Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station, 904-906 [2015-00027]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 80, Number 4 (Wednesday, January 7, 2015)]
[Notices]
[Pages 904-906]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2015-00027]



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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-305 and 72-64; NRC-2014-0280]


Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.; Kewaunee Power Station

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Exemption; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing an 
exemption in response to a June 10, 2013, request from Dominion Energy 
Kewaunee, Inc. (DEK or the licensee), from certain power reactor 
security requirements. The exemption would remove the requirement that 
continuous communication be maintained between the security alarm 
stations and the control room at Kewaunee Power Station (KPS). The 
licensee has committed to modify its Physical Security Plan to require 
continuous communication between the security alarm stations and the 
shift manager.

DATES: January 7, 2015.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2014-0280 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2014-0280. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-287-
3422; email: Carol.Gallagher@nrc.gov. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced in this document 
(if that document is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time 
that a document is referenced.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Huffman, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-2046; email: William.Huffman@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The licensee, DEK, is the holder of Renewed Facility License No. 
DPR-43. The license provides, among other things, that the facility is 
subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the NRC now or 
hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of a permanently shutdown and defueled 
pressurized water reactor and a general licensed independent spent fuel 
storage installation (ISFSI) located in Kewaunee County, Wisconsin.
    By letter dated February 25, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13058A065), and in accordance with Sec.  50.82(a)(1)(i) of Title 10 
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), DEK submitted to the NRC a 
certification indicating it would permanently cease power operations at 
KPS on May 7, 2013. On May 7, 2013, DEK permanently ceased power 
operation at KPS. By letter dated May 14, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13135A209), and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.82(a)(1)(ii), DEK 
submitted to the NRC a certification that the reactor vessel at KPS was 
permanently defueled.

II. Request/Action

    In accordance with 10 CFR 73.5, ``Specific exemptions,'' the 
licensee has, by letter dated June 10, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML13165A343), requested an exemption from 10 CFR 73.55(j)(4)(ii), which 
otherwise requires continuous communications between security alarm 
stations and the control room. Portions of the letter dated June 10, 
2013, contain safeguards information and, accordingly, have been 
withheld from public disclosure. The licensee is requesting exemption 
from the continuous communications requirements between the control 
room and the security alarm stations.
    The exemption request relates solely to removing the control room 
from the requirements specified in the regulations that direct the 
licensee to establish a system for continuous communications between 
the control room and the security alarm stations. The licensee will 
have a system for continuous communications between the shift manager 
and the alarm stations.
    As specified in its June 10, 2013, application, DEK will implement 
changes to its Physical Security Plan that would require a system of 
continuous communications between the alarm stations and the shift 
manager/Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) instead of the control room.

III. Discussion

    The intent of 10 CFR 73.55(j)(4)(ii) is to maintain continuous 
effective communication capability between security alarm stations and 
operations staff with shift command function responsibility to ensure 
any necessary coordination during security events or other emergencies 
can be accomplished at all times. The regulation requires maintaining a 
system for continuous communications between the security alarm 
stations and the control room for an operating reactor based on the 
presumption that the shift command function resides in the control 
room. The control room at an operating reactor contains the controls 
and instrumentation necessary for complete supervision and response 
needed to ensure safe operation of the reactor and support systems 
during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions and, therefore, is 
the location of the shift command function. Following certification of 
permanent shutdown and removal of fuel from the reactor, operation of 
the reactor is no longer permitted. The control room at a permanently 
shutdown and defueled reactor does not perform the same function as 
required for an operating reactor. There are no longer any safety 
related systems or processes that are controlled from the control room. 
The primary functions of the control room at a permanently shutdown 
plant is to provide a central location from where the shift command 
function can be conveniently performed due to existing communication 
equipment, office computer equipment, and ready access to reference 
material. The control room also provides a central location from which 
emergency response activities are coordinated. However, the control 
room does not always need to be the location of the shift command 
function since most remaining system processes at a permanently 
shutdown and defueled reactor are controlled locally. At KPS, the shift 
manager/CFH has responsibility for the shift command function. The 
shift manager/CFH is the senior on-shift licensee representative and 
decision-maker and is responsible for the overall safety of the 
permanently shutdown and defueled facility and for directing the 
response to abnormal situations and emergencies. The requested 
exemption would provide the KPS shift manager/CFH the flexibility to

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leave the control room to perform managerial and supervisory activities 
throughout the plant while retaining the command function 
responsibility. While the shift command function is normally 
accomplished from the control room in accordance with applicable KPS 
procedures, it can also be accomplished anywhere in the facility 
provided an effective means of continuous communication with the shift 
manager/CFH is maintained. Because KPS is permanently shutdown and 
defueled, the ability to leave the control room may benefit the shift 
manager/CFH's understanding of facility conditions as well as enhance 
his assessment and response to any abnormal situation or emergency 
conditions. Although the control room will remain the physical command 
center, the exemption will allow the location of the KPS command 
function to be wherever the shift manager/CFH is located. Being absent 
from the control room will not relieve the shift manager/CFH of the 
responsibility for the shift command function. The exemption will allow 
DEK to establish and maintain continuous communication capability with 
the shift manager/CFH, regardless of his location.
    The NRC staff assessed the method proposed by the licensee to 
maintain continuous communications with the shift manager/CFH in a 
safety evaluation report dated April 14, 2014 (the NRC staff's safety 
evaluation report contains safeguards information and is, therefore, 
not publicly available). The NRC staff determined that the proposed 
method of maintaining continuous communication with the shift manager/
CFH is consistent with the functional requirement of the regulation for 
maintaining communication with the control room. The NRC staff has 
concluded that upon implementing a system for continuous communications 
between the alarm stations and the shift manager/CFH, as documented in 
the licensee's Physical Security Plan, the requested exemption to 10 
CFR 73.55(j)(4)(ii) will meet the intent of the regulation, regardless 
of the location of the shift manager/CFH.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission may, upon application of 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant such exemptions 
from the requirements of 10 CFR part 73 as it determines are authorized 
by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and 
security, and are otherwise in the public interest.

A. Authorized by Law

    In accordance with 10 CFR 73.5, the Commission may grant exemptions 
from the regulations in 10 CFR part 73 as the Commission determines are 
authorized by law. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the 
licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or other laws. Therefore, the 
exemption is authorized by law.

B. Will Not Endanger Life or Property or the Common Defense and 
Security

    Removing the requirement to have a continuous communication system 
between the security alarm stations and the control room will not 
endanger life or property or the common defense and security for the 
reasons discussed below.
    The shift manager/CFH is the senior on-shift licensee 
representative, is responsible for the shift command function, and 
directs the action of the operations staff during both normal and 
emergency conditions. Therefore, the shift manager/CFH is the 
appropriate individual to have continuous communication capability with 
the alarm stations. The exemption would not reduce the measures in 
place to protect against radiological sabotage. In addition, the NRC 
staff has determined that the exemption will not reduce the overall 
effectiveness of the KPS Physical Security Plan, Training and 
Qualification Plan, or Safeguards Contingency Plan. Maintaining a 
system of continuous communication between the alarm stations and the 
shift manager/CFH rather than the control room will provide the shift 
manager with the flexibility to leave the control room and respond to 
other locations onsite, as necessary, to conduct appropriate management 
oversight. The NRC staff has determined that maintaining continuous 
communication capability with the shift manager/CFH, whether in the 
control room or elsewhere, does not significantly change the current 
process that ensures that any necessary coordination during security 
events or other emergencies can be accomplished at all times. 
Continuous communication capability is essentially unchanged (other 
than the location of the shift manager/CFH when the communications are 
initiated).
    Therefore, the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 73.55(j)(4)(ii) will 
continue to be met. The exemption does not reduce the overall 
effectiveness of the Physical Security Plan and has no adverse impact 
on DEK's ability to physically secure the site or protect special 
nuclear material at KPS, and therefore would not have an effect on the 
common defense and security. The NRC staff has concluded that the 
exemption would not reduce the effectiveness of security measures 
currently in place to protect against radiological sabotage. Therefore, 
removing the requirement to have continuous communication between the 
security alarm stations and the control room will not endanger life or 
property or the common defense and security.

C. Is Otherwise in the Public Interest

    The licensee is implementing changes to its Physical Security Plan 
to establish a system of continuous communication between the security 
alarm stations and the shift manager/CFH that is not dependent on the 
shift manager's location. By granting DEK's proposed exemption to 
remove the requirement for a continuous communication system between 
the security alarm stations and the control room, the shift manager/CFH 
can roam around the facility in an oversight role and obtain first-hand 
information of facility conditions and status while still maintaining 
continuous communication with the alarm stations. The NRC staff has 
concluded that there would be no decrease in the level of safety by 
granting this exemption and that the capability to observe conditions 
directly serves the public interest by assuring that the shift manager/
CFH has the best possible information needed to make decisions or to 
communicate to the alarm stations or to offsite entities. Accordingly, 
the NRC staff concludes that exempting DEK from the requirement for a 
continuous communication system between the security alarm stations and 
the control room is in the public interest, provided the licensee 
maintains continuous communication capability between the alarm 
stations and the shift manager/CFH.

D. Environmental Considerations

    The NRC's approval of the exemption to security requirements 
belongs to a category of actions that the Commission, by rule or 
regulation, has declared to be a categorical exclusion, after first 
finding that the category of actions does not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. 
Specifically the exemption is categorically excluded from further 
analysis under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
    Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the 
requirements of any regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR is a categorical 
exclusion provided that (i) there is no significant hazards 
consideration; (ii) there is no significant change in the types or 
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be 
released offsite; (iii) there is no significant increase in individual 
or cumulative public or occupational

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radiation exposure; (iv) there is no significant construction impact; 
(v) there is no significant increase in the potential for or 
consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements 
from which an exemption is sought involve: safeguard plans, and 
materials control and accounting inventory scheduling requirements; or 
involve other requirements of an administrative, managerial, or 
organizational nature.
    The Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined that approval of the 
exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration because 
removing the requirement for a continuous communications system between 
the security alarm stations and the control room at KPS does not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The 
exempted security regulation is unrelated to the operation of KPS. 
Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or significant 
increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; 
and no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or 
occupational radiation exposure. The exempted regulation is not 
associated with construction, so there is no significant construction 
impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., 
potential amount of radiation in an accident), nor mitigation. 
Therefore, there is no significant increase in the potential for, or 
consequences of, a radiological accident. The requirement for a 
continuous communication system between the security alarm stations and 
the control room may be viewed as involving either safeguards or 
managerial matters.
    Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), no 
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be 
prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption request.

IV. Conclusions

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
73.5, the exemption is authorized by law and will not endanger life or 
property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the 
public interest. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants DEK exemption 
from the requirement of 10 CFR 73.55(j)(4)(ii) for a system of 
continuous communication capability with the control room, provided 
that DEK maintains a system for continuous communication capability 
with the shift manager/CFH consistent with the method described in its 
submittal dated June 10, 2013. This exemption is effective when the 
system for continuous communication between the alarm stations and the 
shift manager/CFH is documented in DEK's Physical Security Plan and 
functionally implemented.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 29th day of December 2014.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
George A. Wilson Jr.,
Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2015-00027 Filed 1-6-15; 8:45 am]
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