Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Airplanes, 3164-3168 [2015-00007]
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Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2014–0108; Directorate
Identifier 2013–CE–052–AD; Amendment
39–18063; AD 2015–01–02]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–35, MU–
2B–36, MU–2B–36A, and MU–2B–60
airplanes. This AD results from
mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI) issued by an
aviation authority of another country to
identify and correct an unsafe condition
on an aviation product. The MCAI
describes the unsafe condition as stress
corrosion cracking in the flanges of the
airframe at stations 4610 and 5605. We
are issuing this AD to require actions to
address the unsafe condition on these
products.
DATES: This AD is effective February 26,
2015.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain publications listed in the AD
as of February 26, 2015.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0108; or in person at Document
Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
For service information identified in
this AD, contact Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries America, Inc., c/o Turbine
Aircraft Services, Inc., 4550 Jimmy
Doolittle Drive, Addison, Texas 75001;
telephone: (972) 248–3108, ext. 209; fax:
(972) 248–3321; Internet: https://mu2aircraft.com. You may view this
referenced service information at the
FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901
Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106.
For information on the availability of
this material at the FAA, call (816) 329–
4148.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kenneth A. Cook, Aerospace Engineer,
FAA, Fort Worth Airplane Certification
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SUMMARY:
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Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort
Worth, Texas 76137; telephone: (817)
222–5475; fax: (817) 222–5960; email:
Kenneth.A.Cook@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to add an AD that would apply
to certain Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Ltd. (MHI) Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–
35, MU–2B–36, MU–2B–36A, and MU–
2B–60 airplanes. The NPRM was
published in the Federal Register on
February 26, 2014 (79 FR 10710). The
NPRM proposed to correct an unsafe
condition for the specified products and
was based on mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country.
The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
(JCAB), which is the aviation authority
for Japan, has issued AD No. TCD–
8231–2013, dated August 6, 2013
(referred to after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to
correct an unsafe condition for certain
MHI Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–35,
and MU–2B–36 airplanes. You may
examine the MCAI on the Internet at
https://www.regulations.gov/
#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-01080002.
The JCAB has informed us that as part
of the MHI continuing aging aircraft
program, Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–
35, and MU–2B–36 airplanes were
subjected to detailed teardown
inspections. During the inspections,
structural cracks in the flanges of some
long body airplane frames were found at
frame station (STA) 4610 and STA 5605.
It has been determined that the
structural cracks resulted from stress
corrosion.
Japan is the State of Design for (MHI
Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–35, and
MU–2B–36, which the MCAI applies to,
and the United States is the State of
Design for MHI Models MU–2B–36A
and MU–2B–60 airplanes. Since the
Models MU–2B–36A and MU–2B–60
airplanes are of similar type design, the
same structural cracks could exist.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. The
following presents the comments
received on the proposal and the FAA’s
response to each comment.
Request To Extend Comment Period
Mike Ciholas and seven others stated
that they need more time for discussions
at seminars and to obtain more
information from MHI and Turbine
Aircraft Services.
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The commenters requested the
comment period be extended to allow
for more time to gather and analyze
data.
We do not agree with the commenters.
We have considered the request and
have determined sufficient evidence
and data exist, specifically information
recently from MHI on the inspections of
18 of the 119 airplanes in the U.S. fleet
that indicate that 8 of them were
cracked. Out of these eight, four have
been removed from service. Based on
the data presented in the NPRM and this
more detailed information provided by
MHI, the location of cracks, and the
cause of cracking (stress corrosion), we
have concluded that the inspections are
necessary to address the unsafe
condition.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Request To Withdraw Proposed AD
Mike Ciholas and eight others stated
that the unsafe condition addressed in
the proposed AD be handled as part of
routine inspections. The commenters
stated that there has never been any
incident, accident, injury, or fatality
attributed to this issue despite the
millions of flight hours the MU–2B
airplane has accumulated, including
those hours that some airplanes have
flown with a crack present. There has
never been any damage to any airplane
from this issue. None of the subject
parts have failed to perform in service,
cracked or otherwise.
Mark James of Intercontinental Jet
Service Corp. and two others stated that
there have been no failures in the
airframes.
The commenters requested that the
proposed AD be withdrawn.
We do not agree with the commenters.
While there have been no failures to
date, the stress corrosion cracking
exhibited is in primary load structure.
Upon crack initiation, the frames will
have diminished load carrying
capabilities, which will propagate over
time, potentially leading to failure.
Although previous inspection
requirements specify visual inspection
of all frames, no instruction was
provided for accessing the difficult to
reach areas where the subject cracks
have been found. In addition, we are
issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition and prevent such failures of
this airplane.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Request To Delay Issuing the Final Rule
AD Action
David Klain and six others stated that
they wanted the FAA to hold the
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proposed AD in abeyance and request
additional data from the manufacturer,
service centers, and the owner/operator
community. At the very least, all
inspections completed to date should be
considered and an evaluation made as
to what specifically is causing these
cracks, other than the simple fact these
are MU–2 long body airplanes.
Additional data can be collected from
ongoing inspections conducted in
accordance with the maintenance
manual as well. Once that data is
collected, an informed decision based
on facts instead of speculation can be
made.
The commenters requested that we
delay issuing the final rule AD action.
We do not agree with the commenters.
We have considered the request to delay
issuing the final rule AD action and
have determined that sufficient
evidence and data exist, specifically
information recently from MHI on the
inspections of 18 of the 119 airplanes in
the U.S. fleet that indicate that 8 of them
were cracked. Out of these eight, four
have been removed from service. Based
on the data presented in the NPRM and
this more detailed information provided
by MHI, the location of cracks, and the
cause of cracking (stress corrosion), we
have concluded that the inspections are
necessary to address the unsafe
condition. Further delay of the final rule
AD action would allow a known unsafe
condition to exist without AD action to
address it.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
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Request To Verify Cost of Compliance
David Klain and three others stated
that the Mitsubishi Service Centers have
indicated that the time and cost
estimates detailed in the proposed AD
are not accurate and do not reflect the
actual higher costs and time necessary
to complete the inspection based on the
inspections completed to date.
The commenters requested a change
to the Cost of Compliance section.
We do not agree with the commenters.
The cost provided by the original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) is a
rough order of magnitude estimate
based on available information and
standardized cost evaluation methods.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Request To Withdraw Proposed AD
David Klain and three others stated
that the proposed AD is based on nonrepresentative airframes. The proposed
AD was derived from a service bulletin
that originated from inspections of a
limited, non-representative sample of
airframes that have been removed from
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service and represent the worst possible
scenario with regards to airframe stress
(freighters).
The commenters stated that since
Special Airworthiness Information
Bulletin (SAIB) No. CE–03–26, dated
February 28, 2003 (which can be found
at https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_
Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/
(LookupSAIBs)/CE-0326?OpenDocument), three additional
airplanes with a total airframe time and
operational use (non-freighter) that is
more representative of the fleet have
been inspected at several service centers
and not a single plane exhibited the
cracks in question. The commenters
stated, based on these findings, there is
a situation where a very small sample
size may give some indication there is
a correlation between total time and/or
airplane utilization (freighters with
heavy takeoff/landing weights and many
cycles) and the cracks in question, but
further empirical data is likely
necessary to draw any firm conclusions.
The commenters also stated that the
costly inspection goes against the FAA’s
mandate to encourage and promote
aviation by potentially mandating a
costly inspection that would result in
the decommissioning of perfectly safe
and flyable airplanes for no reason other
than the high cost of an inspection
mandated by the FAA without any
engineering data to support such
inspections.
We infer that the commenters believe
that the final rule AD action is
unnecessary and want the proposed AD
withdrawn.
We do not agree with the commenters.
More detailed information from MHI on
the inspections of 18 of the 119
airplanes in the U.S. fleet indicate that
8 of them were cracked of which 5 were
used as freighters. Out of these eight,
four have been removed from service.
Based on the data presented in the
NPRM and this more detailed
information provided by MHI, the
location of cracks, and the cause of
cracking (stress corrosion), we have
concluded that the inspections are
necessary to address the unsafe
condition.
The OEM has also provided the time
and cost information presented in this
final rule AD action.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Request To Include a Less Expensive
Repair Option
Richard Wheldon and one other
commenter stated that there is a less
expensive repair available to the
owners/operators of the affected
airplanes.
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The commenters stated that the
repairs specified in the Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI Ltd.) MU–
2 Service Bulletins No. 231, dated July
2, 1997, and No. 073/53–002B, dated
April 27, 1999, involve doublers and are
much less intrusive and less labor
intensive. The repairs in MHI Ltd. MU–
2 Service Bulletins No. 242, dated July
10, 2013, and No. 104/53–003, dated
July 22, 2013, involve large splices and/
or frame segment replacements, which
are very costly. It is not explained why
the less expensive methods were not
proposed. In discussions with
experienced sheet metal mechanics and
structures engineers, they expressed that
other repair schemes are possible that
adequately address any safety concerns
and are much less costly.
Many of the cracks found at the lower
sections of the bottom frame segments
might be repairable using doublers
rather than replacing the entire lower
frame segments, which is the only
solution allowed in the proposed AD.
Obviously, the replacement of an entire
lower frame segment is a huge,
potentially unnecessary undertaking
involving considerable assembly and
disassembly. Any conventional solution
short of frame segment replacement
should be investigated.
The commenters also stated that an
operator is not allowed to repair the side
frame segments per MHI Ltd. MU–2
Service Bulletins No. 231, dated July 2,
1997, and No. 073/53–002B, dated April
27, 1999, and still be in compliance
with the proposed AD. The only
solution to a side frame crack allowed
per MHI Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletins
No. 242, dated July 10, 2013, and No.
104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, is the
much more expensive replacing of the
side frame segment.
The commenters requested
compliance based on MHI Ltd. MU–2
Service Bulletins No. 231, dated July 2,
1997, and No. 073/53–002B, dated April
27, 1999, at a minimum, be permitted in
the final rule AD action.
We do not agree with the commenters.
MHI Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletins No.
231, dated July 2, 1997, and No. 073/53–
002B, dated April 27, 1999, require
inspecting for cracks that are
specifically located around rivet holes.
The service bulletins specified in this
AD require inspecting for cracks in a
different area, specifically throughout
the frame flanges.
If lower cost repair methods exist that
meet the intent of the proposed AD, you
may propose an alternative method of
compliance or a change in the
compliance time that provides an
acceptable level of safety using the
procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
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We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
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Request To Consider Other Causes of
the Cracks
David Klain and one other commenter
stated that the proposed AD does not
accurately consider what the causal
factors are that may have caused the
cracks in question (airframe age, cycles,
total time, utilization as freighters, etc.)
due to lack of adequate representative
data.
The commenters requested the FAA
to further investigate the cause of the
cracks.
We do not agree with the commenters.
We have evaluated the data provided
and have determined that the cause of
cracking is stress corrosion. We have
determined that is sufficient evidence
and data of an unsafe condition and we
should proceed with issuing the final
rule AD action.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Request To Utilize Special
Airworthiness Information Bulletin
(SAIB) No. CE–03–26, Dated February
28, 2003
Mark James of Intercontinental Jet
Service Corp. stated that the inspections
introduced and recommended in SAIB
No. CE–03–26, dated February 28, 2003,
which can be found at https://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/
rgSAIB.nsf/(LookupSAIBs)/CE-0326?OpenDocument, should be sufficient
to cover inspections required from this
AD because the stresses are the same.
The commenter stated that the
inspection criteria in the proposed AD
require inspection of a different location
of these same frames and the fact is that
the frame materials and stresses are the
same.
We infer that the commenter believes
the inspections introduced and
recommended in SAIB No. CE–03–26,
dated February 28, 2003, are sufficient
in addressing the unsafe condition
identified in this AD wants the
proposed AD withdrawn.
We do not agree with the commenter.
It is stated in the proposed AD that
stress corrosion cracking may be located
throughout the area of the frame flanges.
The inspections recommended in SAIB
No. CE–03–26 are more limited and
only inspect for stress corrosion
cracking at screw holes in the flange.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Request To Modify the Applicability
Section
An anonymous commenter stated that
the statistical analysis and evaluation
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performed in support of the proposed
AD is flawed. The commenter also
stated that given the inconsistent data
from a sample size that is not
representative of the fleet, there appears
to be no scientific or engineering basis
for issuing the final rule AD action and
mandating it for the entire fleet
The commenter stated that Mark
James of Intercontinental Jet Service
Corp. also stated that the conclusions
made by the FAA were not based on an
adequate representation of the fleet and
that thus far the only cracks found have
been on two higher time airframes and
not on the many airplanes that have less
than one-third of the flight time and
cycles
The commenter requested the
applicability of the final rule AD action
be changed to apply only to high time,
high-cycle airplanes.
We do not agree with the commenters.
More detailed information from MHI on
the inspections of 18 of the 119
airplanes in the U.S. fleet indicate that
8 of them were cracked. Out of the 18
airplanes, 5 of them are used as
freighters and all 5 of these were among
the 8 found cracked. Four of the eight
airplanes found cracked have been
removed from service. Based on the data
presented in the NPRM and this more
detailed information provided by MHI,
the location of cracks, and the cause of
cracking (stress corrosion), we have
concluded that the inspections are
necessary to address the unsafe
condition.
We have not changed the final rule
AD action based on this comment.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data,
considered the comments received, and
determined that air safety and the
public interest require adopting the AD
as proposed except for minor editorial
changes. We have determined that these
minor changes:
• Are consistent with the intent that
was proposed in the NPRM (79 FR
10710, February 26, 2014) for correcting
the unsafe condition; and
• Do not add any additional burden
upon the public than was already
proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 10710,
February 26, 2014).
Relevant Service Information
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. has
issued Service Bulletin No. 242, dated
July 10, 2013, and Service Bulletin No.
104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013. The
actions described in this service
information are intended to correct the
unsafe condition identified in the
MCAI. The service bulletin describes
procedures to inspect and repair/replace
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the side and lower frame at stations
4610 and 5605. You can find this
service information on the Internet at
https://www.regulations.gov by searching
for and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0108.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect
119 products of U.S. registry. We also
estimate that it will take about 100
work-hours per product to comply with
the basic requirements of this AD. The
average labor rate is $85 per work-hour.
Based on these figures, we estimate
the cost of this AD on U.S. operators to
be $1,011,500, or $8,500 per product.
In addition, we estimate that any
necessary follow-on actions will take up
to 428 work-hours and require parts
costing up to $14,400, for a cost up to
$50,780 per product. We have no way
of determining the number of products
that may need such repair based on the
results of the inspection. The extent of
damage will vary on each airplane.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII:
Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, section 44701:
General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not
have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
the DOT Regulatory Policies and
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Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26,
1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation
in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov by searching for
and locating Docket No. FAA–2014–
0108; or in person at the Docket
Management Facility between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains the NPRM, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for
the Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–
5527) is in the ADDRESSES section.
Comments will be available in the AD
docket shortly after receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
■
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding
the following new AD:
■
2015–01–02 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Ltd.: Amendment 39–18063; Docket No.
FAA–2014–0108; Directorate Identifier
2013–CE–052–AD.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes
effective February 26, 2015.
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(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. Models MU–2B–30, MU–2B–
35, and MU–2B–36 airplanes, serial numbers
502 through 651, 653 through 660, and 662
through 696, and Models MU–2B–36A and
MU–2B–60 airplanes, serial numbers 661SA,
697SA through 799SA, and 1501SA through
1569SA, certificated in any category.
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(d) Subject
Air Transport Association of America
(ATA) Code 53: Fuselage.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of another
country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI
describes the unsafe condition as stress
corrosion cracking in the flanges of the
airframes at stations 4610 and 5605. We are
issuing this AD to detect and correct
structural cracks in the airframe flanges,
which could reduce the structural integrity of
the airplane.
(f) Actions and Compliance
Unless already done, do the actions in
paragraphs (f)(1) through (f)(3) of this AD.
(1) Within the next 1,000 hours time-inservice (TIS) after February 26, 2015 (the
effective date of this AD) or within the next
3 years after February 26, 2015 (the effective
date of this AD), whichever occurs first,
inspect the side and lower frames at frame
station (STA) 4610 and STA 5605 for cracks
and corrosion. Do the inspection following
paragraphs 3.0 through 3.3 of Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin
No. 242, dated July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin
No. 104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, as
applicable.
(2) If any crack is found during the
inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this
AD, before further flight, do the actions in
paragraphs (f)(2)(i) or (f)(2)(ii) of this AD:
(i) Repair the frame following paragraphs
4.0 and 5.0 of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No. 242, dated
July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No.
104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, as
applicable; or
(ii) Replace the frame following paragraphs
4.0, 6.0, and 7.0 of Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No.
242, dated July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. MU–2 Service Bulletin No.
104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013, as
applicable.
(3) If any corrosion is found during the
inspection required in paragraph (f)(1) of this
AD, before further flight, repair the damage
following the instructions in paragraph 3.2 of
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Service
Bulletin No. 242, dated July 10, 2013, or
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Service
Bulletin No. 104/53–003, dated July 22, 2013,
as applicable.
(g) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this
AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs): The Manager, Standards Office,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested using the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send information to
ATTN: Kenneth A. Cook, Aerospace
Engineer, FAA, Fort Worth Airplane
Certification Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham
Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone:
(817) 222–5475; fax: (817) 222–5960; email:
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3167
Kenneth.A.Cook@faa.gov. Before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to which
the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate
principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight
Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking
a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement
in this AD to obtain corrective actions from
a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective
actions are considered FAA-approved if they
are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required
to assure the product is airworthy before it
is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any
reporting requirement in this AD, a federal
agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a
person is not required to respond to, nor
shall a person be subject to a penalty for
failure to comply with a collection of
information subject to the requirements of
the Paperwork Reduction Act unless that
collection of information displays a current
valid OMB Control Number. The OMB
Control Number for this information
collection is 2120–0056. Public reporting for
this collection of information is estimated to
be approximately 5 minutes per response,
including the time for reviewing instructions,
completing and reviewing the collection of
information. All responses to this collection
of information are mandatory. Comments
concerning the accuracy of this burden and
suggestions for reducing the burden should
be directed to the FAA at: 800 Independence
Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn:
Information Collection Clearance Officer,
AES–200.
(h) Special Flight Permit
We are allowing special flight permits with
the following limitations:
(1) Essential crew only;
(2) Minimum weight;
(3) Limit ‘‘G’’ loading to minimum; and
(4) Most direct flight to repair center.
(i) Related Information
Refer to MCAI Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
(JCAB) AD No. TCD–8231–2013, dated
August 6, 2013, for related information. You
may examine the MCAI on the Internet at
https://www.regulations.gov/#!document
Detail;D=FAA-2014-0108-0002.
(j) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
(IBR) of the service information listed in this
paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51.
(2) You must use this service information
as applicable to do the actions required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–
2 Service Bulletin No. 242, dated July 10,
2013.
(ii) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU–
2 Service Bulletin No. 104/53–003, dated July
22, 2013.
(3) For Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
service information identified in this AD,
contact Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
America, Inc. c/o Turbine Aircraft Services,
Inc., 4550 Jimmy Doolittle Drive, Addison,
Texas 75001; telephone: (972) 248–3108, ext.
E:\FR\FM\22JAR1.SGM
22JAR1
3168
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 14 / Thursday, January 22, 2015 / Rules and Regulations
209; fax: (972) 248–3321; Internet: https://mu2aircraft.com.
(4) You may view this service information
at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901
Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this
material at the FAA, call (816) 329–4148.
(5) You may view this service information
that is incorporated by reference at the
National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on
the availability of this material at NARA, call
202–741–6030, or go to: https://
www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on
December 30, 2014.
Robert Busto,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2015–00007 Filed 1–21–15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Bureau of Prisons
28 CFR Part 540
[BOP Docket No. 1148–F]
RIN 1120–AB48
Communications Management Units
Bureau of Prisons, Justice.
Final rule.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
In this document, the Bureau
of Prisons (Bureau) finalizes regulations
that establish and describe
Communications Management Units
(CMUs) by regulation. The CMUs
regulations serve to detail the specific
restrictions that may be imposed in the
CMUs in a way that current regulations
authorize but do not detail. CMUs are
designed to provide an inmate housing
unit environment that enables staff
monitoring of all communications
between inmates in a Communications
Management Unit (CMU) and persons in
the community. The ability to monitor
such communication is necessary to
ensure the safety, security, and orderly
operation of correctional facilities, and
protection of the public. These
regulations represent a ‘‘floor’’ beneath
which communications cannot be
further restricted. The Bureau currently
operates CMUs in two of its facilities.
This rule clarifies existing Bureau
practices with respect to CMUs.
DATES: This rule is effective on February
23, 2015.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sarah Qureshi, Office of General
Counsel, Bureau of Prisons, phone (202)
307–2105.
tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
SUMMARY:
VerDate Sep<11>2014
16:25 Jan 21, 2015
Jkt 235001
This final
rule codifies and describes the Bureau’s
procedures for designating inmates to,
and limiting communication within, its
CMUs. Currently, the Bureau operates
two CMUs, separately located at the
Federal Correctional Complex (FCC),
Terre Haute, Indiana (established in
December 2006), and the United States
Penitentiary (USP), Marion, Illinois
(established in March 2008). A proposed
rule was published on April 6, 2010 (75
FR 17324). We received 733 comments
during the 2010 comment period. We
later reopened the comment period on
March 10, 2014, for 15 days (79 FR
13263). We received an additional 443
comments during the 2014 comment
period. Similar issues were raised by
most of the commenters. We respond
below to the issues raised.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Designation to a CMU Is Not
Discriminatory or Retaliatory
Several commenters felt that there
exists in CMUs an ‘‘overrepresentation
of Muslim and political prisoners,
showing that CMUs are not designed for
legitimate purposes, but rather to
discriminate and remove and isolate
politically active members of society.’’
The Bureau does not use religion or
political affiliation as a criterion for
designation to CMUs. 28 CFR 551.90
states the Bureau’s non-discrimination
policy: ‘‘Bureau staff shall not
discriminate against inmates on the
basis of race, religion, national origin,
sex, disability, or political belief. This
includes the making of administrative
decisions and providing access to work,
housing and programs.’’ Further,
§ 540.201, which describes the
designation criteria, must be read in
tandem with § 540.202, particularly
subparagraph (b), which states that after
the Bureau becomes aware of one or
more of the criteria described in
§ 540.201, the Bureau’s Assistant
Director for the Correctional Programs
Division must conduct a review of the
evidence found and make a finding that
designation to the CMU is necessary to
ensure the safety, security, and orderly
operation of correctional facilities or
protection of the public. An inmate
cannot, therefore, be designated to a
CMU based upon religious or political
affiliation, both because neither are part
of the stated criteria, and because it is
also necessary to have credible evidence
of a threat to the safety, security, and
good order of the institution or
protection of the public to support
designation to a CMU.
Instead, an important category of
inmates that might be designated to a
CMU is inmates whose current
offense(s) of conviction, or offense
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
conduct, included association,
communication, or involvement, related
to international or domestic terrorism.
Past behaviors of terrorist inmates
provide sufficient grounds to suggest a
substantial risk that they may inspire or
incite terrorist-related activity,
especially if ideas for or plans to incite
terrorist-related activity are
communicated to groups willing to
engage in or to provide equipment or
logistics to facilitate terrorist-related
activity. The potential ramifications of
this activity outweigh the inmate’s
interest in unlimited communication
with persons in the community.
Communication related to terroristrelated activity can occur in codes that
are difficult to detect and extremely
time-consuming to interpret. Inmates
involved in such communication, and
other persons involved or linked to
terrorist-related activities, take on an
exalted status with other like-minded
individuals. Their communications
acquire a special level of inspirational
significance for those who are already
predisposed to these views, causing a
substantial risk that such recipients of
their communications will be incited to
unlawful terrorist-related activity.
The danger of coded messages from
prisoners has been recognized by the
courts. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 93 (1987) (‘‘In any event, prisoners
could easily write in jargon or codes to
prevent detection of their real
messages.’’); United States v. Salameh,
152 F.3d 88, 108 (2nd Cir. 1998)
(‘‘Because Ajaj was in jail and his
telephone calls were monitored, Ajaj
and Yousef spoke in code when
discussing the bomb plot.’’); United
States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673
(7th Cir. 2000) (‘‘And we know that
anyone who has access to a telephone
or is permitted to receive visitors may
be able to transmit a lethal message in
code.’’); United States v. Hammoud, 381
F.3d 316, 334 (4th Cir. 2004) (‘‘A
conversation that seems innocuous on
one day may later turn out to be of great
significance, particularly if the
individuals are talking in code.’’);
United States v. Moncivais, 401 F.3d
751, 757 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that
seemingly nonsensical conversations
could be in code and interpreted as
indicative of drug dealing activity).
Also, an Al Qaeda training manual
contains the following advice regarding
communications from prison: ‘‘Take
advantage of visits to communicate with
brothers outside prison and exchange
information that may be helpful to them
in their work outside prison. The
importance of mastering the art of
hiding messages is self-evident here.’’
E:\FR\FM\22JAR1.SGM
22JAR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 14 (Thursday, January 22, 2015)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 3164-3168]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00007]
[[Page 3164]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2014-0108; Directorate Identifier 2013-CE-052-AD;
Amendment 39-18063; AD 2015-01-02]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Models MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, MU-2B-36,
MU-2B-36A, and MU-2B-60 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation
authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe
condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as stress corrosion cracking in the flanges of the airframe
at stations 4610 and 5605. We are issuing this AD to require actions to
address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective February 26, 2015.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of February 26,
2015.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0108; or in person at Document Management Facility, U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590.
For service information identified in this AD, contact Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries America, Inc., c/o Turbine Aircraft Services, Inc.,
4550 Jimmy Doolittle Drive, Addison, Texas 75001; telephone: (972) 248-
3108, ext. 209; fax: (972) 248-3321; Internet: https://mu-2aircraft.com.
You may view this referenced service information at the FAA, Small
Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call (816)
329-4148.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth A. Cook, Aerospace Engineer,
FAA, Fort Worth Airplane Certification Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham
Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137; telephone: (817) 222-5475; fax: (817)
222-5960; email: Kenneth.A.Cook@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to add an AD that would apply to certain Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. (MHI) Models MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, MU-2B-36, MU-2B-36A,
and MU-2B-60 airplanes. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register
on February 26, 2014 (79 FR 10710). The NPRM proposed to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified products and was based on mandatory
continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation
authority of another country.
The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB), which is the aviation
authority for Japan, has issued AD No. TCD-8231-2013, dated August 6,
2013 (referred to after this as ``the MCAI''), to correct an unsafe
condition for certain MHI Models MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, and MU-2B-36
airplanes. You may examine the MCAI on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0108-0002.
The JCAB has informed us that as part of the MHI continuing aging
aircraft program, Models MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35, and MU-2B-36 airplanes
were subjected to detailed teardown inspections. During the
inspections, structural cracks in the flanges of some long body
airplane frames were found at frame station (STA) 4610 and STA 5605. It
has been determined that the structural cracks resulted from stress
corrosion.
Japan is the State of Design for (MHI Models MU-2B-30, MU-2B-35,
and MU-2B-36, which the MCAI applies to, and the United States is the
State of Design for MHI Models MU-2B-36A and MU-2B-60 airplanes. Since
the Models MU-2B-36A and MU-2B-60 airplanes are of similar type design,
the same structural cracks could exist.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal
and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Extend Comment Period
Mike Ciholas and seven others stated that they need more time for
discussions at seminars and to obtain more information from MHI and
Turbine Aircraft Services.
The commenters requested the comment period be extended to allow
for more time to gather and analyze data.
We do not agree with the commenters. We have considered the request
and have determined sufficient evidence and data exist, specifically
information recently from MHI on the inspections of 18 of the 119
airplanes in the U.S. fleet that indicate that 8 of them were cracked.
Out of these eight, four have been removed from service. Based on the
data presented in the NPRM and this more detailed information provided
by MHI, the location of cracks, and the cause of cracking (stress
corrosion), we have concluded that the inspections are necessary to
address the unsafe condition.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Withdraw Proposed AD
Mike Ciholas and eight others stated that the unsafe condition
addressed in the proposed AD be handled as part of routine inspections.
The commenters stated that there has never been any incident, accident,
injury, or fatality attributed to this issue despite the millions of
flight hours the MU-2B airplane has accumulated, including those hours
that some airplanes have flown with a crack present. There has never
been any damage to any airplane from this issue. None of the subject
parts have failed to perform in service, cracked or otherwise.
Mark James of Intercontinental Jet Service Corp. and two others
stated that there have been no failures in the airframes.
The commenters requested that the proposed AD be withdrawn.
We do not agree with the commenters. While there have been no
failures to date, the stress corrosion cracking exhibited is in primary
load structure. Upon crack initiation, the frames will have diminished
load carrying capabilities, which will propagate over time, potentially
leading to failure. Although previous inspection requirements specify
visual inspection of all frames, no instruction was provided for
accessing the difficult to reach areas where the subject cracks have
been found. In addition, we are issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition and prevent such failures of this airplane.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Delay Issuing the Final Rule AD Action
David Klain and six others stated that they wanted the FAA to hold
the
[[Page 3165]]
proposed AD in abeyance and request additional data from the
manufacturer, service centers, and the owner/operator community. At the
very least, all inspections completed to date should be considered and
an evaluation made as to what specifically is causing these cracks,
other than the simple fact these are MU-2 long body airplanes.
Additional data can be collected from ongoing inspections conducted in
accordance with the maintenance manual as well. Once that data is
collected, an informed decision based on facts instead of speculation
can be made.
The commenters requested that we delay issuing the final rule AD
action.
We do not agree with the commenters. We have considered the request
to delay issuing the final rule AD action and have determined that
sufficient evidence and data exist, specifically information recently
from MHI on the inspections of 18 of the 119 airplanes in the U.S.
fleet that indicate that 8 of them were cracked. Out of these eight,
four have been removed from service. Based on the data presented in the
NPRM and this more detailed information provided by MHI, the location
of cracks, and the cause of cracking (stress corrosion), we have
concluded that the inspections are necessary to address the unsafe
condition. Further delay of the final rule AD action would allow a
known unsafe condition to exist without AD action to address it.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Verify Cost of Compliance
David Klain and three others stated that the Mitsubishi Service
Centers have indicated that the time and cost estimates detailed in the
proposed AD are not accurate and do not reflect the actual higher costs
and time necessary to complete the inspection based on the inspections
completed to date.
The commenters requested a change to the Cost of Compliance
section.
We do not agree with the commenters. The cost provided by the
original equipment manufacturer (OEM) is a rough order of magnitude
estimate based on available information and standardized cost
evaluation methods.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Withdraw Proposed AD
David Klain and three others stated that the proposed AD is based
on non-representative airframes. The proposed AD was derived from a
service bulletin that originated from inspections of a limited, non-
representative sample of airframes that have been removed from service
and represent the worst possible scenario with regards to airframe
stress (freighters).
The commenters stated that since Special Airworthiness Information
Bulletin (SAIB) No. CE-03-26, dated February 28, 2003 (which can be
found at https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/
(LookupSAIBs)/CE-03-26?OpenDocument), three additional airplanes with a
total airframe time and operational use (non-freighter) that is more
representative of the fleet have been inspected at several service
centers and not a single plane exhibited the cracks in question. The
commenters stated, based on these findings, there is a situation where
a very small sample size may give some indication there is a
correlation between total time and/or airplane utilization (freighters
with heavy takeoff/landing weights and many cycles) and the cracks in
question, but further empirical data is likely necessary to draw any
firm conclusions.
The commenters also stated that the costly inspection goes against
the FAA's mandate to encourage and promote aviation by potentially
mandating a costly inspection that would result in the decommissioning
of perfectly safe and flyable airplanes for no reason other than the
high cost of an inspection mandated by the FAA without any engineering
data to support such inspections.
We infer that the commenters believe that the final rule AD action
is unnecessary and want the proposed AD withdrawn.
We do not agree with the commenters. More detailed information from
MHI on the inspections of 18 of the 119 airplanes in the U.S. fleet
indicate that 8 of them were cracked of which 5 were used as
freighters. Out of these eight, four have been removed from service.
Based on the data presented in the NPRM and this more detailed
information provided by MHI, the location of cracks, and the cause of
cracking (stress corrosion), we have concluded that the inspections are
necessary to address the unsafe condition.
The OEM has also provided the time and cost information presented
in this final rule AD action.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Include a Less Expensive Repair Option
Richard Wheldon and one other commenter stated that there is a less
expensive repair available to the owners/operators of the affected
airplanes.
The commenters stated that the repairs specified in the Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. (MHI Ltd.) MU-2 Service Bulletins No. 231, dated
July 2, 1997, and No. 073/53-002B, dated April 27, 1999, involve
doublers and are much less intrusive and less labor intensive. The
repairs in MHI Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletins No. 242, dated July 10,
2013, and No. 104/53-003, dated July 22, 2013, involve large splices
and/or frame segment replacements, which are very costly. It is not
explained why the less expensive methods were not proposed. In
discussions with experienced sheet metal mechanics and structures
engineers, they expressed that other repair schemes are possible that
adequately address any safety concerns and are much less costly.
Many of the cracks found at the lower sections of the bottom frame
segments might be repairable using doublers rather than replacing the
entire lower frame segments, which is the only solution allowed in the
proposed AD. Obviously, the replacement of an entire lower frame
segment is a huge, potentially unnecessary undertaking involving
considerable assembly and disassembly. Any conventional solution short
of frame segment replacement should be investigated.
The commenters also stated that an operator is not allowed to
repair the side frame segments per MHI Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletins No.
231, dated July 2, 1997, and No. 073/53-002B, dated April 27, 1999, and
still be in compliance with the proposed AD. The only solution to a
side frame crack allowed per MHI Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletins No. 242,
dated July 10, 2013, and No. 104/53-003, dated July 22, 2013, is the
much more expensive replacing of the side frame segment.
The commenters requested compliance based on MHI Ltd. MU-2 Service
Bulletins No. 231, dated July 2, 1997, and No. 073/53-002B, dated April
27, 1999, at a minimum, be permitted in the final rule AD action.
We do not agree with the commenters. MHI Ltd. MU-2 Service
Bulletins No. 231, dated July 2, 1997, and No. 073/53-002B, dated April
27, 1999, require inspecting for cracks that are specifically located
around rivet holes. The service bulletins specified in this AD require
inspecting for cracks in a different area, specifically throughout the
frame flanges.
If lower cost repair methods exist that meet the intent of the
proposed AD, you may propose an alternative method of compliance or a
change in the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of
safety using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
[[Page 3166]]
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Consider Other Causes of the Cracks
David Klain and one other commenter stated that the proposed AD
does not accurately consider what the causal factors are that may have
caused the cracks in question (airframe age, cycles, total time,
utilization as freighters, etc.) due to lack of adequate representative
data.
The commenters requested the FAA to further investigate the cause
of the cracks.
We do not agree with the commenters. We have evaluated the data
provided and have determined that the cause of cracking is stress
corrosion. We have determined that is sufficient evidence and data of
an unsafe condition and we should proceed with issuing the final rule
AD action.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Utilize Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB)
No. CE-03-26, Dated February 28, 2003
Mark James of Intercontinental Jet Service Corp. stated that the
inspections introduced and recommended in SAIB No. CE-03-26, dated
February 28, 2003, which can be found at https://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/rgSAIB.nsf/(LookupSAIBs)/CE-03-
26?OpenDocument, should be sufficient to cover inspections required
from this AD because the stresses are the same.
The commenter stated that the inspection criteria in the proposed
AD require inspection of a different location of these same frames and
the fact is that the frame materials and stresses are the same.
We infer that the commenter believes the inspections introduced and
recommended in SAIB No. CE-03-26, dated February 28, 2003, are
sufficient in addressing the unsafe condition identified in this AD
wants the proposed AD withdrawn.
We do not agree with the commenter. It is stated in the proposed AD
that stress corrosion cracking may be located throughout the area of
the frame flanges. The inspections recommended in SAIB No. CE-03-26 are
more limited and only inspect for stress corrosion cracking at screw
holes in the flange.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Request To Modify the Applicability Section
An anonymous commenter stated that the statistical analysis and
evaluation performed in support of the proposed AD is flawed. The
commenter also stated that given the inconsistent data from a sample
size that is not representative of the fleet, there appears to be no
scientific or engineering basis for issuing the final rule AD action
and mandating it for the entire fleet
The commenter stated that Mark James of Intercontinental Jet
Service Corp. also stated that the conclusions made by the FAA were not
based on an adequate representation of the fleet and that thus far the
only cracks found have been on two higher time airframes and not on the
many airplanes that have less than one-third of the flight time and
cycles
The commenter requested the applicability of the final rule AD
action be changed to apply only to high time, high-cycle airplanes.
We do not agree with the commenters. More detailed information from
MHI on the inspections of 18 of the 119 airplanes in the U.S. fleet
indicate that 8 of them were cracked. Out of the 18 airplanes, 5 of
them are used as freighters and all 5 of these were among the 8 found
cracked. Four of the eight airplanes found cracked have been removed
from service. Based on the data presented in the NPRM and this more
detailed information provided by MHI, the location of cracks, and the
cause of cracking (stress corrosion), we have concluded that the
inspections are necessary to address the unsafe condition.
We have not changed the final rule AD action based on this comment.
Conclusion
We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received,
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting
the AD as proposed except for minor editorial changes. We have
determined that these minor changes:
Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the
NPRM (79 FR 10710, February 26, 2014) for correcting the unsafe
condition; and
Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was
already proposed in the NPRM (79 FR 10710, February 26, 2014).
Relevant Service Information
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. has issued Service Bulletin No.
242, dated July 10, 2013, and Service Bulletin No. 104/53-003, dated
July 22, 2013. The actions described in this service information are
intended to correct the unsafe condition identified in the MCAI. The
service bulletin describes procedures to inspect and repair/replace the
side and lower frame at stations 4610 and 5605. You can find this
service information on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by
searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-0108.
Costs of Compliance
We estimate that this AD will affect 119 products of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it will take about 100 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of this AD. The average labor rate
is $85 per work-hour.
Based on these figures, we estimate the cost of this AD on U.S.
operators to be $1,011,500, or $8,500 per product.
In addition, we estimate that any necessary follow-on actions will
take up to 428 work-hours and require parts costing up to $14,400, for
a cost up to $50,780 per product. We have no way of determining the
number of products that may need such repair based on the results of
the inspection. The extent of damage will vary on each airplane.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. ``Subtitle VII: Aviation
Programs,'' describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
``Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, section 44701: General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications
under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct
effect on the States, on the relationship between the national
government and the States, or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and
[[Page 3167]]
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2014-
0108; or in person at the Docket Management Facility between 9 a.m. and
5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains the NPRM, the regulatory evaluation, any comments received,
and other information. The street address for the Docket Office
(telephone (800) 647-5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly after receipt.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
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2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new AD:
2015-01-02 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: Amendment 39-18063;
Docket No. FAA-2014-0108; Directorate Identifier 2013-CE-052-AD.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) becomes effective February 26,
2015.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Models MU-
2B-30, MU-2B-35, and MU-2B-36 airplanes, serial numbers 502 through
651, 653 through 660, and 662 through 696, and Models MU-2B-36A and
MU-2B-60 airplanes, serial numbers 661SA, 697SA through 799SA, and
1501SA through 1569SA, certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association of America (ATA) Code 53: Fuselage.
(e) Reason
This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness
information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another
country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as stress corrosion
cracking in the flanges of the airframes at stations 4610 and 5605.
We are issuing this AD to detect and correct structural cracks in
the airframe flanges, which could reduce the structural integrity of
the airplane.
(f) Actions and Compliance
Unless already done, do the actions in paragraphs (f)(1) through
(f)(3) of this AD.
(1) Within the next 1,000 hours time-in-service (TIS) after
February 26, 2015 (the effective date of this AD) or within the next
3 years after February 26, 2015 (the effective date of this AD),
whichever occurs first, inspect the side and lower frames at frame
station (STA) 4610 and STA 5605 for cracks and corrosion. Do the
inspection following paragraphs 3.0 through 3.3 of Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 242, dated July 10, 2013,
or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 104/
53-003, dated July 22, 2013, as applicable.
(2) If any crack is found during the inspection required in
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight, do the actions
in paragraphs (f)(2)(i) or (f)(2)(ii) of this AD:
(i) Repair the frame following paragraphs 4.0 and 5.0 of
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 242,
dated July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2
Service Bulletin No. 104/53-003, dated July 22, 2013, as applicable;
or
(ii) Replace the frame following paragraphs 4.0, 6.0, and 7.0 of
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletin No. 242,
dated July 10, 2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2
Service Bulletin No. 104/53-003, dated July 22, 2013, as applicable.
(3) If any corrosion is found during the inspection required in
paragraph (f)(1) of this AD, before further flight, repair the
damage following the instructions in paragraph 3.2 of Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd. Service Bulletin No. 242, dated July 10,
2013, or Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. Service Bulletin No. 104/
53-003, dated July 22, 2013, as applicable.
(g) Other FAA AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager,
Standards Office, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. Send
information to ATTN: Kenneth A. Cook, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, Fort
Worth Airplane Certification Office (ACO), 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort
Worth, Texas 76137; telephone: (817) 222-5475; fax: (817) 222-5960;
email: Kenneth.A.Cook@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC on any
airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify your appropriate
principal inspector (PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District Office
(FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local FSDO.
(2) Airworthy Product: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
corrective actions from a manufacturer or other source, use these
actions if they are FAA-approved. Corrective actions are considered
FAA-approved if they are approved by the State of Design Authority
(or their delegated agent). You are required to assure the product
is airworthy before it is returned to service.
(3) Reporting Requirements: For any reporting requirement in
this AD, a federal agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person
is not required to respond to, nor shall a person be subject to a
penalty for failure to comply with a collection of information
subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act unless
that collection of information displays a current valid OMB Control
Number. The OMB Control Number for this information collection is
2120-0056. Public reporting for this collection of information is
estimated to be approximately 5 minutes per response, including the
time for reviewing instructions, completing and reviewing the
collection of information. All responses to this collection of
information are mandatory. Comments concerning the accuracy of this
burden and suggestions for reducing the burden should be directed to
the FAA at: 800 Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 20591, Attn:
Information Collection Clearance Officer, AES-200.
(h) Special Flight Permit
We are allowing special flight permits with the following
limitations:
(1) Essential crew only;
(2) Minimum weight;
(3) Limit ``G'' loading to minimum; and
(4) Most direct flight to repair center.
(i) Related Information
Refer to MCAI Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) AD No. TCD-
8231-2013, dated August 6, 2013, for related information. You may
examine the MCAI on the Internet at https://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FAA-2014-0108-0002.
(j) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this service information as applicable to do
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletin No.
242, dated July 10, 2013.
(ii) Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. MU-2 Service Bulletin No.
104/53-003, dated July 22, 2013.
(3) For Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. service information
identified in this AD, contact Mitsubishi Heavy Industries America,
Inc. c/o Turbine Aircraft Services, Inc., 4550 Jimmy Doolittle
Drive, Addison, Texas 75001; telephone: (972) 248-3108, ext.
[[Page 3168]]
209; fax: (972) 248-3321; Internet: https://mu-2aircraft.com.
(4) You may view this service information at the FAA, Small
Airplane Directorate, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. For
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call
(816) 329-4148.
(5) You may view this service information that is incorporated
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on December 30, 2014.
Robert Busto,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 2015-00007 Filed 1-21-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
