Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767-2C Series Airplanes; Airplane Electronic-System Security Protection From Unauthorized External Access, 10328-10330 [2015-03970]
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<![CDATA[
10328
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 38 / Thursday, February 26, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
The electronic-system network
architecture for the Model 767–2C series
airplane introduces potential security
risks and vulnerabilities not addressed
in current regulations and airplane-level
or system-level safety-assessment
methods.
This network architecture allows
connection to previously isolated data
networks connected to systems that
perform functions required for the safe
operation of the airplane. This data
network and design integration may
result in security vulnerabilities from
intentional or unintentional internalconnection corruption of data and
systems critical to the safety and
maintenance of the airplane.
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Discussion
The Boeing Model 767–2C series
airplane design introduces the potential
for unauthorized persons to access, from
internal connection, airplane-control
domain and operator-informationservices domain in the passengerservices domain. The Model 767–2C
design further introduces the potential
for security vulnerabilities related to the
introduction of viruses, worms, user
mistakes, and intentional sabotage of
airplane networks, systems, and
databases. As such, these special
conditions address these vulnerabilities.
The digital systems architecture for
the Boeing Model 767–2C series
airplanes is composed of several
connected networks. This network
architecture is used for a diverse set of
functions, including:
1. Flight-safety related control and
navigation systems,
2. operator business and
administrative support, and
3. passenger entertainment.
The existing regulations and guidance
material did not anticipate this type of
system architecture or electronic access
to airplane systems. Furthermore,
regulations, and current system safetyassessment policy and techniques, do
not address potential security
vulnerabilities, which could be caused
by unauthorized access to airplane data
buses and servers. These special
conditions are meant to ensure that
security, integrity, and availability of
airplane systems are not compromised
by certain wired or wireless electronic
connections between airplane data
busses and networks.
Special conditions have been applied
on past airplane programs to require
consideration of related security
vulnerabilities. These special conditions
are similar to those previously applied,
except that the scope has been adjusted
to be consistent with those features
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:38 Feb 25, 2015
Jkt 235001
unique to the Model 767–2C series
airplane.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions apply to Boeing Model 767–
2C series airplanes. Should Boeing
apply later for a change to the type
certificate to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions
would apply to that model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
series of airplane. It is not a rule of
general applicability.
The substance of these special
conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several
prior instances, and has been derived
without substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. Therefore, because a
delay would significantly affect the
certification of the airplane, the FAA
has determined that prior public notice
and comment are unnecessary and
impracticable, and good cause exists for
adopting these special conditions upon
publication in the Federal Register.
The FAA is requesting comments to
allow interested persons to submit
views that may not have been submitted
in response to the prior opportunities
for comment described above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the typecertification basis for Boeing Model
767–2C series airplanes.
1. The applicant must ensure that the
design provides isolation from, or
airplane electronic-system security
protection against, access by
unauthorized sources internal to the
airplane. The design must prevent
inadvertent and malicious changes to,
and all adverse impacts upon, airplane
equipment, systems, networks, or other
assets required for safe flight and
operations.
2. The applicant must establish
appropriate procedures to allow the
operator to ensure that continued
PO 00000
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
airworthiness of the airplane is
maintained, including all post-typecertification modifications that may
have an impact on the approved
electronic-system security safeguards.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February
19, 2015.
John J. Piccola, Jr.,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–03969 Filed 2–25–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0711; Special
Conditions No. 25–575–SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767–
2C Series Airplanes; Airplane
Electronic-System Security Protection
From Unauthorized External Access
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
These special conditions are
issued for Boeing Model 767–2C series
airplanes. These airplanes, as modified
by The Boeing Company, will have a
novel or unusual design feature
associated with airplane electronicsystem security protection or isolation
from unauthorized external access. The
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for this design feature.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: This action is effective on The
Boeing Company on February 26, 2015.
We must receive your comments by
April 13, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified
by docket number FAA–2014–0711
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov/ and follow
the online instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket
Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC
20590–0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take
comments to Docket Operations in
SUMMARY:
E:\FR\FM\26FER1.SGM
26FER1
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 38 / Thursday, February 26, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
Room W12–140 of the West Building
Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket
Operations at 202–493–2251.
Privacy: The FAA will post all
comments it receives, without change,
to https://www.regulations.gov/,
including any personal information the
commenter provides. Using the search
function of the docket Web site, anyone
can find and read the electronic form of
all comments received into any FAA
docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or
signing the comment for an association,
business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s
complete Privacy Act Statement can be
found in the Federal Register,
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477–19478), as well as at https://
DocketsInfo.dot.gov/.
Docket: Background documents or
comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov/ at any time.
Follow the online instructions for
accessing the docket or go to Docket
Operations in Room W12–140 of the
West Building Ground Floor at 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and
Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM–111,
Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue
SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356;
telephone (425) 227–1298; facsimile
(425) 227–1320.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA
has determined that notice of, and
opportunity for prior public comment
on, these special conditions is
impracticable because these procedures
would significantly delay issuance of
the design approval and thus delivery of
the affected airplane. In addition, the
substance of these special conditions
has been subject to the public-comment
process in several prior instances with
no substantive comments received. The
FAA therefore finds that good cause
exists for making these special
conditions effective upon publication in
the Federal Register.
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take
part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data.
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:38 Feb 25, 2015
Jkt 235001
We will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for
comments. We may change these special
conditions based on the comments we
receive.
Background
On January 18, 2010, Boeing applied
for an amendment to Type Certificate
No. A1NM to include a new Model 767–
2CX series airplane, a derivative of the
767–200, which later was renamed 767–
2C. Later, Boeing requested, and the
FAA approved, an extension to the date
of application for FAA amended type
certification to December 22, 2010.
The Model 767–2C is a freighter
airplane equipped with Pratt & Whitney
PW4062 engines. This freighter has a
maximum takeoff weight of 415,000
pounds and can be configured to carry
up to 11 supernumeraries (see
Exemption No. 10691).
Type-Certification Basis
The regulations listed in the type
certificate are commonly referred to as
the ‘‘original type-certification basis.’’
The regulations to be listed in A1NM
are as follows:
Under the provisions of Title 14, Code
of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 21.101,
Boeing must show that the Boeing
Model 767–2C series airplane meets the
applicable provisions of part 25, as
amended by Amendments 25–1 through
25–130, and 14 CFR 25.1316 at
Amendment 25–134, except for earlier
amendments as agreed upon by the
FAA. These regulations will be listed in
Type Certificate No. A1NM after typecertification approval of the 767–2C.
14 CFR part 26 as amended by
Amendments 26–1 through 26–6, and
any later amendments in existence at
the time of certification per 14 CFR 26.5.
For any future part 26 Amendments, the
holder of this type certificate must
demonstrate compliance with the
applicable sections.
14 CFR part 34 as amended by
Amendments 34–1 through 34–5A, and
any later amendments in existence at
the time of certification.
14 CFR part 36 as amended by
Amendments 36–1 through 36–29, and
any later amendments in existence at
the time of certification.
The certification basis also includes
certain special conditions, exemptions,
or later amended sections of the
applicable part that are not relevant to
these special conditions.
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations
(i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for the Model 767–2C series airplane
because of a novel or unusual design
PO 00000
Frm 00007
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
10329
feature, special conditions are
prescribed under § 21.16.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to
include any other model that
incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, or should any other
model already included on the same
type certificate be modified to
incorporate the same novel or unusual
design feature, these special conditions
would also apply to the other model
under § 21.101.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Model 767–2C series
airplane must comply with the fuel-vent
and exhaust-emission requirements of
14 CFR part 34, and the noisecertification requirements of 14 CFR
part 36. The FAA must issue a finding
of regulatory adequacy under § 611 of
Public Law 92–574, the ‘‘Noise Control
Act of 1972.’’
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38,
and they become part of the typecertification basis under § 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Feature
The Boeing Model 767–2C series
airplane will incorporate the following
novel or unusual design feature:
The electronic-system network
architecture for the Model 767–2C series
airplane introduces potential security
risks and vulnerabilities not addressed
in current regulations and airplane-level
or system-level safety-assessment
methods. This network architecture
allows connection to airplane electronic
systems and networks, and access from
airplane external sources (e.g., operator
networks, wireless devices, Internet
connectivity, service-provider satellite
communications, electronic flight bags,
etc.), to the previously isolated airplane
electronic assets. Airplane electronic
assets include electronic equipment and
systems, instruments, networks, servers,
software and electronic components,
field-loadable software and hardware
applications, and databases.
Discussion
The Boeing Model 767–2C series
airplane design introduces the potential
for unauthorized persons to access
airplane-control domain and operatorinformation-services domain in the
passenger-services domain. The 767–2C
design further introduces the potential
for security vulnerabilities related to the
introduction of viruses, worms, user
mistakes, and intentional sabotage of
airplane networks, systems, and
E:\FR\FM\26FER1.SGM
26FER1
10330
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 38 / Thursday, February 26, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
databases. As such, these special
conditions address these vulnerabilities.
The digital systems architecture for
the Boeing Model 767–2C series
airplanes is composed of several
connected networks. This network
architecture is used for a diverse set of
functions providing data connectivity
between systems, including:
1. Airplane control, communication,
display, monitoring and navigation
systems,
2. operator business and
administrative support systems,
3. passenger entertainment systems,
and
4. access by systems external to the
airplane.
The Model 767–2C series airplane
electronic-system network architecture
allows connection to airplane electronic
systems and networks, and access from
airplane external sources (e.g., operator
networks, wireless devices, Internet
connectivity, service-provider satellite
communications, electronic flight bags,
etc.) to the previously isolated airplane
electronic assets.
This design may result in networksecurity vulnerabilities from intentional
or unintentional corruption of data and
systems required for the safety,
operations, and maintenance of the
airplane. The existing regulations and
guidance material did not anticipate this
type of system architecture, or external
wired and wireless electronic access to
airplane electronic systems.
Furthermore, regulations, and current
system safety-assessment policy and
techniques, do not address potential
security vulnerabilities, which could be
caused by unauthorized access to
airplane electronic systems and
networks.
Special conditions have been applied
on past airplane programs to require
consideration of related security
vulnerabilities. These special conditions
are similar to those previously applied,
except that the scope has been adjusted
to be consistent with those features
unique to the Model 767–2C series
airplane.
rmajette on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions apply to Boeing Model 767–
2C series airplanes. Should Boeing
apply later for a change to the type
certificate to include another model
incorporating the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions
would apply to that model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:38 Feb 25, 2015
Jkt 235001
series of airplane. It is not a rule of
general applicability.
The substance of these special
conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several
prior instances, and has been derived
without substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. Therefore, because a
delay would significantly affect the
certification of the airplane, the FAA
has determined that prior public notice
and comment are unnecessary and
impracticable, and good cause exists for
adopting these special conditions upon
publication in the Federal Register.
The FAA is requesting comments to
allow interested persons to submit
views that may not have been submitted
in response to the prior opportunities
for comment described above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the typecertification basis for Boeing Model
767–2C series airplanes.
1. The applicant must ensure airplane
electronic-system security protection
from access by unauthorized sources
external to the airplane, including those
possibly caused by maintenance
activity.
2. The applicant must ensure that
electronic-system security threats are
identified and assessed, and that
effective electronic-system security
protection strategies are implemented to
protect the airplane from all adverse
impacts on safety, functionality, and
continued airworthiness.
3. The applicant must establish
appropriate procedures to allow the
operator to ensure that continued
airworthiness of the airplane is
maintained, including all post typecertification modifications that may
have an impact on the approved
electronic-system security safeguards.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February
19, 2015.
John J. Piccola, Jr.,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–03970 Filed 2–25–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
PO 00000
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Fmt 4700
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Food and Drug Administration
21 CFR Part 884
[Docket No. FDA–2014–M–1957]
Medical Devices; Obstetrical and
Gynecological Devices; Classification
of the Assisted Reproduction Embryo
Image Assessment System
AGENCY:
Food and Drug Administration,
HHS.
ACTION:
Final order.
The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is classifying the
Assisted Reproduction Embryo Image
Assessment System into class II (special
controls). The special controls that will
apply to the device are identified in this
order, and will be part of the codified
language for the Assisted Reproduction
Embryo Image Assessment System
classification. The Agency is classifying
the device into class II (special controls)
in order to provide a reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness of
the device.
DATES: This order is effective February
26, 2015. The classification was
applicable June 6, 2014.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Michael Bailey, Center for Devices and
Radiological Health, Food and Drug
Administration, 10903 New Hampshire
Ave., Bldg. 66, Rm. G120, Silver Spring,
MD 20993–0002, 301–796–6530.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
I. Background
In accordance with section 513(f)(1) of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (the FD&C Act) (21 U.S.C.
360c(f)(1)), devices that were not in
commercial distribution before May 28,
1976 (the date of enactment of the
Medical Device Amendments of 1976),
generally referred to as postamendments
devices, are classified automatically by
statute into class III without any FDA
rulemaking process. These devices
remain in class III and require
premarket approval, unless and until
the device is classified or reclassified
into class I or II, or FDA issues an order
finding the device to be substantially
equivalent, in accordance with section
513(i), to a predicate device that does
not require premarket approval. The
Agency determines whether new
devices are substantially equivalent to
predicate devices by means of
premarket notification procedures in
section 510(k) of the FD&C Act (21
U.S.C. 360(k)) and part 807 (21 CFR part
807) of the regulations.
E:\FR\FM\26FER1.SGM
26FER1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 38 (Thursday, February 26, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 10328-10330]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-03970]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0711; Special Conditions No. 25-575-SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 767-2C Series Airplanes;
Airplane Electronic-System Security Protection From Unauthorized
External Access
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for Boeing Model 767-2C
series airplanes. These airplanes, as modified by The Boeing Company,
will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with airplane
electronic-system security protection or isolation from unauthorized
external access. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design
feature. These special conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: This action is effective on The Boeing Company on February 26,
2015. We must receive your comments by April 13, 2015.
ADDRESSES: Send comments identified by docket number FAA-2014-0711
using any of the following methods:
Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to https://www.regulations.gov/ and
follow the online instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
Mail: Send comments to Docket Operations, M-30, U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Room W12-140, West
Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
Hand Delivery or Courier: Take comments to Docket Operations in
[[Page 10329]]
Room W12-140 of the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through
Friday, except Federal holidays.
Fax: Fax comments to Docket Operations at 202-493-2251.
Privacy: The FAA will post all comments it receives, without
change, to https://www.regulations.gov/, including any personal
information the commenter provides. Using the search function of the
docket Web site, anyone can find and read the electronic form of all
comments received into any FAA docket, including the name of the
individual sending the comment (or signing the comment for an
association, business, labor union, etc.). DOT's complete Privacy Act
Statement can be found in the Federal Register, published on April 11,
2000 (65 FR 19477-19478), as well as at https://DocketsInfo.dot.gov/.
Docket: Background documents or comments received may be read at
https://www.regulations.gov/ at any time. Follow the online instructions
for accessing the docket or go to Docket Operations in Room W12-140 of
the West Building Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Varun Khanna, FAA, Airplane and
Flightcrew Interface Branch, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-1298; facsimile (425) 227-
1320.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice of, and
opportunity for prior public comment on, these special conditions is
impracticable because these procedures would significantly delay
issuance of the design approval and thus delivery of the affected
airplane. In addition, the substance of these special conditions has
been subject to the public-comment process in several prior instances
with no substantive comments received. The FAA therefore finds that
good cause exists for making these special conditions effective upon
publication in the Federal Register.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing
date for comments. We may change these special conditions based on the
comments we receive.
Background
On January 18, 2010, Boeing applied for an amendment to Type
Certificate No. A1NM to include a new Model 767-2CX series airplane, a
derivative of the 767-200, which later was renamed 767-2C. Later,
Boeing requested, and the FAA approved, an extension to the date of
application for FAA amended type certification to December 22, 2010.
The Model 767-2C is a freighter airplane equipped with Pratt &
Whitney PW4062 engines. This freighter has a maximum takeoff weight of
415,000 pounds and can be configured to carry up to 11 supernumeraries
(see Exemption No. 10691).
Type-Certification Basis
The regulations listed in the type certificate are commonly
referred to as the ``original type-certification basis.'' The
regulations to be listed in A1NM are as follows:
Under the provisions of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14
CFR) 21.101, Boeing must show that the Boeing Model 767-2C series
airplane meets the applicable provisions of part 25, as amended by
Amendments 25-1 through 25-130, and 14 CFR 25.1316 at Amendment 25-134,
except for earlier amendments as agreed upon by the FAA. These
regulations will be listed in Type Certificate No. A1NM after type-
certification approval of the 767-2C.
14 CFR part 26 as amended by Amendments 26-1 through 26-6, and any
later amendments in existence at the time of certification per 14 CFR
26.5. For any future part 26 Amendments, the holder of this type
certificate must demonstrate compliance with the applicable sections.
14 CFR part 34 as amended by Amendments 34-1 through 34-5A, and any
later amendments in existence at the time of certification.
14 CFR part 36 as amended by Amendments 36-1 through 36-29, and any
later amendments in existence at the time of certification.
The certification basis also includes certain special conditions,
exemptions, or later amended sections of the applicable part that are
not relevant to these special conditions.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 25) do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the Model 767-2C series airplane
because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are
prescribed under Sec. 21.16.
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or
unusual design feature, or should any other model already included on
the same type certificate be modified to incorporate the same novel or
unusual design feature, these special conditions would also apply to
the other model under Sec. 21.101.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Model 767-2C series airplane must comply with the fuel-
vent and exhaust-emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34, and the
noise-certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must issue
a finding of regulatory adequacy under Sec. 611 of Public Law 92-574,
the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19,
under Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis
under Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Feature
The Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane will incorporate the
following novel or unusual design feature:
The electronic-system network architecture for the Model 767-2C
series airplane introduces potential security risks and vulnerabilities
not addressed in current regulations and airplane-level or system-level
safety-assessment methods. This network architecture allows connection
to airplane electronic systems and networks, and access from airplane
external sources (e.g., operator networks, wireless devices, Internet
connectivity, service-provider satellite communications, electronic
flight bags, etc.), to the previously isolated airplane electronic
assets. Airplane electronic assets include electronic equipment and
systems, instruments, networks, servers, software and electronic
components, field-loadable software and hardware applications, and
databases.
Discussion
The Boeing Model 767-2C series airplane design introduces the
potential for unauthorized persons to access airplane-control domain
and operator-information-services domain in the passenger-services
domain. The 767-2C design further introduces the potential for security
vulnerabilities related to the introduction of viruses, worms, user
mistakes, and intentional sabotage of airplane networks, systems, and
[[Page 10330]]
databases. As such, these special conditions address these
vulnerabilities.
The digital systems architecture for the Boeing Model 767-2C series
airplanes is composed of several connected networks. This network
architecture is used for a diverse set of functions providing data
connectivity between systems, including:
1. Airplane control, communication, display, monitoring and
navigation systems,
2. operator business and administrative support systems,
3. passenger entertainment systems, and
4. access by systems external to the airplane.
The Model 767-2C series airplane electronic-system network
architecture allows connection to airplane electronic systems and
networks, and access from airplane external sources (e.g., operator
networks, wireless devices, Internet connectivity, service-provider
satellite communications, electronic flight bags, etc.) to the
previously isolated airplane electronic assets.
This design may result in network-security vulnerabilities from
intentional or unintentional corruption of data and systems required
for the safety, operations, and maintenance of the airplane. The
existing regulations and guidance material did not anticipate this type
of system architecture, or external wired and wireless electronic
access to airplane electronic systems. Furthermore, regulations, and
current system safety-assessment policy and techniques, do not address
potential security vulnerabilities, which could be caused by
unauthorized access to airplane electronic systems and networks.
Special conditions have been applied on past airplane programs to
require consideration of related security vulnerabilities. These
special conditions are similar to those previously applied, except that
the scope has been adjusted to be consistent with those features unique
to the Model 767-2C series airplane.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions apply to Boeing Model
767-2C series airplanes. Should Boeing apply later for a change to the
type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel
or unusual design feature, the special conditions would apply to that
model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model series of airplane. It is not a rule of general
applicability.
The substance of these special conditions has been subjected to the
notice and comment period in several prior instances, and has been
derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is
unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change
from the substance contained herein. Therefore, because a delay would
significantly affect the certification of the airplane, the FAA has
determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and
impracticable, and good cause exists for adopting these special
conditions upon publication in the Federal Register.
The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to
submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior
opportunities for comment described above.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type-certification basis for Boeing Model 767-2C series airplanes.
1. The applicant must ensure airplane electronic-system security
protection from access by unauthorized sources external to the
airplane, including those possibly caused by maintenance activity.
2. The applicant must ensure that electronic-system security
threats are identified and assessed, and that effective electronic-
system security protection strategies are implemented to protect the
airplane from all adverse impacts on safety, functionality, and
continued airworthiness.
3. The applicant must establish appropriate procedures to allow the
operator to ensure that continued airworthiness of the airplane is
maintained, including all post type-certification modifications that
may have an impact on the approved electronic-system security
safeguards.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on February 19, 2015.
John J. Piccola, Jr.,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-03970 Filed 2-25-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
