), the
conduct is not relevant conduct under this provision.
(B) Scope.--Because a count may be worded broadly and include the
conduct of many participants over a period of time, the scope of the
`jointly undertaken criminal activity' is not necessarily the same as
the scope of the entire conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not
necessarily the same for every participant. In order to determine the
defendant's accountability for the conduct of others under subsection
(a)(1)(B), the court must first determine the scope of the criminal
activity the particular defendant agreed to jointly undertake (i.e.,
the scope of the specific conduct and objectives embraced by the
defendant's agreement). In doing so, the court may consider any
explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the
conduct of the defendant and others. Accordingly, the accountability of
the defendant for the acts of others is limited by the scope of his or
her agreement to jointly undertake the particular criminal activity.
Acts of others that were not within the scope of the defendant's
agreement, even if those acts were known or reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant, are not relevant conduct under subsection (a)(1)(B).
In cases involving contraband (including controlled substances),
the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (and thus the
accountability of the defendant for the contraband that was the object
of that jointly undertaken activity) may depend upon whether, in the
particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is more
appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity or as
a number of separate criminal activities.
A defendant's relevant conduct does not include the conduct of
members of a conspiracy prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy,
even if the defendant knows of that conduct (e.g., in the case of a
defendant who joins an ongoing drug distribution conspiracy knowing
that it had been selling two kilograms of cocaine per week, the cocaine
sold prior to the defendant joining the conspiracy is not included as
relevant conduct in determining the defendant's offense level). The
Commission does not foreclose the possibility that there may be some
unusual set of circumstances in which the exclusion of such conduct may
not adequately reflect the defendant's culpability; in such a case, an
upward departure may be warranted.
(C) In Furtherance.--The court must determine if the conduct (acts
and omissions) of others was in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity.
(D) Reasonably Foreseeable.--The court must then determine if the
conduct (acts and omissions) of others that was within the scope of,
and in furtherance of, the jointly undertaken criminal activity was
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
Note that the criminal activity that the defendant agreed to
jointly undertake, and the reasonably foreseeable conduct of others in
furtherance of that criminal activity, are not necessarily identical.
For example, two defendants agree to commit a robbery and, during the
course of that robbery, the first defendant assaults and injures a
victim. The second defendant is accountable for the assault and injury
to the victim (even if the second defendant had not agreed to the
assault and had cautioned the first defendant to be careful not to hurt
anyone) because the assaultive conduct was within the scope of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery), was in furtherance
of that criminal activity (the robbery), and was reasonably foreseeable
in connection with that criminal activity (given the nature of the
offense).
With respect to offenses involving contraband (including controlled
substances), the defendant is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A)
for all quantities of contraband with which he was directly involved
and, in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity under
subsection (a)(1)(B), all quantities of contraband that were involved
in transactions carried out by other participants, if those
transactions were within the scope of, and in furtherance of, the
jointly undertaken criminal activity and were reasonably foreseeable in
connection with that criminal activity.
The requirement of reasonable foreseeability applies only in
respect to the conduct (i.e., acts and omissions) of others under
subsection (a)(1)(B). It does not apply to conduct that the defendant
personally undertakes, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces,
procures, or willfully causes; such conduct is addressed under
subsection (a)(1)(A).
4. Illustrations of Conduct for Which the Defendant is Accountable
under Subsections (a)(1)(A) and (B).--
(A) Acts and omissions aided or abetted by the defendant.--
(i) Defendant A is one of ten persons hired by Defendant B to off-
load a ship containing marihuana. The off-loading of the ship is
interrupted by law enforcement officers and one ton of marihuana is
seized (the amount on the ship as well as the amount off-loaded).
[[Page 25786]]
Defendant A and the other off-loaders are arrested and convicted of
importation of marihuana. Regardless of the number of bales he
personally unloaded, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-ton
quantity of marihuana. Defendant A aided and abetted the off-loading of
the entire shipment of marihuana by directly participating in the off-
loading of that shipment (i.e., the specific objective of the criminal
activity he joined was the off-loading of the entire shipment).
Therefore, he is accountable for the entire shipment under subsection
(a)(1)(A) without regard to the issue of reasonable foreseeability.
This is conceptually similar to the case of a defendant who transports
a suitcase knowing that it contains a controlled substance and,
therefore, is accountable for the controlled substance in the suitcase
regardless of his knowledge or lack of knowledge of the actual type or
amount of that controlled substance.
In certain cases, a defendant may be accountable for particular
conduct under more than one subsection of this guideline. As noted in
the preceding paragraph, Defendant A is accountable for the entire one-
ton shipment of marihuana under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant A also
is accountable for the entire one-ton shipment of marihuana on the
basis of subsection (a)(1)(B) (applying to a jointly undertaken
criminal activity). Defendant A engaged in a jointly undertaken
criminal activity and all three criteria of subsection (a)(1)(B) are
met. First, the conduct was within the scope of the criminal activity
(the importation of the shipment of marihuana). Second, the off-loading
of the shipment of marihuana was in furtherance of the criminal
activity, as described above. And third, a finding that the one-ton
quantity of marihuana was reasonably foreseeable is warranted from the
nature of the undertaking itself (the importation of marihuana by ship
typically involves very large quantities of marihuana). The specific
circumstances of the case (the defendant was one of ten persons off-
loading the marihuana in bales) also support this finding. In an actual
case, of course, if a defendant's accountability for particular conduct
is established under one provision of this guideline, it is not
necessary to review alternative provisions under which such
accountability might be established. See Application Note 2.
(B) Acts and omissions aided or abetted by the defendant; acts and
omissions in a jointly undertaken criminal activity.--
(i) Defendant C is the getaway driver in an armed bank robbery in
which $15,000 is taken and a teller is assaulted and injured. Defendant
C is accountable for the money taken under subsection (a)(1)(A) because
he aided and abetted the act of taking the money (the taking of money
was the specific objective of the offense he joined). Defendant C is
accountable for the injury to the teller under subsection (a)(1)(B)
because the assault on the teller was within the scope and in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery),
and was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal
activity (given the nature of the offense).
As noted earlier, a defendant may be accountable for particular
conduct under more than one subsection. In this example, Defendant C
also is accountable for the money taken on the basis of subsection
(a)(1)(B) because the taking of money was within the scope and in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the robbery),
and was reasonably foreseeable (as noted, the taking of money was the
specific objective of the jointly undertaken criminal activity).
(C) Requirements that the conduct of others be within the scope of
the jointly undertaken criminal activity, in furtherance of that
criminal activity, and reasonably foreseeable.--
(i) Defendant D pays Defendant E a small amount to forge an
endorsement on an $800 stolen government check. Unknown to Defendant E,
Defendant D then uses that check as a down payment in a scheme to
fraudulently obtain $15,000 worth of merchandise. Defendant E is
convicted of forging the $800 check and is accountable for the forgery
of this check under subsection (a)(1)(A). Defendant E is not
accountable for the $15,000 because the fraudulent scheme to obtain
$15,000 was not within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity (i.e., the forgery of the $800 check).
(ii) Defendants F and G, working together, design and execute a
scheme to sell fraudulent stocks by telephone. Defendant F fraudulently
obtains $20,000. Defendant G fraudulently obtains $35,000. Each is
convicted of mail fraud. Defendants F and G each are accountable for
the entire amount ($55,000). Each defendant is accountable for the
amount he personally obtained under subsection (a)(1)(A). Each
defendant is accountable for the amount obtained by his accomplice
under subsection (a)(1)(B) because the conduct of each was within the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity (the scheme to sell
fraudulent stocks), was in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
was reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
(iii) Defendants H and I engaged in an ongoing marihuana
importation conspiracy in which Defendant J was hired only to help off-
load a single shipment. Defendants H, I, and J are included in a single
count charging conspiracy to import marihuana. Defendant J is
accountable for the entire single shipment of marihuana he helped
import under subsection (a)(1)(A) and any acts and omissions of others
related to the importation of that shipment on the basis of subsection
(a)(1)(B) (see the discussion in example (A)(i) above). He is not
accountable for prior or subsequent shipments of marihuana imported by
Defendants H or I because those acts were not within the scope of his
jointly undertaken criminal activity (the importation of the single
shipment of marihuana).
(iv) Defendant K is a wholesale distributor of child pornography.
Defendant L is a retail-level dealer who purchases child pornography
from Defendant K and resells it, but otherwise operates independently
of Defendant K. Similarly, Defendant M is a retail-level dealer who
purchases child pornography from Defendant K and resells it, but
otherwise operates independently of Defendant K. Defendants L and M are
aware of each other's criminal activity but operate independently.
Defendant N is Defendant K's assistant who recruits customers for
Defendant K and frequently supervises the deliveries to Defendant K's
customers. Each defendant is convicted of a count charging conspiracy
to distribute child pornography. Defendant K is accountable under
subsection (a)(1)(A) for the entire quantity of child pornography sold
to Defendants L and M. Defendant N also is accountable for the entire
quantity sold to those defendants under subsection (a)(1)(B) because
the entire quantity was within the scope of his jointly undertaken
criminal activity (to distribute child pornography with Defendant K),
in furtherance of that criminal activity, and reasonably foreseeable.
Defendant L is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the
quantity of child pornography that he purchased from Defendant K
because he is not engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity
with the other defendants. For the same reason, Defendant M is
accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) only for the quantity of child
pornography that he purchased from Defendant K.
(v) Defendant O knows about her boyfriend's ongoing drug-
trafficking activity, but agrees to participate on
[[Page 25787]]
only one occasion by making a delivery for him at his request when he
was ill. Defendant O is accountable under subsection (a)(1)(A) for the
drug quantity involved on that one occasion. Defendant O is not
accountable for the other drug sales made by her boyfriend because
those sales were not within the scope of her jointly undertaken
criminal activity (i.e., the one delivery).
(vi) Defendant P is a street-level drug dealer who knows of other
street-level drug dealers in the same geographic area who sell the same
type of drug as he sells. Defendant P and the other dealers share a
common source of supply, but otherwise operate independently. Defendant
P is not accountable for the quantities of drugs sold by the other
street-level drug dealers because he is not engaged in a jointly
undertaken criminal activity with them. In contrast, Defendant Q,
another street-level drug dealer, pools his resources and profits with
four other street-level drug dealers. Defendant Q is engaged in a
jointly undertaken criminal activity and, therefore, he is accountable
under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the quantities of drugs sold by the four
other dealers during the course of his joint undertaking with them
because those sales were within the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity, in furtherance of that criminal activity, and
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
(vii) Defendant R recruits Defendant S to distribute 500 grams of
cocaine. Defendant S knows that Defendant R is the prime figure in a
conspiracy involved in importing much larger quantities of cocaine. As
long as Defendant S's agreement and conduct is limited to the
distribution of the 500 grams, Defendant S is accountable only for that
500 gram amount (under subsection (a)(1)(A)), rather than the much
larger quantity imported by Defendant R. Defendant S is not accountable
under subsection (a)(1)(B) for the other quantities imported by
Defendant R because those quantities were not within the scope of his
jointly undertaken criminal activity (i.e., the 500 grams).
(viii) Defendants T, U, V, and W are hired by a supplier to
backpack a quantity of marihuana across the border from Mexico into the
United States. Defendants T, U, V, and W receive their individual
shipments from the supplier at the same time and coordinate their
importation efforts by walking across the border together for mutual
assistance and protection. Each defendant is accountable for the
aggregate quantity of marihuana transported by the four defendants. The
four defendants engaged in a jointly undertaken criminal activity, the
object of which was the importation of the four backpacks containing
marihuana (subsection (a)(1)(B)), and aided and abetted each other's
actions (subsection (a)(1)(A)) in carrying out the jointly undertaken
criminal activity (which under subsection (a)(1)(B) were also in
furtherance of, and reasonably foreseeable in connection with, the
criminal activity). In contrast, if Defendants T, U, V, and W were
hired individually, transported their individual shipments at different
times, and otherwise operated independently, each defendant would be
accountable only for the quantity of marihuana he personally
transported (subsection (a)(1)(A)). As this example illustrates, the
scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity may depend upon
whether, in the particular circumstances, the nature of the offense is
more appropriately viewed as one jointly undertaken criminal activity
or as a number of separate criminal activities. See Application Note
3(B).''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2K2.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 14(E) by striking ``Application Note 9'' both places
such term appears and inserting ``Application Note 11''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2X3.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 1 by striking ``Application Note 10'' and inserting
``Application Note 12''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2X4.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 1 by striking ``Application Note 10'' and inserting
``Application Note 12''.
Reason for Amendment: This amendment is a result of the
Commission's effort to clarify the use of relevant conduct in offenses
involving multiple participants.
The amendment makes clarifying revisions to Sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant
Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)). It restructures
the guideline and its commentary to set out more clearly the three-step
analysis the court applies in determining whether a defendant is
accountable for the conduct of others in a jointly undertaken criminal
activity under Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). The three-step analysis requires
that the court (1) identify the scope of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity; (2) determine whether the conduct of others in the
jointly undertaken criminal activity was in furtherance of that
criminal activity; and (3) determine whether the conduct of others was
reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.
Prior to this amendment, the ``scope'' element of the three-step
analysis was identified in the commentary to Sec. 1B1.3 but was not
included in the text of the guideline itself. This amendment makes
clear that, under the ``jointly undertaken criminal activity''
provision, a defendant is accountable for the conduct of others in a
jointly undertaken criminal activity if the conduct meets all three
criteria of the three-step analysis. This amendment is not intended as
a substantive change in policy.
2. Amendment: Section 2B1.1(b) is amended by striking paragraph (1)
as follows:
``(1) If the loss exceeded $5,000, increase the offense level as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss (apply the greatest) Increase in level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $5,000 or less........................ no increase
(B) More than $5,000...................... add 2
(C) More than $10,000..................... add 4
(D) More than $30,000..................... add 6
(E) More than $70,000..................... add 8
(F) More than $120,000.................... add 10
(G) More than $200,000.................... add 12
(H) More than $400,000.................... add 14
(I) More than $1,000,000.................. add 16
(J) More than $2,500,000.................. add 18
(K) More than $7,000,000.................. add 20
(L) More than $20,000,000................. add 22
(M) More than $50,000,000................. add 24
(N) More than $100,000,000................ add 26
(O) More than $200,000,000................ add 28
(P) More than $400,000,000................ add 30.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
``(1) If the loss exceeded $6,500, increase the offense level as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss (apply the greatest) Increase in level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $6,500 or less........................ no increase
(B) More than $6,500...................... add 2
(C) More than $15,000..................... add 4
(D) More than $40,000..................... add 6
(E) More than $95,000..................... add 8
(F) More than $150,000.................... add 10
(G) More than $250,000.................... add 12
(H) More than $550,000.................... add 14
(I) More than $1,500,000.................. add 16
(J) More than $3,500,000.................. add 18
(K) More than $9,500,000.................. add 20
(L) More than $25,000,000................. add 22
(M) More than $65,000,000................. add 24
(N) More than $150,000,000................ add 26
(O) More than $250,000,000................ add 28
(P) More than $550,000,000................ add 30.''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2B1.4(b)(1) is amended by striking ``$5,000'' and inserting
``$6,500''.
Section 2B1.5(b)(1) is amended by striking ``$2,000'' and inserting
``$2,500''; and by striking ``$5,000'' both places such term appears
and inserting ``$6,500''.
[[Page 25788]]
Section 2B2.1(b) is amended by striking paragraph (2) as follows:
``(2) If the loss exceeded $2,500, increase the offense level as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss (apply the greatest) Increase in level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $2,500 or less........................ no increase
(B) More than $2,500...................... add 1
(C) More than $10,000..................... add 2
(D) More than $50,000..................... add 3
(E) More than $250,000.................... add 4
(F) More than $800,000.................... add 5
(G) More than $1,500,000.................. add 6
(H) More than $2,500,000.................. add 7
(I) More than $5,000,000.................. add 8.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
``(2) If the loss exceeded $5,000, increase the offense level as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss (apply the greatest) Increase in level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $5,000 or less........................ no increase
(B) More than $5,000...................... add 1
(C) More than $20,000..................... add 2
(D) More than $95,000..................... add 3
(E) More than $500,000.................... add 4
(F) More than $1,500,000.................. add 5
(G) More than $3,000,000.................. add 6
(H) More than $5,000,000.................. add 7
(I) More than $9,500,000.................. add 8.''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2B2.3(b)(3) is amended by striking ``$2,000'' and inserting
``$2,500''; and by striking ``$5,000'' both places such term appears
and inserting ``$6,500''.
Section 2B3.1(b) is amended by striking paragraph (7) as follows:
``(7) If the loss exceeded $10,000, increase the offense level as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss (apply the greatest) Increase in level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $10,000 or less....................... no increase
(B) More than $10,000..................... add 1
(C) More than $50,000..................... add 2
(D) More than $250,000.................... add 3
(E) More than $800,000.................... add 4
(F) More than $1,500,000.................. add 5
(G) More than $2,500,000.................. add 6
(H) More than $5,000,000.................. add 7.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
``(7) If the loss exceeded $20,000, increase the offense level as
follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss (apply the greatest) Increase in level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $20,000 or less....................... no increase.
(B) More than $20,000..................... add 1
(C) More than $95,000..................... add 2
(D) More than $500,000.................... add 3
(E) More than $1,500,000.................. add 4
(F) More than $3,000,000.................. add 5
(G) More than $5,000,000.................. add 6
(H) More than $9,500,000.................. add 7.''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2B3.2(b)(2) is amended by striking ``$10,000'' and
inserting ``$20,000''.
Sections 2B3.3(b)(1), 2B4.1(b)(1), 2B5.1(b)(1), 2B5.3(b)(1), and
2B6.1(b)(1) are each amended by striking ``$2,000'' and inserting
``$2,500''; and by striking ``$5,000'' both places such term appears
and inserting ``$6,500''.
Sections 2C1.1(b)(2), 2C1.2(b)(2), and 2C1.8(b)(1) are each amended
by striking ``$5,000'' and inserting ``$6,500''.
Sections 2E5.1(b)(2) and 2Q2.1(b)(3) are each amended by striking
``$2,000'' and inserting ``$2,500''; and by striking ``$5,000'' both
places such term appears and inserting ``$6,500''.
Section 2R1.1(b) is amended by striking paragraph (2) as follows:
``(2) If the volume of commerce attributable to the defendant was
more than $1,000,000, adjust the offense level as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of commerce (apply the greatest) Adjustment to offense level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) More than $1,000,000.................. add 2
(B) More than $10,000,000................. add 4
(C) More than $40,000,000................. add 6
(D) More than $100,000,000................ add 8
(E) More than $250,000,000................ add 10
(F) More than $500,000,000................ add 12
(G) More than $1,000,000,000.............. add 14
(H) More than $1,500,000,000.............. add 16.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
``(2) If the volume of commerce attributable to the defendant was more
than $1,000,000, adjust the offense level as follows:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Volume of commerce (apply the greatest) Adjustment to offense level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) More than $1,000,000.................. add 2
(B) More than $10,000,000................. add 4
(C) More than $50,000,000................. add 6
(D) More than $100,000,000................ add 8
(E) More than $300,000,000................ add 10
(F) More than $600,000,000................ add 12
(G) More than $1,200,000,000.............. add 14
(H) More than $1,850,000,000.............. add 16.''.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 2T3.1(a) is amended by striking ``$1,000'' both places such
term appears and inserting ``$1,500''; and by striking ``$100'' both
places such term appears and inserting ``$200''.
Section 2T4.1 is amended by striking the following:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Tax loss (apply the greatest) Offense level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $2,000 or less........................ 6
(B) More than $2,000...................... 8
(C) More than $5,000...................... 10
(D) More than $12,500..................... 12
(E) More than $30,000..................... 14
(F) More than $80,000..................... 16
(G) More than $200,000.................... 18
(H) More than $400,000.................... 20
(I) More than $1,000,000.................. 22
(J) More than $2,500,000.................. 24
(K) More than $7,000,000.................. 26
(L) More than $20,000,000................. 28
(M) More than $50,000,000................. 30
(N) More than $100,000,000................ 32
(O) More than $200,000,000................ 34
(P) More than $400,000,000................ 36.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Tax loss (apply the greatest) Offense level
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(A) $2,500 or less........................ 6
(B) More than $2,500...................... 8
(C) More than $6,500...................... 10
(D) More than $15,000..................... 12
(E) More than $40,000..................... 14
(F) More than $100,000.................... 16
(G) More than $250,000.................... 18
(H) More than $550,000.................... 20
(I) More than $1,500,000.................. 22
(J) More than $3,500,000.................. 24
(K) More than $9,500,000.................. 26
(L) More than $25,000,000................. 28
(M) More than $65,000,000................. 30
(N) More than $150,000,000................ 32
(O) More than $250,000,000................ 34
(P) More than $550,000,000................ 36.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 5E1.2 is amended in subsection (c)(3) by striking the
following:
``Fine Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense level A minimum B maximum
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 and below............................. $100 $5,000
4-5..................................... 250 5,000
6-7..................................... 500 5,000
8-9..................................... 1,000 10,000
10-11................................... 2,000 20,000
12-13................................... 3,000 30,000
14-15................................... 4,000 40,000
16-17................................... 5,000 50,000
18-19................................... 6,000 60,000
20-22................................... 7,500 75,000
23-25................................... 10,000 100,000
26-28................................... 12,500 125,000
29-31................................... 15,000 150,000
32-34................................... 17,500 175,000
35-37................................... 20,000 200,000
38 and above............................ 25,000 250,000.'',
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
[[Page 25789]]
``Fine Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense level A minimum B maximum
------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 and below............................. $200 $9,500
4-5..................................... 500 9,500
6-7..................................... 1,000 9,500
8-9..................................... 2,000 20,000
10-11................................... 4,000 40,000
12-13................................... 5,500 55,000
14-15................................... 7,500 75,000
16-17................................... 10,000 95,000
18-19................................... 10,000 100,000
20-22................................... 15,000 150,000
23-25................................... 20,000 200,000
26-28................................... 25,000 250,000
29-31................................... 30,000 300,000
32-34................................... 35,000 350,000
35-37................................... 40,000 400,000
38 and above............................ 50,000 500,000.'';
------------------------------------------------------------------------
in subsection (c)(4) by striking ``$250,000'' and inserting
``$500,000'';
and by inserting after subsection (g) the following new subsection
(h):
``(h) Special Instruction
(1) For offenses committed prior to November 1, 2015, use the
applicable fine guideline range that was set forth in the version of
Sec. 5E1.2(c) that was in effect on November 1, 2014, rather than the
applicable fine guideline range set forth in subsection (c) above.''.
Section 8C2.4 is amended in subsection (d) by striking the
following:
``Offense Level Fine Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense level Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 or less................................. $5,000
7......................................... 7,500
8......................................... 10,000
9......................................... 15,000
10........................................ 20,000
11........................................ 30,000
12........................................ 40,000
13........................................ 60,000
14........................................ 85,000
15........................................ 125,000
16........................................ 175,000
17........................................ 250,000
18........................................ 350,000
19........................................ 500,000
20........................................ 650,000
21........................................ 910,000
22........................................ 1,200,000
23........................................ 1,600,000
24........................................ 2,100,000
25........................................ 2,800,000
26........................................ 3,700,000
27........................................ 4,800,000
28........................................ 6,300,000
29........................................ 8,100,000
30........................................ 10,500,000
31........................................ 13,500,000
32........................................ 17,500,000
33........................................ 22,000,000
34........................................ 28,500,000
35........................................ 36,000,000
36........................................ 45,500,000
37........................................ 57,500,000
38........................................ or more 72,500,000.'',
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and inserting the following:
``Offense Level Fine Table
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offense level Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 or less................................. $8,500
7......................................... 15,000
8......................................... 15,000
9......................................... 25,000
10........................................ 35,000
11........................................ 50,000
12........................................ 70,000
13........................................ 100,000
14........................................ 150,000
15........................................ 200,000
16........................................ 300,000
17........................................ 450,000
18........................................ 600,000
19........................................ 850,000
20........................................ 1,000,000
21........................................ 1,500,000
22........................................ 2,000,000
23........................................ 3,000,000
24........................................ 3,500,000
25........................................ 5,000,000
26........................................ 6,500,000
27........................................ 8,500,000
28........................................ 10,000,000
29........................................ 15,000,000
30........................................ 20,000,000
31........................................ 25,000,000
32........................................ 30,000,000
33........................................ 40,000,000
34........................................ 50,000,000
35........................................ 65,000,000
36........................................ 80,000,000
37........................................ 100,000,000
38 or more................................ 150,000,000.''
------------------------------------------------------------------------
and by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection (e):
``(e) Special Instruction
(1) For offenses committed prior to November 1, 2015, use the
offense level fine table that was set forth in the version of Sec.
8C2.4(d) that was in effect on November 1, 2014, rather than the
offense level fine table set forth in subsection (d) above.''.
Reason for Amendment: This amendment makes adjustments to the
monetary tables in Sec. Sec. 2B1.1 (Theft, Property, Destruction, and
Fraud), 2B2.1 (Burglary), 2B3.1 (Robbery), 2R1.1 (Bid-Rigging, Price-
Fixing or Market-Allocation Agreements Among Competitors), 2T4.1 (Tax
Table), 5E1.2 (Fines for Individual Defendants), and 8C2.4 (Base Fine)
to account for inflation. The amendment adjusts the amounts in each of
the seven monetary tables using a specific multiplier derived from the
Consumer Price Index (CPI), and then rounds--
Amounts greater than $100,000,000 to the nearest multiple
of $50,000,000;
amounts greater than $10,000,000 to the nearest multiple
of $5,000,000;
amounts greater than $1,000,000 to the nearest multiple of
$500,000;
amounts greater than $100,000 to the nearest multiple of
$50,000;
amounts greater than $10,000 to the nearest multiple of
$5,000;
amounts greater than $1,000 to the nearest multiple of
$500; and
amounts of $1,000 or less to the nearest multiple of $50.
In addition, the amendment includes conforming changes to other
Chapter Two guidelines that refer to the monetary tables.
Congress has generally mandated that agencies in the executive
branch adjust the civil monetary penalties they impose to account for
inflation using the CPI. See 28 U.S.C. 2461 note (Federal Civil
Penalties Inflationary Adjustment Act of 1990). Although the
Commission's work does not involve civil monetary penalties, it does
establish appropriate criminal sentences for categories of offenses and
offenders, including appropriate amounts for criminal fines. While some
of the monetary values in the Chapter Two guidelines have been revised
since they were originally established in 1987, none of the tables has
been specifically revised to account for inflation.
Due to inflationary changes, there has been a gradual decrease in
the value of the dollar over time. As a result, monetary losses in
current offenses reflect, to some degree, a lower degree of harm and
culpability than did equivalent amounts when the monetary tables were
established or last substantively amended. Similarly, the fine levels
recommended by the guidelines are lower in value than when they were
last adjusted, and therefore, do not have the same sentencing impact as
a similar fine in the past. Based on its analysis and widespread
support for inflationary adjustments expressed in public comment, the
Commission concluded that aligning the above monetary tables with
modern dollar values is an appropriate step at this time.
The amendment adjusts each table based on inflationary changes
since the year each monetary table was last substantially amended:
Loss table in Sec. 2B1.1 and tax table in Sec. 2T4.1:
adjusting for inflation from 2001 ($1.00 in 2001 = $1.34 in 2014);
Loss tables in Sec. Sec. 2B2.1 and 2B3.1 and fine table
for individual defendants at Sec. 5E1.2(c)(3): adjusting for inflation
[[Page 25790]]
from 1989 ($1.00 in 1989 = $1.91 in 2014);
Volume of Commerce table in Sec. 2R1.1: adjusting for
inflation from 2005 ($1.00 in 2005 = $1.22 in 2014); and
Fine table for organizational defendants at Sec.
8C2.4(d): adjusting for inflation from 1991 ($1.00 in 1991 = $1.74 in
2014).
Adjusting from the last substantive amendment year appropriately
accounts for the Commission's previous work in revising these tables at
various times. Although not specifically focused on inflationary
issues, previous Commissions engaged in careful examination (and at
times, a wholesale rewriting) of the monetary tables and ultimately
included monetary and enhancement levels that it considered appropriate
at that time. The Commission estimates that this amendment would result
in the Bureau of Prisons having approximately 224 additional prison
beds available at the end of the first year after implementation, and
approximately 956 additional prison beds available at the end of its
fifth year of implementation.
Finally, the amendment adds a special instruction to both
Sec. Sec. 5E1.2 and 8C2.4 providing that, for offenses committed prior
to November 1, 2015, the court shall use the fine provisions that were
in effect on November 1, 2014, rather than the fine provisions as
amended for inflation. This addition responds to concerns expressed in
public comment that changes to the fine tables might create ex post
facto problems. It ensures that an offender whose offense level is
calculated under the current Guidelines Manual is not subject to the
inflated fine provisions if his or her offense was committed prior to
November 1, 2015. Such guidance is similar to that provided in the
commentary to Sec. 5E1.3 (Special Assessment) relating to the amount
of the special assessment to be imposed in a given case.
3. Amendment: Section 2B1.1 is amended in subsection (b)(2) by
striking the following:
``(Apply the greatest) If the offense--
(A) (i) involved 10 or more victims; or (ii) was committed through
mass-marketing, increase by 2 levels;
(B) involved 50 or more victims, increase by 4 levels; or
(C) involved 250 or more victims, increase by 6 levels.'',
and inserting the following:
``(Apply the greatest) If the offense--
(A) (i) involved 10 or more victims; (ii) was committed through
mass-marketing; or (iii) resulted in substantial financial hardship to
one or more victims, increase by 2 levels;
(B) resulted in substantial financial hardship to five or more
victims, increase by 4 levels; or
(C) resulted in substantial financial hardship to 25 or more
victims, increase by 6 levels.'';
in subsection (b)(10)(C) by inserting after ``the offense otherwise
involved sophisticated means'' the following: ``and the defendant
intentionally engaged in or caused the conduct constituting
sophisticated means'';
and in subsection (b)(16)(B) by inserting ``or'' at the end of
subdivision (i), and by striking ``; or (iii) substantially endangered
the solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2B1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 3(A)(ii) by striking ``(I) means the pecuniary harm
that was intended to result from the offense; and'' and inserting ``(I)
means the pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought to
inflict; and'';
in Note 3(F)(ix) by striking ``there shall be a rebuttable
presumption that the actual loss attributable to the change in value of
the security or commodity is the amount determined by--'' and inserting
``the court in determining loss may use any method that is appropriate
and practicable under the circumstances. One such method the court may
consider is a method under which the actual loss attributable to the
change in value of the security or commodity is the amount determined
by--'';
in Note 4 by striking ``50 victims'' and inserting ``10 victims''
at subdivision (C)(ii); and by inserting at the end the following new
subdivision (F):
``(F) Substantial Financial Hardship.--In determining whether the
offense resulted in substantial financial hardship to a victim, the
court shall consider, among other factors, whether the offense resulted
in the victim--
(i) becoming insolvent;
(ii) filing for bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code (title 11,
United States Code);
(iii) suffering substantial loss of a retirement, education, or
other savings or investment fund;
(iv) making substantial changes to his or her employment, such as
postponing his or her retirement plans;
(v) making substantial changes to his or her living arrangements,
such as relocating to a less expensive home; and
(vi) suffering substantial harm to his or her ability to obtain
credit.'';
in Note 9 by striking ``Sophisticated Means Enhancement under'' in
the heading and inserting ``Application of''; and by inserting at the
end of the heading of subdivision (B) the following: ``under Subsection
(b)(10)(C)'';
and in Note 20(A)(vi) by striking both ``or credit record'' and
``or a damaged credit record''.
Reason for Amendment: This amendment makes several changes to the
guideline applicable to economic crimes, Sec. 2B1.1 (Theft, Property
Destruction, and Fraud), to better account for harm to victims,
individual culpability, and the offender's intent. This amendment is a
result of the Commission's multi-year study of Sec. 2B1.1 and related
guidelines, and follows extensive data collection and analysis relating
to economic offenses and offenders. Using this Commission data,
combined with legal analysis and public comment, the Commission
identified a number of specific areas where changes were appropriate.
Victims Table
First, the amendment revises the victims table in Sec. 2B1.1(b)(2)
to specifically incorporate substantial financial hardship to victims
as a factor in sentencing economic crime offenders. As amended, the
first tier of the victims table provides for a 2-level enhancement
where the offense involved 10 or more victims or mass-marketing, or if
the offense resulted in substantial financial hardship to one or more
victims. The 4-level enhancement applies if the offense resulted in
substantial financial hardship to five or more victims, and the 6-level
enhancement applies if the offense resulted in substantial financial
hardship to 25 or more victims. As a conforming change, the special
rule in Application Note 4(C)(ii)(I), pertaining to theft of
undelivered mail, is also revised to refer to 10 rather than 50
victims.
In addition, the amendment adds a non-exhaustive list of factors
for courts to consider in determining whether the offense caused
substantial financial hardship. These factors include: becoming
insolvent; filing for bankruptcy; suffering substantial loss of a
retirement, education, or other savings or investment fund; making
substantial changes to employment; making substantial changes to living
arrangements; or suffering substantial harm to the victim's ability to
obtain credit. Two conforming changes are also included. First, one
factor--substantial harm to ability to obtain credit--was previously
included in Application Note 20(A)(vi) as a potential departure
consideration. The amendment removes this language from the Application
[[Page 25791]]
Note. Second, the amendment deletes subsection (b)(16)(B)(iii), which
provided for an enhancement where an offense substantially endangered
the solvency or financial security of 100 or more victims.
The Commission continues to believe that the number of victims is a
meaningful measure of the harm and scope of an offense and can be
indicative of its seriousness. It is for this reason that the amended
victims table maintains the 2-level enhancement for offenses that
involve 10 or more victims or mass marketing. However, the revisions to
the victims table also reflect the Commission's conclusion that the
guideline should place greater emphasis on the extent of harm that
particular victims suffer as a result of the offense. Consistent with
the Commission's overall goal of focusing more on victim harm, the
revised victims table ensures that an offense that results in even one
victim suffering substantial financial harm receives increased
punishment, while also lessening the cumulative impact of loss and the
number of victims, particularly in high-loss cases.
Intended Loss
Second, the amendment revises the commentary at Sec. 2B1.1,
Application Note 3(A)(ii), which has defined intended loss as
``pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense.'' In
interpreting this provision, courts have expressed some disagreement as
to whether a subjective or an objective inquiry is required. Compare
United States v. Manatau, 647 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that
a subjective inquiry is required), United States v. Diallo, 710 F.3d
147, 151 (3d Cir. 2013) (``To make this determination, we look to the
defendant's subjective expectation, not to the risk of loss to which he
may have exposed his victims.''), United States v. Confredo, 528 F.3d
143, 152 (2d Cir. 2008) (remanding for consideration of whether
defendant had ``proven a subjective intent to cause a loss of less than
the aggregate amount'' of fraudulent loans), and United States v.
Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 527 (5th Cir. 2003) (``our case law requires the
government prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
had the subjective intent to cause the loss that is used to calculate
his offense level''), with United States v. Innarelli, 524 F.3d 286,
291 (1st Cir. 2008) (``we focus our loss inquiry for purposes of
determining a defendant's offense level on the objectively reasonable
expectation of a person in his position at the time he perpetrated the
fraud, not on his subjective intentions or hopes'') and United States
v. Lane, 323 F.3d 568, 590 (7th Cir. 2003) (``The determination of
intended loss under the Sentencing Guidelines therefore focuses on the
conduct of the defendant and the objective financial risk to victims
caused by that conduct'').
The amendment adopts the approach taken by the Tenth Circuit by
revising the commentary in Application Note 3(A)(ii) to provide that
intended loss means the pecuniary harm that ``the defendant purposely
sought to inflict.'' The amendment reflects the Commission's continued
belief that intended loss is an important factor in economic crime
offenses, but also recognizes that sentencing enhancements predicated
on intended loss, rather than losses that have actually accrued, should
focus more specifically on the defendant's culpability.
Sophisticated Means
Third, the amendment narrows the focus of the specific offense
characteristic at Sec. 2B1.1(b)(10)(C) to cases in which the defendant
intentionally engaged in or caused conduct constituting sophisticated
means. Prior to the amendment, the enhancement applied if ``the offense
otherwise involved sophisticated means.'' Based on this language,
courts had applied this enhancement on the basis of the sophistication
of the overall scheme without a determination of whether the
defendant's own conduct was ``sophisticated.'' See, e.g., United States
v. Green, 648 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bishop-
Oyedepo, 480 Fed. App'x 431, 433-34 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Jenkins-Watt, 574 F.3d 950, 965 (8th Cir. 2009). The Commission
concluded that basing the enhancement on the defendant's own
intentional conduct better reflects the defendant's culpability and
will appropriately minimize application of this enhancement to less
culpable offenders.
Fraud on the Market
Finally, the amendment revises the special rule at Application Note
3(F)(ix) relating to the calculation of loss in cases involving the
fraudulent inflation or deflation in the value of a publicly traded
security or commodity. When this special rule was added to the
guidelines, it established a rebuttable presumption that the specified
loss calculation methodology provides a reasonable estimate of the
actual loss in such cases. As amended, the method provided in the
special rule is no longer the presumed starting point for calculating
loss in these cases. Instead, the revised special rule states that the
provided method is one method that courts may consider, but that
courts, in determining loss, are free to use any method that is
appropriate and practicable under the circumstances. This amendment
reflects the Commission's view that the most appropriate method to
determine a reasonable estimate of loss will often vary in these highly
complex and fact-intensive cases.
This amendment, in combination with related revisions to the
mitigating role guideline at Sec. 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role), reflects
the Commission's overall goal of focusing the economic crime guideline
more on qualitative harm to victims and individual offender
culpability.
4. Amendment: Section 2D1.1(c) is amended in each of subdivisions
(5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) by striking the lines referenced to
Schedule III Hydrocodone;
and in each of subdivisions (10), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16),
and (17) by striking the lines referenced to Schedule III Hydrocodone,
and in the lines referenced to Schedule III substances (except Ketamine
or Hydrocodone) by striking ``or Hydrocodone''.
The annotation to Sec. 2D1.1(c) captioned ``Notes to Drug Quantity
Table'' is amended in Note (B) in the last paragraph by striking ``The
term `Oxycodone (actual)' refers'' and inserting ``The terms
`Hydrocodone (actual)' and `Oxycodone (actual)' refer''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2D1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 8(D), under the heading relating to Schedule I or II
Opiates, by striking the line referenced to Hydrocodone/
Dihydrocodeinone and inserting the following:
``1 gm of Hydrocodone (actual) = 6700 gm of marihuana'';
in the heading relating to Schedule III Substances (except ketamine and
hydrocodone) by striking ``and hydrocodone'' both places such term
appears;
and in the heading relating to Schedule III Hydrocodone by striking the
heading and subsequent paragraphs as follows:
``Schedule III Hydrocodone ****
1 unit of Schedule III hydrocodone = 1 gm of marihuana
**** Provided, that the combined equivalent weight of all Schedule III
substances (except ketamine), Schedule IV substances (except
flunitrazepam), and Schedule V substances shall not exceed 2,999.99
kilograms of marihuana.'';
and in Note 27(C) by inserting after ``methamphetamine,'' the
following: ``hydrocodone,''.
[[Page 25792]]
Reason for Amendment: This amendment changes the way the primary
drug trafficking guideline calculates a defendant's drug quantity in
cases involving hydrocodone in response to recent administrative
actions by the Food and Drug Administration and the Drug Enforcement
Administration. The amendment adopts a marihuana equivalency for
hydrocodone (1 gram equals 6700 grams of marihuana) based on the weight
of the hydrocodone alone.
In 2013 and 2014, the Food and Drug Administration approved several
new pharmaceuticals containing hydrocodone which can contain up to
twelve times as much hydrocodone in a single pill than was previously
available. Separately, in October 2014, the Drug Enforcement
Administration moved certain commonly-prescribed pharmaceuticals
containing hydrocodone from the less-restricted Schedule III to the
more-restricted Schedule II. Among other things, the scheduling doubled
the statutory maximum term of imprisonment available for trafficking in
the pharmaceuticals that were previously controlled under Schedule III
from 10 years to 20 years. The change also rendered obsolete the
entries in the Drug Quantity Table and Drug Equivalency Table in Sec.
2D1.1 (Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking
(Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or
Conspiracy) that set a marihuana equivalency for the pharmaceuticals
that were previously controlled under Schedule III.
As a result of these administrative actions, all pharmaceuticals
that include hydrocodone are now subject to the same statutory
penalties. There is wide variation in the amount of hydrocodone
available in these pharmaceuticals and in the amount of other
ingredients (such as binders, coloring, acetaminophen, etc.) they
contain. This variation raises significant proportionality issues
within Sec. 2D1.1, where drug quantity for hydrocodone offenses has
previously been calculated based on the weight of the entire substance
that contains hydrocodone or on the number of pills. Neither of these
calculations directly took into account the amount of actual
hydrocodone in the pills.
The amendment addresses these changed circumstances by setting a
new marihuana equivalency for hydrocodone based on the weight of the
hydrocodone alone. Without this change, defendants with less actual
hydrocodone could have received a higher guideline range than those
with more hydrocodone because pills with less hydrocodone can sometimes
contain more non-hydrocodone ingredients, leading the lower-dose pills
to weigh more.
In setting the marihuana equivalency, the Commission considered:
Potency of the drug, medical use of the drug, and patterns of abuse and
trafficking, such as prevalence of abuse, consequences of misuse
including death or serious bodily injury from use, and incidence of
violence associated with its trafficking. The Commission noted that the
Drug Enforcement Administration's rescheduling decision relied in part
on the close relationship between hydrocodone and oxycodone, a similar
and commonly-prescribed drug that was already controlled under Schedule
II. Scientific literature, public comment, and testimony supported the
conclusion that the potency, medical use, and patterns of abuse and
trafficking of hydrocodone are very similar to oxycodone. In
particular, the Commission heard testimony from abuse liability
specialists and reviewed scientific literature indicating that, in
studies conducted under standards established by the Food and Drug
Administration for determining the abuse liability of a particular
drug, the potencies of hydrocodone and oxycodone when abused are
virtually identical, even though some physicians who prescribe the two
drugs in a clinical setting might not prescribe them in equal doses.
Public comment indicated that both hydrocodone and oxycodone are among
the top ten drugs most frequently encountered by law enforcement and
that their methods of diversion and rates of diversion per kilogram of
available drug are similar. Public comment and review of the scientific
literature also indicated that the users of the two drugs share similar
characteristics, and that some users may use them interchangeably, a
situation which may become more common as the more powerful
pharmaceuticals recently approved by the Food and Drug Administration
become available.
Based on proportionality considerations and the Commission's
assessment that, for purposes of the drug guideline, hydrocodone and
oxycodone should be treated equivalently, the amendment adopts a
marihuana equivalency for hydrocodone (actual) that is the same as the
existing equivalency for oxycodone (actual): 1 gram equals 6,700 grams
of marihuana.
5. Amendment: The Commentary to Sec. 3B1.2 captioned ``Application
Notes'' is amended in Note 3(A) by inserting after ``that makes him
substantially less culpable than the average participant'' the
following: ``in the criminal activity'', by striking ``concerted'' and
inserting ``the'', by striking ``is not precluded from consideration
for'' each place such term appears and inserting ``may receive'', by
striking ``role'' both places such term appears and inserting
``participation'', and by striking ``personal gain from a fraud offense
and who had limited knowledge'' and inserting ``personal gain from a
fraud offense or who had limited knowledge'';
in Note 3(C) by inserting at the end the following new paragraphs:
``In determining whether to apply subsection (a) or (b), or an
intermediate adjustment, the court should consider the following non-
exhaustive list of factors:
(i) the degree to which the defendant understood the scope and
structure of the criminal activity;
(ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in planning or
organizing the criminal activity;
(iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised decision-making
authority or influenced the exercise of decision-making authority;
(iv) the nature and extent of the defendant's participation in the
commission of the criminal activity, including the acts the defendant
performed and the responsibility and discretion the defendant had in
performing those acts;
(v) the degree to which the defendant stood to benefit from the
criminal activity.
For example, a defendant who does not have a proprietary interest
in the criminal activity and who is simply being paid to perform
certain tasks should be considered for an adjustment under this
guideline.
The fact that a defendant performs an essential or indispensable
role in the criminal activity is not determinative. Such a defendant
may receive an adjustment under this guideline if he or she is
substantially less culpable than the average participant in the
criminal activity.'';
in Note 4 by striking ``concerted'' and inserting ``the criminal'';
and in Note 5 by inserting after ``than most other participants''
the following: ``in the criminal activity''.
Reason for Amendment: This amendment is a result of the
Commission's study of Sec. 3B1.2 (Mitigating Role). The Commission
conducted a review of cases involving low-level offenders, analyzed
case law, and considered public comment and testimony. Overall, the
study found that mitigating role is applied inconsistently and more
sparingly than the Commission intended. In drug cases, the Commission's
study confirmed that
[[Page 25793]]
mitigating role is applied inconsistently to drug defendants who
performed similar low-level functions (and that rates of application
vary widely from district to district). For example, application of
mitigating role varies along the southwest border, with a low of 14.3
percent of couriers and mules receiving the mitigating role adjustment
in one district compared to a high of 97.2 percent in another.
Moreover, among drug defendants who do receive mitigating role, there
are differences from district to district in application rates of the
2-, 3-, and 4-level adjustments. In economic crime cases, the study
found that the adjustment was often applied in a limited fashion. For
example, the study found that courts often deny mitigating role to
otherwise eligible defendants if the defendant was considered
``integral'' to the successful commission of the offense.
This amendment provides additional guidance to sentencing courts in
determining whether a mitigating role adjustment applies. Specifically,
it addresses a circuit conflict and other case law that may be
discouraging courts from applying the adjustment in otherwise
appropriate circumstances. It also provides a non-exhaustive list of
factors for the court to consider in determining whether an adjustment
applies and, if so, the amount of the adjustment.
Section 3B1.2 provides an adjustment of 2, 3, or 4 levels for a
defendant who plays a part in committing the offense that makes him or
her ``substantially less culpable than the average participant.''
However, there are differences among the circuits about what
determining the ``average participant'' requires. The Seventh and Ninth
Circuits have concluded that the ``average participant'' means only
those persons who actually participated in the criminal activity at
issue in the defendant's case, so that the defendant's relative
culpability is determined only by reference to his or her co-
participants in the case at hand. See, e.g., United States v. Benitez,
34 F.3d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cantrell, 433 F.3d
1269, 1283 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. DePriest, 6 F.3d 1201,
1214 (7th Cir. 1993). The First and Second Circuits have concluded that
the ``average participant'' also includes ``the universe of persons
participating in similar crimes.'' See United States v. Santos, 357
F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Rahman, 189
F.3d 88, 159 (2d Cir. 1999). Under this latter approach, courts will
ordinarily consider the defendant's culpability relative both to his
co-participants and to the typical offender.
The amendment generally adopts the approach of the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, revising the commentary to specify that, when
determining mitigating role, the defendant is to be compared with the
other participants ``in the criminal activity.'' Focusing the court's
attention on the individual defendant and the other participants is
more consistent with the other provisions of Chapter Three, Part B.
See, e.g., Sec. 3B1.2 (the adjustment is based on ``the defendant's
role in the offense''); Sec. 3B1.2, comment. (n.3(C)) (a determination
about mitigating role ``is heavily dependent upon the facts of the
particular case''); Ch. 3, Pt. B, intro. comment. (the determination
about mitigating role ``is to be made on the basis of all conduct
within the scope of Sec. 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct)'').
Next, the amendment addresses cases in which the defendant was
``integral'' or ``indispensable'' to the commission of the offense.
Public comment suggested, and a review of case law confirmed, that in
some cases a defendant may be denied a mitigating role adjustment
solely because he or she was ``integral'' or ``indispensable'' to the
commission of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Skinner, 690
F.3d 772, 783-84 (6th Cir. 2012) (a ``defendant who plays a lesser role
in a criminal scheme may nonetheless fail to qualify as a minor
participant if his role was indispensible or critical to the success of
the scheme''); United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 725
(7th Cir. 2008) (defendant ``played an integral part in the
transactions and therefore did not deserve a minor participant
reduction''); United States v. Deans, 590 F.3d 907, 910 (8th Cir. 2010)
(``Numerous decisions have upheld the denial of minor role adjustments
to defendants who . . . play a critical role''); United States v.
Carter, 971 F.2d 597, 600 (10th Cir. 1992) (because defendant was
``indispensible to the completion of the criminal activity . . . to
debate which one is less culpable than the others . . . is akin to the
old argument over which leg of a three-legged stool is the most
important leg.''). However, a finding that the defendant was essential
to the offense does not alter the requirement, expressed in Note 3(A),
that the court must assess the defendant's culpability relative to the
average participant in the offense. Accordingly, the amendment revises
the commentary to emphasize that ``the fact that a defendant performs
an essential or indispensable role in the criminal activity is not
determinative'' and that such a defendant may receive a mitigating role
adjustment, if he or she is otherwise eligible.
The amendment also revises two paragraphs in Note 3(A) that
illustrate how mitigating role interacts with relevant conduct
principles in Sec. 1B1.3. Specifically, the illustrations provide that
certain types of defendants are ``not precluded from consideration
for'' a mitigating role adjustment. The amendment revises these
paragraphs to state that these types of defendants ``may receive'' a
mitigating role adjustment. The Commission determined that the double-
negative tone (``not precluded'') may have had the unintended effect of
discouraging courts from applying the mitigating role adjustment in
otherwise appropriate circumstances.
Finally, the amendment provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
for the court to consider in determining whether to apply a mitigating
role adjustment and, if so, the amount of the adjustment. The factors
direct the court to consider the degree to which the defendant
understood the scope and structure of the criminal activity,
participated in planning or organizing the criminal activity, and
exercised decision-making authority, as well as the acts the defendant
performed and the degree to which he or she stood to benefit from the
criminal activity. The Commission was persuaded by public comment and a
detailed review of cases involving low-level offenders, particularly in
fraud cases, that providing a list of factors will give the courts a
common framework for determining whether to apply a mitigating role
adjustment (and, if so, the amount of the adjustment) and will help
promote consistency.
The amendment further provides, as an example, that a defendant who
does not have a proprietary interest in the criminal activity and who
is simply being paid to perform certain tasks should be considered for
a mitigating role adjustment.
6. Amendment: The Commentary to Sec. 2L1.2 captioned ``Application
Notes'' is amended in Note 4(B) by striking ``not counted as a single
sentence'' and inserting ``not treated as a single sentence''.
Section 4A1.1(e) is amended by striking ``such sentence was counted
as a single sentence'' and inserting ``such sentence was treated as a
single sentence''.
The Commentary to Sec. 4A1.1 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 5 by striking ``are counted as a single sentence'' and
inserting ``are treated as a single sentence''; and by striking ``are
counted as a single prior
[[Page 25794]]
sentence'' and inserting ``are treated as a single prior sentence''.
Section 4A1.2(a)(2) is amended by striking ``those sentences are
counted separately or as a single sentence'' and inserting ``those
sentences are counted separately or treated as a single sentence''; by
striking ``Count any prior sentence'' and inserting ``Treat any prior
sentence''; and by striking ``if prior sentences are counted as a
single sentence'' and inserting ``if prior sentences are treated as a
single sentence''.
The Commentary to Sec. 4A1.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 3 by redesignating Note 3 as Note 3(B), and by
inserting at the beginning the following:
`` Application of `Single Sentence' Rule (Subsection (a)(2)).--
(A) Predicate Offenses.--In some cases, multiple prior sentences
are treated as a single sentence for purposes of calculating the
criminal history score under Sec. 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c). However, for
purposes of determining predicate offenses, a prior sentence included
in the single sentence should be treated as if it received criminal
history points, if it independently would have received criminal
history points. Therefore, an individual prior sentence may serve as a
predicate under the career offender guideline (see Sec. 4B1.2(c)) or
other guidelines with predicate offenses, if it independently would
have received criminal history points. However, because predicate
offenses may be used only if they are counted ``separately'' from each
other (see Sec. 4B1.2(c)), no more than one prior sentence in a given
single sentence may be used as a predicate offense.
For example, a defendant's criminal history includes one robbery
conviction and one theft conviction. The sentences for these offenses
were imposed on the same day, eight years ago, and are treated as a
single sentence under Sec. 4A1.2(a)(2). If the defendant received a
one-year sentence of imprisonment for the robbery and a two-year
sentence of imprisonment for the theft, to be served concurrently, a
total of 3 points is added under Sec. 4A1.1(a). Because this
particular robbery met the definition of a felony crime of violence and
independently would have received 2 criminal history points under Sec.
4A1.1(b), it may serve as a predicate under the career offender
guideline.
Note, however, that if the sentences in the example above were
imposed thirteen years ago, the robbery independently would have
received no criminal history points under Sec. 4A1.1(b), because it
was not imposed within ten years of the defendant's commencement of the
instant offense. See Sec. 4A1.2(e)(2). Accordingly, it may not serve
as a predicate under the career offender guideline.'';
and in Note 3(B) (as so redesignated) by striking ``Counting
multiple prior sentences as a single sentence'' and inserting
``Treating multiple prior sentences as a single sentence''; and by
striking ``and the resulting sentences were counted as a single
sentence'' and inserting ``and the resulting sentences were treated as
a single sentence''.
The Commentary to Sec. 4B1.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 1 by striking ``the sentences for the two prior
convictions will be counted as a single sentence'' and inserting ``the
sentences for the two prior convictions will be treated as a single
sentence''.
Reason for Amendment: This amendment responds to a circuit conflict
regarding the meaning of the ``single sentence'' rule, set forth in
subsection (a)(2) of Sec. 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for
Computing Criminal History), and its implications for the career
offender guideline and other guidelines that provide sentencing
enhancements for predicate offenses.
When the defendant's criminal history includes two or more prior
sentences that meet certain criteria specified in Sec. 4A1.2(a)(2),
those prior sentences are counted as a ``single sentence'' rather than
separately. Generally, this operates to reduce the cumulative impact of
prior sentences in determining a defendant's criminal history score.
Courts, however, are divided over whether this ``single sentence'' rule
also causes certain prior convictions that ordinarily would qualify as
predicate offenses under the career offender guideline to be
disqualified from serving as predicate offenses. See Sec. 4B1.2
(Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1), comment. (n.3).
In 2010, in King v. United States, the Eighth Circuit held that
when two or more prior sentences are treated as a single sentence under
the guidelines, all the criminal history points attributable to the
single sentence are assigned to only one of the prior sentences--
specifically, the one that was the longest. King, 595 F.3d 844, 852
(8th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, only that prior sentence may be
considered a predicate offense for purposes of the career offender
guideline. Id. at 849, 852.
In 2014, in United States v. Williams, a panel of the Sixth Circuit
considered and rejected King, because it permitted the defendant to
``evade career offender status because he committed more crimes.''
Williams, 753 F.3d 626, 639 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original). See
also United States v. Cornog, 945 F.2d 1504, 1506 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991)
(``It would be illogical . . . to ignore a conviction for a violent
felony just because it happened to be coupled with a nonviolent felony
conviction having a longer sentence.'').
After the Williams decision, a different panel of the Eighth
Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's analysis but was not in a
position to overrule the earlier panel's decision in King. See Donnell
v. United States, 765 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2014). The Eighth Circuit
has applied the analysis from King to a case involving the firearms
guideline and to a case in which the prior sentences were consecutive
rather than concurrent. See, e.g., Pierce v. United States, 686 F.3d
529, 533 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) (firearms); United States v. Parker, 762
F.3d 801, 808 (8th Cir. 2014) (consecutive sentences). This issue has
also been addressed by other courts, some which have followed the Sixth
Circuit's approach in Williams. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 2013
WL 4855341 (N.D. Ga. 2013); United States v. Agurs, 2014 WL 3735584
(W.D. Pa., July 28, 2014). Other decisions have been consistent with
the Eighth Circuit's approach in King. See, e.g., United States v.
Santiago, 387 F. App'x 223 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. McQueen,
2014 WL 3749215 (E.D. Wash., July 28, 2014).
The amendment generally follows the Sixth Circuit's approach in
Williams. It amends the commentary to Sec. 4A1.2 to provide that, for
purposes of determining predicate offenses, a prior sentence included
in a single sentence should be treated as if it received criminal
history points if it independently would have received criminal history
points. It also provides examples, including an example to illustrate
the potential impact of the applicable time periods prescribed in Sec.
4A1.2(e). Finally, Sec. Sec. 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category) and
4A1.2 are revised stylistically so that sentences ``counted'' as a
single sentence are referred to instead as sentences ``treated'' as a
single sentence.
The amendment ensures that those defendants who have committed more
crimes, in addition to a predicate offense, remain subject to enhanced
penalties under certain guidelines such as the career offender
guideline. Conversely, by clarifying how the single sentence rule
interacts with the time limits set forth in Sec. 4A1.2(e), the
amendment provides that when a prior sentence was so remote in time
that it does not independently receive criminal history points, it
cannot serve as a predicate offense.
[[Page 25795]]
7. Amendment: The Commentary to Sec. 1B1.11 captioned
``Background'' is amended by striking ``144 S. Ct.'' and inserting
``133 S. Ct.''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2B4.1 captioned ``Statutory Provisions'' is
amended by striking ``41 U.S.C. 53, 54'' and inserting ``41 U.S.C.
8702, 8707''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2B4.1 captioned ``Background'' is amended
by striking ``41 U.S.C. 51, 53-54'' and inserting ``41 U.S.C. 8702,
8707''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2C1.8 captioned ``Statutory Provisions'' is
amended by striking ``2 U.S.C.'' and all that follows through ``441k;''
and after ``18 U.S.C. 607'' inserting ``; 52 U.S.C. 30109(d), 30114,
30116, 30117, 30118, 30119, 30120, 30121, 30122, 30123, 30124(a),
30125, 30126''; and by striking ``Statutory Index (Appendix A)'' and
inserting ``Appendix A (Statutory Index)''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2C1.8 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 1 by striking ``2 U.S.C. 441e(b)'' and inserting ``52
U.S.C. 30121(b)''; by striking ``2 U.S.C. 431 et seq'' and inserting
``52 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.''; and by striking ``(2 U.S.C. 431(8) and
(9))'' and inserting ``(52 U.S.C. 30101(8) and (9))''.
Section 2D1.11(e)(7) is amended in the line referenced to
Norpseudoephedrine by striking ``400'' and inserting ``400 G''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2H2.1 captioned ``Statutory Provisions'' is
amended by striking ``42 U.S.C. 1973i, 1973j(a), (b)'' and inserting
``52 U.S.C. 10307, 10308(a), (b)''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2H4.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 2 by striking ``et. seq.'' and inserting ``et seq.''.
The Commentary to Sec. 2M3.9 is amended by striking ``Sec. 421''
each place such term appears and inserting ``Sec. 3121''; and by
striking ``Sec. 421(d)'' and inserting ``Sec. 3121(d)''.
The Commentary following Sec. 3D1.5 captioned ``Illustrations of
the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'' is amended by striking the
heading as follows:
``Illustrations of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'',
and inserting the following new heading:
``Concluding Commentary to Part D of Chapter Three
Illustrations of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'';
in Example 1 by striking ``convicted on'' and inserting ``convicted
of''; and by striking ``$12,000'' and inserting ``$21,000'';
in Example 2 by striking ``Defendant C'' and inserting ``Defendant
B''; by striking ``convicted on'' and inserting ``convicted of''; and
by striking ``offense level for bribery (22)'' and inserting ``offense
level for bribery (20)'';
and in Example 3 by striking ``Defendant D'' and inserting
``Defendant C''; by striking ``$27,000'', ``$12,000'', ``$15,000'', and
``$20,000'' and inserting ``$1,000'' in each place such terms appear;
by striking ``$74,000'' and inserting ``$4,000''; and by striking
``16'' both places such term appears and inserting ``9''.
The Commentary to Sec. 5E1.2 captioned ``Application Notes'' is
amended in Note 5 by striking ``2 U.S.C. 437g(d)(1)(D)'' and inserting
``52 U.S.C. 30109(d)(1)(D)''; and by striking ``2 U.S.C. 441f'' and
inserting ``52 U.S.C. 30122''.
Appendix A (Statutory Index) is amended by striking the following
line references:
``2 U.S.C. Sec. 437g(d) 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 439a 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441a 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441a-1 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441b 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441c 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441d 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441e 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441f 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441g 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441h(a) 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441i 2C1.8
2 U.S.C. Sec. 441k 2C1.8'',
and inserting at the end the following new line references:
``52 U.S.C. Sec. 30109(d) 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30114 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30116 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30117 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30118 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30119 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30120 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30121 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30122 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30123 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30124(a) 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30125 2C1.8
52 U.S.C. Sec. 30126 2C1.8'';
by striking the following line references:
``42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973i(c) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973i(d) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973i(e) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973j(a) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973j(b) 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973j(c) 2X1.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973aa 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973aa-1 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973aa-1a 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973aa-3 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973bb 2H2.1
42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973gg-10 2H2.1'',
and inserting after the line referenced to 50 U.S.C. App. Sec.
2410 the following new line references:
``52 U.S.C. Sec. 10307(c) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10307(d) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10307(e) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10308(a) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10308(b) 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10308(c) 2X1.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10501 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10502 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10503 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10505 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 10701 2H2.1
52 U.S.C. Sec. 20511 2H2.1'';
and by striking the line referenced to 50 U.S.C. 421 and inserting
after the line referenced to 50 U.S.C. 1705 the following new line
reference:
``50 U.S.C. Sec. 3121 2M3.9''.
Reason for Amendment: This amendment makes certain technical
changes to the Guidelines Manual.
First, the amendment sets forth technical changes to reflect the
editorial reclassification of certain sections in the United States
Code. Effective February 2014, the Office of the Law Revision Counsel
transferred provisions relating to voting and elections from titles 2
and 42 to a new title 52. It also transferred provisions of the
National Security Act of 1947 from one place to another in title 50. To
reflect the new section numbers of the reclassified provisions, changes
are made to--
(1) the Commentary to Sec. 2C1.8 (Making, Receiving, or Failing to
Report a Contribution, Donation, or Expenditure in Violation of the
Federal Election Campaign Act; Fraudulently Misrepresenting Campaign
Authority; Soliciting or Receiving a Donation in Connection with an
Election While on Certain Federal Property);
(2) the Commentary to Sec. 2H2.1 (Obstructing an Election or
Registration);
(3) the Commentary to Sec. 2M3.9 (Disclosure of Information
Identifying a Covert Agent);
(4) Application Note 5 to Sec. 5E1.2 (Fines for Individual
Defendants); and
(5) Appendix A (Statutory Index).
Second, it makes stylistic and technical changes to the Commentary
following Sec. 3D1.5 (Determining the Total Punishment) captioned
``Illustrations of the Operation of the Multiple-Count Rules'' to
better reflect its purpose as a concluding commentary to Part D of
Chapter Three.
Finally, it makes clerical changes to--
(1) the Background Commentary to Sec. 1B1.11 (Use of Guidelines
Manual in Effect on Date of Sentencing (Policy Statement)), to correct
a typographical error in a U.S. Reports citation;
(2) the Commentary to Sec. 2B4.1 (Bribery in Procurement of Bank
Loan and Other Commercial Bribery), to correct certain United States
Code citations to correspond with their respective references in
Appendix A
[[Page 25796]]
that were revised by Amendment 769 (effective November 1, 2012);
(3) subsection (e)(7) to Sec. 2D1.11 (Unlawfully Distributing,
Importing, Exporting or Possessing a Listed Chemical; Attempt or
Conspiracy), to add a missing measurement unit to the line referencing
Norpseudoephedrine; and
(4) Application Note 2 to Sec. 2H4.2 (Willful Violations of the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act), to correct a
typographical error in an abbreviation.
[FR Doc. 2015-10516 Filed 5-4-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 2210-40-P