Agency Information Collection Activity; Response to Comments on Notice of Request for Approval To Collect New Information: Voluntary Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf, 5876-5880 [2015-02053]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Curtis Rich, Agency Clearance Officer,
(202) 205–7030 curtis.rich@sba.gov. A
copy of the Form OMB 83–1, supporting
statement, and other documents
submitted to OMB for review may be
obtained from the Agency Clearance
Officer.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Governor of the State, U.S. territory or
possession affected by a disaster
submits this information collection to
request that SBA issue a disaster
declaration. The information identifies
the time, place and nature of the
incident and helps SBA to determine
whether the regulatory criteria for a
disaster declaration have been met, and
disaster assistance can be made
available to the affected region.
Solicitation of Public Comments:
Comments may be submitted on (a)
whether the collection of information is
necessary for the agency to properly
perform its functions; (b) whether the
burden estimates are accurate; (c)
whether there are ways to minimize the
burden, including through the use of
automated techniques or other forms of
information technology; and (d) whether
there are ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information.
Summary of Information Collections:
(1) Title: Disaster Business
Application.
Description of Respondents: Governs
Request for Disaster Declaration.
Form Number: N/A.
Estimated Annual Respondents: 31.
Estimated Annual Responses: 58.
Estimated Annual Hour Burden:
1,160.
Curtis B. Rich,
Management Analyst.
[FR Doc. 2015–01993 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025–01–P
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
[Eagle Fund III–A, L.P.; License No. 07/07–
0117]
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
Notice Seeking Exemption Under
Section 312 of the Small Business
Investment Act, Conflicts of Interest
Notice is hereby given that Eagle
Fund III–A, L.P., 101 S. Hanley Road,
Suite 1250, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, a
Federal Licensee under the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, as
amended (the ‘‘Act’’), in connection
with the financing of a small concern,
has sought an exemption under Section
312 of the Act and 13 CFR 107.730,
Financings which Constitute Conflicts
of Interest, of the Small Business
Administration (‘‘SBA’’) Rules and
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Regulations. Eagle Fund III–A, L.P.,
provided a loan to Net Direct Merchants
LLC, (‘‘Net Direct’’), 217 North
Seminary Street, Florence AL, 35630.
The financing was contemplated to
provide capital that contributes to the
growth and overall sound financing of
Net Direct.
The financing is brought within the
purview of § 107.730(a)(1) because Eagle
Fund II, L.P., an Associate of Eagle Fund
III–A, L.P. as defined in § 107.50, owns
a ten percent or greater equity interest
in Net Direct. Accordingly, Net Direct is
considered an Associate of Eagle Fund
III–A, L.P.
Notice is hereby given that any
interested person may submit written
comments on the transaction to the
Associate Administrator, Office of
Investment and Innovation, U.S. Small
Business Administration, 409 Third
Street SW., Washington, DC 20416.
Javier E. Saade,
Associate Administrator, Office of Investment
and Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2015–02028 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025–01–P
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
[Eagle Fund III, L.P.; License No. 07/07–
0116]
Notice Seeking Exemption Under
Section 312 of the Small Business
Investment Act, Conflicts of Interest
Notice is hereby given that Eagle
Fund III, L.P., 101 S. Hanley Road, Suite
1250, St. Louis, Missouri 63105, a
Federal Licensee under the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, as
amended (the ‘‘Act’’), in connection
with the financing of a small concern,
has sought an exemption under Section
312 of the Act and 13 CFR 107.730,
Financings which Constitute Conflicts
of Interest, of the Small Business
Administration (‘‘SBA’’) Rules and
Regulations. Eagle Fund III, L.P.,
provided a loan to Net Direct Merchants
LLC, (‘‘Net Direct’’), 217 North
Seminary Street, Florence AL, 35630.
The financing was contemplated to
provide capital that contributes to the
growth and overall sound financing of
Net Direct.
The financing is brought within the
purview of § 107.730(a)(1) because Eagle
Fund II, L.P., an Associate of Eagle Fund
III, L.P. as defined in § 107.50, owns a
ten percent or greater equity interest in
Net Direct. Accordingly, Net Direct is
considered an Associate of Eagle Fund
III, L.P.
Notice is hereby given that any
interested person may submit written
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comments on the transaction to the
Associate Administrator, Office of
Investment and Innovation, U.S. Small
Business Administration, 409 Third
Street SW., Washington, DC 20416.
Javier E. Saade,
Associate Administrator, Office of Investment
and Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2015–02030 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025–01–P
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Surrender of License of Small
Business Investment Company
Pursuant to the authority granted to
the United States Small Business
Administration under the Small
Business Investment Act of 1958, as
amended, under Section 309 of the Act
and Section 107.1900 of the Small
Business Administration Rules and
Regulations (13 CFR 107.1900) to
function as a small business investment
company under the Small Business
Investment Company License No. 03/
73–0214 issued to Virginia Capital SBIC,
LP, said license is hereby declared null
and void.
United States Small Business
Administration.
Dated: January 22, 2015.
Javier E. Saade,
Associate Administrator for Investment and
Innovation.
[FR Doc. 2015–01992 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Research and Technology
[Docket Number: OST–2014–0112]
Agency Information Collection
Activity; Response to Comments on
Notice of Request for Approval To
Collect New Information: Voluntary
Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas
Operations on the Outer Continental
Shelf
Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS), Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Research and Technology
(OST–R), U.S. Department of
Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; response to comments.
AGENCY:
On July 2, 2014, the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
announced its intention in a Federal
Register Notice (79 FR 37837) to request
that the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) approve the following
SUMMARY:
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
information collection: Voluntary Near
Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas
Operations on the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS). At that time, BTS also
encouraged interested parties to submit
comments to docket number DOT–OST–
2014–0112, allowing for a 60-day
comment period. The comment period
closed on September 2, 2014. BTS
received three public comments from:
LLOG Exploration (DOT–OST–2014–
0112–0004), the American Petroleum
Institute (API) and the Center for
Offshore Safety (COS) (DOT–OST–
2014–0112–0003), and the Offshore
Operators Committee (OOC) (DOT–
OST–2014–0112–0002). The purpose of
this Notice is to respond to the
comments received on the July 2, 2014
announcement and allow 30 days for
public comment to OMB on this
collection from all interested
individuals and organizations.
DATES: Written comments should be
submitted by March 5, 2015.
ADDRESSES: BTS seeks public comments
on its proposed information collection.
Comments should address whether the
information will have practical utility;
the accuracy of the estimated burden
hours of the proposed information
collection; ways to enhance the quality,
utility and clarity of the information to
be collected; and ways to minimize the
burden of the collection of information
on respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
Send comments to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, 725
17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20503,
Attention: BTS Desk Officer.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Demetra V. Collia, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Research and
Technology, U.S. Department of
Transportation, RTS–31, E36–302, 1200
New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington,
DC 20590–0001; Phone No. (202) 366–
1610; Fax No. (202) 366–3383; email:
demetra.collia@dot.gov. Office hours are
from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., EST, Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Data Confidentiality Provisions: The
confidentiality of near miss data is
protected under the BTS confidentiality
statute (49 U.S.C. 6307) and the
Confidential Information Protection and
Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of
2002 (Pub. L. 107–347, Title V). In
accordance with these confidentiality
statutes, only statistical and nonidentifying data will be made publicly
available through reports. BTS will not
release to the Bureau of Safety and
Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), or
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to any other public or private entity, any
information that might reveal the
identity of individuals or organizations
mentioned in near miss reports without
explicit consent of the respondent.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. The Data Collection
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. chapter 35; as amended) and
5 CFR part 1320 require each Federal
agency to obtain OMB approval to
initiate an information collection
activity. BTS is seeking OMB approval
for the following BTS information
collection activity:
Title: Voluntary Confidential Near
Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas
Operations on the Outer Continental
Shelf.
OMB Control Number: TBD.
Type of Review: Approval of data
collection.
Respondents: Employees working in
the oil and gas industry on the OCS.
Number of Potential Responses: Based
on near miss reporting trends in other
industries, BTS expects to receive no
more than two responses per calendar
day during the first three years of the
program (approximately 730 responses
per year).
Estimated Time per Response: Not to
exceed 60 minutes (this includes
estimated time for a follow up
interview, if needed).
Frequency: Intermittent for 3 years.
(Reports are submitted when there is a
qualifying event, i.e., when a near miss
occurs in oil and gas operations on the
OCS.)
Total Annual Burden: 730 hours.
II. Public Participation and Request for
Public Comments
On July 2, 2014, BTS published a
notice (70 FR 37837) encouraging
interested parties to submit comments
to docket number DOT–OST–2014–0112
and allowing for a 60-day comment
period. The comment period closed on
September 2, 2014. To view comments,
go to https://www.regulations.gov and
insert the docket number, ‘‘DOT–OST–
2014–0112’’ in the ‘‘Search’’ box and
click ‘‘Search.’’ Next, click ‘‘Open
Docket Folder’’ button and choose
document listed to review. If you do not
have access to the Internet, you may
view the docket by visiting the Docket
Management Facility in Room W12–140
on the ground floor of the DOT West
Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.
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Privacy Act
All comments the BTS received were
posted without change to https://
www.regulations.gov. Anyone may
search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or of the
person signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on January 17, 2008 (73 FR
3316), or you may visit https://
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8785.pdf.
III. Discussion of Public Comments and
BTS Responses
A. General Discussion
BTS announced on July 2, 2014, in a
Federal Register Notice (79 FR 37837),
its intention to request that OMB
approve the following information
collection: Voluntary Near Miss
Reporting in Oil and Gas Operations on
the OCS. BTS received three comments
during the 60-day public comment
period. Comments from LLOG
Exploration, API/COS, and the OOC
covered various topics including the
definition of a near miss reporting (i.e.,
the reporting of conditions, root cause
analysis, duplicative reporting,
information-sharing, the scope of
reporting, and the potential for reporting
to multiple systems), the estimated
number of burden hours, notification of
near misses at their respective facilities,
evaluation of the program, and the
intent of the 2011 report by the National
Commission on the Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill (the National Commission
Report).
B. Definition of a Near Miss
All three of the commenters had
questions about the description of a near
miss used by BTS in the July 2, 2014
notice. BTS appreciates the
commenters’ concerns. BTS intends the
term ‘‘near miss’’ to encompass a variety
of safety conditions, since a narrow
operational definition of the term may
unduly inhibit reporting of events or
conditions that, regardless of potential
severity, would limit the program’s
effectiveness in preventing and
minimizing safety risks. In addition, the
BTS’ description of the term is
consistent with the International
Maritime Organization’s (IMO)
definition of a ‘‘near miss’’ and is
therefore widely recognized around the
world.’’
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C. Reporting
1. Reporting of Conditions
Two of the three commenters were
concerned that any hazard could be
deemed a ‘‘condition’’ and be reported
as a near miss. BTS’s experience with
the railroad and aviation industry close
call/near miss reporting programs
indicates that the reporting of
‘‘conditions’ may be very valuable to
causal analysis of potential safety risks
and the prevention of safety incidents.
By learning more about potentially
unsafe conditions, the public,
government, and industry will be better
able to identify hazards, hazardous
conditions, and potential design and
operational improvements that could
reduce risks on the OCS.
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2. Root Cause Analysis
All three of the commenters sought
additional information on whether and
how BTS would conduct root cause
analyses of near miss reports. In
addition, one commenter had questions
about the background and experience of
those individuals that would review and
analyze the near miss reports. BTS
agrees that causal analysis of near miss
information reported under this
program will be very important and
should be conducted by experienced
personnel. For this program, BTS
intends to employ subject matter experts
(SMEs) in oil and gas operations and
trained in investigative techniques to
conduct follow-up interviews with
individuals who report near misses.
Further, SMEs, using well-established
causal analysis tools similar to those
widely used by industry and research
organizations, will collect additional
information about potential contributing
factors to reported near misses and
unsafe conditions as well as help
conduct causal analyses of reported near
misses.
3. Duplicative Reporting
Two of the three commenters
expressed concern about how multiple
reports for the same near miss event
would be handled. BTS has experience,
through its other reporting programs,
with identifying duplicate reports for
the same event; e.g., through comparing
event location, event description, event
time, and other factors. In addition,
assessment and follow-up of near miss
reports by experienced SMEs acting on
behalf of BTS will help identify
duplicative reports. However,
occasional multiple reports to BTS of a
single near miss event by more than one
source is not necessarily a problem.
Reports on the same event from
different sources can provide different
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and useful perspectives, and thus may
help BTS obtain a more complete
picture of the event.
4. Information-sharing
One of the three commenters
expressed some concern over how long
it might take for a hazard to go
uncorrected if it is only reported
through this reporting system; the
commenter indicated that such reports
should be made directly to the facility
or company involved so that the hazard
can be promptly corrected. If BTS
receives a near miss report indicating a
significant hazard or condition exists
that poses an imminent risk, BTS will
take action, consistent with CIPSEA, to
share that information with an affected
facility or facilities, or with the industry
as a whole, as quickly as possible.
Under CIPSEA, BTS may disclose such
reported information, as appropriate, if
the reporter consents to BTS doing so
and in cases of potentially imminent
risks, BTS would seek such consent
expeditiously. In addition, assuming a
reporter does not consent to share
information from an individual report,
BTS may be able to aggregate data in a
way that protects the anonymity of the
reporter and the confidentiality of the
specific report and share information
about the potential risks in near real
time.
5. Scope of Reporting
All three commenters had questions
about the scope of reporting near misses
by individuals to the Voluntary Near
Miss Reporting System and advocated
that near miss information should be
reported by OCS companies or industry
associations. BTS recognizes the
potential value of the near miss
reporting systems operated by
individual companies and other entities.
The near misses reported to company or
other industry systems undoubtedly
provide important safety information to
the individual companies and could
provide valuable information to the
industry, government, and public, if
shared. BTS looks forward to discussing
with industry groups and companies
their potential participation in a near
miss reporting system.
However, BTS does not agree that an
offshore oil and gas near miss reporting
system should be limited to
participation by companies or other
industry organizations that collect nearmiss information. This Voluntary Near
Miss Reporting System provides strict
protection, under CIPSEA, of the
reporters’ identities and of the
confidentiality of the information,
which is typically not afforded by
company or other industry organization
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reporting systems. Thus, this system
will afford individuals—including
company and contractor employees—an
opportunity to report near misses that
they otherwise might not feel safe to
report to their employers. Accordingly,
this near miss reporting system could,
through BTS’ aggregate reports, provide
information to industry, the workforce,
the government, and the public about
potential hazards and unsafe conditions
that would not be reported (or shared)
under company or other industry
programs.
Moreover, if participation in this
voluntary program were limited to
companies, or other industry
organizations, the information provided
to BTS would be circumscribed by
whatever definitions or other limitations
each company or entity places on its
reporting programs. For example, as
indicated by some of the commenters,
existing industry programs appear to
focus on high impact or high potential
events, to the exclusion of lower
potential events or conditions. By
contrast, this near miss reporting system
extends to what industry might consider
‘‘low severity’’ near misses that could,
depending upon other factors, indicate
the potential for more severe events to
occur or demonstrate a lack of safety
culture or awareness about specific
hazards with industry-wide
implications.
Similarly, if this voluntary near miss
reporting system were restricted to
participation only by companies or
other industry entities, the information
submitted to BTS would also be subject
to whatever limits the specific company
or entity places on the information it
chooses to share. For example, the
company or entity might decide to
submit only information that it
considered ‘‘legitimate’’ or significant,
instead of providing the initial or ‘‘raw’’
information that the company/entity
had received. BTS believes there is
potential value to be gained from near
miss information that companies/
entities may think is of low severity or
importance or of uncertain validity, but
that reflects the individual reporters’
unique perspectives on the event or
condition.
In addition, BTS disagrees with the
suggestion made by two commenters
that individuals should not be allowed
to participate in this system because
they would not understand
‘contributing factors’ or root causes.
That concern is academic since
individual reporters would not
participate in the causal analysis
process; BTS, with help from
appropriately qualified SMEs, would
perform causal analyses.
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
Finally, based on its experience with
other industry reporting programs, BTS
does not agree with the comment made
by two commenters suggesting that BTS
limit participation in the program to
companies/entities in order to reduce
the estimated time for responses. For the
reasons stated elsewhere in this notice,
BTS believes there will be substantial
potential benefits from individual
reporting and that, even assuming a
company could submit reports in less
time than an individual, the suggested
efficiency of company reporting does
not warrant precluding individuals from
filing reports offering their own
perspectives on the same events.
Moreover, as discussed previously, if
reporting were limited only to
companies, BTS likely would not
receive reports on all of the near-misses
that could be reported by individuals.
In addition, BTS does not agree with
the two commenters who asserted that
the estimated time (60 minutes) for
individual responses is excessive. The
estimated time needed to complete an
initial report is approximately 15
minutes, which is short enough to
encourage widespread participation.
The remainder of the estimated 60
minutes would be used for a
confidential follow-up interview, as
warranted by the initial report. It is
important to point out that follow-up
interviews are voluntary and not every
respondent will consent to be
interviewed. Although, a respondent
who feels it is worthwhile to voluntarily
submit an initial report is likely to be
willing to participate in a confidential
interview in order to ensure that the
reported information is clearly
understood and correctly evaluated by
BTS.
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6. Potential for Reporting to Multiple
Systems
Two commenters asserted that this
near miss reporting system may create
redundant reporting with other private
and governmental reporting programs or
near miss initiatives. In particular, the
commenters suggested that individuals
may submit reports under BSEE’s
regulation allowing voluntary reporting
of hazardous or unsafe working
conditions on OCS facilities (30 CFR
250.193). BTS disagrees with these
comments. The BTS Voluntary Near
Miss Reporting System is strictly
voluntary and is not intended to replace
or interfere with industry, BSEE, or
other agency reporting programs,
whether voluntary or mandatory.
Instead, the BTS Voluntary Near Miss
Reporting System will provide another
opportunity for reporting a wide range
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of potential hazard and risk information
related to OCS oil and gas operations.
As one commenter recognized, in
some cases an individual may feel
inhibited about reporting a near miss to
a company or other industry reporting
program and thus may choose to report
the event or condition to BTS under the
protections afforded by CIPSEA. In such
cases, there would be no duplication of
reporting.
Similarly, an individual may prefer
reporting to CIPSEA under the
guarantees of anonymity and
confidentiality provided by CIPSEA
rather than reporting voluntarily to
BSEE under 30 CFR 250.193. Although
section 250.193 of BSEE’s rules allows
an individual to report hazardous or
unsafe working conditions
anonymously, BSEE is subject to FOIA
and cannot guarantee the anonymity or
confidentiality of the information to the
same degree BTS can protect
information collected under CIPSEA.
Thus, individuals concerned with
protecting their anonymity or with
confidentiality may choose to submit
near miss information to BTS under
CIPSEA rather than to BSEE. Moreover,
the types of issues that may be reported
under § 250.193 (potential violations of
BSEE rules and hazardous or unsafe
working conditions) are potentially not
as inclusive as the issues that may be
reported under this near-miss reporting
system.
BTS also does not agree with the two
commenters who suggested that BTS
should not accept reports for near
misses that have been reported to
industry. The reports submitted to BTS
will serve an important purpose even if
some of the near misses were also
submitted to industry. For example, the
aggregated results of BTS analysis of
near miss reports will be widely
disseminated to government agencies,
the industry, and the public. By
contrast, information from existing
industry near-miss systems, to date, is
generally not shared within the industry
or with the government and the public.
In any event, at present BTS has no way
of knowing which specific near misses
have been reported to industry, and thus
no basis for rejecting individual reports
submitted under this near miss
reporting system.
API/COS noted in their joint
comments, the implementation of the
COS Learning from Incidents (LFI)
program, which COS believes could
inform BTS’s Voluntary Near Miss
Reporting System but also demonstrates
a potential overlap between the two
programs. BTS is aware of the potential
benefits of the COS LFI program, for
COS’ members, and looks forward to
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discussing with COS the potential
sharing of that information with BTS,
and potential sharing of lessons learned
from that information with all
stakeholders. However, it is evident that
the LFI program is limited in scope to
only information from COS member
companies regarding specificallydefined incidents and ‘‘High Value
Leaning Events.’’ Moreover, as API/COS
also notes in their joint comments, the
aggregated information from that
program is only shared with COS
members. For that reason, BTS does not
agree that the proposed near miss
reporting system should be delayed
pending the outcome of further
consideration of the LFI program.
D. Estimated Burden Hours
Two of the three commenters
questioned BTS’s estimated number of
near miss reports that would be
submitted. In particular, OOC claimed
that the number of potential
respondents submitting reports could be
up to 4 or 5 times higher than BTS’s
estimate, ‘‘if a reporting compliance
level of 10–15% is reached,’’ primarily
because the broad scope of ‘‘near miss’’
in this system will result in a large
number of reports on ‘‘low potential’’
events. In the absence of actual near
miss reporting rates in offshore oil and
gas operations, BTS’s estimates were
based upon BTS’ experience with near
miss reporting in other industry sectors.
This estimate will be revised, as
appropriate, once BTS can establish an
expected annual reporting rate based on
‘‘actual’’ reporting statistics of near
misses collected during the initial phase
of this program (i.e., first 3 years).
E. Notification of Near Misses
Two of the three commenters asked
that facilities be notified when a near
miss has been reported for their
installation or unit. BTS, however,
cannot notify an owner or operator of a
near-miss reported which is reported in
confidence without jeopardizing the
anonymity of the individual making the
report or the confidentiality of the
information provided, and thus
violating the statutory protections
afforded by CIPSEA, unless the reporter
consents to sharing that information.
Moreover, if the reporter’s identity were
discovered, it would open the
individual up to potential sanctions or
retaliation by the company. The
National Commission Report which
recommended that BSEE develop a
near-miss reporting system for OCS oil
and gas operations, also specifically
recommended that whistleblowers who
notify authorities about lapses in safety
be provided protection: ‘‘All offshore
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 22 / Tuesday, February 3, 2015 / Notices
was in that part of the report directed to
the Department of the Interior (DOI) that
the National Commission recommended
that DOI: ‘‘Develop more detailed
requirements for incident reporting and
data concerning offshore incidents and
‘near misses.’ Such data collection
would allow for better tracking of
incidents and stronger risk assessments
and analysis.’’
F. Program Evaluation
One commenter requested that BTS
report the results of the program to
stakeholders at least once a year and
that the program be evaluated after two
years of operation. The frequency of
public reports will depend on how
many near miss reports are reported to
the system. To comply with CIPSEA,
reports of aggregated data must be
prepared in such a way that no third
party could determine the identity of a
reporter, directly or indirectly. BTS
expects to issue public reports at least
once per year and potentially more
often, as appropriate.
With regard to re-evaluating the
program after two years, as
demonstrated by near miss reporting in
the aviation industry, it took a
commitment of several years before
employee reporting increased
sufficiently to allow for a robust
program evaluation. BTS agrees that
‘‘formative evaluation’’ is essential in
developing a successful data collection
program and will conduct such
evaluation as soon as there is sufficient
quantitative information in the near
miss data system to allow for such
analysis. However, the potential value
of sharing data in a confidential manner
is worth the investment of time and
effort because the continuation of
environmental and human losses is an
unacceptable alternative to the public
and the government.
rljohnson on DSK3VPTVN1PROD with NOTICES
workers have a duty to ensure safe
operating practices to prevent accidents.
To ensure all workers, regardless of
employer, will take appropriate action
whenever necessary, Congress should
amend the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act or specific safety statutes to
provide the same whistleblower
protection that workers are guaranteed
in other comparable settings.’’
Issued On: January 28, 2015.
Rolf Schmitt,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Transportation
Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Research and Technology.
G. Intent of the National Commission
Report
One commenter correctly noted that
the National Commission Report on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill was
issued in 2011, not 2013 as the 60-day
notice inadvertently stated. BTS,
however, does not agree with the
commenter’s suggestions that the
National Commission Report did not
envision a government-managed system
for near miss reporting, or that the
Commission’s recommendation for an
industry ‘‘self-policing institute that
would gather incident and performance
data’’ would satisfy the
recommendation for a near miss
reporting program. In fact, the two
recommendations are contained in
different parts of the 2011 report, and it
VerDate Sep<11>2014
14:46 Feb 02, 2015
Jkt 235001
[FR Doc. 2015–02053 Filed 2–2–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–9X–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee—New Task
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of new task assignment
for the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC).
AGENCY:
The FAA assigned the
Aviation Rulemaking Advisory
Committee (ARAC) a new task to
provide recommendations regarding
Aircraft Systems Information Security/
Protection (ASISP) rulemaking, policy,
and guidance on best practices for
airplanes and rotorcraft, including both
certification and continued
airworthiness. The issue is that without
updates to regulations, policy, and
guidance to address ASISP, aircraft
vulnerabilities may not be identified
and mitigated, thus increasing exposure
times to security threats. In addition, a
lack of ASISP-specific regulations,
policy, and guidance could result in
security related certification criteria that
are not standardized and harmonized
between domestic and international
regulatory authorities.
This notice informs the public of the
new ARAC activity and solicits
membership for the new ASISP Working
Group.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven C. Paasch, Federal Aviation
Administration, 1601 Lind Ave. SW.,
Renton, WA 98057–3356, Email:
steven.c.paasch@faa.gov, Phone: (425)
227–2549, Fax (425) 227–1100.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
SUMMARY:
ARAC Acceptance of Task
As a result of the December 18, 2014,
ARAC meeting, the FAA assigned and
ARAC accepted this task establishing
PO 00000
Frm 00153
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
the ASISP Working Group. The working
group will serve as staff to the ARAC
and provide advice and
recommendations on the assigned task.
The ARAC will review and approve the
recommendation report and will submit
it to the FAA.
Background
The FAA established the ARAC to
provide information, advice, and
recommendations on aviation related
issues that could result in rulemaking to
the FAA Administrator, through the
Associate Administrator of Aviation
Safety.
The ASISP Working Group will
provide advice and recommendations to
the ARAC on ASISP-related rulemaking,
policy, and guidance, including both
initial certification and continued
airworthiness. Without updates to
regulations, policy, and guidance to
address ASISP, aircraft vulnerabilities
may not be identified and mitigated,
thus increasing exposure times to
security threats. Unauthorized access to
aircraft systems and networks could
result in the malicious use of networks,
and loss or corruption of data (e.g.,
software applications, databases, and
configuration files) brought about by
software worms, viruses, or other
malicious entities. In addition, a lack of
ASISP-specific regulations, policy, and
guidance could result in security related
certification criteria that are not
standardized and harmonized between
domestic and international regulatory
authorities.
There are many different types of
aircraft operating in the United States
National Air Space (NAS), including
transport category airplanes, small
airplanes, and rotorcraft. The
regulations, system architectures, and
security vulnerabilities are different
across these aircraft types. The current
regulations do not specifically address
ASISP for any aircraft operating in the
NAS. To address this issue, the FAA has
published special conditions for
particular make and model aircraft
designs. The FAA issues Special
Conditions when the current
airworthiness regulations for an aircraft
do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for certain novel or
unusual design features including
ASISP. Even though the FAA published
special conditions for ASISP, an update
to the current regulations should be
considered. International civil aviation
authorities are also considering
rulemaking for ASISP and the ASISP
Working Group could be used as input
into harmonization of these activities.
The FAA has issued policy statement,
PS–AIR–21.16–02, Establishment of
E:\FR\FM\03FEN1.SGM
03FEN1
]]>Agencies
- DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
- Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 22 (Tuesday, February 3, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 5876-5880]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-02053]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology
[Docket Number: OST-2014-0112]
Agency Information Collection Activity; Response to Comments on
Notice of Request for Approval To Collect New Information: Voluntary
Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas Operations on the Outer Continental
Shelf
AGENCY: Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (OST-R), U.S.
Department of Transportation.
ACTION: Notice; response to comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: On July 2, 2014, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)
announced its intention in a Federal Register Notice (79 FR 37837) to
request that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approve the
following
[[Page 5877]]
information collection: Voluntary Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas
Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). At that time, BTS also
encouraged interested parties to submit comments to docket number DOT-
OST-2014-0112, allowing for a 60-day comment period. The comment period
closed on September 2, 2014. BTS received three public comments from:
LLOG Exploration (DOT-OST-2014-0112-0004), the American Petroleum
Institute (API) and the Center for Offshore Safety (COS) (DOT-OST-2014-
0112-0003), and the Offshore Operators Committee (OOC) (DOT-OST-2014-
0112-0002). The purpose of this Notice is to respond to the comments
received on the July 2, 2014 announcement and allow 30 days for public
comment to OMB on this collection from all interested individuals and
organizations.
DATES: Written comments should be submitted by March 5, 2015.
ADDRESSES: BTS seeks public comments on its proposed information
collection. Comments should address whether the information will have
practical utility; the accuracy of the estimated burden hours of the
proposed information collection; ways to enhance the quality, utility
and clarity of the information to be collected; and ways to minimize
the burden of the collection of information on respondents, including
the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology. Send comments to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street
NW., Washington, DC 20503, Attention: BTS Desk Officer.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Demetra V. Collia, Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Research and Technology, U.S. Department of Transportation, RTS-31,
E36-302, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590-0001; Phone
No. (202) 366-1610; Fax No. (202) 366-3383; email:
demetra.collia@dot.gov. Office hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m., EST,
Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Data Confidentiality Provisions: The confidentiality of near miss
data is protected under the BTS confidentiality statute (49 U.S.C.
6307) and the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical
Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, Title V). In
accordance with these confidentiality statutes, only statistical and
non-identifying data will be made publicly available through reports.
BTS will not release to the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
Enforcement (BSEE), or to any other public or private entity, any
information that might reveal the identity of individuals or
organizations mentioned in near miss reports without explicit consent
of the respondent.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. The Data Collection
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. chapter 35; as
amended) and 5 CFR part 1320 require each Federal agency to obtain OMB
approval to initiate an information collection activity. BTS is seeking
OMB approval for the following BTS information collection activity:
Title: Voluntary Confidential Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas
Operations on the Outer Continental Shelf.
OMB Control Number: TBD.
Type of Review: Approval of data collection.
Respondents: Employees working in the oil and gas industry on the
OCS.
Number of Potential Responses: Based on near miss reporting trends
in other industries, BTS expects to receive no more than two responses
per calendar day during the first three years of the program
(approximately 730 responses per year).
Estimated Time per Response: Not to exceed 60 minutes (this
includes estimated time for a follow up interview, if needed).
Frequency: Intermittent for 3 years. (Reports are submitted when
there is a qualifying event, i.e., when a near miss occurs in oil and
gas operations on the OCS.)
Total Annual Burden: 730 hours.
II. Public Participation and Request for Public Comments
On July 2, 2014, BTS published a notice (70 FR 37837) encouraging
interested parties to submit comments to docket number DOT-OST-2014-
0112 and allowing for a 60-day comment period. The comment period
closed on September 2, 2014. To view comments, go to https://www.regulations.gov and insert the docket number, ``DOT-OST-2014-0112''
in the ``Search'' box and click ``Search.'' Next, click ``Open Docket
Folder'' button and choose document listed to review. If you do not
have access to the Internet, you may view the docket by visiting the
Docket Management Facility in Room W12-140 on the ground floor of the
DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590,
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
Privacy Act
All comments the BTS received were posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov. Anyone may search the electronic form of all
comments received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or of the person signing the comment, if
submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on January 17, 2008 (73 FR 3316), or you may visit
https://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-785.pdf.
III. Discussion of Public Comments and BTS Responses
A. General Discussion
BTS announced on July 2, 2014, in a Federal Register Notice (79 FR
37837), its intention to request that OMB approve the following
information collection: Voluntary Near Miss Reporting in Oil and Gas
Operations on the OCS. BTS received three comments during the 60-day
public comment period. Comments from LLOG Exploration, API/COS, and the
OOC covered various topics including the definition of a near miss
reporting (i.e., the reporting of conditions, root cause analysis,
duplicative reporting, information-sharing, the scope of reporting, and
the potential for reporting to multiple systems), the estimated number
of burden hours, notification of near misses at their respective
facilities, evaluation of the program, and the intent of the 2011
report by the National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
(the National Commission Report).
B. Definition of a Near Miss
All three of the commenters had questions about the description of
a near miss used by BTS in the July 2, 2014 notice. BTS appreciates the
commenters' concerns. BTS intends the term ``near miss'' to encompass a
variety of safety conditions, since a narrow operational definition of
the term may unduly inhibit reporting of events or conditions that,
regardless of potential severity, would limit the program's
effectiveness in preventing and minimizing safety risks. In addition,
the BTS' description of the term is consistent with the International
Maritime Organization's (IMO) definition of a ``near miss'' and is
therefore widely recognized around the world.''
[[Page 5878]]
C. Reporting
1. Reporting of Conditions
Two of the three commenters were concerned that any hazard could be
deemed a ``condition'' and be reported as a near miss. BTS's experience
with the railroad and aviation industry close call/near miss reporting
programs indicates that the reporting of ``conditions' may be very
valuable to causal analysis of potential safety risks and the
prevention of safety incidents. By learning more about potentially
unsafe conditions, the public, government, and industry will be better
able to identify hazards, hazardous conditions, and potential design
and operational improvements that could reduce risks on the OCS.
2. Root Cause Analysis
All three of the commenters sought additional information on
whether and how BTS would conduct root cause analyses of near miss
reports. In addition, one commenter had questions about the background
and experience of those individuals that would review and analyze the
near miss reports. BTS agrees that causal analysis of near miss
information reported under this program will be very important and
should be conducted by experienced personnel. For this program, BTS
intends to employ subject matter experts (SMEs) in oil and gas
operations and trained in investigative techniques to conduct follow-up
interviews with individuals who report near misses. Further, SMEs,
using well-established causal analysis tools similar to those widely
used by industry and research organizations, will collect additional
information about potential contributing factors to reported near
misses and unsafe conditions as well as help conduct causal analyses of
reported near misses.
3. Duplicative Reporting
Two of the three commenters expressed concern about how multiple
reports for the same near miss event would be handled. BTS has
experience, through its other reporting programs, with identifying
duplicate reports for the same event; e.g., through comparing event
location, event description, event time, and other factors. In
addition, assessment and follow-up of near miss reports by experienced
SMEs acting on behalf of BTS will help identify duplicative reports.
However, occasional multiple reports to BTS of a single near miss event
by more than one source is not necessarily a problem. Reports on the
same event from different sources can provide different and useful
perspectives, and thus may help BTS obtain a more complete picture of
the event.
4. Information-sharing
One of the three commenters expressed some concern over how long it
might take for a hazard to go uncorrected if it is only reported
through this reporting system; the commenter indicated that such
reports should be made directly to the facility or company involved so
that the hazard can be promptly corrected. If BTS receives a near miss
report indicating a significant hazard or condition exists that poses
an imminent risk, BTS will take action, consistent with CIPSEA, to
share that information with an affected facility or facilities, or with
the industry as a whole, as quickly as possible. Under CIPSEA, BTS may
disclose such reported information, as appropriate, if the reporter
consents to BTS doing so and in cases of potentially imminent risks,
BTS would seek such consent expeditiously. In addition, assuming a
reporter does not consent to share information from an individual
report, BTS may be able to aggregate data in a way that protects the
anonymity of the reporter and the confidentiality of the specific
report and share information about the potential risks in near real
time.
5. Scope of Reporting
All three commenters had questions about the scope of reporting
near misses by individuals to the Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System
and advocated that near miss information should be reported by OCS
companies or industry associations. BTS recognizes the potential value
of the near miss reporting systems operated by individual companies and
other entities. The near misses reported to company or other industry
systems undoubtedly provide important safety information to the
individual companies and could provide valuable information to the
industry, government, and public, if shared. BTS looks forward to
discussing with industry groups and companies their potential
participation in a near miss reporting system.
However, BTS does not agree that an offshore oil and gas near miss
reporting system should be limited to participation by companies or
other industry organizations that collect near-miss information. This
Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System provides strict protection, under
CIPSEA, of the reporters' identities and of the confidentiality of the
information, which is typically not afforded by company or other
industry organization reporting systems. Thus, this system will afford
individuals--including company and contractor employees--an opportunity
to report near misses that they otherwise might not feel safe to report
to their employers. Accordingly, this near miss reporting system could,
through BTS' aggregate reports, provide information to industry, the
workforce, the government, and the public about potential hazards and
unsafe conditions that would not be reported (or shared) under company
or other industry programs.
Moreover, if participation in this voluntary program were limited
to companies, or other industry organizations, the information provided
to BTS would be circumscribed by whatever definitions or other
limitations each company or entity places on its reporting programs.
For example, as indicated by some of the commenters, existing industry
programs appear to focus on high impact or high potential events, to
the exclusion of lower potential events or conditions. By contrast,
this near miss reporting system extends to what industry might consider
``low severity'' near misses that could, depending upon other factors,
indicate the potential for more severe events to occur or demonstrate a
lack of safety culture or awareness about specific hazards with
industry-wide implications.
Similarly, if this voluntary near miss reporting system were
restricted to participation only by companies or other industry
entities, the information submitted to BTS would also be subject to
whatever limits the specific company or entity places on the
information it chooses to share. For example, the company or entity
might decide to submit only information that it considered
``legitimate'' or significant, instead of providing the initial or
``raw'' information that the company/entity had received. BTS believes
there is potential value to be gained from near miss information that
companies/entities may think is of low severity or importance or of
uncertain validity, but that reflects the individual reporters' unique
perspectives on the event or condition.
In addition, BTS disagrees with the suggestion made by two
commenters that individuals should not be allowed to participate in
this system because they would not understand `contributing factors' or
root causes. That concern is academic since individual reporters would
not participate in the causal analysis process; BTS, with help from
appropriately qualified SMEs, would perform causal analyses.
[[Page 5879]]
Finally, based on its experience with other industry reporting
programs, BTS does not agree with the comment made by two commenters
suggesting that BTS limit participation in the program to companies/
entities in order to reduce the estimated time for responses. For the
reasons stated elsewhere in this notice, BTS believes there will be
substantial potential benefits from individual reporting and that, even
assuming a company could submit reports in less time than an
individual, the suggested efficiency of company reporting does not
warrant precluding individuals from filing reports offering their own
perspectives on the same events. Moreover, as discussed previously, if
reporting were limited only to companies, BTS likely would not receive
reports on all of the near-misses that could be reported by
individuals.
In addition, BTS does not agree with the two commenters who
asserted that the estimated time (60 minutes) for individual responses
is excessive. The estimated time needed to complete an initial report
is approximately 15 minutes, which is short enough to encourage
widespread participation. The remainder of the estimated 60 minutes
would be used for a confidential follow-up interview, as warranted by
the initial report. It is important to point out that follow-up
interviews are voluntary and not every respondent will consent to be
interviewed. Although, a respondent who feels it is worthwhile to
voluntarily submit an initial report is likely to be willing to
participate in a confidential interview in order to ensure that the
reported information is clearly understood and correctly evaluated by
BTS.
6. Potential for Reporting to Multiple Systems
Two commenters asserted that this near miss reporting system may
create redundant reporting with other private and governmental
reporting programs or near miss initiatives. In particular, the
commenters suggested that individuals may submit reports under BSEE's
regulation allowing voluntary reporting of hazardous or unsafe working
conditions on OCS facilities (30 CFR 250.193). BTS disagrees with these
comments. The BTS Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System is strictly
voluntary and is not intended to replace or interfere with industry,
BSEE, or other agency reporting programs, whether voluntary or
mandatory. Instead, the BTS Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System will
provide another opportunity for reporting a wide range of potential
hazard and risk information related to OCS oil and gas operations.
As one commenter recognized, in some cases an individual may feel
inhibited about reporting a near miss to a company or other industry
reporting program and thus may choose to report the event or condition
to BTS under the protections afforded by CIPSEA. In such cases, there
would be no duplication of reporting.
Similarly, an individual may prefer reporting to CIPSEA under the
guarantees of anonymity and confidentiality provided by CIPSEA rather
than reporting voluntarily to BSEE under 30 CFR 250.193. Although
section 250.193 of BSEE's rules allows an individual to report
hazardous or unsafe working conditions anonymously, BSEE is subject to
FOIA and cannot guarantee the anonymity or confidentiality of the
information to the same degree BTS can protect information collected
under CIPSEA. Thus, individuals concerned with protecting their
anonymity or with confidentiality may choose to submit near miss
information to BTS under CIPSEA rather than to BSEE. Moreover, the
types of issues that may be reported under Sec. 250.193 (potential
violations of BSEE rules and hazardous or unsafe working conditions)
are potentially not as inclusive as the issues that may be reported
under this near-miss reporting system.
BTS also does not agree with the two commenters who suggested that
BTS should not accept reports for near misses that have been reported
to industry. The reports submitted to BTS will serve an important
purpose even if some of the near misses were also submitted to
industry. For example, the aggregated results of BTS analysis of near
miss reports will be widely disseminated to government agencies, the
industry, and the public. By contrast, information from existing
industry near-miss systems, to date, is generally not shared within the
industry or with the government and the public. In any event, at
present BTS has no way of knowing which specific near misses have been
reported to industry, and thus no basis for rejecting individual
reports submitted under this near miss reporting system.
API/COS noted in their joint comments, the implementation of the
COS Learning from Incidents (LFI) program, which COS believes could
inform BTS's Voluntary Near Miss Reporting System but also demonstrates
a potential overlap between the two programs. BTS is aware of the
potential benefits of the COS LFI program, for COS' members, and looks
forward to discussing with COS the potential sharing of that
information with BTS, and potential sharing of lessons learned from
that information with all stakeholders. However, it is evident that the
LFI program is limited in scope to only information from COS member
companies regarding specifically-defined incidents and ``High Value
Leaning Events.'' Moreover, as API/COS also notes in their joint
comments, the aggregated information from that program is only shared
with COS members. For that reason, BTS does not agree that the proposed
near miss reporting system should be delayed pending the outcome of
further consideration of the LFI program.
D. Estimated Burden Hours
Two of the three commenters questioned BTS's estimated number of
near miss reports that would be submitted. In particular, OOC claimed
that the number of potential respondents submitting reports could be up
to 4 or 5 times higher than BTS's estimate, ``if a reporting compliance
level of 10-15% is reached,'' primarily because the broad scope of
``near miss'' in this system will result in a large number of reports
on ``low potential'' events. In the absence of actual near miss
reporting rates in offshore oil and gas operations, BTS's estimates
were based upon BTS' experience with near miss reporting in other
industry sectors. This estimate will be revised, as appropriate, once
BTS can establish an expected annual reporting rate based on ``actual''
reporting statistics of near misses collected during the initial phase
of this program (i.e., first 3 years).
E. Notification of Near Misses
Two of the three commenters asked that facilities be notified when
a near miss has been reported for their installation or unit. BTS,
however, cannot notify an owner or operator of a near-miss reported
which is reported in confidence without jeopardizing the anonymity of
the individual making the report or the confidentiality of the
information provided, and thus violating the statutory protections
afforded by CIPSEA, unless the reporter consents to sharing that
information. Moreover, if the reporter's identity were discovered, it
would open the individual up to potential sanctions or retaliation by
the company. The National Commission Report which recommended that BSEE
develop a near-miss reporting system for OCS oil and gas operations,
also specifically recommended that whistleblowers who notify
authorities about lapses in safety be provided protection: ``All
offshore
[[Page 5880]]
workers have a duty to ensure safe operating practices to prevent
accidents. To ensure all workers, regardless of employer, will take
appropriate action whenever necessary, Congress should amend the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act or specific safety statutes to provide the
same whistleblower protection that workers are guaranteed in other
comparable settings.''
F. Program Evaluation
One commenter requested that BTS report the results of the program
to stakeholders at least once a year and that the program be evaluated
after two years of operation. The frequency of public reports will
depend on how many near miss reports are reported to the system. To
comply with CIPSEA, reports of aggregated data must be prepared in such
a way that no third party could determine the identity of a reporter,
directly or indirectly. BTS expects to issue public reports at least
once per year and potentially more often, as appropriate.
With regard to re-evaluating the program after two years, as
demonstrated by near miss reporting in the aviation industry, it took a
commitment of several years before employee reporting increased
sufficiently to allow for a robust program evaluation. BTS agrees that
``formative evaluation'' is essential in developing a successful data
collection program and will conduct such evaluation as soon as there is
sufficient quantitative information in the near miss data system to
allow for such analysis. However, the potential value of sharing data
in a confidential manner is worth the investment of time and effort
because the continuation of environmental and human losses is an
unacceptable alternative to the public and the government.
G. Intent of the National Commission Report
One commenter correctly noted that the National Commission Report
on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill was issued in 2011, not 2013 as
the 60-day notice inadvertently stated. BTS, however, does not agree
with the commenter's suggestions that the National Commission Report
did not envision a government-managed system for near miss reporting,
or that the Commission's recommendation for an industry ``self-policing
institute that would gather incident and performance data'' would
satisfy the recommendation for a near miss reporting program. In fact,
the two recommendations are contained in different parts of the 2011
report, and it was in that part of the report directed to the
Department of the Interior (DOI) that the National Commission
recommended that DOI: ``Develop more detailed requirements for incident
reporting and data concerning offshore incidents and `near misses.'
Such data collection would allow for better tracking of incidents and
stronger risk assessments and analysis.''
Issued On: January 28, 2015.
Rolf Schmitt,
Deputy Director, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology.
[FR Doc. 2015-02053 Filed 2-2-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-9X-P
